Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 94 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analogies | Field | II 16 Reduction/Field: e.g. chemical valence: the concept allows calculating the valences of the molecules from the valence of the elements. Valence: is used here as an analogy. Compositionality, >Measuring, >Method. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Anthropic Principle | Dennett | I 225 Anthropic Principle/Freeman Dyson(1): "I am not saying the structure of the universe proves the existence of God, but He is compatible with the hypothesis that the spirit plays a crucial role for its functioning. I 227 Anthropic Principle/Dennett: In its "weak form" it is harmless. It is an occasionally useful application of elementary logic: if x is a necessary condition for the existence of y, and if y exists, then x exists as well. DennettVsAnthropic Principle: "Strong Form": false use of "must": "If physical structures depend on larger molecules, then they must exist, because we exist. Correct instead: It must be the case that: if consciousness depends on ..., then there are such elements in the world, because we have a consciousness. The conclusion to which one is entitled only says that there are such elements, not that there have to be. 1. Dyson, Freeman, 1979. Disturbing the Universe. New York: Harper & Row. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| As if | Cartwright | I 129 as if / Physics / Science / Grice / Cartwright: - as if - should not lead to further questions. e.g. How closely are the oscillators packed? (Assuming one equates the radiating molecules in ammonium maser with electronic oscillators). I 130 as-if-Operator/Grice/Cartwright: The as-if operator has two functions: 1) written left of the operator: signifies existential import. 2) right: Description of that what we must know in order to apply a mathematical formulation. - (This is independent of the existential commitment). - The reason is that our fundamental equations do not dictate reality. Multiple equations can be applied. >Ontology, >Ontological commitment, >Quantification, >Fictions, >Existence, >Existence statements. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| As if | Dennett | I 555 As-if-Intentionality/Searle: e.g. Computers - DennettVs: from this, genuine intentionality can arise. Artificial intelligence: we are composed of machines (macromolecules). - Darwinism/Dennett: we descended from machines (macromolecules). Cf. >Emergence. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Assignment | Schurz | I 167 Assignment Law/Theoretical Terms/Dispositional Terms/Schurz: Each dispositional feature is semantically characterized by a bilateral assignment law in the form of a bilateral reduction set: Zi(D): (for all x,t): If Tixt, then Dix gdw Rixt) for 1 < i < n. (formally: (x),(t)(Txt > (Dix <> Rixt)). >Disposition. From the n theoretical laws and the n postulates of meaning logically follow the following n assignment laws for one and the same theoretical feature τ(x): Zi(τ): for all x,t): If Tixt, then (t(x) gdw. Rixt). Ex if x is added to t in water, then the molecules of x have dipole structure gdw. they dissolve x in water. Dipole structure: can also be responsible for many other phenomena! I 168 Assignment law/Schurz: but cannot be regarded as analytically true, as a partial definition or as a postulate of meaning for the theoretical characteristic! And this is why: Empirical content/Theoretical terms/Schurz: two or more assignment laws (for dispositional features) together automatically possess empirical content! >Empirical content, >Content, >Analyticity/Syntheticity. E.g. dipole structure: can be responsible for the fact that a substance dissolves in water as well as for the fact that it does not dissolve in oil. However, this must then be the same substance (recovered from water). Therefore, several assignment laws cannot be taken as analytically true. Assignment law: is always synthetic, a part of the respective background theory, which like all other components are hypothetical and therefore correctable. I 185 Assignment law/Schurz: not every mixed sentence is an assignment law: ex The conjunction Fa u τ(a) or ex The Existence Theorem (Ex)(Fx u τ(x)) are essentially mixed, but not an assignment law. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Atomism | Sellars | I 33 Standard Conditions: assuming them leads out of the logical atomism. >Circumstances/Sellars. It is not enough that the conditions are appropriate, the subject must know that they are. >Conditions, >Standard conditions, >Ideal observer, >Observation, >Idealization. Circumstances: to determine them it is necessary to know something about the objects: how they are under different circumstances. --- I 34 Logical atomism: VsSellars: it could reply that Sellars 1) overlooks the fact that the logical space of physical objects in space and time is based on the logical space of sense content. >Logical space. 2) the concepts of the sense contents have the kind of logical independence from one another which is characteristic of traditional empiricism. >Independence, >Empiricism. 3) concepts for theoretical entities such as molecules have the kind of interdependence which Sellars may have rightly attributed to the concepts of physical facts, but: the theoretical concepts have empirical content precisely because they are based on a more fundamental logical space. >Theoretical entities, >Theoretical terms, >Unobservables. Sellars would have to show that this space is also loaded with coherence, but he cannot do that until he has abolished the idea of a more fundamental logical space than that of the physical objects in space and time. >Spatial order, >Temporal order, >Localization, >Objects. Logical atomism: statements only occur truth-functionally in statements. >Truth functions. --- I 70 Atomism/SellarsVsAtomism/SellarsVsWittgenstein: analysis does not stand for definition of terms, but for the exploration of the logical structure of discourse - which does not follow a simple pattern. >Analysis/Sellars. cf. Def truth-functional/Tugendhat: depends on other sentences, not on situations. Def truth-functional/Read: directly dependent only on the occurring concepts. --- II 314 SellarsVsWittgenstein/Paradox: to say of a particular atomic fact that it was represented by a certain elementary statement, we have to use a statement in which the elementary statement occurs, but this is not truth-functional. We have to say something like: (1) S (in L) represents aRb. >Complex, >Relation, >Atomism/Wittgenstein, >Atomism. This representation relationship cannot be expressed through a statement. Wittgenstein dito. --- II 321 If only simple non-linguistic objects could be represented, if complex objects were facts, that would lead to the well-known antinomy that there would have to be atomic facts which would be prerequisites for the fact that language can depict the world, but for which no example can be given if the speaker demands one. Both difficulties are avoided by the realization that complex objects are no facts (VsTractatus). >Facts, >States of affairs. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Causality | Rorty | VI 128f Causality/Davidson/Rorty: (implicitly found in Davidson's writings): a causal effect occurs only at the level of microstructure, so just where strict laws apply and no "ceteris paribus molecules or space-time points clauses" interfere. >Causality/Davidson, >Microstructure, >Causal laws. VI 129f Causality/Rorty: you should always be able to recognize exactly the same causal relations between these same, but arbitrarily described things: e.g. between dinosaurs and eggs, you should realize the same causal relations like between the respective molecules or space-time points. (Like Davidson). This has nothing to do with "intrinsical" or "thing in itself". >Causal relation, >Description levels, >Intrinsicness. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Causality | Searle | I 287/88 (Note) Causality/identity/PlaceVsSearle: causal dependency requires separate entities (>Causality/Armstrong). SearleVsPlace: E.g. a liquid state may be causally dependent on the behavior of molecules while being a feature of the system. --- II 93 Causality/Searle: causality is not an external instance, only more experiences. II 101f Causality: e.g. pressure cooker: we can infer from steam to pressure. Through seeing there is no inference on physical objects. SearleVsHume: causality may well be experienced directly, but not independently, but causality is part of the experience. >Causality/Hume. II 152ff Causality/SearleVsHume: causality is real and directly observable. --- I 157 Logical causality: logical causality is not inference, but intentional content and an experience condition. There are not two experiences, but causation = intentional content. >Satisfaction conditions/Searle, >Intentional contents. --- II 179 Causality: causality is part of the experience, causation is part of the experience. --- Danto I 299 Causality/Searle: causality only arises through interpretation. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Classes | Quine | I 289 Class abstraction is attributed to singular descriptions: (iy)(x)(x from y iff ..x..). Instead: x^(..x..). This does not work for intensional abstraction. Difference classes/properties: classes are identical with the same elements. Properties are not yet identical if they are assigned to the same things. >Properties/Quine. II 29 Classes: one could reinterpret all classes in their complement: "no element of .." and you would never notice anything. At the bottom layer every relative clause, every general term determines a class. II 100 Russell (Principia Mathematica(1)) classes are things: they must not be confused with the concept of classes. However: paradoxes also apply to class terms and propositional functions are not only for classes. Incomplete symbols (explanation by use) are used to explain away classes. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. VII (a) 18 Classes/Quine: simplify our access to physics but are still a myth. VII (f) 114 Classes/Quine: classes are no accumulations or collections! E.g. the class of stones in a pile cannot be identified with the pile: otherwise another class could also be identified with the same pile: e.g. the class of stone molecules in the pile. The validity theory applies to classes, but not to the individual sentences - predicates are not names of classes, classes are the extension of predicates - classes are assumed to be pre-existent. IX 21 Classes/Relations/Quine: classes are real objects if values of bound variables. IX 23 Class/Individuals/Quine: everything is class! If we understand individuals to be identical to their class of one (i.e. not elementless). IX 223 Classes/Quine: quantification through classes allows for terms that would otherwise be beyond our reach. XIII 24 Class/Quantity/Quine: we humans are stingy and so predisposed that we never use two words for the same thing, or we demand a distinction that should underlie it. XIII 25 Example ape/monkey: we distinguish them by size, while French and Germans have only one word for them. Problem: how is the dictionary supposed to explain the difference between "beer, which is rightly called so" and "ale, which is rightly called so"? Example Sets/Classes/Quine: here this behaves similarly. Class/Mathematics: some mathematicians treat classes as something of the same kind as properties (Quine pro, see above): sets as something more robust, though still abstract. >Properties/Quine. Classes: can contain sets as elements, but not other classes. (see impredicativity). Paradox/Paradoxes/Quine: lead to some element relationships not being able to define sets. Nevertheless, they can still define classes! von Neumann: established such a system in 1925. It simplifies evidence and strengthens the system, albeit at the risk of paradoxes. >Paradoxes/Quine. Problem: it requires imaginative distinctions and doublings, e.g. for every set there must be a coextensive class. Solution/Quine. (Quine 1940): simply identify the sets with the coextensive classes. XIII 26 Def Classes/Def Sets/QuineVsNeuman: new: sets are then classes of a certain type: a class is a set if it is an element of a class. A class is a Def outermost class/Quine: if it is not an element of a class. Russell's Paradox/Quine: some authors thought that by distinguishing between classes and sets, it showed that Russell's antinomy was mere confusion. Solution/some authors: classes themselves are not such substantial objects that they would come into question as candidates for elements according to a condition of containment. But sets can be. On the other hand: Sets: had never been understood as defined by conditions of abstinence. And from the beginning they had been governed by principles that Zermelo later made explicit. QuineVs: these are very perishable assumptions! In reality, sets were classes from the beginning, no matter what they were called. Vagueness of one word was also vagueness of the other word. Sets/Cantor/Quine: sure, the first sets at Cantor were point sets, but that does not change anything. QuineVsTradition/Quine: it is a myth to claim that sets were conceived independently of classes, and were later confused with them by Russell. That again is the mistake of seeing a difference in a difference between words. Solution/Quine: we only need sets and outermost classes to enjoy the advantages of von Neumann. >Sets/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Coincidence | Kauffman | I 9 Science/coincidence/Kauffman: science has reduced us to beings who owe their existence to coincidence. KauffmanVs: this is incomplete. >Life/Kauffman, >Science, >Evolution, >Beginning. I 282 Coincidence/Kauffman: There is an inevitability of historical coincidence. The periodic table is clear, but at the level of chemistry, the space of possible molecules is larger than the number of atoms in the universe. Life is thus the product of a historical coincidence. I 286 Evolution/Life/Self-organisation/Coincidence/Necessity/Kauffman: we are not just pieced up handicrafts, not just molecular ad hoc apparatuses. KauffmanVsGould, KauffmanVsMonod, KauffmanVsJacob, KauffmanVsBricolage. >St. J. Gould, >J. Monod, >F. Jacob, >Bricolage. We are children of necessity. At home in the universe. |
Kau II Stuart Kauffman At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity New York 1995 Kauffman I St. Kauffman At Home in the Universe, New York 1995 German Edition: Der Öltropfen im Wasser. Chaos, Komplexität, Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft München 1998 |
| Complexes/Complexity | Simon | Weizenbaum I 176 Complexity/H. A. Simon: (H. A. Simon, 1969)(1): an ant that is seen as a behavioural system is quite simple. The obvious complexity of its behaviour over a longer period of time is largely an expression of the complexity of the environment in which it is located... The cells and molecules of ants are complex, but these microscopic details of the inner environment are probably largely irrelevant to the ant's behavior compared to the outer environment. This is the reason why a completely different constructed machine could simulate the behaviour of the ant. >Environment, >Behavior, >Simulation., >Robots. Simon: I would like to investigate this hypothesis in more detail, but I would like to replace the word "ant" with the word "human". For my part, I believe that this hypothesis even applies to the whole human. 1. H. A. Simon, The Sciences and the Artificial, Cambridge, 1969, p. 24f. |
psySimn II Herbert A. Simon Models of Thought New Haven 1979 Simon I Herbert A. Simon The Sciences of the Artificial Cambridge, MA 1970 Weizenbaum I Joseph Weizenbaum Computer Power and Human Reason. From Judgment to Calculation, W. H. Freeman & Comp. 1976 German Edition: Die Macht der Computer und die Ohnmacht der Vernunft Frankfurt/M. 1978 |
| Correctness | Dennett | I 279 Right/wrong/Dennett: thesis: The distinction between right and wrong only came into the world with reproduction (of molecules or anything). |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Criteria | Dawkins | I 372 Gene/selection/Dawkins: Under reasonable consideration, selection does not directly affect the genes. The DNA is spun into proteins, wrapped in membranes, shielded from the world and invisible to natural selection. (Like >GouldVsDawkins.) The selection would also hardly have a criterion for DNA molecules. All genes look the same just like all tapes look the same. Genes show in their effects. - ((s) Effect makes identity and difference.) |
Da I R. Dawkins The Selfish Gene, Oxford 1976 German Edition: Das egoistische Gen, Hamburg 1996 Da II M. St. Dawkins Through Our Eyes Only? The Search for Animal Consciousness, Oxford/New York/Heidelberg 1993 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des tierischen Bewusstseins Hamburg 1993 |
| Deceptions | Goodman | I 92 Seeing/Goodman: how can I see a bunch of molecules, without seeing a single one of them? How could you say of me that I see a magnet? Or a poisonous mushroom? It might happen that someone asks me if I have seen the football coach in my audience. And I respond falsely to the negative. And even saw the entire audience. I 107 ff Perception/Goodman: perception improvises smooth transitions. Goodman: one could ask whether such improvisations are not even more peculiar to humans than innate ideas. Virtually every clear case of visual motion perception depends on an abrupt change in color (no shades of gray). >Perception, >Seeing, >Interpretation, >Understanding. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Definitions | Feynman | I 174 Laws Definition//Meaning/Laws of Nature/Feynman: it is generally believed that laws of nature represent some kind of genuine knowledge. What does that mean? What does F = ma mean? What is the meaning of force, mass, acceleration? We can feel mass intuitively and we can define acceleration. Definition e.g. "when a body accelerates, a force acts upon it". Definitions/Feynman: such definitions cannot be the content of physics, because they are circular. Nevertheless, the Newtonian statement above appears to be the most precise definition of force. But it is completely pointless, because no predictions can be made from it. (From no definition!). >Laws of nature, >Forces/Bigelow, >Forces/Cartwright, >Forces/Leibniz, >Forces/Russell, >Knowledge, >Circularity. The way in which objects behave is completely independent of the choice of definitions. For example, we define something new: Def "Gorce"/Fictitious Force/Terminology/Feynman: temporal change of position with a new law: everything stands still, except when a gorce is effective. This would be analogous to the old force and would not contain any new information. (But: see below...) >Cause/Cartwright, >Cause/Fraassen, >Cause/Vollmer, >Cause/Lewis, >Cause/Bigelow, >Cause/Armstrong. I 175 Forces/Laws of Nature/Newtonian Laws/Theory/Feynman: their true content is that the force, in addition to the law F = ma, should have some independent properties. But these specific properties have not not been described by Newton, nor by anyone else, and therefore F = ma is an incomplete law. It implies that we will find some simple properties when studying the forces. It is an indication that forces are simple. This is a good program for analyzing nature. Laws/Laws of Nature/Theory/Feynman: if nothing but gravitation existed, then the combination of the law of gravitation and the law of force would be a complete theory. We need further properties of the force: e.g. if no physical object is present, the force equals zero, if it is different from zero, and something is found in the neighborhood, then that must be the cause. That is the difference to "gorce" (see above). That power has a material origin is one of its most important properties, and that is not only a definition. I 175 Definition/Law/Feynman: e.g. second Newtonian Law. Action equals response: that is not quite precise. If it were a definition, we would have to say that it is always precise, but it is not! >Natural laws/Cartwright. Feynman: every simple thought is approximated. E.g. chair: superposition of atoms, constant decrease and increase, depending on the accuracy of the measurement. I 176 Mathematical definitions can never work in the real world. I 233 Empiricism/Definition/Mach/Feynman: you can only define what you can measure. FeynmanVsMach: whether a thing is measurable or not cannot be decided a priori solely by reasoning! It can only be decided in experiments. >Experiments, >Measurements, >Ernst Mach. Feynman: it is clear that absolute speed has no meaning. Whether or not it can be defined is the same as the problem, whether you can prove if you are moving or not! I 642 Definition/Temperature/Physics/Chemistry/Feynman: two different definitions: 1) Assuming the kinetic energy of the molecules is proportional to the temperature, this assumption defines a temperature scale: "Scale of the ideal gas". We call the correspondingly measured temperatures kinetic temperature. 2) Other temperature definition: independent of any substance: "Great thermodynamic absolute temperature". |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Emotion System | Gray | Corr I 358 Emotion System/Gray: reduction of pathological emotions can be achieved in one of two ways: (a) deconditioning aversive reinforcing stimuli, which weakens the strength of stimulus inputs into the innate emotion systems; or (b) by dampening down the activity in the systems themselves (e.g., by the use of drugs that target key molecules in parts of the innate system). We may see the effectiveness of cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) as another way to ‘decondition’ the power of hitherto aversive stimuli to activate the emotion systems (e.g., by restructuring ‘irrational’ cognitions that serve as inputs into these systems) Gray 1970)(1). >GrayVsEysenck, >Conditioning/Gray, >Emotion/Gray. 1. Gray, J. A. 1970. The psychophysiological basis of Introversion–Extraversion, Behaviour Research and Therapy 8: 249–66 Philip J. Corr, „ The Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory of Personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Equivalence | Field | l 159 Equivalence/Platonism/Nominalism/Field: Question: in what sense are platonist (E.g. "Direction1 = direction2") and nominalistic statements (c1 is parallel to c2) equivalent? >Platonism, >Nominalism. Problem: if there are no directions, the second cannot be a consequence of the first. - They are only equivalent within a directional theory. Cf. >Definition/Frege, >Consequence. Solution/Field: one can regard the equivalences as important, even if the theories are wrong. Problem: for the meaning one should be able to accept truth. >Meaning. Solution: conservative extension (does not apply to the ontology) - this is harmless for consequences that do not mention directions. >Conservativity/Field, >Mention. I 228 Def cognitively equivalent/Field: equivalent by logic plus the meaning of "true". >Truth. Disquotational true/Deflationism: means that the propositions in the Tarski scheme should be cognitively equivalent. - ((s) Plus meaning of true here: the same understanding of true.) >Disquotationalism/Field, >Deflationism. --- II 16 Extensional equivalence/Field: Problem: if we assume extensional equivalence and abstract it from the size, there are infinitely many entities to which a simple theory, such as the chemical valences applies: For example, the number 3 not only applies to molecules but also to larger aggregates etc. >Reference classes. II 106 Redundancy theory/Field: an utterance u and the assertion that u is true (as the speaker understands it) are cognitively equivalent. >Redundancy theory, >Utterance. N.B.: the assertion that an utterance is true, has an existential obligation (ontological commitment): there must be something that is true. >Ontological commitment. While the utterance u itself does not provide an ontological obligation. Therefore, the two are not completely cognitively equivalent. Relatively cognitively equivalent: here: u and the assertion of the truth of u are cognitively equivalent relative to the existence of u. II 106 E.g. "Thatcher is so that she is self-identical and snow is white" is cognitively equivalent to "snow is white" relative to the existence of Thatcher - the verification conditions are the same. N.B.: we do not need any truth conditions. >Verification conditions, >Truth conditions. II 252 Material Equivalence/Field: means that A > B is equivalent to ~ A v B. Problem: most authors do not believe the conclusion of e.g. "Clinton will not die in office" on "When Clinton dies in office, Danny de Vito becomes President". Therefore equivalence does not seem to exist. Solution/Lewis: the truth conditions for indicative conditionals must be radically index-dependent to maintain the surface logic. >Conditionals. Lewis: thesis: the surface logic should not be respected. Lewis: thesis: E.g. Clinton/Vito: truth-maintaining despite absurdity. Solution: probability function: P (Vito I Clinton). >Probability function. II 253 In the case of the indicative conditional, the premise is always presupposed. Adams: intuitively, conclusions with conditionals are correct. >Conditional/Adams. Problem: then they will say less about the world. >Empiricism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Evolution | Dawkins | I 48 Evolution/Dawkins: There is a tendency in molecules to duplicate faster, because they will automatically be the majority. Evolution/Dawkins: There is no "desire for evolution". I 60 Inheritance/Dawkins: In fact, no whole chromosomes are transmitted. I 66 Evolution/Dawkins: If we were to examine a very short genetic unit, it may have been put together for the first time in a very remote ancestor. I 67 Def Point mutation/Dawkins: An error that consists in a single wrong letter. This is rare, but of great importance. |
Da I R. Dawkins The Selfish Gene, Oxford 1976 German Edition: Das egoistische Gen, Hamburg 1996 Da II M. St. Dawkins Through Our Eyes Only? The Search for Animal Consciousness, Oxford/New York/Heidelberg 1993 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des tierischen Bewusstseins Hamburg 1993 |
| Evolution | Gould | Dennett I 412 Evolution/Gould theory: the key difference in evolution is not simple adaptation but speciation. (DennettVs). Gould: thesis: species are fragile but have unalterable structures. There are no improvements in species, only closed discarding. Correct level: the correct level are not the genes but entire species or clades. Species/Gould/(s): species are not going to be improved, but discarded. Level/explanation/Dennett: as software/hardware: some is better explained on one level, others is better explained on a different level. >Explanation, >Darwinism. Gould I 88ff Evolution/Darwinism/individual/Gould: individuals do not develop evolutionary, they can only grow, reproduce and die. Evolutionary changes occur in groups of interacting organisms. Species are the units of evolution. Orthodox Darwinism/Gould: thesis: gene mutate, individuals are subject to selection and species evolve evolutionary. I 131 Evolution/Gould: Thesis: I do not imagine evolution as a ladder, but rather in the form of a shrub with many branches. Therefore: the more species the better. I 133 The importance of this point can be seen in the development of molecules. The number of differences between amino acids clearly correlates with the time since the diversion of development lines. The longer the separation, the greater the differences. This is how a molecular clock was developed. The Darwinians were generally surprised by the regularity of this clock. After all, the selection should proceed at a noticeably different speed for the different development lines at different times. I 134 VsDarwinism: the Darwinists are actually forced to contemplate that the regular molecular clock represents an evolution that is not subject to selection, but to the random fixation of neutral mutations. We have never been able to separate ourselves from the concept of the evolution of the human being, which puts the brain in the centre of attention. The Australopithecus afarensis disproved what had been predicted by astute evolutionary theorists such as Ernst Haeckel and Friedrich Engels. Tradition: general view: that the upright gait represented an easily attainable gradual development, and the increase in brain volume represented a surprisingly rapid leap. I 136 GouldVs: I would like to take the opposite view: in my opinion, the upright gait is a surprise, a difficult event to achieve, a rapid and fundamental transformation of our anatomy. In anatomical terms, the subsequent enlargement of our brain is a secondary epiphenomenon, a simple transition embedded in the general pattern of human evolution. Bipedality is not an easy achievement, it represents a fundamental transformation of our anatomy, especially of the feet and pelvis. I 191 Evolution/Gould: evolution essentially proceeds in two ways: a) Definition phyletic transformation: an entire population changes from one state to another. If all evolutionary changes were to occur in this way, life would not last long. This is because a phyletic transformation does not lead to an increase in diversity and variety, only to a transformation from one state to another. Now that extinction (by eradication) is so widespread, everything that does not have the ability to adapt would soon be destroyed. b) Definition speciation: new species branch off from existing ones. All speciation theories assume that splits occur quickly in very small populations. With the "sympatric" speciation, new forms appear within the distribution area of the previous form. Large stable central populations have a strong homogenizing influence. New mutations are impaired by the strong previous forms: they may slowly increase in frequency, but a changed environment usually reduces their selective value long before they can assert themselves. Thus, a phyletic transformation of the large populations should be very rare, as the fossil finds prove. It looks different in the periphery: isolated small populations here are much more exposed to the selection pressure, because the periphery marks the limit of the ecological tolerance of the previous living beings. I 266 Evolution/Biology/Gould: evolution proceeds by replacing the nucleotides. II 243 Evolution/Gould: thesis: evolution has no tendency. II 331 Evolution/Gould: official definition of evolution/Gould: evolution is the "change of gene frequencies in populations". (The process of random increase or decrease of the gene frequency is called definition "genetic drift".) The new theory of neutralism suggests that many, if not most, genes in individual populations owe their frequency primarily to chance. IV 199 Evolution/species richness: the change from a few species and many groups to a few groups and many species would occur even in the case of purely coincidental extinction if every speciation process at the beginning of life's history had been accompanied by average major changes. IV 221 Evolution/Gould: pre-evolutionary theory: a pre-evolutionary theory is "the chain of being": it is the old idea that every organism is a link. It confuses evolution with higher development and has been misinterpreted as a primitive form of evolution, but has nothing to do with it! The thesis is emphatically antievolutionary. Problem: there are no links between vertebrates and invertebrates IV 223 Intermediate form: the theory assumed asbestos as an intermediate form between minerals and plants due to the fibrous structure. Hydra and corals were seen as an intermediate form between plants and animals. (Today: both are animals of course.) Absurd: it is absurd to assume a similarity between plants and baboons, because plants lose their leaves and baboon babies lose their hair. IV 346 Evolution/Gould: evolution is not developing in the direction of complexity, why should it? |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Evolution | Mayr | I 43 Evolution/Mayr: Unit of evolution is the population (or species) and not the gene or the individual. (MayrVsDawkins). >Species, >Genes, >R. Dawkins, >Genes/Dawkins, >Evolution/Dawkins. Def Integron/Mayr: An integron is a system created by integration of subordinate units on a higher level. Integrons evolve by natural selection. They are adapted systems at each level because they contribute to the fitness (suitability) of an individual. >Selection. I 183 Evolution/Mayr: Species is the decisive entity of evolution. I 230 Evolution/Progress/Mayr: Cohesion: an expression of the fact that the system of development has become very narrow. Evolution: proceeds very slowly in large, member-rich species, and very quickly in small peripheral isolated groups. >Speciation, >punctuated equilibrium/Eldredge/Gould. A start-up population with few individuals and therefore little hidden genetic variation can more easily assume a different genotype. Macroevolution: is most strongly determined by the geographical factor (isolation). I 234 Evolution/Mayr: the concepts: 1) Rapid evolution: (transmutationism): type jump. Even after Darwin some researchers (including his friend Huxley) could not accept the concept of natural selection and developed saltationist theories. 