Dictionary of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute

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The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.

Disputed term/author/ism	Author	Entry	Reference
I, Ego, Self	Kaplan	Frank I 412 Vivid name/Kaplan: restriction: there must not only be one a of which I think he is going to be the next president, but a "vivid Name". (> vivid name/Locke). - Perry: but that does not solve the problem of the essential index word "I". I 430 I/Kaplan: "rigid intension", not individual - "I" designates in each claim in which it occurs, the person who is making the claim. >Index words, >Indexicality, >Names, >Designation, >Denotation. John Perry (1979): The Problem of the Essential Indexicals, in : Nous 13 (1979), 3-21 --- I 459ff I/Kaplan: designates always the one who makes the claim (the user). - CastanedaVs: only de re not in a de dicto-references - does not help with the preparation of a network of beliefs. I 469 Problem: the pronoun does not always express the speaker - more of a bound variable: "Stan thinks of me ..." VsKaplan: the first person aspect is a "grammatical illusion". >Pronoun, >de re, >de dicto. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1983 b): Reply to John Perry: Meaning, Belief, and Reference, in: Tomberlin (ed.) (1983),313-327	D. Kaplan Here only external sources; compare the information in the individual contributions. Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Ideas	Ryle	I 341 ff Idea/Ryle: an idea may be livelier than another idea. Cf. >Vivid name. In contrast to that: Impressions cannot be described as lively, e.g. babies are not lifelike dolls. >Impressions. Sensations may be stronger or weaker. >Sensation. Imaginations: imaginations are not comparable in terms of intensity. - Imagined noise is not louder or softer than genuine noise. >Imagination.	Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969
Proper Names	Kaplan	Frank I 412 "vivid name" /Kaplan: restriction: there must not only be some A here, of which I believe he will be the next president, but a "vivid name" (> vivid name/Locke). Perry: but that does not solve the problem of "essential index word "" I ". >Index words, >Indexicality, >Names, >Designation; cf. >He/He himself. John Perry (1979): The Problem of the Essential Indexicals, in : Nous 13 (1979), 3-21	D. Kaplan Here only external sources; compare the information in the individual contributions. Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Proper Names	Wiggins	Simons I 259f Def good name/Wiggins: one whose bearer exists. cf. >Vivid name, >Reference, >Existence, >Non-existence.	Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Supervenience	Chalmers	I 33 Supervenience/Chalmers: supervenience is in general a relation between two sets of properties: B properties: higher-level properties A properties: lower-level properties (for us physical properties). The specific nature of these properties is not relevant to us. >Levels/order, >Description Levels. Basic pattern: Definition Supervenience/Chalmers: B-properties supervene on A-properties, if two possible situations are not identical with regard to their A-properties and at the same time differ in their B-properties. For example, biological properties supervene on physical ones insofar as two possible physically identical situations are also biologically identical. Local/Global Supervenience/Chalmers: we distinguish global supervenience, depending on how the situations under consideration, refer to individuals or possible worlds. Local Supervenience/Chalmers: B supervenes locally on A when the A properties of an individual determine the B properties of that individual. I 34 E.g. form supervenes on physical properties. Definition Global Supervenience/Chalmers: when A facts about the world determine B facts about the world. That is, there are no two possible worlds which are identical with respect to A, which are not also identical with regard to B. For example biological properties supervene globally on physical properties. Definition local supervenience implies global supervenience, but not vice versa. E.g. two physical organisms can differ in certain biological characteristics, one individual can be fitter than the other, triggered by environmental conditions. >Extrinsic properties,> Niches. Chalmers: For example, one could imagine that two physically identical organisms might belong to different species, if they had different evolutionary stories. Consciousness: here it will be more about local supervenience. I 35 Logical Supervenience/Chalmers: logical supervenience is conceptual and stronger than natural supervenience. Natural Supervenience/Chalmers: this term is used to distinguish between logical supervenience. I 38 A situation would be conceivable in which laws that automatically produce B facts might not produce these for once. (Kripke 1972, 1980)⁽¹⁾. I 39 Logical Supervenience/Chalmers: Problem: There could be a possible world which is identical to our actual world, but not additionally with non-physical elements such as angels and ghosts. These could be physically identical with us, but biologically different from us. This has led some authors (Haugeland 1982⁽²⁾, Petrie 1987⁽³⁾) to say that the logical possibility and logical necessity are too strong terms for our supervenience relations. Solution/Chalmers: we must explicitly refer to our actual world or specified possible worlds. I 40 Other problems have to do with negative existence statements about what does not exist in our world, or does not exist in other possible worlds. Such problems can never be determined by local facts or local characteristics. Supervenience should always be determined by reference to positive facts and characteristics. I 84 Name/Supervenience/Explanation/Chalmers: E.g. according to Kaplan (1989)⁽⁴⁾ the name "Rolf Harris" simply picks out its speaker directly. Does that mean that the property to be Rolf Harris does not logically supervene on physical facts? >Names, >Reference, >Identification, >Vivid name/Kaplan. Secondary intension of the name: what resulted from a certain egg and sperm in all possible worlds. This supervenes logically on facts. Primary intension of the name: is that what results from the linguistic usage, of those who have, or had assiociate with Rolf Harris, or heard of Rolf Harris. The primary intension may be absent, which is a problem for the supervenience >Propositions/Chalmers, >Terminology/Chalmers. I 87 Logical Supervenience/Chalmers: apart from conscious experience, indexicality, and negative existence theorems everything supervenes logically on physical facts, including physical laws. >Indexicality, >Experience, >Non-existence, >Existence statements. I 88 Supervenience/Horgan/Blackburn/Chalmers: Question: (Blackburn 1985)⁽⁵⁾, Horgan (1993)⁽⁶⁾: How do we explain the supervenience relation itself? Primary Intension/Chalmers: For logical supervenience on primary intensions, we simply need to present a conceptual analysis, together with the determination that the reference over possible worlds remains preserved (is rigid). Thereby, the supervenience conditional is an a priori conceptual truth. I 89 Secondary Intension: here, the logical supervenience can be explained by saying that the primary intension of the concept picks out a referent of the actual world, which is projected unchanged to other physically identical worlds (by rigidifying operations). Such facts are contingent. (See Horgan and Timmons 1992b.⁽⁷⁾) Natural Supervenience/Chalmers: natural supervenience is - as opposed to the logical - contingent. This is ontologically expensive, so we can be glad that logical supervenience is the ussual case. I 124 Supervenience/Consciousness/Chalmers: we have seen that conscious experience does not logically supervene on the physical facts, but not that it does not supervene at all! 1. S. A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Reprint: Cambridge 1980 2. J. Haugeland, Weak supervenience. American Philosophical Quarterly 19, 1982: pp. 93-103 3. B. Petrie, Global supervenience and reduction. Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 48, 1987: pp. 119-30 4. D. Kaplan, Demonstratives. In: J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein (Eds) Themes from Kaplan. New York 1989 5. S. Blackburn, Supervenience revisited. In: I. Hacking (ed) Exercises in Analysis: Essay by Students of Casimir Lewy. Cambridge 1985 6. T. Horgan, From supervenience to superdupervenience: Meeting the demands of a material world. Mind 102, 1993: pp. 555-86 7. T. Horgan and M. Timmons, Troubles for new ware moral sentiments; The "open question argument" revived. Philosophical Papers 1992.	Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014

