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Attribution | Davidson | I (b) 16 Propositional Attitude/Davidson: Thesis: ascribing propositional attitudes is analgous to measuring - weight itself is not an object. I (b) 36 Analogy: just as different measurement systems can indicate the same temperature (Celsius/Fahrenheit), various attributions can capture the same thought content - (SearleVs). Cf. >Measurements, >Thoughts. Frank I 645f Mental states/Proposition/Self-Attribution/External Attribution/Davidson: we must start with sentences or statements instead of propositions or meanings - otherwise, different types are indicated by different sources - instead: relationships between actors and statements - no different knowledge and no different criteria. Solution: if anyone knows that I keep a set for right, he knows what I think - it would be circular to explain the fundamental asymmetry by an asymmetry of security. -> Interpretation/Davidson. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica38 (1984), 101-111 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Beliefs | Boer | I 20 Believe/Boer: (instead of mental reference): here it is not so clear whether this is an existence-independent relation, solely because of the fact that we have the being/existening-distinction. Thought content: Problem: we still do not know what thought contents are. Platonism/N.B.: If we assume that ideas can be equated with propositions, states, or properties, and that they would be accepted as platonic in existence, without having to participate in the world, we would not have to assume the believe relation as existence-independent. But we need a proper theory of the nature of belief contents and attitude relations to them. --- I 21 Mental reference/concept dependency/Boer: is it also dependent on the concept? Concept dependency/logical form/Boer: according to (D5): it would be sufficient that mental reference (thinking about) implies that for a representation z, an intrinsic property of z and a behavior-determining relation Q: A) x has Q to z B) z contains something that expresses or maps y for x C) whether x has the relation Q to a representation of y depends on whether the representation has one or more of a range of intrinsic features. But this presupposes believe as a concept-dependent relation. Belief/question: whether believe is a relation mediated by representations. So B) z has a fulfillment condition defined by y and C) as above. Believe/Representation/Boer: to clarify whether believe is a representation-mediated relation, we need a theory of propositional attitudes. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |
Content | Boer | I XIII Definition Thought/Boer: can be common to different states of mind. Proposition/Boer: I do not call it thought content, because this expression brings too much ballast with it. --- Note I XVIII Intensional transitive verbs: have three conditions, each of which is sufficient for itself: (i) failure of the principle of the substitutability of identity (ii) quantification permits a specific "narrow range" (iii) there is no existential (ontological) commitment. --- I XIV Direct objects/direct object/propositional settings/Boer: it is controversial whether the relation to direct thought objects can be analyzed as propositional attitudes. E.g. "search": here it is certainly the case, e.g. "worship": seems to contradict this analysis. Fulfillment conditions/EB/proopositional attitudes/individuation/Boer: N.B.: The fulfillment conditions do not appear to be sufficient to individuate a propositional attitude. On the other hand: Thought content/GI: seems to be sufficient for the individuation of a propositional attitude. Truth conditions: (and hence also the fulfillment conditions) can be the same for two beliefs, while the subject is not sure whether it is the same object. E.g. woodchucks/groundhogs. Propositional attitudes/Individuation/Lewis: (1969)(1): the mere existence of a convention of this kind presupposes that speakers from a community have certain propositional attitudes with certain fulfillment conditions. Abstract objects/propositional attitudes/Boer: in order to believe that patience is a virtue, one must think of patience. Definition mental reference/Terminology/Boer: Thinking of: be a mental analogue to speaker reference. Speaker reference/some authors: thesis: never exists in isolation, but is only a partial aspect of a speech act (utterance). --- I XV Mental reference: should then only be a partial aspect of thinking-of-something. Probably, there is also predication. Definition mental reference/Boer: be in a state of thought with a content of thought which defines a fulfillment condition of which the object is a constituent. Problem: non-existent objects. --- I XV Thought content/GI/Boer: must be carefully distinguished from any objects that it might contain. Definition object of thought/object/GO/Boer: "object of the propositional attitudes ψ" is clearly only the item/s to which a subject by the power of having ψ refers to. (s) So not the propositional attitudes themselves. Individuation/identification/Boer: should be identified by a that-sentence (in a canonical attribution of ψ). That-sentence/Boer: is the content (thought content). Content/thought content/Boer: is the that-sentence. Thinking about/Boer: what you think of something is the object itself. 1. David Lewis 1969. Convention: A Philosophical Study, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |
Content | Davidson | Rorty VI 217 Brandom/Davidson/SellarsVs"Content"/Rorty: content is an incomprehensible concept. You need nothing more than a concept that acts as a node of an inference pattern. Thus all words systematically put into circulation are on the same level, regardless of whether they come from superstitious people or cavemen. (VsMcDowell). Davidson I (b) 19 Pone Example: Thought content must be known - to find it simple or difficult. Davidson I (e) 96/7 Content/Belief/Davidson: the sensory experience does play a major role in the causal process through which beliefs are connected to the world, but it is a mistake to believe that it plays an epistemological role in determining the content of these beliefs! - ((s) beforehand, the content is already defined during learning, otherwise no comparison of beliefs and world is possible, because they would always behave in parallel.) >Sensory impressions, >Perception, >Causal theory of knowledge, >Conceptual content, >Propositional content. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