2) Transformational evolution (transformationism) gradual change of the ice to the organism. Ignored by Darwin. I 235 3) Variation Evolution (Darwin) I 235 Darwin (early): adaptation modification. Vs: can never explain the enormous variety of organic life, because it does not allow for an increase in the number of species. I 236 Darwin/Mayr: The Origin of Species: 5 Main Theories 1) Organisms are constantly evolving over time (evolution as such). 2) Different species of organisms are derived from a common ancestor. 3) Species multiply over time (speciation) 4) Evolution takes the form of gradual change. (GradualismVsSaltationism). >Gradualism, >Saltationism. 5) The evolutionary mechanism consists in the competition among numerous unique individuals for limited resources that leads to differences in survival and reproduction (natural selection). I 234 Evolution/Mayr: the concepts: 1) Rapid evolution: (transmutationism): type jump. Even after Darwin some researchers (including his friend Huxley) could not accept the concept of natural selection and developed saltationist theories. 2) Transformational evolution (transformationism) gradual change of the ice to the organism. Ignored by Darwin. I 235 3) Variation Evolution (Darwin) I 235 Darwin (early): adaptation modification. Vs: can never explain the enormous variety of organic life, because it does not allow for an increase in the number of species. I 236 Darwin/Mayr: The Origin of Species: 5 Main Theories 1) Organisms are constantly evolving over time (evolution as such). 2) Different species of organisms are derived from a common ancestor. 3) Species multiply over time (speciation) 4) Evolution takes the form of gradual change. (GradualismVsSaltationism). 5) The evolutionary mechanism consists in the competition among numerous unique individuals for limited resources that leads to differences in survival and reproduction (natural selection). >Selection. I 377 Evolution of life: a chemical process involving autocatalysis and a directing factor. Prebiotic selection. Cf. >St. Kauffman. I 237 Pasteur: proofed the impossibility of life in oxygen-rich atmosphere! In 1953, Stanley Miller grew amino acids, urea and other organic molecules in a glass flask by discharging electricity into a mixture of methane, ammonium, hydrogen, and water vapor. I 238 Proteins, nucleic acids: the organisms must form these larger molecules themselves. Amino acids, pyrimidines, puridine do not need to formed by the organisms themselves. I 239 Molecular biology: discovered that the genetic code is the same for bacteria, which do not have nuclei, as in protists, fungi, animals and plants. I 240 Missing link: Archaeopteryx: half bird half reptile. Not necessarily direct ancestor. Speciation: a) dichopatric: a previously connected area is divided by a new barrier: mountain range, inlets, interruption of vegetation. b) peripatrically: new start-up population emerges outside of the original distribution area. c) sympatric speciation: new species due to ecological specialization within the area of distribution. Darwin's theory of gradualism. >Gradualism. I 243 VsGardualism: cannot explain the emergence of completely new organs. Problem: How can a rudimentary wing be enlarged by natural selection before it is suitable for flying? I 244 Darwin: two possible solutions: a) Intensification of the function: E.g. eyes, e.g. the development of the anterior limbs of moles, whales, bats. b) Functional change: E.g. Antennae of daphia (water flea): additional function of the swimming paddle, which is enlarged and modified under selection pressure. E.g. Gould: Feathers probably first for temperature control before any animal could fly. Function/Biology: Functional differences are also related to behavioral patterns, e.g. feather cleaning. Competing theories on evolutionary change I 247 Salationism: Huxley later Bateson, de Vries, (Mendelists). The saltationist emergence of new species only occurs poyploidy and some other forms of chromosomal restructuring (very rare) during sexual reproduction. Teleological theories: assume that nature has a principle: Osbron's arsitogenesis, Chardin's omega principle. Should lead to perfection. >Teilhard de Chardin. Lamarck's Theories: Changes go back to use and non-use, environmental conditions. Until the 1930s! I 248 Def "soft inheritance" (acquired characteristics). Was refuted by genetics. Def "hard inheritance" (so-called "central dogma"): the information contained in the proteins (the phenotype) cannot be passed on to the nucleic acids (the genotype)! (Insight of molecular biology). I 256 Macroevolution: after saltationism, soft heredity and autogenesis, had been refuted with evolution, macroevolution had to be explained more and more as a phenomenon on the level of the population, i.e. as a phenomenon directly attributable to events and processes during microevolution. (Speciation: faster in isolation). (>Gould, Eldredge, 1971(1): "punctuated equilibrium", punctualism.) I 281 New: we know today that the cycles of herbivores elicit those of the predators and not vice versa! Coevolution: E.g. the Yucca moth destroys the plant's ovules by its larvae, but pollens the flowers. 1. N. Eldredge, S. J. Gould: Punctuated equilibria: an alternative to phyletic gradualism. In: T. Schopf (Ed), Models in Paleobiology, 82-115, San Francisco, (1972). |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Evolution | Monod | Dennett I 268 Evolution/Molecules/Genesis of Life/Monod/Dennett: that means that the "language" of the DNA and its "readers" have gone through a common evolution. Neither of them works on its own. Dennett I 416 Evolution/Monod: Selection from disturbing noises has produced the whole concert. >Selection, >Noise. |
Mon I J. Monod Le hasard et la nécessité, Paris 1970 German Edition: Zufall und Notwendigkeit Hamburg 1982 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Explanation | Wilson | I 93 Explanation/Science/Wilson, E. O.: One of the scientific mantras means that physical explanations are necessary but not sufficient. >Necessity, >Sufficiency. There are too many idiosyncrasies in the structure of a cell nucleus and other organelles including their molecules, and there is far too much complexity in the constantly changing chemical exchange of a cell with the environment, than conceptual interconnections of this kind would be possible. >Complexity, >Simplicity. |
WilsonEO I E. O. Wilson Consilience. The Unity of Knowledge, New York 1998 German Edition: Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge New York 1998 |
| Exterior/interior | Maturana | I 98 Recursion/within/without/Maturana: through recursive distinctions the observer can operate as if he moves outside his circumstances. (Self-reference, application of operations an operations). >Recursion, >Self-reference. I 113f Unity/closed system/Maturana: within/without is only for the observer not by Input/Output describable, otherwise open system. >Systems, >Input/Output. I 121 Distinction from hallucination for nervous system not possible, part of the cognitive domain of the observer. >Observation/Maturana, >Nervous system. I 183 Definition Life/Maturana: in ontogenetic drift push through a range of interference, while a constantly changing niche is realized. >Life, >Niche. Living System/: operates only in the present. - It is open for the passage of molecules (parts of autopoietic systems). Purpose: is part of the observer. >Purposes. Living systems have no within/without - they are in the process of autopoiesis or disintegrated. >Autopoiesis. Environment: is not "used" by the system. - Instead living systems they bring their own niche out. I 194 Life is knowledge - living systems are cognitive systems. >Knowledge, >Cognition. |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
| Forces | Dennett | I 277 Force/Dennett: There once was the birth of a driving force: in the first macromolecules which are so complex, that they can "do something". However, this is not intentional. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Forms | Dennett | I 268f Form/Meaning/Dennett: in the world of macromolecules form is the same as determination. ((s) Cf. >Functional analysis, >Functional explanation.) |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Foundation | Simons | I 340 Foundation/SimonsVsFine: a foundation cannot be made up of individuals of the same category. Better: R-families. These normally include continuants and events (problem: then again no sum can be formed). >Continuants, >Events. Generic dependency: often, only something vague is required: e.g. any oxygen molecules. >Dependence. I 342 Foundation/Husserl: the foundation explains best what the whole complex holds together. Connection/Husserl: a conncection is ultimately purely formal. If objects cannot exist without each other, it is pointless to look for a chain. >E. Husserl. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Functions | Armstrong | Place III 119 Function/Place/(s): There is no double function: a thing cannot at the same have the categorical property (as a function) of sharpness and the dispositional property (as a function) of the ability to cut. - ((s) At least no "double explanation" no "double yield"?). Example: if the arrangement of the molecules of opium contitutes the categorical aspect of the binding of these atoms, it can not simultaneously have the categorical aspect of the soporific effect. - There does not seem to enough categorical to supply all reactants with their dispositional property. >Dispositions/Place. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
| Functions | Kauffman | I 407 Function/Kauffman: is simply put, a string of signs. Strings of signs affect other strings and produce new strings. They can be models for economy, molecules, chemicals, goods and services, etc. >Self-organization, >Character strings, >Molecules. |
Kau II Stuart Kauffman At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity New York 1995 Kauffman I St. Kauffman At Home in the Universe, New York 1995 German Edition: Der Öltropfen im Wasser. Chaos, Komplexität, Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft München 1998 |
| Holism | Schurz | I 190 Verification holism/Holism/Schurz: deduction-logical background: if the set of premises (H1...Hn) logically implies the prediction P, then (per modus tollens) the negation of the prediction, ~P implies the negation of the conjunction of all premises, i.e. ~(H1,...Hn). The latter is logically equivalent to the disjunction of all negated premises, i.e. ~H1 v ...v ~Hn i.e. at least one of the premises Hi is false. ((s) "i" instead of "n", because n would be merely the last hypothesis). Theory net/Schurz: consists of different theory associations. There are at least 3 kinds of relations between the theory elements of a theory net: 1. through the relation of specialization: hierarchical theory associations are formed 2. the relation of the Vortheoretizität: can exist both within and between theory federations. These two relations connect only theoretically homogeneous theory elements with each other. Terms that are identical in expression are identified with each other. Elements connected in this way can never compete. Anders: 3. between different theory associations there are intertheoretical cross connections: (a) simplest case: again identity connections. I 191 Ex electrostatic force within a mechanical model. b) Bridging principles: Ex between phenomenological thermodynamics and statistical mechanics, according to which temperature is proportional to the mean kinetic energy of molecules. c) approximate theory reduction. Ex Newtonian mechanics Relativity. >Theories, >Relativity theory, >Bridge laws, >Laws of nature, >Laws. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Hypotheses | AI Research | Norvig I 768 Hypotheses/examples/learning/AI Research/Norvig/Russell: [a learning rule for decisions will need examples.] Examples [are] described by attributes Norvig I 769 Each hypothesis predicts that a certain set of examples - namely, those that satisfy its candidate definition - will be examples of the goal predicate ((s) i.e. a description of the resulting action). This set is called the extension of the predicate. Two hypotheses with different extensions are therefore logically inconsistent with each other, because they disagree on their predictions for at least one example. Norvig I 770 An example can be a false negative for the hypothesis, if the hypothesis says it should be negative but in fact it is positive. An example can be a false positive for the hypothesis, if the hypothesis says it should be positive but in fact it is negative. Current-best-hypothesis search: The idea behind current-best-hypothesis search is to maintain a single hypothesis, and to adjust it as new examples arrive in order to maintain consistency. The basic algorithm was described by John Stuart Mill (1843)(1), and may well have appeared even earlier. Generalization: The extension of the hypothesis must be increased to include [the example]. Norvig I 771 Specialization: The extension of the hypothesis must be decreased to exclude the example. Norvig I 772 Current-best-learning algorithm: (…) generalization and specialization are also logical relationships between hypotheses. If hypothesis h1, with definition C1, is a generalization of hypothesis h2 with definition C2, then we must have ∀x C2(x) ⇒ C1(x). Therefore in order to construct a generalization of h2, we simply need to find a definition C1 that is logically implied by C2. Norvig I 773 The current-best-learning algorithm and its variants have been used in many machine learning systems, starting with Patrick Winston’s (1970)(2) “arch-learning” program. Problems/VsCBL algorithm: 1. Checking all the previous examples over again for each modification is very expensive. 2. The search process may involve a great deal of backtracking. Backtracking: arises because the current-best-hypothesis approach has to choose a particular hypothesis as its best guess even though it does not have enough data yet to be sure of the choice. Solution: what we can do instead is to keep around all and only those hypotheses that are consistent with all the data so far. >Prior knowledge/AI Research. Version space learning algorithm: Assuming that the original hypothesis space does in fact contain the right answer, the reduced disjunction [of hypotheses] must still contain the right answer because only incorrect hypotheses have been removed. The set of hypotheses remaining is called the version space, and the learning algorithm (…) is called the version space learning algorithm (also the candidate elimination algorithm). Norvig I 776 Problems/VsVersion space learning algorithm: a) If the domain contains noise or insufficient attributes for exact classification, the version space will always collapse. b) If we allow unlimited disjunction in the hypothesis space, the S-set [the most specific boundary] will always contain a single most-specific hypothesis, namely, the disjunction of the descriptions of the positive examples seen to date. Similarly, the G-set [most general boundary] will contain just the negation of the disjunction of the descriptions of the negative examples. c) For some hypothesis spaces, the number of elements in the S-set or G-set may grow exponentially in the number of attributes, even though efficient learning algorithms exist for those hypothesis spaces. Noise: To date, no completely successful solution has been found for the problem of noise. The problem of disjunction can be addressed by allowing only limited forms of disjunction or by including a generalization hierarchy of more general predicates. The pure version space algorithm was first applied in the Meta-DENDRAL system, which was designed to learn rules for predicting how molecules would break into pieces in a mass spectrometer (Buchanan and Mitchell, 1978)(3). >Prior knowledge/Norvig. 1. Mill, J. S. (1843). A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence, and Methods of Scientific Investigation. J.W. Parker, London. 2. Winston, P. H. (1970). Learning structural descriptions from examples. Technical report MAC-TR-76, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 3. Buchanan, B. G.,Mitchell, T.M., Smith, R. G., and Johnson, C. R. (1978). Models of learning systems. In Encyclopedia of Computer Science and Technology, Vol. 11. Dekker. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Identity | Goodman | I 21f Def Identification/Goodman: identification is based on the division into entities and kinds. The answer to the question: "The same or not the same?" always has to be: "The same what?". >Identification, >Individuation, >Context dependence. I 142 (16) In the relevant correct system each point correlates with a combination of a vertical and a horizontal line. (17) In the (other) corresponding correct system no point correlates with a combination of any other elements. Moreover, since the isomorphism neither guarantees identity nor excludes it (although it is guaranteed by it), (16) means no positive or negative determination on something other than straight lines, and combinations of straight lines, while (17) does not determine itself on anything except to points. I 140 (14) Each point is generated by a vertical and a horizontal straight line. (15) No dot is formed by straight lines or something else. I 142f Are (14) and (15) about the same points? Is the screen on which a spot moves the same as the one on which no spot moves? Is the seen table the same as the pile of molecules? I 145 Goodman: the answer to such frequently asked questions in philosophy is a strong Yes and a strong No. The realist will oppose the conclusion that there is no world. The idealist will oppose the conclusion that conflicting versions describe different worlds. Goodman: both views are appealing. Finally, the difference between them is purely conventional! --- Goodman IV 21 Individuation/Quine: is defined by a bundle of mutually interrelated grammatical particles and constructions. Plurals, pronouns, numerals, the "is" (the identity) and the "same" and "another" derived from them. >individuation IV 21 GoodmanVsQuine: Quine failed to explain that the interpretation of these particles cannot be made without consideration of the thing-places they individuate. The interpretation changes when they are used in different systems. IV 77 There is no way to individuate a world, except with the help of a version. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Identity | Kripke | I 53 Identity: identity is given by arbitrary criteria (only math is required). Identity is not for objects or people. >Criteria. Identity over time: is it still the same object if several parts of a table have been replaced? There is a certain vagueness. Where the identity relation is vague, it might appear intransitive. I 62 A kind of "counterpart" concept could be useful here. (However, without Lewis worlds that are like foreign countries, etc.) You could say that strict identities only apply to individual things (molecules) and the counterpart relation to those individual things that are composed of them, the tables. I 116 Our concept of identity, which we are using here, deals with identity criteria of individual objects in concepts of other individual objects, and not in concepts of qualities. Identity: through the use of descriptions one can make contingent identity statements. >Counterparts, >Counterpart relation, >Counterpart theory, >Possible world/Kripke, >Possible world/Lewis, >Identity across worlds. I 63f Kripke (VsTradition): molecular motion: is necessarily identical with heat. We have discovered it, but it could not be otherwise. Physical truths are necessary: e.g. heat equals molecular motion - but there is no analogy to mind-brain identities. >Identity theory/Kripke. I 117 Ruth Barcan Markus: thesis: identities between names are necessary ("mere tag"). QuineVsMarkus: we could label the planet Venus with the proper name "Hesperus" on a beautiful evening. We could label the same planet again on a day before sunrise, this time with the proper name "Phosphorus". If we discover that it was the same planet twice, our discovery is an empirical one. And not because the proper names have been descriptions. I 120f Designation does not create identity: the same epistemic situation, Phospherus/Hesperus named as different celestial bodies is quite possible and therefore contingent, but does not affect the actual identity. We use them as names in all possible worlds. >Possible world, >Naming/Kripke. I 124 Identity: a mathematician writes that x = y are only identical if they are names for the same object. Kripke: those are not names at all, but rather variables. >Names/Kripke, >Variables. I 125 Definition "Schmidentity": this artificial relation can only exist between an object and itself. Kripke: it is quite okay and useful. I 175 Does the mere creation of molecular motion still leaves the additional task for God to turn this motion into heat? This feeling is actually based on an illusion, what God really has to do is to turn this molecular motion into something that is perceived as heat. >Sensation/Kripke, >Pain/Kripke, >Contingency/Kripke. --- Frank I 114 Identity/Kripke: if an identity statement is true, it is always necessarily true. E.g. heat/motion of molecules, Cicero/Tullius, Water/H20 - these are compatible with the fact that they are truths a posteriori. But according to Leibniz it is not conceivable that one occurs without the other. Frank I 125 Identity/body/Kripke: "A" is the (rigid) name for the body of Descartes - it survived the body, i.e.: M (Descartes unequal A). This is not a modal fallacy, because A is rigid. Analogue: a statue is dissimilar to molecule collection. >Rigidity/Kripke. Saul A. Kripke (1972): Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann (eds.) (1972), pp. 253-355. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Identity | Stalnaker | I 14 Vague identity/Stalnaker: vague identity can at most occur with vague terms in identity-statements. >Vagueness. Solution/counterpart theory/Stalnaker: if cross-wordly-relation between classes of deputies ((s) counterparts) exists and not between individuals themselves, then the relation must not be the one of identity, and this other relation may be vague.) >Counterparts, >Counterpart theory, >Cross world identity, >Possible worlds. I 126 Contingent Identity/Stalnaker: it is of course not the case that the actualism requires contingent identity, the above examples can be explained away. >Actualism. One cannot simply reject the possibility on the basis of semantics and logic of identity. Necessary identity: that means, that the thesis that all identity is necessary is a metaphysical thesis. >Identity/Kripke. I 131 Identity/necessary/contingent/Stalnaker: according to the modal quantifier theory all identity is necessary. We do not want this, e.g. a thing can have more counterparts in another possible world. I 132 Solution: there are different ways of picking. I 133 Vague identity/Stalnaker/Nathan SalmonVsVague Identity: (Salmon 1981(1), 243) according to Salmon identity cannot be vague: e.g. suppose there is a pair of entities x and y so that it is vague if they are one and the same thing - then this pair is certainly not the same pair like the pair, in which this is definitely true that x is the same thing as itself - but it is not vague, if the two pairs are identical or differentiated. I 134 Vague identity/identity statement/vague objects/Stalnaker: e.g. M is a specific piece of land within the indeterminate Mt Rainier. a) Mt. Rainier is an indefinite object: then it is wrong to say that M = Mt. Rainier. b ) If it is about a statement instead of an object: then it is indeterminate. I 135f Vague identity/Stalnaker: e.g. there are two fish restaurants called Bookbinder's. Only one can be the same as the original. Endurantism: Problem: "B0": (the original) is then an ambiguous term. Perdurantism: here it is clear. >Perdurantism, cf. >Endurantism. I 138 Vague identity/SalmonVsVague identity/uncertainty/Stalnaker: Salmon's argument shows that if we manage to pick out two entities a and b that there then has to be a fact, whether the two are one thing or two different things (Stalnaker pro Salmon, Nathan). Conversely: if it is undetermined whether a = b, then it is uncertain what "a" refers to or what "b" refers to. But this does not give us a reason to suppose that facts together with terms have to decide this. Salmon just shows that when facts and terms do not decide that it is then indeterminate. I 140 StalnakerVsSalmon: Salmon's vagueness is a vagueness of reference. I 139 Identity/indefinite/Kripke: (1971(2), 50-1) e.g. would the table T be the same in the actual world if in the past the constituting molecules were spread a little differently? Here, the answer can be vague. I 148 Identity/one-digit predicates/Stalnaker: one cannot generally treat sentences as predications. >Predication, >Sentences. E.g. x^(Hx u Gx) is an instance of the form Fs, but "(Hs and Gs)" is not. Therefore, our identity-scheme is more limited than Leibniz' law is normally formulated. >Leibniz Principle. I 154f Definition essential identity/Stalnaker: all things x and y, which are identical, are essentially identical, i.e. identical in all possible worlds, in which this thing exists ((s) that means, the existence is made a prerequisite, not the identity for the existence.) ((s) necessary identity/Stalnaker/(s): here the situation is reversed: if x and y are necessarily identical, they must exist in all possible worlds - or if a thing does not exist in a possible world, it may, in the possible worlds in which it exists, not be necessarily identical). Necessary identity/logical form: x^(x = y)> N(x = y) fails in the standard semantics and in counterpart theory, because a thing can exist contingently and include self-identity existence. Counterpart theory. Two different things may be identical, without being essentially identical, e.g. two possible worlds a and b, each possible for the respective other, and two distinct things have the same counterpart in b, namely 3. Then the pair satisfies the identity-relation in b, but because 1 exists in the world a and is from 2 different, the pair does not satisfy N(Ex> x = y) in b. >Cross world identity. 1. Salmon, Wesley C. 1981. Rational prediction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (2):115-125 2. Kripke, Saul S. Identity and NEcessity. In Milton Karl Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation. New York: New York University Press. pp. 135-164 (1971). |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Individuals | Nietzsche | Danto III 173 Individual/Group/Nietzsche/Danto: compared to Nietzsche's view of the individual in the early work of the birth of tragedy(1), where he had an idea of how the individual could go up by music in a form of communion in the group, ... Danto III 174 ... one can hardly find anything of it in the late work. Nietzsche had meanwhile come to the conclusion that there was sufficient solidarity in life, but not enough individuality. Individual/Tradition/Danto: Hobbes and Locke (originally Plato in the Glaucon) were tempted to think of humans as primordial individuals, from whom societies were supposed to have formed in such a way that chemical bonds were supposed to have formed from elements or atoms and molecules. >Language and thought/Ancient philosohy, >Language/Hobbbes, >Social contract/Hobbes, >Language/Locke, >Social contract/Locke. Social relations would then only be external, or, as Hobbes says, "artificial". NietzscheVsLocke/NietzscheVsHume/NietzscheVsPlato/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche rejected such a theory; in his opinion, consciousness and language have a social origin and a social function,... Danto III 175 ...so that the individual only develops an awareness of those ideas that everyone has in common with everyone. Just as the individual could hardly survive without community, it is difficult for him to gain a sense of himself as an independent entity. >Consciousness/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche. Die Geburt der Tragödie, 4, KGW III. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Information | Dennett | I 268 Information/code/Dennett: the fact that a one-dimensional code can represent a three-dimensional structure is a gain of information. Actually, "value" is added! (Contribution to the functioning). >Functions, >Functional explanation, >Code. II 35 Information/action/virus/Dennett: The virus must "make sure" of the proliferation of its information. in order to achieve its objectives, it produces an enzyme which is shown a "password", and then it leaves the other molecules "untouched". II 94f Information/Life/Dennett: long before there were nervous systems in organisms, they used a primitive. postal service: the circulation and metabolism for transmitting information. Information processing/DennettVsFunctionalism: one thing was always clear: as soon as there are transducers and effectors in an information system, its "media neutrality" or multiple realization disappears. (VsPutnam, VsTuring). Embodied Information/Dennett: evolution causes information to become physical in every part of every living creature. E.g. the baleen of the whale embodies information about the food. E.g. The bird's wings contain information about the medium air. E.g. The skin of the chameleon carries information about the environment. This information need not go to the brain as copies. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Information | Kauffman | I 111 Order/Life/Human/Kauffman: the human is the product of two sources of order, not one. >Order/Kauffman, >Life/Kauffman, >Humans. I 112 Information/order/life/emergence/Kauffman: most people assume that DNA and RNA are stable stores of genetic information. However, if life began with collective autocatalysis and later learned to incorporate DNA and genetic code, we must explain how these formations could be subject to hereditary variation and natural selection, even though they did not yet contain a genome! >Genes, >Selection. On the one hand, evolution cannot proceed without matrices copying mechanisms, but on the other hand it is the one that combines the mechanisms. >Evolution. Could an autocatalytic formation evolve without it? Solution: Spatial compartments (spaces divided by membranes) that split are capable of variation and evolution! Solution: Assumption: every now and then random, uncatalysed reactions take place and produce new molecules. The metabolism (conversion, metabolism) would be extended by a reaction loop. Evolution without genome, no DNA-like structure as a carrier of information. >Life/Kauffman. I 114 Catalysis/Autocatalysis/Kauffman: in the case of autocatalytic formations, there is no difference between genotype and phenotype. >Genotype, >Phenotype. Life/emergence/Kauffman: this inevitably leads to the formation of a complex ecosystem. Molecules produced in a primordial cell can be transported into other primordial cells and influence reactions there. Metabolic-based life does not arise as a whole or as a complex structure, but the entire spectrum of mutualism and competition is present from the very beginning. Not only evolution, but also co-evolution. >Co-evolution. I 115 Order/life/emergence/Kauffman: the autocatalytic formations must coordinate the behaviour of several thousand molecules. The potential chaos is beyond imagination. Therefore, another source of molecular order has to be discovered, the fundamental internal homeostasis (balance). Surprisingly simple boundary conditions are sufficient for this. >Beginning I 148 Information/Genes/Kauffman: Question: What mechanism controls the implementation and suppression of certain genetic information? And how do the different cell types know which genes to use and when? J. Monod/Francois Jacob: Mid-1960s: Discovery of an operator that only releases a reaction at a certain point in time. >J. Monod. I 149 Also repressor. A small molecule can "switch on" a gene. I 150 In the simplest case, two genes can suppress each other. Two possible patterns. >Genes. Gene 1 is active and suppresses gene 2 or vice versa. Both cell types would then have the same "genotype", the same genome, but they could realize different gene sets. New horizon of knowledge: unexpected and far-reaching freedom at the molecular level. The addition of the repressor to the operator at different points results in different receptivity to the operator on the DNA. Regulation. I 151 This control mechanism by addition in two different places means complete freedom for the molecules to create genetic circuits of arbitrary logic and complexity. We must first learn to understand such systems. |
