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The author or concept searched is found in the following 48 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analyticity/Syntheticity | Quine | I 120 Lasting Sentences: In lasting sentences the meaning of the stimulus is more sparse. Accordingly, the synonymy of stimuli is less plumable. > VsAnalyticity. I 339 Material implication "p impl q" is not equal to "p > q" (> mention/use) "Implies" and "analytical" are the best general terms. V 114 QuineVsAnalyticity: one can form universal categorical sentences later e.g. "A dog is an animal". Of these, we will not say that they are analytical or even true. Analyticity is as social as language. Random first examples should not have any special status. Definition Analytical/Quine: a sentence is analytical if everyone learns the truth of the sentence by learning the words. That is bound as social uniformity because of the observation character. Every person has a different set of first learned analytical sentences - therefore Vs. VI 79 Quine: HolismVsAnalyticity. >Holism/Quine. --- VII (b) 21 Analytical/QuineVsKant: Quine limits them to the subject-predicate form. They can be reformulated as following: "true by force of meaning, regardless of the facts". VsEssentialism: a creature is arbitrary: a biped must be two-legged (because of his feet), but he does not need to be rational. This is relative. VII (b) 23 Analyticity/Quine: a) logically true: "No unmarried man is married" - b) this is translatable into logical truth: Bachelor/unmarried. The problem is that it is based on unclear synonymy. Analytical/Carnap: "true under any state description" - QuineVsCarnap: this only works when the atom sentences are independent. it does not work with e.g. bachelor/unmarried. VII (b) 28ff Analyticity/Quine: we need an adverb "neccess.", which is designed in that way that it delivers truth when it is applied to an analytical truth, but then we would indeed have to know what "analytical" is. - Problem: The extensional agreement of bachelor/unmarried man relies more on random facts than on meaning. A. cannot mean that the fact component would be zero: that would be an unempirical dogma. VII (b) 37 Verification Theory/Peirce: the method is the meaning. Then "analytically" becomes a borderline case: method does not matter. Synonymous: the method of refutation and confirmation are the same. VII (b) 37 Analytical/Quine: early: a is a statement when it is synonymous with a logically true statement. VII (i) 161ff Analyticity/Quine: analyticity is an approximate truth because of meaning. That says nothing about existence. >Synonymy/Quine, >Verfication/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Atomism | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 25 Atomism/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Thesis: all logical forms can be constructed from the shapes of objects. Hintikka I 175 Logical Independence/Elementary Proposition/Atomism/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: (1931) Wittgenstein eventually abandons the quest for logical independence of elementary propositions. - It was a real failure. - Reason: color attributes (color predicates) are not independent - E.g. red exists in the degree q1r and red exists in the degree q2r, then it follows: if q2>q1, q1r follows from q2r. - Later Vs: does not work with impure and opaque colors either. I 176 Atomism/Middle Period/Wittgenstein/Waismann/Hintikka: new: atomic sentences are no longer individually compared with the world, but as a sentence systems. - ("Holistic"). - WittgensteinVsAtomism: middle period: - New: I apply the whole color scale at once. - That is the reason why a point cannot have more than one color. -> Measuring/Wittgenstein, More autors on measurements. - If I apply a set system to reality, then it is thereby said that only one fact can exist at a time. --- II 138 WittgensteinVsAtomism/WittgensteinVsTractatus: 2 errors: 1) assuming the infinite to be a number and assuming that there would be an infinite number of sentences. - 2) that there are statements that express degrees of qualities - atomism; requires, however, that if p and q are contradictory, they may be further analysed until t and ~t result. II 157 Atomism/Atom Sentence/WittgensteinVsRussell: in the analysis of atomic sentences you do not encounter "particulars", not unlike in chemical analysis. --- IV 14 Atomism/Substance/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: if the world had no substance, ((s) = unchangeable objects), the atomic sentences would not be independent of each other. ad IV 36ff Tractatus/Atomism/Wittgenstein/(s): Atoms: undefined objects, quasi material things, (sounds), primitive signs - unclear whether thing (object) or immaterial, only components of the sentence are translated. - Thus, they are open to meaning theory which simultaneously derives from complex of objects, facts as well as connection of words, but (4.0312) the logic of the facts cannot be represented - the logical constants (and, or, not) do not represent. - Representative: sign for the object - internal properties: in the sentence different than the relations to the world (external). WittgensteinVsRussell, VsFrege: confusion mention/use: internal/external. >Mention, >Use, >Representation, >Logical constants, >Facts, >Signs. --- VII 122 Atomism/Atom Sentence/Truth Value/Truth Functions/Tr. fnc./Laws of Nature/LoN//Tractatus/Te Tens: the truth values of the atom sentences determine the truth of all remaining sentences with logical necessity, also those of the Laws of Nature - but then you should not say that something is only possible impossible or necessary by virtue of natural law or causality. - (6.37) - Laws of Nature are the truth functions of elementary propositions. - Therefore, the world as a whole cannot be explained. >Truth values, >Truth functions. VII 124 Laws of Nature: are not the ultimum; that is logical space. >Laws of Nature. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Conditional | Quine | III 67 Implication/Conditional/Quine: Implication only exists if the conditional is true. III 68 Implication/Mention/Use/Quine: not sentences or schemata are implied, but their descriptions. For we cannot write "implies" between the sentences themselves, but only between their descriptions. So we mention the sentences by using their descriptions. We are thus talking about the sentences. ((s) implication is via the sentences. Different: Conditional/Quine: (">" or "if...then...") here we use the sentences or schemes themselves, we do not mention them. No reference is made to them. They appear only as parts of a longer sentence or schema. Example: If Cassius is not hungry, then he is not skinny and hungry. This mentions Cassius but it does not mention a sentence. It is the same with conjunction, negation and alternation. Implication/Quine/(s): only example "p implies q" but not "Cassius' skinniness implies..." III 72 "Only if....then"/Quine: is the sign for the hind leg! It also does not have the meaning of the whole "then and only then (biconditional). I 389/90 Conditional with a false antecedent/Quine: > truth value gaps. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Conjunction | Tugendhat | I 296 And/sign/mention/use/Tugendhat: "A and B": on the side of the sign, we do not have to expect the term "p and q", but the expression ’that p and that q". This is an analogy, in fact. Moreover it is in need of a completion by a predicate. >Logical connectives, >Levels, >Logical constants, >That-clauses, >States of affairs. I 297 but the state of affairs that p and the st.o.a. that q are not composed - we need a more general term, that somehow contains composition, but goes beyond it. I 297 Conjunction/Tugendhat: "and" is not connecting objects nor states of affairs - it combines nothing at all. Cf. >Compositionality, >Complexes. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Consciousness | Chisholm | I 112 Consciousness/Chisholm: all my opinions are direct attributions - I am the subject of these attributions, but not their content. >Content, >I, Ego, Self, >Attribution. I/ChisholmVsDescartes: no certain propositions about themselves - existence also not property I am sure of - consciousness defined through self-presenting property - no direct access. I 130 Consciousness/unity/Chisholm: a person who realizes that they see something and realizes that they hear something is also aware that they see and hear something - Outsourcing/Mention/Use - Chisholm: but it is not sure that consciousness is the same. I 133 Self-awareness: goes beyond direct attribution: subject must know that the properties are attributed to itself. >Awareness, >Self-consciousness. I 131f Consciousness/Unit/Kant: the subject does not need to unite the ideas, but it must be able to - self-awareness: a) direct attribution of a property, b) going further: here, the subject must also know that it is the object of direct attribution itself - Accuracy results from observation, many people never observe. II 193 ff Two-Aspects Doctrine/Fechner: People have inner (mental) and external aspects (not two sides of the same coin) - they differ only by point of view! (No identity theory) - both do not have to be based on a being - VsFechner: only interesting if yet another sense can be connected to the "inner" - Fechner: being is monistic - but also: FechnerVsMonism: only makes sense if the world is perceived uniformly - as self-appearance, everything is ultimately spirit. >Aspects, >Monism, >Dualism, >Anomalous monism. II 198f FeiglVsFechner: all his examples are basically for external things! (Fechner has seen that himself) - also the interior of the body is physical. - So the crucial difference does not even exist. Fechner: ultimately only metaphorical. Stubenberg, Leopold. Chisholm, Fechner und das Geist-Körper-Problem. In: Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/ Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Denotation | Geach | I 28 Denotating expression/Russell/Geach: the denotating expression is a general term after the prefix the, one, every, all, some, etc. >Articles, >Quantifiers, >Quantification, >Demonstratives, >Index words, >Predication, >Attribution, >Sentence/Geach. I 93f Denotating expression/Geach: E.g. Robinson made a lot of money by selling it This is no sentence - "it" without antecedent is no denotating expression. But if a word chain does not have a logical role in a particular context, it does not mean that it never has one. - E.g. Jones has a car and Jones daughter drives it. "has a car" is not denotating: "p and Jones' daughter drives it". > Anaphora. Also not: "there is a car ..." for "p" then: p and that is driven by Jones' daughter. Wrong solution: to look for criteria for "real incidents": these can also be of the wrong kind. E.g. "the only one who ever stole a book from Snead ..." I 190f Denotation of sentences/Carnap/Geach: E.g. DES(English) "red" is red, DES(French) "l'eau" is water etc. - for all x, x is true in L ⇔ DES(L) x. Geach: this offers a definition of "true in L" in terms of "denotation in L"- if it is grammatically not a complete sentence, it is nevertheless in the logical sense. It means roughly: "mon crayon est noir" is true in French". Because "DES(English)"Chicago is a large city" is a complete sentence, "DES(English)" is not a relation sign. We cannot ask "what is it what it denotates," as we cannot ask, "what is it that it rains?" >Translation, >Designation. I 204 Denotation/naming/names of expressions/mention/use/Geach: E.g. A. or is a junctor. If this sentence is to be true, then only when the first word is used to denotate that of which the sentence says something. "Or" is only a junctor (E.g. "but" is a junctor or a verb") in special contexts. >Junctor. Therefore "or" is not used autonym in A (it does not denotate itself). The first word in A is no example here. It is a logical subject, so in the sentence it is no junctor, so the sentence A is wrong. ((s) With and without quotation marks that were saved here) - (s) Or can only be used as a connection, when it is mentioned, it is no longer a connection.) >Mention, >Use, >Mention/use, >Description level, >Level/Order. Mention/use/Geach: Is it wrong to say or is a connection? - No. - Is it wrong to say "or" is a connection? - Yes. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Goedel | Quine | XIII 82 Goedel/Goedel Theorem/Quine: Evidence/Self-Evidence/Quine: it is too much to ask that a proof should be self-evident. E.g. Euclid's parallel axiom is not self-evident. E.g. set theory is also not self-evident because it is shaken by paradoxes. Self-Evidence/Quine: we find it in a small number of axioms of number theory. They are the axioms of Dedekind, which are called the axioms of Peano. Elementary Number Theory/Quine: there was always the question whether there were still valid laws that could not be derived from the axioms. They existed! That was a question of adequacy. Laws/Quine: the question of further, still undiscovered laws seemed to be a problem of all branches of mathematics. By supplementing the axioms, perhaps this could be remedied? But Goedel proved in 1931 that this cannot be done! Goedel/Quine: proved that there can be no complete deductive system for even the smallest fragment of mathematics, such as Elementary Number Theory. XIII 82 Tendency: Goedel/Quine: proved that there can be no complete deductive system for even the smallest fragment of mathematics, such as the elementary number theory. Def Elementary Number Theory/Quine: includes digits, notation for plus, times, power and equality. >Numbers/Quine. XIII 83 Sentence operators: for "not", "and" and "or" and the quantifiers "Each number x is such that..." and "there is a number x so that...". The numbers are the positive integers and the zero. With this you can express e.g. Fermat's last theorem. Goedel/Quine: Thesis: No axiom system or other deductive apparatus can cover all truths that can be expressed even in this most moderate notation. Any valid proof procedure will disregard some true sentences, even infinitely many of them. Self-Evidence/Mathematics/Goedel/Quine: therefore we must drop the requirement of self-evidence. Wrong solution/Quine: could one not simply take all discovered truths as axioms? Vs: this is not impossible because there could be no axiom system with infinitely many axioms - which exist. Rather, it is the case that a proof must be able to be examined in finite time. Goedel/Goedel's Theorem/Quine: is related to the reflexive paradoxes. The point is that the notation of the elementary number theory must be able to speak about itself. ((s) Self-Reference). Goedel Numbering/Goedel Number/Quine: ...