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The author or concept searched is found in the following 22 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Articles | Russell | Cresswell I 179 Definite Article/theory of descriptions/Russell: requiring that a sentence e.g. "the φ is ψ" provided that "the φ" has a wide range, entails that there exists a unique φ. >Scope, >Narrow scope, >Wide Scope. Russell I X Russell/Gödel: (K.Gödel, Preface to Principia Mathematica) Russell avoids any axioms about the particular articles "the", "the", "that". - Frege, on the other hand, must make an axiom about it! The advantage for Russell, however, remains only as long as he interprets definitions as mere typographical abbreviations, not as the introduction of names. >Proxy, >Names, >Logical proper names, >Axioms, Typographical abbreviation: >"blackening of the paper", >Formalism. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Axioms | Gödel | Berka I 367 Axioms/Principia Mathematica/Gödel: axioms are only counted as different, when they do not emerge by increasing the type. >Type theory, >Levels/order. I 367 Definition/Goedel: all definitions are abbreviations and therefore in principle superfluous.(1) >Definitions, >Definability. 1. K. Gödel: Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I, Mh. Math. Phys. 38 (1931), pp. 175-198. |
Göd II Kurt Gödel Collected Works: Volume II: Publications 1938-1974 Oxford 1990 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Calculus | Mates | I 63 artificial language/formal language/counterpart/Mates: the statements of the natural language correspond the artificial formulas, as a counterpart, not as abbreviations. >Symbols, >Equivalence, >Propositional forms, >Propositional functions, >Formal language, >Natural language. If symbols are associated with no sense, then it is an uninterpreted calculus. >Interpretation/Mates. I 115 Propositional calculus: the propositional calculus has no quantifiers. >Propositional calculus, >Quantifiers, >Quantification. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
| Definitions | Gödel | Berka I 367 Definition/Goedel: all definitions are abbreviations and therefore in principle superfluous.(1) >Concepts, >Meaning, >Terms, >Expressions, >Formulas, >Formalism, >Blackening of the paper, >Symbols, >Signs, >Distinctions. 1. K. Gödel: Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I, Mh. Math. Phys. 38 (1931), pp. 175-198. |
Göd II Kurt Gödel Collected Works: Volume II: Publications 1938-1974 Oxford 1990 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Descriptions | Tugendhat | I 348 Descriptions/Frege (also Husserl): descriptions more fundamental than names - for finding the reference of names. MillVsFrege: Names more fundamental. >Names/Mill. VsMill: mysterious: "enclosed to the object itself". Solution/Mill: not to the object but to the idea of object. >Imagination. I 378 Frege: names are abbreviations for descriptions. >Abbreviated descriptions. I 396 Description/properties/Identification/Tugendhat: doubtful whether descriptions can really pick out an object. "Original" property: E.g. "the highest mountain", "the second highest mountain," and so on. Problem: there can also be two mountains of the same height, at one point there can be multiple or none so-and-so. Tugendhat: there must be added something else, ostension, name or location. E.g. someone who is lead in front of the highest mountain, does not need to know that it is the highest. - ((s) "This mountain" is not a property.) >Knowledge, >Identification, >haecceitism, cf. >Two lost wanderers. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Formal Language | Mates | I 63 Artificial language/formal/counterpart/Mates: the statement forms of the natural language comply with formulas of the artificial, namely as a counterpart, not as abbreviations. >Propositional forms, >Propositional functions, >Natural language, >Equivalence. If symbols are not assigned to meaning, then "uninterpreted calculus". >Interpretation, >Sense, >Symbols. I 74 artificial language L/Mates: E.g. statement j: always true in relation to an interpretation I - values of "j": statements of the language L - values of I: interpretations of L. Cf. >Value progression/Frege, >Ideal language, >Universal language. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
| Formal Language | Tarski | Berka I 458 Formal language/Tarski: in a formal language the meaning of each term is uniquely determined by its shape. I 459 Variables: variables have no independent meaning. - Statements remain statements after translation into everyday language. Variable/Tarski: variables represent for us always names of classes of individuals. >Class name. Berka I 461 Formal language/terminology/abbreviations/spelling/Tarski: here: the studied language (object language). Symbols: N, A, I, P: negation, alternation, inclusion, quantifier - metalanguage: Symbols ng (negation), sm (sum = alternation), in (inclusion) - this is the language in which the examination is performed. ng, sm, etc. correspond to the colloquial expressions ((s) the formal symbols N, A, etc. do not). I 464 E.g. object language: Example expression: Nixi, xll: - meta language: translation of this expression: (structural-descriptive name, symbolic expression): name: "((ng ^ in) ^ v1) ^ v2" - but: see below: difference name/translation.(1) >Structural-descriptive name, >Quotation name, >Metalanguage. 1. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol 1, Lemberg 1935 --- Horwich I 112 Formal language/Tarski: in it all assertible sentences are theorems. - There may be a language with exactly specified structure, which is not formalized. - Then the assertibility may depend on extra-linguistic factors.(2) >Assertibility. 2. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Induction | Poincaré | Waismann I 70 Induction/Brouwer/Poincaré/Waismann: the power of induction: it is not a conclusion that carries to infinity. The sentence a + b = b + a is not an abbreviation for infinitely many individual equations, as well as 0.333 ... is not an abbreviation, and the inductive proof is not the abbreviation for infinitely many syllogisms (VsPoincaré). In fact, with the formulation of the formulas we begin a+b = b+a a+(b+c) = (a+b)+c a whole new calculus, which cannot be inferred from the calculations of arithmetic in any way. >Calculus, >Infinity, >Abbreviations, >Equations. But: Principle/Induction/Calculus/Definition/Poincaré/Waismann: ... this is the correct thing in Poincaré's assertion: the principle of induction cannot be proved logically. >Proofs, >Provability. VsPoincaré: But he does not represent, as he thought, a synthetic judgment a priori; it is not a truth at all, but a determination: If the formula f(x) applies for x = 1, and f(c + 1) follows from f(c), let us say that "the formula f(x) is proved for all natural numbers". --- A. d'Abro Die Kontroversen über das Wesen der Mathematik 1939 in Kursbuch 8 Mathematik 1967 46 Induction/PoincaréVsHilbert: in some of his demonstrations, the principle of induction is used and he asserts that this principle is the expression of an extra-logical view of the human mind. Poincaré concludes that the geometry cannot be derived in a purely logical manner from a group of postulates. >Geometry, >Postulates, >Derivation, >Derivability. 46 Induction is continually applied in mathematics, inter alia also in Euclid's proof of the infinity of the prime numbers. >Euclid, >Primes. Induction principle/Poincaré: it cannot be a law of logic, for it is quite possible to construct a mathematics in which the principle of induction is denied. Hilbert, too, does not postulate it among his postulates, so he also seems to be of the opinion that it is not a pure postulate. |