Kau II Stuart Kauffman At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity New York 1995 Kauffman I St. Kauffman At Home in the Universe, New York 1995 German Edition: Der Öltropfen im Wasser. Chaos, Komplexität, Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft München 1998 |
| Instantiation | Bigelow | I 39 Instantiation/Universal/Antisymmetry/Bigelow/Pargetter: Instantiation is an antisymmetric relation: If x instantiates y, y cannot inversely instantiate x. Order: from the antisymmetry arises an order that can be a) linear b) a tree structure. For example, the relation "parents of". >Asymmetries, >Relations, >Universals. I 94 Instantiation/Bigelow/Pargetter: (see above Chapter 2) cannot be a universal itself. (Example: chemical molecules require more than one instance of a universal, the element. Absurd: 2 hydrogen atoms cannot be two different universals within one molecule). Universals/Strawson: (1959)(1) there is a "non-relational connection" between a particular and a universal. Armstrong: (1978)(2): ditto. >Universals/Armstrong, >Universals/Strawson. 1. Strawson, P.F. (1959). Individuals: An essay in descriptive metyphasics. London: Methuen. 2. Armstrong, D.M. (1978). Universals and scientific realism. Cambridge University Press. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Intentionality | Darwin | Dennett I 282 Intentionality/Darwin/Dennett: Darwin reverses the whole thing: intentionality assures from the bottom up. The first meaning ((s) of macromolecules or rather their mode of action) was not a fully developed meaning; it certainly does not show all "essential" properties (whatever that may be). "Quasi meaning", half-semantics. >Meaning, >Semantics. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Intentions | Dennett | II 39f Intention/action/life/Evolution/Dennett: modes of action within such primitive systems (macromolecules) are similar to intentional actions. The systems are driven by information and strive for goals. Thermometers are similar "pseudo-agents"! They are "intentional systems". In order to understand them we should take the "intentional position" against them. II 57 Purpose/intention/meaning/action/Dennett: the goal of expressing exactly how the actor sees his task is erroneous, a pointless exercise, like reading poems under the microscope. >Intentional Stance/Dennett. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Language | Dennett | I 269 Evolution/molecules/origin of life/Monod/Dennett: "Language" of DNA and its "readers" have gone through a common evolution. Neither works alone. ((s) See T. Deacon on >language and >brain.) I 474 Culture/Language/Dennett: For culture we need language, but language must first develop for its own reasons (because of the impossibility of foreseeing evolution). >Culture. I 516 Animal/Language: is it true, do dolphins and chimpanzees have some kind of language? So you can also call music and politics a kind of language. >Animal language. I 517 Language/Intelligence/Dennett: To what extent does language contribute to intelligence? Which forms of thinking require language? I 528 Language/Darwin: "Prerequisite for the development of long thoughts": Decisive for planning and persevering with long projects. II 23/24 Consciousness/Language/Dennett: There is a view that certain beings may have consciousness, but for lack of language cannot communicate it to us. DennettVs: Why do I think this is problematic? For example, the computer can calculate even if no printer is connected. Our ideal way to get to know the spirit of others is language. It does not reach as far as you, but that is only a limitation of our knowledge, not a limitation of your mind. >Theory of mind. II 185 Think/Human/Dennett: Also we humans do not think many things, brush our teeth, tie our shoes, etc. We even answer questions without thinking. We call fleeting processes that last longer and gain more and more influence thoughts. Some of the (previously existing) mental content gains more influence through language. II 190 Language/thinking/Dennett: Thesis: There is no thinking without language. Cf. >Psychological theories on Language and Thought. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Life | Dawkins | I 42 Life/genesis/structure/Dawkins: Thesis: Even prior to the development of life there was a certain rudimentary evolution of molecules, whereby there was no need at all for a plan or a direction. I 52 Life/genesis/Cairns-Smith: Thesis: Our progenitors were perhaps minerals. I 80 Death/Dawkins: It's actually a good question, why we die. Death/Tradition: Death is an act of altruism towards the rest of the species. MedawarVs: circular conclusion, presupposes what he wants to prove: namely, that old animals are too weak to reproduce. No ancestor died in infancy. I 419 Life/Dawkins: the only unit that must exist for life to be created somewhere in the universe is the immortal replicator. ((s) Replicator is gene, not the individual, not the body). |
Da I R. Dawkins The Selfish Gene, Oxford 1976 German Edition: Das egoistische Gen, Hamburg 1996 Da II M. St. Dawkins Through Our Eyes Only? The Search for Animal Consciousness, Oxford/New York/Heidelberg 1993 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des tierischen Bewusstseins Hamburg 1993 |
| Life | Kanitscheider | I 285 Life/Universe/Possible worlds/Kanitscheider: (Investigation of Ellis and Brundrit)(1) if one makes the plausible assumption that there is a finite probability for life in galaxies of our type, then there is certainly in one of the other life-bearing systems an individual with identical genetic construction as a special living being on earth. But if there is also only one individual of a certain type, it follows immediately from the presupposed finite, non-vanishing probability that there are infinitely many genetically identical living beings in the universe at any time! Not only copies, but also their history several times existing! However, this is valid only if one refrains from the fact that the space-time allows infinitely many different localizations of the events because of its continuity. One must put a kind of finite grid over the space-time so that the finite events also occur infinitely often. I 287 The striking thing about this argument is that, in addition to cosmological data, it relies only on a relatively weak assumption that there are not an infinite number of different life forms. Physically, this is credible because there are only finitely many elements and the maximum size of stable molecules is certainly finite. So the kinds of life we know are certainly a true fraction of all possible life forms Kanitscheider: moreover, practically only carbon can be considered as a basis, silicon life is inferior to carbon life in the competition. Ellis/Brundrit(1), however, consider even more exotic objections: if a now-unknown long-range force played a role in the origin of life, so that the probability of life in larger systems would decrease, the result would still remain intact, since particle horizons exist in almost all FRW worlds, limiting the interactions. the present probabilities for life on separate Earth-like planets are independent of each other. At any point in time, there are infinitely many causally decoupled regions in a low total energy universe. I 288 Now in each of them only a finite number of viable structures can exist, the infinite multiplicity of these organisms is inevitable! If one does not want to share these assumptions, nevertheless the ways out are not less strange, under retention of the homogeneity one would have to already 1. deny that the origin of life can be estimated at all with a probability measure, or that this is vanishingly small. Or: 2. a) (with homogeneity): the space-like hypersurfaces would have to be compact (K = +1). That would be a universe with negative total energy (high density). This is not supported empirically at present. b) Way out: force solution: one would have to provide the space sections with local hyperbolic or Euclidean geometry via identification topologies with a compact connection form. Ex (k = 0): then the local geometry of spacetime can be described in the line element ds² = dt² + R²(t)[dx² + dy² + dz²] Notation: L: coordinate length. (see below identification topology, determines the galaxy number). If one chooses in this space a cube of the coordinate length L, x, y, z respectively between 0 and L, and identifies opposite sides, then this does not change the local spatial structure, but the spatial coordinates become cyclic in the sense that (t, x, y, z) and (t, x +L, y + L, z + L) represent the same event. By the new coherence form, the spatial sections have now become 3-toroi of finite volume V =R³L³. In such a finite Euclidean space, of course, there are only finitely many galaxies, just as in a space with positive curvature. so the multiplicity of things would be avoided. >Coordinate system/Kanitscheider. I 289 In exchange, however, a new parameter emerges which is not at all determined by local physics, namely the length scale of the identification topology L. The quantity L which determines the galaxy number could be determined in any number of different ways without being supported by local empirical information. However, if one sticks to the principle of choosing more exotic topologies only when prompted by empirical evidence, it follows that each of us has infinite doubles, most of them behind a particle horizon. Steady-State Theory SST would have the same consequence in temporal terms. At infinity, any particle combination for which there is even a tiny finite probability simply occurs infinitely often. Copernican Principle/Ellis: his main point was to point out that the Copernican Principle has no empirical support, on the other hand it leads to such strange consequences. I 290 Ellis: to make this clearer, he designed a Bsp alternative model universe, locally isotropic, but without Copernican principle, which nevertheless covers all empirical findings. SSS: Spherically symmetric static universe, two centers, near one we live, the other is a naked singularity. Redshift here is interpreted not as result of space expansion, but as gravitational redshift, background not as relic radiation, but as result of hot fireball sphere permanently surrounding second singularity. Cold center C, hot center S. At a point p near the cold center, the background radiation is taken as an indication that the past light cone refocuses from p toward the hot singularity. The world is spherically symmetric about S and C. If one goes from C in the direction of S, it becomes hotter and hotter. Near the singularity, all the things happen that happen in a FRW world in the deep past. Symmetrically around S, there is an area of decoupling, and even closer, an area of nucleosynthesis. Circulation, light elements drift from S to C, there heavy elements are formed, which migrate back. I 291 Such a world is dominated by the singularity as the "soul of the universe". It also provides the dominant arrow of time. Methodologically, it is now important whether one can make the correspondence between a Steady State (SSS) and a Friedman world perfect. The temporal range of circumstances favorable to life in the Friedman world is matched in the SSS by a small spatial range around C. This is a real alternative to the Copernican principle for some authors. (I.e. it looks completely different somewhere else, conclusions from our environment on distant sections of the universe are not allowed). With alternative theories one decides mostly after simplicity and uniformity points of view. Kanitscheider: The absurd consequence of the infinitely many doubles does not seem to be a sufficient argument for leaving the homogeneity assumption. >Universe/Kanitscheider. 1. Ellis, G. F. R. & Brundrit, G. B. Life in the infinite universe. Royal Astronomical Society, Quarterly Journal, vol. 20, Mar. 1979, p. 37-41. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Life | Kauffman | I 60 Primordial Soup/Kauffman: Earth's atmosphere mainly hydrogen, methane and carbon dioxide. Vs: it should have been extremely diluted. Solution: new theory by Alexander Oparin, biophysicist, Soviet Union: When glycerine is mixed with other molecules, gel-like structures are formed which are called coacervates. Inside these structures, the molecular processes are isolated from the diluted aqueous environment. Life/Emergence/Stanley Miller, 1952: received amino acids from the primordial soup tracted with lightning in the laboratory. DNA: pure DNA does not replicate itself. This requires complex mixtures of protein enzymes. I 68 Life/Development/RNA/Kauffman: a naked, replicating RNA molecule would be conceivable. It would be a more promising candidate for the first living molecule. Practically never succeeds in experiments. There are only balls instead of stretched structures. DNA/RNA/Kauffman: 10 years ago (until 1985) it was believed that the two are largely inert chemical information stores. Then it was discovered that the RNA itself can act as enzymes! Ribozymes. They cut out their introns themselves. I 71 Life/Emergence/Kauffman: Assuming that such a molecule had been created. Could it have defied mutation-related destruction? Could it have gone through a development? 1. Vs: Both times: probably no! Problem: Error catastrophe. 2. KauffmannVs: it is unlikely because those bare RNA molecules are not complex enough. All living beings have a certain minimum complexity which cannot be undercut! The simplest living organisms, the bacteria "Pleuromona" already possess cell membranes, genes, RNA, particles for protein synthesis, proteins. Question: why is a system simpler than Pleuromona not viable? I 77 Life/Kauffman: Thesis: Life is not bound to the magical power of matrix replication, but is based on a deeper logic. Life is an inherent characteristic of complex chemical systems. As soon as the number of different types of molecules in a chemical soup exceeds a certain threshold, an autocatalytic metabolism suddenly occurs in a self-sustaining network of reactions. >Self-organisation. Life was already complex at the time of its creation and has remained so to this day. The roots reach deeper down than to the level of the double helix, they are based on the laws of chemistry itself. >Complexity. I 79 Life/Development/Kauffman: Assuming that the laws of chemistry would be somewhat different, e. g. nitrogen four instead of five valence electrons and therefore only four instead of five possible binding partners. Key: Catalysis. Life: Condition of emergence: catalytic closure. This is necessary, but not yet sufficient. >Necessity, >Sufficiency Chemistry/Reaction/Kauffman: in general, chemical reactions are reversible. >Symmetries, >Asymmetry. I 97 Life/Kauffman: thesis: the emergence of autocatalytic formations is almost inevitable. >Emergence. In more complex systems, the number of edges compared to the nodes is increasing. Molecules with the length L can be composed of smaller polymers in L-1 ways. I 107 All we need is sufficient molecular diversity. I 108 Life/Kauffman: Thesis: simple systems do not achieve catalytic closure. Life emerged in one piece and not in successive steps, and it has retained this holistic character to this day. |
Kau II Stuart Kauffman At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity New York 1995 Kauffman I St. Kauffman At Home in the Universe, New York 1995 German Edition: Der Öltropfen im Wasser. Chaos, Komplexität, Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft München 1998 |
| Life | Mayr | I 21 Life/Mayr: in reality it is only the process of being-alive (as opposed to death) made to a thing, and does not exist as an independent entity! One can even attempt to explain that being-alive as a process can be the product of molecules that are not themselves alive. Life: what is "life", has been strongly controversial since the 16th century. A group always claims that living organisms did not really differ from non-living matter: the physicalists. Vitalists: living organisms have properties that inanimate matter lacks, which is why biological theories and concepts cannot be reduced to the laws of physics and chemistry. >Physicalism, >Vitalism. Today it is clear that both groups were, in a sense, right and wrong. Today: "Organism": unites the most useful from both and rejects the extremes. I 46 Life/Mayr: can be synthesized in the laboratory. Principally open systems, therefore subjected to the second main sentence of thermodynamics. Cf. >St. Kauffman, >Second Law of Thermodynamics. I 349 Def Life/Mayr: Activities of self-developed systems, controlled by a genetic program. >Self-organisation. Def Life/Rensch(1): Living beings are hierarchically ordered, open systems, predominantly organic compounds, which normally appear as circumscribed, cell-structured individuals of temporally limited constancy. Def Life/Sattler 1986(2): an open system that replicates and regulates itself, shows individuality, and subsists on energy from the environment. MayrVs: all contain superfluous and do not go into the genetic program, which is perhaps the most important. More description than definition. 1. R. Sattler (1986). Biophilosophy. Berlin: Springer. S. 228. 2. B. Rensch (1968). Biophilosophie. Stuttgart: G. Fischer. S. 54. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Life | Monod | I 9 Coincidence/necessity/life/individual/Monod/own: the individual owes his life to a chain of conserved coincidences. Only the mechanism of the macroscopic expression of these "microscopic" coincidences is necessary. I 27 Life/Monod: Teleonomy (superordinate purpose) is necessary for a definition, but not sufficient. >Teleonomy. One needed a program that explores not only the present object, but also its origin, history and structure. Life owes almost nothing to the influence of external forces! Its structure proves a clear self-determination, which includes a quasi "total freedom" opposed to external forces and conditions. On the basis of this criterion, however, the crystals would have to be classified among the living creatures! I 31 Life/Monod: up to now there are three criteria: 1. Teleonomy (proteins) 2. Autonomous morphogenesis 3. reproductive invariance. (Nucleic acids) I 32 But the three do not have the same status: While teleonomy and invariability are actually characteristic "properties" of the living beings, the spontaneous construction must be regarded as a mechanism. I 98 Life/Monod: 1. All living beings consist without exception of the same two main classes of macromolecules, made up of proteins and nucleic acids. Proteins: are made up of twenty amino acids Nucleic acids: made up of four types of nucleotides. 2. The same reaction sequences are used in all living beings for the same essential chemical operations. Mobilization and reserve formation of the chemical potential and biosynthesis of the cell components. Differences: Nitrogen excretion happens in mammals via urea, in birds via uric acid. |
Mon I J. Monod Le hasard et la nécessité, Paris 1970 German Edition: Zufall und Notwendigkeit Hamburg 1982 |
| Maxwell’s Demon | Monod | I 67 Maxwell's Demon/Monod: Solution: he must consume a certain energy for his differentiation activity himself. This is one of the sources for modern ideas about the equivalence between information and negative entropy. >Entropy. Proteins/Monod: proteins fulfill their "demonic function" thanks to their ability to form, together with other molecules, non-covalent, stereospecific complexes. |
Mon I J. Monod Le hasard et la nécessité, Paris 1970 German Edition: Zufall und Notwendigkeit Hamburg 1982 |
| Meaning | Dennett | I 565 Example Vending Machine: A beverage vending machine that recognizes quarter dollar coins is later shipped to Brazil, where it accepts certain local coins. Thesis: The environment creates the meaning. Meaning/function/evolution/Dennett: the importance is how the function at the moment of their creation is still nothing definite! Example: a zoo of frogs exclusively with flying dummies, but adequate replacement diet for frogs: What do the eyes tell the brain then? I 281 Meaning/Dennett: origins, birth of meaning: thesis: The nucleotide sequences, initially purely syntactically, take "semantics", "quasi-meaning": e.g. mode of action of macromolecules. SearleVsDennett: this is just as-if intentionality. >As if/Searle. DennetVsSearle: We must start somewhere - the first steps are not to be seen as steps towards significance. I 282 Also parts that have only half-intentionality belong to us. >Intentionality. Brandom I 110ff Meaning/Dennett: That something is a piece of copper means nothing else than that it is appropriate to treat it as such. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Meaning Change | Rorty | I 293f Meaning Change/Rorty: Question: Did the Greeks refer to prudence with the expression Sophrosyne? >Reference. Rorty: This question can be rejected with the hint that there is for expectation; in a completely different culture this expression would be implantable; no particular reason. We have to make ourselves familiar with the exotic language game. >Relativism, >Cultural relativism, >Context dependence. In the case of science, however, such an attitude seems unnatural. Here we want to say that out there is something, laws to which one should refer or at least one has referred to. Rorty: "whiggistic" winner perspective: tells us, Aristotle spoke in reality of gravity, when he spoke of a natural settling movement, sailors would have, when they spoke of unicorns, referred to the horns of narwhals in reality, "heat flow" is a misleading description of the energy transfer between dancing molecules. >Theory change. I 301 Meaning/truth/existence/Change of Theories/Meaning Change/Quine/Rorty: Quineans would say, the question, whether they meant the same back then, is not raised. - It's more about the truth values. >Truth values, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Meaning/Intending, >Assertibility. Rorty: a) Aristotle said something wrong about movement, or b) He said something true, but that was not movemnt. RortyVsAyers: with this, one will not get far if one does no longer believe in concepts like intellectual property etc. Ayers exaggerates the contrast between our and his concepts. I 315 ff Semantic change/change of theory/reference/Rorty: solution: the functioning of an expression should be better seen as the picking out of objects, than as the description of reality. - So either a) reference as a basis, or b) also accepting reference as conventional. - Searle-trawson-Criterion: "What would make most of his opinions true." I 318 Solution: distinction reference: a) philosophical - b) "Speaking about" (common sense) - Rorty: it is only about existence. - Therefore, no criterion for reference possible. I 321 RortyVsReference Theory/Theory of Reference: 1. Semantic search for the objects is hopeless. - 2. Hopeless: to strive for an epistemological refutation of skepticism. >Skepticism. --- III 103 Meaning change: Adorno/Horkheimer/Rorty: pro - PutnamVs. --- IV 131 Term/Meaning change/Conceptual change/Change of theories/Rorty: terms that got a new twist through a thinker: E.g. Aristotle: ousia Descartes: res Hume: impression. Wittgenstein: game Einstein: simultaneity. Bohr: Atom. >Theory Change, >Incommensurability. --- VI 361 Interpretation/Rorty: in such approximation efforts, the procedure is obviously anachronistic. But when that happens consciously, there is no objection. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Microstructure | Rorty | I 38 Microstructure / macrostructure / MiSt / Putnam: the MiSt does not explain why a rectangular blade plug does not fit into round holes. Rorty: but that is no decisive ontological gap. >Microstructure/Armstrong, >Causal explanation, >Disposition. IV 51 Def Physicalism/Rorty: each event can also be described in a terminology that refers exclusively to elementary particles. >Physicalism. VI 129 Causality/Davidson/Rorty: implicitly one finds in Davidson's writings: there is a causal effect only on the level of microstructure, thus only where strict laws apply and no "ceteris paribus molecules or space time places clauses" occur. (RortyVs.) >ceteris paribus. VI 209 Science/Rorty: I think a distinction is important that doesn't occur in McDowell: 1. particle physics together with the part of natural science concerning the microstructure 2. all the rest of science. Rorty: Particle physics has too much fascination: Indeterminacy: You don't have to explain everything according to Heisenberg. >Uncertainty relation. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Mind Body Problem | Quine | II 31/32 Mind Body Problem: is an unattractive dualism - if there is interaction, then there is no possible explanation - physical conservation laws would have to be abandoned. Parallelism: is mere doubling. Mentalist terms: are re-interpretable in physical terms - reversedly impossible. Cf. >Identity theory, >Token-Physikalism, >Typ/Token identity. I 456 The physical conditions exist in any case. So why add any additional mental ones? Introspection can then also focus exclusively on physical conditions. A parallel to the body soul problem is the molecular theory. Does this theory reject the familiar solids and instead professes to swarms of molecules? Or does it retain the solids and explain them as consisting of swarms of molecules below the visibility threshold? But here, too, there is really nothing to decide. >Introspection, >Materialism. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Modal Properties | Bigelow | I 126 Property, modal/possible worlds/existence/Bigelow/Pargetter: sometimes it is said that for an object to have a property, it must exist. That excludes fictional objects. >Possible worlds, >Barcan formula. BigelowVs. Bigelow/Pargetter: if we were to demand this, we would demand that an individual in the possible world w be mapped to a set of possible worlds all containing this individual. In this case, an n-digit predicate could not be mapped if there are not n individuals in one and the same possible world. This is worth investigating, even if modal realism rejects it. >Modal Realism. I 203 Instantiation/Existence/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis: even uninstantiated properties exist. It is they who constitute the possible world. >Instantiation. Possible worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: are universals. Namely, complex structural universals. (see above Chapter 2, for example, chemical molecules: several universals are represented there with several instantiations, but a universal never occurs more than once in a constellation.) >Universals Possibility/Property/Bigelow/Pargetter: one could argue that not every uninstantiated property is possible. There can only be non-contradictory properties. So modal terms come in again. >Possibility, >Properties. Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: there are simply no contradictory properties. That is why we are saving the modality here. Certainly there are contradictory predicates, but they do not correspond to universals. >Predicates, >Contradictions, >Modality. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Modal Properties | Putnam | I (g) 189 Nature/essence/Kripke: e.g. statue: the statue and the piece of clay are two items. The fact that the piece of clay has a modal property, namely, "to be a thing that might have been spherical" is missing in the statue. VsKripke: that sounds initially odd: e.g. when I put the statue on the scale, do I measure then two objects? E.g. it is equally strange to say that a human being is not identical with the aggregation of its molecules. Intrinsic Properties/Putnam: e.g. suppose, there are "intrinsic connections" to my thoughts to external objects: then there is perhaps a spacetime region in my brain with quantity-theoretical connections with an abstract object which includes some external objects. >Intrinsic, >Extrinsic. Then this spacetime region will have a similar quantity-theoretical connection with other abstract entities that contain other external objects. Then the materialist can certainly say that my "thoughts" include certain external objects intrinsically, by identifying these thoughts with a certain abstract entity. Problem: if this identification should be a train of reality itself, then there must be real essences in the world in a sense that the set theory cannot explain. Nature/essential properties/PutnamVsKripke: Kripke's ontology presupposes essentialism, it cannot serve to justify it. >Essentialism, >Essence. I (g) 190 Term/possible world/Putnam: modern semantics: functions about possible worlds represent terms, e.g. the term "this statue" unequals the phrase "this piece of clay". PutnamVsPossible Worlds: question: in the actual world, is there an object to which one of these terms significantly and the other only accidentally applies to? Possible worlds provide too many objects. PutnamVsKripke/PutnamVsEssentialism: Kripke's ontology presupposes essentialism, it cannot justify it. Modal properties are not part of the materialistic means of the world but Kripke individuated objects by their modal properties. Essential Properties/Putnam: I have not shifted them into "parallel worlds" but instead into possible states of the actual world (other liquid than H20 water) which is insofar essentialist that we have thus discovered the nature of water. We just say water should not be anything else (intention). That is our use and not "built into the world" (intrinsic, Kripke ditto). VsMaterialism: this does not help the semantic reading because it presupposes reference (materialism wants to win reference from "intrinsic" causal relationship). >Materialism, >Reference, >intrinsic. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Models | Hacking | I 357f Model/Hacking: a model states interactivity between speculation and experiment. Models are in the head. Cf. >"Meanings are not in the head". E.g.: An atomic nucleus is treated temporarily as if it had an infinite mass. Molecules are treated as a rigid rod. We can ignore the spin. >Method, >Quantum mechanics, >Physics. CartwrightVsModel: in the examples above we see that not all can be true, but we all use them at the same time. >Model theory. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Natural Laws | Armstrong | III 137 Laws of Nature/LoN/Natural Laws/Science/Form/Identification/Armstrong: theoretical identification of water and H2O is not a law of nature. - Intead there are two all-quantifications on molecules and water. - Each law of nature must have double-digit form of premise-conclusion. Ontology/Armstrong: what entities exist is inextricably linked with laws of nature. - But also distinguishable from it. III 158 Laws of nature/Armstrong: contingent - but not because they are discovered - the distinction a priori/a posteriori an epistemic one. II (a) 17 Laws of nature/Armstrong: Laws are not true >statements of law, but >truth-makers. ArmstrongVsHume: strong LoN: contain regularities, but cannot be reduced to them (because dispositions do not always show) - Def Natural law/Armstrong: can be identified with relations between universals (properties). Scientific camp: realistic view: e.g., possession of a property leads to possession of another property. - Laws of nature/Armstrong: are contingent! - But the regularity seems to be contained analytically. >Regularity. Place I 25 Law of nature/Armstrong: is a relation between categorical properties (not dispositional ones) - PlaceVsArmstrong: this smuggles modality into the laws (because the relations then have to be intentional or modal). >Modality. III 44 Laws of nature/Armstrong: laws are no causal factors. - A law exists only when it is instantiated. - That three values of volume, pressure, temperature always are connected is not because of the law! (Boyle's law is no law of nature). |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
