Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Extensionality | Simons | Chisholm II 185 Extensionality/Quine: we assume space time points instead of "durable goods". SimonsVsQuine: language without continuants (permanent object) cannot be learned. Chisholm: probably time and modality, but not temporal or modal components: either a) accept phenomena, refuse extensionality or b) reject phenomena, demand extensionality for real lasting objects. >Entia Sukzessiva. SimonsVsChisholm: it is better to accept Aristotle things with unnecessary parts: trees simply consist of matter. This is more evidence than Wittgenstein's atoms. --- Simons I 3 Extensionality/Simons: if extensionality is rejected, more than one object can have exactly the same parts and therefore more than one object can be at the same time in the same place. Then we are dealing with continuants. Continuant/Simons: everything which is not an event is a continuant (see below) or everything that can have mass. >Continuants, >Parts. I 11 Extensional Mereology/CEM/extensionality/Simons: a characteristic property of extensional mereology is the relationship "part-of-or-identical-with". This corresponds with "less-than-or-equal" relationship. Overlapping: overlapping can be used as the only fundamental concept. Limiting case: separateness and identity. I 105f Part/VsExtensional Mereology/Simons: 1. A whole is sometimes not one of its own parts. 2. Sometimes it is not transitive. 3. The existence of "sum-individuals" is not always guaranteed. That means, that the axioms, for individuals who obey any predicate, are wrong. 4. Identity criteria for individuals who have all parts in common, are wrong. I 106 5. Provides a materialist ontology of four-dimensional objects. Part/Simons: thesis: there is no uniform meaning of "part". I 117 Extensionality/Simons: extensionality is left with the rejection of the proper parts principle: I 28 Proper Parts Principle/strong/strong supporting principle: if x is not part of y, then there is a z which is part of x and which is separated from y. Solution for distinguishing sum (Tib + Tail) and whole (process) Tibbles (cat). >Tibbles-expample. Simons: the coincidence of individuals is temporarily indistinguishable (perceptually). >Superposition: superposition means being at the same time in the same place. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Four-Dimensionalism | Simons | I 121 Four-Dimensionalism/flux/Simons (instead continuants): then Tib and Tibbles do not share all parts. But non-identity does not exclude mereological extensionality. >Mereology, >Extensionality, >Extensional mereology. I 122 Four-Dimensionalism/flux/Simons: e.g. "Tibbles at t": is an instantaneous three-dimensional phase or time-slice of the four-dimensional object Tibbles. >Tibbles-example. Predicates: predicates in four-dimensionalism are "eternal". The change is supported by the terms ((s) nouns). Then Tibbles equals a cat process. Then we cannot say Tib + Tail because this is different, although they have all parts in common. Then this is no longer extensionality. To save these, modality must be denied de re. Four-Dimensionalism pro extensionality, VsModality de re. "Time slice": a "time slice" is still a whole human. ((s) The "thinness" lies in the time period.) Quine: physical objects in four-dimensional space time are indistinguishable from processes. >Four-dimensionalism/Quine. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Identity | Simons | Chisholm II 171 Identity/Simons: thesis: differentiated objects may well have all parts in common: e.g. I and my body (ChisholmVs). >Parts, >Part-of-relation. --- Simons I 113 Identity/individual/whole/part/whole/extensional mereology/RescherVsExtensionality: (Rescher 1955): the extensional property that involves that wholes are identical if they have the same parts, excludes those part-whole relations, in which the organization ((s) internal structure) is involved, e.g. different sentences can consist of the same sentences, e.g. two "I's", and must not be identical if they have the same parts. E.g. a building committee equals a personnel committee, e.g. family Robinso equals the basketball team Robinson, e.g. a person/its body. N.B.: this is not about relations among themselves. >Mereology. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Objects (Material Things) | Chisholm | I 257 Res/Aquinas/Duns Scotus: "thing", transcendental, convertible with the beings (ens). Brentano: Reism (late): abstractions, universals, negations, facts, forms, fictions: are not things. >Ontology/Brentano. Hedwig, Klaus. Brentano und Kopernikus. In: Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/ Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986 --- Simons I 2 Chisholm: Thesis: (appearing) things (appearances) are logical constructions of objects for which the mereological essentialism applies. - Flux: Problem: changing objects cannot be regarded as identical with themselves according to the extensional mereology - Solution/Chisholm: thesis the actual are mereologically constant and the phenomena again logical constructions from immutable objects - VsChisholm: other solution: processes (with temporal parts ) instead of objects (continuants). >Continuants. Simons I 120 Object/Thing/Object/Chisholm: Thesis: "Mereological constancy": objects in the original sense: - entia per se: cannot change - in the derived sense: entia per alio: subject to the flux, but only by being consulted successively through different entia per se, which differ in their parts. >Mereology/Simons, >Terminology/Simons. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chisholm, R.M. | Simons Vs Chisholm, R.M. | Chisholm II 166 SimonsVsChisholm/SimonsVsBrentano: thesis: Chisholm inherited a mereological essentialism by Brentano with which I do not agree. But I will use these ideas to give a slightly different interpretation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Wittgenstein himself was not so clear with respect to facts as it seems. Self-Criticism: self-criticism is a mess of facts and complexes. There are worlds between the later Wittgenstein and Brentano, but there are contacts between Brentano and the Tractatus. --- Simons I 1 Extensional Mereology/Simons: extensional mereology is a classical theory. Spelling: CEM. Individuals Calculus/Leonard/Goodman: (40s): another name for the CEM is an individual calculus. This is intended to express that the objects of the part-whole relation belong to the lowest logical type (so they are all individuals, both a whole and a part are individuals). VsCEM: 1. The CEM claims the existence of sums as individuals for whose existence we have no evidence beyond the theory. Vs: 2. The whole theory is not applicable to most things in our lives. Vs: 3. The logic of the CEM has not the resources to deal with temporal and modal terms: e.g. temporal part, substantial part, etc. Simons: these are all external critiques but there is an internal critique: that comes from the extensional mereology. Extensional Mereology: thesis: objects with the same parts are identical (analogous to set theory). Problem: 1. Flux: e.g. people have different parts at different times. I 2 2. Modality/extensional mereology: problem: e.g. a man could have other parts than he actually has and still be the same person. (s) The extensionality would then demand together with the Leibniz identity that all parts are essential. This leads to mereological essentialism. Chisholm/mereological essentialism/Simons: Chisholm represents the mereological essentialism. Thesis: no object can have different parts than it actually has. Vs: it is a problem to explain why normal objects are not modally rigid (all parts are essential). Solution/Chisholm: thesis: (appearing) things (appearances) ((s) everyday things) are logical structures made of objects for which the mereological essentialism applies. Flux/mereology/Simons: problem/(s): according to the CEM changing objects may not be regarded as identical with themselves. 1. Solution/Chisholm: thesis: the actual objects are mereologically constant and the appearances again logical constructions of unchanging objects. SimonsVsChisholm: the price is too high. 2. Common solution: the common solution is to replace the normal things (continuants) through processes that themselves have temporal parts. SimonsVs: hence, the extensionality cannot be maintained. Such four-dimensional objects fail on the modal argument. CEM/event/Simons: in the case of events the extensional mereology is applicable. It is also applicable in classes and masses. Classes/masses/Simons: these are non-singular objects for which the extensionality applies. Part/Simons: a part is ambiguous, depending on whether used in connection with individuals, classes or masses. Extensionality/mereology/Simons: if extensionality is rejected, we are dealing with continuants. I 3 Continuants/Simons: continuants may be in flux. Extensionality/Simons: if extensionality is rejected, more than one object can have exactly the same parts and therefore several different objects can be at the same time in the same place. I 175 Temporal Part/continuants/mereology/SimonsVsAll/SimonsVsChisholm: thesis: continuants can also have temporal parts! That means that they are not mereologically constant but mereologically variable. Continuants/Simons: thesis: continuants do not have to exist continuously. This provides us with a surprising solution to the problem of the Ship of Theseus. I 187 SimonsVsChisholm: if Chisholm is right, most everyday things, including our organism, are only logical constructions. I 188 Strict Connection/separateness/SimonsVsChisholm: the criterion for strict connection is unfortunately so that it implies that if x and y are strictly connected, but not in contact, they can be separated by the fact that a third object passes between them what per se is not a change, also not in their direct relations to each other. Problem: when this passing is only very short, the question is whether the separated sum of the two which was extinguished by the third object is the same that exists again when the third object has disappeared. If it is the same, we have a discontinued existing sum. Chisholm: Chisholm himself asks this question with the following example: a castle of toy bricks will be demolished and built again with the same bricks. I 189 Chisholm: thesis: it is a reason to be dissatisfied with the normal ontology, because it just allows such examples. SimonsVsChisholm: but Chisholm's own concepts just allowed us the previous example. Topology/Simons: yet there is no doubt that it is useful to add topological concepts such as touching or to be inside of something to the mereology. I 192 Def succession/Chisholm: 1. x is a direct a-successor of y to t ' = Def (i) t does not start before t’ (ii) x is an a to t and y is a y to t’ (iii) there is a z so that z is part of x to t and a part of y to t’ and in every moment between t’ and t including, z is itself an a. Simons: while there will be in general several such parts. We always choose the largest. w: is the common part in it, e.g. in altering a table. SimonsVsChisholm: problem: w is not always a table. ChisholmVsVs: claims that w is indeed a table: if we cut away a small part of the table, what remains is still a table. Problem: but if the thing that remains is a table because it was already previously there then it was a table that was a real part of a table! I 193 SimonsVsChisholm: the argument is not valid! E.g.: Shakespeare, Henry IV, Act IV Scene V: Prince Hal considers: if the king dies, we will still have a king, (namely myself, the heir). But if that person is a king, then, because he had previously been there, then he was a king who was the eldest son of a king. ((s) This is a contradiction because then there would have been two kings simultaneously.) Simons: this point is not new and was already highlighted by Wiggins and Quine (not VsChisholm). I 194 Change/transformation/part/succession/SimonsVsChisholm: it seems, however, that they are not compatible with the simple case where a at the same time wins and loses parts. E.g. then a+b should be an A-predecessor of a+c and a+c an A-successor of a+b. But that is not allowed by the definition, unless we know that a is an A all the time, so that it connects a+b and a+c in a chain. But this will not usually be the case. And if it is not the case, a will never ever be an A! SimonsVsChisholm: so Chisholm's definitions only work if he assumes a wrong principle! Succession/entia successiva/SimonsVsChisholm: problem: that each of the things that shall "stand in" (for a constant ens per se to explain the transformation) should themselves be an a in the original sense (e.g. table, cat, etc.) is counterintuitive. Solution/Simons: the "is" is here an "is" of predication and not of constitution (>Wiggins 1980, 30ff). Mereological Constancy/Simons: thesis: most things, of which we predict things like e.g. "is a man" or "is a table" are mereologically constant. The rest is easy loose speech and a play with identity. E.g. if we say that the man in front of us lost a lot of hair in the last year we use "man" very loosely. Chisholm: we should say, strictly speaking, that the man of today (stands for) who today stands for the same successive man has less hair than the man who stood for him last year. SimonsVsChisholm/WigginsVsChisholm: with that he is dangerously close to the four-dimensionalism. And especially because of the following thesis: I 195 To stand in for/stand for/entia successiva/Chisholm: thesis: "to stand in for" is not a relation of an aggregate to its parts. Sortal Concept/Simons: the question is whether sortal concepts that are subject to the conditions that determine what should count at one time or over time as a thing or several things of one kind are applicable rather to mereologically constant objects (Chisholm) or variable objects (Simons, Wiggins). SimonsVsChisholm: Chisholm's thesis has the consequence that most people mostly use their most used terms wrongly, if this is not always the case at all. I 208 Person/body/interrupted existence/identity/mereology/Chisholm/Simons: our theory is not so different in the end from Chisholm's, except that we do not accept matter-constancy as "strictly and philosophically" and oppose it to a everyday use of constancy. SimonsVsChisholm: advantage: we can show how the actual use of "ship" is related to hidden tendencies to use it in the sense of "matter-constant ship". Ship of Theseus/SimonsVsChisholm: we are not obligated to mereological essentialism. A matter-constant ship is ultimately a ship! That means that it is ready for use! Interrupted Existence/substrate/Simons: there must be a substrate that allows the identification across the gap. I 274 SimonsVsChisholm: according to Chisholm's principle, there is no real object, which is a table, because it can constantly change its microstructure ((s) win or lose atoms). Chisholm/Simons: but by this not the slightest contradiction for Chisholm is demonstrated. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Extensionality | Verschiedene Vs Extensionality | Simons I 105 VsCEM/VsExtensional Mereology/Simons: Criticisms in ascending importance: 1. That there are different meanings of "part" where a whole does not count as one of its own parts. 2. That there are meanings of "part" for which the part-whole relation is not transitive. 3. That the existence of "sum-individuals" is not guaranteed or (equivalently) that the axioms for individuals who obey any predicate are wrong. 4. That the identity criteria for individuals of the axioms that identify individuals who have all parts in common are wrong. I 106 5. That the ontology imposed by extensional part-whole theory is a materialistic ontology of four-dimensional objects. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Extensionality | Simons Vs Extensionality | I 116 Extensionality/Simons: we leave extensionality with the rejection of ≤. I 117 ≤: the relation ≤ is not antisymmetric, it is a partial order, that means it is reflexive and transitive. In terms of it one can define a symmetric predicate: Def coincidence of parts/mereology/spelling/Simons: SD16 x ≤≥ y ≡ x ≤ y u y ≤ x. Coinciding individuals are perceptually indistinguishable for their period of coincidence. They are in superposition. Def superposition/mereology/Simons: they occupy the same place at the same time. Question: (see below): do all superposed objects coincide mereologically? By rejecting the proper parts principle we receive an abundance of descriptions and explanatory power. SimonsVsExtensionality: extensionality is too ascetic for mereology. I 251 Part/SimonsVsExtensionality/VsCEM/VsExtensional Mereology/Simons: we see which abundance we have to give up if we want to remain extensional, because now we have three concepts of part instead of one, which throws together the SSP and there may be even more. CEM/Extensional Mereology/Simons: extensional mereology is actually a substantive thesis: individuals who are of the same material are identified. Coincidence-Principle/Simons: 1. For the two more powerful coincidence concepts of identity and the strong coincidence we refuse it. 2. For weak coincidence we allow it, provided we consider only superimposed material individuals. Strictly weak inclusion: e.g. there is no reason to deny that Caesar's heart is weakly included in the matter of Caesar. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Extensionality | Rescher Vs Extensionality | Simons I 113 Identity/individual/whole/part/extensional mereology/RescherVsExtensionality: (Rescher 1955): the extensional property that implies that wholeness is identical when they have the same parts excludes those "part-whole" relations in which the organization (being ordered, (s) internal structure) is involved. For example, different sentences may consist of the same sentences. Identity Condition/Simons: "...if they have the same parts" is thus ambiguous. Simons: the Rescher Sense corresponds to SF13. SF13 (z)[z ≤ x ≡ z ≤ y] ⊃ x = y. Individual/Partial/Identity condition/SimonsVsRescher: but he also has something like SF12 under his axioms, although at the same time he argues that "part" does not need to be reflexive, while our two relations "<" and ">" are indeed reflexive. Simons: one can put it this way: ((s) holistic): Some individuals exist only because other individuals exist, namely their parts. These are the sums. SimonsVsRescher: for example different sentences from the same words: the example is unfortunate because it speaks of what could be instead of what is. Thus he has already accepted the reference to abstract types instead of concrete tokens. Mereology/Simons: but we are not talking about the mereology of abstract entities, but of concrete tokens. Let us assume, for example, plastic pieces that are shaped like words. In a box there are tokens of the word "cardinals" and tokens of the word "multiply". Thus a sum of these two can exist as long as they are in the box, but no sentence. ((s) thus sum unequal to sentence!). Now we can form sentences: 1. "Multiply Cardinals": this could mean: a) one imperative to mathematicians, b) another to the Pope. Sum/Rescher/Simons: cannot be the same as the sentence, because the sum already existed before