Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 17 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Animal Models | Behavioral Ecology | Corr I 278 Animal Models/Behavioral Ecology/Gosling: Researchers in psychology tend to use animal modes to understand the biological and environmental bases of personality (e.g., Ray, Hansen and Waters 2006(1); Willis-Owen and Flint 2007(2) and the implications of various personality traits (e.g., Capitanio, Mendoza and Baroncelli 1999(3); Pederson, King and Landau 2005(4)). Compared with human studies, animal studies afford greater experimental control of both environmental and genetic factors, as well as greater ability to manipulate independent variables and assess dependent variables (Gosling 2001(5); Mehta and Gosling 2006(6); Vazire and Gosling 2003(7)). >Animal Studies. 1. Ray, J., Hansen, S. and Waters, N. 2006. Links between temperamental dimensions and brain monoamines in the rat, Behavioural Neuroscience 120: 85–92 2. Willis-Owen, S. A. G. and Flint, J. 2007. Identifying the genetic determinants of emotionality in humans: insights from rodents, Neuroscience and Biobehavioural Reviews 31: 115–24 3. Capitanio, J. P., Mendoza, S. P. and Baroncelli, S. 1999. The relationship of personality dimensions in adult male rhesus macaques to progression of Simian Immunodeficiency Virus disease, Brain, Behaviour, and Immunity 13: 138–54 4. Pederson, A. K., King, J. E. and Landau, V. I. 2005. Chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) personality predicts behaviour, Journal of Research in Personality 39: 534–49 5. Gosling, S. D. 2001. From mice to men: what can we learn about personality from animal research?, Psychological Bulletin 127: 45–86 6. Mehta, P. H. and Gosling, S. D. 2006. How can animal studies contribute to research on the biological bases of personality?, in T. Canli (ed.), Biology of personality and individual differences, pp. 427–48. New York: Guilford 7. Vazire, S. and Gosling, S. D. 2003. Bridging psychology and biology with animal research, American Psychologist 5: 407–8 Samuel D. Gosling and B. Austin Harley, “Animal models of personality and cross-species comparisons”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Competition | Alchian | Henderson I 21 Competition/property rights/Alchian/Henderson/Globerman: (…) doesn't the owner of [a] new restaurant harm the incumbent restaurant's owner simply by competing for customers? Likely so, although Alchian argues that this apparent intrusion on the incumbent owner's property right is legitimate. Although private property rights protect private property from physical interference, no immunity is implied for the commercial value of anyone's property. Henderson I 22 No one should expect the profits or other benefits he receives from his property to be protected from other peoples' use of their own private property when the latter usage does not physically limit the former's use of his or her private property. >Property rights/Alchian, >Behavior/Alchian. |
Alchian I Armen A. Alchian William R. Allen Exchange and Production: Competition, Coordination and Control Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 1977 Henderson I David R. Henderson Steven Globerman The Essential UCLA School of Economics Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2019 |
| Deceptions | Frith | I 30 Waterfall deception/deception/illusion: for example, objects stand still here, but we still see them moving. There is also the reverse deception. I 37 Deception/illusion/Frith: for example, someone who is deaf can be awakened by the illusion of hearing loud music. I 39 False Knowledge/Frith: e.g. epilepsy can lead to false knowledge. >Illusion. I 40 Aura: an aura lets a person hear voices and sounds. Also e.g. experiences from the past. I 41 This can lead to false knowledge. I 47 Schizophrenia/Frith: typical characteristic of schizophrenia: e.g. the people firmly believe that they had had experiences, which they did not have. I 49 Illusion/Schizophrenia/Frith: people hear voices that give them commands and comment on actions. The brain can create a false mental world. It is not about the physical world. >Schizophrenia. Thesis: even the completely normally functioning brain can tell us something wrong. I 51 Brain/world/reality/perception/Frith: thesis: even if our brain works normally, we have no direct access to the world. >World/Thinking. I 83 Movement/perception/deception/illusion/Frith: for example, the hand should draw a straight line that appears on the computer screen - but the hand itself is not visible. The computer itself can produce distortions. N.B.: you do not know what the hand is doing. The border is outside the body and ends at the cursor I move across the screen. E.g. people see a hand in the mirror without knowing that it is the hand of a helper. I 85 Conscious action: self-awareness: here the boundary lies within the body and ends at the point where I intend to draw a vertical line. >Actions. I 89 Deception/optical/illusion: for example, a target in a frame is shown briefly, then again, with the target remaining, but the frame has moved somewhat. The person believes that the target has moved, but not the frame. N.B.: only the visual cortex comes to the conclusion that the frame has remained when the person is supposed to show where he/she presumes the target to be, he/she shows the correct position. The pointing movement is not affected by the movement of the frame. Knowledge: the hand "knows" that the target has not moved. I 90/91 Brain/Frith: our brain does not tell us if our body moves differently than we intend (for normal people). I 209 Definition Schizophrenia/Frith: shizophrenia is not a personality split, but the split runs between the parts of a personality, i.e. between emotion and knowledge. >Emotion, >Knowledge. I 210 Diagnosis: there are no physical signs of schizophrenia. The diagnosis is based on what the patient tells the doctor. The patient believes that his action is controlled by foreign powers. He hallucinates about foreign powers. I 211 Erroneous immunity/immunity/error/misidentification/Frith: erroneous immunity does not appear to exist in the case of schizophrenia. Thought/thinking/Frith: that leads to the question of how we know where our thoughts come from and that they are our own thoughts. >Thought, >Thinking. I 235 Deception/Frith: autists are usually not able to deceive someone. Friendship/society/community: this is the reason why autists are often alone. I 236 The ability to deceive is an important prerequisite to maintain friendships. >Friendship. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
