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The author or concept searched is found in the following 15 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Background | Habermas | IV 191 Background/Habermas: is a knowledge inventory of unproblematic beliefs that are shared and assumed to be guaranteed, from which the context of communication processes forms, in which the participants use proven situation definitions or negotiate new ones. >Conventions, >LIfeworld. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas. The participants of communication find the connection between objective, social and subjective world, which they are facing, already interpreted in terms of content. If they overwrite the horizon of a given situation, they could not step into the void; they immediately find themselves in another, now updated, but preinterpreted area of the culturally self-evident. New situations also emerge from a lifeworld built on an ever-trusted inventory of cultural knowledge. The actors cannot take an extramundane position in relation to this lifeworld, just as they cannot take an extramundane position in relation to language as the medium of the processes of communication through which the lifeworld is maintained. >Standpoint, >Observation, >Perspective. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Cultural Tradition | Habermas | III 108 Tradition/Culture/Myth/Myths/Habermas: In mythical worldviews as the background for the interpretation of a lifeworld in a social group, the burden of interpretation is taken away from the individual family members as well as the chance to achieve a critical agreement. Here, the linguistic view of the world is reified as a world order and cannot be seen through as a critisable system of interpretation. >Worldviews, >Interpretation. In this way it becomes clear which formal characteristics cultural traditions must exhibit if rational orientations for action are to be possible in an appropriately interpreted environment: III 109 a) Cultural tradition must provide formal concepts for the objective, the social and the subjective world; it must allow for differentiated claims of validity (propositional truth, normative correctness, subjective truthfulness) and stimulate a corresponding differentiation of basic attitudes (objectifying, normative and expressive). >Validity claims, >Objective world, >Subjective world, >Social world. Then symbolic expressions can be presented at a formal level, where they are systematically linked to reasons and are accessible for an objective assessment. b) Cultural tradition must allow a reflexive relationship with itself. c) It must be able to feed back in its cognitive and evaluative components with specialised arguments to the extent that the corresponding learning processes can be socially institutionalised. d) Finally, it must interpret the world in such a way that success-oriented action is released from the imperatives of a communication to be renewed again and again and can be at least partially decoupled from communication-oriented action. >History, >Historiography, >Philosophy of History, >Culture. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Goals | Cognitive Science | Corr I 404 Goals/Research/Cognitive Science/Matthews: Suppose anxiety relates to vulnerability to overload, to selective attention to threat, and negative biases in higher-level thinking. Individuals high and low in anxiety may then differ fundamentally in how they cognize the world around them and their own place in it; they inhabit different subjective worlds. >Fear, >Subjectivity, >Personality, >Personality traits. Researchers may then have different motives for running studies of personality and performance: to test psychobiological theories, to relate traits to information-processing, and to link traits to high level cognitive functions that shape the person’s sense of self. (…) I will argue that these different research goals correspond to different explanations within cognitive science (Pylyshyn 1999)(1). >Levels/order, >Description Levels, >Explanations. Somewhat separate theories may be developed that variously account for personality in terms of individual differences in (1) key neural functions, (2) parameters of the virtual cognitive architecture that supports information-processing, and (3) self-knowledge and personal goals. >Information processing. 1. Pylyshyn, Z. W. 1999. What’s in your mind?, in E. Lepore and Z. W. Pylyshyn (eds.), What is cognitive science?, pp. 1–25. Oxford: Blackwell Gerald Matthews, „ Personality and performance: cognitive processes and models“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Interpretation | Habermas | III 150 Interpretation/action/situation/Habermas: None of the participants in an action situation has a monopoly on interpretation. Each communication participant assigns the various elements of the action situation to one of the three worlds (one objective, one social world and one subjective world as the entirety of the speaker's privilegedly accessible experiences). >Objective world, >Subjective world, >Social world. Interpretations do not have to lead to a stable and clearly differentiated classification in every case or even normally. III 154 Standards-regulated action: in its interpretation the actor challenges the interpreter to check not only the actual conformity with a standard or the actual validity of a standard, but also the correctness of that standard itself. >Norms, >Correctness. III 155 The interpreter can reject this challenge as pointless from a sceptical point of view. >Values, >Sense. III 158 Problem: for the understanding of communicative actions we have to distinguish between questions of meaning and validity. The interpretation performance of an observer differs from the coordination efforts of the participants. >Observation, >Exterior/Interior. The observer does not seek an interpretation able to take a consensus. But perhaps only the functions differed here, not the structures of interpretation. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Lifeworld | Habermas | III 72 Lifeworld/Habermas: this is about the socio-cultural conditions of a rational lifestyle. Here we must examine the structures that enable individuals and groups to rationalize their actions. >Actions/Habermas, >Action Systems/Habermas, >Action theory/Habermas >Rationality/Habermas, >Group behavior. III 73 Interpretational systems and world views that reflect the background knowledge of social groups play a role here. >Background. III 107 I first introduce the concept of the lifeworld as a correlative to processes of understanding. Communicatively acting subjects always communicate in the horizon of a lifeworld. >Agreement, >Horizon. Their lifeworld is based on more or less diffuse, always unproblematic background beliefs. It saves the interpretation work of previous generations; it is the conservative counterbalance to the risk of disagreement that arises with every current communication process. >Cultural tradition. III 108 Myth/Myths/Habermas. In mythical worldviews as the background for the interpretation of a lifeworld in a social group, the burden of interpretation is taken away from the individual group members as well as the chance to achieve a critical agreement. Here, the linguistic view of the world is reified as a world order and cannot be seen through as a critisable system of interpretation. >Worldviews. IV 189 Lifeworld/Method/HabermasVsHusserl/Habermas: If we give up the basic concepts of consciousness philosophy in which Husserl deals with the lifeworld problems (1), we can think of the lifeworld represented by a culturally handed down and linguistically organized inventory of interpretative patterns. >E. Husserl. Then the context of reference no longer has to be explained in the context of phenomenology and psychology of perception, but as a context of meaning. >Phenomenology, >Cognitive Psychology. IV 191 Lifeworld/Habermas: since the communication participants cannot take an extramundane position towards it, it has a different status than the other world concepts (the social, the subjective and the objective world), in which speakers and listeners can optionally refer to something objective, normative or subjective. This is not possible in relation to the lifeworld. With their help, the participants cannot refer to something "inter-subjective" either. >Intersubjectivity, >Objectivity, >Norms, >Subjectivity. IV 192 They always move within the horizon of their lifeworld and cannot refer to "something in the lifeworld", such as facts, norms or experiences. >Facts, >Experiences. The lifeworld is also the transcendental place where speakers and listeners can meet and reciprocally claim that their statements fit into the world (the objective, social or subjective world). IV 198 The phenomenologically described basic features of the constituted lifeworld can be explained without difficulty if "lifeworld" is introduced as a complementary term to "communicative action". >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas. IV 205 Background/Lifeworld/Habermas: the lifeworld should not be equated with the background consisting of cultural knowledge. Instead, it is the case that the solidarity of the groups and competences of socialized individuals integrated via values and norms flow into communicative action. IV 224 Lifeworld/Habermas: when we conceive of society as a lifeworld, we assume a) the autonomy of those acting, b) the independence of culture, c) the transparency of communication. >Autonomy, >Culture. These three fictions are built into the grammar of narratives and return in a culturally biased Verstehen. >Fiction/Habermas). IV 230 Lifeworld/System/Habermas: I understand social evolution as a second-level process of differentiation: system and lifeworld differentiate, in that the complexity of one and the rationality of the other grows, not only in each case as a system and as lifeworld - but both also differentiate from each other at the same time. From a systemic point of view, these stages can be characterized by newly occurring systemic mechanisms. These are increasingly separating themselves from the social structures through which social integration takes place. Cf. >Systems. IV 273 Lifeworld/control media/communication media/language/Habermas: the conversion from language to control media (money, power (influence, reputation)) means a decoupling of the interaction from lifeworld contexts (see Lifeworld/Habermas), >Control media, >Communication media, >Money, >Power, >Recognition. Media such as money and power begin with the empirically motivated ties; they code a purpose-rational handling of calculable amounts of value and enable a generalized strategic influence on the decisions of other interaction participants, bypassing linguistic consensus-building processes. >Language/Habermas. N.B.: thus, the lifeworld is no longer needed for the coordination of actions. 1. E.Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, Hamburg 1948; zur Kritik an den bewusstseinstheoretischen Grundlagen der phänomenologischen Sozialontologie von A. Schütz vgl. M. Theunissen, Der Andere, Berlin 1965, S. 406ff. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Norms | Habermas | III 35 Norms/Knowledge/Habermas: the knowledge embodied in norm-regulated actions or in expressive expressions does not (...) refer to the existence of facts, but to the target validity of norms and to the subjective experiences that emerge. >truthfulness, >Subjectivity, >Correctness. III 132 Norms/Habermas: are not expressed by existential clauses such as "It is the case that q is required", but in the form of "It is required that q". This concerns the claim to normative correctness, which is expressed in such a way that it applies to a group of addressees. >Deontology, >Deontic logic. III 133 The a fact that a norm actually exists means that the claim to validity with which it occurs is recognised by the parties concerned. >Validity claim. III 134 Norm-regulated action requires two worlds, the objective and a social world. >Objective world, >Subjective world, >Social world. Acting in accordance with norms presupposes that the actor can distinguish between the factual and the normative elements. III 135 of his acting situation, i. e. can distinguish the conditions and means from values. III 405 Norms/Habermas: Within a standardised framework, the filing of a validity claim is not an expression of a contingent will. >Objectivity, >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas Likewise, agreement to a claim to validity is not an empirically motivated decision alone. The rejection of such a claim can only take the form of a criticism and the defence of the claim can only take the form of a refutation of the criticism. >Critique/Habermas. Whoever doubts the validity of norms will have to give reasons, whether against the legality of the regulation, i.e. the legality of its social validity - or against the legitimacy of the regulation, i.e. the claim to be correct or justified in a moral-practical sense. Here, conditions of acceptability are sufficient for compliance with a norm; they do not have to be supplemented by conditions of sanctions. >Acceptability/Habermas, >Justification, >Rationale, >Reasons. IV 65 Norms/Tradition/VsTradition/Habermas: only when the power of tradition has been broken to such an extent that the legitimacy of existing orders can be viewed in the light of hypothetical alternatives, the relatives of one cooperation ask themselves. That is to say, a group dependent on joint efforts to achieve collective objectives, whether the norms in question regulate the arbitrariness of the relatives in such a way that each of them can see his or her interests safeguarded. >Cultural tradition, >Conventions. IV 143 Norms/Language/Mead/Habermas: As language establishes itself as a principle of socialization, the conditions of sociality converge with conditions of communicatively established intersubjectivity. Since the authority of the holy is transformed into the binding power of normative claims to validity, which can only be discursively redeemed, the notion of the validitiy to be achieved is purified from empirical admixtures. In the end, the validity of a norm only means that it could be accepted by all those concerned for good reasons. >Validity claims, >Intersubjectivity, >Society, >Community. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Observation | Habermas | III 171 Observation/Ontology/Habermas: when we describe a behaviour as a teleological action, we assume that the actor makes certain ontological conditions, that he or she expects an objective world in which he or she recognizes something and in which he or she can intervene purposefully. >Behavior, >Goals, >Intentionality, >Interpretation, >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas. At the same time, the observer creates ontological conditions with regard to the subjective world of the actor. He or she distinguishes between "the" world and the world as it appears from the point of view of the actor. He or she can determine descriptively what the actor thinks is true, in contrast to what the observer believes is true. >External world/Habermas, >Internal world, >Other minds, >Conflicts, >Justification. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Ontology | Habermas | III 171 Ontology/observation/interpretation/sociology/method/Habermas: when we describe a behaviour as a teleological action, we assume that the actor makes certain ontological conditions, that he or she expects an objective world in which he or she recognizes something and in which he or she can intervene purposefully. >Observation, >Interpretation, >Sociology, >Method, >Teleology, >Procedural rationality. At the same time, the observer creates ontological conditions with regard to the subjective world of the actor. He or she distinguishes between "the" world and the world as it appears from the point of view of the actor. He or she can determine descriptively what the actor thinks is true, in contrast to what the observer believes is true. >Facts, >Situations, >Reality, >Objectivity, >Objectivity/Habermas. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Outer World | Habermas | III 376 Outer World/Habermas: Thesis: for the purposes of our sociological investigations we should differentiate the external world into an objective and a social world and introduce the internal world as a complementary concept to this external world. >Inner world, >Objective world, >Subjective world, >Social world, >World. The corresponding claims of validity (truth, correctness, truthfulness) can serve as a guideline for the choice of theoretical aspects for the classification of the speech acts. >Validity claims, >Truth, >Correctness, >Truthfulness |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Reification | Lukács | Habermas III 474 Reification/Lukács/Habermas: Lukács thesis: "in the structure of the relationship of goods (can) the archetype of all forms of representationalism and all corresponding