Waismann I F. Waismann Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996 Waismann II F. Waismann Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976 |
| Logical Truth | Quine | X 87 Logical Truth/Quine: is always in relation to a particular language, because grammatical structure (is not transcendent). - Because the same language (i.e. set of sentences) can be generated by different formation rules or encyclopedia - dependency on language and its grammar. X 88 Identity/logical truth/structure/Quine: Identity puts structural conception of the logical truth (as structural property of schemes) in question, because they become wrong if one inserts a different predicate instead of = (in logical truth each predicate must be replaceable by another). X 90 Identity/logical truth/structure/definition/Quine: if = is not simply interpreted as a predicate in the lexicon of the object language, but only as an abbreviation for compound sentences like (3), then the laws of identity are nothing but abbreviations of logical truths of the quantifier logic. Then the structural conception of the logical truth is saved. X 109 Logical truth/attitudes/propositional attitude/Quine: if we had schemes with them, we could not decide which of them are valid. - Laws for attitudes should not be logical laws, because propositional attitudes are too content rich. X 109 Logical Truth/modality/modal logic/Quine: the modalities leave more room here than the attitudes: we can get schemes here that are valid: E.g. ~(~ p necc. p) - Also, we receive from any valid scheme another one by prefixing of necessary E.g. necc. (p or ~p) from p or ~p. X 127 Logical truth/Carnap: Thesis: are purely linguistical, because they are true in every replacement from the lexicon. >Lexicon/Quine. X 127ff Logic/language/reality/QuineVsCarnap: logical truth is not purely linguistic, because evidence is as important as the translation. - E.g. expression of "it is raining" when it rains. - But no logical consequences from circumstances, because true sentences follow from any sentence. - All evident things are inseparable from the translation. - Semantic ascent seems to speak for the language of logic. - Vs: the truth predicate shows the separation from the language. - Quine: the logic is based on the world and not on the language. I 133 Yet: pro Carnap: we learn the logic by learning the language. - But that’s not different from everyday knowledge. >Logic/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Natural Deduction | Wessel | I 201 Natural deduction/quantifier logic: here we have only definite descriptions; individual constants construed only as abbreviations for definite individual terms, not as a variable. >Variables, >Individual constants, >Descriptions, >Definite descriptions, >Singular terms. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Nominalism | Adorno | XII 107 Nominalism/Adorno: Prehistory: Aristotle's critique of Plato. Concept/Plato/Adorno: for Plato, the concepts were independent and being-in-itself and indestructible and eternal, namely, the ideas. >Ideas/Plato, >Logos/Plato, >Language/Plato, >Words/Plato. AristotelesVsPlato/Adorno: these concepts should instead be mediated and fulfilled with concrete and factual. >Concepts/Aristotle, >Logos/Aristotle, >Plato/Aristotle. Kant/Adorno: he has also transferred this critical motive to the concept of God in opposition to the reification. --- XIII 56 Nominalism/Adorno: Nominalism is the view, which in principle views the concepts as abbreviations of the matters covered by them, and denies the concepts - in any case tendentially - the independence against what they contain among themselves. This western view belongs to Kant himself. In the consequence of nominalism, the subjective moment of the concept of idea prevails. >Concepts/Kant, >God/Kant, >Immanuel Kant. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Prediction | Poundstone | I 388 Prediction/forecast/prophecy/Poundstone: a) calculation for a model, example eclipse, just a "shortcut" b) there is no model or method or simulation, which is simpler than the phenomenon itself. >Abbreviations, >Models, >Simulation, >Method. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
| Proper Names | Kenny | Prior I 168 Name/Kenny/Prior: Kenny has outlined a completely different theory of Non-Plural Names: Thesis: Names are logically unstructured (as with Russell). Def Name/Kenny: N is a name if and only if the user intends to refer to a singular object B. If the object does not exist, one can only say that the speaker with a sentence that contains B, only means B and that the sentence mentions B. Names, even if they are blank, are generally not merely abbreviations of Russell's specific descriptions. Although the speaker must have some particular description in mind! They are abbreviations of certain descriptions in sentences of the form: "B exists" or "B does not exist". See PriorVsKenny. |
Kenn I A. Kenny A New History of Western Philosophy Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Proper Names | Russell | Russell: logical proper names: this: identity without empirical investigation, therefore the only correct name. >Acquaintance. Geach I 28ff Name/Frege/Russell: refers to the bearer. Russell VI 11 Names/Russell: proper names are abbreviated descriptions, but both do not play the role of singular terms. >Description, >Singular term. VI 12 Name/FregeVs Russell: is a singular term. VII 346 Names/Russell/Frege/Wittgenstein: Meaning: most of all we are talking about our ideas and knowledge of the carrier. Newen I 90 Names/proper names/Russell: names are nothing but abbreviations for descriptions. VI 70~ Names/Russell: not just words for particulars: E.g. Socrates is a description for us! - Names do not appear in Principia Mathematica(1), only general objects are interesting there. - Acquaintance brings full information, no more possible. VI 80 Russell: names can be abbreviated descriptions: E.g. The man who did this and that = Socrates - but vice versa. Certain descriptions are not names: otherwise tautology: Scott = Scott -> Descriptions/Quine: names are hidden descriptions. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Properties | Quine | Rorty VI 151 Major Property/holism/Quine/Rorty: at best: "property, which is necessary for the use of a certain description" - but not: "property, which is necessary for the identity of an object with itself." Quine I 43 Features: independent existence is pointless. >Existence/Quine I 218 Mass Term/Quine: is archaic(> (> E. Cassirer, Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, Berlin 1923-1929))) - Properties: a) Is commonality decisive? b) Is it about cattered clumps? I 217 Features: are usually merely convenient abbreviations for long cross-references - Quine/Cassirer: features of archaic remains. I 219 Not all abstract objects are properties: numbers, classes, functions, geometric figures, ideas, possibilities - give up or trace back to abstract objects - one can faithfully distinguished concrete objects by use of "-ness". >Object/Quine I 322 Property abstraction (elimination) instead of "a = x(..x..)" - new: irreducible two-digit operator "0": "a0x(..x..)" - variables remain as the only ones - primacy of the pronoun. >Variables/Quine I 344/45 Properties/Quine: there are no necessary or contingent properties (VsModal Logic) - there are only more or less important properties. I 344 Properties/relations: meaning of timeless open sentences - is unidentifiable (How-propositions). I 361 Elimination of relations and properties in favor of classes of ordered pairs, open sentences, general terms - even scattered objects (in the case of color) (46). I 412 QuineVsProperties: fallacy of subtraction: to derive existence from "about" and "deals with" - "round" and "dog" are terms for physical objects - but no additional features. "Round" and "dog" are general terms for objects not singular terms for properties or classes. The same argument would be for classes instead of properties: general term symbolizes its extension as well as its intension. >General Term/Quine I 412 Properties: not every general term is necessarily about properties or classes - properties and classes are acceptable as values of variables. I 464 QuineVsRussell/Whitehead: theory of incomplete symbols: eliminated classes only in favor of properties. II 129f Properties: are hard to individuate - not to define like classes by the same elements - various properties can get to the same things. Properties: "Zettsky" (like Russell): properties are identical when they were members of the same classes - QuineVs - solution: property is identical if two sentences ↔ (follow seperately) - unsatisfactory, less analyticity and necessity-operator. Properties/Quine: identical when coextensive-classes: are not specified by elements, but by condition of containment (open sentence). Property is not the same as predicate - property: open sentences - propositions: completed sentences. Properties are not the same as classes: since no individuation principle for properties - solution "last classes" (do not belong to any other class, only have elements themselves) - like Russell: statement function only comes through their values - properties = last classes or properties = statement function. >Classes/Quine Properties as last classes are every element of the zero class, therefore all identical? - Vs: this identity definition only applies to theories that allow no objects who belong to no class (Unicorn). Properties/identity: (here) are interchangeability in all contexts - Prerequisite: exhaustion of a finite lexicon by interchangeability of atomic contexts - RyleVs: Category confusion. Properties: QuineVsCarnap/Russell: minimize grammatical categories, expand scope - if all can be attributed to "has", then all properties are extensional - rest could be listed by list. Properties: contexts with "has" unproblematic - "contained in" prohibited (less classes) - "is" leads to circular definition of properties - properties do not count. "Nap had all properties but one": is prohibited. - however: "all properties" allowed. II 144 f De re: E.g. spy should be an essential property (wrong) - no belief is de re (essential property). Modal Logic/Quine: the entire modal logic is context-dependent - what role does someone or something play? - Same level as essential properties. Necessity/Quine: the whole concept is only meaningful in context. Property Einstein/Quine: are preserved. - But not de re. >de re/Quine X 95 Properties/Quine: do not exist for lack of distinctness (only amounts) - "synonymy unclear" - open sentences that apply to the same objects never determine different amounts, but differnt properties could underlie. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Rationality | Millikan | I 66 Rationality/Bennett/Millikan: it seems as if he should not choose "abbreviations" as a rational human. That is, one must take into account not only positive evidence, but also negative ones. General/formal: e.g. assuming, John believes "Usual": if A then B and also: "Not-(usual: if A-and-not-C, then B)" Rational: would then follow that John would have to believe A) "usual: if A then C" and B) if A and C, then B. Then there are the following possible cases. 1. The only evidence for C comes from that John knows that usually, if A then C. Then he should simply pass from A to B. 2. John has independent ways to believe C due to evidence. And he encounters A, while he already has evidence for not-C. I 67 Then, rationally, he should also believe that not-C and not conclude from A to B. 3. John has independent evidence according to which he could know C, but this time he does not know beforehand whether C. Question: then, in order to be rational, must he first check whether C? Millikan: Let's suppose he needs to do it. Problem: if this again depends solely on the fact that he believes: "Usually if D, then C", etc. Rationality/Millikan: Problem: The more knowledge one acquires, the more he has to strive to be rational at all. Would it not be better for him to refrain from the whole checking process? >Verification, >Confirmation, >Knowledge/Millikan. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Sensory Impressions | Sellars | McDowell I 168 Sensory Impressions/Sellars: distinguished from pieces of the given. No direct relationship with the knowledge. >Given/Sellars, >Knowledge/Sellars, >Perception, >Perception/Sellars. Active receptivity. But the receptivity cannot cooperate itself in a rational manner with the spontaneity. (VsQuine). --- I IX Sellars: no renunciation of sensations in toto. (Unlike Quine). >Sensations/Quine. I XXIII Sensory Impressions/Quine: manifolds, which are to be structured through various theory drafts. (SellarsVs). I XXIII Sellars: Physical and mental are not in a causal relationship, but belong to different world views. >Physical/psychic. Only conveyed by structure of world views. (Vs above). The frames are related by their structure and not by content. It is simply a wrongly asked question how impressions and electromagnetic fields can tolerate each other. I XXIX The theory of sensory impressions does not speak of inner objects. >Inner objects. I XXXVII Sellars: sensory impressions only have causal consequences of external physical objects. A red sensation can also occur if the external object only seems to be red. Both concepts explain why the speaker always speaks of something red. Only, the sensation is according to Sellars no object of knowledge, and even the category of the object is questioned by Sellars. >Object/Sellars, >Knowledge/Sellars, >Sensation/Sellars. I XL First, however, these states are states of a person. Not of a brain. In any case, they are imperceptible. Sensory Impressions: neither they have a color, nor do they have a shape. (> Perception/Sellars). Impressions: that these are theoretical entities, is shown to us by how to characterize them in an intrinsic way: not only as descriptions: "entity as such, that looking at a red and triangular object under such and