| Natural Laws | Place | Armstrong III 137 Laws of Nature/LoN/Natural Laws/Science/Form/Identification/Armstrong: theoretical identification of water and H2O is not a law of nature. - Intead there are two all-quantifications on molecules and water. - Each law of nature must have double-digit form of premise-conclusion. Ontology/Armstrong: what entities exist is inextricably linked with laws of nature. - But also distinguishable from it. III 158 Laws of nature/Armstrong: contingent - but not because they are discovered - the distinction a priori/a posteriori an epistemic one. Armstrong II (a) 17 Laws of nature/Armstrong: Laws are not true >statements of law, but >truth-makers. ArmstrongVsHume: strong LoN: contain regularities, but cannot be reduced to them (because dispositions do not always show) - Def Natural law/Armstrong: can be identified with relations between universals (properties). Scientific camp: realistic view: e.g., possession of a property leads to possession of another property. - Laws of nature/Armstrong: are contingent! - But the regularity seems to be contained analytically. >Regularity. Place I 25 Law of nature/Armstrong: is a relation between categorical properties (not dispositional ones) - PlaceVsArmstrong: this smuggles modality into the laws (because the relations then have to be intentional or modal). >Modality. Armstrong III 44 Laws of nature/Armstrong: laws are no causal factors. - A law exists only when it is instantiated. - That three values of volume, pressure, temperature always are connected is not because of the law! (Boyle's law is no law of nature). |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Naturalized Epistemology | Stroud | I 209 Skepticism/naturalized epistemology/Stroud: Skepticism gets more inevitable, the more we take the external (distanced) position and look at evidence. >Epistemology, >Empiricism, >Evidence. There is no independent information about the world - E.g. room with monitors. Cf. >Colour researcher Mary. Brains in a vat/Descartes/Kant: such a distinction between sensory experience and other knowledge would cut us off from the world. >Brains in a vat. I 211 QuineVs: only applies to the traditional epistemology theory. Solution: we must only avoid a "distanced" position. Cf. >Naturalism, >Naturalized Epistemology. QuineVsKant: so works the examination of general human knowledge. >Knowlede/Kant. I 211 Naturalized epistemology/QuineVsCarnap/Stroud: denies the need for an external position - thus avoided interior/exterior problem. >Interior/exterior. I 214 QuineVsKant: no a priori knowledge. >a priori, >a priori/Quine. I 250 Naturalized epistemology/knowledge/underdetermination/skepticism/ StroudVsQuine: naturalized epistemology: must explain: how distant events cause closer events? - How is our exuberant belief caused? But that would not explain them - (how the "gap" between data and knowledge is bridged.) >"Meager input"/Quine. Stroud: because it makes no sense to say that here there is a gap in a causal chain. - Then you cannot speak of underdetermination - that an event "underdetermines" another. -((s), there is no reason that would not be sufficient.) >Underdetermination/Quine. Underdetermination/Quine: E.g. truths about molecules are underdetermined by truths about everyday things. Gap/Stroud: Quine has to do with a gap, because he talkes about information ((s) content), not about mere events. >Knowledge/Quine. I 251 Input/Stroud: the individual input is not small - ((s) only as a mass term) - not small when it is conceived as an event - so we cannot speak of indeterminacy as events. >Indeterminacy, >Events. StroudVsQuine: Problem: if the input is too small, the transition to the over flowing output requires consciousness. >Consciousness. I 253 Naturalized Epistemology/KantVsQuine/StroudVsQuine: we cannot see all our beliefs as "projections". And we must not accept epistemic priority ((s) that sensations are closer to us than the external objects). >Beliefs, >Knowledge, >World/thinking, >Perception, >Evidence, >W.V.O. Quine. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Necessity | Kripke | I 116 Necessary/not a priori: e.g. Goldbach’s conjecture: it will turn out with necessity. >Goldbach's conjecture, >necessary a posteriori. I would suggest, however, that it is not a necessary fact that Aristotle has the logical sum of the properties which are usually attributed to him. Kripke (VsTradition): molecular motion is necessarily identical with heat. We have discovered it, but it could not have been otherwise. Physical truths are necessary: e.g. heat = molecular motion - but this has no analogy to mind-brain identities. >Identity theory, >Pain/Kripke. I 116 Def necessity/Kripke: identity assertions in which both expressions designate rigidly constitute necessity. E.g. »Water is H20". Water could not have been something else. It is essential for water that it is this material with this atomic structure. Where there is no H20, there is no water. >Rigidity/Kripke. Frank I 121f Necessary/Kripke: compounds formed with two or more rigid designation expressions are necessary, e.g. that pain simply feels like pain. Contingent/Kripke: e.g. the fact that there are living beings on this planet (namely us) who feel heat a certain way. E.g. that heat feels to us as it feels. Tradition: a brain condition could also occur without pain. I 122 Necessary/essential properties/KripkeVsTradition: the type of picking out pain (by experience) and the brain state (configuration of molecules) in both cases is essential and not accidental. The brain state could be singled out through contingent facts, but not the pain. Saul A. Kripke (1972): Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann (eds.) (1972), pp. 253-355. Kripke I 144 Necessary properties do not have to belong to the meaning. (The periodic table was discovered later). Scientific discoveries do not change the meaning. Meaning does not arise from properties. >Meaning/Kripke, >Properties/Kripke. --- Stalnaker I 188 Necessary a posteriori/Kripke/Stalnaker: typical cases: statements that contain names e.g. Hesperus = Phosphorus (see below: they were determined by different causal chains). Statements about natural kinds: e.g. "the atomic weight of gold is 79". >Morning star/evening star, >Natural kinds/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Ontological Commitment | Quine | Lauener XI 130 Ontological Commitment/Quine/Lauener: only exists when an object is common to all differently re-interpreted domains - (while retaining the interpretation of the predicates) - the theory only presupposes objects if it would be wrong if the objects did not exist - E.g. "objects of any kind whatsoever": here one is commited to dogs if each of the domains contains one or the other dog. XI 48 Substitutional Quantification/sQ/Ontology/Quine/Lauener: substitutional quantification does not enter into an ontological obligation in so far as the names used do not have to name anything. That is, we are not forced to accept values of the variables. XI 49 QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification: precisely with this we disguise ontology by not getting out of the language. >Substitutional Quantification/Quine. XI 133 Ontology/Modality/LauenerVsQuine: it is noticeable that in its formulations occur intensional expressions such as "must occur among the values of the variables", "must be true of" etc. Or psychological connotations such as "we look at". ChurchVsQuine: the expression "ontological commitment" is intentional. (>Intensions). XI 158 Ontology/ontological obligation/Quine/Lauener: Lauener: unsolved problem: the relationship between ontological obligation and ontology. For example, two modern chemical theories, one implies the existence of molecules with a certain structure, the other denies them. Question: do they have the same ontology despite different commitments? Quine/Lauener: would probably say yes and say that one of the two theories must be wrong. ((s) Then they have rather the same obligation than the same ontology). LauenerVsQuine: my attempts to solve these problems make me believe that not only the quantified variables (with the objects) but also the predicates play a role. Quine VII (a) 12 Ontology: the bound variable is the only way to impose ontological obligations on us. Example: we can already say that it is something (namely the value of the bound variables) that red houses and sunsets have in common. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Q XI H. Lauener Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982 |
| Order | Feynman | I 657 Def Disorder/Feynman: the number of ways in which elements (molecules) can be arranged inside so that it looks the same from the outside. Def Order/Feynman: the fact that the number of possibilities to arrange elements so that the structure looks the same from the outside is limited. Disorder/Feynman: if all laws of physics are reversible, whence the irreversibility? How is it that our everyday situations are always out of balance? >Symmetries, >Laws, >Natural laws. How does disorder evolve out of order? We do not yet know the origin of order. E.g. container with mixed white and black balls. I 658 It would be very unlikely, but not excluded, that after a time the colors separate again. As time progresses, they are mixed again afterwards. So it is a possible explanation that today's order of the universe is simply a question of luck. >Entropy. This type of theory is not asymmetrical, because we can ask how the state looks either a bit into the future or to the past. In any case, we see a gray spot at the interface(?), because the molecules mix again. (I.e. in both directions). E.g. variant: we only look at one part of the container at once. Question: What should be derived from that for the regions that have not been seen? We have to assume the most likely case, and that is certainly not that the other molecules are also ordered. If our order stems from a fluctuation, we would not expect order to prevail in other places. Feynman: Thesis the universe was ordered in the past. This theory predicts that there is order in other places too, and that is what we observe (stars, galaxies). Our present order comes from a higher order at the beginning of time. Today's order is a reminder of an earlier order. Therefore, we have memories of the past and not the future. I 659 Knarre: works only, because it is part of the universe. If isolated for a long time, it would no longer be more likely to turn in one direction than the other. The asymmetrical behavior is connected with the asymmetry of the entire universe. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Order | Genz | II 262 Order/Genz: when everything has decayed to dust, the remaining order of atoms and molecules is still "infinitely" much larger than the disassembled one. II 263 Definition micro-state/gas/Genz: a micro-state is the state of the entirety of molecules (location and speed of molecules). Different micro-states are compatible with the same macro-state. The larger the volume of a gas, the greater the number of possible micro-states. Order: therefore, a smaller gas volume is always in a more orderly state than a larger one. >Entropy. II 264 Order/temperature/Genz: analogous to this applies here: the higher the temperature, the greater the number of possible speeds of individual molecules. Definition Entropy/measure/disorder: entropy is the number of possible micro-states of a macroscopic object that are compatible with a given macro-state of that object. Problem: 1. the micro-states of quantum mechanical objects are quite different. 2. for counting the states, discrete values must then be assigned to the continuous variables. Since the number is very large, you do not use them yourself, but the number of digits that would require you to write them down. >Quantum mechanics. II 266ff Probability/micro-state/gas/Genz: it is so unlikely that all molecules will come together once in the left half of the container and leave the right half empty that it will not occur in world ages. This is a physical "never" or "always", not a mathematical one. >Probability. II 268 Explanation/general/Genz: general explanations do not refer to certain bodies. They say that all developments always lead from improbable to probable conditions. >Explanations. Impossibility/physical/Genz: unlike the mathematical impossibility: is the highest improbability. For example, it is impossible to set an initial state that would cause all molecules to assemble on the left side of the box because it is undetectably isolated in a continuum of states that have no such consequence. II 310 Order/realism/idealism/descartes/Leibniz/Spinoza/Genz: thesis: the "identity of ideal and real order of things" is based on a common ground of both. Descartes/Spinoza: this is the work of God as a creator of both the world and the cognitive mind. Leibniz: the pre-stabilized harmony. >G.W. Leibniz, >B. Spinoza. II 326 Order/disorder/entropy/Turing machine/Genz: it is an important question how entropy as a measure can be freed from the arbitrarily chosen size of the assumed fields in a Turing maschine. In fact, it is not only the location of the particles that is required to define entropy, but also the simultaneous indication of location and velocity in a phase space. However, the uncertainty ratio applies to both together. Solution: therefore, entropy can be traced back to the division of phase space into boxes with volumes as small as is compatible with the blur of location and velocity. >Uncertainty principle. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Order | Kauffman | Dennett I 306 Self-organization/Kauffman/Dennett: Kauffman's laws are not those of form, but of design, the compulsions of meta technology. >Laws/Kauffman, >Laws, >Laws of nature. Dennett I 308 Self-organization/Kauffman: the ability to evolve, i. e. the ability to search the area of opportunity, is optimal when populations are "melting out" of local regions. >Self-organisation. Local/Global/Self-organization/Technology/Kauffman: Local rules create global order. >Local/global. Dennett: mankind's technology is not governed by this principle. For example, pyramids are organized from top to bottom, but the building activity is of course from bottom to top. >Technology. Until the evolution of rational human technology, the rules run from local to global, then the direction is reversed. --- Kauffman I 9 Order/Human/Kauffman thesis: natural selection has not formed us alone, the original source of order is self-organization. The complex whole can show "emergent" characteristics in a completely unmystic sense, which are legitimate for themselves. >Complexity, >Emergence. Kauffman I 21 The human then no longer appears as a product of random events, but as the result of an inevitable development. >Life, >Humans. Kauffman I 18 Definition Rational Morphologists/Kauffman: (Darwin's predecessor): Thesis: biological species are not the product of random mutation and selection, but of timeless laws of shape formation. (Kauffman goes in a similar direction). Order/Physics/Kauffman: physics knows phenomena of profound spontaneous order, but does not need selection! Cf. >Selection. Kauffman I 30 Self-organization/Kauffman: thesis: certain structures occur at all levels: from ecosystems to economic systems undergoing technological evolution. >Ecosystems, >Economy. Thesis: all complex adaptive systems in the biosphere, from single-celled organisms to economies, strive for a natural state between order and chaos. Great compromise between structure and chance. >Structures, >Random. Kauffman I 38 Order/physics/chemistry/biology: two basic forms: 1. occurs in so-called energy-poor equilibrium systems: For example, a ball rolls into the middle of a bowl. For example, in a suitable aqueous solution, the virus particle composes itself of its molecular DNA (RNA) and protein components, striving for the lowest energy state. 2. type of order: is present when the preservation of the structure requires a constant substance or energy supply. (Dissipative). For example, a whirlpool in the bathtub. For example, the Great Red Spot on Jupiter. It is at least 300 years old, which is longer than the mean residence time of a single gas molecule in the vortex. It is a stable structure of matter and energy through which a constant stream of matter and energy flows. One could call it a living being: it supports itself and gives birth to "baby whirls". >Life/Kauffman. Cells, for example, are not low-energy, but rather complex systems that constantly convert nutrient molecules to maintain their inner structure and multiply. Kauffman I 115 Order/life/emergence/Kauffman: the autocatalytic formations must coordinate the behaviour of several thousand molecules. The potential chaos is beyond imagination. Therefore, another source of molecular order has to be discovered, of the fundamental internal homeostasis (balance). Surprisingly simple boundary conditions are sufficient for this. >Laws/Kauffman. |
Kau II Stuart Kauffman At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity New York 1995 Kauffman I St. Kauffman At Home in the Universe, New York 1995 German Edition: Der Öltropfen im Wasser. Chaos, Komplexität, Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft München 1998 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Parts | Armstrong | Martin II 145 Part-Whole Relationship/Martin: (instead of >supervenience). - Parts: as part of the whole, they are not really separated - interdependence: brings forth a mass of dispositions that are never realized - Whole: consists of the parts in their correlation and their stability and the degrees of their stability. >Part-of-Relation, cf. >Mereology. Martin III 164 ff Part/Whole: MartinVsPlace: collection of parts weak description of what the whole has more - there is no correlation and interaction of the parts that make them parts of this machine. Martin III 176 Problem: then the separateness of the whole is lost which they need to produce the emergence in causally active way - Solution/Martin: instead of parts: assume properties, properties of the whole consist of properties of the parts - liquid (viscosity) is not a causal effect of the mobility of the molecules against each other, it is made of them. Martin III 168 Constitution is not causation. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Physicalism | Quine | I 404 If one stands up for sense data (learning by stimuli), one at best opposes physicalism and not nominalism. >Nominalism/Quine. I 456 Is physicalism now a denial of mental objects, or is it a theory about them? "Schmidt is in pain," and "Schmidt is angry," is said of the same thing. I 457 Tame physicalism can perhaps be characterized as follows: it explains that there are no irreconcilable categorial differences between the mental and the physical. If e.g. it concerns whether solids consist of swarms of molecules, there is nothing to decide. However, when we declare mental states as physical states, it is not the case that we paraphrase the standard contexts of mental expressions into independently declared contexts of physical expressions: The partial expression "Schmidt is" (from "Schmidt is in pain") and the partial expression "Schmidt is" (from "Schmidt is angry") remain unchanged. They are merely understood to have physical complements instead of mentalistic ones. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Possibility | Genz | II 268 Impossibility/physical/Genz: unlike mathematical impossibility: is the highest improbability. For example, it is impossible to set an initial state that would cause all molecules to assemble on the left side of the box because it is undetectably isolated in a continuum of states that have no such consequence. Cf. >Possibility, >Logical possibility, >Metaphysical possibility. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Possible Worlds | Goodman | II IX (Preface Putnam) There are no "possible but not actual" worlds. GoodmanVsFormalism: no formalism for the sake of formalism. >Formalism. GoodmanVsImagination: imagination is independent from our theorizing "ontological basement". >Imagination. II 78 We have become accustomed to see the real world as one of many possible. This needs to be corrected: all possible worlds are within the real. --- Putnam III 144 Versions/Goodman: it is not about different descriptions of "identical facts". Versions are unequal possible worlds and only incompatible versions must refer to different possible worlds - not different languages, so that tables sometimes as aggregates of time segments of molecules ... etc., but we decide to produce a corresponding world, e.g. "Big Dipper" was not created, but made a constellation. PutnamsVsGoodman: this is a too daring extrapolation: that there was nothing what we have not created. III 147 PutnamVsGoodman: "Big Dipper" is not analytical: if a star perishes, we would further speak of the Big Dipper - but "star" has properties that cannot be accounted for by specifying a list - we cannot get to know this, by finding out what belongs to the Big Dipper. Big Dipper: which stars are included, is rather answered by the linguist. PutnamVsGoodman: the term "constellation" is in the middle. The constellation remains when all the stars are light bulbs. PutnamVsGoodman: easy answer: we have not created the star Sirius ourselves. We have not made it a star and we have brought about the term star, and this term applies to Sirius. Our term of bachelor applies to "Joseph Ullian", without, however, that our language practice made him a bachelor. We create the concepts, but we do not cause them to be true. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Possible Worlds | Kripke | I 51f The expressions "winners" and "losers" do not refer to the same objects in all possible worlds. >Rigidity. I 51 Proper names are rigid designators: Nixon is Nixon in all possible worlds, but he is not the winner of the election in all the possible worlds (descriptions are non-rigid designators). >Names/Kripke. I 54 Possible worlds are no foreign countries. A possible world is given by the descriptive conditions we associate it with. Cf. >Telescope theory of possible worlds. I 55 Possible world/Lewis: possible worlds are counterparts, not the same people. Kripke: then it is not about identification but about similarity relation. >Counterparts, >Counterpart theory, >Counterpart relation, >Possible world/Lewis, >Identity across worlds. I 90/91 We do not demand that the objects must exist in all possible worlds of course. Possible world/counterparts: strict identity: are molecules. Counterparts: are for example, tables (not identity of qualities, but of individual objects). Counterpart/Lewis: representatives of the theories that a possible world is only given qualitatively to us ("counterpart theory", David Lewis) argue that Aristotle and his counterparts "in other possible worlds" are "to be identified" with those things that Aristotle resembles most in his most important characteristics. I 123 ff Remember, though, that we describe the situation in our language, not in the language that would be used by people in that situation. Hesperus = Phosphorus is necessarily true (but situation possible in which Venus does not exist). >Morning star/evening star, >Nonexistence. I 143 Epistems: epistems are a different concept of possibility than in logic. The designation is done by us. >Naming/Kripke. --- Berka I 161 Def normal world/Kripke: a normal world is a maximum consistent set of sentences in which at least one statement is necessary. Def non-normal world/Kripke: in non-normal worlds each sentence of the type LB is false. Berka I 179 Definition possible world/Kripke: old: (1959)(1) a world is possible with the complete attribution of truth value, i.e. it is impossible to find two possible worlds in which each atomic formula is attributed to the same truth value (absolute concept of the possible world). New definition: (1963)(2): a world is possible in relation to another world (relatively possible world) Hughes/Cresswell: > accessibility relation. Reflexive accessibility: each possible world is in itself, i.e. that each statement that is true in H is also possible in H. Definition necessary: a formula A in H if it is true in every (possible) world accessible from H. Definition possible: dual to this: if A is possible in H1, iff a world H2 exists, which is possible in relation to H1, and true in A. Transitivity: H2RH3: any formula that is true in H3 is possible in H2. Problem: for traceability to H1 we need a reduction axiom: "what is possibly possible is possible" - you can also set the equivalence relation as accessibility relation. --- Hughes/Cresswell I 243 Non-normal world/possible world/Kripke: non-normal worlds are worlds in which each statement is possible without exception, i.e. including those of the form p. ~p rating: like in normal worlds (p ~ p.) Never 1 - but for modal formulas V (Ma) is always 1 in non-normal worlds, and hence V(La) is always 0, i.e. there are no necessary statements in non-normal worlds. this n-n world is at least accessible for a normal world, but no world is accessible to a n-n world - not even for these themselves. --- Frank I 114 Identity/Kripke: if an identity statement is true, it is always necessarily true, e.g. heat/motion of molecules, Cicero/Tullius, Water/H20 - these are compatible with the fact that they are truths a posteriori. But according to Leibniz: they it is not conceivable that one occurs without the other. Frank I 125 Identity/body/Kripke: "A" is the (rigid) name for the body of Descartes - it survived the body, i.e.: M (Descartes unequal A). This is not a modal fallacy, because A is rigid. Analog: a statue is dissimilar to molecule collection. 1) S.A. Kripke (1959): "A completeness theorem in modal logic", in: The journal of symbolic logic 24 (1), pp. 1-14. 2) S.A. Kripke (1962): The Undecidability of Monadic Modal Quantification Theory, in: Zeitschrift für mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik, Vol. 8, pp. 113-116. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Probability | Feynman | I 86 Def Probability//Feynman: of a particular result of an observation: our estimate of the most probable fraction of a number of repeated observations giving the particular result. I 87 P(A) = NA/N. (s) NA: desired N: all Probability/Feynman: absurd: e.g. what is the probability of a ghost in this house? There is no repetition here. N and NA are not numbers based on actual observations. NA is our best guess of what would happen. >Subjective probability, >Chance, >Conditional probability, cf. >Bayesianism, >Relative frequency. I.e. probability is dependent on our knowledge and common sense. Probabilities change as our knowledge changes. I 551 Probability/Feynman: of course, there is no probability that gas atoms will go in a certain direction, because a certain direction is too exact. Therefore, we must speak of a standard "size": As many molecules pass through any surface as through any other surface of equal size on the sphere. >Measurements, >Method, >Generalization, >Idealization. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Probability | Genz | II 61 Negative probability/Weinberg/Genz: negative probability is absurd. That is controversial(1). II 266ff Probability/micro-state/Gas/Genz: it is so unlikely that all molecules will come together in the left half of the container and leave the right half empty that it will not occur in world ages. This is a physical "never" or "always", not a mathematical one. >Physics, >Mathematics, >Entropy, >Second Law of Thermodynamics. 1) See: http://www.wissenschaft.de/technik-kommunikation/physik/-/journal_content/56/12054/1196196/Negative-Wahrscheinlichkeiten-der-Quantenmechanik-experimentell-best%C3%A4tigt/ (03.0.4.2023). |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Reason/Cause | Dennett | II 66 Reason/Cause/Knowledge/Evolution/Dennett: The early doubling macromolecules did have causes, but they had no idea about their reasons. II 77 Cause/existence/ontology/Dennett: There were causes and reasons for millions of years, but no one existed to formulate them, represent the reasons or even to appreciate them in the strict sense. Brandom I 379 Reason/Davidson/Brandom: reasons are causes - (elsewhere): Davidson always defines causality as an explanation - we only need causality. Den I 627 Reason/Darwin/causality/Dennett: Question: Can there be reasons which are recognized without a conscious mind recognizing them?. I 628 Yes! Selection is the "blind watchmaker" (Dawkins), who nevertheless finds forced moves. - Connection: with truths/Goedel which you can see but cannot prove. Dennett: intermediate solutions are good! E.g. the halting problem: a program that would not perfect but still good. >Causation, >Causality, >Causes, >Progress, >Decidability. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Reduction | Vollmer | II 170 Reduction/Vollmer: Def Entropy: the number of microstates that could realize the present macrostate. Def Pressure: average pulse to transfer the moving molecules on a wall. >Reducibility, >Reductionism, >Entropy. Reduction: e.g. the terms of the phenomenological thermodynamics are defined by concepts of molecular mechanics and thus reduced to this. VsReductionism: in simple language contradictions can still be formulated - then why reduction? II 228 Reduction/Vollmer: if system S2 is developed from system S1, then would theory T2, logically imply theory T1 - but if T1 or T2 are still faulty, it is unlikely that there is an entailment relation between them. >Implication, >Consequences, >Theories. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Reference | Kripke | I 71 Reference/Kripke: the reference of the name is not determined by a description, but by a "causal" chain of communication. I 109 Kripke: the relevant element is the actual chain of communication, not the way the speaker came about his reference. >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Speaker reference, >referential/attributive. I 123 Baptism: baptism has a correct causal chain, but: it has added conditions and no personal knowledge. It is generally not the case that the reference of a name is determined by identifying the specific characteristics, through certain properties that the referee alone meets and of which the speaker knows or believes that they apply. I 147f Reference: "water is H2O", "light is a photon flux" or "heat is the motion of molecules": if I refer to heat, then I do not refer to an inner sensation someone may have, but to external phenomenon which we perceive through our sense of perception. It caused the characteristic sensation that we call the sensation of heat. I 149 Reference: we determine what light is by the fact that it is the one thing in the outside world that affects our eyes in a certain way. I 154 In the case of proper names, the reference can be defined in various ways. Establishing reference: is done a priori (contingent) - not synonymous. Meaning: meaning is analytic (and required). Definition: the definition specifies reference and expresses truth a priori. --- II 211 Reference: e.g. "Her husband is kind to her"/Kripke: variant: the (absent) husband is not nice. Then the statement is false for all authors (because of the absent husband). There is a distinction between speaker reference and semantic reference. II 221 Goedel-Schmidt Case/Kripke: description does not determine the reference - we would not withdraw the name when we learn something new. II 231f Kripke thesis: Donnellan's distinction referential/attributive. Generalized: a speaker can believe that his/her specific intention coincides with his/her general intention in a situation for one of two reasons: a) "simple" case: his/her specific intention is to refer to the semantic referee, (by definition)(that is Donnellan's attributive use), b) "complex" case: the intentions are different, but the speaker believes that they refer to the same object (referential). VsDonnellan: one must not understand the referential as proper names. The distinction simple/complex is equally applicable to descriptions and names. >Description/Kripke, >Names/Kripke. --- Newen I 111 Direct reference/Kripke/Newen/Schrenk: Kripke calls the object theory of names the theory of direct reference. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Selection | Dawkins | I 38 Selection/Dawkins: Thesis: Selection occurs at the lowest level. (Not species, not individual, but genes, unit of heredity). >Genes, >Genes/Dawkins. I 42 Selection/Dawkins: Earliest form of selection: simply a selection of more stable molecules and rejecting unstable ones. It would not make sense to shake the right number of atoms and the right amount of added energy to expect a human to come out. The age of the universe would not suffice for that. I 73 Order/ordering: The cards themselves survive the shuffling. Selection/Dawkins: If genes always mixed, selection would be absolutely impossible. I 158 Def Degree of relationship/Dawkins: generation span: steps on the family tree. To Uncle: 3 steps: the common ancestor is e.g. A's father and B's grandfather. Degree of Relationship: per generation span ½ multiplied by itself. For g steps (1/2) g. But that is only part of the degree of relationship. In case of several common relatives they must also be determined. I 158 Selection/relationship/altruism/Dawkins: Now we can correctly calculate the chances for the multiplication of genes for altruism: E.g., A gene for the suicidal rescue of five cousins would not become more numerous, but probably one for the suicidal rescue of five brothers or ten cousins. >Altruism. I 162 Family altruism/Dawkins: parental care is merely a special case of family altruism. The fact that siblings do not exchange genes is not relevant, because they have obtained identical copies of the same genes from the same parents. Family Selection/Kin Selection/DawkinsVsWilson, E.O.: transfers the concept of group selection to family. Now, however, the core of Hamilton's argument is that the separation between family and non-family is not clear, but a question of mathematical probability. Hamilton's thesis(1) does not imply that animals are selfless towards all family members and self-serving to all outsiders. I 164 DawkinsVsWilson: He does not consider offspring as relatives! (I 461: Wilson has now withdrawn that). Def Group selection/Dawkins: different survival rate in groups of individuals. I 164 Kin selection/Dawkins: Of course animals cannot be expected to count how many relatives they are saving! I 462 Kin selection/Dawkins: It is a frequent mistake for students to assume that animals must count how many relatives they are saving. I 165 Kin selection/Dawkins: To determine the degree of relationship actuarial weightings can be used as a basis. How much of my wealth would I invest in the life of another individual. I 166 An animal can behave as if it had done this calculation. E.g. just as a human catches a ball as if he had solved a series of differential equations. I 372 Gene/selection/Dawkins: Under reasonable consideration, selection does not directly affect the genes. The DNA is spun into proteins, wrapped in membranes, shielded from the world and invisible to natural selection. (Like GouldVsDawkins.) The selection would also hardly have a criterion for DNA molecules. All genes look the same just like all tapes look the same. Genes show in their effects. ((s) effect creates identity.) 1. Hamilton, W.D. 1964. The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior. In: Journal of Theoretical Biology 7. pp- 1-16; 17-52. |
Da I R. Dawkins The Selfish Gene, Oxford 1976 German Edition: Das egoistische Gen, Hamburg 1996 Da II M. St. Dawkins Through Our Eyes Only? The Search for Animal Consciousness, Oxford/New York/Heidelberg 1993 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des tierischen Bewusstseins Hamburg 1993 |
| Self-Replication | Crick | Brockman I 56 Self-replication/Crick/Brooks: Francis Crick and James Watson (…) showed, in 1953(1), how (…) a tape could be instantiated in biology by a long DNA molecule with its finite alphabet of four nucleobases: guanine, cytosine, adenine, and thymine (G, C, A, and T). As in von Neumann’s machine (>Self replication/Neumann), in biological reproduction the linear sequence of symbols in DNA is interpreted - through transcription into RNA molecules, which are then translated into proteins, the structures that make up a new cell - and the DNA is replicated and encased in the new cell. 1. Crick, F, Watson J. “A Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid,” Nature 171 (1953): 737-38. Brooks, RA. “The inhuman mess our machines have gotten us into” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Sensations | Kripke | I 152 Sensation: let us say that it is a contingent property of heat to cause these sensations in people? Finally, it is also contingent that there are people on this planet at all. So you do not know a priori which physical phenomenon produces this or that sensation. I 167 f Sensation: acertain inventor (Franklin) could have existed without being an inventor. But a particular sensation (pain) could not have existed without being a sensation. >Pain/Kripke. I 167f Sensation: sensation is a mediator. Mental and physical: the mental and physical are no mediator, but identity (KripkeVs)! >Identity theory. Sensation: sensation has mediators between external phenomenon and observer. >Physical/psychic. I 167 One can have such a sensation without the presence of heat. In the case of pain and other mental phenomena that is not possible. Heat sensation is not equal to pain sensation. >a posteriori, >a priori. I 175 Heat: heat is rigid. Reference is determined by accidental properties (sensation, even without heat, deception possible). Pain: pain is rigid. The reference is determined by essential properties: if it feels like pain, it is pain. >Rigidity, >Reference. What God really has to do is turn this molecular movement into something that is perceived as heat! In order to do that, he must create some sentient beings. They can then go on and understand that the phrase "heat is the motion of molecules" expresses an a posteriori truth. I 175 In the case of excitation of the C-fibers, God would additionally have to make us feel this excitement as pain, and not as a tickle or as heat or as nothing. The relation between the two phenomena is not the identity. >Identity/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Sense | Dennett | I 222 Sense/Manfred Eigen/Dennett: [Something] has sense because it works! I 249 Recurring/repetition/senses/Hume/Nietzsche: Nietzsche discovered something again, which Hume had already been thinking of: giving meaning through repetition. We get an apparently meaningful story. I 268 Form/meaning/Dennett: In the world of macro molecules form is the same as determination. I 252 Sense/meaning/Dennett: Thesis: Sense and meaning arise gradually out of nowhere. >Meaning, >Form, >Repetition. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Sensory Impressions | Sellars | McDowell I 168 Sensory Impressions/Sellars: distinguished from pieces of the given. No direct relationship with the knowledge. >Given/Sellars, >Knowledge/Sellars, >Perception, >Perception/Sellars. Active receptivity. But the receptivity cannot cooperate itself in a rational manner with the spontaneity. (VsQuine). --- I IX Sellars: no renunciation of sensations in toto. (Unlike Quine). >Sensations/Quine. I XXIII Sensory Impressions/Quine: manifolds, which are to be structured through various theory drafts. (SellarsVs). I XXIII Sellars: Physical and mental are not in a causal relationship, but belong to different world views. >Physical/psychic. Only conveyed by structure of world views. (Vs above). The frames are related by their structure and not by content. It is simply a wrongly asked question how impressions and electromagnetic fields can tolerate each other. I XXIX The theory of sensory impressions does not speak of inner objects. >Inner objects. I XXXVII Sellars: sensory impressions only have causal consequences of external physical objects. A red sensation can also occur if the external object only seems to be red. Both concepts explain why the speaker always speaks of something red. Only, the sensation is according to Sellars no object of knowledge, and even the category of the object is questioned by Sellars. >Object/Sellars, >Knowledge/Sellars, >Sensation/Sellars. I XL First, however, these states are states of a person. Not of a brain. In any case, they are imperceptible. Sensory Impressions: neither they have a color, nor do they have a shape. (> Perception/Sellars). Impressions: that these are theoretical entities, is shown to us by how to characterize them in an intrinsic way: not only as descriptions: "entity as such, that looking at a red and triangular object under such and such circumstances has the standard cause." But rather as predicates. These are no abbreviations for descriptions of properties. Example if one says that molecules have a mass, then the word "mass" is not an abbreviation of a description of the form "the property that ...". I 101 "Impression of a red triangle" does not only mean "impression like he ... through red and triangular objects ...." although it is a truth, namely a logical truth about impressions of red triangles. I 103 Impressions need to be inter-subjective, not completely dissolvable impressions in behavioral symptoms: states (but not physiological) - impressions are not objects. I 106 Sellars: Rylean Language: actual explanation, is more than just a code: conceptual framework public objects in space and time. >Rylean ancestors. Language of impressions: embodies the discovery that there are such things, but it is not specifically tailored to them (individual things no antecedent objects of thinking). SellarsVsHume: because he does not clearly distinguish between thoughts and impressions, he can assume that a natural derivative corresponds not only to a logical but also a temporal sequence. His theory must be extended so that it also includes cases such as the above or backwards: Thunder now, before a moment of lightning. --- II 328 Hume does not see that the perception of a configuration is also the configuration of perceptions. >Perception/Hume, >Impression/Hume, >Thinking/Hume, >David Hume. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Sociology | Pareto | Brocker I 97 Sociology/Pareto: Leading French sociology in the Romanic-speaking world since Auguste Comte at the beginning of the 20th century Brocker I 98 (Gabriel Tarde, Émile Durkheim, Ernest Renan) was too literary and essayistic for Pareto, but above all too moralizing to live up to his expectations trained in science. (ParetoVsDurkheim, ParetoVsRenan, ParetoVsTarde). >E. Durkheim. His research program included the study of human actions and the corresponding emotional states in order to recognize the social forms. (1) Brocker I 99 From his economical scientific works, which were influenced by the categories of theoretical mechanics and physicalism, Pareto adopted the terms "system" and "equilibrium" and transferred them to sociology as "social system" and "social equilibrium". Pareto's central sociological object of knowledge is society. The system concept emphasizes the interdependencies between the elements, while the equilibrium concept refers to the movements and forces of the respective social system (cf. Bach 2004, 63 ff.) (2). Brocker I 100 Pareto compared the actions of the social actors with the molecules in the mechanics of the solid and liquid bodies. At the same time, however, he assumed that the socially relevant actions were predominantly not rational. >Actions/Pareto. Pareto drew the limits of his field of research where the assessment of the purposes of action depends on value assumptions about which no scientifically sound statements are possible according to the logical-experimental method. 1. Vilfredo Pareto, Trattato di sociologia generale, Florenz 1916. Vilfredo Pareto, Trattato di sociologia generale. Edizione critica a cura di Giovanni Busino, 4 Bände, Turin 1988. Dt.: Vilfredo Paretos System der allgemeinen Soziologie, herausgegeben und übersetzt von Gottfried Eisermann, Stuttgart 1962, § 145. 2. Maurizio Bach, Jenseits des rationalen Handelns. Zur Soziologie Vilfredo Paretos, Wiesbaden 2004. Maurizio Bach, Vilfredo Pareto, Allgemeine Soziologie (1916) in: Manfred Brocker (Hg). Geschichte des Politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Symmetries | Feynman | L 159 Def Symmetry/Weyl: a thing is symmetrical, if it can be subjected to a certain operation and it then appears as exactly the same as before. Symmetry/Physics/Laws/Feynman: For example, if we move a machine, it will still work. I 726 Symmetry Operations/Physics/Feynman: Translation in space - translation in time - rotation around a fixed angle - constant speed in a straight line (Lorentz transformation) - time reversal - reflection of space - exchange of the same atoms or particles - quantum mechanical phase Matter antimatter (charge conjugation). >Time reversal. I 728 Asymmetry/Scale/Scale Change/Feynman: in the case of scale changes, the physical laws are not symmetrical! Question: will an apparatus which is re-built five times larger work in the same way? - No! E.g. The light wavelength, e.g. emitted by sodium atoms in a container, is the same when the volume quintuples. It is not made five times longer by that Consequently, the ratio of the wavelength to the size of the emitter changes. E.g. Cathedral made of matches: if it were built on a real scale, it would collapse, because enlarged matches are not strong enough. We might think that it is enough to take a larger earth (because of the same gravitation). But then it would become even worse! I 730 Symmetry/Law/Conservation Law/Quantum Mechanics: in quantum mechanics there is a corresponding conservation law for every symmetry! This is a very profound fact. The fact that the laws of translation are symmetrical in time means, in quantum mechanics, that the energy is conserved. Invariance in rotation corresponds to the conservation of the angular momentum. (In quantum mechanics). I 731 Symmetry/reflection of Space/Right/Left/Direction/Space Direction/Feynman: a clock whose every part was mirror symmetrical, would run the same way. If this was correct, however, it would be impossible to distinguish between "right" and "left" by any physical phenomenon, just as it is impossible to define an absolute speed by a physical phenomenon. The empirical world, of course, need not be symmetrical. We can define the direction in geography. But it does not seem to violate the physical laws that everything is changed from right to left. E.g. right/left: If you wanted to find out where "right" is, a good method would be to buy a screw in a hardware store. Most have legal threads. It's just a lot more likely. >Convention. I, 732 E.g. right/left: next possibility: Light turns its polarization plane when it penetrates sugar water. So we can define "right-turning". But not with artificially made sugar, only with that from living creatures. >Monod, molecular structure, right-turning/left-turning. I 733 Feynman: it looks as if the phenomena of life (with much more frequent molecules in a certain direction) allow the distinction between left/right. But that is not the case! The Schrödinger equation tells us that molecules rotating right and left behave the same physically. Nevertheless, there is only one direction in life! I 734 Conservation Law: there is no preservation of the number of right-sided molecules. Once started, evolution has increased their number and we can further multiply them. We can assume that the phenomena of life do not violate symmetry but, on the contrary, demonstrate the universal nature and the ultimate origin of all living creatures. I 737 Mirror Symmetry: is fulfilled by the laws of: electricity, gravitation, magnetism, nuclear forces. They cannot be used to define right/left! But there is a violation of symmetry in nature: the weak decay (beta decay): (1954): there is a particle, a certain cobalt isotope, which decays into three π mesons, and another one that decays into two. I 738 Def South Pole: can only be defined by cobalt isotopes: it is such that the electrons in a beta decay prefer to lead away from it. This is the only way to explain right/left unambiguously to the Martian: he gets building instructions for a beta decay in a cooled system. I 739 Parity/Law of Violation of Parity Conservation/Asymmetry/Symmetry/Feynman: only unsymmetrical law in nature: the violation only occurs with these very slow reactions: the particles that bear a spin (electron, neutrino, etc.) come out with a left-tending spin. The law combines the polar vector of a speed and the axial vector of a rotational momentum, stating that the rotational momentum is more likely to be opposite to the velocity than being parallel to it. I 742 Symmetry/Nature/Feynman: where does it come from? We don't know. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Symmetries | Pinker | I 213 Symmetry/PinkerVsTradition: the most in nature is not symmetrical. Reason: even molecules such as internal organs are asymmetrical. >Asymmetry. But the body is symmetrical, otherwise only limited (circular) motion would be possible. And that has very much to do with selection. >Body, >Motion, >Selection. Pairing partner are chosen for symmetry because symmetry in nature is unlikely. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
| Terminology | Kauffman | Dennett I 306 Definition "Epistasis"/Kauffman: Interactions between genes. Suitability landscape strongly determines the development. For example, the creation of a sonnet: forces us to remove some of the beautiful parts that we have worked hard on, because they do not fit into the overall scheme. Kauffman I 117/118 Definition State Space/Kauffman: Range of possibilities of the light pattern, 2 exp n. With 1000 molecules and a change after a trillionth of a second, the existence time of the universe would not be sufficient to complete a cycle (running through all possible states). I 121 Networks/Kauffman: Question: How to create networks with short status cycles? Is it difficult to produce them, so they are extremely unlikely? Solution: Attractor: more than one trajectory can enter the same state cycle. If attractors are small, more order is created. I 176 Definition "Supracritical Behavior"/Kauffman: here: abrupt increase in the diversity of the biosphere. Similar to a nuclear chain reaction. While the biosphere as a whole is supracritical, like a mass of split atomic nuclei, the individual cells that make up the biosphere must be subcritical. This protects the system from chaos. ((s) e.g. So that a house can be built from bricks, not from crumbs.). I 189 System/cell/order/evolution/supracritical/Kauffman: the fact that we eat our food and do not merge with it indicates a fundamental fact: Biosphere: supracritical Cells: subcritical If we merged with our food, a supercritical explosion would be triggered in the organism. I 393 Definition Recipient-based communication/Larry Wood: all actors in a system that seek to coordinate behavioural patterns share what happens to them. This is included in the decision-making process. There is a superordinate team goal. For example, fighter pilots can do without ground support. They react to those other machines that fly the least distance away from them. Similar to the example of flocks of birds. |
Kau II Stuart Kauffman At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity New York 1995 Kauffman I St. Kauffman At Home in the Universe, New York 1995 German Edition: Der Öltropfen im Wasser. Chaos, Komplexität, Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft München 1998 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Terminology | Mayr | I 45 Def genotype: nucleic acids, (total number of genes) Def phenotype: proteins, lipids, macromolecules, (total of characteristics, environmentally dependent). I 43 Def Integron/Mayr: An integron is a system created by integration of subordinate units on a higher level. Integrons evolve by natural selection. They are adapted systems at each level because they contribute to the fitness (suitability) of an individual. I 205 Def Parthenogenesis: Asexuality: in some organisms, individuals develop themselves from the eggs, fertilization is not necessary. E.g. Aphids, plankton crustaceans: here sexual and asexual generations alternate. I 324 Def Altruism: (Trivers, 1985)(1): action that benefits another organism at the expense of the actor, with the costs and benefits being defined as reproductive success. I 175 Def Class/Biology/Mayr: Grouping of entities that are similar and related to each other. Classification: two important functions: a) recovery of information. b) comparative research. Information storage. I 177 Def "Variety": (Linné, even Darwin): Deviations that are slightly smaller than those of a new species. ("typological" or "essential concept of species"). ("Common essence" ("Nature")). I 178 Def Twin species: (discovered only recently: spatially separated, but equally developed, discovered in almost all animal species), forces a new criterion for the delineatation of species: reproductive isolation of populations. I 179 Def Species/Mayr: device for protecting balanced, harmonic genotypes. "Biological concept of species" seeks biological reasons for the existence of species. Maybe there are other properties by chance. I 183 Def Species Taxa: special populations or population groups corresponding to the species definition. They are entities. I 373 Def Similarity: certain characteristics must occur together with other characteristics from which they are logically independent. I 49 Def knowledge/Mayr: facts and their interpretation. I 279 Def r-selection: strongly fluctuating, often catastrophically exposed population size, weak intraspecific competition, very fertile. K-Selection: constant population size, strong competition, stable life expectancy. I 41 Def Reductionism/Mayr: Reductionism considers the problem of explanation fundamentally as solved as soon as the reduction to the smallest components is completed. I 186 Def Feature/Biology/Mayr: a distinguishing feature or attribute. Is arbitrarily chosen by the taxonomists. Often led to very strange "unnatural" groups. At the end of the 18th century, attempts were made to replace the Linné system with a more natural one. I 211 Def Preformation: Eggs produce individuals of the same species. Therefore it was concluded that egg or sperm is already a miniature of the future organism. I 212 Def Epigenesis: Development during the life history of the individual, in contrast to ontogeny and phylogeny. I 219 Def Induction/Biology/Mayr: Influence of already existing tissues on the development of other tissues. By proteins. It is important for almost all organisms. I 349 Def Life/Mayr: Activities of self-developed systems, controlled by a genetic program. Def Life/Rensch(2): Living beings are hierarchically ordered, open systems, predominantly organic compounds, which normally appear as circumscribed, cell-structured individuals of temporally limited constancy. Def Life/Sattler 1986(3): an open system that replicates and regulates itself, shows individuality, and subsists on energy from the environment. MayrVs: all contain superfluous and do not go into the genetic program, which is perhaps the most important. More description than definition. 1. R. L. Trivers (1985). Social evolution. Menlo Park: Benjamin/Cummings. 2. B. Rensch (1968). Biophilosophie. Stuttgart: G. Fischer. S. 54. 3. R. Sattler (1986). Biophilosophy. Berlin: Springer. S. 228. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Theoretical Entities | Fraassen | I 36 Theoretical Terms/Theoretical Entities/Rationality/Fraassen: the attitude of "maybe there are no electrons" (> Fictions/Vaihinger). This assumption is more cautious. But this is merely a methodological matter. >Method. Neither empirical nor logical deductive - simply logically weaker. Therefore, it can not be less plausible. >Strength of theories. Putnam: now shifted intention from electrons to demons. Putnam: There can be theories that match the empirical content, but differ in the truth value. >Adequacy. I 214 Observability/Theoretical Entities/Fraassen: error: to assume a continuity here. - (E.g. giant crystals are observable). >Observability. Solution: Theoretical entities are also clusters of th.e. - E.g. the table as a cluster of molecules. - (Logically trivial). |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Theoretical Entities | Sellars | I 39 Theoretical entities/Sellars: are entities that are postulated along with certain principles. - To explain the regularities of perception. >Regularity, >Perception. I 100 Theoretical entities/Sellars: you cannot just take them as objects (particulars). That depends more on the comment. Impressions are theoretical entities. - They are predicates. E.g. molecules have mass, but "mass" is not an abbreviation of a description. >Predicates, cf. >Microstructure. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Theoretical Terms | Sellars | I 39 Def theoretical entities/Sellars: entities that are postulated along with certain them affecting, essential principles to explain regularities within the sensory perception, e.g. like molecules postulated together with the principles of molecular motion. >Regularity, >Perception. I 91 Theoretical terms/Behaviorism: theoretical termsare not defined in behaviorist psychology not only in terms of open behavior, but also not in terms of nerves, synapses, neuron irritation, etc. A behaviorist theory of behavior is not already a physiological explanation of behavior. In order that a structure of theoretical terms is suitable to provide explanations for behavior, the theoretical terms do not have to be identified with the terms of neurophysiology. >Behaviorism, >Behavior, cf. >Neuroscience. I 91/92 Theoretical terms: their logic has two aspects: a) their role in explaining selected phenomena b) their role as candidates for integration into an overall image. Both roles are equal. E.g. It would be imaginable that the chemistry, before people became aware of electrical or magnetic phenomena, has reached a mature and successful theory of explanation of chemical phenomena. And that some terms that were later connected to the electromagnetic theory, were first introduced by chemists as purely theoretical terms. >Phenomena, >Explanation. I 91ff Thinking: the terms belonging to thinking are theoretical terms. >Thinking/Sellars. I 100 Theoretical entities: it is wrong to assume that they are also individual objects. The role of the comment is ignored. >Objects/Sellars. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Time Reversal | Feynman | I 657 Time Reversal/Movement Reversal/Reversibility/Feynman: E.g. A movie played backwards: here entropy is not as high as you might think, since all elements have exactly the right speed to return to their starting point. >Symmetries/Feynman. Reversibility/Irreversibility/Physics/Time Inversion/Feynman: E.g. retarded electric field: t: time, r: distance from the charge: field corresponding to the acceleration at the time t r/c and not t + r/c. Consequently, it appears that the law of electricity is not reversible. Vs: but in fact Maxwell's equations are reversible! In addition, we could take the advanced field instead of the retarded field and everything goes the same way. This also means that an oscillating charge in a closed container (black body) will lead to an equilibrium. >Equations. I 729 Time Reversal/Time/Backward Movement/Film/Reversibility/Feynman: e.g. movie playing backwards: if we were able to see the individual molecules, we could not see if the machine was moving forward or backward. Nothing contradicts the physical laws. On the other hand, if we do not see all the details, it will be clearly detectable, e.g. as a forward movement. For example, if we looked at the individual atoms of an egg, we could not determine whether the egg was bursting or assembling. At the level of the individual atoms the laws look completely reversible. >Atoms/Feynman, >Natural laws. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Time Reversal | Genz | II 254 Time reversal symmetric/Genz: for example, "angle of incidence" = "angle of reflection" is time reversal symmetric, i.e. it would not be possible to determine whether a film with billiard balls runs backwards. II 255 Reflection/time reversal/Genz: the same applies to all reflection processes, forward as well as backward deterministic n. >Symmetries. II 256 If there was a law: "angle of reflection = half angle of incidence", we would have no time reversal symmetry and we could see a film running backwards. II 256 Time inversion invariant/Genz: e.g. Newton's laws of planetary motion: the directions in which the planets move could be reversed. Therefore, a film running backwards would not be recognizable. >Laws/Newton. Quantum mechanics/not time inversion invariant/Genz: the laws for elementary particles are excellent in one direction. >Quantum mechanics. II 259 In the last 200 years, the Earth was 4 hours slow, if one wanted to calculate a solar eclipse. Eventually the moon will stand still for the earth in the sky. N.B.: in a backward running film, the tides would have the opposite effect that the earth rotates faster instead of slower! Thus the time directions have become distinguishable. By comparing the two processes. N.B.: but we cannot tell from them which one is the real one and which one is the manipulated one. Tides: the laws of the tides cannot be fundamental like those of the K mesons. They do not include the origin of deformations. They are not time-reversal symmetric. Time-reversal symmetric: are fundamental laws about the collisions of molecules. Time reversal symmetry/problem: how can symmetric laws of nature lead to processes that are not symmetric themselves? Asymmetry/Genz: it is not the laws that are responsible for them, but the initial conditions or circumstances. Order/Law/Genz: the superordinate law in such cases is that order cannot increase. >Order. II 258 Asymmetry/time reversal/Genz: asymmetry is much more pronounced in macroscopic (tides) than in microscopic (K mesons). Tides: the law that the rotation of the earth slows down is forward deterministic, but not backward deterministic! For example, because it is not possible to tell from a standstill how long ago the rotation came to rest. >Tidal force. There are many ways in which it has come to a standstill, but only one more to rest. The direction of time cannot be inferred from the observation of the standstill. II 260 This does not mean absolute rotation, which is marked by centrifugal forces, but relative to the moon. Friction/Genz: friction leads to time reversal asymmetry. (If you brake until standstill). Then we see in the backward running film a course of events prohibited by the laws of nature. II 261 Statistical fluctuation/Genz: statistical fluctuation does not indicate a time direction. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Truth | Kripke | I 47/48 Necessary and a priori are not obviously synonymous. They are not even coextensive: there are both: necessary truths from posteriori and probably contingent truths a priori! >Necessary/Kripke, >necessary a posteriori, >necessary de re/Kripke, >a priori/Kripke. Many people have thought that these two things should mean the same thing because they imagine we would go through all possible worlds in our minds and then be able to recognize them a priori. But that is not so clear! I 50 Description: if we call Nixon "the man who won the 1988 election", it will of course be a necessary truth. >Description/Kripke. I 66 Prototype meter/standard meter: someone who thinks that everything you know a priori is necessary might think: "This is the definition of a meter. This is a necessary truth." Kripke: however, he/she does not use this definition to specify the meaning, but to define the reference. >Standard meter, >Speaker reference, >Reference/Kripke. I 68 Rigid: a meter is rigid ((s) "rigid" means that the reference is the same in all possible worlds). Non-rigid: the length of S at time t is non-rigid. The "definition" does not say that the two expressions are synonymous, but rather that we have determined the reference of the expression "one metre" by fixing that it is to be a rigid expression of designations, which in fact has the length S. The term "one metre" is not synonymous with the term "one metre". So it is no necessary truth! And that is because under certain circumstances it would not have been one metre long. One expression is rigid and the other is not. The truth he/she knows is contingent. So I prefer not to call them "analytical." >Analytic/synthetic, >Rigidity, >Contingency. I 77 E.g. a thesis may be true because it is simply a definition. >Definition/Kripke. I 153ff Reference of proper names: Definition of the reference: is given a priori (contingent) - this is not the same as synonymy. Meaning: the meaning is analytical (necessary). Definition: defines reference and expresses truth a priori. I 156 E.g. necessary truth: "Cats are animals". I 175 The phrase "heat is the movement of molecules" expresses a truth a posteriori. I 181 A posteriori: one can experience a mathematical truth a posteriori by looking at a computer or by asking a mathematician. The philosophical analysis tells us that it was not contingent and therefore any empirical knowledge of its truth is automatically an empirical knowledge of its necessity. --- III 409 Truth/formal languages: understanding the meta language > explicit truth-definition > truth conditions > understanding of the language examined. >Truth conditions, >Understanding. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Underdetermination | Quine | X 25ff Underdetermination/Empiricism/Quine: also through unmonitored data. --- Lauener XI 119 Underdetermination/Identity of theories/Quine/Lauener: theories: can be logically incompatible and empirically equivalent. - E.g. interchanging -electron/molecule-: makes true sentences false. Since the change is purely terminological, you can say that both versions express the same theory. - So they are empirically equivalent - however, the predicates can be reconstructed in a way that the theories also become logically equivalent. E.g. empirically equivalent: Theory a) space infinite Theory b) finite, objects shrink with distance from the center. Again, the predicates can be rephrased in such a way that the theories are logically equivalent. Underdetermination: In order to prove them, it would have to have an influence on the empirical content. Quine: it is almost impossible to find an example. --- Lauener XI 120 Underdetermination/Quine/Lauener: there are rivals to every infinite theory that are equivalent empirically, but not logically, and that cannot be made logically equivalent by reconstructing the predicates. --- Stroud I 217 Underdetermination/Theory/Theoretical terms/Entities/Quine/Stroud: the truths that the scientist introduces e.g. about molecules are not sufficiently determined by all the truths that he knows or can ever know about the normal objects. - (s) There could be several possible theories which imply the same set of truths about the normal objects, but differ in terms of the theoretical ones. - theoretical entities do not follow from the truths about normal things. Quine/Stroud: for him, normal objects are also just hypotheses. - This is how all theories go beyond data. - Underdetermination: also remains, if we included all past and future nervous stimuli of all people. --- I 234 Problem: even true sentences go beyond the data, are projections - therefore they cannot be known. >Theories; cf. >Indeterminacy, >Inscrutability. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Q XI H. Lauener Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Understanding | Genz | II 118 Understanding/principle/principles/Genz: a deeper understanding is achieved if one can show that a theory can be derived from principles. >Principles, >Theories, >Derivation, >Derivability. Relativity theory/Einstein/Genz: Einstein has done this for the three theories of relativity. >Relativity theory. II 185 Understanding/Genz: we only understand artifacts. II 186 Quantum mechanics: we understand the behavior of molecules only by taking quantum mechanics into account, so we do not understand it. II 207 Law/understanding/compression/natural laws/Genz: a law allows understanding, unlike merely observed periodicity. >Laws, >Natural laws, >Regularities. II 208 A law compresses the observation data. Prediction: any theory compressing the data allows predictions. >Predictions. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Universals | Bigelow | I VII Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro: they help to create a unified picture and to understand probabilities. They help to establish a unified theory of modalities (possibility, necessity) that we find in science. >Probability, >Modalities, >Possibility, >Necessity. I 82 Universals/science/Bigelow/Pargetter: we have encountered universals that are useful for physics, now we are looking at those that are useful for chemistry: Chemical components: are structures made up of elements. Universal: is the property of having a certain structure, which in turn is related to the universals that determine the elements. These are structural universals. Structural universals/Bigelow/Pargettesr e.g. expressed by the predicate "to be methane" or "Methane"; Instantiated: by a carbon atom and four hydrogen atoms in a certain constellation. >Essence, >Properties. This constellation is an essential property. Instantiation: by methane molecules. >Instantiation. N.b.: this universal is intrinsically connected to other universals: the universals, being hydrogen, being carbon and be bound. >Intrinsicness. I 87 Structural Universals/Level/Bigelow/Pargetter: Level 1: material individuals who have the property of being butane or methane, etc. These are then methane molecules, etc. These individuals have parts with different properties and relations. Level 2: Properties and relations of the individuals of the 1st Level. Property: For example, the property to be methane. Level 3: Relations or proportions between properties or relations between individuals, no matter whether they are properties of the 1st or 2nd level (sic) of these individuals. For example,"having the same number of instances as". Cardinal numbers/Frege: Frege needed this construction for the cardinal numbers. Family: this relation between properties have the form of a family, including e.g. "having twice as many instances","having four times as many instances", etc. Proportion: these "numerical" proportions will also exist between more complex properties of the 2nd level: e.g. "conjunctive property: being carbon and be part of this molecule". >Proportions. For example, if the molecule is methane, these two properties are in a ratio characterized by the proportion 4:1. Structural universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: we can then characterize it as a relational property of an object. It relates the molecule to various properties. These properties are being carbon, being hydrogen and being bound. Universal: e.g. being methane: is then identical with a highly conjunctive relational property of the 2nd level of an individual (molecule). I 88 Property: the property of being methane stands in a pattern of internal proportions to other properties, e.g. being hydrogen, being bound, etc. Mereology/Chemistry/Bigelow/Pargetter: but these relations are not mereological. >Mereology. Relations/Bigelow/Pargetter: these relations are internal relations and they are essential. Essentialism/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro: we need essential properties here. But this is better than seeking refuge in magic (see above). >Essentialism. I 89 Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: could not exist as these universals if they were not in these relations with each other. These are the structural universals. I 164 Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: a full theory of universals needs a pre-semantic source for universals (pre-semantic/s): something that does not require truthmakers. >Truthmakers, >Semantics. Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: we need something that instantiates something without ever being instantiated. Existence of 2nd level/Bigelow/Pargetter: is also required by a theory of universals. From which, however, you cannot deduce any existence of the 1st level without additional premises. Causes as structural universals. >Levels/order, >Description levels, >Derivation, >Derivability I 293 Fundamental Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: are vectors. >Vectors. Basic forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: are aggregates of vectors: thesis: they are structural universals. >Forces. For example, mass: each specific mass corresponds to a specific property. Nevertheless, massive objects have something in common: that they have mass. This corresponds to a relation of a higher level. These relations are internal and essential, not external. That is, the particular mass properties could not be them if they were in different relations to other objects. >Exterior/interior, >Extrinsic. Common: this is the fact that all massive things are related to other massive things. Property of the 1st level: Example: velocity in the plane. Relation 1st level: For example, difference in velocity or direction. Therefore, there are two relations of the 1st level. Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: are more complex vectors, since they themselves are relations of the 2nd level. Fundamental forces can be of different sizes and directions. I 293 They are thus in a cluster of internal relations of higher degrees to other fundamental forces. That makes sure that they are a family with something in common. Necessary/Properties/Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: the fact that one fundamental force is twice as great as the other, or perpendicular to another; it is not contingent. Solution: they would otherwise be different from the forces they are. On the other hand, Contingent: whether things are connected by a force is contingent. >Contingency, >Necessity. Structural Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: (see above: methane example) Forces: the constitutive properties of structural universals can also be fundamental forces, including vectors with size and direction. Internal relations: there are many of them within a structural universal. And they also establish the connections to individuals. Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: we said it is local. So it cannot be a relation only between completely nonlocal universals. Structural universals: must therefore have a local element. Solution: their relational properties embed particulars as well as universals. Fundamental cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: if it is a structural universal, it will be a conjunctive relation of a higher level between single events. >Causes, >Causation. I 294 Causal relations/Bigelow/Pargetter: after all, they have a rich and essential nature. And they are not primitive basic concepts. They are explained by vectors and structural universals. They exist independently alongside causes and effects. >Causal relations, >Effect. Modalities/Bigelow/Pargetter: some are essentially causal. But: Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: is not essentially modal for its part. >Modalities, >Causation. I 378 Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: are things in the world like others. In particular, they are namable. >Naming, >Identification, >Individuation. I 379 There is no essential connection between universals and predicates. I.e. universals can be in subject position. ((s) But can we quantify via them?). Therefore, we have no problem with higher-level logic (2nd level logic). >Predicates, >Predication. Universals: should not be dominated by semantic theory. They should not have to be arranged according to a hierarchy. Nevertheless, they have a hierarchical pattern with individuals as a basis. Paradoxes: are avoided by prohibiting universals from instantiating themselves or other universals. Self-reference/Bigelow/Pargetter: however, this is only a problem if mathematics is based a priori on logic alone. And we do not want that. For example, we do not assume that each linguistic description determines a quantity. >Self-reference, >Sets, >Set theory, >Descriptions, >Mathematics, >Logic, >Ultimate justification. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Universe | Anderson | Brockman I 145 Universe/artificial intelligence/Chris Anderson: We live in a world of countless gradients, from light and heat to gravity and chemical trails (chemtrails!). Water flows along a gravity gradient downhill, and your body lives on chemical solutions flowing across cell membranes from high concentration to low. Brockman I 146 clients to form molecules. Our own urges, such as hunger and sleepiness, are driven by electrochemical gradients in our bodies. And our brain’s functions, the electrical signals moving along ion channels in the synapses between our neurons, are simply atoms and electrons flowing “downhill” along yet more electrical and chemical gradients. As I sit here typing, I’m actually seeking equilibrium states in an n-dimensional topology of gradients. Brockman I 147 Problem: However, this is too simplistic. The limits of gradient descent constitute the so-called local-minima problem (or local-maxima problem, if you’re doing a gradient ascent). >Fitness landscape/Kauffman. (>Local minimum). Solution/Anderson: (…) you either need a mental model (i.e., a map) of the topology, so you know where to ascend to get out of the valley, or you need to switch between gradient descent and random walks so you can bounce your way out of the region. Anderson, Chris “Gradient Descent” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Ander I Chris Anderson The Long Tail: Why the Future of Business is Selling Less of More New York 2006 Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Vagueness | Quine | I 226 Vagueness: can be useful - it leaves the truth value untouched. I 84 It is known that color words are grouped very differently in different languages, the color boundaries are vague in both languages. "Red" is a good translation of a native sentence, for example, if it resembles vagueness. >Language acquisition. I 156 ff Learning/vagueness/Quine: Vagueness plays an important role in the first learning phase. Distribution around central norm values. "More or less red" can be more fundamental for learning than the "red norm". I 228f Ambiguity/Quine: is something other than vagueness. >Ambiguity. I 334 Vagueness, ambiguity and transience of the designation are characteristics of linguistic expressions and do not extend to the designated objects. VII (b) 27 Replaceability/Leibniz: replaceability salva seritate should provide synonymy. Quine: this does not save the synonyms conceived in this way from vagueness. II 48 Bivalence/Divalence/Vagueness/Quine: I do not care very much about bivalence, mainly it is good for simplification. Besides the undecidable facts of the realists regarding physical objects, the vagueness of the terms has to be taken into account. Also here there are problems caused by bivalence: Sorites: For example, if after removing a single grain from a heap of sand, there is always a heap left, then complete induction is used to ensure that a heap remains after removing all the grains. II 128ff Insufficient individuation has nothing to do with vagueness of demarcation. We are used to tolerating the vagueness of boundaries. (>Fine structure of a table). What the vagueness of boundaries on physical objects boils down to is that there are almost identical objects that are almost the same circumference and only differ in the inclusion or exclusion of several peripheral molecules. Any of these almost circumferential objects could serve as the table, without anyone being smarter about it. That is the vagueness of the table. VI 24/25 Science/verification/Quine: much of science is shielded by excuses such as vagueness from unreal conditional sentences or dispositions from simple tests of experience. >Verification. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Vitalism | Mayr | I 29 Vitalists/Vitalism/Mayr: Appropriateness (before Kant). >Purposefulness. "Protoplasm": a special substance that inanimate matter lacks. I 31 Vitality, "élan vital". Fluid: (no liquid) Debate "Preformations/Epigenesis Theory 2nd half of the 18th century. Preformationists: believed that the parts of an adult individual were already present in smaller form at the beginning of its development. (Caspar Friedrich Wolff refuted preformation, needed causal power "vis essentialis"). I 33 Epigenetics: assumed that they appeared as products of a development, not at the beginning. >Terminology/Mayr. Blumenbach, rejected "vis essentialis" and spoke of "educational drive" that plays a role not only in the embryo but also in growth, regeneration and reproduction. I 35 Selection theory: made vitalism superfluous: Haeckel:"We recognize in Darwin's selection the decisive proof for the exclusive effectiveness of mechanical causes in the entire field of biology... definitive end of all teleological and vitalistic interpretations of organisms".(1) I 35 Protoplasm: the search for it promoted a flourishing branch of chemistry: colloid chemistry. It was finally discovered that there is no protoplasm! Word and concept disappeared. Life: it became possible to explain it by means of molecules and their organisation! Organic/inorganic: in 1828 urea was synthesized: first proof of the artificial conversion of inorganic components into an organic molecule! I 38 Vitalism: Strange phenomenon: among the physicists of the 20th century vitalistic ideas arose. Bohr: in organisms, certain laws could have an effect that cannot be found in inanimate matter. Bohr looked in biology for evidence of its complementarity and drew on some desperate analogies. MayrVsBohr: there is really nothing that can be considered.(Unclear only in the subatomic field). Cf. >Eccles/Popper. 1. E. Haeckel (1869/1879). Über Entwicklungsgang und Aufgabe der Zoologie. In. Jeanuische zeitung 5 s. 353-370. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| World/Thinking | Rorty | III 21 Language/world/Rorty: the world contains reasons that our beliefs are true, but that is not to be confused with the (false) claim that a non-linguistic state of the world in itself is an example of truth. (> Metaphysics). --- III 21 Vocabularies: the world does not prefer a vocabulary before others. Newton's vocabulary makes it easier for us to describe the world than Aristotle's vocabulary, but it does not prefer it. The human self is created by vocabularies. III 21 Wrong questions: What place have values in a world of facts? - What place has the intensionality in a world of causality? - What place has the consciousness in a world of molecules? - Are colors more awareness dependent than weights? - What is the relationship between language and thought? --- IV (a) 40 ff Correct Question: (Rorty, Davidson) "Is our use of these words in the way of our use of other words?" It is about whether we use our tools well, not whether our beliefs are contradictory. Perspective/Berkeley: even mass is perspective. This leads to a dead end, that all words are perspective to the same degree with respect to human interests. >Perspective. Solution: One can question according to the correctnes of Wittgenstein's picture of the relationship language/world. Language/world/Wittgenstein: his picture of this relationship has no place for the distinction subjective/objective (important for Nagel) - or "real"/"not real" evaluation. (Michael Williams). >Subjectivity/Nagel, >Objectivity/Nagel, >Michael Williams. --- VI 51 Davidson/Dewey: we do not have the ability to distinguish the contribution provided by "the world" for a process of judgment from our own contribution. >Judgments. --- Horwich I 446 Language/world/Rorty: there is no reason why the progression of our language game should have something to do with the rest of the world. >Language game. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anthropic Principle | Dennett Vs Anthropic Principle | I 227 DennettVsAnthropic Principle: "Strong Form": misuse of "must", "If physical structures depend on larger molecules, then they must exist, because we exist. Instead properly: It must be the case that: if consciousness ..... depends, then there are in the world such elements, because we have a consciousness. Dennett: it need not be the case that we are there, but since we re here, it must be the case that we evolved from primates. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Dawkins, R. | Gould Vs Dawkins, R. | I 94 GouldVsDawkins: genes are not visible for selection (only individuals are) so the selection does not respond to them. I passim Richard Dawkins Thesis: genes are the relevant units of selection, GouldVs. VsDawkins: starting with Butler's famous aphorism Z "a hen is only the special way in which an egg produces a second egg". GouldVsDawkins: there is a fatal flaw in Dawkins' attack on Darwinian theory: no matter how much power Dawkins wants to attribute to the genes, he cannot give them one thing, namely direct visibility in the process of natural selection. I 94 GouldVsDawkins: he will have to use other metaphors. He will have to come back to the fact that genes gather, make alliances, respect each other, join a pact, and explore a possible environment. But we call the object composed of them a body. VIII 434 GouldVsDawkins: the theory of the selfish gene and the selfish DNA are very different. According to Dawkins, the genes increase in frequency because they have effects on the body - but the DNA for exactly the opposite reason, because they have no effects! VIII 372 Gene/Selection/Dawkins: on reasonable consideration, selection does not directly affect the genes! The DNA is spun into proteins, wrapped in membranes, shielded from the world and invisible to natural selection. (Like GouldVsDawkins.) Selection would also hardly have a criterion for DNA molecules. All genes look the same, as all tapes look the same! Genes show their effects! |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Grice, P.H. | Cartwright Vs Grice, P.H. | I 129 As if/Physics/Cartwright: (from a seminar by Grice): Is there an "as-if-operator" in physics? Grice: E.g. a) helium gas behaves as if it were a collection of molecules that interact only in case of collision. b) ... helium gas is composed of molecules that behave as if they only interacted in case of collisions. CartwrightVsGrice: early: at the time I made objections that only apparently contradicted this: There are well known cases with the "as-if" operator. E.g. the radiating molecules in an ammonium-Maser behave as if they were normal electronic oscillators. As if/False realism: realistic question: how densely are the oscillators packed? VsRealism: this question is absurd, normal electron oscillators themselves are a mere theoretical construct, a fiction! The behavior of atoms is amazingly similar to a normal electron oscillator. Helium-neon laser/Cartwright: (...) behaves as if it were a collection of 3-level atoms(...). I 130 As if/Behavior/Existence/Ontology/Explanation/Theory/Cartwright: early: but by saying "as if", I do not deny the existence of 3-level atoms in this situation! I recognize these existential facts, and yet put the "as-if operator" in front of them! CartwrightVsCartwright: later: back then I confused two functions that the as-if the operator may have: as-if-operator/Cartwright: a) writing things left from the as-if-operator means to enter into an existential commitment. E.g. ... molecules as if ... b) things to the right of the as-if operator: have a different function: what is at the right side (a description) is what we need to know in order to be able to apply a mathematical formulation. Description/Equation/Law/Physics/Cartwright: the description on the right side is the kind of description for which the theory provides an equation. E.g. we say a "real quantum atom" behaves like a normal electron oscillator. The theory tells us beforehand which equation this oscillator obeys. I 131 Description/Equation/Theory/Cartwright: it might be assumed: in order to obtain a description according to which we can establish it, we must depart from what we assume to exist. (to be the case). CartwrightVs: it but does not work like that: Principles/Theory/Cartwright: the theory has only few principles to get from descriptions of equations. And these principles certainly demand structured information. And the "descriptions" on the right side must satisfy many mathematical requirements. Description/Theory/Equations/Cartwright: thesis: the descriptions that best describe are just not the ones which best apply to the equations. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Heraclitus | Quine Vs Heraclitus | I 296 ff Everyday language has the annoying habit of grammatically highlighting time relations at the expense of relations relations of weight or color. In the canonical notation you usually drop the temporal distinctions. Even in mathematics: we feel the "is" differently after "seven" than after "Maria". Re-forming. E.g. "I called him, but he is asleep" becomes: "I call him then, but he sleeps at that time". E.g. "Earlier than now George marries Maria and now Maria is a widow, therefore Georg earlier marries someone who is now a widow." I 298 QuineVsHeraclitus: It's not a bigger problem to step twice into the same river than it is to do so twice at two different locations. (Goes back to the different weighting in our grammar). III 270 Identity/Time/Change/Transformation/Heraclitus/QuineVsHeraclitus: how can you say that a thing that changes its substance does not remain identical with itself? The key is not in the concept of identity, but in the concepts "object" and "time". Def Object/Object/Thing/Quine: in every moment the sum of the simultaneous current states of atoms distributed in the area or other small physical particles. And over time it is the sum of its successive current states. QuineVsHeraclitus: we can step into the same river twice. What we cannot do is step twice into the same temporal stage (time stage) of the river. (At least not if this part is shorter than the time we need to climb into it ((s)(twice)). III 271 ((s) Transformation/Change/Quine/(s): depends on the choice of the time periods under comparison.) Equal Sign/Quine: "=" is an ordinary relative term (rel term). The equal sign is necessary, because two variables may relate to the same or to different objects. From a logical point of view, the use of the equal sign between variables is fundamental, not between singular terms. V 186 Ontology/QuineVsHeraclitus: we forced his talk of time and river into a clear structure of general term and singular term and the reference to objects. Thus we have a simpler ontology. VII (d) 65 Identity/Heraclitus/Quine: E.g. you cannot bathe in the same river twice. Solution: you can, but not twice in the same "river stages". A river is a process in time. Unlike its stages. Water: to be a multiplicity of water molecules. VII (d) 66 River Stage: is simultaneously a water stage. But two stages of the same river are not always stages of the same water. ((s) division into two types of stages to explain the change). Quine: in our fast-paced world you could bathe twice in the same water but in different rivers! A: current stage of the river Cayster in Lydia b: stage of the Cayster two days later c: Current (two days later) state of the water molecules from river stage a. Half of them is further downstream, the other half in the Aegean Sea. a and b: are in "river relation". a and c: are in "water relation". River: as an entity is thus introduced as a single thing, namely as a process or time-consuming object that you say identity instead of "river relation". Identity: but you cannot say that a and b are the identical, they are merely river-related. But if we point to a and after two days to b, then we should express that we do not point to stages, but to the same river, which contains both. The assumption of identity is essential. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Kauffman, St. | Verschiedene Vs Kauffman, St. | Kauffman I 94 Life/Catalysis/Kauffman: we want to determine the conditions under which the same molecules act as catalysts and products at the same time. We know that proteins and RNA molecules play this role. In addition, all types of organic molecules can be substrates and products of reactions, while at the same time being catalysts for other reactions. Now we need to know which molecules catalyse which reactions. We only have assumptions here. Vs: but you have to know about it to be sure that a molecule system contains an autocatalytic formation. If the general conditions were slightly different, there would be no life. I 97 KauffmanVsVs: Thesis: perhaps these details of chemistry do not play a role at all! The legality of life lies on an even deeper level. This emergence is directly rooted in mathematics itself. Kauffman I 104 VsKauffman: it could be argued that what is true for As and Bs is not considered necessary for atoms and molecules. Problem: to produce large polymers energy is required because the thermodynamics favors their splitting into smaller groups. E.g. peptide bond. (100 amino acids) during the bond, a water molecule is released, vice versa consumed during the splitting. Thus, water itself is product of the reaction. (Water > Life). In a normal aqueous environment the ratio of split to bound amino acid pairs is about 10 : 1. I 105 For tri or tetrapeptides, the ratio increases to 100 : 1 or 1000 : 1. Rule: If the length of a polymer increases by one amino acid, its equilibrium concentration decreases by a factor of 10 in relation to the free amino acids. How can high concentrations of such molecules be achieved against this trend? Life/Catalysis/Kauffman: there are at least three basic mechanisms: 1. Reactions can be limited to surfaces instead of taking place in a volume. This favors the formation of larger molecules, because the speed of the reaction depends on how fast the partners meet each other. 2. Dehydration. if the water molecules are removed, the reaction is slower. I 108 Life/Kauffman: Thesis: Simple systems do not achieve catalytic isolation. Life came into being in one piece and not in successive steps, and it has retained this holistic character to this day. |