+... XIII 84 Mention/Use/Goedel/Quine: Goedel's evidence also requires this distinction. For example, the digit "6" names the number 6 and has the Goedel number 47. We can say that the Goedel number 47 names the number 6. Syntax/Arithmetic/Goedel/Quine: after all expressions have their naming by Goedel numbers, the syntactic operations can be mirrored by expressions, by arithmetic operations via numbers. Quote/Goedel/Quine: Problem: the corresponding notation is not part of symbolic logic and arithmetic. Quotation marks cannot be simply named by Goedel numbers. Quote/Quine: of an expression: names this expression. Goedel Numbers/Goedel number/Quine: 47 names 6, furthermore 5361 names 47 if 53 and 61 are randomly the Goedel numbers of the digits "4" and "7". ((s) Quotation marks sic). Quote/Goedel/Quine: the quote relation is represented as by the arithmetic relation that has 5361 to 47 and 47 to 6. The general relation can be expressed in the notation of the elementary number theory, though not easily. The arithmetic reconstruction of syntactic concepts like this was a substantial part of Goedel's work. Liar/Liar's Paradox/Goedel/Quine: is useful in one of the two parts where Goedel's proof can be split. The bomb explodes when the two parts are put together. The liar can be completely XIII 85 expressed by Goedel numbering with the exception of a single expression: "truth". If that could be done, we would have solved the paradox, but discredited the elementary number theory. Truth/Goedel Number/Goedel Number/Quine: truth is not definable by Goedel numbers, within the elementary number theory. >Goedel Numbers/Quine. Goedel's Theorem/Quine: formal: no formula in the notation of the elementary number theory is true of all and only the Goedel numbers of truths of the elementary number theory. (This is the one part). Other part/Quine: deals with every real evidence procedure, here it is about that every evidence must be testable. Formal: a given formula in the notation of the elementary number theory is true of all and only the Goedel numbers of provable formulas. Church/Quine: here I skip his thesis (Church-Thesis), (see recursion below). Goedel/Quine: the two parts together say that the provable formulas do not coincide with the truths of the elementary number theory. Either they contain some falsehoods, or they do not cover some truths. God forbids that. Goedel/Quine: his own proof was more direct. He showed that a given sentence, expressed in Goedel numbers, cannot be proved. Either it is false or provable, or true and not provable. Probably the latter. Wrong solution/Quine: one could add this lost truth as an axiom, but then again others remain unprovable. Goedel/N.B./Quine: ironically, it was implausible that there could be a proof procedure for all truths of the elementary number theory. This would clarify Fermat's theorem, and much more. XIII 86 On the other hand, Goedel's result hit him like a bomb. N.B.: these two shortcomings turned out to be equivalent! Because: Kleene/Quine: showed that if there is a complete evidence procedure, any statement could be tested as true or false as follows: a computer would have to be programmed to rewind any statement, in alphabetical order, the shortest first, then always longer. In the end, because of the completeness of the procedure, he will have proved or refuted every single sentence. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Implication | Quine | I 339 Material implication "p implies q" is not equal to p > q (> mention/use) - implicit and analytical are the best general terms. >General Term/Quine. X 46 Material Implication/Quine: occurs when the sense can be reproduced only with negation and conjunction. Normal implication: in addition to existential quantification. III 67 Implication/Conditional/Quine: Implication only exists if the conditional is true. I 68 Implication/Mention/Use/Quine: not sentences or schemata are implied, but their descriptions. For we cannot write "implies" between the sentences themselves, but only between their descriptions. So we mention the sentences by using their descriptions. We are talking about the sentences. ((s) implication is done via the sentences. Different: Conditional/Quine: (">" or "if...then...") here we use the sentences or schemes themselves, we do not mention them. No reference is made to them. They appear only as parts of a longer sentence or schema. Example: If Cassius is not hungry, then he is not skinny and hungry. This mentions Cassius but it does not mention a sentence. It is the same with conjunction, negation and alternation. Implication/Quine/(s): only example "p implies q" but not "Cassius' skinniness implies..." III 72 "Only if....then"/Quine: is the sign for the hind leg! It also does not have the meaning of the whole "then and only then" (biconditional). I 389/90 Conditional with a false antecedent/Quine: > truth value gap. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Intuitionism | Quine | II 178 Intuitionism: shows us that Truth is not assertibility. X 118 Intuitionism/Quine: one could characterize it as follows: it rejects adjunction if one does not know how to decide which of the subsets is true. Sentence of the excluded middle: we had wanted to protect it via the negation. >Excluded Middle/Quine. Logic/Quine: in reality you cannot make any distinction: once you have changed the relationships between the logical operators ((s) logical constants), you can consider any or all of them as changed. (>Holism). You can tell from that: Adjunction/Negation/Logical Operators/Quine: are inherent, not transcendent. Because with a deviating logic we cannot maintain its meanings. Intuitionism: is therefore not a different opinion about the laws for the operators. He rather fights them as useless for science. QuineVsIntuitionistic Logic: it lacks manageability and familiarity. Their sentence links have no probability function but an intuitive meaning, which we explain with the help of "refute" and "follow from...". However, these explanations become unclear if one wants to maintain the difference between pronouncing a sentence and speaking about the sentence (mention/use)! Quine: then you can also go straight to Heyting's axioms and not interpose a translation, but X 119 apply the direct method of the language teacher. Intuitionism: gained even more impetus through Goedel's proof of incompleteness. QuineVsIntuitionistic Logic: changes the meanings of quantification and constants. Solution: one can proceed constructivistically, but still use the orthodox logic: this is Weyl's constructive set theory. X 121 Ontology/QuineVsIntuitionism/VsIntuitionist Logic: we may not even find what the Intuitionist declares existing. Solution: we have to translate his language into ours first. And not necessarily into our logic, but in our overall language! Then we can say what he sees as existing (in our sense of "exist"). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Knowledge | Hare | II 142 Knowledge/Saying/Ryle: it may be that we know something without being able to say what we know. E.g. how a particular word is used, or a particular dance is danced. HenleVsRyle: but this should not be extended to speech situations. >Situations, >Communication. II 143 It is by no means clear that one can always know how a word is used, even if one cannot say how it is used. Knowledge/Saying/HareVsHenle: in language, however, this is perhaps clearer than anywhere else. E.g. if we explain the use of an expression, we do not have to use it ourselves. Consequently, we can fully know its use in all contexts, even without being able to say how it is needed. For example, a child may have learned the use of the word "father", and uses it correctly, but perhaps cannot tell how it is used because it has not yet learned the use of "to mean"! >Explanation, >Use, >Meaning (Intending). Henle confuses the ability "to decide for logical reasons" whether a statement is true with the ability to use the expression "the statement is logically true". This is a confusion of mention/use (doing without knowledge). Hare: anyone who does not know how to use the term "logical true" could do the former, but not the latter. II 143 Menon/Socrates: question: what is the good? Menon: how can you look for something if you do not know what you are looking for, and when you have found it, how do you know it is what you were looking for? (Knowledge/saying). II 151 Socrates: if we already knew, we would not have asked the first question. So philosophizing can never begin, or it can never lead to a conclusion. Solution/Hare: the solution lies in the distinction between knowing how a dance is danced and the ability to also tell how it is danced. Before beginning the investigation, we can do the former but not the latter. We could start because we could do the former all the time. VsMenon: you already know what the good is, i.e. you can pick it out. >Knowledge, >Knowing how. |
Hare I Richard Mervyn Hare The Language of Morals Oxford 1991 Hare II Richard M. Hare Philosophical discoveries", in: Mind, LXIX, 1960 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Language | Quine | X 134 Language/Carnap/Quine: the language is presented as a deductive system Carnap - 1. Formation rules: Deliver the grammar and the lexicon so that they deliver the well formed formulas - 2. Transformation rules: these provide logical truths (including the mathematical, generally the analytical truths). >Logical Truth/Quine.# VI 17 Ontology/Language/Quine: as far as the assumption of a scientific theory can be called a linguistic matter, the assumption of an ontology can also be called a linguistic matter - but not more than this. >Ontology/Quine. VI 63 Language/Observation/Translation/Quine: most of our utterances are not correlated with stimuli at all, e.g. connectives etc. VI 64 The linguist can create an archive of uninterpreted sentences and dissect them. Recurring segments can be treated as words. (Analytical hypothesis). VI 65 Ultimately, we depend on very poor data material. We can expect successive statements to have something to do with each other. Later, the translator will be dependent on psychological hypotheses. What will the jungle inhabitants most likely believe to be true? What will they probably believe? VI 66 In this case, preference is given to recognizably rational translations. But to establish an alleged grammar and semantics of the natives would be nothing more than bad psychology. Instead one should assume that the psyche of the natives is largely like ours. VI 67 When the linguist discovers an error, he will wonder how far back it goes. VI 105 Language/QuineVsMentalism: The prerequisite of language is that people perceive that others perceive something. This, however, is the seduction to overstretch the mentalistic way of speaking. Mentalism. VII (b) 26 Definition/Quine: can serve two opposite purposes: 1. abbreviation and practical representation (short notation) 2. reverse: redundancy in grammar and vocabulary. Economical vocabulary leads to longer strings. Conversely, economical vocabulary simplifies the theoretical discourse about a language. Language/Quine: by habit these two types are fused together, one as part of the other: External language: is redundant in grammar and vocabulary and economical in terms of the length of strings. Partial language "primitive notation": is economical in grammar and vocabulary. VII (b) 27 Part and whole are connected by translation rules. We call these definitions. They are not assigned to one of the two languages, but connect them. But they are not arbitrary. They should show how primitive notations can serve all purposes. VII (d) 61 Language/Translation/Whorf/Cassirer/Quine: you cannot separate the language from the rest of the world. Differences in language will correspond to differences in life form. Therefore, it is not at all clear how to assume that words and syntax change from language to language while the content remains fixed. VII (d) 77 Introduction/Language/General Term/Quine: the use of general terms has probably arisen in the course of language development because similar stimuli cause similar reactions. Language would be impossible without general terms. In order to understand them, one must recognize the additional operator "class of" or "-ness" when introducing them. Failure to do so was probably the reason for accepting abstract entities. >General Terms/Quine. VII (d) 78 Science/Language/Quine: how much of our science is actually contributed by language, and how much is an original (real) reflection of reality? To answer this, we have to talk about both the world and the language! ((s) And that is already the answer!) Quine: and in order to talk about the world, we have to presuppose a certain conceptual scheme that belongs to our particular language. Conceptual Scheme/Quine: we were born into it, but we can change it bit by bit, like Neurath's ship. VII (d) 79 Language/Quine: its purpose is efficiency in communication and prediction. Elegance is even added as an end in itself. X 34/35 Truth/Language/Quine: Truth depends on language, because it is possible that sounds or characters in one language are equivalent to "2 < 5" and in another to "2 > 5". When meaning changes over many years within a language, we think that they are two different languages. Because of this relativity, it makes sense to attribute a truth value only to tokens of