Content | Nagel | I 60 Meaning/content/Validity/Valid/Use/use theory/Nagel: the validity of thoughts does not depend on how they are used. I 61 However, the practice of a community cannot be beaten by objectivity: language changes. >Language/Nagel, >Language, >Objectivity/Nagel. For the content of thought. >Propositional content. As opposed to the meaning of the words, this is not true. Meaning: is contingent! - E.g. that "and" is a word of conjunction. Thought content: is the conjunction (not contingent). |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
Content | Peacocke | I 144 Content/Peacocke: evidence-based approach: about constitutive role: "The person with these conscious states" = I. >Belief content, >Thought, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge, >Constitutive role, >Roles, >Conceptual role, >Empirical content, >I, Ego, Self, >I think, >cogito, >Thinking, >Person. I 187 Description/Thought Content/Peacocke: Triple from way of givenness, object, point in time: no solution: a thought component could remain the same, while the object changes. >Descriptions, >Localization, >Identification, >Individuation, >Way of givenness. As with descriptive thoughts: it is possible that the content remains the same, while the "reference" changes. >Reference, cf. >Demonstratives, >Index Words, >Indexicality, >Objects of Belief, >Objects of Thought. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
Correspondence Theory | Ramsey | III 72 Correspondence/Correspondence Theory/Fact/Ramsey: which fact corresponds to e.g. Jones thinks that Smith is either a liar or an idiot if reality does not contain any such either or. >Disjunction, cf.>Disjunctive predicates. If we believe that reality contains no such "either or," we must change our approach. >Objects of belief, >Objects of thought. But that does not necessarily speak against Correspondence Theory. We have given a truth definition without any correspondence. ((s) >Tarski per correspondence (explicitely)) >Correspondence theory/Tarski. Ramsey: we can rewrite the truth definition with correspondence, though. >Truth definition. Fact/Ramsey: if A is B, then by common usage we can say that it is a fact that A is B and then say that it corresponds to the belief that A is B. >Facts. Fact/falsity/Ramsey: if A is not b, there is no fact corresponding to it. ((s) RamseyVsNegative Fact). >Negative fact. Problem: we cannot describe the nature of this correspondence unless we know the analysis of the propositional reference of "believe that A is B". >Reference, >Propositional attitude, >Thought content. |
Ramsey I F. P. Ramsey The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013 Ramsey II Frank P. Ramsey A contribution to the theory of taxation 1927 Ramsey III Frank P. Ramsey "The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Externalism | Burge | Esfeld I 149 Social Externalism/Esfeld: is implied by social holism, since the convictions are at least partly determined by the social environment. >Individuation. (Scientific camp: Tyler Burge, 1979(1)). Burge: E.g. suppose all internal factors of a person remain the same, while the social environment is varied. >Twin earth. I 149/159 This allows to show that the environment contributes to the content of the convictions of a person. The opposite position is what Burge calls "individualism" ((s) The thesis that the convictions do not depend on the environment.) 1. Tyler Burge: 1979. Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4: 73–121. --- Frank I 29 Externalism/Burge: tries to reconcile this with Descartes: no conflict between E. and perception-independent self-consciousness: what determines the thought contents also determines what the thinking subject thinks about them. (Common cause). To think the thought one does not need to know the enabling conditions. It is enough that they are fulfilled. Frank I 664 Externalism/Burge: but there is another way in which external factors are introduced into the determination of the content of thought: "thought experiment" (Davidson: happens to be true for me): For example, until recently, I believed arthritis was a joint inflammation resulting from calcium deposits. I did not know that any joint inflammation, like gout, is also considered to be arthritis. When a doctor told me (falsely) that I have gout, I thought I had gout, but not arthritis. Burge: e.g. let us imagine a possible world in which I am physically the same, but the word "arthritis" is actually applied only to calcium-induced joint inflammations. Then the sentence "gout is not a form of arthritis" would be true and not false. The corresponding conviction would not have been the wrong belief that gout is not a form of arthritis (but it is wrong), but a true conviction about a disease other than arthritis. But in that world all my physical conditions and my behavior are the same as in this world. My conviction would have changed, but I had no reason to believe it, and so in such a case I would not know what I believed. Davidson pro. Burge: That depends on the fact that a concept is only imperfectly mastered and yet a content is believed. >Objects of belief, >Objects of thought, >Mental states, >First Person, >Incorrigibility. Fra I 665 But this is common for a large number of expressions. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Externalism | Frank | Frank I 27ff Externalism/Burge: the externalism leads to a reconciliation with Descartes: perception does not conflict with independent self consciousness: what the thought content (causally) determines also determines what the subject thinks about it. (There is a common cause). >R. Descartes, >T. Burge, >Thinking, >World/thinking, >Contents, >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, cf. >Internalism. |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Intensional Objects | Boer | I XIV Direct objects/direct object/propositional attitudes/Boer: it is controversial whether the relation to direct thought objects can be analyzed as propositional attitudes. E.g. "search": here it is certainly the case, e.g. "worship": seems to contradict this analysis. Fulfillment conditions/EB/propositional attitudes/Individuation/Boer: N.B.: The conditions of fulfillment do not seem to be sufficient to individuate a propositional attitude. On the other hand: Thought content/GI: seems to be sufficient for the individuation of a propositional attitude. Truth conditions: (and hence also the fulfillment conditions) can be the same for two beliefs, while the subject is not sure whether it is the