forms of subjectivity be found in bourgeois society". (1) Habermas: Lukács uses the new Kantian expression "representational form" in a sense shaped by Dilthey as a historically created "form of existence or thought" that distinguishes the "totality of the stage of development of society as a whole". >Neo-Kantianism, >W. Dilthey, >About Dilthey. He understands the development of society as "the history of the uninterrupted transformation of the representational forms that shape people's existence". LukácsVsHistorism/Habermas: Lukács does not, however, share the historicist view that the particularity of each unique culture is expressed in a representational form. The forms of representationalism convey "the confrontation of the human Habermas III 475 with his/her environment, which determines the representationalism of his/her inner and outer life".(2) >Historism. Def Reification/Lukács/Habermas: Reification is the peculiar assimilation of social relationships and experiences to things, i.e. to objects that we can perceive and manipulate. The three worlds (subjective, objective and social ((s) shared) world) are so miscoordinated in the social a priori of the living world that category errors are built into our understanding of interpersonal relationships and subjective experiences: we understand them in the form of things, as entities that belong to the objective world, although in reality they are components of our common social world or of our own subjective world. >Objective world, >Subjective world, >Social world, >Life world. Habermas: because understanding and comprehending are constitutive for the communicative handling itself, such a systematic misunderstanding affects the practice, not only the way of thinking but also the "way of being" of the subjects. It is the lifeworld itself that is "reified". Habermas: Lukács sees the cause of this deformation in a Habermas III 476 method of production that is based on wage labour and requires "becoming goods of a function of humans"(3). Habermas III 489 AdornoVsLukács/HorkheimerVsLukács/Habermas: Horkheimer and Adorno shift the beginnings of reification in the dialectic of the Enlightenment back behind the capitalist beginning of modernity to the beginnings of the incarnation. >Dialectic of Enlightenment, >M. Horkheimer, >Th.W. Adorno. The reason for this is that Lukác's theory of the unforeseen integration achievements of advanced capitalist societies has been denied. >Society, >Capitalism. 1. G. Lukács, „Die Verdinglichung und das Bewusstsein des Proletariats“ in: G. Lukács, Werke, Bd. 2. Neuwied 1968, S. 257-397. 2.G.Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, Werke, Bd. 2, 1968, S. 336 3. Ebenda S. 267. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Rule Following | Habermas | III 143 Rule Following/communicative action/Habermas: the concept of communicative action owes a great deal to the linguistic philosophical investigations that go back to Wittgenstein, but the concept of rule following falls short. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas >Rule following/Wittgenstein, >Rule following/Kripke. III 144 Concentrating on this, the aspect of the triple world-reference (to an objective, a social world and a subjective world as the entirety of the privilegedly accessible experiences of the speaker) would be lost. >Objective world, >Subjective world, >Social world. IV 33 Rule Following/Wittgenstein/Habermas: the N.B. of Wittgenstein's argument is that A cannot be sure whether he follows a rule at all, if there is not a situation in which he exposes his behavior to a basically consensual criticism by B. For Wittgenstein, the identity and validity of rules are systematically linked. Following a rule means to follow the same rule in every single case. Habermas: However, this identity of the rule is not based on observable invariances, but on the intersubjectivity of their validity. >Intersubjectivity, >Validity/Habermas, >Rules. Since rules are counterfactual, it is possible to criticize (...) behaviour or to evaluate it as incorrect. Two roles are assumed for the interaction participants then: IV 34 The competence to follow the rules and the competence to assess behaviour (which in turn presupposes rule competence). >Counterfactuals. N.B.: these roles or competences must be interchangeable: each participant in the interaction must be able to exercise them; on the other hand, the identity of the rules would not be secure. >Communicative Action/Habermas. Question: how are rules initially established at all? See Rules/Habermas |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Situations | Habermas | III 150 Situation/action situation/Habermas: a situation definition establishes an order. With it, the communication participants assign the various elements of the action situation to one of the three worlds (one objective, one social world and one subjective world as the entirety of the speaker's privilegedly accessible experiences). >Objective world, >Subjective world, >Social world. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas. In doing so, they incorporate the current situation of their preinterpreted lifeworld. Deviation of the situation definition by the opposite presents a different kind of problem. None of those involved has a monopoly on interpretation. >Interpretation. IV 188 Situations/LifeWorld/Understanding/Habermas: for the participants, the action situation forms the centre of their life world; it has a moving horizon because it refers to the complexity of the life world: In a sense, the world to which the communication participants belong is always present, but only in such a way that it forms the background for a current scene. As soon as such a reference context is included in a situation (...), it loses its triviality and unquestionable solidity. New information can be raised. >Life world/Habermas, >Language/Habermas. IV 189 Relevance: before it is explicitly mentioned, the facts of life are given only as a matter of course. From the perspective of the situation, the life world appears to be a reservoir of self-evidence or unshaken beliefs. >Background. These self-evident facts are mobilized when they become relevant to a situation. ((s) For today's discussion see also Frame Theories). IV 203 Situation/Habermas: the situation includes everything that can be seen as a restriction for (...) action initiatives. While the actor retains the environment as a resource for communication-oriented action, the restrictions imposed by the circumstances of the implementation of his plans are part of the situation. IV 204 These limitations can be sorted by facts, norms and experiences within the framework of the three formal world concepts. Theoretical status: the communication-theoretical concept of the life world developed from the participant's perspective... IV 206 ...is not directly useful for theoretical purposes; it is not suitable for delimiting an object area of social science, i.e. the region within the objective world that forms the totality of hermeneutically accessible, in the broadest sense historical or socio-cultural facts. The everyday concept of the life world is recommended for this purpose, with the help of which communicative actors locate and date themselves and their expressions in social spaces and historical times. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Social Relations | Piaget | Habermas III 106 Social Relations/Piaget/Habermas: Piaget thesis: Every social relationship is a totality in itself that creates new traits by transforming the individual in its mental structure.(1) Habermas: For Piaget, this results in a cognitive development in a broader sense, which is not only understood as the construction of an outer universe, but as the construction of a frame of reference for the simultaneous delimitation of the objective and the social from the subjective world. >Cognitive develoment/Piaget. Habermas: Cognitive development generally means the decentralisation of an egocentrically characterized world understanding. Cf. >Inner world, >Outer world, >Life world. 1.J. Piaget, Die Entwicklung des Erkennens, Bd. 3, Stuttgart 1973. |
Piag I J. Piaget The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Structural Violence | Habermas | IV 278 Structural Violence/Habermas: Reproductive constraints that instrumentalize a lifeworld without impairing the appearance of self-sufficiency in the lifeworld, must hide in the pores of communicative action. This results in a structural violence that, without becoming manifest as such, takes over the form of inter-subjectivity of possible understanding. >Violence. Structural violence is exercised through a systematic restriction of communication; it is anchored in the formal conditions of communicative action in such a way that the connection between objective, social and subjective world is typically prejudiced for the communication participants. For this relative a priori of understanding I would like to introduce the concept of the form of communication in analogy to the a priori of knowledge of the form of object (Lukács). >Objective world, >Subjective world, >Social world, >Agreement/Habermas. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Terminology | Habermas | IV 188 Reference context/terminology/Habermas: In a sense, the world to which the communication participants belong is always present, but only in such a way that it forms the background for a current scene: the context of reference. IV 189 Lifeworld/Habermas: If we give up the basic concepts of consciousness philosophy in which Husserl deals with the problem of the life world, we can think of the life world represented by a culturally handed down and linguistically organised inventory of patterns of interpretation. Then the context of reference must no longer be explained in the context of phenomenology and psychology of perception, but as IV 190 a connection of meaning between a communicative utterance, the context and the connotative horizon of meaning. Reference contexts go back to grammatically regulated relationships between elements of a linguistically organized inventory of knowledge. IV 209 Def Culture/Habermas: I call culture the inventory of knowledge from which the communication participants provide themselves with interpretations by communicating about something in a world. Def Society/Habermas: I call society the legitimate orders through which communication participants regulate their affiliation to social groups and thus ensure solidarity. Def Personality/Habermas: By personality I understand the competences that make a subject capable of speaking and acting, i.e. repairing, participating in processes of communication and thereby asserting one's own identity. Semantics/Habermas: the semantic field of symbolic contents form dimensions in which the communicative actions extend. Medium/Habermas: the interactions interwoven into the network of everyday communicative practice form the medium through which culture, society and person reproduce themselves. These reproductive processes extend to the symbolic structures of the lifeworld. We must differentiate between the preservation of the material substrate of the lifeworld. IV 260 Norm/Terminology/Habermas: Norm = generalized behavioral expectation. Principles: = higher-level norms. IV 278 Form of communication/terminology/Habermas: Structural violence is