sentences. Truth/World/Quine: the desire for an extra-linguistic basis for truth arises only if one ignores the fact that the truth predicate has precisely the purpose of linking the mention of linguistic forms with the interest in the objective world. X 42 Immanent/Language/Quine: are immanent in language: educational rules, grammatical categories, the concept of the word, or technically: the morpheme. ad X 62 Object language/meta language/mention/use/(s): the object language is mentioned (spoken about), the meta language is used to speak about the object language. X 87 Language/Grammar/Quine: the same language - the same infinite set of sentences can be created with different educational rules from different lexicons. Therefore, the concept (definition) of logical truth is not transcendent, but (language) immanent. (logical truth: is always related to a certain language, because of grammatical structure). >Logical Truth/Quine. Dependence on language and its grammatization. XI 114 Theory/Language/Quine/Lauener: we do not have to have an interpreted language in order to formulate a theory afterwards. This is the rejection of the isolated content of theoretical sentences. Language/Syntax/Lauener: Language cannot be considered purely syntactically as the set of all correctly formed expressions, because an uninterpreted system is a mere formalism. ((s) Such a system is not truthful). XI 115 Language/Theory/ChomskyVsQuine/Lauener: a person's language and theory are different systems in any case, even if you would agree with Quine otherwise. XI 116 Quine: (ditto). Uncertainty of translation: because of it one cannot speak of a theory invariant to translations. Nor can one say that an absolute theory can be formulated in different languages, or conversely that different (even contradictory) theories can be expressed in one language. ((s) Because of the ontological statement that I cannot argue about ontology by telling the other that the things that exist in it do not exist in me, because then I contradict myself that there are things that do not exist). Lauener: that would correspond to the fallacy that language contributes to the syntax but theory to the empirical content. Language/Theory/Quine/Lauener: i.e. not that there is no contradiction between the two at all: insofar as two different theories are laid down in the same language, this means that the expressions are not interchangeable in all expressions. But there are also contexts where the distinction between language and theory has no meaning. Therefore, the difference is gradual. The contexts where language and theory are interchangeable are those where Quine speaks of a network. V 32 Def Language/Quine: is a "complex of dispositions to linguistic behaviour". V 59 Language/Quine: ideas may be one way or the other, but words are out there where you can see and hear them. Nominalism/Quine: turns away from ideas and towards words. Language/QuineVsLocke: does not serve to transmit ideas! (> NominalismVsLocke). >Nominalism. Quine: it is probably true that when we learn a language we learn how to connect words with the same ideas (if you accept ideas). Problem: how do you know that these ideas are the same? V 89 Composition/language/animal/animal language/Quine: animals lack the ability to assemble expressions. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Language Rules | Chisholm | II 68/69 Language rules/Carnap: a) what "square" is true of, is a square, b) what "rectangle" is true of, is a rectangle c) What are "square" is true of, is a rectangle - meaning postulates allow the step c) - Mention/use/Carnap: the expressions are not mentioned in the maning postulate, but only used - "(x) (Fx> Gx)" is a m.post. of S" is a statement about "F" and "G" in S. >Meaning postulates, >Mention, >Use. ChisholmVsCarnap: Tarski: on the left is a necessary condition for the truth of the expression on the right-hand side - that does not refer to language rules, but to non-linguistic entites - no sentence is true only due to the use. Cf. >Truth definition. Sauer, W. Über das Analytische und das synthetische Apriori bei Chisholm. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Logic | Mates | I 258 Definition logic/Mates: theory of conlcusion relation. Task: to find general laws about what follows from what - correct thinking is not a contribution to logic. >Conditional/Mates, >Consequence, >Inference, >Conclusion, >Logical laws. I 260 Logic/Aristotle/Mates: Aristotle did not yet know the distinction mention/use. >Mention/use, >Aristotle. It is the same: if a thing is contained in another, and when each is stated of the other. I 261 First clear use of variables in history - for these names are used. >Variables, >Unity and multiplicity, >Difference, >Names. Variables/Stoics: "the first", "the second", etc. (unlike Aristotle). I 262 "Zukommen"/Aristotle: goes in both directions - which shows that there is no distinction between concept and object. >Concept, >Object, >Object/Quine, >Levels/order, >Levels of Description. I 265 Terms for "Zukommen" are nouns, sensual beings, human, for "Nicht-Zukommen" substance, sensual being, number. ((s) Today the corresponding form is "true of".) >Satisfaction, >Satisfiability. I 281 Logic/Hobbes/Mates: influential (misleading) Argument: necessary truths would just come about through the random way how people like tthe o use their words. >Necessity, >Contingency, >Language use. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
| Logical Proper Names | Prior | I 150f Logical Proper Names/Prior: Logical proper names make complex predicates superfluous. N and M are l.E. if and only if any propositions in which they are both used (not only mentioned) express a relation between the objects to which they refer, and whose relation has a converse, so if φ and ψ are converses, [φMN] and [ψNM] are logically equivalent. >Predicates, >Equivalence, >Mention, >Use, >Mention/Use. An expression N is then a logical proper name (Russell's proper name, "this" etc.) only if [(δφ)N] is indistinguishable in meaning from [δ(φN)]. (Parenthesis)Prior: the latter contributes to the fact that one could say that logical proper names are always arguments of sentence-forming functions and never functions of such functions. >Functions. In general: a context of a context of a real "argument" x is a context of x. For example, "I think this is a human" is synonymous(!) with "This is a thought of mine, to be human". >Synonymy, >Context, >Levels/order, >Description levels. I 149 Bound Variables/Prior: stand for logical proper names - "For an x: 1. x φt , 2. Not other than x φt and 3. It is not the case that x ψt". >Variables, >Bound variables. I 152 Logical Proper Names/Prior: if expressions like "the φ-er" can be used as Russell's logical proper name, then without doubt all names can be used that way! >Logical proper names/Russell. But Peirce and Russell believe that this is not the case, real relations are expressed. >Relations/Russell, >B. Russell, >Ch. S. Peirce. I 155 Names/Relation/Logical Proper Names/Prior: if "Y" is a logical proper name, the following forms are equivalent: (A) X says that Y is bald (B) X says that Y is bald (C) Y is considered bald by YX. Problem: what are names in this sense anyway? >Proper names. Prior Thesis: There is a close relationship between names and the term "to be about something". >"About", >Predication, >Attribution. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Logical Proper Names | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 94 ff This/Logical Proper Name/Russell: "this" is a (logical) proper name. WittgensteinVsRussell/Philosophical Studies: The indicative "this" can never become bearerless, but that does not make it a name." (Philosophical Investigation § 45) I 95 According to Russell's early theory, there are only two logical proper names in our language for particular objects apart from the ego, namely "this" and "that". You introduce them by pointing at them. Hintikka: of these concrete Russellian objects it is true in the true sense of the word that they cannot be pronounced, but only named. (> Mention/Use/Saying/> Pointing). I 95 Saying/Pointing/Showing/Logical Proper Names/Russell/Hintikka: "this" cannot be expresed (pronounced) - only named - ((s) > Mention / >Use) - ((s) "This" cannot express the thing in absence of the thing). - ((s) The object cannot be mentioned by the logical proper name.) I 102 We can only point to the objects of acquaintance. >Acquaintance. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Meaning Theory | McDowell | Avramides I 12 Meaning Theory/m.th./McDowell: Problem: if meaning is explained in terms of something else, this other must be explained again. - Thesis: indirect access to understanding and general language behavior without the concept of analysis. - Instead, depiction of the relations between concepts we already assume as understood. - With this the concept of meaning does not occur. >Understanding/McDowell, >Definition, >Explanation/McDowell, >Meaning/McDowell, >Circle. --- McDowell II IX Translation semantics/Evans/McDowell: The point of view according to which the meaning theory has the task to frame rules which put sentences with their representations in relation - McDowellVs - E.g. x is a picture of F. - Problem: >Something "is a lion picture". ((s) This carries the singular qualities into the relation.) - instead: Solution/Davidson: satisfies neutrally. - N.B.: that removes the quotes. II IX/X Meaning Theory/m.th./McDowell: makes no relation between a sentence and itself. Instead, the m.th. represents a semantic property of the sentence by using it. - Translation: the knowledge that chauve bare is fulfilled, is no knowledge of a relation. - Instead: empirical relation between chauve and bald men. - This is just the use and not the mention. >Mention, >Use, >Mistake mention/use, >Translation, >Convention T, >Truth theories, >Disquotational scheme. II XII Translation problem/Evans/McDowell: E.g. x "is a picture of F" - Solution/Davidson: "satisfies", the relation of satisfaction neutrally conceived: x satisfies F iff Wx. - W: is an expression of the meta-language. - Problem is still there: x satisfies "is a picture of a lion iff x is a picture of a lion" must be explained (by additional determination). - The manipulations allowed in the theorem must correspond to the meaning of the used object-language expressions. II XVIIf Meaning Theory/m.th./Evans/McDowell: not from truth theory, for radical interpretation at best says that the truth theory is true. - For a foreign language, however, a reliably true truth theory is at the same time a meaning theory. II 43 Truth theory/McDowell: if one had a rule for f in "s, f is iff p" and this f could be replaced by "true". For this we need only the concept of the equality of the sentence-sense. II 50 Truth Theory: must show the content of the speech actions recognizable - ((s) The right side uses part of the world (e.g. the actual nature of snow.) - ((s) Problem: compared with this the language is relatively completed.) II 43ff Meaning Theory/m.th./McDowell: Thesis: a theory of the sense should be a meaning theory at the same time. - In addition: theory of force. (Question, command, etc.) >Theory of force. --- Dummett III 130f Definition "Exuberant Theory"/meaning theory/McDowell: attributes to the speaker knowledge of the conditions that an object must fulfill in order to be a bearer of a name. - Definition "Sober theory"/McDowell: here the speaker knows only about the object that he is the name bearer of. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Meaning Theory | Seuren | EMD II VII ff Meaning theory/Seuren: thesis: a meaning theory is impossible meanings can not be described in language - otherwise circle! McDowellVs: this is not at all circular: there is no doubled mention but once we have mention, and once use. >Mention, >Use, >Meta language, >Object language, >Mention/Use, II XIII Use and not mention shows the meaning. >Meaning. |
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| Mention | Chisholm | I 101 Mention in use/Chisholm: something about "Thomas" Thomas says something about Thomas. >Use, >Mistake Mention/Use. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Mention | Cresswell | II 79 Mention/use/Cresswell: we tolerate here a confusion of use and mention, by allowing that u, v and ~ now represent the intensions of "and", "or" and "not". >Connectives, >Logical constants, >Logic, >Intensions, >Use, >Mention/Use. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Mention | Field | II 115 Logical connectives/deflationism/explanation/mention/use/counterfactual conditional/Field: the explanation why "or" obeys the truth table though needs rules of inference, but does not mention them - but you can use here "because" (inference rules). >Inferences, >Logical constants, >Counterfactual conditional. But that does not back counterfactual conbditionals. - Because the fact that these rules are connected to "or" does not matter in the explanation - which also applies to all other words. >Explanation, >Word meaning. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Mention | Fraassen | I 91 Mention/use/Fraassen: E.g. Mention: to say that Newton's theory explained tides. Use: to explain tides with Newton's theory. >Use, >Mistake mention/use. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Mention | Geach | I 74 Mention/Use/Geach: for each x: either x is white or x is not white. Mention: for each object x: either the predicate is "white" or its negation is true of x. "True-of": is a simpler term. Therefore, Tarski begins his defintion of truth with it: >Satisfaction. E.g.,"Proxy": at use - quote: at mention. Mention: "... its negation is true of ..". Negation is mentioned. Use of the negation: "x is ~ F" - ((s) Mention/(s): about the negation: "it is true" - likewise: "has a true negation".) ad I 84 Mention/Use/Quote/Geach/(s) E.g. "is an obscene expression" is not an obscene expression. I 195 Meta-language/mention/use/Geach: if p and q are meta-linguistical variables, then "~ p" means: "the negation of p" and not "it is not the case that p". >Meta language, >Variables, >Object language, >Levels/Order, >Use. I 202 Mention/use/names/sentence/Geach: names of expressions are formed by quotation marks - then at the same time mention and use. - Mentioned by the combination of its own with the quotes - used as part of a complex expression. >Quotation marks, >Name of a sentence, >Quote. Mention/Use: both are no contrasting pair. I 225 Mention/Use: E.g. a class or number is specified by mention (not use) of a property. >Classes, >Properties. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Mention | Locke | Arndt II 179 Mention/use/word/object/language/Locke: was the first to have a consciousness of the confusability: to keep the words for the things themselves. Or to put a sign for things that it cannot designate. Designate: designation is ambivalent: the thought that it was possible that the mere language use gives insight into the nature of the thing signified. >Language behavior, >Sign, >Meaning, >Use, >Designation, >Denotation. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Loc II H.W. Arndt "Locke" In Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen - Neuzeit I, J. Speck (Hg) Göttingen 1997 |