same object. E.g. woodchucks/groundhogs. Abstract objects/propositional attitudes/Boer: In order to believe that patience is a virtue, one must think of patience. Definition reference/terminology/Boer: Thinking of: be a mental analogue to speaker reference. Speaker reference/some authors: thesis: never exists in isolation, but is only partial aspect of a speech act (utterance). --- I XV Mental reference: should then be only a partial aspect of thinking-of-something. Probably, there is also predication. Definition mental reference/Boer: be in a state of thought with a content of thought which defines a fulfillment condition of which the object is a constituent. Problem: non-existent objects. Thought object/Tradition/Boer: Thought objects are often understood in the tradition as the thought content of a propositional attitude with all involved objects: BoerVs: confusion of thinking-that with thinking-about. --- I XV Thought content/GI/Boer: must be carefully distinguished from any objects that it might contain. Definition object of thought/object/GO/Boer: "object of the propositional attitudes ψ" is clearly only that/these item/s to which a subject refers to by the power of ψ. (s) So not the propositional attitudes themselves! Individuation/identification/Boer: should be identified by a that-sentence (in a canonical attribution of ψ). That-sentence/Boer: is the content (thought content). Content/Thought content/Boer: is the that-Satz. Thinking about/Boer: what you think of something is the object itself. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |
Intensions | Putnam | V 47 Sense/Frege: the sense is an extra-mental entity ("old" intension). The thought content, which is detected is, on the other hand, a new intension. PutnamVsFrege: there are meaning differences that escape the intension, i.e. understanding not only by linking with intension. VsFrege: detecting follows only by representation, not from the 6th sense. Representation is determined by the environment (twin earth). >Twin earth/Putnam. V 48f Bracketing/Husserl: bracketing means the talk about what is going on in someone's head, without a condition relating to actual nature of the objects. Twin earth: e.g. the "belief that a glass of water is in front of him (namely for the believer himself, in full non-bracketed sense). >More authors on twin earth. V 49 "Notional world"/Dennett: the "notional world" is a set of bracketed beliefs of a subject. The reference of course is the actual substance (twin earth). Intension/tradition: the notional world determines the intension. PutnamVs: this is wrong, therefore we have no uniform concept of meaning anymore. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
Intentionality | Boer | I 4 Definition semantic intentionality/Boer: weaker: can be defined by fulfillment conditions with quasi-semantic characteristics. Fulfillment conditions/EB: are determined asymmetrically by thought contents (GI). N.B.: therefore, all cognitive intentional states are semantically intentional, but not vice versa. E.g. to have a thought content is to have certain terms, but not vice versa. Animal/Thinking/Terms/Boer/(s): Thesis: we could concede animals certain terms, but not the full handling with them. And indeed, rather, in attributed whole sentences, not alone. Perception/Semantics/Cognition/Peacocke/Boer: Thesis: some perceptual states are semantic but not cognitively intentional. Boer: that is controversial. ((s) Whether perception can also be non-conceptual). I 6 Definition weak metaphysical intentionality/Boer: the fact that a relation is participation-independent, or a condition that is such that its existence entails a participation-independent relation to something. Intentionality/Boer: some authors have something stronger in mind: I 7 Existence-independence/conceptual dependency/intentionality/Smith/McIntyre/Boer: (Smith, McIntyre, 1982)(1): BoerVs: Problem: this is much more remote from actualism. >Dependency. I 10 Definition metaphysical strongly intentional/Boer: is a relation R iff it is both existence-independent in the sense of (D3sub) and is concept dependent in the sense of (D4sub). Sufficient condition for this: (4) (ER) {that a subject is a in s entails (Σw) aRw & M [Σx) (Σy) x exists and xRy, but y does not exist and M (Σx) (Σy) (Σz) (y = z & xRy & ~ xRz)]}. (D4sub) R is a concept dependent relation = it is possible that (Σx) (Σy (Σz) (y = z & x has R to y &~(x has R to z)). For example, Oedipus wants to marry Iokaste, but not his mother. E.g. to believe that... exists (But ... does not exist) I 11 Boer: Thesis: this can be a real relation. (In substitutional quantification/sQ). I 20 Definition strong metaphysical intentionality/Boer: is a relation between terms by virtue of their simultaneous existence-independence in the sense of (D3NA) and conceptual dependency. In the sense of (D5). Definition strongly metaphysical intentional state/Boer: exists when in this state being is involved, since one stands in at least one strongly metaphysical intentional relation to a being. 1. Smith, D. W. & McIntyre, R. (1982) Husserl and Intentionality. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Co. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |
Manifestation | Schiffer | I 229 Past/manifestation/understanding/SchifferVsDummett: e.g. we discover a historical document that Thales did begin to run not before his 13th month. How can you say that the mere understanding of the sentence enables one to identify whether the document verifies the sentence? >Antirealism/Dummett, >Understanding, >Verification. Problem: e.g. Betty believes that Australians drink too much - it is not easy to manifest that she thinks so. >Thought content. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
Meaning | Perry | Frank I 396 Meaning/idea/PerryVsFrege: We must separate sharply meaning and thoughts. >Thoughts, >Thoughts/Frege, >Sense. The thought is not a mental entity, but corresponds to the informational content. >Thought content, cf. >Thought objects. The meaning corresponds to the role of words. >Conceptual role, >Words, >Word meaning. The same role creates another de re proposition in any context. >Sentences, >Propositions, >Context, >de re. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Objective Mind | Habermas | III 124 Objective mind/Habermas: I would like to overcome the term "objective mind" in favour of one concept of cultural knowledge differentiated according to several claims of validity. >Validity claims, >Culture/Habermas, >Society. III 125 However, I would like to insist on the speech of three worlds (Popper: World 1: physical objects, World 2: states of consciousness, World 3: objective thought content). These three worlds are to be distinguished from the lifeworld. >K. Popper. Only one of them, namely the objective world, can be regarded as a correlate... III 126 ...to the totality of true statements. >Consciousness, >States of belief, >Objectivity, >World, >World/thinking, >Life-world, >Thinking, >Thoughts, >Content, >Laws of nature. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