| Dispositions | Lewis | V 223 Disposition: something that plays a causal role - not a cause in itself - e.g. possession of antibodies does not cause - but the immunity - immunity = Disposition. V 224 E.g. another patient has anti-bodies to the formation of anti-bodies - then two properties - disjunction: "one or the other" - Lewis pro - but these existential properties as the basis of the disposition are not causal - real event: the possession of anti-bodies - immunity: no event, therefore not a causal explanation. >Causal role. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Explanation | Lewis | I (b) 36 Explanation/Law/Lewis: Problem: my behavior is always explained by individual facts premises - Solution: the laws are implied by these individual fact premises - the attributions can only be true if something holds the causal role necessary, e.g., for wishes - this role can only be played by states that are connected causally in the right way with the behavior. >Causal explanation, >Individual causation, >Behavior, >Attribution, >Causal role/Lewis. --- V 218 Explanation/Sylvain Bromberger: something that needs time, language, speaker, etc. - Lewis: also something that can perhaps never be given. V 219 Lewis: even things can explain something. V 220 Event patterns can be described with different descriptions - there is also negative information e.g. about Arctic penguins and that there are no arctic penguins. V 211 Lewis: Thesis: there are no non-causal explanations. V 221 Non-causal explanation/LewisVs: 1) E.g. refractive index - Fermat: light must follow the shortest route - the refractive index is that part of the glass that has not yet been reached by the light - the pattern of alternate routes is part of the explanation, but not part the causal story - the explanation consists in relational information - 2) non-causal: star collapse comes to an end, so as not to violate the Pauli principle - 3) non-causal: possession of anti-bodies does not cause immunity - the immunity consists in the possession of anti-bodies - solution/Lewis: the possession is a disposition - it plays a causal role - solution/Lewis: What is explained is that something protects the patient. V 232 Probability explanation/Peter Railton/Lewis: "deductive-nomological model of probabilistic explanation" - it must be distinguished from Fetzer's model: for both are: covering law/Raiton/Fetzer: universal generalization about an individual case chances - FetzerVsRailton: as in Hempel: inductive, not deductive. Explanation: like argument - LewisVsFetzer: But: a good explanation is not necessarily a good argument - LewisVsFetzer/LewisVsRailton: both want an explanation, even if the event is extremely unlikely, but in that case a good explanation is a very bad argument - probability/explanation/Hempel: deviates from his deductive-nomological model. >Explanation/Railton. V 238 Explanation/unity/Lewis: Explanation is not a thing of which one can demand unity - rather something of which you can have more or less. LewisVsWhite, Morton: then a "therefore-response" is not an existential statement. V 269 Explanation/Lewis: partly causal, partly non-causal information. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| First Person | Freud | Frank I 640 Authority/Davidson: apart from Freud, there is little that could threaten the authority of the first person. >Priviledged access, >Incorrigibility, >Immunity. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica38 (1984), 101-111 |
Freud I S. Freud Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Human Rights | International Political Theory | Gaus I 293 Human rights/International political theory/Brown: (...) an account of universal principles based on the rights of individuals rather than on the rights of collectivities was instituted by the UN Charter of 1945, and, more specifically, by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948. There is, as might be expected, a very large literature on the international human rights regime; (...) (Dunne and Wheeler, 1999)(1). (...) one important feature of the human rights regime[:] although it purports to impose universal standards upon states, it has been, until very recently, itself statist in origin and modes of operation. It comprises declarations made by states, covenants signed and ratified by them, and institutions subordinated to them. Only in one case, that of the European Convention on Human Rights, can it be said that effective mechanisms exist for ensuring that states live up to their treaty obligations. Interventions/Problems: In the last decade or so practices have emerged that have challenged this situation. 1) In the first place, groups of states have, on occasion, taken it upon themselves to intervene forcibly in the internal affairs of another state, in the interests of its inhabitants; 2) second, more radically, developments in international law have begun to undermine the prin- ciple of sovereign immunity. As to the first of these changes - humanitarian intervention - the record of the 1990s has been mixed (Mayall, 1996(2); Moore, 1998(3)). (...) although there have been developments of international law in this area, it may be premature to talk of an emerging norm of humanitarian intervention, as Nicholas Wheeler does (2000)(4) in the best book on the subject. >Inequalities/International political theory. Gaus I 295 Economic rights/social rights: Economic and social rights are often described as 'second generation', political rights being 'first'. 