such circumstances has the standard cause." But rather as predicates. These are no abbreviations for descriptions of properties. Example if one says that molecules have a mass, then the word "mass" is not an abbreviation of a description of the form "the property that ...". I 101 "Impression of a red triangle" does not only mean "impression like he ... through red and triangular objects ...." although it is a truth, namely a logical truth about impressions of red triangles. I 103 Impressions need to be inter-subjective, not completely dissolvable impressions in behavioral symptoms: states (but not physiological) - impressions are not objects. I 106 Sellars: Rylean Language: actual explanation, is more than just a code: conceptual framework public objects in space and time. >Rylean ancestors. Language of impressions: embodies the discovery that there are such things, but it is not specifically tailored to them (individual things no antecedent objects of thinking). SellarsVsHume: because he does not clearly distinguish between thoughts and impressions, he can assume that a natural derivative corresponds not only to a logical but also a temporal sequence. His theory must be extended so that it also includes cases such as the above or backwards: Thunder now, before a moment of lightning. --- II 328 Hume does not see that the perception of a configuration is also the configuration of perceptions. >Perception/Hume, >Impression/Hume, >Thinking/Hume, >David Hume. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Sentences | Geach | I 204 Sentence/name/abbreviation/substitute/proxy/Geach: e.g. if "P" and "Q" are abbreviations of sentences and "A" and "B", the respective names of these sentences, then we could have a convention, by which "A > B" is the name (abbreviation) of the sentence "P > Q". >Name of a sentence, >Level/Order, >Names, >Descriptions. Autonymous/Carnap: the symbol ">" in "A > B", is used as a sign of itself, autonymous. - (Geach per) >Logical constants, >Logical connectives, >Sign, >Symbol. I 258 Conjunction/Sentence/Frege: "P u Q" is a phrase that is different from "p" and "q" individually. Mill: ditto: otherwise "a group of horses" would be the same as "a kind of horse" - but not: E.g. "Jim is convinced and his wife is unfaithful". Solution: "the fact that ..." is always to be split into a pair of statements. >Facts. I 291 Sentence/GeachVsAristotle: it is a mistake to analyze complex sentences as a combination of atomic sentences. >Atomic sentence, >Complex, cf. >Compositionality. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Signs | Geach | I 204 Sentence/name/abbreviation/substitute/proxy/Geach: e.g. if "P" and "Q" are abbreviations of sentences and "A" and "B", the respective names of these sentences, then we could have a convention, by which "A > B" is the name (abbreviation) of the sentence "P > Q". >Name of a sentence, >Level/Order, >Names, >Descriptions. Autonymous/Carnap: the symbol ">" in "A > B", is used as a sign of itself, autonymous. - (Geach per) >Logical constants, >Logical connectives, >Sign, >Symbol. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Syntax | Geach | I 116 Syntax: replacing salva congruitate: the word chain remains correct when it is replaced. QuineVs: Replacing changes syntax: e.g. Copernicus was a complete idiot, if and only if the earth is adisk. - different ranges: a) Copernicus with predicate + sentence b) complex predicate. Then there is no ambiguous word chain, but different analyzes are possible. Ambiguity: "An astronomer is a great idiot iff the earth is flat" can be seen as an operator (like negation). Different brackets are possible. Syntax/Quine/Geach: Quine's 1st Syntactic insight: spurious names: these are a problem of range - for real names the problem does not exist. >Names/Quine, >Range/Quine, >Improper names. GeachVsQuine: he, himself blurs the distinction by regarding names as abbreviations of certain descriptions. >Descriptions/Quine. I 120 3rd Syntactic insight of Quine: E.g. "lx (2x² + 3x³)". This function of a number: twice its square plus three times its third power - such complex descriptions can be eliminated by usage definition. (Russell):> Relative-clause. I 126 4th Syntactic insight of Quine: Introducing a predicate by a schema letter F. >Schematic letters/Quine. Problem: E.g.: "Every sentence or its opposite is true" must not become "(Every sentence is true) or (Every sentence is not true)". Solution: "F() is then -__ or __s opposite is true". Geach: sub-clauses (relative-clauses) and pronouns are not mere substitutes. - This is even a mistake in modern logic books. >Clauses, >Substitution, >Proxy. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Syntheticity | Poincaré | Waismann I 70 Induction/Brouwer/Poincaré/Waismann: the power of induction: it is not a conclusion that carries to infinity. The set a + b = b + a is not an abbreviation for infinitely many individual equations, as well as 0.333 ... is not an abbreviation, and the inductive proof is not the abbreviation for infinitely many syllogisms (VsPoincaré). In fact, we begin with the formulation of the formulas a+b = b+a a+(b+c) = (a+b)+c a whole new calculus, which cannot be inferred from the calculations of arithmetic in any way. >Calculus, >Infinity, >Abbreviations, >Equations. But: Principle/Induction/Calculus/Definition/Poincaré/Waismann: ... this is the correct thing in Poincaré's assertion that the principle of induction cannot be proved logically. >Proofs, >Provability. VsPoincaré: But he does not represent, as he thought, a synthetic judgment a priori; it is not a truth at all, but a determination: If the formula f(x) applies for x = 1, and f(c + 1) follows from f(c), let us say that "the formula f(x) is proved for all natural numbers". |
Waismann I F. Waismann Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996 Waismann II F. Waismann Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976 |
| Systems | Quine | VII (e) 91 Abbreviations/Quine: defining abbreviations are always outside of a formal system - that's why we need to get an expression in simple notation before we examine it in relation to hierarchy. IX 190 System/Quine: a new system is not introduced by new definitions, but by new distinctions. ((s) Example (s): if I always have to note "n + 1" to mark the difference between real and rational numbers, I did not eliminate the real numbers, but kept the old difference. I only changed the notation, not the ontology.) IX 232 Theory/Enlargement/Extension/System/Quine: an enlargement is not an extension! Extension: addition of axioms, can create contradictions. Magnification/Quine: means to relativize an added scheme to already existing axioms of a system, e.g. to "Uϑ", (s) so if something exists in "Uϑ", it must be a set. Such a magnification never creates a contradiction. IX 237 Theory/stronger/weaker/Quine: if a deductive system is an extension of another in the sense that its theorems include all of the other and others, then in a certain way one is stronger than the other. But this basis of comparison is weak: 1. It fails if each of the two systems has theorems that are not found in the other. (Comparability). 