Dictionary of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute

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The author or concept searched is found in the following 11 entries.

Disputed term/author/ism	Author	Entry	Reference
Being a Bat	Chalmers	I 236 Bat Example/Nagel/Chalmers: equipped with the approach of Crick and Koch⁽¹⁾, we may get even more insight into how it is to be a bat. Functional organization can tell us something about the kind of information a bat has access to. The distinctions which it is capable of making, and thus also classifications of the most prominent things in its field of perception. Bat/Chalmers: this of course shows nothing about the intrinsic nature of the experiences of bats, but Akins (1993)⁽²⁾ can add something to this. Chalmers: Cheney/Seyfarth (1990)⁽³⁾ How Monkeys See the World tries to answer such questions about bats by puting us into the mind of other species. Cf. >Hetero-phenomenology. I 295 Bat Example/Chalmers: Why should not we suppose there is a way for a thermostat of "How it is to be a thermostat"? Cf. >Thermostat example, cf. >Fuel gauge. I 296 Such an "experience" could occur like a lightning and completely without concept. >Experience, >Knowing how. I 298 For the thermostat, there is a canonical information space, and so we can say he has the canonical experiences of a thermostat. I 299 The experiences of a thermostat can be called proto-phanomenal. >Protophenomena. 1. F. H. C. Crick and C. Koch, Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness. Seminars in the Neurosciences 2, 1990: pp. 263-75 2. K. Akins, What is it like to be boring and myopic? In B. Dahlbom (ed) Dennett and His Critics, Oxford 1993. 3. D. L. Cheney and R. M. Seyfarth, How Monkeys See the World, Chicago 1990.	Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Learning	Dretske	I 220 Learning/Behavior/Animal/Consciousness/Dretske: E.g. birds avoid certain butterflies that make them vomit. I 221 Now there are non-toxic butterflies that mimic the color of these poisonous. Now we can ask: why did the bird not eat it? We know why but we have to choose our words carefully: because he does not want to get sick again, but what he saw was not a disgusting insect. No recognition has taken place. The bird thinks (wrongly) that the insect tastes bad. The thought directs his behavior. Similar causal behavior as with the thermostat and the plant. So there is something inside the bird, which means (like the bimetallic strip in the thermostat) that an m-kind insect is present, and a switch is actuated. I 222 Unlike the thermostat and the plant: however, the representation for the behavior is directly relevant to the bird. >Representation/Dretske. Purpose: Is the behavior of the bird purposeful? Is the bird thinking of something? >Purposes. The meaning of the internal element is genuinely explanatory. ((s) but for us, not for the bird). Thinking/Animal/Dretske: for me this sounds sufficiently of thoughts, in order not to have to bargain what is still missing. >Animals, >Meaning/Dretske, >Thermostats. I Fred Dretske Minimale Rationalität in D.Perler/M. Wild (Hg.)Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt/M. 2005	Dretske I Fred Dretske "Minimal Rationality", in: S. L. Hurley and M. Nudds (Eds.) Rational Animals?, Oxford 2005 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dretske II F. Dretske Naturalizing the Mind Cambridge 1997
Panpsychism	Chalmers	I 297 Panpsychism/Chalmers: if we admit a thermostat experience (flashy information state changes), then perhaps there is consciousness or conscious states everywhere? Perhaps in a stone? But a stone does not correspond to a thermostat. We can say that the stone contains subsystems that are conscious. I 298 Consciousness/Chalmers: if we assume that very simple systems have very simple phenomenology, it makes it less unintelligible to accept consciousness as a unified property of the universe. Experience/Chalmers: can experiences arise in a static state? Intuitively, it seems necessary that a change of state is necessary for a system to have an experience. Proto-phanomenal: we can call the "experiences" of a thermostat proto-phenomenal. >Proto-phenomenal. I 299 Panpsychism/Chalmers: The reason why I am not referring to my thesis as panpsychism is that it is misleadingly suggested that proto-phanomenal experiences are somehow basic and complex experiences are composed of them, which I do not believe. But I call my thesis of naturalistic dualism a variant of panpsychism. >Dualism, >Dualism/Chalmers, >Property dualism, cf. >Monism.	Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Rationality	Dretske	I 213 Definition minimal rationality/Dretske: minimal rationality demands that thoughts are involved in the process, therefore, it is more demanding than: biological rationality: E.g. blinking. Minimal rationality: requires that something is done for reasons, but not that it is done for good reasons. I 215 This term keeps the normative in check. It is discarded and thus searchable. Rationality/Dretske: E.g. with a sudden movement of something towards my eyes I blink. I cannot help it. I believe that one way to get this object into my eye is to blink (suddenly close your eyes). N.B.: but although I believe this and although I close my eye, I do not close my eyes because I think this! My reasons to close them are not the reason why I close them! Although I am doing exactly from what I think it will bring me the desired, my behavior is not a purposeful action. It does not represent the "minimal rationality". Definition Minimal Rationality/Dretske: he demands that thoughts are involved in the process, therefore, it is more demanding than: biological rationality: E.g. blinking. Minimal rationality: minimal rationality demands that something is done for reasons, but not that it is done for good reasons! Nor does it require any justification. Although the behavior must be explained by a thought, it does not have to be rationalized by this idea. I 214 Not even under ideal conditions, the corresponding behavior must contribute to the ability to survive. It can even degrade them. E.g. "I am searching here under the lantern because it is brighter, although I lost the keybund somewhere else". This can be explained by what you think. I 215 E.g. terrorist: suicide bomber: to him the paradise in the hereafter with 40 virgins has been promised. Moreover, his actions are of service. Is his behavior rational? It does not increase survivability, but it is minimal rational because the behavior is explained by what the terrorist believes and wants. This term keeps the normative in check. It is discarded and thus searchable. I 216 Rationality/Dretske: If nothing of what you do is explained by what you think, then you are not a rational being, but an impostor. For example, you could say that a sprinkler system is clever because it extinguishes the fire that would otherwise destroy it (Survival!). If I did this, I would be rational, but the sprinkler system is not rational because of this! Because it is not the reason why it does it! It has no minimal rationality. When I sweat and cool myself with it, I also have no minimal rationality. The behavior is not controlled by thoughts. It may be wise to do that, but I am not wise because I do it. It is not enough that my behavior is caused by an internal representation. Difference: a) to be caused by an event that represents B. b) by the fact of being explained that it represents B. ((s) >de dicto). I 217 E.g. Thermostat: If we do what it does, keep the temperature constant in the room, we would be considered rational. The thermostat is not. The bimetallic strip has a double function: 1. it represents the room temperature, 2. it is a switch. I 218 Its behavior is not explained by thoughts it has about temperature. For example, microphone: we cannot regard it as obedient, simply because it does what we tell it. (E.g. "Vibrate fast!". Not what I say is relevant for the behavior of the microphone.) Difference: A) Causation by an event, B) Explanation by the fact that it has the meaning B. I Fred Dretske Minimale Rationalität in D.Perler/M. Wild (Hg.)Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt/M. 2005	Dretske I Fred Dretske "Minimal Rationality", in: S. L. Hurley and M. Nudds (Eds.) Rational Animals?, Oxford 2005 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dretske II F. Dretske Naturalizing the Mind Cambridge 1997
Reduction	Chalmers	I 43 Reduction/explanation/Chalmers: a reductive explanation of a phenomenon does not imply the reduction of this phenomenon to something else. >Phenomena, >Experience. Explanation: it does not mean identification with something else, especially not with something on a lower level. >Levels/order, >Description Levels. Chalmers I 264 Reduceability: The fact that multiple realizability is possible is regarded by some authors as a counter-argument to a reducibility. But: BrooksVs: (Brooks 1994)⁽¹⁾: explains this as irrelevant. Likewise, Wilson (1985)⁽²⁾ and Churchland (1986)⁽³⁾; paradigmatic reducible cases such as e.g. temperature are indeed mutiple possible. Reduction: reduction should not be equated with a reduction towards a higher-level theory. Sometimes there is no such theory. >Theories. I 46 Consciousness/explanation/reduction/Chalmers: we need something like a cognitive model, that is, a model of the abstract causal organization, without having to specify the physicochemical substrates. >Models. This is very good for psychological aspects, but not for the phenomenal side. >Psychology/Chalmers, >Consciousness/Chalmers. I 47 Explanation gap: an explanation gap exists