'Third-generation' rights are the rights of peoples, which include such general notions as a right to self-determination, but also more specific sets of rights such as those of indigenous peoples (Crawford, 1988)(5). Problems: There is a conceptual problem here; the notion of human rights is associated with the promotion of universal standards and equality of treatment, but the rights of peoples can only be meaningful if they endorse a right to be different. Indigenous peoples, for example, demand the right to be governed in terms of their own customs and mores, which may well not sit easily with universal norms; this is a well-recognized issue in the politics of multiculturalism (Kymlicka, 1995(6); Parekh, 2000)(7) (...). However, in international Gaus I 296 relations, the most striking manifestation of this problem arises in the context ofa wider challenge to the notion of human rights: the argument that the international human rights regime is based on specifically Western values, an argument most clearly articulated by a number of East Asian states, hence often referred to as the 'Asian values' debate (Bauer and Bell, 1999(8); Bell, 2000(9)). Religion/family: The core argument is that the human rights identified in the 1948 Declaration and subsequently are related to a specifically Western conception of the individual and the public sphere; Asian values, it is argued, are oriented towards the family and the collectivity, stress duties and responsibilities rather than rights, and place a greater emphasis on religion. 1. Dunne, T. and N. Wheeler, eds (1999) Human Rights in Global Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Mayall, J., ed. (1996) The New Interventionism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Moore, J., ed. (1998) Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 4. Wheeler, N. J. (2000) Saving Strangers. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Crawford, J. , ed. (1988) The Rights of Peoples. Oxford: Clarendon. 6. Kymlicka, W. , ed. (1995) The Rights of Minority Cultures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 7. Parekh, B. (2000) Rethinking Multiculturalism. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 8. Bauer, J. and D. A. Bell, eds (1999) The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 9. Bell, D. (2000) East Meets West: Human Rights and Democracy in East Asia. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Brown, Chris 2004. „Political Theory and International Relations“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| I, Ego, Self | Anscombe | Frank I 76 I/Anscombe/Schaede: complicated argumentation: 1) If there is a reference for the expression "I", i.e. a singular entity exists to which "I" refers directly, then Descartes is right, if anyone. VsDescartes: his theory, however, cannot explain specific peculiarities of the expression "I": e.g. the immunity against misidentification. >Misidentification, >incorrigibility. So Descartes is wrong and Elisabeth Anscombe is right. Anscombe thesis "I" has no referees at all! Course of the argumentation: first, Descartes' position is made as strong as possible to make some brief, almost essayistic remarks on Anscombe's own position at the end. I 77 I/Anscombe: why does it have to be certain? E.g. John Smith himself could not know that he is John Horatio Auberon Smith, who is mentioned somewhere. He could quote this text and speak of himself without knowing it! When using "I", only the reference is specified (the speaker), but not the (changing) meaning! >Reference, >Meaning. Question: Does "I" work like a proper name? From a logical point of view (where the meaning is not relevant) it does syntactically! E.g. but only an idiot would sign "I". Uncorrectability (immunity against misidentification): is not yet guaranteed by self-reference. I 82 "I"/Anscombe: the peculiarity of this expression lies in its strict situation-relatedness. It follows that "I" should not be emphatically substantiated to an "I"! The question remains: do "I" thoughts imply thoughts with "here" and "this", or is the implication just reversed? Frank I 99 I/Body/Anscombe: "I" is not identified by the body: e.g. the bishop could mistake the lady's knee for his own, but will he mistake the lady herself for himself? Frank I 100 Then that for which "I" stands would have to be the Cartesian ego. >cogito. Assuming it is my body: e.g. I am in a situation (water tank with lukewarm water, unable to move) where I am practically deprived of my body. However, I can still think, "I do not want this to happen again." The I is thus not identical with the body. >Body, >Self-reference. Thinking is just what is guaranteed by the cogito. I 101 I/Anscombe: for "I" there is only the use! I/Ambrose Bierce: ("The Devil's Dictionary"): ...the idea of two that are I is difficult, but subtle. I 102 I/Anscombe: Thesis solution: "I" is neither a name nor any other type of expression whose logical role it is to refer. (I has no reference). I 103 I/Logic/Anscombe: we still accept the rule of the logician that the proposition is true if the predicates are true. But that is not a sufficient description of "I". Because it does not differentiate between "I" and "A". The truth definition of the whole sentence does not determine the meaning of the individual phrases. Accordingly, the logical rule does not justify the idea that "I" from the mouth of x is another name for x. But the rule means that the question "whose assertion?" was all decisive. For example, a translator could repeat the author's "I". >Quote, >Indirect speech. It follows: "I am E.A." is not at all an assertion of identity. An assertion of identity would be: "This thing is E.A." But there is also the proposition: "I am this thing here". >Quasi-indicator, >He/he himself. |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Incorrigibility | Evans | Frank I 504ff Incorrigibility/Evans: the thesis of Incorrigibility is idealistic, when it proceeds from the self-construction of the world by us. On the other hand the ability to identify ourselves as an objective person, is not to be exploited in a verificationist manner. >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge. I 515 Immunity/Evans: Immunity against misidentification is a direct result of demonstrative identification - but it’s not about "identification". >First Person. Error: to believe that immunity was not extended to physical features. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Incorrigibility | Frith | I 211 Erroneous immunity/immunity/error/misidentification/Frith: erroneous immunity does not appear to exist in the case of schizophrenia. Thought/thinking/Frith: that leads to the question of how we know where our thoughts come from and that they are our own thoughts. >Beliefs/Donald Davidson, >Thinking, >Thinking/Hume, >Knowledge, >First Person, >Subjectivity. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
