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Action Theory | Weber | Habermas III 378 Action Theory/Communicative Action/Weber/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: since Weber assumes a monological model of action, "social action" cannot be explained by the concept of meaning. It is based on the concept of purposive action and must extend it by two provisions to explain social interaction: a) Orientation towards the behaviour of other subjects b) The reflective relationship between the orientations of several interaction participants. >Purposive action, >Purpose rationality, >Action, >Interaction, >Cooperation. Habermas III 379 Act/Action/Weber/Habermas: Weber distinguishes between procedural rational value rational emotional and traditional action. Weber therefore does not start with the social relationship. >Value rationality, >Rationality, cf. >Rationalization. Habermas III 380 Purpose rational action/Weber: the subjective sense here extends to: Means, purposes, values, consequences Value rational action: on means, purposes, values Emotional action: on means and purposes Traditional action: only on the means. Cf. >Purpose-means-rationality, >Purposes, >Goals, >Values, cf. >Consequentialism. Habermas III 381 Habermas: "Inofficial version" of Weber's theory of action ((s) this is a position not explicitly represented by Weber, which could, however, be deduced from his texts): here mechanisms of coordination of action are distinguished, depending on whether only interests or also social agreement are taken as a basis. (1) >Action Theory/Habermas. 1.Vgl. M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, hrsg. v. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964, S.246f. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
Animals | Papineau | I 254 Thinking/Knowledge/Animal/Papineau: Levels: Purpose-Means-Thinking/Papineau: Level 0: "Monomats": Tue V Level 1: "Opportunists": If B, do V I 248 Level 2: "people in need": If B and T, do V Level 3: "Voter": If B1 and T1, do V1, IF T1 is the dominant need A comparative mechanism is needed here. Level 4: "Learners": AFTER experience has shown that B1, T1, and V1 result in a reward, then ... (like 3). Level 0: 4 apply to simple creatures. Nowhere is general information of the form "all A's or B's" or generic, causal information "A's cause B's" I 255 Or even conditionals about present circumstances, "If A occurs, B will also occur." >Generality/Papineau, >Animals, >Animal language, >Thinking without language, >World/thinking. |
Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 |
Bourgeois/Citizen | Marx | Mause I 49 Bourgeois/citoyen/MarxVsHegel/Marx: The "political state" (Marx 1956b, p. 351), which historically helped the "bourgeois society" (1) to assert it, is the mere guarantor of this atomistic society of the selfish bourgeois pursuing its private interests, whose rights it protects in the form of liberal fundamental and human rights (2). In this way it preserves the bourgeois way of existence of (...) a human being alienated from his "species-being" (3), isolated individual, who sees in his peers not the communitarian opportunity for realization, but the barrier of his freedom. The citoyen is nothing more than the idealized projection of this alienated species-being, and the state, which according to this idealization presents itself as the Republican realizing space of this citoyen, actually proves to be an instrument for stabilizing bourgeois society and the competition of its members. Under the historical conditions of bourgeois society, therefore, the citoyen always remains subordinate to the bourgeois, and likewise the relationship between politics and economy appears in the form of a purpose-means reversal. Republicanism/MarxVsRousseau, MarxVsHegel: The republican goal planned by Rousseau and Hegel is therefore not achievable for Marx within the limits of the existing economic system. >Bourgeois/citizen//Hegel. >Bourgeois/citizen/Rousseau. 1. K. Marx, Zur Judenfrage. In Marx Engels Werke, Bd. 1 (MEW 1), Hrsg. Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED, Berlin 1956, S. 354-356,366-370. 2. Ibid. p. 361-367 3. Ibid. p. 366,370. |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
Cognition | Papineau | I 273 Cognition/space/spatial orientation/content/animal/Papineau: Many birds and insects do not have egocentric maps of their environments. Nevertheless, this is not necessary purpose-means-thinking. It depends on how they use these maps! >Map example, >Animals/Papineau, >Thinking without language, >World/thinking, >Thinking. For example, they might just simply draw a straight line from their respective position to the destination, which would not be purpose-means-thinking. For example, it would be purpose-means-thinking if they were to use cognition to imagine a continuous path, which avoids all obstacles, from their initial position within the non-egocentric map, and then decide to take this path. This would be a combination of causal individual information. >Purposes/Papineau. |
Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 |