2. It depends on randomness of interpretation and not simply on structural properties. Example: suppose we would have exactly "=" and "R" as primitive two-digit predicates with an ordinary identity axiom and transitivity. Now we extend the system by adding the reflexivity "x(xRx)". The extended system is only stronger if we equate its "R" with the original "R". But if we reinterpret its "xRy" as "x = y v x R y" using the original "R", then all its theorems are provable in the non-extended system. (>Löwenheim, >Provability), Example (less trivial): Russell's method ((1) to (4), Chapter 35) to ensure extensionality for classes without having to accept them for attributes. Given is a set theory without extensionality. We could extend it by adding this axiom, and yet we could show that all theorems of the extended system could be reinterpreted with Russell's method as theorems already provable in the non-extended system. Stronger/weaker/Quine: a better standard for the comparison of strength is the "comparison by reinterpretation": if we can reinterpret the primitive logical signs (i.e. in set theory only "e") in such a way that all theorems of this system become translations of the theorems of the other system, then the latter system is at least as strong as the first one. IX 238 If this is not possible in the other direction, one system is stronger than the other. Def "ordinal strength"/Quine: another meaningful sense of strength of a system is the following surprising numerical measure: the smallest transfinite ordinal number, whose existence can no longer be proven in the system. Any normal set theory can, of course, prove the existence of infinitely many transfinite numbers, but that does not mean that you get them all. Transfinite/Quine: what is so characteristic about it is that we then iterate the iteration further and iterate the iteration of iterations until our apparatus somehow blocks. The smallest transfinite number after blocking the apparatus then indicates how strong the apparatus was. An axiom that can be added to a system with the visible goal of increased ordinal strength is the axiom that there is an unattainable number beyond w (omega). (End of Chapter 30). An endless series of further axioms of this kind is possible. Strength of systems/Ordinal Numbers/Quine: another possibility to use ordinal numbers for strength: we can extend the theory of cumulative types to transfinite types by accrediting to the x-th type for each ordinal number x, all classes whose elements all have a type below x. So the universe of the theory of cumulative types in chapter 38, which lacks the transfinite types, is even the ω-th type. Def "Natural Model"/Montague/Vaught/Quine: this is what they call this type, if the axioms of set theory are fulfilled, if one takes their universe as such a type. So Zermelo's set theory without infinity axiom has the ω-th type as a natural model. (We have seen this in chapter 38). So the ordinal strength of this system is at most ω, obviously not smaller. With infinity axiom: ω + ω. Strength of the system of von Neumann-Bernays: one more than the first unattainable number after w. XII 33 Object/existence/system/Quine: systematic considerations can lead us to reject certain objects XII 34 or to declare certain terms as non-referring. Occurrence: also individual occurrences of terms. This is Frege's point of view: an event can refer to something on one occasion, not on another (referential position). Example "Thomas believes that Tullius wrote the Ars Magna". In reality he confuses Tullius with Lullus. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Frege, G. | Newen Vs Frege, G. | I 209 Physicalism/Identity Theory/New: because of the possibility that mental phenomena could be realized in different ways (functionalism) token physicalism was abandoned in favor of type physicalism. (VsToken Physicalism) Functionalism/Newen: Problem: we do not know what the possibly physical states have in common ((s) on a mental level). Mental Universals/Newen: are needed then. Bieri: Problem: either a theory about mental universals seems empirically implausible. Or it is empirically plausible, then it does not tell us what we want to know. (Bieri: Anal. Ph. d. Geistes, p. 41). Functional State/Newen: similar to dispositions in that it can be characterized by hypothetical relations between initial situations and consequent states. I 211 VsFunctionalism/Newen: qualia problem FunctionalismVsVs: zombie argument: I 212 There need be no qualia to explain behavior. Mental Causation/Newen: is still an open question. NS I 90 Descriptions/Theory/Russell/Newen/Schrenk: the objective is to overcome two problems: 1) identity statements: need to be informative 2) negative existential statements or statements with empty descriptions must be sensible. Names/Personal Names/Russell: Thesis: names are nothing but abbreviations for decriptions. Theory of Descriptions/Russell: E.g. 1) There is at least one author of "Waverley" (existence assertion). 2) There is not more than one author of "Waverley" (uniqueness assertion) 3) Whoever wrote "Waverley", was a Scot (statement content). This is about three possible situations where the sentence may be wrong: a) nobody wrote Waverley, b) several persons did it, c) the author is not a Scot. NS I 91 Identity/Theory of Descriptions/Russell/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: if the identity of Cicero with Tullius is necessary (as self-identity), how can the corresponding sentence be informative then? Solution/Russell: 1) There is at least one Roman consul who denounced Catiline 2) There is not more than one Roman consul who denounced Catiline 1*) There is at least one author of "De Oratore" 2*) There is not more than one author of "De Oratore" 3) whoever denounced Catiline is identical with the author of "De Oratore". Empty Names/Empty Descriptions/Russell/Newen/Schrenk: Solution: 1) There is at least one present king of France 2) There is not more than one present king of France 3) Whoever is the present King of France is bald. Thus the sentence makes sense, even though the first part of the statement is incorrect. Negative Existential Statements/Theory of Descriptions/Russell/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: assigning a sensible content. It is not the case that 1) there is at least one flying horse 2) not more than one flying horse. Thus, the negative existence statement "The flying horse does not exist" makes sense and is true. RussellVsFrege/RussellvsFregean Sense/Newen/Schrenk: this is to avoid that "sense" (the content) must be assumed as an abstract entity. Truth-Value Gaps/RussellVsFrege: they, too, are thus avoided. Point: sentences that seemed to be about a subject, however, now become general propositions about the world. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Kenny, A. | Prior Vs Kenny, A. | I 167 Names/Lejewski: for him, names can either be singular or empty, but not plural. "Non plural names": can be logically be complex (normal names cannot). For this, a special functor is needed with its own axioms. This functor could be e.g. the Lesniewskian individual identity, the form "a = a", which is true if "a" is applied to an object, and false if not. Names/Aristotle: can be singular or plural, but not empty! If complex names are introduced here, then it needs to be ensured that the composition is not empty. E.g. Even if "a" and "b" have applications, "a and b" need not! If "Socrates" is not plural, it does not follow that "Not Socrates" is not plural either. E.g. there could be a million "Not Socrates". Solution/Lejewski: introduces a "definition frame": Only allows only names like "He who alone is not Socrates". Point: nevertheless, the verb "is not Socrates" be applied to many objects! I 168 Names/Kenny/Prior: Kenny outlined a very different theory of non-plural names: These names are logically without structure (like Russell). Def Names/Kenny: N is a name iff. the user intends to refer to one singular object B. If the object does not exist, it can only be said that the speaker only means B with a sentence that contains B, and that B is mentioned in the sentence. Names, even if they are empty, are generally not mere abbreviations of Russell's defined descriptions. Although the speaker has to have some kind of particular description in mind! They are abbreviations of defined descriptions in sentences of the form: "B exists" or "B does not exist". Names/PriorVsKenny: I cannot find any clue in Kenny as to how it should work in indirect speech: E.g. "Paul thinks Elmer is a fellow traveler." According to Kenny, Paul will use the word "Elmer" as name, but the reporter who covers Paul's opinion will generally not use it as a name and could even make his statement if he knew that a person like Elmer does not exist! Question: how does the reporter use the word then? According to Kenny, he would have to use it as covert description. E.g. if he says "there is no such person as Elmer". Problem: e.g. if he knows that Elmar does not exist, but says "Paul thinks Elmer is a fellow traveler", does he use the name as covert description then? If not, then Kenny does not tell us what he does instead, bit if yes, then the reporter does not report correctly what Paul thinks! PriorVsKenny: this is not a peripheral problem, but infects Kenny's entire theory. I 169 E.g. if I myself (as Kenny) say: "what Paul thinks is not that such and such is his fellow traveler, but Elmar", how am I (as a theorist) using the word "Elmer" here? If the theorist himself uses it as a covert description, he himself does not make the distinction it is about for him! I can still use it as a name! Because I cannot intend to refer with it, because ex hypothesi I cannot do that if I know that a person like Elmer does not exist. Paul means Elmer with "Elmer", but what does Kenny mean with "Elmer"? And what does Kenny mean when he says Paul means Elmer with "Elmer"? Ex hypothesi Kenny cannot intend to mean Elmer. But if he uses the name as a covert description, then he says that Paul the means such and such, and we can do that a) with quotation marks b) without quotation marks. Then we say with this that Paul means that a single such and such is meant by Paul, to which he thus puts himself in relation. But ex hypothesi it is not. a) with quotation marks: then we say that with the word "Elmer" Paul means that which is meant by the expression "such and such". But according to Kenny's own theory, Paul does not use the word as a covert description! (Only in forms such as "B exists"). Names/Prior: Thesis: what does not exist, simply cannot be named, just as it cannot be pushed with the foot. Neither by someone who believes in the existence, nor by someone who does not believe in it. In circumstances where the object x is absent, x cannot be used as a proper noun in sentences and there are no facts with x. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Principia Mathematica | Gödel Vs Principia Mathematica | Russell I XIV Circular Error Principle/VsPrincipia Mathematica(1)/PM/Russell/Gödel: thus seems to apply only to constructivist assumptions: when a term is understood as a symbol, together with a rule to translate sentences containing the symbol into sentences not containing it. Classes/concepts/Gödel: can also be understood as real objects, namely as "multiplicities of things" and concepts as properties or relations of things that exist independently of our definitions and constructions! This is just as legitimate as the assumption of physical bodies. They are also necessary for mathematics, as they are for physics. Concept/Terminology/Gödel: I will use "concept" from now on exclusively in this objective sense. A formal difference between these two conceptions of concepts would be: that of two different definitions of the form α(x) = φ(x) it can be assumed that they define two different concepts α in the constructivist sense. (Nominalistic: since two such definitions give different translations for propositions containing α.) For concepts (terms) this is by no means the case, because the same thing can be described in different ways. For example, "Two is the term under which all pairs fall and nothing else. There is certainly more than one term in the constructivist sense that satisfies this condition, but there could be a common "form" or "nature" of all pairs. All/Carnap: the proposal to understand "all" as a necessity would not help if "provability" were introduced in a constructivist manner (..+...). Def Intensionality Axiom/Russell/Gödel: different terms belong to different definitions. This axiom holds for terms in the circular error principle: constructivist sense. Concepts/Russell/Gödel: (unequal terms!) should exist objectively. (So not constructed). (Realistic point of view). When only talking about concepts, the question gets a completely different meaning: then there seems to be no objection to talking about all of them, nor to describing some of them with reference to all of them. Properties/GödelVsRussell: one could surely speak of the totality of all properties (or all of a certain type) without this leading to an "absurdity"! ((s) > Example "All properties of a great commander". Gödel: this simply makes it impossible to construe their meaning (i.e. as an assertion about sense perception or any other non-conceptual entities), which is not an objection to someone taking the realistic point of view. Part/whole/Mereology/GödelVsRussell: neither is it contradictory that a part should be identical (not just the same) with the whole, as can be seen in the case of structures in the abstract sense. Example: the structure of the series of integers contains itself as a special part. I XVI/XVII Even within the realm of constructivist logic there are certain approximations to this self-reflectivity (self-reflexivity/today: self-similarity) of impredicative qualities, namely e.g. propositions, which as parts of their meaning do not contain themselves, but their own formal provability. There are also sentences that refer to a totality of sentences to which they themselves belong: Example: "Each sentence of a (given) language contains at least one relational word". This makes it necessary to look for other solutions to the paradoxes, according to which the fallacy does not consist in the assumption of certain self-reflectivities of the basic terms, but in other assumptions about them! The solution may have been found for the time being in simple type theory. Of course, all this refers only to concepts. Classes: one should think that they are also not created by their definitions, but only