Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 18 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Animal Language | Deacon | I 34 Animal language/Deacon: the communication of other species is never a "simpler form" of human language. It is not language at all. >Communication. Biological explanation/Deacon: is always evolutionary and tries to show continuity. However, there are no animal precursors to the emergence of human language, let alone an ascending scale of complexity. (See Robin Dunbar, Grooming, Gossip and the Evolution of Language, 1997(1); and Dunbar 1992 a(2), b(3)). I 54 Animal language/animals/Deacon: the misconception that animal calls and gestures are like words or phrases can be traced back to misunderstandings about the concept of reference. >Reference, >Gestures. Behaviorism: some behaviorists have suggested that animal cries are just external expressions of internal states and therefore have nothing to do with reference. >Behaviorism. Cognitive behaviorists saw calls as equivalent to words. One study played a central role in this. Seyfarth/Cheney: Thesis: Warning calls of guenons are like names for predators in the distance. (See Seyfarth, Cheney and Marler 1980(4)). I 56 In response to various calls, the monkeys left the trees (warning of eagles) or jumped on trees (leopards) or peeked into bushes (snake). Deacon: this is evolutionary easy to explain. Since the saving behaviour cannot always look the same and is even mutually exclusive, different calls have to be distinguished. (See also Hauser, 1996(5)). Animal calls/Cheney/Seyfarth/Deacon: Cheney and Seyfarth initially assumed that the animal calls were names for the predators. These were accepted instead of a complete sentence, i.e. as "holophrastic" utterances. Holophrastic utterances/Deacon: it is disputed how much syntactic potential lies in them. >Wittgenstein language game "Platte", cf. >Subsententials. Animal communication: the thesis was put forward that warning cries were different from cries of pain or grimaces by referring to something else... I 57 ...than the inner state of the animal. Reference/DeaconVsCheney/DeaconVsSeyfarth: it was implicitly assumed that pain cries, for example, could not be referring. Such assumptions give rise to the idea of a "proto-language" with calls as "vocabulary". >Vocabulary, >Words, >Signs, >Signals. Then you could imagine an animal language evolution with grammar and syntax that emerged later. This whole house of cards is falling apart however. (See also Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990(6)). Reference/Deacon: is not limited to language. Symptoms can refer to something other than themselves. For example, laughter: is congenital in humans. It does not have to be produced intentionally and can be simulated in social contexts. But laughter can also refer to things, even to absent ones. In this way alarm calls also refer. >Innateness. I 58 Language/DeaconVsSeyfarth/DeaconVsCheney: e.g. laughter differs from speech by the fact that it is contagious. In a room full of laughing people, it is hard to be serious. The idea of a room full of people repeating just one sentence is absurd. Intentionality/Intention/animal calls/Deacon: Animal calls do not fulfil the Grice criterion for messages either: "I think you believe that I believe x". Animal calls are involuntary and contagious. >Language, >P. Grice. I 59 Solution/Deacon: it is more about spreading excitement than sharing information. Reference/Deacon: therefore, reference is not the distinguishing feature between animal calls and words. Both can refer to inner states and things in the outer world. We must therefore distinguish between different types of reference rather than distinguish between referring and allegedly non-referring signals. >Reference/Deacon. I 65 Animal language/Herrnstein/Deacon: (Herrnstein 1980(7)): Experiments with pigeons who had successfully learned an arbitrary sign language and cooperation. I 66 Symbolic reference/Deacon: this simple form of reference with the characteristic learned association, randomness of characters, transmission of information between individuals are not sufficient to define symbolic reference. A symbolic reference system does not simply consist of words without syntax. >Symbolic reference, >Syntax. I 67 Animal calls: in one sense their understanding is innate, on the other hand the connection to the referent is not necessary. The reference is somewhat flexible. Some connections are built in prenatal, others are learned. I 68 Symbolic competence: is that which goes beyond parrot-like expressions. For this purpose, one has to distinguish between contextually determined causes of expression and memorized dictations. >Symbolic communication, >Symbolic learning, >Symbolic representation. 1. Dunbar, R. (1997). Grooming, Gossip, and the Evolution of Language. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Dunbar, R. (1992a). Co-evolution of neocortex size, group size and language in humans. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 3. Dunbar, R. (1992b). Neocortex size as a constraint on group sizes in primates. Journal of Human Evolution 20, 469-493. 