| Incorrigibility | Peacocke | I 140 Certainty/Peacocke/(s): demonstrative way of givenness: guarantees that the object has properties that are determined by the perception (not that he has certain properties for sure). - In any case that these properties do not depend on other beliefs. >Certainty, >Properties, >Observation, >Way of givenness, >Pointing, cf. >Ostensive definition. I 140 f Infallibility/incorrigibility/immunity to error/perception: visual condition: E.g. "This man is bald": infallible in reference of "this man". >Reference, >Appearance, cf. >Appearance/Sellars, Peacocke: this is no identification, not of identity with something dependent, which is just not given - "There is (in this perception situation) no one, so he would be bald, but not this man" presented by the perception at this location. - It cannot be that the way of givenness refers to "this box" while this box is not the thing which is cubical. >Reference. Hallucination: also in this case the thought "Dummett amuses himself" is a thought about Dummett! >Hallucination. I 175 Immunity/infallibility/tradition/Evans: the judgement, to be the judgment of a specific content, can be constituted that this judgement responds to this condition. >Judgments. I/Evans: The reference may fail. >I, Ego, Self, >Self-identification, >Self-reference, cf. >Quasi-indicator. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| International Law | International Political Theory | Gaus I 293 International Law/International political theory/Brown: The final ruling in the Pinochet case in Britain (1998-2000) established that the doctrine of 'sovereign immunity' could not be allowed to cover acts banned under the international Torture Convention of 1984. War crimes tribunals: the International Criminal Court, established by the 1998 Rome Statute which was ratified by the necessary 60 states in April 2002 and came into existence on 1 July 2002, represents an even greater challenge to Westphalian sovereignty norms. >Sovereignty/International political theory. In practice the powers of the ICC are strictly circumscribed but even so, a number of influential states, including China, India, Russia and the US, regard this as a step too far. American 'new sovereigntists' have argued that Gaus I 294 the ICC and the Pinochet judgement have taken international law far beyond its proper function, which is to promote coexistence between sovereigns (Spiro, 2000(1); Rivkin and Casey, 2000-1(2)). The key issue here, (...) is whether there exists a sufficiently deep sense of community at the global level to support a legal system based on individuals as opposed to states. In this connection, it should be noted that the bedfellows of the new sovereigntists include all the major Asian powers, few of whom have signed, let alone ratified, the Rome Statute. 1. Spiro, P. J. (2000) 'The new sovereigntists'. Foreign Affairs, 79: 9-15. 2. Rivkin, D. B. and L. A. Casey (2000-1) 'The rocky shoals of international law'. The National Interest, 2: 35-46. Brown, Chris 2004. „Political Theory and International Relations“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Regulation | Hilton | Henderson I 82 Regulation/Hilton/Henderson/Globerman: Economic theories on regulation: One of the UCLA School's main contributions to our understanding of the regulatory process is that it shows how regulators behave. Self-interest: Rather than acting as all-knowing promoters of the social good, regulators act in their own self-interest. Specifically, while in their positions, regulators seek to maximize political support, which translates into more secure on-the-job tenure, larger agency budgets and higher salaries, and greater immunity from the scrutiny of legislators. >Government policy, >Interventions, >Interventionism. George Hilton: Hilton (1973)(1) was one of the earliest scholars to point out how regulators can benefit from their regulatory experiences after they leave the agency. He noted that few people make careers as regulators. Self-interest: Their relatively short tenure makes them concerned with what they will do after they leave their regulatory positions. If regulators want lucrative jobs, then friendly relationships created with organizations regularly appearing before the regulatory agency, particularly companies subject to regulation, are arguably more valuable to regulators than building a reputation for being knowledgeable and effective regulators. Regulatory capture: Early critics of the regulatory process emphasized the concept of "regulatory capture," whereby the financial interests of the companies being regulated dictated regulatory decisions. Concentrated benefits/dispersed costs: Beyond the potential interests of regulators in seeking future employment in the regulated industry, the basic logic behind this view of regulation was the concentrated benefits/dispersed costs paradigm. Producers/consumers: Producers tend to be in concentrated groups and consumers tend to be in much larger, dispersed groups. Producers have much to gain individually by dominating the regulatory process while consumers have less to lose as individuals. So even if a regulation causes more harm to consumers than it creates in gains to producers, producers will dominate the rregulatory debate. Indeed, consumers might not be represented at all and might not even know about the regulations. 1. Hilton, George (1973). The Basic Behavior of Regulatory Commissions. American Economic Review 62, 1/2: 47-54. |
Hilton I George W. Hilton John F. Due The Electric Interurban Railways in America Redwood City: Stanford University Press 2000 Henderson I David R. Henderson Steven Globerman The Essential UCLA School of Economics Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2019 |