Consciousness | Sterelny | I 378 Mind/Animal/Consciousness/Representation/Sterelny: what would show that an animal has a "theory of mind"? >Theory of mind, >Animals, >Animal language. Heyes/Whiten: Maybe the ability for a role exchange? Later Vs. I 379 Premack/Woodruff: E.g. Chimpanzee Sarah sorted out photos that showed the solution of problems! HeyesVs: every single case can be clarified. Method/Heyes/Sterelny: however, it is little economical to "explain away" every single performance. One can see that there is no uniform "spoilsport theory". >Method, >Theories, >Explanations. Gorillas/Byrnes: gorillas do not learn by learning individual "chunks" of movement, but they capture a behavioral program. >Learning, >Behavior. Imitation/Sterelny: although there is a lot of anecdotal evidence about imitation in human beings, the experimental evidence for imitation is astonishingly narrow. >Imitation. I 380 But in the positive cases, it is impressive because it shows the ability of an observer to extract a program of motoric movements. >Observation, >Generality, >Generalization. HeyesVs: it doubts that the concept of a behavioral program is unclear. Delimitation to a series of movements or behavioral sequences are not clear. Sterelny: but we should be able to distinguish something empirically: 1. If social learning consists in imprecisely imitating, different individuals should not commit the same errors. The errors would have to happen at random. 2. Imitation could be distinguished from other types of social learning if a result could be achieved in more than one way. If a model is needed, it should not only contain something about the objectives but also about the means. >Models, >Goals, >Purpose-means-rationality. |
Sterelny I Kim Sterelny "Primate Worlds", in: The Evolution of Cognition, C. Heyes/L. Huber (Eds.) Cambridge/MA 2000 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Sterelny II Kim Sterelny Dawkins vs. Gould: Survival of the Fittest Cambridge/UK 2007 |
Content | Papineau | I 253 Drive/Animal/Content/Papineau: Purpose-Means-thinking/Papineau: Level 0: "Monomats": Tue V Level 1: "Opportunists": If B, do V >Purposes/Papineau. I 248 Level 2: "people in need": If B and T, do V Level 3: "Voter": If B1 and T1, do V1, IF T1 is the dominant need A comparative mechanism is needed here. Level 4: "Learners": AFTER experience has shown that B1, T1, and V1 result in a reward, then ... (like 3). >Learning. Level 2 does not necessarily entail 3. There can be something like Buridan's donkey, which works reliably when only one drive is activated. >Buridan's donkey. Level 4: here drives play a further role: they intensify behavior, which lead to the reduction of drives. >Behavior, >Drives. I 254 Drive/Content/Papineau: through this complexity, it is uncertain what the exact content is, which the drives represent. A) Should it consist in the specific results? B) or in the different effects? Papineau pro b). >Thinking, >Animals, cf. >Animal language. |
Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 |
Drives/Instincts | Papineau | I 250, 254 Drive/Content/Papineau: Level 0: Monomats: tue V Level 1 Opportunists If A, tue V Level 3: Voters: if a and B, tue V1 or V2, depending on what is more desired. Due to this complexity, it is uncertain what the exact content is that drives represent a) specific results b) different effects? Papineau pro b. >Complexity, >Parts, >Whole, >Behavior, >Animals. I 276 Purpose-Means-Thinking/Non-Egocentric/Animal/Dickinson's Rats/Papineau: which animals have non-egocentric awareness of causal relations? Apes, primates: only very limited - new experiments by Dickinson seem to show that rats have non-egocentric purpose-means-thinking. >Egocentrism, >Thinking, >Thinking without language. I 279 Practical syllogism is unequal to purpose-means thinking. >Practical syllogism, >Purposes/Papineau. I 281 PapineauVsDickinson: (ad Heyes & Dickinson 1990(1)): the rats are still causally egocentric. Only causal information: from their own behaviour. 1. C. Heyes & A. Dickinson (1990). "The Intentionality of Animal Action". In: Mind and Language 1990, p. 87-104. |
Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 |
Generality | Papineau | I 255 Generality/Animal/Thinking/Papineau: no simple organism explicitly represents general facts. E.g. it is one thing to represent the location of a particular pond, that water is in ponds is quite another matter. This corresponds to the question: which animals can have beliefs? >Animals, >Thinking, >World/thinking, >Thinking without language, >Spatial localization, >Representation. I 256 Purpose-means-thinking/Papineau: I have not defined this concept in terms of beliefs but of design: as the use of general representations. I avoid the concept belief. >Beliefs, >Content. Representation/Papineau: why should an animal have no general representations? I 257 After all, it has this disposition right now, because its behavior in the past has led to this result. >Generalization. Disposition/Representation/Papineau: should the disposition itself not be regarded as the incarnation of the general information "Drinking supplies water"? >Disposition, >Information. I do not want to dispute such content attribution. The disposition represents information about the general "connection of reaction with result" (B&T, V>R). Purpose-Means-Thinking/Papineau: if it requires explicit representations, it no longer follows that simple creatures can be considered ZM thinkers. I 258 Explicit representation requires physical tangibility. Vs: all behavioral dispositions must have some kind of physical embodiment. >Behavior, >Embodiment. I 259 Explicit/implicit: if an organism has implicitly different pieces of general information in different dispositions ("water is in ponds"), it still has no system to combine them. >Complexity, >Parts, >Whole, >Sense. |
Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 |
Inferentialism | Brandom | I 205 Inferentialism/BrandomVs: the following varieties: 1) content construed only as representation 2) quality of the inference only formal 3) rationality only instruments (purpose-means-justification). Brandom: Thesis: In favor of strong inferentialism, VsHyper-inferentialism: according to which the inferential structure is always sufficient for the content. >Content. --- II 45 Inferentialism/Brandom: Definition weak inferentialism: inferential structure is a necessary element for defining the conceptual. Definition strong inferentialism: an ample inferential structure is sufficient to explain the conceptual content. Definition Hyper-inferentialism: a closely understood inferential structure is sufficient - Definition ample (considering the circumstances, not only subject). Thesis: here a strong inferentialism is represented - closer to holism than to atomism. >Holism, >Atomism. Newen I 165 VsBrandom/Newen/Schrenk: A: how can inferentialism explain the compositionality? - "It is set to full sentences, because there are inferences between them". Solution/Brandom: distinction singular term/predicate - B: how does it explain reference and truth? >Singular terms, >Predicates. Newen I 166 ad B: Reference/Brandom: Formation of equivalence classes of sentences whose position in the network of inferences remains intact when terms are replaced by coreferential terms. Truth/Brandom: twists the definition in a way that truth characterizes the inferential concept. - For this purpose, he looks at the position of sentences starting with "It is true" in our network of inferences. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
Interaction | Parsons | Habermas IV 319 Interaction/Parsons/Habermas: Problem: if the concept of action is connected to the concept of order in such a way that both complement each other on the same analytical level to form the concept of social interaction, the focus would no longer be on the purpose-means structure, but on language-dependent consensus building as the mechanism that coordinates the action plans of different actors. >Order/Parsons, Order/Hobbes, Order/Locke. Habermas IV 320 Solution/Parsons: the starting point remains the singular action of a single actor. Parsons thinks that elementary interaction consists of two independently introduced actions of two actors. Values define the preferences of alternatives. >Double Contingency/Parsons. Habermas IV 321 Problem: how should Parsons link the monadic concept of action with an intersubjectivist concept of order? Solution/Habermas: one could make interpretations of the actors a core component of social action. The problem would be solved by orienting oneself towards the validity claims of norms that are based on intersubjective recognition. ParsonsVsHabermas: Parsons, on the other hand, sees action-oriented decisions first and foremost as a result of private arbitrariness of individual actors. (Habermas: This is so in Parsons early middle period). >Arbitrariness. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
Language | Papineau | I 284 Purpose-means-thinking/language/animal/Papineau: (also as "Spandrille", side effect): Thesis: supposedly purpose-means-thinking emerged in a piggyback manner with language in the evolution. >Evolution, >Purposes, >Animals, >Animal language, >Thinking, >World/Thinking. PapineauVs: there is a danger of circularity: the primary biological purpose of language could be to increase the supply of information, but this would not help if the purpose-means-thinking had not already been developed. >Circular reasoning. Papineau: language could also have developed first as an instrument for passing on information. E.g. "A tiger approaches". >Information. I 285 Problem/Papineau: to explain the last step: what is the additional biological pressure that led to the language with which general information are reported? >Selection. A) If for the purpose of facilitating the purpose-means-thinking, then the purpose-means-thinking is not a side effect. It might have been language-dependent. B) If, on the other hand, language developed the ability to represent and process general information on an independent basis, there are further problems: 1. Why should language be selected for reporting and processing at all? 2. Fundamental: If language is independent of the purpose-means-thinking, then we need a story about how this independent ability is subsequently expanded as a side effect for the purpose-means-thinking. Cf. >Epiphenomenalism. The point is that the purpose-means-thinking must exercise a behavioral control. >Behavior, >Control mechanism, >Behavioral control, cf. >Self-regulation. I 286 The ability for general information processing must be able to add something to the set of dispositions: E.g.: "From now on only fish instead of meat", E.g. "At the next mailbox I will post the letter". Without this, the purpose-means-thinking makes no difference for our actions. >Information processing, cf. >Problem solving. I 286 Language/Purpose-Means-Thinking/Evolution/Papineau: Problem: how