described! Then the circular error principle does not apply again. Zermelo splits classes into "levels", so that only sets of lower levels can be elements of sets of higher levels. Reducibility Axiom/Russell/Gödel: (later dropped) is now taken by the class axiom (Zermelo's "axiom of choice"): that for each level, for any propositional function φ(x) the set of those x of this level exists for which φ(x) is true. This seems to be implied by the concept of classes as multiplicities. I XVIII Extensionality/Classes: Russell: two reasons against the extensional view of classes: 1. the existence of the zero class, which cannot be well a collection, 2. the single classes, which should be identical with their only elements. GödelVsRussell: this could only prove that the zero classes and the single classes (as distinguished from their only element) are fictions to simplify the calculation, and do not prove that all classes are fictions! Russell: tries to get by as far as possible without assuming the objective existence of classes. According to this, classes are only a facon de parler. Gödel: but also "idealistic" propositions that contain universals could lead to the same paradoxes. Russell: creates rules of translation according to which sentences containing class names or the term "class" are translated into sentences not containing them. Class Name/Russell: eliminate by translation rules. Classes/Principia Mathematica/Russell/Gödel: the Principia Mathematica can do without classes, but only if you assume the existence of a concept whenever you want to construct a class. First, some of them, the basic predicates and relations like "red", "colder" must be apparently considered real objects. The higher terms then appear as something constructed (i.e. something that does not belong to the "inventory of the world"). I XIX Ramsey: said that one can form propositions of infinite length and considers the difference finite/infinite as not so decisive. Gödel: Like physics, logic and mathematics are based on real content and cannot be "explained away". Existence/Ontology/Gödel: it does not behave as if the universe of things is divided into orders and one is forbidden to speak of all orders, but on the contrary: it is possible to speak of all existing things. But classes and concepts are not among them. But when they are introduced as a facon de parler, it turns out that the extension of symbolism opens the possibility of introducing them in a more comprehensive way, and so on, to infinity. To maintain this scheme, however, one must presuppose arithmetics (or something equivalent), which only proves that not even this limited logic can be built on nothing. I XX Constructivist posture/constructivism/Russell/Gödel: was abandoned in the first edition, since the reducibility axiom for higher types makes it necessary that basic predicates of arbitrarily high type exist. From constructivism remains only 1. Classes as facon de parler 2. The definition of ~, v, etc. as valid for propositions containing quantifiers, 3. The stepwise construction of functions of orders higher than 1 (of course superfluous because of the R-Axiom) 4. the interpretation of definitions as mere typographical abbreviations (all incomplete symbols, not those that name an object described by the definition!). Reducibility Axiom/GödelVsRussell: this last point is an illusion, because of the reducibility axiom there are always real objects in the form of basic predicates or combinations of such according to each defined symbol. Constructivist posture/constructivism/Principia Mathematica/Gödel: is taken again in the second edition and the reducibility axiom is dropped. It is determined that all basic predicates belong to the lowest type. Variables/Russell/Gödel: their purpose is to enable the assertions of more complicated truth functions of atomistic propositions. (i.e. that the higher types are only a facon de parler.). The basis of the theory should therefore consist of truth functions of atomistic propositions. This is not a problem if the number of individuals and basic predicates is finite. Ramsey: Problem of the inability to form infinite propositions is a "mere secondary matter". I XXI Finite/infinite/Gödel: with this circumvention of the problem by disregarding the difference between finite and infinite a simpler and at the same time more far-reaching interpretation of set theory exists: Then Russell's Apercu that propositions about classes can be interpreted as propositions about their elements becomes literally true, provided n is the number of (finite) individuals in the world and provided we neglect the zero class. (..) + I XXI Theory of integers: the second edition claims that it can be achieved. Problem: that in the definition "those cardinals belonging to each class that contains 0 and contains x + 1 if it contains x" the phrase "each class" must refer to a given order. I XXII Thus whole numbers of different orders are obtained, and complete induction can be applied to whole numbers of order n only for properties of n! (...) The question of the theory of integers based on ramified type theory is still unsolved. I XXIII Theory of Order/Gödel: is more fruitful if it is considered from a mathematical point of view, not a philosophical one, i.e. independent of the question of whether impredicative definitions are permissible. (...) impredicative totalities are assumed by a function of order α and ω . Set/Class/Principia Mathematica(1)/Russell/Type Theory/Gödel: the existence of a well-ordered set of the order type ω is sufficient for the theory of real numbers. Def Continuum Hypothesis/Gödel: (generalized): no cardinal number exists between the power of any arbitrary set and the power of the set of its subsets. Type Theory/VsType Theory/GödelVsRussell: mixed types (individuals together with predications about individuals etc.) obviously do not contradict the circular error principle at all! I XXIV Russell based his theory on quite different reasons, similar to those Frege had already adopted for the theory of simpler types for functions. Propositional functions/statement function/Russell/Gödel: always have something ambiguous because of the variables. (Frege: something unsaturated). Propositional function/p.f./Russell/Gödel: is so to speak a fragment of a proposition. It is only possible to combine them if they "fit together" i.e. are of a suitable type. GödelVsRussell: Concepts (terms) as real objects: then the theory of simple types is not plausible, because what one would expect (like "transitivity" or the number two) to be a concept would then seem to be something that stands behind all its different "realizations" on the different levels and therefore does not exist according to type theory. I XXV Paradoxes in the intensional form/Gödel: here type theory brings a new idea: namely to blame the paradoxes not on the axiom that every propositional function defines a concept or a class, but on the assumption that every concept results in a meaningful proposition if it is claimed for any object as an argument. The objection that any concept can be extended to all arguments by defining another one that gives a false proposition whenever the original one was meaningless can easily be invalidated by pointing out that the concept "meaningfully applicable" does not always have to be meaningfully applicable itself. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Göd II Kurt Gödel Collected Works: Volume II: Publications 1938-1974 Oxford 1990 |