| Mention | Logic Texts | Salmon I 243 Mentioning/use/confusion/W. Salmon: e.g. 9/12 has a nine in the numerator - 3/4 = 9/12 - 3/4 has a nine in the numerator - If we want to talk about number signs, we have to make names for them - we have to replace the second premise by "3/4" = "9/12" (wrong! while 3/4 = 9/12 is mathematically correct!) What is wrong with the syllogism? The name of the number sign of the first premise must be understood as a non-compound word. And parts of words must not be replaced. >Mistake mention/Use. I 244 "There are no binary numbers in reality! (these are signs) - in the same way "Roman numerals" or "Arabic numerals" are always signs! The decimal system or the binary system are also just sign systems that refer to the same numbers". >Use. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Sal I Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 German Edition: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sal II W. Salmon The Foundations Of Scientific Inference 1967 SalN I N. Salmon Content, Cognition, and Communication: Philosophical Papers II 2007 |
| Mention | Prior | I 98 Mention/use/Prior: E.g. use only: "if ... then he says truthfully that snow is white": no mention (adverbial). >Use, >Mention/Use, >Levels/order, >Description levels. This is only about snow, not about truth. - There is no metalanguage in this case. >Metalanguage. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Mention | Quine | V 100 Mention/Use/Language Learning/Quine: the confusion mention/use is necessary for learning: the sound of the word has approximately the same effect as the sight of the object - also transition from observation statements to timeless statements: E.g. from "Fido is a dog" to "A dog is an animal" (the confusion is ignored here). >Language Acquisition/Quine, >Learning/Quine. VII (e) 82ff Mention/use/expression/Quine: e.g. the term "(F I Y)" itself is not a formula, but a name that describes the formula. ((s) conditional probability). IX 22 Use/mention/Quine: on the right hand side of "ε" we use quantifiable variables - on the left hand side of "ε" we mention classes. >Variables/Quine, >Classes/Quine. I 339 Mentioning/Use/Russell/Whitehead/QuineVsRussell/QuineVsWhitehead: Whitehead and Russell, who took the distinction between use and mention lightly, wrote "p implies q" (in the material sense) as if it were interchangeable with "If p, then q" (in the material sense). C. I. Lewis did the same, he wrote "p implies strictly q" and declared it as "It is necessary that not (p and not q)". Hence, he developed a modal logic in which "necessary" is a sentence operator. Solution/Quine: It is best to consider "implies" and "analytical" as general terms that are predicted by sentences by adding them predictively to names (i.e. quotations) of sentences. Unlike "and", "not", "if so" which are not terms but operators. I 68 Implication/mention/use/Quine: not sentences or schemata are implied, but their names. For we cannot write "implies" between the sentences themselves, but only between their names. So we mention the sentences by using their names. We are talking about the sentences. ((s) Implication is via the sentences. >Implication/Quine. Different: Conditional/Quine: (">" or "if...then...") here we use the sentences or schemes themselves, we do not mention them. No reference is made to them. They appear only as parts of a longer sentence or schema. Example: If Cassius is not hungry, then he is not skinny and hungry This mentions Cassius but not a sentence. It is the same with conjunction, negation and alternation. VII (e) 82 Mention/Use/Expression/Quine: For example: the expression "(φ I ψ)" is not a formula itself, but a name describing the formula. VII (f) 112f Sentence/Schema/Quine: the distinction between sentence and schema is not the same as that between mention/use. IX 22 Usage/Mention/Quine: to the right of "ε" we use quantifiable variables, to the left of "ε" we mention classes. X 62 Object language/meta language/mention/use/(s): the object language is mentioned (it is spoken about), the meta language is used to talk about the object language. >Metalanguage/Quine, >Object language/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Mention | Rorty | III 221 Dialectic/RortyVsDerrida: requires only imagination. - Method is not among them. - E.g. Derrida: "use is just a special case of mention." ((s)VsDerrida: Logical flaw: placing the distinction between two domains A and B in domain A. Examples are: To regard the sign as "unity of sign and signified", or to regard representation as "unity of representation and the represented". See "The overarching general". III 222 DerridaVs distinction mention/Use when communicating with other philosophers. >Use, >Metalanguage, >Object language. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Mention | Russell | V 38 QuineVsRussell: there is a great confusion in Principia Mathematica(1) between use and mention of linguistic expressions: you do not know whether you are talking about the sign or its meaning. >Mention/Use, >Use, >Meta language, >Object language. VI 84 Incident/Mention/Use/Russell: "Scott has written Waverley": here, the name "Scott" does not appear in what I say. - What I say is about the person, not the name. >Theory of descriptions. Constituent element of a sentence: E.g. "the unicorn does not exist": "the unicorn" is not a constituent part (part of the reality, unicorn is not a part of a fact). >Unicorn example. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hauptwerke der Philosophie. 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 33 Use/mention/QuineVsRussell: in Principia Mathematica(1) there is a widespread confusion between use and mention of linguistic expressions: you don't know if you are talking about the sign or its meaning. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |
| Mention | Ryle | Geach I 255 Conditional/Ryle: antecedent and consequent are no allegations. Statements are neither used nor mentioned in conditionals. >Mention/Use, >Use, >Conditional, >Assertion, >Statement, >Truth value. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Mention | Searle | V 116F SearleVsRussell: Russell's distinction between mention and >use is too strict. --- VI 194 Example: Pragmatic analysis/Ross: further development: certain elements are present in the context of the speech act and syntactic processes can refer to them. VI 195 SearleVs: this hardly differs from performative analysis. SearleVsRoss: confusion of mention and use: Ross confuses the speaker with the "I" that refers to him, the listener with the "you", and the acts with the verbs they indicate. VI 196 Of course, the formulation of the rules that mention speakers, listeners and acts will use these expressions. Ross makes this mistake because he is under the spell of assuming that the rules should only mention syntactic elements. If we abandon this, our alternative theory will become easier: 1. We use independently motivated semantic and "pragmatic" knowledge. 2. We do not have to postulate erased syntactic elements. >Deletion, >Syntax, >Mention/use. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Mention | Strawson | VII 102 Mention/use/Strawson: not the expression refers, but the use of the term. Meaning: function of the sentence or phrase. >Meaning. Reference: function of the use. >Reference. Truth: feature of the use of sentences. >Truth/Strawson. >Mention/Use, >Mention, >Speech acts. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Mention | Tugendhat | I 296 And/characters/mention/use/Tugendhat: "a and b": on the side of the characters we must not expect the expression "p and q", but the expression "that p and that q". This is an analogy, in fact. And they are also in need of completion by a predicate. >Logical connectives, >Levels, >Logical constants, >That-clauses, >States of affairs. I 297 But the fact that p and the fact that q are not composed - we need a more general term which somehow contains composition, but goes beyond that. Cf. >Compositionality, >Complex/complexity. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Mention | Wessel | I 220 Use/mention/Wessel: the statement "a and b are identical" is not about the terms "a" and "b", but about the objects they designate - that is, the terms "a" and "b" are used and not mentioned - (s) if the terms were mentioned, one would talk about the terms and not about the objects. >Mention/use, >Use, >Levels/order, >Metalanguage, >Object language. I 286 Use/mention: logical follow-up relationship: A I- B: talks about statements (i.e. not content). >Consequence. Conditional: A -> B: talking about the content which is talked about in the statements (e.g. current, magnetic field). ((s)Question/(s): mention is = if it is not talked about statements content-related? Use: = if e.g. the truth is found? - But: "A is true" - does not mean "the current flows".) I 313 ((s) Use/mention/Wessel/(s): E.g. "The Inselsberg is referred to by the term Inselsberg": 1. incident used as a term, and designates the object, 2. the word is not used here as a term, but mentioned as a physical object Inselsberg: is mentioned - name: is used. Mention: = quote (quotes). Instead of quotation marks: t: t A: name of statement A - "the statement A". I 352 Incident/mention/use/Wessel: 1. Term or statement A occurs as a term or statement in: E.g. ~ A or A and B. 2. merely as a physical thing (darkness, sound) in E.g. "the statement A" (tA), or "the facts that A" (sA) - E.g. from "Ließchen says a" (only graphically A) and A ↔ B does not follow "Ließchen says B" - therefore it always needs to be defined what must be regarded as incident of a term. (s) A sound cannot be true or false. ad I 352 ((s) Mention/use/density/Wessel/(s): different density of the pages: just plays no role in 2 + 2 = 4.) I 35 "Odd"/Frege: occurrence as merely graphical part. >Odd sense, >Odd meaning, >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >G. Frege. Extensionality rule: statements can be replaced by identical ones in meaning, but not any graphical parts. >Extensionality, >Extensions. Wessel: the extensionality rule is here not applicable. - Because intensional rules are very similar to extensional ones, but sometimes replacing of graphical parts by genuine statements. I 353 Planets example /Wessel: Quine does not differentiate between graphic and genuine occurrence. Only identity sentences: evening star = morning star, number of planets = 9 and then substitutability for identities. >Substitution, >Substitutability, >Identity, >Morning star/evening star, >Planets example. WesselVsQuine: See them as compound expressions: then evening star unequal morning star, as simple equal (for Venus). |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Metalanguage | Quine | X 71 Metalanguage/Set Theory/Quine: in the metalanguage a stronger set theory is possible than in the object language. In the metalanguage a set z is possible so that ERz applies - ((s) A set of that is the satisfaction relation (in the form of a set of ordered pairs) - not in the object language, otherwise >Grelling paradox. >Set Theory/Quine, >Object Language/Quine. X 61 Object Language/Metalanguage/Mention/Use/(s): the object language is mentioned (it is spoken about), the metalanguage is used to talk about the object language. Object Language/Metalanguage/OS/MS/ordered pairs/Quine: if we define ordered pairs ('x,y': the set whose only elements are {{x},1} and {{y},2}.), this does not mean that in the object language the variables could also take sets or ordered pairs as values. We use the ordered pairs only in metalanguage. Metalanguage: is the everyday language in which we talk about logic. For example, if I say that the pair '3.5' fulfills the sentence "x < y" then I temporarily assume that the sentence "x < y" belongs to the object langauge and that the numbers 3 and 5 belong to the subject area of the object language. But I don't have to assume that the ordered pairs '3,5' belong to the object language. It is enough that it belongs to metalanguage, and it does. Fulfillment/metalanguage/object language/Quine(s): what fulfills belongs to metalanguage, what is fulfilled to object language |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Method | Ortega y Gasset | Brocker I 200 Method/Ortega y Gasset: Ortega y Gasset's phenomenological descriptions and analyses are often vague. Some of them prove to be general comments on certain macro themes of world history, to which there are alternative divergent interpretations that are as plausible as those that Ortega favors. Therefore, the reader is not always able to decide which view is the appropriate one. Ortega himself admits that the phenomena of interest to him are characterized by an ambivalence that cannot be eliminated. On page 56 it is clearly stated: "I care a lot about the statement that the situation [...] in whose analysis we are here is ambiguous in nature. […] And this ambiguity clings not to our judgment, but to reality itself." (1) ((s)VsOrtega: "..to reality itself": confusion of word and object, confusion of mention/use). >Mention, >Use, >Mention/use, >Reality, >Description levels, >Levels/order. 1. José Ortega y Gasset, La Rebelión de las Masas (con un prólogo para franceses, un epílogo para ingleses y un apéndice: Dinámica del tiempo), Madrid 1937 (zuerst 1929). Dt.: José Ortega y Gasset, Der Aufstand der Massen, Reinbek 1956, p. 56. Thomas Gil, „Ortega y Gasset, Der Aufstand der Massen (1929)“ In: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Mistake Mention/Use | Mention/Use: Words are mostly used to mention an object. Words can also be mentioned when the use of language is under discussion. Various logical problems arise from an unconscious use of words while it is unclear whether they are used or mentioned. The confusion of mention and use corresponds to a confusion of words and objects. There are also forms between mention and use. See also object Language, metalanguage, quote/disquotation, reference, type/token. |