could a new way to change our behavior arise without a fundamental biological change? As a side effect? This is a pointless assumption. It must have brought the ability to develop new dispositions. >Evolution, >Dispositions. It is hard to imagine how this should have happened without biological selection. I 287 But this is not yet an argument for a wholly separate mechanism for the purpose-means-thinking in the human brain. Weaker: there could be some biological mechanism for the purpose-means-thinking, e.g. that the language has developed independently of the processing and reporting. Thereafter, further steps allow their outputs to influence the behavior. Cf. >Strength of theories, >Stronger/weaker. I 290 Language/Evolution/Generality/Papineau: previously I distinguished the language for special facts from one for general facts. >Generality/Papineau, >Generalization. Perhaps the former has developed for communication, and the latter for the purpose-means-thinking. >Communication. Or language for general facts has evolved under the co-evolutionary pressure of purpose-means-thinking and communication. Presentation/figurative/Papineau: how could the results of the figurative representation gain the power to influence the already existing structures of the control of the action? >Imagination, >Thinking without language. I 291 Perhaps from imitation of complex action sequences of others. >Imitation. |
Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 |
Magical Thinking | Lévi-Strauss | I 23 Magical Thinking/Lévi-Strauss: one could consider the rigour and precision of magical thinking and ritual practices as the expression of an unconscious notion of the truth of determinism. I 22 Magic/Witchcraft/Evans-Pritchard: seen as a system of natural philosophy, it contains a theory of causes: misfortune arises from the magic that cooperates with the forces of nature. (E.E. Evans-Pritchard 1955(1)) I 34 The mythical thinking, although trapped in images, is already generalizing, i.e. scientific, because it works with analogies and comparisons. .... However, reconstructions with the same materials are always related to past purposes and play in this the role of means. The signifiers become significants and vice versa. >Determinism, >Nature, >Causes, >Effect, >Generalization, >Analogies, >Purpose-means-rationality, >Pathetic fallacy. 1. E.E. Evans-Pritchard, "Witchcraft", Africa, vol. 8, Number 4, London 1955, S. 418f. |
LevSt I Claude Lévi-Strauss La pensée sauvage, Paris 1962 German Edition: Das Wilde Denken Frankfurt/M. 1973 LevSt II C. Levi-Strauss The Savage Mind (The Nature of Human Society Series) Chicago 1966 |
Purposes | Aristotle | Gadamer I 326 Purpose/Means/Aristotle/Gadamer: ((s) This is only about the purpose-means relationship within the discussion about moral knowledge). A fundamental modification of the conceptual relationship between means and purpose is shown, by which moral knowledge differs from technical knowledge. It is not only that moral knowledge does not have a merely particular purpose, but that it concerns right living as a whole - whereas, of course, all technical knowledge is particular and serves particular purposes. It is also not only that moral knowledge must occur wherever technical knowledge would be desirable but is not available. Moral knowledge cannot, in principle, have the precedence of teachable knowledge. The relationship between means and purpose is not such that knowledge of the right means could be made available in advance, and this is because knowledge of the right purpose is not merely the object of knowledge either. There is no prior determination of what the right life as a whole is aimed at. For this reason the Aristotelian provisions of the phronesis show a significant fluctuation, as long as this knowledge soon becomes more assigned to the purpose, soon more to the means to the end.(1) >Morality/Aristotle, >Techne/Aristotle, >Self-Knowledge/Aristotle, >Morality/Aristotle, 1. Aristotle generally emphasises that the phronesis is concerned with the means (ta pros to telos) and not with the telos. It is probably the contrast to the Platonic doctrine of the idea of good that makes him emphasize this so. But that the phronesis is not a mere property of the right choice of means, but itself a moral hexis, which sees the telos with which the actor is directed by his moral being, is clearly evident from its systematic place within Aristotelian ethics. Cf. Eth. Nic. Z 10, 1142 b33; 1140 b 13; 1141 b 15. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
Purposes | Papineau | I 246 Purpose/means/thinking/animal/evolution/Fodor/Papineau: newer direction: Fodor: the adoption of purpose-built modules selected for certain tasks. >J. Fodor, >Language of thought. Problem: this bypasses the actual thinking, especially the consideration of the means. >Thinking, >Animal language. Papineau: nevertheless, pro module. But as a later addition in evolution, for the coordination of perception and action. I 247 Purpose-Means-Thinking: is a very special mechanism, not a "universal pocket knife". >Rationality/Papineau. I 254 Thinking/Knowledge/Animal/Papineau: Levels: Purpose-Means-Thinking/Papineau: Level 0: "Monomats": do V Level 1: "Opportunists": If B, do V I 248 Level 2: "people in need": If B and T, do V Level 3: "Voter": If B1 and T1, do V1, IF T1 is the dominant need A comparative mechanism is needed here. Level 4: "Learners": AFTER experience has shown that B1, T1, and V1 result in a reward, then ... (like 3). Level 0 - 4 apply to simple living beings. Nowhere is general information of the form "all A's or B's" or generic, causal information "A's cause B's". I 255 Or even conditionals about present circumstances, "If A occurs, B will also occur." I 259 Purpose-Means-Thinking/Papineau: requires explicit representation of general information so that it can be processed to provide new items of general information. Thesis: this is a biological adaptation that specifically applies to human beings. Vs: 1. Purpose-means-thinking is too simple, and therefore widespread in the animal kingdom. 