Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 13 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Being a Bat | Chalmers | I 236 Bat Example/Nagel/Chalmers: equipped with the approach of Crick and Koch(1), we may get even more insight into how it is to be a bat. Functional organization can tell us something about the kind of information a bat has access to. The distinctions which it is capable of making, and thus also classifications of the most prominent things in its field of perception. Bat/Chalmers: this of course shows nothing about the intrinsic nature of the experiences of bats, but Akins (1993)(2) can add something to this. Chalmers: Cheney/Seyfarth (1990)(3) How Monkeys See the World tries to answer such questions about bats by puting us into the mind of other species. Cf. >Hetero-phenomenology. I 295 Bat Example/Chalmers: Why should not we suppose there is a way for a thermostat of "How it is to be a thermostat"? Cf. >Thermostat example, cf. >Fuel gauge. I 296 Such an "experience" could occur like a lightning and completely without concept. >Experience, >Knowing how. I 298 For the thermostat, there is a canonical information space, and so we can say he has the canonical experiences of a thermostat. I 299 The experiences of a thermostat can be called proto-phanomenal. >Protophenomena. 1. F. H. C. Crick and C. Koch, Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness. Seminars in the Neurosciences 2, 1990: pp. 263-75 2. K. Akins, What is it like to be boring and myopic? In B. Dahlbom (ed) Dennett and His Critics, Oxford 1993. 3. D. L. Cheney and R. M. Seyfarth, How Monkeys See the World, Chicago 1990. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Beliefs | Stalnaker | I 54 Belief/objective/Lewis/Stalnaker: according to Lewis all objective impersonal beliefs are beliefs about what exists in reality, and not about the place of the believer in the world. They are either necessarily true or necessarily false. But beliefs do not express anything. Schiffer I 46 Belief/Stalnaker/Schiffer: a belief with content can have the form: "x believes that dogs have fleas". A belif without content can have the form: "x is a belief". Stalnaker/Stampe: counterfactual: x believes p iff. x is in a brain state, that x would not be under optimal conditions, if it were not the case that p. >Counterfactuals, >Counterfactual conditionals. Representation/Dretske: example fuel gauge: is a reliable indicator (> reliability) by regularity for the representation. SchifferVs: problem: if the condition is never met. Conclusion: if propositions are belief objects, then the theory is never functionalist. >Functionalism. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Mentalese | Fodor | Rorty I 269 ff Rorty: Fodor's image of the internal representations has nothing to do with our mirror of nature that we have accepted. What is crucial, is that with regard to Fodor's "Language of thought" the skeptical question of "how exactly do the internal representations represent the reality" cannot be asked! There is no gap. >Representations, >Reference, >World/Thinking. --- Newen/Schrenk I 132 Mentalese/language of thought/thought language/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: thesis: thinking takes place with mental representations, e.g. fuel gauge, causal connection. >Thinking. Mentalese: mentaleses is as rich as natural language, but purely internal and symbolic; it is a purely syntactic symbol manipulation and exists only in connection with propositional attitudes. >Propositional attitudes. VsFodor: a) regress. I 133 b) The supporters of the thesis of the prevalence of thought cannot explain the normativity of thinking with the help of social institutions such as the language. c) There are also beliefs without representation: e.g. chess computers: "brute force" then: "I should take the queen out of the game early". Cf. >Chess/Artificial intelligence. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Observation | Sellars | I XVII Observatory Reports: reports seem to be able to take the foundation of justification instead of the sensory data. >Sense data, >Justification. Vs: They are not independent, in the sense that they require no further knowledge Someone who always responds with "This is green" expresses no knowledge. >Thermometer, parrot). He has no position in the "logical space of reasons." >Logical space of reasons, >Fuel gauge example. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Ostension | Quine | Quine VII (d) 67 Ostension/Pointing/Quine: is always ambiguous because of temporal vastness. Our setting of the object does not show us yet which summation of current objects (stadiums or totality) is intended. Problem: adding "this river" presumes the concept of river. Problem: "This" must also refer to something else, which is the same in the different cases. Problem: we only know that a and b belong to the constituents. Solution: learning through induction. Problem: spatial expansion cannot be separated from temporal, because we need time when pointing. Pointing becomes superfluous in the course of science - which leads to the question of how much depends on the language. >Pointing/Quine. XII 56f Ostension/Direct/Pointing/Quine: Problem: 1) how much of the environment counts? 2) how may an absent thing differ from the one that is shown to still fall under the stated term. Shifted ostension: E.g. pointing to the fuel gauge. E.g. pointing to grass to explain green. E.g. to an inscription to explain a letter. Shifted twice: Goedel number for an expression. 1) inscription of formula 2) Goedel number as a proxy for it >Goedel Numbers/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Picture (Image) | Millikan | I 82 Graphics/Diagram/Syntax/Millikan: Graphics and diagrams have describable syntactic structures. E.g. Drawings of impossible rooms: can be described as breaking through syntactic rules. >Syntax. I 125 TV picture/TV/Millikan: here the case is quite different from the case of machine signs such as the e.g. fuel gauge. There are no pre-established characteristics as a model, and the interpreter is not expected to learn such standards! The images are rather produced by the model of natural signs. Interpretation: does not happen here according to a program designed for reading intentional icons, but it is about an ability that is either innate or has been developed for reading natural signs. ((s)> film). --- I 126 Watching Television/loudspeaker/TV/radio/Millikan: this is not a question of establishing or developing a cooperation as a normal condition for the proper operation of the loudspeaker. Malfunction: is not interpreted as a "false statement". Picture/TV picture/TV: what the TV picture is a picture of is not something the interpreter would accept - if it functions normally - but the one in the world to which it is to be adapted. ((s) Realistic rendering, realism, not communication). |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Pointing | Quine | V 70f Pointing/indicative/Wittgenstein/Quine: Problem: how do we know which part of the area is meant, how do we recognize pointing as such. Solution: Sorting out the irrelevant by induction. Also amplification without a pointing finger or deletions with pointing finger. X 24 Indicative Pointing/Ostension/Language Learning/Quine: both the learner and the teacher must understand the appropriateness of the situation. This leads to a uniformity of response to certain stimuli. This uniformity is a behavioural criterion for what should become an observation sentence. It also makes it possible for different scientists to check the evidence for each other. >Language Learning/Quine, >Stimuli/Quine, >Observation Sentences/Quine. XI 182 Note: Pointing/indicative/Ostension/Quine/Lauener: difference: between direct and shifted ostension: Def shifted Ostension/Quine/Lauener: if we refer to a green leaf to explain the abstract singular term "green", we do not mean the perceptible green thing, because the word does not denote a concrete entity. >Ostension/Quine. XII 47 Pointing/Ostension/Color Words/Gavagai/Wittgenstein/Quine: Problem: for example the color word "sepia": can be learned by conditioning or induction. It does not even need to be said that sepia is a color and not a form, a material or a commodity. However, it may be that many lessons are necessary. >Colour/Quine. XII 56 Def Direct Ostension/Pointing/Quine: the point shown is at the end of a straight line on an opaque surface. Problem: how much of the environment should count? Problem: how far may an absent thing differ from the object shown to fall under the term declared ostensively? XII 57 Def Shifted Ostension/Pointing/Quine: For example, pointing to the fuel gauge instead of the fuel itself to indicate how much is still there. ((s) But not that the fuel gauge is still there). Example shifted: if we point to an event (token) and mean the type. E.g. pointing to grass to explain green. For example, point to an inscription to explain a letter. Double shifted: e.g. Goedel number for an expression. (1st inscription of the formula (of the expression), 2nd Goedel number as proxy for it). XII 58 The shifted ostension does not cause any problems that are not already present in the direct version. VII (d) 67 Pointing/indicating definition/Ostension/Identity/Quine: is always ambiguous because of the temporal extension! Our setting of an object does not tell us yet which summation