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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Deontology | Geach | I 273 Deontic logic/Geach: sentences with "can" are no imperatives - there is also no information. >Cf. >Logic, >Epistemic logic, >Modal logic, >Modalities, >Inferences, >Information, >Conclusion, >Content. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Norms | Habermas | III 35 Norms/Knowledge/Habermas: the knowledge embodied in norm-regulated actions or in expressive expressions does not (...) refer to the existence of facts, but to the target validity of norms and to the subjective experiences that emerge. >truthfulness, >Subjectivity, >Correctness. III 132 Norms/Habermas: are not expressed by existential clauses such as "It is the case that q is required", but in the form of "It is required that q". This concerns the claim to normative correctness, which is expressed in such a way that it applies to a group of addressees. >Deontology, >Deontic logic. III 133 The a fact that a norm actually exists means that the claim to validity with which it occurs is recognised by the parties concerned. >Validity claim. III 134 Norm-regulated action requires two worlds, the objective and a social world. >Objective world, >Subjective world, >Social world. Acting in accordance with norms presupposes that the actor can distinguish between the factual and the normative elements. III 135 of his acting situation, i. e. can distinguish the conditions and means from values. III 405 Norms/Habermas: Within a standardised framework, the filing of a validity claim is not an expression of a contingent will. >Objectivity, >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas Likewise, agreement to a claim to validity is not an empirically motivated decision alone. The rejection of such a claim can only take the form of a criticism and the defence of the claim can only take the form of a refutation of the criticism. >Critique/Habermas. Whoever doubts the validity of norms will have to give reasons, whether against the legality of the regulation, i.e. the legality of its social validity - or against the legitimacy of the regulation, i.e. the claim to be correct or justified in a moral-practical sense. Here, conditions of acceptability are sufficient for compliance with a norm; they do not have to be supplemented by conditions of sanctions. >Acceptability/Habermas, >Justification, >Rationale, >Reasons. IV 65 Norms/Tradition/VsTradition/Habermas: only when the power of tradition has been broken to such an extent that the legitimacy of existing orders can be viewed in the light of hypothetical alternatives, the relatives of one cooperation ask themselves. That is to say, a group dependent on joint efforts to achieve collective objectives, whether the norms in question regulate the arbitrariness of the relatives in such a way that each of them can see his or her interests safeguarded. >Cultural tradition, >Conventions. IV 143 Norms/Language/Mead/Habermas: As language establishes itself as a principle of socialization, the conditions of sociality converge with conditions of communicatively established intersubjectivity. Since the authority of the holy is transformed into the binding power of normative claims to validity, which can only be discursively redeemed, the notion of the validitiy to be achieved is purified from empirical admixtures. In the end, the validity of a norm only means that it could be accepted by all those concerned for good reasons. >Validity claims, >Intersubjectivity, >Society, >Community. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Practical Inference | Kenny | Geach I 285 Practical Inference/Kenny: (A. KIenny 1966(1)). Thesis: Theoretical and practical inference are radically different. Geach: What they have in common is a certain asymmetry between premises and conclusions. >Premises, >Conclusions. 1. A lot of premises provide a single conclusion and cannot be achieved with any of these premises. 2. On the other hand, a set of conclusions follows from a single premise only if each individual conclusion follows from it on its own. Carnap and Kneale have sought technical solutions to this asymmetry. GeachVs: one should leave the asymmetry. Cf. >Asymmetries. It remains in Kenny's approach. If a set of conclusions would always be deducible together, but not individual conclusions...(s) then the set itself could not follow. Practical Inference/Kenny/Geach: I present it in the style of Kenny: From a set of commands Fq, Fr, Fs... one can conclude the conclusion Ft, provided that the phrastic of the conclusion entails the phrastic of a premise and that it is consistent with the phrastic of all other premises. I. e. >Phrastic. t ent q and the conjunction Kt, Kr, Ks... is consistent. Spelling: ent: entails, p ent q = p contains q, q follows q from p, entailment Kpq: Conjunction p u q Cpq Conditional p > q >Entailment. It is about how a wish is consistent with other wishes. This immediately means that no practical conclusion can be drawn from an inconsistent set of commands. When Kq, Kr, Ks... is an inconsistent conjunction and t ent q, then Kt, Kr, Ks... is inconsistent and then Ft is not valid deducible from the set FqFrFs.... >Commands, >Imperatives. Further difference to theoretical inference: practical inference can be cancelled. (>added premises). Geach I 287 Definition Synthetic theorem/Peripathetics/Geach: the principle that if a conclusion t follows from its set of premises P, and if P plus t delivers the conclusion v, then the premises provide P v. Only if the synthetic theorem applies, we get a chain of inferences. That is what we need in theory and practice. Kenny's theory secures the synthetic theorem. Practical Conclusion/Kenny/Geach: it is necessary for a correct conclusion Ft from a set of premises that (the phrasticon t ent the phrasticon v) from one of these fiats (commands) is compatible with the phrastics of all other fiats from the set. We can omit the word "or" if we formulate it in this way: t ent v, KtKpKqKr.... is a consistent conjunction if and only if KtKvKpKr.... is consistent. Proof: with the validity criterion in this practical form: We have to show that from (1) Ft is deducible from Fp, Fq, Fr... and (2) Fv is deducible from Ft, Fp, Fq, Fr... from that follows that (3) Fv is derived from Fp, Fq, Fr..... (1) holds if and only if t ent (one of the phrastic p, q, r...) I 288 and if the conjunction KtKpKqKr.... is consistent. Without losing the general public, it can be said that t ent p. Now (2) will hold if and only if v ent (one of the phrastic t, p, q, r...) and the if conjunction KvKtKpKpKqKr... is consistent. But if v ent t, because t ent p (through (1)), then v ent p. And no matter if v ent t or v ent (one of the phrastics of p, q, r...), v is always ent one of (p, q, r...). Now if KvKtKpKqKr... is a consistent conjunction, then also KvKpKqKr is ... Then v ent (one of p, q, r...) and KvKpKqKr... a consistent conjunction. (3) Q.E.D. holds. Premises/Added/Deleted/Inference/Conclusion/Concluding/Inference/Geach: although the modus ponens becomes invalid by added premises, a conclusion from the modus ponens will remain valid if it does not become invalid by an added premise. Because we do not get any conclusions from inconsistent practical premises. But if p and Cpq are consistent, it is also p and q. So Kpq will be consistent. And q ent cpq. But then Fq is a correct conclusion of Fp and FCpq! Practical Inference/Kenny/Geach: surprising result: in practical closing, the FKpq command is not deductively equivalent to the pair Ep, Eq. But this is not really paradoxical: the equivalence would lead to an absurd result, because for the same reason the set Fp, Fq, Fr... would be deductively equivalent to FKpKqKr... But this latter order could only be fulfilled if it were guaranteed that all our wishes could be fulfilled at the same time. We therefore need further closing rules for practical closure. >Desires, >Will, >Deontic logic. 1. A. Kenny (1966). "Practical Inference" in: Analysis 26,3. 1966. |
Kenn I A. Kenny A New History of Western Philosophy Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
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