Objective Mind | Popper | Habermas III 116 Objective mind/Popper/Habermas: Popper deals with the basic empirical conception according to which the subject is suddenly confronted with the world, receives its impressions from it via sensory perceptions or acts on states in it. >Myth of the given. This problem context explains why Popper sees his doctrine of the objective mind as an extension of the empirical concept and introduces the objective as well as the subjective mind as "worlds", i. e. as special totalities of entities. World 1: physical objects, World World 2: states of consciousness, World 3: objective thought content) The older theories of the objective mind, developed from Dilthey to Theodor Litt and Hans Freyer in the historical and new Hegelian traditions, start from the primacy of an active mind that interprets itself in the worlds it constitutes. PopperVsLitt/PopperVsDilthey/PopperVsFreyer/Habermas: Popper, on the other hand, holds on fast to the primacy of the world over the mind and understands the second and third world in analogy to the first world ontologically. In this respect, his construction of the third world is more reminiscent of Nicolai Hartmann's theory of mental being. (1) (PopperVsEmpiricism). >Empiricism. World 3/Popper/Habermas: the products of the human mind immediately turn against him as problems:"These problems are obviously independent. They are not created in any way by us; rather, we discover them and in this sense they already exist before their discovery, moreover, at least some of these problems may be unsolvable.". (2) 1.N. Hartmann, Das Problem des geistigen Seins, Berlin 1932. 2.K. R. Popper, J. C. Eccles The Self and its Brain, Berlin 1977 p. 41ff. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
Propositions | Perry | Frank I 396 Meaning/idea/PerryVsFrege: We must separate sharply meaning and thoughts. >Thoughts, >Thoughts/Frege, >Sense. The thought is not a mental entity, but corresponds to the informational content. >Thought content, cf. >Thought objects. The meaning corresponds to the role of words. >Conceptual role, >Words, >Word meaning. The same role creates another de re proposition in any context. >Sentences, >Propositions, >Context, >de re. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 --- I 409f Proposition/PerryVsTradition: what is missing, is not a conceptual component, but an indexical. >Indexicality, >Index words. New theory: a kind of proposition is individuated by an object and a part of the old proposition. VsTradition: limiting the substitutability in quotations with propositional attitudes is not explained. >Opacity, >Substitutability. Tradition: E.g. Dean/Franks neighbor (identical, one and the same person): no variable but term. Problem: "He" does not provide a concept but a variable. Cf. >He/He himself. Solution/Perry: "open proposition": with objects and a conceptual component: "de re". - Then the "dean himself" is included and not only the term "Dean". >de re. Then a substitution by "Frank's neighbor" is valid and a quantification meaningful. >Quantification. Vs: de re does not solve the problem of mess in the supermarket (sugar trail) - (because of "I"). >Sugar trail example. --- I 455f Proposition/extra sense//Perry: parabola E.g. early humans who can only eat carrots lying in front of them, are equipped with the ability to believe propositions (to collect and pick up carrots). - Nothing happens, because the propositions do not say to humans that they even appear in it. Solution/Castaneda: additional localization in space and time. >Extra-Sense/Castaneda. Vs: the king of France does not know that he is the King of France and whether the carrot is not in front of the editor of Soul. VsExtra-sense: an extra-sense does not help the thinker embedding himself into a network of mental states. People understand sentences but do not form beliefs. >Understanding, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge. List of extra senses for everyone: too long. Extra-sense "i" for everyone: validity by decree: solves the carrots problem but maims the language. Rule: "I" stands for the user ": makes people to speak of themselves in the "third person": ""I" is doing this". Problem: for truth of such sentences one needs reference (reference), meaning ("user") is not enough. >Reference, >Sense. The same meaning cannot perform different references. |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Propositions | Plantinga | Cresswell II 168 Def Propositions/Plantinga: propositions are no linguistic entities for Plantinga. Cf. >Thought content, >Thought objects, >Belief objects, >Mental states, >Thinking, >Thinking without language, >World/thinking, cf. >Intensions, >Propositional attitudes. |
Plant I A. Plantinga The Nature of Necessity (Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy) Revised ed. Edition 1979 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
Questions | Prior | I 72ff Questions/Prior: difference: a) questions, b) the questioning c) interrogative sentence, d) the things which they are about. >Levels/order, >Description levels To assume never asked questions is quite reasonable. Problem: "For some p, no one has ever asked if p" is not the same as "There are questions that were never asked". Because there are other kinds of questions than that of the "if" variety. - It is arbitrary, to single one out a) "if p" b) " what is p ", etc. Possible solution: then variable for questions:" for some p: it was never asked p "(here no longer" what "or" "if"). - The argument is not a name but an interrogative sentence. >Names, >Names of sentences. Problem: "There are questions that were never asked" cannot be represented formally as "For some p, no one has asked if p". - Because that only covers the specific question type "if", and not for example: "which are?" or "Who has stolen my pencil?". Interrogabilia/Medieval/Prior":" the questioned"," the questionable "(platonic). >Platonism, >Medieval philosophy. PriorVs: do not need to be considered as "part of the sentence" as if there were names. >Clauses, >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief PriorVs: asking is no relation between questioning and Interrogabilia. Question/command/Prior: there are no special features, which account for a content, nothing "behind" the indicative sentences. >Content, >Thought content. I 73ff Questions/David Harrah: thesis: A question is simply an indicative statement which is the disjunction or the set of possible answers - Harrah thesis: any issue is identified by an implicit statement that it presupposes. E.g. the question whether I come or go presupposes that I either do one or the other. That would be the statement "You are coming or going." - The answer is then a statement that contains the statement which is the question, but is not included in it. - E.g. that I sit is less specific and includes the fact that I sit on a chair - (presupposition: that I sit at all). >Presuppositions, >Answers, >D. Harrah. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
Reference | Boer | I XIV Definition mental reference/terminology/Boer: Thinking of: be a mental analogue to speaker reference. Speaker reference/some authors: thesis: never exists in isolation, but is only partial aspect of a speech act (utterance). --- I XV Mental reference: should then only be a partial aspect of thinking-of-something. Probably, there is also predication. Definition mental reference/Boer: to be in a state of thought with a content of thought which defines a fulfillment condition of which the object is a constituent. Problem: non-existent objects. --- I 20 Mental reference/Boer: it is hardly controversial to assume that it is a participation-independent relation, i.e. weakly metaphysical intentional. It is controversial whether mental reference is also strongly metaphysical intentional. Belief attribution: in everyday life, we regard e.g. "Some people believe that Atlantis sank in the sea" as true. Problem: one may be afraid to attribute to these people an intentional relation to something non-existent. Mental reference/Boer: Thesis: after having accepted the distinction "there is/exists", we can consider mental reference as an existence-independent relation. On the other hand: Belief/Boer: (instead of mental reference): here it is not so clear whether this is an existence-independent relation, solely because of the fact that we have the being/existent distinction. Thought content/GI: Problem: we still do not know what thought contents are. Platonism/N.B.: if we assume that thought content could be equated with propositions, states, or properties and that they would be accepted as Platonic in existence without having to participate in the world, then we would not have to assume the belief relation as existence-independent. But for this we need a proper theory of the nature of thought contents and attitude relations to them. --- I 21 Mental reference/concept dependency/Boer: is it also dependent on the concept? Concept dependency/logical form/Boer: according to (D5) would it be sufficient that mental reference (thinking about) implies that for a representation z, an intrinsic property of z and a behavior-determining relation Q: A) x has Q z z B) z contains something that expresses or maps y for x C) Whether x has the relation Q to a representation of y depends on whether the representation has one or more of a range of intrinsic features. But this presupposes believe as a concept-dependent relation. Believe/question: whether believe is a relation mediated by representations. So B) z has a fulfillment condition defined by y and C) as above. Believe/Representation/Boer: to clarify whether believe is a representational-mediated relation, we need a theory of propositional attitudes. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |
Terminology | Boer | I XI TI/Boer: Thesis: Believe as a 2-digit relation to a special kind of property ("thought content"). Spelling: German writing (fracture). --- I XI Stock: Relation theory: Boer pro: belief as a relation to thought content (certain property) STI/Boer: Semantics for belief attribution, which considers substitutional opacity in belief reports as a genuine semantic feature. Thesis: these two together solve many known puzzles. Object-dependent senses/Frege/Boer: these are to be defended here (Boer pro Frege). --- I 6 Participating/Participation/Boer: a thing that does not participate in the world is either e.g. a non-existent thing or a non-space-time individual, a non-existent or false proposition, a non-existent or non-persisting state, a non-existent or unexplained property or relation, or a non-existent or non-occurring event. So more precisely: (D2) R is a participation-independent relation = it is possible for an existing thing to have a relation R to a thing that does not participate in the world. E.g. mental reference: would then be intentional simply because one can think of abstract as well as of concrete individuals (also unexemplified properties, etc.). Relation/Participation/Boer: although a tolerant actualist who acknowledges the existence of relations at all, accepts that some relations are participation-independent, the relation of such relations is not limited to existing things. (D2) only requires that an existing thing has such a relation to a non-participating thing. Relation R: from the fact that someone has R to something does not follow that this something participates in the world ((s) one can think of abstract objects). Non-existence: if there are non-existent things, there is nothing in (D2) that forbids one to have a participation-independent relation like mental reference to them. ((s One can think of something non-existent) That at most will be rejected by a very strict nominalism. --- I 12 Notation/Boer: N: be an entity of a given type (E: spelling in the book: black letter) EN: be the essential property of things of this type N iff --- I 13 i) EN can be exemplified (i.e., that there may be such a thing) ii) necessary: a thing exemplifies EN iff it is identical to N. Haecceitas: of N. the property to be N. This would be trivially the essence of N. --- I 13 Definition normal/terminology/Boer: if we wanted to name things for which it is possible that they exist/that they are actual. Definition abstract/terminology/Boer: be a thing for which it is not possible that it exists/is actual. Fiction/fictitious/Boer: a) in the first sense: (mere Possibilia): normal, if non-existent. b) as essentially fictional: abstract. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |
Thinking | Castaneda | Frank I 171ff Pure Thought/Pure Thinking/Castaneda/Pape: there is no pure self-conscious thinking, I always think of myself as having a certain localizable experience content as identical. (> Hume: "I" is applicable only on perceptions). >Self-consciousness, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Self, >I, Ego, Self, >I, Ego, Self/Hume, >Sensualism. Hector-Neri Castaneda(1966b): "He": A Study on the Logic of Self-consciousness, in : Ratio 8 (Oxford 1966), 130-157 I 385f Thinking/World/Castaneda: if the thought content is purely universal and abstract thinking, how can we get in touch with something special? - Chisholm allowed not only that singular terms are only composed of expressions that denote pure universals, he goes so far as to eliminate singular terms entirely analytically, by free variables with the performative role to express self-ascription. >Self-attribution, >Attribution, >Attribution/Chisholm, >Person/Chisholm, >Singular terms. |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Thoughts | Perry | Frank I 395f Thought is not the same as content: it may be that I now believe that it is a nice day today, but tomorrow do not think that it was nice yesterday, another thought, same content. - Then the thought is not the informational content. >Content, >Informational Content, >Information. Frank I 396 Meaning/idea/PerryVsFrege: We must separate sharply meaning and thoughts. >Thoughts, >Thoughts/Frege, >Sense. The thought is not a mental entity, but corresponds to the informational content. >Thought content, cf. >Thought objects. The meaning corresponds to the role of words. >Conceptual role, >Words, >Word meaning. The same role creates another de re proposition in any context. >Sentences, >Propositions, >Context, >de re. |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
World | Jarvie | Habermas III 115 World/Rationality/Jarvie/Habermas: Jarvie makes an interesting use of Popper's theory of the three worlds (Popper: World 1: physical objects, World 2: states of consciousness, World 3: objective thought content). Habermas III 120 Jarvie/Habermas: by adopting Popper's concept of the third world for the characterization of social relationships and institutions, Jarvie Popper has to introduce the socially active subjects following the example of theoretical and problem-solving scientists. The members of society are constantly learning something about them.(1) Jarvie: they create maps that are in some way "softer" than geographical maps. Habermas III 121 These social maps are landscapes that other people have to study and map.(2) HabermasVsJarvie: a) Jarvie blurs the difference between a performative and a hypothetical-reflexive attitude towards cultural traditions. b) He neglects the elements of cultural tradition that cannot be attributed to "thoughts" or truthful statements. He restricts the objective contexts of meaning that the acting subjects create and discover at the same time to the cognitive patterns of interpretation in the narrower sense. Habermas III 122 c) His proposal does not allow any distinction to be made between cultural values and the institutional embodiment of values in norms. This does not explain the coercive nature of existing standards and institutions. 1.I.C. Jarvie, Die Logik der Gesellschaft, München, 1974, S. 254f 2. ibid S. 248 |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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Burge, T. | Newen Vs Burge, T. | NS I 129 VsBurge/VsExternalism/Newen/Schrenk: if supervenience, i.e. a close relation between thoughts and brain states, exists, there cannot be an equally close relation between the thoughts and the community. This is because brain states (in contrast to thought content) are determined regardless of the surroundings and the language community. Namely with view to the activation of brain areas. Supervenience/Newen/Schrenk: no difference in content without difference in the brain states, but not vice versa: the same thought can be implemented through different brain states. I.e. one-sided dependence of thought content on the brain states. Terminology: then they say: thought contents supervene on brain states. Burge's thesis is inconsistent with supervenience. Or rather, the following three statements cannot be simultaneously true: 1) thought contents are determined depending on community and surroundings. 2) brain states independent from... 3) Thought contents supervene on brain states. NS I 130 But if thought contents do not supervene on brain states, it becomes difficult to understand how thought contents can be causally effective. VsBurge: E.g. Twin Earth/TE: if Karl was transported to Twin Earth without even noticing anything, he would have other thought contents. Because the objective content of expressions of thoughts would be different. But that would not cause any difference to the behavioral dispositions of Karl. The content change would be causally irrelevant. Externalism/Newen/Schrenk: Two varieties: 1) for the dependence of the content of statements from the surroundings (Putnam) 2) for the dependence of the thought contents from the surroundings (Burge). VsBurge: if he were to be right, we need a second concept of thought contents, namely a subjective content. (Narrow/Wide) narrow content: only considered in the way it is perceived by the subject. Only it is relevant for behavior explanations. Wide content: as the content is usually interpreted in the language community. It is decisive for what I have fixed myself on by utterances. Externalism: Frege: can there be a wide (objective) content of a thought so that you can understand the causal relevance of this entire content or is the causal relevance only to be understood for narrow (subjective) contents? |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