| Roles | Peacocke | I 109ff Constitutive role: 1st sortal, 2nd psychic state, 3rd relation between 1 and 2. >Sortals, >Psychological states, >Roles, >Constitutive role. Evidence: Sensitivity for evidence is dependend on terms developed for them. >Concepts, >Language use, >Reference. Of two descriptions the constitutive role is the uninformative one. >Description. Constitutive role: "the person who has these perceptions" explains immunity to misidentification. >Incorrigibility, >Cf. >Apprehension, >Apperception. Constitutive role of" now": "the time when this attitude (belief, idea, etc.) occurred". >Localisation. Instead of trivial identity "I am I ": Constitutive role: "I am the person with these states". >Predication. I 122 Constitutive role/I/Peacocke: the constitutive role brings just the difference to the trivial identity: "I am the person with these states" instead of "I am I". >Identity, >Self-identification. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Self- Consciousness | Shoemaker | Frank I 37f Self-consciousness/Shoemaker: selfconsciousness is immune to misidentification. >Inverted spectra, >Qualia, >Incorrigibility, >Misidentification, >Immunity. Shoemaker per Qualia: Functioal state identity theory. (VsBlock). >Qualia/Block, >Qualia/Shoemaker. Self-reference does not imply self-identification. >Self-reference. Frank I 65 Self-consciousness/Shoemaker: radically different from the consciousness of perception. I cannot learn from from any object, not even learn from the mirror, that I myself am displayed unless I had known previously. >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge, >Self, >I, Ego, Self, >Perception, cf. >He/He himself, >Quasi-indicator. |
Shoemaker I S. Shoemaker Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Self- Identification | Evans | Frank I 504ff Incorrigibility/Evans: the view is idealistic if it assumes the self-construction of the world through us. On the other hand, the possibility of identifying ourselves as objective persons cannot be exploited verificationistically. >Incorrigibility. I 515 Immunity/Evans: immunity against misidentification is a direct result of demonstrative identification. - But it is not about "identification". - Erorr: to believe that immunity does not extend to physical characteristics. I 518 Self-identification/Evans: logical form: structure: if we consider [I am F] as if it were based on [b is F] and [I am b], then we get into trouble. I 545 Identification/self-identification/I/Evans: identification is based on localization in space. I 557ff Self-identification/SI/Evans: you cannot identify yourself as a "bearer of pain" (circular). - Pain must first be learned through your own experience. - ((s) Correspondingly with other physical experiences: body does not identify the self/I.) Evans: The idea that I associate with my name does not allow self-identification. Self-Identification: is mixed and not decomposable (in physical/mental components). - Otherwise it is circular. It is not absurd that one cannot identify oneself. >Self-knowledge, >Self-ascription. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Skepticism | Anscombe | Frank I 79 I/Descartes/Anscombe: pro: the conception of "I" cannot be a "self" and it must guarantee that the speaker is necessarily present. This shows how powerful the approach of Descartes is. The conception is the "thinking of thoughts". >I, >cogito, >R. Descartes. I/Anscombe: Error immunity: 1. The speaker must exist, 2. The referent must exist, 3. The referent exists as the one who is meant. >Meaning/Intending, >Reference. I/Body/AnscomeVsDescartes: E.g. I am tied up in a large water tank and cannot move. I think, "I will not let this happen to me again." Thus it becomes clear that a body cannot be a referent of "I", but a Cartesian res cogitans. >Body, >res cogitans. Problem: the Cartesian ego fulfills the criteria of the guaranteed reference,... Frank I 80 ...but does not solve the problem of Locke: who guarantees that the referential object is in different "I" thoughts the same? >I, Ego, Self, >Person/Locke. AnscombeVsDescartes: he cannot even be sure that "I" does not refer to several thinkers at the same time! I/Skepticism/Anscombe: Solution: "I" refers to nothing! So it is error immune. This follows from the failure of logic in determining the meaning and the failure of Descartes' in determining the referent. Question: Why did not someone come up with this solution earlier? Because of the "grammatical illusion of a subject". The questions about meaning and referent of the "I" are meaningless, however! >Meaning, >Grammar. |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Evans, G. | Peacocke Vs Evans, G. | I 169/170 Demonstratives/Evans: perceptually demonstrative ways of givenness are possible, because these conditions are fulfilled: in a normal perception situation, there is an information link between subject and object, and also the subject knows or is able to find out where the object is. If the subject has the general ability to know what propositions makes of the form "π = p" true for any π (where π is an identification of a public place without index words (in a non-indexical frame of reference)) if p is the notion of a place in its egocentric space. If it is also able to locate the object in its egocentric space, we can say that it has an idea of the object. Idea/Notion/Evans/Terminology/Intension/Way of Givenness/Peacocke: Evans "Idea" (notion) corresponds to my way of givenness "mode of presentation". Idea/Evans: Thesis: we can conceive the idea of an object a as consisting in its knowledge of what it is to be true for an arbitrary sentence of the form "δ = a". Peacocke: where "δ" is the area of the basic ideas of an object. Fundamental Idea/Evans: is what you have if you think of an object as the possessor of the fundamental ground of difference that it actually has. Peacocke: i.e. what distinguishes an object from all others. I.e. for material objects type and location. PeacockeVsEvans: we have already seen cases where the thinker was unable to locate the object in his egocentric space: E.g. the craters on the moon. I 171 E.g. apple in the mirror cabinet. But it still seems possible to think about it, for example, wonder where it is! It is true that it is possible to at least provide a rough direction in egocentric space, but that is hardly sufficient for the knowledge condition of Evans. In the case of the memory image, it is clearer that no localization in the current egocentric space is needed. pro Evans: there must be additional imaginable evidence, e.g. experience or tools for localization (if necessary, even space travel!). If that were not imaginable, we would have to assume that the subject was not able to think of the object in public space! pro Evans: an information link is not sufficient