The author or concept searched is found in the following controversies.

Disputed term/author/ism	Author Vs Author	Entry	Reference
Kaplan, D.	Brandom Vs Kaplan, D.	I 763 Kaplan: "Vivid name" BrandomVsKaplan: Which privileged class of designators corresponds to the "know who" or the "know what", varies in a manner with the various situations that makes a previous systematization impossible. E.g. If Holmes believes the killer has left footprints, he can pick out this person in two ways: he has epistemically stronger beliefs than the inspector who can relate "the murderer" only. Of course, he does not know for a long time, who is the murderer. ((s)> strong / weak).	Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.

Disputed term/author/ism	Author	Entry	Reference
de re	Kaplan, D.	Cresswell II 144 Kaplan/Cresswell: genau darum geht es Kaplan (1969, 235): Bsp Ralph ist immer noch sicher, daß der man im Braunen Mantel ein Spion ist, aber enthält sich in Bezug auf den Mann am Strand, im grauen Mantel. Kaplan: These das kann nicht analysiert werden dadurch daß man sagt, er glaubt nicht von dem Mann am Strand... sondern daß es eine Weise des Herausgreifens von Ortcutt gibt, (-žvivid name-œ), so daß Ralph nicht glaubt, daß was auch immer durch diese Relation R (lebendiger Name) mit ihm verbunden ist, ein Spion ist. Problem: wir müssen also das Prinzip (von Burdick , s.o.) leugnen, daß wenn -žx enthält sich des Urteils über y, daß es G ist-œ beinhaltet (entails) -žx glaubt nicht von y daß es G ist-œ. Heidelberger: pro Burdick. Devitt: denkt den Irrtum (das falsche Prinzip) auf. Bsp Ralph/Klein/Cresswell: (Klein 1978): statt widersprüchlichen Glaubens: Konstruktion als (-ždouble vision-œ): (ii) Ralph glaubt die Proposition, die ausgedrückt worden wäre duch -žer ist ein Spion-œ im Kontext in dem Ralph glaubt, daß er in der Situation sei, in der Ortcutt sich ihm am Strand zeigte. Cresswell: das entspricht im obigen Text (v).	Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984