Kau II Stuart Kauffman At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity New York 1995 Kauffman I St. Kauffman At Home in the Universe, New York 1995 German Edition: Der Öltropfen im Wasser. Chaos, Komplexität, Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft München 1998 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Putnam Vs Kripke, S. A. | I (a) 35 Names/Kripke/Putnam: central point: you can use a proper name to refer to a thing or a person, without having true beliefs regarding X. I (a) 36 The use of the name includes the existence of a causal chain. PutnamVsKripke: right: knowledge of a speaker does not have to set the reference in his idiolect. The use of names is common. Now you might say that terms of physical quantities are also proper names, not of things but of quantities. ---- I (g) 189 Nature/essence/Kripke: E.g. Statue: The statue and the piece of clay are two items. The fact that the piece of clay has a modal property, namely, "to be a thing that might have been spherical", is missing to the statue. VsKripke: that sounds initially odd: E.g. when I put the statue on the scale, do I measure then two items? E.g. Equally strange is it to say, a human being is not identical with the aggregation of its molecules. Intrinsic properties/Putnam: E.g. Suppose there are "intrinsic connections" of my thoughts to external objects: then there is perhaps in my brain a spacetime region with set-theoretical connections with an abstract object which includes certain external objects. Then this spacetime region will have a similar set-theoretical connections with other abstract entities that contain other external objects. Then the materialist can certainly say that my "thoughts" include certain external objects intrinsically, by identifying these thoughts with a certain abstract entity. Problem: but if this identification should be a train of reality itself, then there must be in the world essences in a sense that cannot be explained by the set theory . Nature/essential properties/PutnamVsKripke: Kripke's ontology presupposes essentialism, it cannot serve to justify him. Modal properties are not part of the materialistic establishment of the world.. But Kripke individuates objects by their modal characteristics. Essential properties/Possible Worlds/Putnam: I, myself,(1975) spoke of "essential properties" but not in parallel worlds, but in other possible states of our world. Example: We can imagine another "possible world" (not parallel), in which a liquid other than water has the taste of water, but none, in which H2O is not water. This is insofar a kind of essentialism, as we have thus discovered the nature of water. We just say water should not be anything else. I (g) 192 And that was already our intention, when we did not know the composition of H2O. Nature/essence/Putnam: is in this sense, however, the product of our use of the word. It is not "built into the world". Nature/Kripke/Putnam: so it is also justified by Kripke. Putnam: both our conception of "nature" does not help the materialists. This purely semantic interpretation presupposes the reference. It cannot support the reference as an "intrinsic correlation" between thought and thing". --- I (i) 246 Truth/legitimate assertibility/Kripke Wittgenstein: that would only be a matter of general agreement. PutnamVsKripke: then this would be a wrong description of the terms that we actually have. And a self-confuting attempt to take an "absolute perspective". --- Rorty VI 129/130 Causal theory of reference: PutnamVsKripke/Rorty, self-criticism, PutnamVsPutnam: the description of the causal relationships between a something and other things is nothing more than the description of characteristics that are neither in a greater nor lesser extent in a"intrinsic" or in an "extrinsic" relationship with it. So also the feature "to be described by a human being". PutnamVsSearle: Vs distinction "intrinsic"/"relational". |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Lewis, D. | Putnam Vs Lewis, D. | I Lanz 291 Functionalism/identity theory: common: recognition of causally relevant inner states. But functionalism Vsidentity theory: the substance is not what plays a causal role for the commitment. (PutnamVsLewis). --- VI 437 "Elite classes"/Nature/Natural Reference/world/language/Lewis/Putnam: thesis, there are certain classes of things "out there" (elite classes) which are intrinsically distinguished, whereby it is a "natural condition" for reference, (incorporated into nature), that as many of our concepts as possible should refer to these elite classes. This does not clearly determine the reference of our terms, because sometimes there are other desiderata, but so the language is "tied to the world". Löwenheim/Putnam: from my ((s) Löwenheim-) argument follows that all our beliefs and experiences would be the same and none of my critics has ever contested that. >Löwenheim/Putnam. N.B.: it follows that Lewis "natural conditions" were not brought in by our interests, but that they are something that works with our interests to fix reference. LewisVsLöwenheim/Putnam: Lewis' thesis boils down to that e.g., the class of cats longs to be designated but not the one of cats*. Reference/PutnamVsLewis: his idea of the elite classes does not solve the problem of reference, but even confuses the materialist picture, by introducing something spooky. >Reference/Lewis. PutnamVsLewis: this does not only affect reference but also justification, relations of simultaneous assertibility, (that something could remain true, while something other is no longer true). All this cannot be fixed by something psychological, by something "in the head". PutnamVsPhysicalism: it cannot say that they are fixed, without falling back into medieval speech of a "clear causal order." Physicalism cannot say how it would be fixed, without falling back into medieval speech. --- Schwarz I 149 "New Theory of Reference/PutnamVsLewis/KripkeVsLewis/Schwarz: Did Kripke and Putnam not prove that, what an expression refers to, has nothing to do with associated descriptions? Then it could be that we are referring with "pain" to a state that does not play the everyday psychological role, which is not caused by injuries, etc., but may play the role that we mistakenly attribute to "joy". Then people would typically smile with pain. Typical cause of pain would be the fulfillment of wishes. LewisVsPutnam: thinks this is nonsense. When a state plays the role of joy, it is joy. --- Putnam III 176 Possible Worlds/Lewis: I believe in what is claimed by permissible reformulations of my beliefs. Does one take the reformulation at face value, I believe in the existence of entities that could be called "ways, how things could have turned out". These entities, I call "possible worlds". (Realistic interpretation possible worlds.) PutnamVsLewis: "way" does not necessarily need to be interpreted as a different world. III 177 Possible Worlds/David Lewis: we already know what our world is all about, other worlds are things of the same kind, which do not differ in kind, but only by the processes that take place in them. We call our world, therefore the real world, because it is the world in which we live. Possible world/PutnamVsLewis: a possible "way" of world development could also be perceived as a property, not as a different world. This property could be (no matter how complicated) a feature that could correspond to the whole world. Possible World/PutnamVsLewis: if a "way of possible world development" would be a property (a "state description" of the whole world), and the Eiffel Tower would have a different height, then the property "is a world in which the Eiffel Tower is 150 meters high" must follow from the property that the Eiffel tower in our world is not 150 meters high. Lewis: claims, properties would have to be something simple, and the statement that a property follows from another, boils down to the assertion that there is a necessary relationship between various simple ones, and that is, as Lewis says, "incomprehensible". So the properties would have to be in turn interpreted as complexes. But Lewis is unable to see in how far properties could be complexes, because of what should they be made? III 178 PutnamVsLewis: Lewis has not answered here in the "analytical" style. He did not say normal things. I have no idea what is going on with the intuitive ideas claimed by Lewis, why something works intuitively and something else works incomprehensible. The argument that something simple cannot enter a relationship, is according to my impression far from possessing practical or spiritual significance. I find these intuitive ideas not only alien; I even feel I do not understand what it means. --- Putnam I (g) 187 Counterfactual conditionals/unreal conditionals/Lewis: Suggestion: analyze "cause" based on unreal conditional sentences: "If A had not happened, B would not have happened". Counterfactual conditional/PutnamVsLewis: there are situations in which it is simply not true that B would not have happened if A had not happened. I (g) 201 E.g. B could have been caused by another cause. E.g. Identical twins: it is so that both always have the same hair color. But the hair of one is not the cause of the other. Lewis cannot separate this. Counterfactual conditionals/unreal conditionals/truth conditions/Lewis/Stalnaker: Lewis follows Stalnaker and provides truth condition for unreal conditional clauses: for this he needs possible worlds and a similarity measure. Definition truth condition/Lewis: "If X would have happened, Y would have happened" is true if and only if Y, in all closest worlds where X is the case, is really true. PutnamVsLewis: an ontology, which requires parallel and possible worlds, is at least not a materialistic ontology. Besides it also sounds pretty much like science fiction. I (g) 188/189 The notion of an intrinsic similarity measure, i.e. a measure that is sensitive to the fact of what we deem relevant or normal, is again in such a way that the world is like a ghost or impregnated with something like reason. This then requires a metaphysical explanation and is therefore idealism. And objective idealism can hardly be "a bit true". "It is all physics, except that there is that similarity measure makes simply no sense. I (g) 189 Identity/nature/essence/Lewis: Proposal: the aggregation of molecules and "I" are identical for a period of time, similar to Highway 2 and Highway 16, which are identical for some time. VsLewis: but not every property of aggregation is a property of mine. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Maxwell J.C. | Cartwright Vs Maxwell J.C. | I 4 Explanation/Truth/van Fraassen/Cartwright: provocative question: (The Scientific Image): "What has explanatory power to do with truth?" Challenge/Fraassen: it is to be shown that if x explains y and y is true, then x should also be true. Cartwright: this may well apply to the case of causal explanations, but only then! I 5 And this kind of declaration only applies when the process is taking place! E.g. Radiometer: (closed glass container with windmill wings, one side black, one white, William Crookes 1853). When light falls onto the container, the blades rotate. Thesis 1: light pressure. (Vs: this proved to be insufficient). Thesis 2: rotation caused by movement of the gas molecules in the container. MaxwellVs: the molecules move in all directions. Solution/Maxwell: instead: different heat levels produced disordered (tangential) pull that let the gas move along the surface. (...). I 6 CartwrightVsMaxwell: he uses the Boltzmann equation and the continuity equation as a fundamental laws, both of which I do not believe. I 154 CartwrightVsMaxwell: the medium that he describes is merely a model, it does not exist anywhere in a radiometer. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Mereology | Verschiedene Vs Mereology | Schwarz I 34 Temporal Parts/Mereology/Schwarz: but if you accept aggregates from Socrates and the Eiffel Tower, you could still deny that Socrates itself has temporal parts. Lewis: does not even claim that necessarily everything that exists over time consists of temporal parts (1986f(1),x,1986e(2),205,1994(3) §1) VsStowe: temporal parts should not provide an analysis of temporal existence. Lewis: (1083d(4),76,similar to Armstrong 1980(5),76): Example: one child, Frieda1 suddenly disappears, while another child, Frieda2 suddenly appears. This may contradict the laws of nature, but it is logically possible. Schw I 35 Maybe nobody notices anything. And there would be nothing to notice. Vs: that is not convincing. Endurantism Vs: cannot accept the premises at all. van InwagenVs: Frieda1 and Frieda2 cannot exist in such a row and yet remain different. (2000(6),398) Schwarz I 36 Thing/EndurantismVsLewis/VsMereology: the objects are not the mereological sum of their parts, because the sum and the parts exist even if the things themselves do not exist (e.g. if they are disassembled or broken). Vs: then the term "part" is not used exactly. The scattered parts are then no longer parts, because the (disassembled) bicycle does not exist at that time. Solution/Lewis: Part of the bicycle is only a past temporal part of the gearshift. Personal identity, temporal identity: we too are not identical with any aggregate of molecules, because we constantly exchange many of them with the metabolism. (1988b(7), 195). 1. David Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 3. David Lewis [1994a]: “Humean Supervenience Debugged”. Mind, 103: 473–490. 4. David Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 5. David Armstrong [1980]: “Identity Through Time”. In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause, Dordrecht: Reidel 6. Peter van Inwagen [2000]: “Temporal Parts and Identity across Time”. The Monist , 83: 437–459. 7. David Lewis [1988b]: “Rearrangement of Particles: Reply to Lowe”. Analysis, 48: 65–72 |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Nagel, Th. | Searle Vs Nagel, Th. | I 120 Thomas Nagel/Searle: presented in his works very powerful arguments against the possibility of any solution to the mind/body problem. His argumentation: We currently have not the conceptual means to even imagine a solution. And from the following reason: Causal explanations in the natural sciences play a certain causal necessity. >Mind body problem. I 121 E.g. the behavior of molecules, that cause the being liquid of water: the molecular theory not only shows that systems will be liquid under certain conditions; it does more because it also shows why the system must be in a liquid state. Scientific explanations imply necessity, and necessity implies the unimaginable to the contrary. Nagel: but we cannot reach this type of need in the case of the relationship between matter and consciousness. No theory could explain why pain is a necessary consequence of certain types of neural firings. We can at any time introduce a situation in which the neurophysiological events have no such consequences. We can just imagine the opposite. Therefore, not a necessity. Nagel draws the desperate conclusion that our conceptual equipment would require an overhaul. SearleVsNagel: this argument does not persuade me. Thus, for example, gravitation is explained by the gravitational attraction law, but it is by this not explained to us why bodies must exert gravitational force. I 123 We create us an image of the need that is based on our subjectivity, but we cannot in the same way create an image of the need of the relationship between subjectivity and neurophysiological phenomena, because then we have already stepped out of subjectivity. Example Supposed, supposed, God or any machine could detect causally necessary relations just like that; then there would be no difference for God or for the machine between matter/matter need forms and matter/mind need forms. And again, even if we admit that we are not out of both sides of the relationship between consciousness and its and can create an image in such a way as we can of the relationship between liquid and molecular motion, so we could still go indirectly to the causal relations. I 124 We may someday after all arrive at a theory that provides a causal explanation of consciousness. >Consciousness/Searle. Nagel has not proven the insolubility of the problem. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Place, U.T. | Searle Vs Place, U.T. | I 287 Note: occasionally my views are not accepted due to a misguided conception of the relationship between cause and identity: so writes PlaceVsSearle: (Place 1988(1)): "According to Searle states of mind are both identical with, and causally dependent on the corresponding brain states. I say: you cannot have it both ways. Either they are identical or there is a causal relationship between them." SearleVsPlace: he is thinking of cases such as the following: e.g. these footprints may causally depend on the shoes of the intruder; but they cannot at the same time be identical to these shoes. But how about this one: e.g. the liquid state in which the water is there, may be causally dependent on the behavior of the molecules; and it can also be a property of the system, which consists of these molecules. There is something going very well. And so my present state of consciousness may be caused by the behavior of the neurons in my brain. This condition itself is simply a higher-level property of my brain. You can after all have both. Cf. >causality/Place. 1. U. T. Place,Thirty Years On “Is Consciousness Still a Brain Process?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66, 208-219 |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 |
| Positivism | Putnam Vs Positivism | Fraassen I 83 Conjunction/theory/science/unified science/Fraassen: Problem: "conjunction-objection" (first probably by Putnam): a conjunction of theories must receive truth, but not empirical adequacy. Fraassen I 222 FN 5 Conjunction/theories/Putnam: his "conjunction-objection" was an argument for that there is no positivist substitute for the notion of truth. (Reference and understanding, 1978). In another context: Putnam: This argument states that an approach that says that what we are looking for is a kind of acceptability, without the property of deductive unity (deductive closure) to not meet the standards of scientific practice. Fraassen I 83 Two incompatible theories can each be empirically adequate for themselves. Putnam: this is what the anti-realism needs to take. Fraassen: it depends on a logical point with regard to truth and adequacy, which needs to be clarified: Problem: in the scientific practice the conjunction of two believed (accepted) theories does not need to be believed (accepted). E.g. the Bohr-Sommerfeld theory. Fraassen I 84 could not be put in accordance with the special theory of relativity (SR). One is a correction of the other. Conjunction/logic: of theories. A theory is a corpus of sentences. Each assertion (statement) A can be regarded as little theory, and there is a family of models F(A) in which A is true. F(T): the family of models in which the theory T is true, consists of precisely these models that exist to F(A) for every statement A, which are part of T. Definition logic/Fraassen: is the study of the functions that lead from statement (premises) to statements (conclusions) and receive truth. Truth/theory/Fraassen: because of the intimate relationship between the truth of a theory and the truth of their sentences, the sentence logic, which we all love, leads to a logic of theories. Truth/Fraassen: is (as opposed to empirical adequacy) no global property of theories ((s) not all sentences must be true. Question: But has the theory as a whole to be empirically adequate?). Empirical adequacy/Fraassen: contrast is (unlike truth) a global property of theories. That is, there is no general pattern of statements (statements) so that when all statements (propositions) of the theory each have this characteristic in themselves, then the theory is empirically adequate. This can only be explained by the fact that theories are families of models, of which each has a particular family of substructures that correspond to possible phenomena (empirical substructures). Problem: because empirical meaning (empirical import) of a theory cannot be syntactically isolated, we need to define empirical adequacy directly without empirical detour. Empirical adequacy/Fraassen. Therefore, it makes no sense to ask about the empirical adequacy of individual statements, or about a logic of syntactical features of premises to conclusions that include empirical adequacy. Empirical adequacy/Fraassen: from a single statement it can only be determined in relation to a theory: contains F(A) at least one of the models, Fraassen I 85 which has this privileged status in the world? Problem: unlike with the truth, here the answer "yes" can be in relation to a theory and "no" in relation to another theory. --- Putnam I (a) 46 PutnamVsPositivism: one can easily construct a positivist theory that leads to successful predictions that no scientist could accept. --- I (c) 78 RealismVsPositivism: must leave it unexplained, that "electron calculi", "spacetime calculi" and "DNA calculi" correctly predict observable phenomena when there are no electrons, curved spacetime and no DNA molecules in reality. I (c) 79 The positivist has as a reply reductionist theories and theories of explanation, etc. --- I (h) 215 Truth/Positivism: what definition of "degree of confirmation" one accepts, is ultimately conventional, a question of purpose. I (h) 216 Ultimately, then, it is completely subjective. ((s) But not yet, when purposes are social). PutnamVsPositivism: so it ends as relativism. He can only avoid deductive inconsistency by agreeing that judgements are not rational. He has no response to the philosopher who says: VsPositivism: "I know what you mean, but positivism is not rational in my system." |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Putnam, H. | Rorty Vs Putnam, H. | McDowell I 175 Coherence Theory/Rorty pro Davidson: Beliefs: can a) be seen from the outside, perspective of the field researcher, causal interactions with the surroundings - b) from the inside, from the perspective of the natives, as rules of action. The inside view is normative, in the space of reasons. RortyVsPutnam: he attempts to somehow think this together. >Exterior/interior, Coherence Theory. McDowell I 178 RortyVsPutnam: By an "explanation of X" Putnam still understands a synopsis, the synthesis of external and internal position. Representatives of >disquotation believe that people could only be described in a behavioral manner. But why should it be impossible to consider supplements by normative representations? (Putnam's philosophy was ultimately traditional). Causality/Putnam: the desire to tell a story about the causal relationships of human pronouncements and environment does not rule out that a story is invented according to which the speakers express thoughts and make assertions, and try not to make mistakes. But these stories may then be indistinguishable! (PutnamVsRorty) Rorty Thesis: from a causal standpoint we cannot subdue our beliefs to standards of investigation. >Causality/Putnam, >Causality/Rorty. Rorty I 304 RortyVsPutnam: he provokes a pseudo-controversy between an "idealistic" and realistic theory of meaning. I 307 Putnam/Rorty: follows 3 thoughts: 1) against the construction of 'true' as synonymous with 'justified assertibility' (or any other "soft" concept to do with justification). This is to show that only a theory of the relationship between words and the world can give a satisfactory meaning of the concept of truth. 2) a certain type of sociological facts requires explanation: the reliability of normal methods of scientific research, the usefulness of our language as a means, and that these facts can be explained only on the basis of realism. 3) only the realist can avoid the inference from "many of the terms of the past did not refer" to "it is very likely that none of the terms used today refers". >Reference/Putnam. I 308 RortyVsPutnam: that is similar to the arguments of Moore against all attempts to define "good": "true, but not assertible" with reason" makes just as much sense as "good, but not conducive to the greatest happiness". I 312 Theoretical Terms/TT/Reference/Putnam/Rorty. We must prevent the disastrous consequence that no theoretical term refers to anything (argument 3), see above). What if we accepted a theory according to which electrons are like phlogiston? We would have to say that electrons do not exist in reality. What if this happened all the time? Of course, such a conclusion must be blocked. Granted desideratum of reference theory. I 313 RortyVsPutnam: puzzling for two reasons: 1) unclear from which philosophical standpoint it could be shown that the revolutionary transformation of science has come to an end. 2) even if there were such a standpoint, it remains unclear how the theory of reference could ever provide it. I 314 In a pre-theoretical sense we know very well that they have referred to such things. They all tried to cope with the same universe. I 315 Rorty: We should perhaps rather regard the function of an expression as "picking of entities" than as "description of reality". We could just represent things from the winning perspective in a way that even the most primitive animists talked about the movement of molecules and genes. This does not appease the skeptic who thinks that perhaps there are no molecules, but on the other hand it will also be unable to make a discovery about the relations between words and the world. Reference/Rorty: Dilemma: either we a) need the theory of reference as a guarantor of the success of today's science, or b) the reference theory is nothing more than a decision about how to write the history of science (rather than supplying its foundation.) I 319 Reference/RortyVsPutnam/RortyVsKripke: if the concept of "really talking about" is confused with the concept of reference, we can, like Kripke and Putnam, easily get the idea that we have "intuitions" about the reference. Rorty: in my opinion, the problem does not arise. The only question of fact that exists here, relates to the existence or non-existence of certain entities that are being talked about. I 320 Fiction/Reference/RortyVsKripke/RortyVsPutnam: of course there can be no reference to fictions. This corresponds to the technical and scientific use. But then "reference" has basically nothing to do with "talking about", and only comes into play after the choice between different strategies is made. Reference is a technical term, and therefore we have no intuitions about it! Real existence issues are also not affected by the criterion of Searle and Strawson! What then is the right criterion? Rorty: there is none at all! We cannot talk about non-existent entities, but we can also find out that we have actually talked about them! Talking about X in reality and talking about a real X is not the same thing. I 324 Realism/PutnamVsPutnam/Self-Criticism/Rorty: metaphysical realism collapses at the point where it claims to be different from Peirce's realism. I.e. the assertion that there is an ideal theory. I 326 Internal Realism/Putnam/Rorty: position according to which we can explain the "mundane" fact that the use of language contributes to achieving our goals, to our satisfaction, etc. by the fact that "not language, but the speakers reflect the world, insofar as they produce a symbolic representation of their environment. (Putnam). By means of our conventions we simply represent the universe better than ever. RortyVsPutnam: that means nothing more than that we congratulate ourselves to having invented the term lithium, so that lithium stands for something for which nothing has stood all the time. I 327 The fact that based on our insights we are quite capable of dealing with the world, is true but trivial. That we reasonably reflect it is "just an image". Rorty V 21 Analytic/Synthetic/Culture/Quine/Rorty: the same arguments can also be used to finish off the anthropological distinction between the intercultural and the intra-cultural. So we also manage without the concept of a universal transcultural rationality that Putnam cites against relativists. V 22 Truth/Putnam: "the very fact that we speak of our different conceptions of rationality sets a conceptual limit, a conceptual limit of the ideal truth." RortyVsPutnam: but what can such a limit do? Except for introducing a God standpoint after all? Rorty VI 75 Idealization/Ideal/Confirmation RortyVsPutnam: I cannot see what "idealized rational acceptability" can mean other than "acceptability for an ideal community". I.e. of tolerant and educated liberals. (>Peirce: "community of researchers at the ideal end of the research"). VI 76 Peirce/Terminology: "CSP" "Conceptual System Peirce" (so called by Sellars). Idealization/Ideal/Confirmation/RortyVsPutnam: since forbids himself to reproduce the step of Williams back to approaching a single correct result, he has no way to go this step a la Peirce! VI 79 Human/Society/Good/Bad/Rorty: "we ourselves with our standards" does not mean "we, whether we are Nazis or not", but something like "language users who, by our knowledge, are improved remakes of ourselves." We have gone through a development process that we accept as rational persuasion. VI 80 This includes the prevention of brainwashing and friendly toleration of troublemakers à la Socrates and rogues à la Feyerabend. Does that mean we should keep the possibility of persuasion by Nazis open? Yes, it does, but it is no more dangerous than the possibility to return to the Ptolemaic worldview! PutnamVsRorty: "cope better" is not a concept according to which there are better or worse standards, ... it is an internal property of our image of justification, that a justification is independent of the majority ... (Rorty: I cannot remember having ever said that justification depends on a majority.) RortyVsPutnam: "better" in terms of "us at our best" less problematic than in terms of "idealized rational acceptability". Let's try a few new ways of thinking. VI 82 Putnam: what is "bad" supposed to mean here, except in regard to a failed metaphysical image? VI 87 Truth/Putnam: we cannot get around the fact that there is some sort of truth, some kind of accuracy, that has substance, and not merely owes to "disquotation"! This means that the normative cannot be eliminated. Putnam: this accuracy cannot apply only for a time and a place (RortyVsPutnam). VI 90 Ratio/Putnam: the ratio cannot be naturalized. RortyVsPutnam: this is ambiguous: on the one hand trivial, on the other hand, it is wrong to say that the Darwinian view leaves a gap in the causal fabric. Ratio/Putnam: it is both transcendent and immanent. (Rorty pro, but different sense of "transcendent": going beyond our practice today). RortyVsPutnam: confuses the possibility that the future transcends the present, with the need for eternity to transcend time. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Brandom Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 577 E.g. Gavagai: sentences are the smallest units that can make a move in the language game. Therefore, there remains a margin for dividing the responsibility between the subsentential linguistic units. I 578 BrandomVsQuine: sentences about rabbit parts predict pruned properties, namely by reference to the merged objects to which they belong!. If you want to use singular terms for parts, there must be predications of them which they do not only address through the entities in which they occur. I 579 Some symmetrical SMSICs must be essential for the use of sentences as translated ones - allow substitutions from one rabbit-part term to another - and exist on a finer distinction than that they belong to the same entitiy. If "Gavagai" is to be a real sortal, then language must be able to individuate objects which it sorts. There must be a concept of "the same Gavagai". (In derived scheme). The native language cannot have expressions for rabbit molecules without absurd pullups. I 580 VsQuine: because no natural language can be non-autonomous to that effect - only an artificial language whose use is established in a richer metalanguage can be that - the way towards a non-circumstantial translation is preferable. Unqualified proposal for solution: "re-individuating translations": speaking of "integral parts of rabbit" instead of talking about rabbits, or even coarser individuations: "Rabbitness": not enough. BrandomVsQuine: here it comes to the accuracy of inferences, not to Quine’s dire basis of superficial stimuli. I 601 Gavagai: how do you decide whether the rabbit fly or a flash of the bright stub tail triggers the expression? You cannot know, the RDRDs and the corresponding causal chains do not matter, but their inferential role. It can, for example, specify whether it is about something flying or something flashing. I 666 BrandomVsQuine: fluctuates constantly whether his "networks of beliefs" or "general theories" are of an individual or communal nature. Therefore, it is not clear whether he sees our communication in general from this perspective. II 217/218 The significance of a belief depends on what else one convinced of. (Holism). II 224 BrandomVsQuine: but then two interlocutors refer to different things if they have different beliefs. (With the same utterances). So it is not clear how the communication can be made understandable as a matter of sharing of meanings. BrandomVsQuine: stuck too much to his dislike of singular terms, grappling with the question of when the "exportation" is legitimate. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Reductionism | Quine Vs Reductionism | Davidson I 89 QuineVsreductionism: Quine appeals to today’s science as the best theory of our world. The irritations of our sense organs are the only evidence of "operations in their environment." Of course, this is not reductionism. Davidson II 130 2nd Dogma: reductionism: the view that every meaningful statement is equivalent to a logical construction of terms which refer to immediate experience. Quine IV 412 Def Reductionism (radical form)/Quine: according to him, every single meaningful expression is translatable into an expression about immediate experience. QuineVsReductionism: radical form: false translatability of individual observations into individual expressions. >HolismVs. weaker form: continued idea: a particular area of sensory irritation is clearly assigned to any (synthetic) statement. (Falsely). Vs: responses to sensory stimuli are not rigid in humans. Rorty I 241 QuineVsReductionism/Rorty: before Quine theorists made a significant contribution to the unification of science. After Quine's attacks on the concept of meaning there is the need to replace functional descriptions of theoretical entities with structural descriptions. (speaking of DNA molecules instead of genes). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Representation | Dennett Vs Representation | II 50 Intentionality / Dennett: designates in a philosophical sense simply the "why". Something is intentional, when it comes to anything else in his abilities. One might say: There must be a representation of something else in the game. DennettVs: this is problematic: e.g. should we say the lock contains a "representation" of the key? (This also applies to molecules that fit into each other). |
Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Searle, J.R. | Dennett Vs Searle, J.R. | I 282 Intentionality/Darwin/Dennett: Darwin turns it all around: intentionality is secured from bottom to top. The first meaning was not a fully developed meaning, it certainly does not show all ’essential’ properties (whatever they may be). "Quasi-meaning", half semantics. I 555 SearleVsDennett: "as-if intentionality". Intentionality/DennettVsSearle: But you have to start somewhere (if you want to avoid metaphysics). The first step in the right direction is hardly recognizable as a step towards meaning. SearleVsArtificial Intelligence: Computers only possess "as-if intentionality". DennettVsSearle: then he has a problem. While AI says we are composed of machines, Darwinism says we are descended from machines!. I 557 You can hardly refuse the first if you agree with the second statement. How can something that has emerged from machines be anything other than a much, much more sophisticated machine?. Function/Searle: (according to Dennett): Only products that have been produced by a real human consciousness have a function ((s)> objet ambigu, Valéry). DennettVsSearle: I.e. the wings of the aircraft, but not the wings of the eagle serve for flying!. I 558 Intentionality/SearleVsDennett: cannot be achieved by the composition of machines or the ever better structure of algorithms. I 569 DennettVsSearle: this is the belief in sky hooks: the mind is not supposed to emerge, it is not created, but only (inexplicable) source of creation. Intention/DennettVsSearle: (E.g. Vending Machine): Those who select its new function perhaps do not even formulate any new intention. They only fall into the habit of relying on the new useful function. They do not perceive that they carry out an act of unconscious exaptation. Parallel: >Darwin: There is an unconscious selection of properties in pets. II 73 Searle: In the case of the artifact the creator must always be asked. Intrinsic (original) intentionality/DennettVsSearle: is metaphysical, an illusion. As if the "author would need to have a more original intention". Dennett: but there is no task for that. The hypothetical robot would be equally capable of transfering derived intentionality to other artifacts. Intentionality/DennettVsSearle: there certainly used to be coarser forms of intentionality (Searle contemptuously "mere as-if intentionality"). Dennett: they serve both as a temporal precursors as well as current components. We are descended from robots and consist of robots (DNA, macromolecules). All intentionality we enjoy is derived from the more fundamental intentionality of these billions of systems. |
Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Searle, J.R. | Poundstone Vs Searle, J.R. | I 350 Chinese Room/Searle/Poundstone: Variant: E.g. book: "What to do if a text in Chinese is slipped under your door." The room is exhibited at fairs. It is claimed that there was a pig in the room that speaks Chinese. People assume that in reality a Chinese is locked in the room (this variant also expresses the belief in the behavior). I 351 PoundstoneVsSearle: Problem: feasibility of the thought experiment. The algorithm must include commmon knowledge. I 352 It must be able to answer questions like those from the short story: e.g. a guest gets scorched food. Furious, he leaves the restaurant without paying. Question: did he eat the food? E.g. "What's the red stuff called that some people put on their fries?" Here, the answer is not included in the question. And perhaps there is no Chinese word for ketchup. SearleVsTuring: the Turing test is not very insightful, therefore Chinese Room. A computer that behaved exactly like a human would be situation a sensation, no matter if he possessed consciousness or not. I 353 Searle: Surprising position: the brain is indeed something like a computer, but consciousness has something to do with the biological and neurological structure. A computer made of wires would therefore not make the experience of his own consciousness. And yet, it could pass the Turing test! Artificial Intelligence/AI/Searle: compares it with photosynthesis: a computer program could create a detailed realistic illustration of photosynthesis, but it would not produce sugar! It would only deliver images of chlorophyll molecules on the screen. I 354 VsSearle/Chinese Room: a book with the algorithm "What to do if a text in Chinese is slipped under your door" cannot exist: it would have to be larger than the largest libraries in the world. We could depart from Davis' office simulation. E.g. the brain contains about 100 billion neurons. If every human drew 20 strings, all of humanity could simulate a single brain. I 355 But no one would know what thoughts are going on! Consciousness/Searle: his followers resort to the distinction "syntactic/semantic". Semantic understanding seems essential for consciousness. I 356 Meaning/PoundstoneVsSearle: VsSemantic Understanding E.g. you were ill on the first day of school and missed the lesson in which numbers were introduced. Later you never dared to ask, what numbers are. In spite of that, you can do maths quite passably. At the bottom of your heart, you have the feeling of being an impostor. In fact, actually we all do not know what numbers are. I 357 Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde: Ex Chinese Room: Suppose that, due to brain damage, the person does not know that they speak Chinese. We all have many skills of which we know virtually nothing. (Involuntary muscle movements, metabolism). I 358 Chinese Room/"System Response": the person himself does not speak Chinese, but the overall system: Person, plus room, plus manual, plus time, plus paper and pencil fulfill the condition. I 359 SearleVsSystem Response: We tear down the walls and let the person learn the manual by heart. Does he speak Chinese? PoundstoneVsSearle/Thought Experiments: the risk with thought experiments is their convenience. One must make reassure oneself that the reason of only imagining the experiment is no reason that makes the experiment altogether impossible. Here: the manual would be to extensive to be written at all, let alone to be learned by heart. ((S) VsPoundstone: could construct a simpler example which is about fewer rules.) I 364 Chinese Room/Poundstone: the room is not only extremely enlarged spatially but also timely. The person could also be a robot, that does not matter. I 365 Consciousness/Hofstadter: E.g. conversation with Einstein's brain: book with answers that simulate exactly what Einstein would have said. Two levels that must be separated: the book and the user! Of course, the book itself has no consciousness! Here, some hair-splitting questions about the "mortality" of Searles room arise: suppose the user goes on a 5-weeks holiday, is the book called "Einstein" dead in meantime? I 366 The book itself could not notice the interruption. Variant: if the pace of work was reduced to one question per year, would that be enough to keep the book "alive"? Time/Poundstone: we could not find that time had stopped if it did. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
| Sellars, W. | Verschiedene Vs Sellars, W. | Rorty I 206 Language/Sellars/Rorty: the peculiarity of language is not that it "changes the quality of our experience" or "opens up new perspectives for consciousness". Rather, its acquisition gives us access to a community whose members justify their claims to each other. I 207 Language/VsSellars: some opponents argue that this is a confusion of terms and words. That having a term and using of a word is one and the same fact in psychological nominalism. I 208 SellarsVsVs: could answer here: either you admit to everything and everyone (e.g. record players) that you are able to react distinctively to certain kinds of objects, or you give an explanation why you want to draw the line between conceptual thinking and its primitive precursor in a place other than between the acquired language and the learning process still in progress. This makes it clear that the: Tradition: (Myth of the Given): has thrown two things together: sensations and differentiation abilities. Sellars I 34 Logical Atomism: VsSellars: he could reply that Sellars 1. overlooks the fact that the logical space of physical objects in space and time is based on the logical space of sensory content. 2. the concepts of sense contents show that logical independence from each other which is characteristic for traditional empiricism. I 34/25 3. Terms for theoretical entities such as molecules have the interdependence that Sellars may rightly have attributed to terms for physical facts, but: the theoretical terms have empirical content precisely because they are based on a more fundamental logical space! Sellars would have to show that this space is also loaded with coherence, but he cannot do that until he has abolished the idea of a more fundamental logical space than that of physical objects in space and time. Sense Data TheoryVsSellars:( > I 103) the individual objects are found in the cosmos of everyday language. Physical redness can be analyzed on the basis of red glow, but red glow must be analyzed on the basis of red sensory content. (SellarsVs). But why should the properties of physical objects not be broken down directly into the properties and phenomenal relationships of sensory content? Sellars: admitted. I 35 SellarsVsSense Data Theory: how does the sensory data theorist get to the system of sensory content? Even if red glow does not play a role in the analysis of physical redness, he hopes to convince us of this system by asking us to think about the experience of red glow of something. But so far my analysis has not even brought to light such things as sensory content! I 36 Glowing/Appear/Sense Data/Sellars: there can be no dispositional analysis of physical redness on the basis of red glow. We have to distinguish between qualitative and existential glowing. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Sellars, W. | Cartwright Vs Sellars, W. | I 157 Explanation/Realism/Physics/Mary Hesse: Paradigm: billiard ball model for the kinetic theory of gases. Thesis: the molecules in the gas share certain properties with the billiard balls. Model/Hesse: There are positive, negative and neutral analogies between objects in the model and the modeled objects (the objects in reality). SellarsVsHesse: the analogy takes place at a higher level: the relations between the properties are analogous, not the properties themselves! (DF level). E.g. the helium-neon laser and a real triode oscillator have no properties in common. Correct: their properties behave in a similar way, so that they can be described by the same van-der-Pol equation. I 58 CartwrightVsSellars: the generality and universality is only an illusion. Causes/Composition/Mill/Cartwright: I use Mills expression of "Composition of Causes" (A System of Logic, NY 1893, Book III, Chapter 6). |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Structuralism | Mayr Vs Structuralism | V 371 Structuralism: teleological, antiselectionist. Recognizes order, logic and rationality in biology.(MayrVs) "Organisms are created according to rational principles". Wants to avoid "historical" causes (StructuralismVsEvolution Theory). V 164 MayrVsStructuralism: each discipline must also consider the other kind of causes. For example: molecular biology: directly: a molecule fulfils a certain function in a cell, therefore it is there. Indirect: it has formed in the course of evolution and differs from homologous molecules in other organisms. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Thomas Aquinas | Smart Vs Thomas Aquinas | Fraassen I 210 Aquinas: fourth way (Fraassen: undoubtedly the most difficult, the most subtle but also the most confused): Aquinas: (based on the gradation in the things found): in the things there are better, worse and truer and less truer things, etc. But gradations are ascribed to things according to agreement with something else (namely a maximum) (>similarity, >comparisons). So there must be something that is best, truest, noblest, etc. (namely God). Most Real Thing/Aquinas: refers to Aristotle: what is greatest in truth has most reality. (FN 11) Fraassen: there is a subtle analogy here: Smart: I want to defend the image of the physicist not just as ontologically respectable, but as a more true image than the image of our everyday language. Susan StebbingVsEddington: ~ the table is who it is for us (in our everyday world). Eddington: Thesis: the truer view is that, as an aggregate of molecules, it consists largely of empty space. (FN 13). Explanation/Smart: what we need is not for micro-theory to explain a macro-theory of macro-laws to which it is linked by correspondence rules, but (with Sellars and Feyerabend) to explain why observable things obey these macro-laws. |
Smart I J. J. C. Smart Philosophy and Scientific Realism London 2013 Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Various Authors | Kripke Vs Various Authors | I 57 Kripke: It would be interesting to compare Lewis’ notions with the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics by Wheeler and Everett. I believe that this notion of physics could suffer from analog philosophical problems. KripkeVsEverett. I 77 KripkeVsBundle theory: prevalent, one version would be, e.g.: (1) for every name "X" there is a corresponding batch of "phi" properties, so that the speaker A means: "phi X". I 78 This thesis is true because it can easily be a definition! The following theses are, however, all wrong I believe. (2) A believes that one of the characteristics or some together pick out a particular individual object and only one. KripkeVs: That just means that A thinks that they are doing it. Whether he is right is a different thesis.That he is right, is another thesis. (3) When the majority or a decisive set of properties from the batch are fulfilled, then y is the referent of "X". KripkeVs: that would therefore mean that certain characteristics are more important than others. However, a theory must specify how this weighting is done.+ I 117 Ruth Barcan-Markus: Identities between names are necessary. If somebody thinks that Cicero and Tullius are identical, and actually uses the two as a name, then it is thereby bound to the thesis that his opinion is a necessary truth. Mark speaks of a "mere tag". QuineVsMarkus: One beautiful evening, we could give the proper name "Hesperus" to planet Venus. One day before dawn, we could give a new proper name to the same planet, this time "Phosphorus". If we discover that it was the same planet twice, then our discovery is an empirical one. And not because the proper names were descriptions. III 413 Ontology/Kripke: thanks to Tarski and the difficult convention T our discourse is committed to the existence of ships and molecules, buildings and even lemons! KierkegaardVsHegel: His philosophy is bizarre (peculiar, funny). KripkeVsWallace: dito! Why should an astronomer who found a new planet be informed that he does not have any "ontological commitments" according to the sQ? |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Vitalism | Dennett Vs Vitalism | Metz II 691 VsArtificial Consciousness/VsRobots/Dennett: Traditional ArgumentsVsArtificial Intelligence: 1) Robots are purely physical objects, while something immaterial is required for consciousness. DennettVs: That is Cartesian dualism. II 692 2) Robots are not organic, consciousness can only exist in organic brains. (Vitalism) DennettVsVitalism: Is deservedly dead, since the biochemistry showed that the properties in all organic compounds can be mechanistically reduced and therefore are also reproducible at any scale in another physical medium. 3) Robots are artifacts and only something natural, born may have consciousness. (Chauvinism of origin). DennettVsChauvinism of Origin/Forgery/Dennett: II 694 E.g. A fake cheap wine can also be a good wine if experts consider it good. E.g. A fake Cézanne is also a good picture, if "experts" consider it good. Dennett: but these distinctions represent a dangerous nonsense if they refer to alleged "intrinsic properties". (That means that the molecules would still needed the consecrations of a befitting birth; that would be racism). (By the way, the robot COG passes through a childhood period of learning). Forgery/Dennett: Whether a fake is produced artificially atom by atom, (but in the same molecule compounds) may have legal consequences with respect to a clone that does not deserve the same punishment. II 695 Dennett: E.g. The movie "Schindler’s List" could in principle be produced artificially through computer animation, because it only consists of two-dimensional gray tones on the screen. II 696 4) Robots will always be too simple to have consciousness. Dennett: this is the only acceptable argument, even if we try to refute it. The human body consists of trillions of individual parts. But wherever one looks, one discovers functional similarities at higher levels that allow us to replace hellishly complex modules with relatively simple ones. II 697 There is no reason to believe that any part of the brain could not be substituted. Robots/Dennett: Robot enthusiasts who believe it is easy to construct a conscious robot reveal an infantile understanding of the real world with the intricacies of consciousness. |
Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Vollmer, G. | Kant Vs Vollmer, G. | I 206 KantiansVsEvolutionary epistemology/EE/KantianismVsEvolutionary epistemology/Vollmer: if Kant is right, the limits of factual knowledge coincide with the limits of sensory experience. Now, if the evolutionary epistemology detects a match with the reality, how can it claim to know what the objective reality truly is? I 207 VollmerVsKantians: This transcendental argument is wrong. The earth seems to be stationary, yet it moves. The space seems Euclidean, but it is not. Therefore, our knowledge goes beyond the perception via our senses. According to Kant, quarks, elementary particles, atoms, molecules, electromagnetic fields, neutron stars, black holes, quasars, etc. should never be objects of empirical science since they cannot be seen. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 |
| Wittgenstein | Dennett Vs Wittgenstein | II 103 WittgensteinVsVollmer: you cannot say that my knowledge of the evolution is a result of evolution II 30 (DennettVsWittgenstein: gradually emerged (> robots, molecules). DennettVsWittgenstein: if a lion could talk, we would understand it quite well - with the usual trouble that a decent translation between different languages requires. But in conversations with it we would learn virtually nothing about the mind of normal lions, because its mind equipped language would be completely different. Pro Wittgenstein: in any case, we should not assume that the mind of the speechless animals is like ours. |
Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 theses of the more related field of specialization.
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| Analogy | Cartwright, N. | I 157 Explanation/Realism/Physics/Mary Hesse: Paradigm: Billiard ball model for kinetic gas theory. Thesis: the molecules in the gas share certain properties with the billiard balls. Model/Hesse: there are positive, negative and neutral analogies between the objects in the model and the modelled objects (the objects in reality). SellarsVsHesse: the analogy takes place on a higher level: the relations between the properties are analog, not the properties themselves! For example, the helium-neon laser and a real triode oscillator have no properties in common. Correct: their properties behave in a similar way, so they can be described with the same Van-Der-Pol-Equation. CartwrightVsSellars: the generality and exceptionlessness is only appearance. |
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| Quantity | Cartwright, N. | I 128 Quantity/Cartwright: early: Thesis: in nature there are no quantities at all, no attributes with exact numerical values that could be said to be equal or unequal to each other. Nevertheless, matter is certainly composed of real atoms, molecules, etc. with specific masses, spins, charges, etc.. I said then that these processes were qualitative because our knowledge of them cannot be expressed in simple quantitative equations. CartwrightVsCartwright: (self-criticism) later: this distinction was not between quantity and quality, but between the narrow mathematical equations of theory and the intricate descriptions with which we must express our knowledge of what happens in real systems. |
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| Intentionality | Dennett, D. | I 281 Meaning/Dennett: Origin, birth of meaning: thesis: the nucleotide sequences, at first purely syntactic, assume "semantics". "Quasi meaning": e.g. mode of action of macromolecules - SearleVsDennett: only as-if-intentionality. DennettVsSearle: you have to start somewhere. But the first steps are not to be recognized as steps towards meaning. I 282 We also have parts that have only half-intentionality. II 147 Person/Intentionality/Dennett: Thesis: Becoming a person is the transition from a system of 1st order (beliefs and desires, but not about beliefs and desires) to a 2nd order intentional system (beliefs about own and foreign beliefs). Intentional 3rd order system: is able to want someone to believe it wants something. |
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| Correctness | Dennett, D. | ad I 279 Distinction true/false/Dennett/(s): has come into the world only with the reproduction (of molecules). |
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| Statistical Mechanics | Feynman, R. | I 557 Statistical Mechanics/Feynman: this is about systems that are in (thermal) equilibrium. Thesis: all properties of matter can be explained by the motion of their parts. New: here we are talking about the position of the atoms, how many are at different positions in thermal equilibrium? 1 How are they distributed when forces act on them? 2. How are they distributed with respect to their velocities? N.B.: 1. The two questions are completely independent of each other. 2. The distribution of the speeds is always the same. (See above): the mean K.E per degree of freedom 1/2 kT is independent of the forces acting on the molecules and thus the velocity distribution is also independent of the forces, because the frequency of collisions does not depend on the forces. I 573 Statistical mechanics: thesis: If a given system is in thermal equilibrium at any temperature, it will also be in thermal equilibrium with any other things of the same temperature! |
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| Cross World Identity | Kripke, S.A. | Staln I 139 Cross-world identity / Kripke / Stalnaker: E.g. Kripke (1972, 50-1) would the table T exist in the actual world as the same (identical), if its constituent molecules would have been distributed a little bit differently by a change in the past ? Indefinite cross-world identity / Kripke: in such cases, the answer may be indeterminate. I 140 Stalnaker: the local indeterminacy is in fact one of the reference, not the identity. |
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| Consciousness | Searle, J.R. | I 9 Searle Thesis: Consciousness and intentionality are intrinsic and cannot be eliminated by anything. I 28 Searle Thesis: according to neurophysiological research, the brain causes certain "mental" phenomena, such as conscious states of mind, and these are simply higher-level characteristics of the brain. Consciousness is a higher-level or emergent characteristic of the brain. Thesis: Consciousness is a mental (higher level) property of the brain in the sense that fluid is a higher level property of a system of molecules. It does not follow from the fact that something is mental that it is not physical. I 104 Searle Thesis: I will claim that consciousness is simply an ordinary biological feature of the world, but I will also try to show why we find it almost literally unimaginable that this is the case. I 125 Searle: Thesis: 1. Consciousness is not a "substance", it is a characteristic or property of the brain in the sense that fluidity is a characteristic of water. 2. Consciousness is not recognized by introspection. I 126 The introspection model requires that a distinction be made between the act of inspection and the object. 3. There is just as little a "connection" between consciousness and brain as there is a connection between being liquid of water and molecules. If a consciousness is a higher level characteristic of the brain, then there is no question of connection at all. I 126 Searle Thesis: my approach in the philosophy of mind: the biological naturalism. I 128 Thesis: Consciousness gives us much greater discernment than unconscious mechanisms. |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Reality | Eddington, A. | Fraassen IV 210 Eddington: the truer view is that the table seen as an aggregate of molecules consists mostly of empty space. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
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