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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Being a Bat | Putnam | V 128 Bat-Example/Nagel: "What is it like to be a bat? Thesis: we cannot imagine what it would be like to be a bat. V 128/129 Qualia/Bat: for example we want to imagine an argument: A: no bat quale is at least the same as a human quale. B: maybe there are at least some that are the same. There are also some feelings of other people that I probably cannot imagine, but that does not mean (that I see the psychological space of these other people as unimaginably different from my own). (By the way, bats can see very well, contrary to the prevailing opinion!) >Qualia, >Experience. I could at least say now: their pain is as much pain as mine. Could we come to a decision on this? The hearing center of the bat is 7/8 of the brain. ((s) Does the brain therefore have to provide completely different experience?) Example: 1. The brain of the bat has the disjunctive property P1 or P2; my brain has the disjunctive property P'1 or P'2. The respective sensations are correlated with the respective disjunctions. V 129/130 We assume: the qualitative character of the bat's sensation is identical to the qualitative character of my sensation, and both are identical (or correlated) with the more complex disjunctive property (P1 or P2 or P'1 or P'2). According to the 1st theory, the bat and I have different experiences, according to the second theory, we have the same experience. However, both theories lead to the same predictions regarding the experiences of normal and abnormal human observers! Again, they are indistinguishable from an observational point of view! It is also not clear whether methodological maxims can be useful here. We also lack the principles to decide which theory is the simpler one. From our perspective we can decide which is the more "chauvinistic" one. V 129/130 Bat Example/disjunctive properties/identity theory/Putnam: Theory 1: Fl: disjunctive property P1 or P2, disjunctive property P'1 or P'2 U (assuming each correlation). Theory 2: we assume identity instead of correlation - correlation to complex property P1 or P2 or P'1 or P'2. N.B.: both theories lead to the same predictions of normal as of abnormal observers. Stones always have the disjunctive property "sensation or no sensation". |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Disjunction | Armstrong | III 15 Disjunction of prop > disjunctive predicates/Armstrong: a single predicate "M" could be used for "A or B or C" > "grue"/Armstrong: simplified form: green becomes blue and at the same time blue becomes green - new pair of pred: bleen/grue: nothing changes relative to the pair: green> blue: remains bleen, blue> green. Remains grue - but: a thing that remains blue changes relative to the new pair bleen/grue - Question: what kind of predicates priority? III 68 Disjunction/Disjunctive Properties/System/Order/F.o.Th./Armstrong: Example, a natural system contains three fundamental laws: Fs are Gs, Hs are Js, Ks are Ls - these are united as follows: we define M: "an F or an H or a K" N: "a G or a J or an L" - then we have a single "fundamental law": "Ms are Ns" - then "F is an N": less informative but apparent improvement: G = J = L: no more information than "F is G v J v L". But if "N" is a true property, then "G", "J", "L" are merely artificial subdivisions (Armstrong pro) (f.o.th disjunction, identity) (>grue) - (s) otherwise we would always have to say "yellow or black Banana"). III 151 Disjunctive properties: being G or H": ArmstrongVs - Problem: disj. laws: does not the unrealized alternative need to be missing first? - disjunctional predicates always possible, but no real relation |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Properties | Meixner | I 31 Names/Ontology/Meixner: "That Regensburg is located on the Danube" is a name for a fact-like entity. >States of affairs, >That-clause. "Being square": name, but not for an individual or a fact-like entity, but name for a property (property name). >Properties. I 42 Properties/(s): Names of properties are expressions with hyphens: e.g. "example-of-the-length-of-Manhattan-in-miles" - e.g. "my-being-176-cm-tall-at-t0" are names of properties - ((s) properties themselves without hyphen!) Cf. >Semantic Ascent. I 50 Exemplification/Identity/Meixner: Object X is F, this is not an identity of X and F, of the object with its property, but the property is exemplified by the object. >Exemplification, >Predication. I 73 Property/Meixner: nothing other than function. This property, when saturated with the individual Hans, again results in the fact that Hans is a human >Saturated/unsaturated. I 75fff Property/Meixner 2nd level: Properties of properties: "the property of being a trait of x" - e.g. being egoistic is the property of being a trait. Not 2nd level: e.g. being 2 meters tall. E.g. the property of being a trait cannot be said of people or cities (this is senseless), but it can be (erroneously) said of the property of being 2 meters tall. >Levels/order, >Description levels. I 76 Individual properties ("initial properties")/Meixner: exactly expressable about individuals, not something that only individuals can have. - There are cases where properties which cannot be expressed exactly about an individual can still apply to the individual. I 78 Ontological/Property/Meixner: the distinction between relational and non-relational properties is ontological. Non-ontological: distinction between negative and non-negative or between disjunctive and non-disjunctive properties. >Disjunctive properties, >Disjunctive predicates. I 150 Properties/Meixner: Identity principle for individual properties: they can be satisfied by exactly the same entities. For all individuals property F and G: F is identical to G if and only if for all individuals x applies: ‹F,x› = ‹G,x›. For triangles: equiangular and equilateral triangles are satified by the same entities. >Satisfaction. I 153ff. Universal Name: means the property. >Universals. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
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