to think demonstratively about the object. VsEvans: but that is less than to demand that the thinker can locate the object at present. Weaker Requirement: Instead, a general ability of the subject can locate the object, if necessary, is sufficient. Evans: if you cannot locate an object, you can still think of it in the mixed demonstrative descriptive way of givenness: "that which causes my experience". But in normal cases this is a wrong description! Peacocke: it also seems to be wrong in the examples of the lunar craters, the apple in the mirror cabinet. PeacockeVsEvans: trange asymmetry: Idea/Evans: an idea a of a place in a self-centered space is an adequate idea of a place in the public space. Holistic/Evans: if an arbitrarily fundamental identification of a location is possible, it is holistic. (Varieties of reference, p. 162). Peacocke: this knowledge is grounded in a general ability to put a cognitive map of the objective spatial world over our own egocentric space. I 172 E.g. in some cases this will not be possible, for example, when you are kidnapped, or ended up in an unknown area, etc. Point: even in such cases, you can still use the demonstrative pronoun "here" (in reference to objects). I.e. the thoughts are still thoughts about public space! ((s) and the self-centered space). Idea/Demonstrative Way of Givenness/PeacockeVsEvans: so his theory does not demand any ability to give a public, non-egocentric individuation our thoughts to have thoughts about a place in the public space at all. Analogy/Peacocke: exactly analogous objections can be made in the case of demonstrative ways of givenness: E.g. Suppose a subject perceives an object of type F in the manner H. Then F is the token way of givenness. Then we can introduce: [W, Fs] for the perceptual "this F". Then there is exactly one proposition of the form "p = localization of [W, Fs] now", which is true, and the subject knows what it is for it that it is true for it. PeacockeVsEvans: why should we demand here, but not in the earlier example, that the subject also knows which p (or which in the earlier case) is mentioned in this one true proposition? This is particularly absurd in the case of the lost subject. PeacockeVsEvans: his theory allows that [W, Fs] is an adequate idea here, although the subject has no fundamental idea of the object. Peacocke: but if we insisted that it could have a fundamental idea if he had more evidence, then why is an analogous possibility not also sufficient for adequacy in terms of the egocentric space? I 173 There seem to be only two uniform positions: 1) Identification/Localization/Idea/Demonstratives/Liberal Position: sufficient for a genuine way of givenness or adequate ideas are the general ability of localization plus uniqueness of the current localization in the relevant space. 2) Strict position: this is neither sufficient for genuine ways of givenness nor for adequate ideas. PeacockeVs: this can hardly be represented as a unified theory: it means that, if you are lost, you cannot think about the objects that you see around you. That would also mean to preclude a priori that you as a kidnapped person can ask the question "Which city is this?". Demonstratives/Peacocke: Thesis: I represent the uniformly liberal position Demonstratives/Evans: Thesis: is liberal in terms of public space and strictly in terms of egocentric space! ad 1): does not deny the importance of fundamental ideas. If a subject is neither able to locate an object in the public nor in egocentric space ((s) E.g. he wakes up from anesthesia and hears a monaural sound), then it must still believe that this object has a fundamental identification. Otherwise it would have to assume that there is no object there. Anscombe: E.g. a subject sees two matchboxes through two holes which (are manipulated) so arranged that it sees only one box, then the subject does not know what it means for the sentence "this matchbox is F" to be true. The uniformly liberal view allows the subject to use demonstratives which depend on mental images, even if it has no idea where in the public space and when it has encountered the object. EvansVs: representatives of this position will say that the knowledge of the subject is at least partial, I 174 because this idea causally results from an encounter with the object. But that makes their position worse instead of better: for it completely twists the grammar and logic of the concept of knowing what it is for the subject that p is true. Ability/PeacockeVsEvans: but a capability can also consist in the experience of finding out the right causal chains in a given environment: the same goes for the localization of an object point seen in the mirror in egocentric space. PeacockeVsEvans: his distinction seems unreal: it may be simultaneously true that someone has a relation R to the object due to causal relations, and be true that the possibility of being in this relation R is a question of the abilities of the subject. E.g. (Evans) to recognize the ball: Peacocke: this is not a sensory motor skill, but rather the ability to draw certain conclusions, which however require an earlier encounter. This also applies to e.g. the cognitive map, which is placed over the egocentric space: PeacockeVsEvans: in both cases it does not follow that the presented object, remembered or perceived, is thought of explicitly in causal terms: the way of givenness is truly demonstrative. First Person/PeacockeVsEvans: the second major objection concerns thoughts of the first person: the different examples of immunity to misidentification, which contain the first person, roughly break down into two groups: a) here, immunity seems absolute: E.g. "I am in pain". I 175 b) Here, the immunity seems to depend on presuppositions about the world: if these assumptions are wrong, they open the possibility of picking out something wrong without stopping to use the word "I". These include: E.g. "I was on the ocean liner": memory image. E.g. "I sit at the desk": visual, kinesthetic, tactile perceptions. The distinction between a) and b) may be made by the constitutive role: "The person with these conscious states." Infallibility/Tradition/Evans: (absolutely immune judgments): the judgment to be a judgment of a specific content can be constituted by the fact that this judgement responds to this state. Peacocke