Chisholm, R.M. | Castaneda Vs Chisholm, R.M. | Chisholm I 43 CastanedaVsChisholm: For him, propositions of the first person are not abstract (eternal) objects, but contingent things. They cease to exist when the person x ceases to exist. Frank I 330 Self-attribution/Chisholm: Builds on Lewis. Any attribution by others contains a self-reference (implicit). I 331 Consciousness/CastanedaVsChisholm: everybody first refers to their own world (as per Chisholm), but from that does not follow the necessity that every consciousness and every thought are explicitly self-conscious. (CastanedaVsFichte). The first-person perspective is only implicitly contained in a non-reflexive consciousness. An explicit self-consciousness differs from this consciousness, however, if it refers to conscious explicit self-reference. Self-attribution/CastanedaVsChisholm: if every consciousness includes direct attribution, including an I-less, purely world-facing consciousness, then direct attribution can only express a purely objective self-understanding and therefore does not explain self-consciousness. When Chisholm points out that reflection still has to be added, he argues circularly, because this self-consciousness should be explained just by the self-attribution. I 332 Reflection/self-consciousness/ChisholmVsCastaneda/Grundmann: This does not go to the heart of Chisholm’s argument: this would ultimately reject the insinuation that in the self-attribution a purely external or objective self-reference is articulated. External self-reference: extremely rare. E.g. Mach, Omnibus (see above). Self-attribution/Chisholm: denominates implicit self-consciousness. VsChisholm: However, he fails to explain the transformation from implicit to explicit self-consciousness. Reduction/CastanedaVsChisholm: according to Chisholm, the use of all indicators can be traced back to those of the first person. E.g. the subject attributes itself the property of directing its attention to a book and indirectly attributes to this book the property of being witty and exciting. I 333 Consubstantiation/CastanedaVsChisholm: the activity of directing the attention is only consubstantiated (implicit) in a determining sentence. Accordingly, the intentional act is not part of the demonstrative thought. I 338 Attribution/CastanedaVsLewis/CastanedaVsChisholm: should not be monolithic: it is necessary to distinguish between propositional attitude and practitions: "mixed conditionals": E.g. the intention to close the window when I open the door is different from the intention to open the door when I close the window. I 375 Consciousness/Attribution theory/CastanedaVsChisholm: Problem: distinction between reflective and non-reflective consciousness. This is a semantic pragmatic distinction between thought contents and it collides with Chisholm’s unit syntax. Fra I 380 Properties/CastanedaVsChisholm: 1) Considers properties to be subjects of predication 2) Quantifies over them - devastating in deontological contexts - too complicated for cumulative quotes. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Fodor, J. | Stalnaker Vs Fodor, J. | II 176 Def narrow content/Fodor/Stalnaker: is a generalization of Kaplan's character in the sense that the context considers any for the speaker external fact that is relevant to the determination of the wide content. Extensional identity criterion/narrow content/Fodor: (1987, 30 – 48)(1): C: be the condition that is fulfilled by the twin-me on twin-earth, C’: by myself in the actual world. Since there is no miracle it must be true that when an organism shares the neurophysiological constitution of my twin and fulfills C it follows that his thoughts and my twin also share the truth conditions (tr.c.). So the extensional identity criterion is that two thought contents (mental content) are the same iff they cause the same mapping of thoughts and context on truth conditions. StalnakerVsFodor: problem: that tells us less than it appears about the mapping that is used here. Nor how the relevant function is determined by what is going on in the mind of the believer. II 177 StalnakerVsFodor: we consider the following parody of his argument: e.g. I have the property of being exactly three miles from a burning stable - my twin is located on twin earth at exactly the same place, but, however, has the property of being exactly three miles from a snowy henhouse. C: then there surely is a property for my twin due to which he is three miles from the henhouse while this property does not exist for me. We call this condition C. C’: is then the property that makes up for me that I am three miles from the burning stable which does not exist for my twin. Since there is no miracle, we know at least this much: both, my twin and I, would in our respective world be three miles from a snowy henhouse when condition C ruled and both three miles from a burning stable if C' ruled. StalnakerVsFodor: problem: which determines no function at all that makes the condition C' to the property to be three miles from a snowy henhouse and at the same time condition C to the property to be three miles from a burning stable - a function that allegedly makes the contribution of the location of the subject to a specific relational property. StalnakerVsFodor: there are such functions and there is no need to identify one of them with the contribution of my intrinsic localization with the special relational property. My twin cannot sensibly say: "I did my part, as I - if condition C had ruled, .... Each localization is in the way that for any external conditions if those conditions rule something in this localizations is three miles away from a burning stable. narrow content/Stalnaker: question: does my cousin have the same narrow content as my conviction that salt is soluble in water but not in something else? StalnakerVsFodor: his theory gives no indication as to how an answer to this question was to be found! Note: however for me it is not about an uncertainty at all, this is also true for wide content but that we do not know at all how to identify narrow content. II 180 Belief/Mentalese/Fodor/Stalnaker: his image of faith is decisively motivated by his approach that there is an internal language (Mentalese) which is saved in the internal Belief/Fodor: are saved inner propositions. ((s) not propositions). They are convictions by virtue of their internal functional role. They are also identifiable independent of the environment of the subject. Semantic properties/Fodor: however partly depend on what happens in the environment around it but the way how they depend on it is determined by purely internal states of the subject! StalnakerVsFodor: here strong empirical presuppositions are in play. Def narrow content/Mentalese/Fodor/Stalnaker: function of context (in a very wide sense) on truth conditional content. StalnakerVsFodor: this is attractive for his intentions but it does not explain how it ever comes to that. And how to identify any narrow content. Narrow content/Stalnaker: is there any way at all to identify narrow content that is not based on Mentalese? Yes, by Dennett (…+…) II 188 Def individualism/Fodor: is the thesis that psychological states in terms of their causal powers are individuated. Science/Fodor: it is a