| Stegmüller, W. | Hintikka Vs Stegmüller, W. | Wittgenstein I 273 Language/World/Language Game/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: according to the popular view (among others, Stegmüller 1975, 584) Wittgenstein abstains from showing in his late philosophy in how far language is directly linked to the reality. Stegmüller: thesis: we should not pay attention to the meaning of our expressions, but to the manner in which they are used. Hintikka: according to this (supposedly Wittgensteinian) view the "vertical" connections do not matter through which our words are linked with objects and our sentences to facts, but it is "horizontal" connections between different moves in the course of our language games that matter. That means suggesting that Wittgenstein says understanding of language is nothing more than understanding the role that different types of statements play in different circumstances in our lives (Vs: Understanding Language = Understanding the Role it Plays). HintikkaVsStegmüller: this interpretation would result in that according to Wittgenstein not even the ordinary descriptive meaning is based on truth conditions. According to that, assertibility and justifiability conditions were a possible Wittgensteinian counterpart to the truth conditions. Then a statement would not be justified if it corresponds to a fact, but if its assertion is justified through its role in our language-related activities - ultimately through its role in our lives. Wittgenstein I 274 HintikkaVsStegmüller: the late Wittgenstein is far from abolishing the vertical relations between language and reality. He rather emphasizes them! The main function of language games (though not the only one) is to accomplish this task. Wittgenstein I 279 ff Use Theory/Wittgenstein/HintikkaVsStegmüller: in the (here criticized) "naturalized" view "X" (Stegmüller among others) Wittgenstein is said to eventually have given up asking questions about meaning, and instead examined the use. Variant: according to a subordinate interpretation Xa, use is to be understood as the language game which is the "logical home" this expression. However, this is not the interpretation that is assumed by the "naturalized" the interpretation of "X". Several facets: in X Wittgenstein understands the use of an expression as something that is not very different from the usual traditional language use. Wittgenstein I 280 Use Theory/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: does this correspond to Wittgenstein, though? In the famous equation of use and meaning Wittgenstein uses a word that essentially has two meanings: for use a) can serve to emphasize the usual, the traditional, or it can. b) indicate that it is about the practical application of a thing (such as "Instructions for Use"). That is consistent with Wittgenstein’s comparison of words with tools and speaks to a high degree in favor of the new interpretation. Wittgenstein speaks of "use" and "application". "Application I understand to be that which makes a language out of the sound combinations or lines. "You can shorten the description of use by saying this word designates the object." Hintikka: if use did not serve as a link between language and the world, it could not be abbreviated in this way. HintikkaVsStegmüller: the mistake is to regard language games as a predominantly intra-linguistic (verbal) games, i.e. games whose moves typically consist in speech acts. Move/Language Game/Hintikka: in contrast, the moves of the interpretation advocated here consist in transitions, where utterances can indeed play a role, but usually not the only role. On the contrary, many moves do not need to contain any linguistic utterances. X/Terminology/Hintikka: we shall call X the "mistake of verbal language games". Wittgenstein already warned against this error in his explanation of the expression "language game": "The word is to emphasize here that the speaking of a language is part of an activity or a way of life". Wittgenstein I 281 Hintikka: according to X, speaking the language would not be a part of the language game, but it would be the whole language game as such. Evidence: in "Über Gewissheit" language games are apparently contrasted to speaking: "Our speech obtains its meaning by the rest of our actions". Wittgenstein I 314/315 E.g. beetle in the box. PU § 293. "The thing in the box does not belong to the language game, not even as a something. Through the thing in the box abbreviations can be made. It lifts off itself, whatever it is". Stegmüller: (according to Hintikka): asserts that Wittgenstein denies the existence of private experiences in general. Hintikka: if we are right, the naturalized conception is not only wrong, but diametrically wrong: Private Language/HintikkaVsStegmüller: the changeover from the phenomenological to the physical language does not even touch the ontological status of the phenomenological objects, including private experiences!. The world in which we live remains for us a world of phenomenological objects, but we need to talk about it in the same language in which we talk about physical objects. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Wittgenstein | Place Vs Wittgenstein | Arm II 55 PlaceVsWittgenstein/PlaceVsArmstrong: the world should not be regarded as a "world of facts" (Tractatus). Situations/Armstrong: are localized in space and time. Spacetime itself is a "big situation". (II 33/34) Conceptualism/PlaceVsArmstrong: thus understood space and time would be abstractions. But these are only linguistic fictions. Ontology/Place: everything that exists are certain spatial relations between particulars. Also relations within particulars. And between situations. Space/Time/Place: are only abbreviations for spatial, temporal and spatio-temporal relations. Spatial Relations/Place: exist between particulars. Temporal Relations/Place: not between particulars, but between situations. |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Names | Burge, T. | I 256 Names/Burge: Thesis first: that proper names do not abbreviate predicates, but are predicates by their own nature. Thesis then: they are not abbreviations for the role of predicate and operator, but in some cases they play the role of predicate and demonstrative pronoun. ~ Thesis (like Kripke): a name applies if the object has received the name in an appropriate way. The name itself enters into the conditions of its applicability an "ï" in which names differ from many predicates. For example, the predicate "is a dog": an object could be a dog even if the word "dog" was never used as a symbol ï-" but an object could not be a Jones if someone did not use "Jones" as a name ï-" Example wrong: Jones is necessarily a Jones. Cresswell II 152 Names/Burge/Cresswell: Burge 1973) Thesis: Names are predicates e.g. "there are relatively few Alfreds in Princeton", e.g. "All Alfreds are crazy". I.e. names are simply very often used predicatively. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
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