of current objects is intended! When pointing again either the river or river stages can be meant! Therefore, pointing is usually accompanied by pronouncing the words "this river". But this presupposes a concept of river. "This river" means: "the river-like summation of momentary objects that this momentary object contains". VII (d) 68 Pointing/Ostension/Quine: the spatial extension cannot be separated from the temporal extension when pointing, because we ourselves need time for pointing at different places. VII (d) 74 Ostension/Pointing/objects/universals/Quine: how does pointing to space-time objects differ from pointing to universals like square and triangle? VII (d) 75 Square: each time we point to different objects and do not assume an identity from one opportunity to another. The river, on the other hand, assumes this identity. Attribute/Quine: the "squareness" is divided by the shown objects. But you do not need to assume entities like "attributes". Neither the "squareness" is pointed to, nor is it needed for a reference to the word "square". The expression "is square" is also not necessary if the listener learns when to use it and when not to use it. The expression does not need to be a name for any detached object. VII (d) 76 Pointing/concrete/abstract/Quine: general terms like "square" are very similar to concrete singular terms like "Cayster" (the name of the river) concerning the east version. With "red" you do not need to make a distinction at all! VII (d) 77 In everyday language, a general term is often used like a proper name. >General Terms/Quine. V 70 Pointing/Quine: is useful to introduce the anomaly. Conspicuousness/Quine/(s): should explain why from the multitude of stimuli certain stimuli are overweighted or how shapes are recognized against a background. V 89 Identity/Pointing/Quine: Problem: there is no point in showing twice and saying, "This is the same as that". Then you could still ask. "The same what? V 102 Pointing/General Terms/Quine: Problem: unique showing requires special care in some situations. Example "this body is an animal": here the outline must be carefully traced, otherwise it could be that only the hull is perceived as an animal. V 103 At the beginning we did not talk about sentences like "This body is Mama", because we have to assume a general mastery of the "is" in the predication of duration. This requires a stock of individually learned examples. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Reduction | Chalmers | I 43 Reduction/explanation/Chalmers: a reductive explanation of a phenomenon does not imply the reduction of this phenomenon to something else. >Phenomena, >Experience. Explanation: it does not mean identification with something else, especially not with something on a lower level. >Levels/order, >Description Levels. Chalmers I 264 Reduceability: The fact that multiple realizability is possible is regarded by some authors as a counter-argument to a reducibility. But: BrooksVs: (Brooks 1994)(1): explains this as irrelevant. Likewise, Wilson (1985)(2) and Churchland (1986)(3); paradigmatic reducible cases such as e.g. temperature are indeed mutiple possible. Reduction: reduction should not be equated with a reduction towards a higher-level theory. Sometimes there is no such theory. >Theories. I 46 Consciousness/explanation/reduction/Chalmers: we need something like a cognitive model, that is, a model of the abstract causal organization, without having to specify the physicochemical substrates. >Models. This is very good for psychological aspects, but not for the phenomenal side. >Psychology/Chalmers, >Consciousness/Chalmers. I 47 Explanation gap: an explanation gap exists between the psychological and the phenomenal side of consciousness (Levine 1983)(4). I 48 Reductive explanation: reductive explanation is always possible when the explanatory (for example, the natural phenomenon) supervenes globally logically on the explanatory (e.g., the physical). If supervenience is not global, the question always remains: why is this process accompanied by this phenomenon? >Supervenience. I 49 Reduction: reduction does not always eliminate a "mystery" at the resulting level, but perhaps eliminates the assumption that there must be something extra that has precedence. I 50 Consciousness/Chalmers: here logical supervenience fails in the explanation. >Explanation. I 104 Reduction/Consciousness/Chalmers: from the arguments of the inverted spectra, the bat example, the color researcher Mary does not necessarily follow that there is no reductive explanation of the consciousness. (This would be equivalent to the fact that consciousness does not logically supervene on physical facts). >Exchanged spectra, >To be a bat. Analysis/Analyzability/Consciousness/Chalmers: One last argument for the irreducibility is that no analysis of consciousness is available from physical facts. I 105 Problem: Arguments that rely on better distinctions or better information in the future must fail. In turn, they do not have what is important: the conscious experience! Even if conscious states can play certain causal roles, they are not defined by their causal roles. For example, distinguishing ability can also be explained without consciousness. >Thermostat, >Fuel gauge, >Reliability. 