between the psychological and the phenomenal side of consciousness (Levine 1983)⁽⁴⁾. I 48 Reductive explanation: reductive explanation is always possible when the explanatory (for example, the natural phenomenon) supervenes globally logically on the explanatory (e.g., the physical). If supervenience is not global, the question always remains: why is this process accompanied by this phenomenon? >Supervenience. I 49 Reduction: reduction does not always eliminate a "mystery" at the resulting level, but perhaps eliminates the assumption that there must be something extra that has precedence. I 50 Consciousness/Chalmers: here logical supervenience fails in the explanation. >Explanation. I 104 Reduction/Consciousness/Chalmers: from the arguments of the inverted spectra, the bat example, the color researcher Mary does not necessarily follow that there is no reductive explanation of the consciousness. (This would be equivalent to the fact that consciousness does not logically supervene on physical facts). >Exchanged spectra, >To be a bat. Analysis/Analyzability/Consciousness/Chalmers: One last argument for the irreducibility is that no analysis of consciousness is available from physical facts. I 105 Problem: Arguments that rely on better distinctions or better information in the future must fail. In turn, they do not have what is important: the conscious experience! Even if conscious states can play certain causal roles, they are not defined by their causal roles. For example, distinguishing ability can also be explained without consciousness. >Thermostat, >Fuel gauge, >Reliability. 1. D. H. M. Brooks, How to perform a reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54, 1994: pp. 803-14. 2. M . Wilson, What is the ting called "pain"? The philosophical science behind the contemporary debate. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66, 1985: pp.227-67. 3. P. S. Churchland, Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Scinece of the Mind-Brain. Cambridge 1986. 4. Levine,J. 1983. Materialism and Qualia: The explanatory gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64:345-61.	Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Reference	Dretske	Brandom I 600 Reference/Triangulation: The crossing point of two chains can help understand reference: e.g., the views of teacher and learning person. >Triangulation. Also Dretske: e.g. thermostat: one cannot say whether the system reacts to the temperature of the room, to the bimetallic strip, to the curvature of the bimetallic strip, or to the closing of the contact. (> Measuring). The practical consequences do not help. If the thermostat has a second sensor, such as a mercury thermometer which closes a contact accordingly and, if necessary, turns the heater on and off, the two causal chains intersect at two points: upstream with the change of the room temperature and downstream with the reaction to turn the heater on or off. --- I 951 Since the two chains intersect at two points, one must imagine them curved. BrandomVsDretske: does that really solve the problem? Is there not still the reaction to the closest disjunctive stimulus? Closing the bimetal strip or the mercury contact? --- I 601 Concept: Mere differing ability to react (cf. > RDRD reliable differential responsive dispositions, Brandom) is not enough to recognize the use of terms! Rationalistic supplementation: the inferential role of the reaction is crucial.	Dretske I Fred Dretske "Minimal Rationality", in: S. L. Hurley and M. Nudds (Eds.) Rational Animals?, Oxford 2005 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dretske II F. Dretske Naturalizing the Mind Cambridge 1997 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Sorites	Chalmers	I 296 Sorites/Consciousness/Chalmers: to avoid being embarrassed, to say a system with n elements has no consciousness, but one with n + 1 elements has consciousness, we simply assume that a simple thermostat has something like experiences, or that there is a way for it of "how it is to be a thermostat". >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Thermostat example, >Experience.	Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Teleology	Braithwaite	Wright I 28 Teleology/Balance/Homeostasis/Feedback/Cybernetics/Nagel/Braithwaite/Wright, G. H.: Example: Regulation of the temperature of a system by a thermostat. In this case, the rise or fall of the temperature is considered to be a "defect" or "correction" of a subsystem. The effect factor of the second system gives the effect of the cause factor of the first system an "appearance of teleology". However, both systems work according to causal laws. >Effect, >Cause, >Causality, >Causal relation, >Causal laws, >Systems. Rosenblueth/Wiener/Bigelow: Thesis: purposefulnes can generally be explained with the help of such a chain of causal systems. Wright I 29 Braithwaite⁽¹⁾: Thesis: Teleological explanations, both of intentional target-oriented activities and of target-oriented behaviour in general can be reduced to (forms of) causal explanations. Ernest Nagel⁽²⁾: E. Nagel is more cautious than Braithwaite: Thesis: Nagel sees teleological explanations in biology as "reducible" to causal explanations. (Wright: this is a careful reproduction of Nagel's view.) >Reduction, >Reducibility, >Reductionism, >Causal explanation. 