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Consciousness | Saussure | Dummett I 117 Content of consciousness: private: fragrance, melody, name, "idea" (no background necessary) -but not: concepts, thoughts, sense (public). VsBritish empiricists: (concepts, no "ideas") British Empiricism: equates concepts with imagination. DummettVsSaussure: mimics this by mechanistically describing the transmission of sound - language as code. I 118 Meaning/Grasping/DummettVsSaussure: too simple explanation, like periodic pain. - We would then also need an explanation of what it means to use this concept. - E.g. if someone knows nothing about trees, it does not help to say that every time he heard the word concept would enter his mind. I 120 Thoughts can only be grasped as a complex. >Holism, >Complex, >Compositionality. What someone thinks about an object must be able to apply to other objects. Generality Condition/Evans: the object must also be able to have other predicates. >Generality Condition/Evans. |
F. de Saussure I Peter Prechtl Saussure zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 (Junius) Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
Generality | Evans | Dummett I 120 Generality condition/Evans: the object in question must be able to have other predicates then those under which it is currently picked out. Evans: No one can have the thought "This rose smells sweet" who is unable to have other thoughts with respect to this rose, or is not clear about what is sweet smelling. Dummett: In addition, you have to grasp the complexity: you have to have a concept of how you think about this rose yourself, thinking something that might apply to other things. >Properties, >Adjectives, >Predicates, >Predication, >Individuation, >Identification. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
Individuation | Evans | I 314 Individuation/Evans: Mind state: a specification always needs a general term when it is directed to an object. Nevertheless, reference to certain objects seems possible more directly than to others. - Otherwise no reference would be identifiable in a cyclic universe. >Identification, >Generality condition. ((s) If there were only general terms, there would be no chance to find out whether we were in an "eternal recurrence".) I 333f Individuation/Information/Evans: Information is individuated by its origin. >Information. Therefore: Identity statements are necessary: if A is the source of information, it could not have been anything else! Demonstratives/Evans: are explained inter alia as follows: no one else can be source of information than this mountaineer, if it is said, "this mountaineer comes to the city today." This is precisely why we can also have false ideas about him. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
Predicates | Evans | Dummett I 120 Generality condition/Evans: the object must be able to have other predicates then those under which it is currently picked out. >Reference, >Individuation, >Identification. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
Properties | Evans | Dummett I 120 Generality condition/Evans: the object must be able to have other predicates then those under which it is currently picked out. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
Sense Data Theory | Sellars | I XII Sense data/Sellars: sense data cannot be candidates for the foundation of a justification practice. Problem to make them a foundation for justification: the sense data of the empiricists are single objects, but only with respect to facts one can speak of a knowledge. >Knowledge, >Knowledge/Sellars, >Facts, >Facts/Sellars, >Observation sentences. Knowledge: "has the form "this and that is so and so." Known is something about a single object, but not a single object itself. Sense-data theory: is faced with the choice: a) either sense data are individual objects, then the perception of sense data would be no knowledge. b) or the theorist declares the feeling of sense data to a form of knowledge, but then one must admit that there are not individual objects, but facts that are known. >Generality, >Generalization, >cf. >Generality condition/Evans. I XXXVII Sense data/Broad/tradition: internal objects, immediately conscious. SellarsVs: no objects, only causal consequences. N.B.: a red sensation can also occur when the object only appears to be red. >Sensation/Sellars. I 15 Sense data/Sellars: can be used as a code, but not as an analysis or explanation for anything. I 37 Sense-data theory: basic problem of how something can appear, without it being so and without it being perceived. >Appearance, >Perception. I 47 SellarsVsSense Data: it is about public physical objects, not about private objects. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
Thoughts | Dummett | I 19 Frege: The thought not the same as sense of the sentence. - Creatures with identical thoughts without linguistic manifestation are possible. I 32 f Frege/thought: According to Frege the thought (the content of the act of thinking) is not part of the stream of consciousness. Frege: capturing the thought ismental act. - The thought is not content of consciousness - consciousness is subjective - the thought is objective. - WittgensteinVsFrege. Frege: Thoughts are objective, ideas are not. - If it were otherwise, we could never disagree. I 194 ff Thoughts/DummettVsFrege: Thoughts are not necessarily linguistic: Proto-thoughts (also animals) (associated with activities). >Animal language. - Proto-thoughts instead of Husserl's noema. I 120 A thought cannot be detected otherwise than as a complex. Evans: "generality condition": "This rose smells sweet" - no one who is unable to have other thoughts regarding this rose can have the thought or who does not understand what smelling sweet is. (Dummett pro). I 89 Grasp: does not determine the truth value, but the truth conditions. >Truth conditions. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
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