in the box. Now we can make a new sentence out of the same words: 2. "Cardinals multiply": "cardinals multiply" (a) because the Pope is active, or b) the cardinals: ba): in mathematics, bb) otherwise). Vs: one could argue that these sentence exist at different times. Thus the representative of extensionalism has a way to introduce temporal parts. I 114 Solution/Simons: assuming the plastic words are semicircular, then one can make both sentences at the same time. PPP/Simons: the example is not necessarily a refutation of PPP, and SCT71 PPP Ez[z << x] u (z)[z << x] ⊃ z < y SCT71 (Ez)[z << x] v (Ez)[z << y ] ⊃. (z)[z << x ≡ z << y] ⊃ x = y because it is not completely wrong to say that one sentence also contains the fragment "nals mult", but the other does not! RescherVsExtensionality/Simons: for a counter-example in its style we need two individuals who are not identical, although they all have parts in common. So that their difference is a question of the relations between the parts. ((s) Structure, intensional). For example, the Robinson family can be the same as the basketball team Robinson at a time. But we shouldn't identify either of them. Similarly, for example, the Building Committee can have the same members as the Personnel Committee. |
Resch I Nicholas Rescher The Criteriology of Truth; Fundamental Aspects of the Coherence Theory of Truth, in: The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford 1973 - dt. Auszug: Die Kriterien der Wahrheit In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Resch II N. Rescher Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kant’ s Theory of Rational Systematization Cambridge 2010 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Goodman, N. | Simons Vs Goodman, N. | I 108 Sum/extensional mereology/CEM/Simons: CEM, or extensional mereology, is based on a general existence of sums. This has found the most critics, including Rescher and Chisholm. ChisholmVsSum: it seems that it does not belong to the concept of part intrinsically or analytically, that there must be a sum that should otherwise contain all of these individuals and nothing else. I 109 Part: but somebody who refuses the sum-axioms does not refuse Lesniewski’s and Goodmans’ and others concept of "part". Individual: instead of it there is disagreement about the concept "individual". Individual/Goodman: an individual has a very technical sense for him: they must not be connected or causally connected as everyday things. They do not have to be "medium size dry". Any accumulation of individuals may be (subject to paradoxes) combined into an abstract quantity. Individual/Goodman: an individual is analogous to such abstract quantities and each cluster (collection) of individuals can be grouped to a sum-individual (here, however, without the threat of paradoxes!). The resulting thing does not have to be anything that can be found in the everyday world. SimonsVsGoodman: but that is only so far a good analogy as the existence of any desired composition is acceptable. We must distinguish: a) the existence of specific (not abstract) pluralities can be claimed, but not: b) the one of abstract pluralities which is just a mere reflection of the existence of a plural term, therefore merely a facon de parler. Goodman's sum-individuals seem merely correspond to the need for a reference for some arbitrary expressions. I 110 Sum/Goodman/Simons: Goodman could indicate that arbitrary sum individuals obey the extensional theory. They exist in which the identity in the equality of parts exists. Identity/SimonsVsGoodman: this general condition of the equality of all parts is itself questionable (see below). Sum/mereology/Simons: so far no one has been able to show that the acceptance of sums leads to contradictions (as Russell has shown it for certain sets). ((s) stronger/weaker/(s): stronger theories tend to lead to contradictions.) Simons: but even the strongest extensional mereology does not lead to contradictions. Theory/solution/Simons: not the theory is suspicious but its non-critical application to the world. Part relation/Simons: part relations may be different in different areas (for example, mathematics). One must not force them to a common denominator. Sum/Simons: what damage should they cause that does not already exist in the ontological assumption of corresponding "pluralisms"? I 111 Sum/mereology/Simons: suppose we looked at any portions of space-time as evidenced by any sums. Then it comes to the question whether the relevant predicates are cumulative. I 284 "Normal part"/mereology/Simons: philosophers often forget that there is a middle way between a simple part and an essential part: that something is a "normal part of a normal kind". There is no formal theory of "normal mereology". Here are some informal remarks: Normality/Simons: one could start from