1. D. H. M. Brooks, How to perform a reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54, 1994: pp. 803-14. 2. M . Wilson, What is the ting called "pain"? The philosophical science behind the contemporary debate. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66, 1985: pp.227-67. 3. P. S. Churchland, Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Scinece of the Mind-Brain. Cambridge 1986. 4. Levine,J. 1983. Materialism and Qualia: The explanatory gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64:345-61. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Reliability Theory | Schiffer | I 83 SchifferVsReliability: (as the key to representation, e.g. fuel gauge: there are false truth conditional functions possible: E-functions that do not ascribe situations but false words: E.g. "snow is white"/"Coal is white" (for mentalese). - Even under "optimal conditions". - Then it is uncertain whether the reliability has come about on the wrong way. >Fuel gauge example, >Mentalese/Language of thought. I 83ff Arthritis/reliability/mentalese/relation theory/SchifferVsFodor: ... + ... - Alfred thinks in his idiolect that he has arthritis in his thigh. Supposing there is a second function g that assigns a condition to arthrite that we connect with shmarthritis (rheumatic-like). Then: you cannot determine if Alfred is more reliable according to f (attribution of truth conditions) or g (attribution of false words). Condition (c): an M-function f is the truth conditional function for x' lingua mentis M iff the head-reliability and world-head reliability of x (thinking in M) with respect to f is greater than with respect to any other M-function. This is neither sufficient nor necessary. We do not know by which attribution function the speaker proceeds. Cf. >Quaddition. I 87 Quaddition/reliability/relation theory/belief/Schiffer: if Ralph does not understand anything about mathematics: there is no difference between two attribution functions a) correct addition, b) quaddition. Because they provide the same values for manageable numbers - and are not discernible for inconceivably large numbers because they are incomprehensible. >Reliability theory. I 104 SchifferVsReliability Theory: the functional relation that is correlated by the reliability theory with "true of" has, as one of its realizations. >arthritis/"shmarthritis". Solution: there must be an "designated role". I 104 Reliability Theory/Schiffer: Solution: adequacy by disquotation schema. - The probability that an M-function f* exists is high, given that x s believes and f*(s) e.g. is about the stock market. ((s), i.e. we assume that the people usually believe and know something true what they are talking about.) I 105 Hartry Field: if there is a functional theory for mentalese, then the reliability theory is indispensable. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Representation | Dretske | Pauen I 230 Meaning/Naturalization/mental representation/Dretske/Pauen: (Dretske 1994(1),1995(2)): tries like Fodor to explain the emergence of meaning in a purely naturalistic manner. However, this also extends to non-human creatures. Four aspects: 1. Causal relation between object and representation 2. Function of representation for the organism 3. Development history of acquiring 4. Possibility of change. >Naturalism. Sign/Meaning/Causality/Dretske/Pauen: (ad 1.) a pure causal relation can only produce a natural sign ("sign/indication"). The normative moment has no place here. >Signs, >Meaning. ad 2. The normative distinction between the right and the wrong of the mental representation comes into play when a device or an organ receives the function of displaying another state of affairs. ad 3. E.g. Magnetotactic bacteria are looking for deeper, oxygen-deficient water layers. If these bacteria were transported to the northern hemisphere, they would seek flatter, more oxygen-rich water layers! Here it would remain unclear what exactly the object of the representation is: is it the magnetic fields or the oxygen concentration? I 232 Dretske: admits that this is hard to decide here. Solution: most organisms have several approaches to a state of affairs. If