exercised through a systematic restriction of communication; it is anchored in the formal conditions of communicative action in such a way that the connection between objective, social and subjective world is typically prejudiced for the communication participants. For this relative a priori of understanding I would like to introduce the concept of the form of communication in analogy to the a priori of knowledge of the form of object (Lukács). IV 413 Def Control Media/terminology/Habermas: are those media that replace language as a mechanism for action coordination . Def communication media/Habermas: are such media that merely simplify over-complex contexts of communication-oriented action, but remain dependent on language and on a lifeworld. IV 536 Def Legal Institution/Terminology/Habermas: I call legal institutions legal norms, which cannot be sufficiently legitimized by the positivistic reference to procedures. E.g. the foundations of constitutional law, the principles of criminal law and criminal procedure. As soon as they are questioned, the reference to their legality is not sufficient. They require material justification because they belong to the legitimate orders of the lifeworld itself and, together with informal norms of action, form the background of communicative action. IV 539 Def Inner colonization/Habermas: this thesis states that as a result of capitalist growth, the subsystems of economy and state become more and more complex and penetrate deeper and deeper into the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld. IV 548 The thesis makes it possible to analyze processes of real abstraction, to which Marx had an eye, without using an equivalent of value theory (see Value Theory/Habermas). III 144 Def Action/Habermas: Actions are only what I call such symbolic expressions with which the actor, as in teleological, norm-regulated and dramaturgical action, makes a reference to at least one world (the physical, the consciousness or the mentally divided world) but always also to the objective world. From these I distinguish between body movements and secondary operations. III 70 Def Critique/Habermas: I speak of criticism instead of discourse whenever arguments are used, without the participants having to assume that the conditions for a speech situation free of external and internal constraints are fulfilled. Aesthetic critique is about opening the eyes of participants, i. e. leading them to an authenticating aesthetic perception. III 412 Def Meaning/Communicative Action/Habermas: within our theory of communicative action, the meaning of an elementary expression consists in the contribution it makes to the meaning of an acceptable speech action. And to understand what a speaker wants to say with such an act, the listener must know the conditions under which he can be accepted. III 41 Def rationality/culture/Habermas: we call a person rational who interprets his or her nature of need in the light of culturally well-coordinated value standards, but especially when he or she is able to adopt a reflexive attitude towards the standards of value that interpret needs. IV 251 Def Productive Forces/Marx/Habermas: According to Marx, productive forces consist of a) the labour force of those working in production, the producers; b) the technically usable knowledge, insofar as it is converted into productivity-increasing work tools, into production techniques; c) organisational knowledge, insofar as it is used to set workers in motion efficiently, to qualify workers and to effectively coordinate the division of labour cooperation of the workers. IV 252 The productive forces determined the degree of possible availability of natural processes. IV 252 Def Relations of Production/Marx/Habermas: relations of production are those institutions and social mechanisms that determine how the labour force, at a given level of productive forces, is combined with the available means of production. The regulation of access to the means of production or the way in which the socially used workforce is controlled also indirectly determines the distribution of socially generated wealth. Relations of production express the distribution of social power; they prejudice the structure of interests that exists in a society with the distribution pattern of socially recognized opportunities of the satisfaction of needs. IV 203 Def Situation/Habermas: the situation includes everything that can be seen as a restriction for (...) action initiatives. While the actor retains the environment as a resource for communication-oriented action, the restrictions imposed by the circumstances of the implementation of his plans are part of the situation. III 400 Def Understanding/Communication/Habermas: in our theory of communicative action we limit ourselves to acts of speech under standard conditions, i.e. we assume that a speaker means nothing else than the literal meaning of what he/she says. Understanding a sentence is then defined as knowing what makes that sentence acceptable. From the speaker's perspective, the conditions of acceptability are identical to the conditions of his/her illocutionary success. Acceptability is not defined in an objective sense from the perspective of an observer, but from the performative attitude of the communication participant. IV 270 Def Knowledge/Habermas: I use "knowledge" in a broader sense that covers everything that can be acquired through learning as well as through the appropriation of cultural tradition, which extends to both cognitive and social integrative, i.e. to expressive and moral-practical elements. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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