the idea of a well-shaped thing of a kind. Normality/Aristotle: Aristotle called an object mutilated when it is connected but a prominent part is missing. Shapeliness/music/Nicholas WolterstorffVsGoodman/Simons: (Wolterstorff 1980, 56): he applied the idea of a normal or shapely thing of a kind to music pieces: it is non-well-formed if one or more of the normal parts are missing or are in the wrong place. Thus, the term is a little wider than Aristotle defined it. It allows us to say that a performance with an incorrect note is still a performance of the same piece. GoodmanVsWolterstorff: (Goodman 1969, 186f): we must not allow this because of the transitivity of identity: if a performance with a wrong note is identical, then at the end all pieces identical. I 285 Metaphysics/Goodman/Simons: metaphysics represents here a hard metaphysical line and adheres to bivalence and strict identity conditions. SimonsVsGoodman: the price for it is a distance from the everyday language. Solution/Simons: musical performance has no strict identity conditions. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Simons, P. | Wiggins Vs Simons, P. | Simons I 216 Superposition/Simons: it is not just a pragmatic resistance that lets us assume that two objects cannot be superposed and yet have no common part. Simons: nevertheless pro, WigginsVsSuperposition/WigginsVsSimons: he makes this clear in the following principle: Principle/Wiggins: A and a real part or component B of a third thing C, where A unequal C and A ≠ B and where no part or component of A is a part or component of B or of C, cannot completely occupy the same space at the same time. Simons: where does this lead? rta: be the container from a to t. This means that space can become the object of timeless operators and predicates of extensional mereology. Frame of Reference: we assume it as fixed, so that identity of spaces can be determined. Then we can apply all axioms of CEM (Extensional Mereology), also the Sum-Axiom and the SSP are not contradictory. (…+…) I 217 SimonsVsWiggins: that does not seem particularly frightening. It even seems to be able to be amplified. For example, we can assume a Strong Supplement Principle (SSP) that is relativized to times: (…+…) SimonsVsCoincidence Principle: if it were correct, it would establish a very close conceptual link between mereological relations and spatial relations between continuants. Simons pro Wiggins: in any case we can agree that "space" can only be mapped by reference to its occupants. ((s) >no "empty space"). Thus, the conceptual utility of the part-whole relations between continuants will consist in their necessity for the formation of spatial concepts. Coincidence Principle/Simons: it is neat and it provides a seductive simplification. SimonsVsCoincidence Principle/SimonsVsWiggins: one pays too high a price. I 218 But with his rejection we must also reject one of the premises, WP, PP or SSP. Which one? I would reject SSP (see below). But first we want to test WP against a hypothetical counter-example from Sharvy. I 220 WigginsVsSuperposition/Simons: his argument for WP goes like this: Suppose A and B were distinct and at the same place at the same time. Then they cannot be distinguished by location. Then they have to be distinguished by their properties. Problem: no space region (volume) can be described simultaneously by different predicates (be it color, form, texture etc.). (s) It cannot be spherical and cube-shaped at the same time). I 221 Simons: the latter may be true, but that does not speak against the possibility of a perfect mixture, because its qualities do not have to be those of its ingredients in isolation, which is proved by the imperfect mixtures every day. ((s) Contradiction to above I 218: there mixture of compound is distinguished by the fact that the properties of the ingredients are largely preserved in the mixture.) Superposition/Simons: Assuming that it would be possible that the occupation of space by a mass would be a gradual matter, then it would be possible that different masses occupy the same region Simons: although the occupation would have different intensity distributions. Simons: if this were the case, Wiggins' principle would be wrong and then we would have to doubt its necessity. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| extens. Mereology | Simons, P. | I 1 Extensional Mereology: Thesis: objects with the same parts are identical (in analogy to set theory). problem: 1st Flux: E.g. people have different parts at different times. I 2 2nd Modality/Extensional mereology: Problem: E.g. a man could have other parts, as he has aktual and still be the same person. I 251 CEM/Simons: is actually a substantive theory: individuals that are made of the same materials are identified. |
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