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| Mistake Mention/Use | Baudrillard | Baud I J. Baudrillard Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994 Baud II Jean Baudrillard Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993 German Edition: Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009 |
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| Mistake Mention/Use | Goodman | II 78 Mention/use/possible worlds/possibility/Goodman: statements about what is possible need not exceed the boundaries of the real world. Often we confuse a description of the real world with the world itself. >World/Thinking, >Circular reasoning, >Descriptions, >Metalanguage, >Use, >Mention, >Object language. II 110 Grue/projection: with grue, the description of the desired result is confused with the description of the permitted means. The confirmation is indeed a relationship between data and hypotheses, but that does not mean that the definition of this relationship is likely to use nothing but these data and hypotheses. >Grueness, >Induction, >Hypotheses. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Mistake Mention/Use | Quine | I 339 Material implication "p impl q" is not equal to "p > q" (> mention/use). - "Implies" and "analytical" are the best general terms. >Mention, >use, >word, >object. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Mistake Mention/Use | Russell | (according to Rorty): Mention/Use: this distinction is originally from Russell. ((s) Explanation: E.g. number of letters of a sentence: "The cat is on the mat" has n letters. Here the sentence is mentioned. It is not about the meaning of the sentence. E.g. meaning of a sentence: might be given by a paraphrase: My pet is at its favorite place. Object language: the original sentence. Metalanguage: a statement about the number of letters, for instance.) >Meta language, >Object language, >Description level, >Levels(Order), >Meaning, >Quote; cf.>Indirect speech. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |
| Mistake Mention/Use | Searle | Rorty III 218f SearleVsDerrida: Derrida did not follow Austin's distinction between mention and use. If he did, his criticism would have been in vain. >Mention, >Use, >Mention/Use/DerridaVsAustin. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Proper Names | Strawson | VII 16 Names/Strawson: proper names have no meaning. Ignorance of the name is not linguistic ignorance. --- I 222 Names/adjective/Strawson: also names can be adjectival: E.g. Napoleonic, Russian, even with auxiliary verb is a Hitler. >Adjectives, >Attribute, >Description, >Comparisons, >Analogies, >Comparability. I 224 But: Napoleonic gesture is not connecting gesture with Napoleon but between gesture and similarity principle of the summary which is made possible by Napoleon. But: Ramsey: we probably say wisdom is a characteristic of Socrates, but not: wisdom sokratizes (this is wrong). >Similarity. A particular cannot be predicted. Solution: Language has a pseudo-universal: be feature of. I 226 Only pseudo-universal. otherwise regress: characterized through being characterized by... --- VI 386ff Names/general term/Strawson: cannot be derived syntactically. >General terms, >Syntax. --- VII 113 Names/Strawson: Meaning not object - (confusion of utterance and use). >Mention/Use. Reference: Expressions plus context. - Referencing does not mean to say that you refer. >Levels/Order. VII 122 StrawsonVsRussell/VsQuine: Summit of circularity: names to treat as camouflaged descriptions - names are chosen arbitrarily or conventionally - otherwise names would be descriptive. >Hidden descriptions. VII 122 Quasi names/Strawson: e.g. Glorious Revolution, Blue Grotto, Patriotic War. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Psychology | Chisholm | II 211ff Purely mental/Marek: disposition: content determined only by experience - not purely psych: e.g. homesick - e.g. perceptual judgment: car is 5 m long. >Dispositions, >Mental states. II 213 Psychology/analytical philosophy/Marek: Question: Is the concept of the psychic uniform? One can speak of things that are psychic: e.g. properties, qualities, phenomena, states, events. And you can say of concepts and theories that they are not psychic. II 214 Question: are there purely logical features characteristic of the psychic? Brentano: yes, intentionality. >Intentionality. Other authors VsBrentano: The search for characteristics is in vain, since the psychic is not further definable. E.G., just as one cannot give specific species characteristics for the concept of the phenomenal color. At the most, one can specify subspecies (for the color as for the psychic). II 212/3 Difference: pain is something unpleasant - pain is something mental (mention/use). >Use, >Mention. Marek, Johann Christian. Zum Programm einer Deskriptiven Psychologie. In: Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/ Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Quotation Marks | Quotes: symbols for highlighting parts in a sentence or text. Often for identification of quotations or for distancing. For philosophical problems see also mention/use, quasi-quotation. |
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| Quotation Marks | Black | IV 147 Quotes/Black/Truth Definition/Tarski/(s): the form is shown in quotation marks, content without quotation marks, truth is attributed to the character itself (e.g."to be the case" or "proxy".) >Truth definition, >Quote/Disquotation, >Description levels, cf. >Mention/Use. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Self- Reference | Prior | I 98f Self-referentiality/Prior: without metalanguage no self-reference is possible. >Metalanguage, >Object Language, >Mention/Use, >Levels/order, >Description levels. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Translation | Millikan | I 78 Translation/Sellars/Millikan: Translation scheme (rubric): ___ (in L) means ... Problem: this should not be confused with other forms of meaning. This is about "having the same use". Cf. >Use theory, >Meaning/Millikan. Stabilization function/Millikan: we can put the stabilization function here for "use". >Terminology/Millikan. Foreign language/Millikan: we can eliminate "(in L)": the word to be translated names its own family (reproductively established family). As an element of a family, it is, of course, in a particular language. I 79 Stabilization function: what role does it play in the scheme? Mention/Use/Sellars: E.g. "and" means "and": the German "and" is mentioned, the English "and" is used. But it is not a question of a rigid comparison of mention and use. Focussed stabilization function/Millikan: e.g. "x means y": the focused stabilization function is to make the listener use x in accordance with its stabilization function. He usually does this by presenting a token of the family "y", whose stabilization function the listener already knows. This enables the listener to adopt the same attitude to the family "x". |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Truth | Prior | I 21 Truth/belief/Prior: Truth cannot only be applied to propositions, but also to belief: logical form: "(X thinks that) p and p" (bracket). - But determination of truth does not ascribe a property to any proposition (always facts are decisive). >Propositions, >Facts. A fact is possible without a believed proposition. >Beliefs, >Thinking. Problem/Moore: if no one believes that the belief must be false, even if it would be correct if someone believes that! ((s) This is due to non-existence). PriorVs: this is a misconception of belief as a relation to facts. >Relation theory. I 98 Truth/PriorVsTarski: you could also see it as an adverb (quasi-property) instead regarding it as a property: E.g. "when someone says that snow is white, he says it truthfully". Cf. >Truth/Tarski, >Truth definition/Tarski. Prior: with me there is no mention, only use. >Quotation marks, >Quotation/disquotation, >Disquotation scheme, >Mention/use. Prior: the sentencenly >snow is white" is only about snow, not about truth. - There is no metalanguage. >Metalanguage. PriorVsTarski: for me the truth is as much about the things that someone thinks, fears, etc. - Then you can also think that you think something wrong. >Thinking, >Self-reference. I 106 Truth/meaning/Buridan: every sentence means that it is true itself (in addition to what else it means). Prior: we have to admit that a sentence can have several meanings at the same time. >Meaning, >Sentence meaning, >Ambiguity. Then the sentence is non-paradoxically wrong (contradictorily) if it is to mean that it is wrong. - But there is no "secondary meaning" and "principle B". Cf. >Paradoxes. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Carnap, R. | Husserl Vs Carnap, R. | Chisholm II 148 Mention/use/Husserl/Mulligan/Smith: (HusserlVsCarnap): the mentioning (abnormal use) of b in quotation marks is parasitic to the original use. One must know what 'b' is in order to be able to use 'b'. So the unmodified and the modified use must have something in common. Mention/Husserl: mention is a nominal function. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Conceptual Role | Fodor Vs Conceptual Role | IV 163 Conceptual Role/CRT/Block/Fodor/Lepore: "conceptual role theory" or theory of the conceptual role, semantics of conceptual role. Thesis: the meaning of an expression is its semantic role (or inferential role). Block: believes that one version of this theory is true, but does not want to decide which one. Anyway, it is, according to Block, the only one that fulfills the conditions of the cognitive sciences. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: Block's arguments for the conceptual role theory are not the decisive ones. But this does not lead to semantic holism anyway. It would have to be asserted together with the distinction analytic/synthetic. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: perhaps the psychology, which Block has in mind, needs these conditions, but we do not believe that a version of the conceptual role theory fulfills them. IV 166 Fodor/Lepore/GriceVsBlock: ad 6.: (autonomous/inherited meaning) each Gricean semantics can tell the same story as Block: namely, that the meanings of sentences in a natural language depend on contents of propositional attitudes expressed by these sentences (propositional attitudes may be, for example, the communicative intentions). Grice: thesis: meanings are derived from the content of propositional attitudes (e.g. communicative intentions, >Position). IV 169 Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: 1) Now it becomes obvious: distinctions between inferential roles only solve Frege’s problem if there is an adequate principle of individuation for them. But there is no criterion for that! Block also names this as the main problem. So it is not easier to distinguish between the inferiential roles than between meanings. Twin Earth/TE/CRT/Block/Fodor/Lepore: problems with the Twin Earth are going in the a different direction than Frege’s problems (intention/extension). Frege: needs more finely grained concepts than extensions. Putnam: needs less finely grained concepts than extensional equivalence. (Eng) Synonymous expressions must be treated as extensionally different (water/twin earth water). Therefore, a common theoretical approach (CRT - conceptual role theory) is unlikely to work. Solution/Block: "two factors" version of the CRT. The two are orthogonal to each other: a) actual CRT: covers the meaning aspect of Frege IV 170 b) independent, perhaps causal theory of reference: (twin earth/water/twin earth water). Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: that has almost nothing to do with conceptual role theory. But also neither a) (meaning) nor b) (causality) are available. But let’s assume it anyway: E.g. suppose distinction meaning/reference: with "two factor" theory: we do have enough discrimination capability, but we pay a high price for it: Question: what actually holds the two factors together? IV 171 Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: precisely in the case of the twin earth, the conceptual role cannot determine the reference! Conceptual Role/Block: seems to be saying that it is indeed not the conceptual role of water that determines what it refers to, but the conceptual role of names! Their reference is causally determined, after all, according to Kripke. Conceptual Role/(s): difference: a) conceptual role of a particular concept, e.g. water. b) a word class, e.g. names. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: but that does not solve the problem! We need something that prevents the confusion of extension and intension. What is it that excludes an expression like (see above) "prime/moisture"? Block: T is not a species concept if the causal theory of species concepts is not true of it. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: that does precisely not prevent "water" from having the extension of a species concept, while having the logic of a numerical concept. Mention/use/Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: Block seems to be guilty of this confusion here: the problem here is how the meaning of an expression is related to the denotation if the intension does not determine the extension. Block only tells us that the concpet T, etc. falls under the extension of expressions such as "name", "species concept" if a certain semantic theory is true. This tells us how the inferential roles of "name", "species concept", etc. are related to their extensions. For those it proposes a kind of description theory: E.g. "name" is applied to "Moses", iff "Moses" has the semantic properties which the causal theory defines for names. IV 172 Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: but it does not tell us how the meaning of "Moses" defines its extension! And that is exactly the problem that the "two-factor" theory raises. Narrow Content/Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: the idea that narrow meanings are conceptual roles sheds no light on the distinction meaning/reference. A semantic theory should not only be able to ascertain the identity of meaning, but also provide a canonical form that can answer the questions about the meaning of expressions. If the latter succeeds, it is not entirely clear whether the first must succeed as well. Narrow Content/categories/twin earth/Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: problem: how to express narrow contents. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Descriptivism | Lewis Vs Descriptivism | Stalnaker I 212 Def Local Descriptivism/Lewis/Stalnaker: Is simply a way to describe a part of the language vi another part.((s) The only possibility,according to Lewis and Stalnaker.) The broader paradigm of Kaplan corresponds to: Def Global Descriptivism/Lewis/Stalnaker: (Lewis 1984, 224) The entirety of a speaker's language is taken as a description of the world. (Theory). All terms of the language are interpreted at the same time, and statements on the world are made by establishing the theory. i.e. the terms refer to "whatever things", characteristics and relations render the theory true, as much as it is possible. LewisVsGlobal Descriptivism/Stalnaker: This cannot work because it is then impossible to explain how statements can be wrong. This is Putnam's Paradox. Def Putnam's Paradox/Stalnaker/(s): If a language is taken as a whole in order to explain all terms (and to set all its references) at the same time, then statements refer to "whatever things". And then relations and characteristics are always going to be what renders the theory the most truthful. Language/Thinking/World/Reality/Lewis/Stalnaker: Additional condition for global descriptivism: The easy terms must split the word "at its joints". ((s) But this is not given with one language.) LewisVsGlobal Descriptivism. StalnakerVsGlobal Descriptivism/StalnakerVsLewis: Such a metasemantic theory is not going to work, but if it were, the theory would give us quite a different depiction of our thoughts' contents. 1. Were the theory holistic, whatever somebody thinks depends from everything else he/she is thinking 2. Were the theory solipsistic, causal relations would depend on the use of the person. Then "Tullius" would mean something different for each person using it. Problem: We would then only speak about the language in the highest degree of generalization. We would not only be unable to refer to singular things which are different from the others, we would also describe the things not by their basic characteristics, but only in terms of characteristics and relations which fit the best, in order to render our theory, which is not interpreted, true. Vs: Representatives of the broader paradigm of Kaplan (semantic, not meta-semantic) could reply: The built-in two-dimensional frame in language allows us to express propositions which convey more direct statements on the world because Secondary propositions: which are set by our thoughts and utterances, are singular propositions and propositions which express basic characteristics and relations. However: primary propositions: they represent the cognitive values of our thoughts. Secondary propositions/semantic//broader frame of Kaplan: based on him, the secondary propositions are described and not expressed. ((s) mentioned, not used/Mention/Use). Secondary proposition/semantic: they are clearly set as a function of the facts. Problem: we do not have a cognitive access to them. Bsp Propositions, which we only know because of descriptions: "The sentence which is cited in Frank Jakson's "From Metaphysics to Ethics"on page 26, lines 3-4". E.g. The content of the first sentence Napoleon spoke to Josephine after his coronation. However: these propositions cannot be claimed by saying, e.g. "I hereby claim the proposition which fulfills the following condition." Secondary Proposition/semantic/Stalnaker: By semantically (not meta-semantically) interpreting the two-dimensional frame, the secondary propositions seem to be like these examples. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Frege, G. | Wittgenstein Vs Frege, G. | Brandom I 919 TractatusVsFrege: nothing can be considered an assertion, if not previously logical vocabulary is available, already the simplest assertion assumes the entire logic. --- Dummett I 32 Frege capturing of thought: psychic act - thought not the content of consciousness - consciousness subjective - thought objective - WittgensteinVs I 35 WittgensteinVsFrege: no personal objects (sensations), otherwise private language, unknowable for the subject itself. WittgensteinVsFrege: Understanding no psychic process, - real mental process: pain, melody (like Frege). Dummett I 62 Wittgenstein's criticism of the thought of a private ostensive definition states implicitly that color words can have no, corresponding with the Fregean assumption, subjective, incommunicable sense. (WittgensteinVsFrege, color words). But Frege represents anyway an objective sense of color words, provided that it is about understanding. Dummett I 158 WittgensteinVsDummett/WittgensteinVsFrege: rejects the view that the meaning of a statement must be indicated by description of their truth conditions. Wittgenstein: Understanding not abruptly, no inner experience, not the same consequences. --- Wolf II 344 Names/meaning/existence/WittgensteinVsFrege: E.g. "Nothung has a sharp blade" also has sense if Nothung is smashed. II 345 Name not referent: if Mr N.N. dies, the name is not dead. Otherwise it would make no sense to say "Mr. N.N. died". --- Simons I 342 Sentence/context/copula/tradition/Simons: the context of the sentence provided the copula according to the traditional view: Copula/VsTradition: only accours as a normal word like the others in the sentence, so it cannot explain the context. Solution/Frege: unsaturated phrases. Sentence/WittgensteinVsFrege/Simons: context only simply common standing-next-to-each-other of words (names). That is, there is not one part of the sentence, which establishes the connection. Unsaturation/Simons: this perfectly matches the ontological dependence (oA): a phrase cannot exist without certain others! --- Wittgenstein I 16 Semantics/Wittgenstein/Frege/Hintikka: 1. main thesis of this chapter: Wittgenstein's attitude to inexpressibility of semantics is very similar to that of Frege. Wittgenstein represents in his early work as well as in the late work a clear and sweeping view of the nature of the relationship between language and the world. As Frege he believes they cannot be expressed verbally. Earlier WittgensteinVsFrege: by indirect use this view could be communicated. According to the thesis of language as a universal medium (SUM) it cannot be expressed in particular, what would be the case if the semantic relationships between language and the world would be different from the given ones? Wittgenstein I 45 Term/Frege/WittgensteinVsFrege/Hintikka: that a concept is essentially predicative, cannot be expressed by Frege linguistically, because he claims that the expression 'the term X' does not refer to a concept, but to an object. I 46 Term/Frege/RussellVsFrege/Hintikka: that is enough to show that the Fregean theory cannot be true: The theory consists of sentences, which, according to their own theory cannot be sentences, and if they cannot be sentences, they also cannot be true ". (RussellVsFrege) WittgensteinVsFrege/late: return to Russell's stricter standards unlike Frege and early Wittgenstein himself. Wittgenstein late: greatly emphasizes the purely descriptive. In Tractatus he had not hesitated to go beyond the vernacular. I 65ff Saturated/unsaturated/Frege/Tractatus/WittgensteinVsFrege: in Frege's distinction lurks a hidden contradiction. Both recognize the context principle. (Always full sentence critical for meaning). I 66 Frege: unsaturated entities (functions) need supplementing. The context principle states, however, neither saturated nor unsaturated symbols have independent meaning outside of sentences. So both need to be supplemented, so the difference is idle. The usual equation of the objects of Tractatus with individuals (i.e. saturated entities) is not only missed, but diametrically wrong. It is less misleading, to regard them all as functions I 222 Example number/number attribution/WittgensteinVsFrege/Hintikka: Figures do not require that the counted entities belong to a general area of all quantifiers. "Not even a certain universality is essential to the specified number. E.g. 'three equally big circles at equal distances' It will certainly not be: (Ex, y, z)xe circular and red, ye circular and red, etc ..." The objects Wittgenstein observes here, are apparently phenomenological objects. His arguments tend to show here that they are not only unable to be reproduced in the logical notation, but also that they are not real objects of knowledge in reality. ((s) that is not VsFrege here). Wittgenstein: Of course, you could write like this: There are three circles, which have the property of being red. I 223 But here the difference comes to light between inauthentic objects: color spots in the visual field, tones, etc., and the actual objects: elements of knowledge. (> Improper/actual, >sense data, >phenomenology). --- II 73 Negation/WittgensteinVsFrege: his explanation only works if his symbols can be substituted by the words. The negation is more complicated than that negation character. --- Wittgenstein VI 119 WittgensteinVsFrege/Schulte: he has not seen what is authorized on formalism that the symbols of mathematics are not the characters, but have no meaning. Frege: alternative: either mere ink strokes or characters of something. Then what they represent, is their meaning. WittgensteinVsFrege: that this alternative is not correct, shows chess: here we are not dealing with the wooden figures, and yet the figures represent nothing, they have no Fregean meaning (reference). There is simply a third one: the characters can be used as in the game. Wittgenstein VI 172 Name/Wittgenstein/Schulte: meaning is not the referent. (VsFrege). --- Sentence/character/Tractatus 3.14 .. the punctuation is a fact,. 3.141 The sentence is not a mixture of words. 3.143 ... that the punctuation is a fact is concealed by the ordinary form of expression of writing. (WittgensteinVsFrege: so it was possible that Frege called the sentence a compound name). 3.1432 Not: "The complex character 'aRb' says that a stands in the relation R to b, but: that "a" is in a certain relation to "b", says aRb ((s) So conversely: reality leads to the use of characters). (quotes sic). --- Wittgenstein IV 28 Mention/use/character/symbol/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: their Begriffsschrift(1) does not yet exclude such errors. 3.326 In order to recognize the symbol through the character, you have to pay attention to the meaningful use. Wittgenstein IV 40 Sentence/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: the verb of the sentence is not "is true" or "is wrong", but the verb has already to include that, what is true. 4.064 The sentence must have a meaning. The affirmation does not give the sentence its meaning. IV 47 Formal concepts/Tractatus: (4.1272) E.g. "complex", "fact", "function", "number". WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell: they are presented in the Begriffsschrift by variables, not represented by functions or classes. E.g. Expressions like "1 is a number" or "there is only one zero" or E.g. "2 + 2 = 4 at three o'clock" are nonsensical. 4.12721 the formal concept is already given with an object, which falls under it. IV 47/48 So you cannot introduce objects of a formal concept and the formal concept itself, as basic concepts. WittgensteinVsRussell: you cannot introduce the concept of function and special functions as basic ideas, or e.g. the concept of number and definite numbers. Successor/Begriffsschrift/Wittgenstein/Tractatus: 4.1273 E.g. b is successor of a: aRb, (Ex): aRx.xRb, (Ex,y): aRx.xRy.yRb ... General/something general/general public/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell: the general term of a form-series can only be expressed by a variable, because the term "term of this form-series" is a formal term. Both have overlooked: the way, how they want to express general sentences, is circular. IV 49 Elementary proposition/atomism/Tractatus: 4.211 a character of an elementary proposition is that no elementary proposition can contradict it. The elementary proposition consists of names, it is a concatenation of names. WittgensteinVsFrege: it itself is not a name. IV 53 Truth conditions/truth/sentence/phrase/Tractatus: 4.431 of the sentence is an expression of its truth-conditions. (pro Frege). WittgensteinVsFrege: false explanation of the concept of truth: would "the truth" and "the false" really be objects and the arguments in ~p etc., then according to Frege the meaning of "~ p" is not at all determined. Punctuation/Tractatus: 4.44 the character that is created by the assignment of each mark "true" and the truth possibilities. Object/sentence/Tractatus: 4.441 it is clear that the complex of characters IV 54 Ttrue" and "false" do not correspond to an object. There are no "logical objects". Judgment line/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 4.442 the judgment line is logically quite meaningless. It indicates only that the authors in question consider the sentence to be true. Wittgenstein pro redundancy theory/Tractatus: (4.442), a sentence cannot say of itself that it is true. (VsFrege: VsJudgment stroke). IV 59 Meaning/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: (5.02) the confusion of argument and index is based on Frege's theory of meaning IV 60 of the sentences and functions. For Frege the sentences of logic were names, whose arguments the indices of these names. IV 62 Concluding/conclusion/result relation/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 5.132 the "Final Acts" that should justify the conclusions for the two, are senseless and would be superfluous. 