2. Purpose-means-thinking is too difficult and therefore not an essential component... I 261 ... of our evolutionary heritage. Then the purpose-means-thinking is a by-product. Papineau: that does not mean that they cannot take over any function. I 276 Purpose-means-thinking/Papineau: must also use non-egocentric causal facts. (> Map, Map-Example). I 273 Cognition/space/spatial orientation/content/animal/Papineau: many birds and insects do not have egocentric maps of their environments. Nevertheless, this is not necessary purpose-means-thinking. It depends on how they use these maps! >Map-example. For example, they might just simply draw a straight line from their respective position to the destination, which would be no purpose-means-thinking. For example, it would be purpose-means-thinking if they were to use cognition to imagine a continuous path, which avoids all obstacles, from their initial position within the non-egocentric map, and then plan on taking the path. This would be a combination of causal individual information. |
Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 |
Rationality | Papineau | I 246 Purpose/means/thinking/animal/evolution/Fodor/Papineau: newer direction: Fodor: the adoption of purpose-built modules selected for certain tasks. Problem: this bypasses the actual thinking, especially the consideration of the means. Papineau: nevertheless, per modules, Papineau per Fodor. >J. Fodor, >Language of thought. But as a later addition in evolution, for the coordination of perception and action. I 247 Purpose-Means-Thinking: is a very special mechanism, not a "universal pocket knife". Purpose-Means-thinking/Papineau: Level 0: "Monomats": do V Level 1: "Opportunists": If B, do V I 248 Level 2: "people in need": If B and T, do V I 250 Level 3: "Voter": If B1 and T1, do V1, IF T1 is the dominant need. A comparative mechanism is needed here. Level 4: "Learners": AFTER experience has shown that B1, T1, and V1 result in a reward, then ... (like 3). >Purposes/Papineau, >Learning, >Learning/Papineau. |
Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 |
Representation | Papineau | I 248 Representation/Animals/Papineau: there is the danger to put more into the explanation than justified by the specific design of animals. >Explanation, >Causal explanation, >Behavior, >Animals, >Animal language. I 256 Representation/Papineau: why should an animal have no general representations? >Generality/Papineau, >Generalization. I 257 After all, it has this disposition right now, because its behavior in the past has led to this result. >Dispositions. Disposition/Representation/Papineau: should the disposition itself not be regarded as the incarnation of the general information "Drinking supplies water"? >Embodiment. I do not want to dispute such content attributions. The disposition represents information about the general "connection of reaction with result" (B & T, V > R). Purpose-Means-Thinking/Papineau: when it requires explicit representations, it no longer follows that simple beings can be regarded as purpose-means thinkers. I 258 Explicit representation requires physical tangibility. Vs: all behavioral dispositions must have some kind of physical embodiment. I 259 Explicit/implicit: if an organism implicitly has different pieces of general information in different dispositions ("water is in ponds"), it still has no system to combine them. Purpose-Means-Thinking/Papineau: requires explicit representation of general information so that it can be processed to provide new items of general information. >Adaption. Thesis: this is a biological adaptation that specifically applies to human beings. Vs: 1. Purpose-middle-thinking is too simple, and therefore widespread in the animal kingdom. 2. Purpose-means-thinking is too difficult and therefore not an essential component... I 261 ...of our evolutionary heritage. Then purpose-means-thinking is a by-product. Papineau: that does not mean that they cannot take over any function. >Purpose, >Function. |
Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 |
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Inferentialism | Brandom, R. | I 205 Inferentialism/BrandomVs: the following variations: 1. content only understood as representation 2. goodness of inference only formal 3. rationality only instruments (purpose-means-reasons) Brandom: thesis for strong inferentialism, VsHyperinferentialism: according to which the inferential classification is always sufficient for the content. II 45 Thesis: here a strong inferentialism is represented - closer to holism than to atomism |
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