1. R. B. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation, Cambridge, 1953 Kap X. 2. E. Nagel, The Structure of Science, 1961, Kap XII.	Braith I R. B. Braithwaite Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1968 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Teleology	Nagel	Wright I 28 Teleology/Balance/Homeostasis/Feedback/Cybernetics/Naqel/Braithwaite/Wright, G. H.: Example: Regulation of the temperature of a system by a thermostat. In this case, the rise or fall of the temperature is considered to be a "defect" or "correction" of a subsystem. The effect factor of the second system gives the effect of the cause factor of the first system an "appearance of teleology". However, both systems work according to causal laws. >Causal laws. Rosenblueth/Wiener/Bigelow: Thesis: Purposefulness can generally be explained with the help of such a chain of causal systems. --- Wright I 29 Braithwaite: Thesis: Teleological explanations, both of intentional target-oriented activities and of target-oriented behaviour in general can be reduced to (forms of) causal explanations.⁽¹⁾ Ernest Nagel⁽²⁾: More cautious than Braithwaite: Thesis: Nagel sees teleological explanations in biology as "reducible" to causal explanations. Wright: this is a cautious reproduction of Ernest Nagel's view. 1. R. B. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation, Cambridge, 1953 Kap X 2. E. Nagel, The Structure of Science, 1961, Kap XII	NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Teleology	Wiener	Wright I 157 Teleology/Wiener/Bigelow/Wright, G. H.: Bigelow and Wiener want to restrict "teleological behaviour" to "targeted reactions controlled by trial and error". This means that it is equivalent to behavior controlled by negative feedback.⁽¹⁾ >Feedback/Wright, G. H.. Wright I 28 Teleology/Balance/Homeostasis/Feedback/Cybernetics/Wright, G. H.: Example: Control of the temperature of a system by a thermostat. In this case, the rise or fall of the temperature is considered to be a "defect" or "correction" of a subsystem. The effect factor of the second system gives the effect of the cause factor of the first system an "appearance of teleology". However, both systems work according to causal laws. >Feedback, >Causal laws, >Causal relation, >Causality, >Cybernetics. Rosenblueth/Wiener/Bigelow: Thesis: Purposefulness can generally be explained by such a chain of causal systems. 1. A. Rosenblueth, N. Wiener and J. Bigelow „Behavior, Purpose and Teleology“, 1943, S. 23-24.	WienerN I Norbert Wiener Cybernetics, Second Edition: or the Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine Cambridge, MA 1965 WienerN II N. Wiener The Human Use of Human Beings (Cybernetics and Society), Boston 1952 German Edition: Mensch und Menschmaschine Frankfurt/M. 1952 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Unconscious	Chalmers	I 299 Unconscious/Chalmers: only a small part of the information of human cognition seems to correspond to the information of conscious experiences. Most of it is unconscious. If the two-aspects principle applies unreservedly, then the "unconscious" information is realized in experiences, but not in our experiences! (>Panpsychism,> Thermostat), e.g. if we assume that individual neurons can have experiences of me like a thermostat. >Experience, >Consciousness/Chalmers. I 300 The overall system of my brain is then only a system of a set of systems, namely that which has the global control. >Systems/Chalmers. Evolution has shaped such systems to form a coherent cognitive structure. Brain: when we accept this, we can also assume that different sets of experiences take place in a set of information spaces. Then I may have a number of related but slightly different phenomenal relatives from processes in my brain. >Information/Chalmers. This follows only from the unrestricted two-aspect principle. >Aspects. The alternative is to limit this principle so that the amount of physically realized information spaces is reduced, preferably by limiting how information is processed. I 301 Criterion: for a "real" information processing the criterion might be the strength of the signal, or the type of causation. Cf. >Information Processing/Psychology.	Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014

The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 controversies.