5.133 All concluding happens a priori. 5.134 one cannot conclude an elementary proposition from another. ((s) Concluding: from sentences, not situations.) 5.135 In no way can be concluded from the existence of any situation to the existence of, IV 63 an entirely different situation. Causality: 5.136 a causal nexus which justifies such a conclusion, does not exist. 5.1361 The events of the future, cannot be concluded from the current. IV 70 Primitive signs/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.42 The possibility of crosswise definition of the logical "primitive signs" of Frege and Russell (e.g. >, v) already shows that these are no primitive signs, let alone that they signify any relations. IV 101 Evidence/criterion/logic/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.1271 strange that such an exact thinker like Frege appealed to the obviousness as a criterion of the logical sentence. IV 102 Identity/meaning/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.232 the essential of the equation is not that the sides have a different sense but the same meaning, but the essential is that the equation is not necessary to show that the two expressions, that are connected by the equal sign, have the same meaning, since this can be seen from the two expressions themselves. 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 --- Wittgenstein II 343 Intension/classes/quantities/Frege/Russell/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege: both believed they could deal with the classes intensionally because they thought they could turn a list into a property, a function. (WittgensteinVs). Why wanted both so much to define the number? |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Intensions | Wessel Vs Intensions | I 352 Word/Object/Mention/Use/WesselVsIntension: instead: Differentiation: Occurrence of terms and statements as terms and statements and: Occurrence only as mere physical things (sounds and lines). Physical thing: not term Example the statement A occurs in the statements ~A and A u B as a statement. But: in the expressions: "the statement "A" (tA) and "the fact that A" (sA) occur merely as a physical thing, as a graphic part, which has the form A. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Intuitionism | Quine Vs Intuitionism | VII (a) 14 Set Theory/Fraenkel: classes are discovered. (VsIntuitionism). Quine: this is more than a play on words, it is an essential question. (>Beings). X 118 QuineVsIntuitionist Logic: it lacks manageability and familiarity. Its sentence links have no truth-functional, but an intuitive meaning which we explain using "refute" and "from ... follows". These explanations become unclear, however, if we want to maintain the difference between uttering a sentence and talking about the sentence (mention/use)! Quine: then you might as well move on to Heyting's axioms and not interpose translation, but X 119 Apply the direct method of language teacher. Intuitionism: gained more momentum through Godel's proof of incompleteness. Constructivism/Quine: there is not a correct definition for it. QuineVsIntuitionist Logic: changes the meanings of quantification and the constants. Solution: you can follow the constructivist procedure, and still use the orthodox logic: that is what Weyl's constructive set theory does. Quantifier/Differing Logic/Quine: there are also variations in quantifiers: intuitionistic logic requires knowledge of the proof path. X 120 Problem: The variables must all (be able to) have a name so that the existential quantification can correspond to the (finite) adjunction of the singular sentences that make them true (see above). Problem: with infinite existential quantification no infinite number of names can be given out. Variations in the quantification are of course important in terms of ontology. X 121 Ontology/QuineVsIntuitionism/VsIntuitionist Logic: we might not even see with what the intuitionist declares as existing,. Solution: We need to translate his language into ours first. And not necessarily into our logic, but into our overall language! Then we can say what he regards as existing (and in our sense of "existing"). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Russell, B. | Quine Vs Russell, B. | Chisholm II 75 Predicates/Denote/Russell: denoting expressions: proper names stand for individual things and general expressions for universals. (Probleme d. Phil. p. 82f). In every sentence, at least one word refers to a universal. QuineVsRussell: confusion! II 108 Theory of Descriptions/VsRussell/Brandl: thus the whole theory is suspected of neglecting the fact that material objects can never be part of propositions. QuineVsRussell: confusion of mention and use. Quine II 97 Pricipia mathematica, 1903: Here, Russell's ontology is rampant: every word refers to something. If a word is a proper name, then its object is a thing, otherwise it is a concept. He limits the term "existence" to things, but has a liberal conception of things which even includes times and points in empty space! Then there are, beyond the existent things, other entities: "numbers, the gods of Homer, relationships, fantasies, and four-dimensional space". The word "concept", used by Russell in this manner, has the connotation of "merely a concept". Caution: Gods and fantasies are as real as numbers for Russell! QuineVsRussell: this is an intolerably indiscriminate ontology. Example: Take impossible numbers, e.g. prime numbers that are divisible by 6. It must be wrong in a certain sense that they exist, and that is in a sense in which it is right that there are prime numbers! Do fantasies exist in this sense? II 101 Russell has a preference for the term "propositional function" against "class concept". In P.M. both expressions appear. Here: Def "Propositional Function": especially based on forms of notation, e.g. open sentences, while concepts are decidedly independent of notation. However, according to Meinong Russell's confidence is in concepts was diminished, and he prefers the more nominalistic sound of the expression "propositional function" which is now carries twice the load (later than Principia Mathematica.) Use/Mention/Quine: if we now tried to deal with the difference between use and mention as carelessly as Russell has managed to do sixty years ago, we can see how he might have felt that his theory of propositional functions was notation based, while a theory of types of real classes would be ontological. Quine: we who pay attention to use and mention can specify when Russell's so-called propositional functions as terms (more specific than properties and relations) must be construed as concepts, and when they may be construed as a mere open sentences or predicates: a) when he quantifies about them, he (unknowingly) reifies them as concepts. For this reason, nothing more be presumed for his elimination of classes than I have stated above: a derivation of the classes from properties or concepts by means of a context definition that is formulated such that it provides the missing extensionality. QuineVsRussell: thinks wrongly that his theory has eliminated classes more thoroughly from the world than in terms of a reduction to properties. II 102 RussellVsFrege: "~ the entire distinction between meaning and designating is wrong. The relationship between "C" and C remains completely mysterious, and where are we to find the designating complex which supposedly designates C?" QuineVsRussell: Russell's position sometimes seems to stem from a confusion of the expression with its meaning, sometimes from the confusion of the expression with its mention. II 103/104 In other papers Russel used meaning usually in the sense of "referencing" (would correspond to Frege): "Napoleon" particular individual, "human" whole class of such individual things that have proper names. Russell rarely seems to look for an existing entity under any heading that would be such that we could call it the meaning that goes beyond the existing referent. Russell tends to let this entity melt into the expression itself, a tendency he has in general when it comes to existing entities. QuineVsRussell: for my taste, Russell is too wasteful with existing entities. Precisely because he does not differentiate enough, he lets insignificance and missed reference commingle. Theory of Descriptions: He cannot get rid of the "King of France" without first inventing the description theory: being meaningful would mean: have a meaning and the meaning is the reference. I.e. "King of France" without meaning, and "The King of France is bald" only had a meaning, because it is the short form of a sentence that does not contain the expression "King of France". Quine: actually unnecessary, but enlightening. Russell tends commingle existing entities and expressions. Also on the occasion of his remarks on Propositions: (P.M.): propositions are always expressions, but then he speaks in a manner that does not match this attitude of the "unity of the propositions" (p.50) and of the impossibility of infinite propositions (p.145) II 105 Russell: The proposition is nothing more than a symbol, even later, instead: Apparently, propositions are nothing..." the assumption that there are a huge number of false propositions running around in the real, natural world is outrageous." Quine: this revocation is astounding. What is now being offered to us instead of existence is nothingness. Basically Russell has ceased to speak of existence. What had once been regarded as existing is now accommodated in one of three ways a) equated with the expression, b) utterly rejected c) elevated to the status of proper existence. II 107 Russell/later: "All there is in the world I call a fact." QuineVsRussell: Russell's preference for an ontology of facts depends on his confusion of meaning with reference. Otherwise he would probably have finished the facts off quickly. What the reader of "Philosophy of logical atomism" notices would have deterred Russell himself, namely how much the analysis of facts is based on the analysis of language. Russell does not recognize the facts as fundamental in any case. Atomic facts are as atomic as facts can be. Atomic Facts/Quine: but they are composite objects! Russell's atoms are not atomic facts, but sense data! II 183 ff Russell: Pure mathematics is the class of all sentences of the form "p implies q" where p and q are sentences with one or more variables, and in both sets the same. "We never know what is being discussed, nor if what we say is true." II 184 This misinterpretation of mathematics was a response to non-Euclidean geometry. Numbers: how about elementary arithmetic? Pure numbers, etc. should be regarded as uninterpreted. Then the application to apples is an accumulation. Numbers/QuineVsRussell: I find this attitude completely wrong. The words "five" and "twelve" are nowhere uninterpreted, they are as much essential components of our interpreted language as apples. >Numbers. They denote two intangible objects, numbers that are the sizes of quantities of apples and the like. The "plus" in addition is also interpreted from start to finish, but it has nothing to do with the accumulation of things. Five plus twelve is: how many apples there are in two separate piles. However, without pouring them together. The numbers "five" and "twelve" differ from apples in that they do not denote a body, that has nothing to do with misinterpretation. The same could be said of "nation" or "species". The ordinary interpreted scientific speech is determined to abstract objects as it is determined to apples and bodies. All these things appear in our world system as values of variables. II 185 It even has nothing to do with purity (e.g. of the set theory). Purity is something other than uninterpretedness. XII 60 Expression/Numbers/Knowledge/Explication/Explanation/Quine: our knowledge of expressions is alone in their laws of interlinking. Therefore, every structure that fulfills these laws can be an explication. XII 61 Knowledge of numbers: consists alone in the laws of arithmetic. Then any lawful construction is an explication of the numbers. RussellVs: (early): Thesis: arithmetic laws are not sufficient for understanding numbers. We also need to know applications (use) or their embedding in the talk about other things. Number/Russell: is the key concept here: "there are n such and suches". Number/Definition/QuineVsRussell: we can define "there are n such and suches" without ever deciding what numbers are beyond their fulfillment of arithmetic addition. Application/Use/QuineVsRussell: wherever there is structure, the applications set in. E.g. expressions and Gödel numbers: even the mention of an inscription was no definitive proof that we are talking about expressions and not about Gödel numbers. We can always say that our ostension was shifted. VII (e) 80 Principia Mathematica(1)/PM/Russell/Whitehead/Quine: shows that the whole of mathematics can be translated into logic. Only three concepts need to be clarified: Mathematics, translation and logic. VII (e) 81 QuineVsRussell: the concept of the propositional function is unclear and obscures the entire PM. VII (e) 93 QuineVsRussell: PM must be complemented by the axiom of infinity if certain mathematical principles are to be derived. VII (e) 93/94 Axiom of infinity: ensures the existence of a class with infinitely many elements. Quine: New Foundations instead makes do with the universal class: θ or x^ (x = x). 