pro. PeacockeVsEvans: Problem: can this infallibility be connected to the rest of Evans' theory? Because: I/Evans: Thesis: the reference of "I" may fail! Peacocke: how is that compatible with the absolute immunity of "I am in pain"? Conditionalisation: does not help: E.g. "if I exist, I am in pain" that cannot fulfill the purpose: the existence of the idea still needs the reference of "I". Similarly: E.g. "If my use of "I" refers, I am in pain": because "my use" must be explained in terms of the first person. Question: Can we use memory demonstratives which refer to previous use of first-person ways of givenness? E.g. "If those earlier uses of "I" speak, I am in pain." (Point: not "my uses"). PeacockeVs: that does not help: Descartes' evil demon could have suggested you the memories of someone else. (>Shoemaker: q-memories.) I 176 Constitutive Role/Brains in the Vat/BIV/EvansVsPeacocke: the constitutive role of [self] would not explain why the brains in the vat would be able to speak in a demonstrative way about their own experiences: Mental States/Evans: differ from all other states and objects in that they refer demonstratively to their owners. Pain is identified as an element of the objective order. Then someone can have no adequate idea of these mental states if he does not know to which person they happen. Peacocke: we can even concede thoughts about its pain to the brain in a vat, provided that it can give a fundamental identification of the person who has the pain. Peacocke: No, the nerves must be wired correctly. I.e. this is not true for the brains in the vat. So we can stick to the liberal point of view and at the constitutive role and the idea of a person. Also to the fact that the mental states are individuated on the person who has them. Individuation/Mental States/PeacockeVsEvans: not through localization (like with material objects), but through the person. I 177 E.g. Split-Brain Patient/Peacocke: here we can speak of different, but qualitatively equivalent experiences. From this could follow two centers of consciousness in a single brain. But: after the surgery we should not say that one of the two was the original and the other one was added later. E.g. olfactory sensation of the left and right nostril separate. Then there are actually separate causes for both experiences. ((s), but the same source.) Peacocke: it does not follow that in normal brains two consciousnesses work in harmony. Here, the sense of smell is caused by simultaneous input through both nostrils and is thus overdetermined. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Kaplan, D. | Newen Vs Kaplan, D. | NS I 117 Index Words/Indicators/Direct Reference/Kaplan: Thesis: typical usage contexts: here. they must be treated according to an object theory (theory of direct reference) of meaning. Namely if they only have to fulfill the state of affairs adequacy (SA). NS I 118 E.g. (1) I am here today. Truth Conditions: are only given adequately here if the content of the sentence is recognized as true, but not necessary. a priori: the sentence is indeed a priori true, but not necessary! E.g. if Carina Silvester speaks the sentence in Bochum, it has the meaning that Carina is in Bochum that day, but Carina is not necessarily in Bochum. It is true because of the expression conditions. NS I 118 Index Words/Indicators/Kaplan: Thesis: indicators are referential expressions, i.e. the standard meaning is always the designated object. Newen/Schrenk: this is considered the common understanding after Kaplan. VsKaplan: Objection: we must not neglect the other types of adequacy. Cognitive adequacy and knowledge adequacy. E.g. Karl receives a threatening letter, "I will rob you someday". This is intuitively the contribution of "I" to the utterance content, not the person who wrote the letter, but the description associated by means of language competence. Then the content of "I" is: the writer of this incident. Here, knowledge adequacy is in the foreground. (Anonymous/Anonymity). Cognitive Adequacy: is paramount if our behavioral attitude is expressed. E.g. Ernst Mach after memory loss: "I'm hungry": This does not have the meaning of "The author of "Die Analyse der Empfindung" is hungry". Mach with amnesia would not have agreed to that. NS I 119 Likewise, it would be wrong to paraphrase. "Ernst Mach believes that Ernst Mach is hungry". EGO Mode/I/Terminology/Newen/Schrenk: some authors call this kind of immediate self-reference the EGO mode of givenness. (Immunity against misidentification). Point: this is about the subject of a thought and not about the speaker of an utterance. (He might be be irritated, e.g. by delay through headphones). Index Words/Indicators/Names/Newen/Schrenk: the situation is like with names: there are three modes of interpretation. The contribution of an indexical expression can be 1) the designated object 2) the description associated by means of language competence 3) cognitive way of givenness. Deictic expressions: applies for them accordingly. E.g. hallucination: here, the content is determined through language competence. Deixis/Cognitive Adequacy. The cognitive adequacy may also play a role: E.g. someone looks through two widely separated windows of his apartment at an extremely long ship, which is moored at the quay. He believes that there are two ships. "This is a Chinese and this is a Russian ship". NS I 120 The content of the statements can only reflect the cognitive situation if in each case the way of givenness of the ship is taken into account (front: Chinese lettering, rear: rusty stern). Index Words/Newen/Schrenk: the explanation interest chooses between the various explanations (interest, interpretation interest). Index Words/Names/Kaplan: according to his theory they are always referential expressions - i.e. the meaning is always the designated object. Then explanations must be shifted from the field of semantics to that of pragmatics (what the speaker means) in line with the knowledge adequacy (language competence) and cognitive adequacy. There is currently debate about whether this is legitimate. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Phenomenalism | Ryle Vs Phenomenalism | I 322 Phenomenalism/Ryle: tries to get along without these useless secret means of the theory, but he does not recognize the disease. (Ryle). RyleVsPhenomenalism: it springs from another, less praiseworthy motive: He assumed that having a sensation is to be a determination of something, or that something is "revealed" in sensation. (> Sense data theory). It seemed to follow that we cannot really observe things and therefore cannot find out through observation things that we already know about gate posts. --- I 323 RyleVsPhenomenalism: the truth is that "sense objects" is a meaningless expression, so the expression "statement about sense objects" is meaningless. Such facts: that gate posts persist for a long time, especially when they are painted with protective paint, that they are hard and solid other than smoke clouds, that they can be found by anyone at day or night other than shadows, that they carry the weight of gates and doors, but possibly burn down, are found by observation and experimentation. In the same way, it is also found that gateposts can sometimes look very similar to trees and people, and that it is, under certain circumstances, very easy to be mistaken about their size and distance. Certainly such facts are not directly given to the senses, or are revealed in sensation. RyleVsPhenomenalism: this also shows why the language does not make it possible to formulate the statements to which, according to phenomenalism, all statements about gate posts should be translatable: the reason is not that the vocabulary is inadequate but that there are no such objects, for which such additional expressions would be desired. "Sense objects" are absurd. Rather, we cannot describe our sensations without referring to ordinary objects. Observation: some say we should reserve the honour-title "observation" for those operations which are absolutely safe. Ryle: But why? If it makes sense to call a person a careful observer and another person a negligent observer, why should we deprive ourselves of this possibility? --- I 325 Because it was assumed that from the fact that every observation could be erroneous, there would have to be a special kind of fail-safe observation so that "empirical" can be defined with their help. For this purpose the sensory perception was invented to play this role. Erroneous immunity/immunity/Ryle: but the reason why a sensation cannot be faulty is not that it is a failing-safe observation, but that it is not an observation at all. (In addition, the above postulate is strongly circular). |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Wittgenstein | Evans Vs Wittgenstein | Frank I 504 EvansVsIdealism: our conception of ourselves is not idealistic: we can understand statements about ourselves that we cannot decide or even justify! ((s) "objective", given to ourselves "objectively"). Example "I have been breastfed". Example "I was unhappy on my first birthday" Example "I rolled around in my sleep last night" Example "I was dragged unconscious through the streets of Chicago" Example "I'm going to die" I.e. our thoughts about ourselves obey the generality clause. EvansVsWittgenstein: This idea is diametrically opposed to an idea by Wittgenstein: by asking us to consider psychological statements in the first person (Evans), because this enhances their similarity to the act of moaning in pain, i.e. exactly considering them to be unstructured responses to situations. Wittgenstein: was well aware that this would enable him not to think about certain issues. Frank I 515 Immunity/EvansVsWittgenstein: his E.g. "The wind tousles my hair" is precisely what leads to the widespread misconception Frank I 516 That immunity does not stretch to the self-attribution of physical phenomena. This is certainly the case. There is a way of knowing that the property of ξ’s hair of being tousled by the wind is currently instantiated. It does not make sense to ask: "The wind tousles someone’s hair, but is it mine?" ((s) Perhaps in this case it is?). EvansVsWittgenstein: does not acknowledge this fact sufficiently. Wittgenstein: the object use requires us to recognize a certain person (ourselves)) therefore, the possibility of error is "envisaged". EvansVsWittgenstein: 1) this can simply not be used correctly to weed out a category of statements that are identified only. Frank I 517 By means of the predicate contained therein, irrespective of the question of how to recognize that the predicate is instantiated. 2) The immunity against misidentification in this absolute sense cannot be invoked for mental self-attribution! E.g. "I see this and that" in cases where I have reason to believe that my tactile information could be misleading. E.g. "I feel a piece of cloth and see a number of outstretched hands in the mirror. Here it makes sense to say "Someone is touching the piece of cloth, but is it me"(Mental predicate) But what does that tell us? 3) Important: The influence of the relevant information on "I" thoughts is not based on a consideration or an identification, but is simply constitutive for the fact that we have an "I" image. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 Wright I 257 Quietism/Truth/Wright: (pro Wittgenstein): it is a metaphysical hypostasis of concepts such as truth and assertion if their applicability is enshrined as a substantial part of a realistic view of its content. Discourses as different as science and film critics, however, are simple tries to determine what is true and do not need any metaphysical relining. But that’s not the end of the matter, of course there are relevant differences between language games. Wright: The realism/Anti-realism debate still remains and the problem of cognitive coercion. I 258 EvansVsWittgenstein: Considerations to follow the rules are themselves only metaphysical defeatism. (More quietist than Wittgenstein himself). |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Self | Evans, G. | Fra I 485f Self/I/Evans: 1. no criteria, 2. limited access (not everyone, anytime) - 3. way of givenness is dependent on existence: I have to be at the place to say "here", but changing is possible ("new sense, old meaning"). I 488 "Self": thoughts are de re - (need information) -(VsHume?) Peacock I 175 Self/I/Evans: thesis: the reference of "I" can fail! Peacocke: how is this compatible with the absolute immunity of "I have pain"? |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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