a representation occurs in the normal case in the presence of an enemy, one can speak of a representation of the enemy. ad 4. It seems possible that the objection, not the enemy, but the disjunction of all stimuli, is the object of the representation. E.g. smell or silhouette, or sound. Here the learning ability is important. Higher living beings can learn new stimuli here, with which even a complete old disjunction might be absent. Thus the disjunction is also not considered as a representation. VsDretske/Pauen: a causally determined sun burn is nevertheless not a representation of the sun. I 233 Stomach upsets are no representation of spoiled food. 1. Fred Dretske 1994. If You Can't Make One, You Don't Know How It Works. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1994.tb00299.x (03.06.2020) 2. Fred Dretske 1995. Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge: MIT Press. --- Schiffer I 46 Representation/fuel gauge/Dretske/Terminology/Schiffer: (Dretske 1986)(1): "fuel gauge model of representation: it represents the fuel status because it is a reliable indicator for it. ((s) By regularity to the representation. Additional assumption: Counterfactual conditional). >Counterfactual conditionals, >Fuel gauge example. 1. Fred Dretske 1986. Misrepresentation. In R. Bogdan (ed.), Belief: Form, Content, and Function. Oxford University Press. pp. 17--36 --- Perler I 225 Mental representation/Dretske/Proust: 1. Covariance between internal condition and external situation ("Indication".) 2. The internal indicator has the function to display the external situation. Then it represents them. 3. Representations can be true or false. Perler I: Joelle Proust Das intentionale Tier in D. Perler/M. Wild (Hg) Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Dretske I Fred Dretske "Minimal Rationality", in: S. L. Hurley and M. Nudds (Eds.) Rational Animals?, Oxford 2005 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dretske II F. Dretske Naturalizing the Mind Cambridge 1997 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 Perler I Dominik Perler Markus Wild Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005 |
| Sensations | Dennett | II 82 Sensation / Dennett: there was never a proper definition of "sentience" (sensitivity) , but you summed up as the lowest form of >consciousness on. II 83 Sensitivity: needs, other than feeling, no consciousness. E.g. protozoa, >thermometer, light sensitive film, plants, >fuel gauge. The question of what distinguishes sensation over the mere sensitivity, has never been satisfactorily answered. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Thoughts | Peacocke | I 129/130 Thoughts/Frege/Peacocke: Conditions for having a thought: i) the truth conditions must not be dependent on anything >Truth conditions. ((s) Otherwise the fuel gauge would have thoughts.) >Fuel gauge example. ii) Content must be indepented of propositional attitudes. >Content, >Propositional attitudes, >Thought objects, >Belief objects. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Understanding | Millikan | I 151 Understanding/Syntax/Millikan: even if I do not understand a word, I have, so to speak, deputy sentences in my inner, with which I maintain the general relation of negation. That is, I know what the negation of a sentence with an unknown word is to me. E.g. I do not understand the word "monotreme". That is, my inner token is not an intentional icon, because it does not belong to any family and has no direct eigenfunction. >Terminology/Millikan. But N.B.: if it has a derived eigenfunction, there is something on which it should map. I 152 Meaning: if there is something on which a word should normally map, it has some kind of meaning. >Meaning. Use/Understanding/Millikan: there is an instance in me that even knows the use of "monotreme". My consistency tester. Consistency Tester/Millikan: its mission is to review the programs that repeat the word use and ensure that this is done according to consistent reasons. >Consistency. I 304 Understanding/belief/conviction/listening/language/conclusion/Millikan: Believing what someone else is saying is happening directly. There is no inference between. It's like direct perception! I 305 Also the use of reading devices such as e.g. fuel gauge: is direct perception without interfering inferences. Nevertheless, there is a difference: E.g. TV: here the subject must know how its relation to the world is what it does not need to know in a "normal situation". But that is not the difference between knowledge with and without conclusion. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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Reference |