Disputed term/author/ism	Author Vs Author	Entry	Reference
Dennett, D.	Verschiedene Vs Dennett, D.	I 400 VsDennett thesis "I m the guy who notoriously denies that people perceive colors and pain, and who believes that thermostats think - You just need to ask my critics"
Determinism	Nozick Vs Determinism	II 314 Determinism/Nozick: is often expressed by saying that we would have to go back to before we were born to find the reasons for our actions. This is intended to preclude our decision-making ability. It would mean that we did not control our actions. But is our concept of control transitive? Even if so, it does not follow that only the first incident and nothing in between in the chain of events controls the last incident. E.g. even if I myself design a thermostat, build it and install it, II 315 it is still the thermostat itself which controls the temperature in the house! NozickVsDeterminism: Nobody has ever said that because determinism is true, thermostats did not control the temperature. Therefore, even if there were reasons for my actions that reach back to before I was born, it would not excluded that I am in new causal chains. And I could very well control them. Reasons: that they exist is not within the control of one person, but the fact that they cause their actions is!	No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994
Dretske, F.	Brandom Vs Dretske, F.	I 600 Dretske: E.g. thermostat: one cannot say whether the system reacts to the room temperature, to the temperature of the bimetallic strip, to the curvature of the bimetallic strip, or the closing of the contact. (> Measuring) A look at the practical consequences will not help. If the thermostat has a second sensor, such as a mercury thermometer which closes a contact accordingly and turns the heating on and off accordingly, then the two causal chains intersect at two points: upstream at the change of the room temperature, and downstream in the reaction of turning the heater on or off. BrandomVsDretske: Does this really solve the problem? Isn’t this still the reaction to the nearest, albeit disjoint stimulus? The closing of the bimetallic strip or the mercury contact? II 12 Concept/BrandomVsDretske, Fodor, Millikan: not semantic continuity to the non- or pre-conceptual, but strict discontinuity. II 144 Semantic Theory: Dretske, Millikan, Fodor. BrandomVs: weakest where they turn to the question of what distinguisjes representations that deserve to be called beliefs from other indicator states. > Camp.	Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Stalnaker, R.	Verschiedene Vs Stalnaker, R.	II 215 VsInformation-theoretical approach/VsStalnaker: 1. it is controversial whether the approach can be reductionist. a) one must distinguish states of belief from simpler states such as those of thermostats. b) we need a non-circular concept of normal conditions. 2. concerns the identity conditions for propositional contents: VsInformation-theoretical approach: it provides only coarse-grained individuation of content ((s) about truth conditions). Problem: x can believe P without believing Q, even if P and Q are necessarily equivalent. StalnakerVsVs: but this is enough for our purposes. And fine grained contents still define truth-conditional (informational) contents.