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. VII (f) 122 Propositional Functions/QuineVsRussell: ambiguous: a) open sentences b) properties. Russell no classes theory uses propositional functions as properties as value-bound variables. IX 15 QuineVsRussell: inexact terminology. "Propositional function", he used this expression both when referring to attributes (real properties) and when referring to statements or predicates. In truth, he only reduced the theory of classes to an unreduced theory of attributes. IX 93 Rational Numbers/QuineVsRussell: I differ in one point: for me, rational numbers are themselves real numbers, not so for Russell and Whitehead. Russell: rational numbers are pairwise disjoint for them like those of Peano. (See Chapter 17), while their real numbers are nested. ((s) pairwise disjoint, contrast: nested) Natural Numbers/Quine: for me as for most authors: no rational integers. Rational Numbers/Russell: accordingly, no rational real numbers. They are only "imitated" by the rational real numbers. Rational Numbers/QuineVsRussell: for me, however, the rational numbers are real numbers. This is because I have constructed the real numbers according to Russell's version b) without using the name and the designation of rational numbers. Therefore, I was able to retain name and designation for the rational real numbers IX 181 Type Theory/TT/QuineVsRussell: in the present form our theory is too weak to prove some sentences of classical mathematics. E.g. proof that every limited class of real numbers has a least upper boundary (LUB). IX 182 Suppose the real numbers were developed in Russell's theory similar to Section VI, however, attributes were now to take the place of classes and the alocation to attributes replaces the element relation to classes. LUB: (Capters 18, 19) of a limited class of real numbers: the class Uz or {x:Ey(x ε y ε z)}. Attribute: in parallel, we might thus expect that the LUB of a limited attribute φ of real numbers in Russell's system is equal to the Attribute Eψ(φψ u ψ^x). Problem: under Russell's order doctrine is this LUB ψ is of a higher order than that of the real numbers ψ which fall under the attribute φ whose LUB is sought. Boundary/LUB/QuineVsRussell: You need LUB for the entire classic technique of calculus, which is based on continuity. However, LUB have no value for these purposes if they are not available as values of the same variables whose value range already includes those numbers whose upper boundary is wanted. An upper boundary (i.e. LUB) of higher order cannot be the value of such variables, and thus misses its purpose. Solution/Russell: Axiom of Reducibility: Def Axiom of Reducibility/RA/Russell/Quine: every propositional function has the same extension as a certain predicative one. I.e. Ey∀x(ψ!x φx), Eψ∀x∀y[ψ!(x,y) φ(x,y)], etc. IX 184 VsConstruktivism/Construction/QuineVsRussell: we have seen Russell's constructivist approach to the real numbers fail (LUB, see above). He gave up on constructivism and took refuge in the RA. IX 184/185 The way he gave it up had something perverse to it: Axiom of Reducibility/QuineVsRussell: the RA implies that all the distinctions that gave rise to its creation are superfluous! (... + ...) IX 185 Propositional Function/PF/Attribute/Predicate/TT/QuineVsRussell: overlooked the following difference and its analogs: a) "propositional functions": as attributes (or intentional relations) and b) proposition functions: as expressions, i.e. predicates (and open statements: e.g. "x is mortal") Accordingly: a) attributes b) open statements As expressions they differ visibly in the order if the order is to be assessed on the basis of the indices of bound variables within the expression. For Russell everything is "AF". Since Russell failed to distinguish between formula and object (word/object, mention/use), he did not remember the trick of allowing that an expression of higher order refers straight to an attribute or a relation of lower order. X 95 Context Definition/Properties/Stage 2 Logic/Quine: if you prefer properties as sets, you can introduce quantification over properties, and then introduce quantification over sets through a schematic context definition. Russell: has taken this path. Quine: but the definition has to ensure that the principle of extensionality applies to sets, but not to properties. That is precisely the difference. Russell/QuineVsRussell: why did he want properties? X 96 He did not notice at which point the unproblematic talk of predicates capsized to speaking about properties. ((s) object language/meta language/mention/use). Propositional Function/PF: Russell took it over from Frege. QuineVsRussell: he sometimes used PF to refer to predicates, sometimes to properties. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Ryle, G. | Verschiedene Vs Ryle, G. | Lanz in Metz I 279 VsRyle: his analysis is not convincing for elements of conscious experience as feelings or perceptions or mental images or thoughts that are currently occurring. E.g. pain: here something is present to the the consciousness when it is neither recognized thorugh behavior nor verbal utterances. Hare II 142 Knowledge/Saying/Ryle: we may know something without being able to say what we know. For example, how a certain word is used, or a certain dance is danced. HenleVsRyle: but you should not extend that to speech situations. II 143 It is by no means clear that one can always know how a word is used here, even if one cannot say how it is used. Knowledge/Saying/HareVsHenle: but in language it may be clearer than anywhere else. For example, when we explain the use of an expression, we do not have to use it ourselves. Consequently, we can fully know its use in all contexts, even without being able to say how it is used. For example, a child may have learned to use the word "father" and use it correctly, but may not be able to say how it is used because it has not yet learned to use "to mean"! Henle confuses the ability "To decide for logical reasons" whether a statement is true or not with the ability to use the expression "the statement is logically true". Confusion Mention/Use. (doing without knowledge). Hare: who does not know how to use the expression "logically true" could do the former, but not the latter. |
Hare I Richard Mervyn Hare The Language of Morals Oxford 1991 Hare II Richard M. Hare Philosophical discoveries", in: Mind, LXIX, 1960 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Tarski, A. | Verschiedene Vs Tarski, A. | Eigen VII 303 v. WeizsäckerVsTarski: for the description of the meta language one needed again a meta language. Recourse. Sainsbury V 180 Tarski: the ordinary everyday concept of truth is incoherent: it must be replaced by a hierarchical series of predicates of truth. The object language must not contain a predicate that applies exactly to its true sentences. SainsburyVsTarski: some authors think that our everyday language is not really deficient, but already contains the required hierarchy. e.g. with turns like "What you just said isn't true." It seems too radical to reject our ordinary concept of truth. On the other hand, it is probably not correct to assume that our everyday concept already contains the whole separation. Reinforced LiarVsTarski : (L2: "L2 is not true"). Despite Tarski we could formulate: LN: LN is not trueN Version 1: If that is flawed because it does not respect the separation of levels, then it is not trueN. But that is what it says, it has to be trueN! Version 2: A sentence that breaks through the levels is semantically flawed and therefore not true. So you can always construct an amplified liar sentence to disprove an approach about levels! Horwich I 122 Truth Definition/T-Def/VsTarski: Objections about alleged lack of correctness are directed against the semantic T-concept in general. VsTarski: the T-Def is circular, because in the form "p iff q" truth occurs implicitly: namely, because the equivalence applies when either both sides are true or both sides are false. TarskiVsVs: if this objection would be valid, there would be no formally correct T-Def at all, because we cannot form a composite sentence without the help of connections and other logical terms defined with their help. I 123 Solution/Tarski: a strict deductive development of logic is often initiated by an explanation of the conditions under which propositions of the form "if p then q" etc. are considered true. (truth value tables). I 123 Solution/Tarski: a strict deductive development of logic is often initiated by an explanation of the conditions under which propositions of the form "if p then q" etc. are considered true. (Truth-value-tables). Horwich I 127 VsTarski: because of his scheme, which obliges him to facts, he is committed to realism. (GonsethVsTarski). TarskiVsVs: that the expression ... Snow is "actually" white...was wrongly inserted by my critics. Truth conditions/T-Def/Tarski: the reference to facts is deliberately missing in the T-scheme! It is not about truth conditions. T-Schema/Tarski: only implies that if we use the sentence (1) Snow is white we claim or negate that we then also have the correlated sentence (2) The sentence "snow is white" is true we have to claim or negate it. I 128 N.B: with it we can keep our respective epistemological attitude: we can remain realists, idealists, etc., if we have been before. Realism/Tarski: the semantic T-concept does not commit us to naïve realism. ((s) If truth is disquotation, then the "disciplines" must be distinguishable by sentences that are disquotationally true instead of "immanently true"). TarskiVsVs: reductio ad absurdum: if there were another T-concept (according to the will of these critics, then it would have to be somehow different and then it would ultimately come out that "snow is white" is true, iff snow is not white! Otherwise it would not be another T-concept but the same T-concept! Nevertheless, such a "new" T-concept would not necessarily be absurd. In any case, any T-concept that is incompatible with the semantic T-Def would have such consequences. Tarski I 160 VsTarski: Question: Is the semantic conception of truth the only "right" one? TarskiVsVs: I must confess that I do not understand this question because the problem is so vague that no clear solution is possible. I 162 VsTarski: in the formulation of the definition, we necessarily use statement links like "if..., then...", "or" etc.. These occur in definitions. However, it is well known that the meaning of propositional connections in logic is explained by the words "true" and "false". (Circle). TarskiVsVs: it is undoubtedly the case that a strictly deductive development of logic is often preceded by certain statements that explain the conditions under which statements of the form "if, then..." are true or false. However, these findings are outside the system of logic and should not be regarded as a definition of the terms in question! I 163 These findings influence in no way the deductive development of logic. Because here we do not discuss the question whether a statement is true, but whether it is provable! (Truth/Proofability). I 163 Logical Connection/Statement/Tarski: the moment we are in the deductive system of logic (or semantics based on logic), we treat the propositional connections either as undefined terms, or we define them with the help of other propositional connections. However, we do not define the connections using terms such as "true" or "false". (p or q) exactly when (if not p, then q). This definition obviously does not contain semantic terms. Error: the schema (T) X is true exactly when p. for a definition of truth! VsTarski: a critic, who commits this mistake, considered this alleged definition to be "inadmissibly short", i.e.: "incomplete". I 164 It is not necessary to decide whether 'equivalence' means a logical formal relationship or a non-logical relationship. He suggests to add: (T') X is true exactly when p is true. ((s) Vs: here "true" occurs twice). (T'') X is true exactly when p is the case. TarskiVsVs: this is a misunderstanding regarding the nature of the statement connections. (Confusion of name and subject matter/confusion of statements and their names, mention/use). ((s) p (right) is the statement itself, not the assertion of its truth. This has nothing to do with the correctness of redundancy theory). I 168 VsTarski: but the formal definition of truth has nothing to do with the "philosophical problem of truth". It gives necessary and sufficient conditions, but not the "essence" of this concept. TarskiVs: I am not able to understand what the "essence" of a term should be. ((s) FregeVsTarski: Terms have necessary characteristics.) I 172 Criterion/criterion of truth/VsTarski: some argue that definitions do not provide us with general criteria for deciding whether an object falls under the defined terms. And the term "true" is of this kind, since no universal criterion of truth emerges directly from the definition. (> criterion of truth). ((s) RescherVsTarski). Tarski: this is completely correct, but it does not distinguish the term from many terms of science such as theoretical physics. (> term). I 174 Semantics/Tarski: Semantic terms are actually contained in many areas of the sciences and especially empirical sciences. |
Eigen I M. Eigen Ruth Winkler Laws of the Game : How the Principles of Nature Govern Chance, Princeton/NJ 1993 German Edition: Das Spiel München 1975 Sai I R.M. Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 German Edition: Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 |
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