scientific principle that in a taxonomy individuals are individuated because of their causal powers. This can be justified a priori metaphysically. Important argument: thus it is not excluded that mental states are individuated due to relational properties. Relational properties/Fodor: are taxonomically when they consider causal powers. E.g. "to be a planet" is relational par excellence StalnakerVsFodor: a) stronger: to individuate a thing by causal powers b) weaker: to individuate the thing by something that considers the causal powers. But the facts of the environment do not constitute the causal powers. Therefore Fodor represents only the weaker thesis. Burge/Stalnaker: represents the stronger. StalnakerVsFodor: his defense of the negative approach of revisionism (FodorVsExternalism) builds on a mixture of the strong with the weak thesis. Stalnaker: to exclude that psychological states are individuated by normal wide content you need a stronger thesis. But the defense of individualism often only goes against the weaker thesis. E.g. Fodor: Individualism/Fodor/Stalnaker: Fodor defends his version of individualism with an example of a causal irrelevant relational property: e.g. h-particle: we call a particle when a coin lands with heads up, II 189 t-particle: we call that way the same particle if the coin shows tails. Fodor: no reasonable theory will use this distinction to explain the behavior of the particle. StalnakerVsFodor: but from this it does not follow that psychological states must be purely internal (intrinsic). (1) Fodor, J. A. (1987): Explorations in cognitive science, No. 2.Psychosemantics: The problem of meaning in the philosophy of mind. British Psychological Society; The MIT Press. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
Skepticism | Putnam Vs Skepticism | Newen/Schrenk I 14 Brains in a vat/BIV/Putnam: Thesis: PutnamVsSkepticism: environmental dependence on thought content. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
Spinoza, B. | Hegel Vs Spinoza, B. | Leibniz I 31 Substance/HegelVsSpinoza: who starts from the thinking requirement of substantial unity of the world and the experience requirement of the qualitative diversity of beings (the manifold), can comprehend this manifold only as manifestations or aspects of a substance in which "all which was thought to be true, has gone down." However, with this the the actual condition of thinking, the distinctiveness of thought content, is exposed!Leibniz saw the danger. --- I 32 Hegel: one must not "let the multiplicity disappear in unity". If the deduction was only possible as a reduction (as in Spinoza), that would be the self-destruction of the world in thinking. Kant: draws the consequence to establish the unity of the world in the priority of thought. The unit is then justified only transcendentally or subjectively idealistic. HegelVsKant: attempts to renew the metaphysics of substance that would justify the unity of being in the unity of a being: the self-development of the absolute spirit in world history. Rorty II 112 Truth/HegelVsSpinoza/Rorty: relinquishes the belief of Spinoza, that we recognize the truth when we see it. Truth/Spinoza: Thesis: W. we recognize when we see it. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
Tradition | Castaneda Vs Tradition | Frank I 342 Proposition/Tradition/Castaneda: its strength: that all of these entities which this theory equates must somehow converge. If language is to be an efficient means of thinking, then meaning and thought content must coincide. I 343 Belief/Intention/Tradition: their contents should coincide. Frege: what can be believed can also be demanded, commanded, required, requested, etc. CastanedaVs: that seems to be synchronically successful, but it lacks dynamism. The discrepancies between the different entities involved in proposition ((i) - (vii) emerge when we consider the diachronic river, where one undergoes changing experiences about a constantly changing world. In particular, we must have direct contact with the world in order to locate ourselves in it. This is precisely the role of the indexical reference. Propositions/CastanedaVsTradition: classical propositionality theory fails with indexical reference when it encounters experiences with "here", "now", "I", "he", etc. I 345 Thinking/Language/Proposition/CastanedaVsTradition: we seem to have assumed that thinking is embodied by symbolic activity. While thinking one somehow produces an illustrative token; since it happens both when thinking aloud and in silence, there has to be some brain pattern. I 346 The distinction between episodes of production of sentences and episodes of thinking is already made in the theory itself: therefore it postulates the convergence of sentence meaning and thought content. The propositionality theory does not have to identify a thinking episode ,that p, with an event in the brain or in the entire body. It is not about the body-soul problem. Vs: the required application of this distinction breaks the elegant arrangement of the coincident units: the distinction between a symbolic system and its application! This is Saussure’s distinction between langue/parole. This accomodates the dynamics of language and is itself not dangerous for the propositionality theory. But: Problem: the distinction between knowing the meaning and correct use exists! This is not a problem in most cases, but: I 347 E.g. "I have 30 grams of nitrogen compounds in my liver": we may understand the sentence, but we do not know whether someone expresses a truth or falsity with it. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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Externalism | Burge, T. | Fra I 691 Externalism/Burge: The thesis which thoughts one can have depends on the relationships one has with one's surroundings. Newen/Schrenk I 128 Externalism/Burge/Newen/Schrenk: more extreme than Putnam: Thesis: not only the content of natural species terms but in general the content of all thoughts depends on the environment. I 129 Burge's thesis is incompatible with supervenience. The following three statements cannot be true at the same time: 1. Thought contents are determined dependent on community and environment. 2. Brain states independent of... 3. Thought contents supervene on brain states. |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Brains in a Vat | Putnam, H. | Newen / Schrenk I 14 Brains in a vat / BIV / Putnam: PutnamVsSkepticism: Environmental dependence of thought content. |
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