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| Correspondence Theory | Strawson Vs Correspondence Theory | Horwich I 196 StrawsonVsCorrespondence theory: he problem with it is not that the corresponding relations are conventional but that the facts which are the referents are considered to be things or objects. Fact/statement/StrawsonVsAustin: e.g. 1. the description of a chess position can not be moved or jumbled. 2. there is no event of the determination (statement) about the chess position that represents an object which would be equivalent to the chess position itself e.g. that you could spill coffee over it.(1) 1. Peter F. Strawson, "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950, in: Paul Horwich (ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 Strawson IV 112/113 StrawsonVsCorrespondence theory: the majority of our conviction is not at all based on personal experience with reality. Most do not even come from second hand. E.g. when the fuel gauge reads zero my ability to make this observation depends on many things outside the situation for which this situation provides absolutely no clue. (>Convention/Strawson). IV 114/115 Correspondence theory/Strawson: reality includes the possession of experience. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Fodor, J. | Newen Vs Fodor, J. | NS I131 Language/Thinking/Newen/Schrenk: two main currents: 1) Thesis of the primacy of language: only beings gifted with language are able to think. The way of thinking is also influenced by the nature of the language: >Sapir-Whorf thesis 2) Thesis of the primacy of thought over language: Fodor, Descartes, Chisholm. Mentalese/Language of Thoughts/Thought Language/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: (Literature 9-8): Thesis: the medium of thought is a language of the mind ("language of thought"). Many empirical phenomena can only be explained with assumption of mental representations, e.g. perception-based beliefs. NS I 132 Language/Fodor: it includes compositionality and productivity. Thinking/Fodor: Thesis: thinking is designed in a way that it has all the key properties of natural language already (from intentionality to systematicity). Thinking takes place with mental representations. E.g. gas gauge, fuel gauge, causal connection. Mental representations are realized through brain states. Language of the Mind/Mentalese/Fodor: is as rich as a natural language, but it is a purely internal, symbolic representation that is modified only with syntactic symbol manipulation. It is completely characterizable through its character combination options (syntax). It is only assumed to explain the dealing with propositional attitudes, it plays no role in the more fundamental mental phenomena like sensations, mental images, sensory memories. VsFodor: a) Recourse: imminent if you want to explain the properties of natural language by assuming a different language. NS I 133 b) the supporters of the thesis of the primacy of thinking cannot explain the normativity of thought with the help of social institutions such as the language. c) there can also be beliefs without an assignable mental representation. E.g. chess computer. They are nowadays programmed with statistical methods so that there is no fixable representation for the belief e.g. "I should take the queen out of the game early." Representation/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: Fodor still assumes localizable, specifiable representations. VsFodor: nowadays, neural networks are assumed. Representation/Today/Newen/Schrenk: pre-conceptual: e.g. spatial orientation, basic cognitive skills. - - NS I 160 Conceptual Atomism/Fodor: E.g. "pet fish": typical pet: Dog, typical fish: trout, typical pet fish: Goldfish. I.e. no compositionality. Thesis: the availability of a concept does not depend on the fact that we have other concepts available. In other terms: Thesis: concepts have no structure. ((s) contradiction to the above: Fodor called concepts compositional. Extension/Predicate/Fodor. Thesis: the extension is determined by which objects cause the utterance of a predicate. VsFodor: Problem: with poor visibility it is possible to confuse a cow with a horse so that the predicates would become disjunctive: "horse or cow." NS I 161 Solution/Fodor: the correct case is assumed as the primary case. VsFodor: 1) the problem of co-extensional concepts. E.g. "King"/"Cardioid" - E.g. "Equilateral"/"Equiangular" (in triangles). 2) The problem of analytic intuitions: even though there is no absolute border between analytic and non-analytic sentences, we have reliable intuitions about this. E.g. the intuition that bachelors are unmarried. FodorVsVs: does not deny that. But he claims that knowledge of such definitional relations is irrelevant for having a concept! Concepts/Meaning/Predicate/Literature/Newen/Schrenk: more recent approaches: Margolis/Laurence. Cognitive Science. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Stalnaker, R. | Schiffer Vs Stalnaker, R. | I 46 The second position in the logical space for the "propositionalist": (Stalnaker) represents a major divergence from functionalism: he concedes that no psychological theory will provide a definition of belief itself as E.g. x believes that some dogs have fleas. ((s) with content). but probably of x is a belief. ((s) without content). 1. you have to find a psychological theory, with which you can define the monadic predicate "x is a conviction". 2. define a functional property, for each composite belief property via non-functional, explicit definition of the form (R) x believes p iff (Es)(s is a belief; x is in s; & R(s,p)) for a given specified relation R. Stalnaker: takes up an idea of Dennis Stampe. Stampe: (1977, unpublished) as the completion of (R ) (FG) x believes p iff x is in a belief system, that x would not have under optimal conditions, if it were not the case that p. FG/Fuel gauge/Fuel gauge/Representation/Dretske/Terminology/Schiffer: (Dretske 1986): "Fuel gauge"-model of representation: it represents the fuel level, because it is a reliable indicator. ((s) By regularity to representation. Additional assumption: Counterfactual conditional). I 47 Representation/Schiffer: is not only a feature of mental states! >fuel gauge example. SchifferVsStalnaker/Belief/theory: the fuel gauge model is only a first step. It implies that one has no wrong beliefs under optimal conditions. That may be. Problem: 1. What shall these optimum conditions be then that will never be fulfilled? 2. how should they be fulfilled without the fuel gauge model becoming circular?. "Optimal"/Condition/(s): as a condition in itself is suspicious circular: they are fulfilled when everything is ok. (R)/belief/Schiffer: FG is only a proposal for the completion of (R). This should best determine the truth conditions in a system of mental representations. Conclusion: if belief is a relation to propositions, and there is a non-mentalist specification of this relation, then it cannot be functionalist. I 282 Belief content/Stalnaker: (1984): his approach refers to public language, but would be, based on Mentalese, the approach by Fodors, b) there is a ("optimum" -) Condition D - unfulfilled but fulfilled - and be specified in naturalistic vocabulary so An M function f the truth-conditions for function x * lingua mentis M is if for every sentence s of M: D would consist, then x would believe if and only if f(s) consists). Comparable, with "only if" rather than "if and only if". Then one is merely infallible under optimal conditions. SchifferVsStalnaker: that is not much better. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Mentalese | Fodor, J. | Cresswell II 55 Mentalese/Propositional Attitude/Fodor: Thesis: A belief sentence is a sentence in the speaker's thought language. CresswellVsFodor: Problem; then the original speaker and the attribution speaker must have the same sentence in mentalese in their inner system; Newen/Schrenk I 131 Mentalese/language of thought/thought language/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: (literature 9-8): Thesis: the medium of thought is a language of mind ("language of thought"). Many empirical phenomena can only be explained with the assumption of mental representations, e.g. perception-based beliefs. I 132 Language/Fodor: it includes compositionality and productivity. Thinking/Fodor: thesis that thinking is lived in such a way that it already has all the core characteristics of natural language (from intentionality to systematicity). Thinking takes place with mental representations. For example, fuel gauge, fuel gauge, causal connection. Mental representations are realized by brain states. I 215/216 Mentalese/Fodor: (Language of Thought, p.199) Thesis: One cannot give a construction of psychology without assuming that organisms possess a proper description as instantiation (embodiment) of another formal system: "Properly" requires: a) There must be a general procedure for assigning formulae to states of the organism. b) For each propositional attitude there must be a causal state of the organism, so that c1) the state can be interpreted as a relation to a formula and c2) it is nomologically necessary and sufficient (or contingent identical) to have propositional attitudes for it. d) Mentalese representations have their causal role by virtue of their formal characteristics. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
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