4. Seyfarth, R. M., Cheney, D. L., & Marler, P. (1980): Vervet monkey alarm calls: Semantic communication in a free-ranging primate. Animal Behaviour, 28(4), 1070–1094. 5. Hauser, M. D. (1996): The evolution of communication. The MIT Press. 6. Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1990): How monkeys see the world: Inside the mind of another species. University of Chicago Press. 7. Herrnstein, R. (1980). Symbolic communication between two pigeons (Columba domestica). Science 210. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Attribution | Field | II 44 Behavior/attribution/ascription/Field: a claim about behavior is not simply a statement about behavior, but how behavior is caused. >Behaviorism. Belief ascription/Martians/Field: to alien beings, we cannot attribute sentences. Problem: we cannot decide whether a functional theory of their beliefs requires internal representations as well. >Other minds, >Representation, >Inner states, >Mental states, >Causation. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Behaviorism | Danto | I 267ff Experiment VsBehaviorismus:subjects had to recognize rotated figures. This led psychologists to distance themselves from behaviorism and the assumption that there could be such a thing as "internal rotation". Cf. >Rabbit-Duck-Head, >Mental states, >Inner states, >Thinking, >Thoughts. However, they rehabilitated not directly introspection, but rather the possibility of an internal representation. >Introspection, >Representation, >Self-knowledge, >Consciousness, >Behavior. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Body | Nietzsche | Danto III 142 Thinking/body/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche tends to assume that just like a thought comes when it wants to and not when I want it to come - my body moves when it moves, and not when I want it to move. Danto III 150 Thinking as such does not need to be conscious. The term unconscious thinking is not contradictory.(1) Private language/language/Nietzsche: paradoxically, it follows from this that allegedly private words - words referring to our own inner states - form the basis and main component of our common and public language. Danto III 265 Body/Nietzsche/Danto: My idea is that each specific body strives to become master over the whole space and expand its power (...) but it continually encounters similar aspirations of other bodies and ends up arranging itself with those ('unite') that are sufficiently related to it.(2) >Unconscious, cf. >Private language/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, KGW V, 2. S. 274. 2. F. Nietzsche, Nachlass, Berlin 1999, S. 705. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Elimination | Churchland | Schiffer I 159 Eliminativism/Churchland/Schiffer: (Paul Churchland 1981)(1): his eliminativism is quite different from that of Quine: Here the irreducibility of intentional vocabulary is denied. Folk Psychology/Churchland: is a functional theory. Belief is a functional state, with a functional role but future neuroscience will show that no inner states have these roles and therefore the folk psychology is wrong. Schiffer: this is a completely different route to eliminativism than that belief cannot be realized physically because our intentional vocabulary was irreducible. I 164 ... SchifferVsChurchland: his eliminativism would then have the consequence that no one believes anything. 1. Churchland, Paul (1981). "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes". Journal of Philosophy. 78 (2, February): 67–90. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Externalism | Davidson | Glüer II 185 Externalism/Putnam/Kripke: Externalism is about correct causal chains between word and object. > Causal theory. Externalism/DavidsonVsKripke, DavidsonVsPutnam: Externalism is about complete sentences and interpretation. Reference of single words/Davidson: is a theoretical construct - ((s) derived from whole sentences). I (a) 8 Def Externalism/Davidson: Events and objects by which a belief is evoked determine at the same time their content. DavidsonVs: (s) nothing outside the mind determines a belief. Externalism: shows the correctness (not infallibility) of the majority of judgments - (Davidson Pro). I (d) 72 Externalism/Davidson: pro this variant: Externalism stems from twin earth examples, not from linguistic division of labor. Therefore it is no threat of the first person authority. Radical interpretation: interpreter has to find out the factors, by means of indirect evidence, that first determine the content of the thought of the others - there is no room for error for one's own content because the same factors determine both thoughts. I (d) 74 Externalism/Burge: two forms: a) social, meaning from linguistic practice (community) b) importance of causal history (learning history) dependent on the individual. Burge: causal relationship to the object in order to comprehend content. DavidsonVsBurge: does not protect against error. Frank I 626ff Externalism/Davidson: It does not matter if mental states are individuated by something outside, just like sunburn ceases to be on the skin because it has an external cause. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica 38 (1984), 101-111 - - - Frank I 663 Externalism/first person/authority: If thoughts are externally determined, then the subject does not necessarily need to know what it thinks of - if the externalism is correct, then: VsFrege: thoughts cannot be completely comprehended. VsDescartes: inner states are not certain. Burge: False use of terms: There is the possibility to not know one's own thoughts. DavidsonVsBurge: Beliefs depend on other beliefs, therefore less strong possibility of error - DavidsonVsBurge: Intent of successful communication has no necessary connection to the correct identification of meaning. I 663-667 Externalism: Putnam: Distinguishing inner and "ordinary" external beliefs - Fodor: "methodological solipsism": is only observing internal states. Burge: External factors find their way into the determination of the contents via "thought experiments". - E.g., wrongly used terms: wrong beliefs about oneself e.g. "I have arthrite in the bones".) >Arthrite/shmarthrite. DavidsonVsBurge: initially pro: the content is not determined by what is going on in the person, but: content is determined so strong holistically that individual confusion of ideas cannot be so decisive, and therefore no rigid rules for the attribution of thoughts, we are not compelled to ascribe to the words of another person the same meaning as that person him- or herself. I 676 Mind/tradition/DavidsonVsDescartes: If there were a stage with alleged representatives of the objects, how can the mind pave its way out? - Anyway, the "objects" do not interest him, but their cousins, the propositions. But the mind has not the solution "in mind": externalism: all that helps to determine the object must likewise be grasped by the mind when it should know in which state it is. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Functional Role | Loar | Schiffer I 19 Belief/Loar: a function, that maps the propositions on internal physical states. - These internal physical states have functional roles that are indicated by these propositions. >Inner States, >Brain/Brain state, >Mental states, >Physicalism, >Token-physicalism, >Propositions, >Functionalism. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Individuation | Esfeld | I 136 ~ Individuation/Esfeld: individuation of belief states: individuation of belief states is done by content. >Content. Meaning: meaning is given by the individuation of beliefs by conceptual content and common standards (external) and a role in the belief system. >Conceptual content. Individuation of content: individuation of content is done by the inferential role. >Inferential role. Individuation of behavior: individuation of behavior is naturalistic by disposition 2. order (coordination). >Behavior. Individuation of representations: individuation of representations is external by causal causation through things. >Representation. It is wrong to say that components of mixed inner states are individuated by components of the world "correlation". Howard: separability is crucial for the individuation of physical systems. So in superposition there is only one system. EsfeldVs: It is empty holism to easily speak of a system. There must be an internal structure - we may very well refer to the parts. >Holism, >Systems, >Structures. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Introspection | Introspection: introspection is the investigation of a self-conscious subject of its own inner states. Prerequisites are, among other things, the ability to distinguish interior from external influences, as well as at least to some extent the use of a public language. Moreover, the subject must be able to compare past internal and external states with present internal and external states, and must be able to deliberately distinguish itself from other subjects. |
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| Introspection | Chalmers | I 13 Introspection/Psychology/Phenomenology/Behavior/Consciousness/Wundt/Chalmers: if one were to use introspection like e.g. Wilhelm Wundt, in order to explain behavior, one would behave 1. Cartesian, and 2. one makes phenomenology the referee on psychology. >Phenomenology/Chalmers. I 26 Introspection/Chalmers: introspection is the way we become clear about the content of our inner states. This is an important component of our everyday concept of consciousness. Introspection can be analyzed in terms of a rational process of open-mindedness for information about inner states and the ability to apply this information meaningfully. Cf. >Awareness/Chalmers, >Content/Chalmers. Status reports: require additional language control. >First person, >Incorrigibility. I 189 Introspection/Consciousness/Explanation/Dennett/Chalmers: (Dennett, 1979 (1)) ... there are public reports about our consciousness and episodes of our propositional awareness, our judgments and - as far as introspection is concerned - darkness (1979, p.95). ChalmersVsDennett: then Dennett's introspection is very different from mine. I find sensations, feelings, pain, etc., although they are accompanied by judgments, they themselves are not merely judgments. I 190 Introspection/Chalmers: Dennett's approach is better described than extrospection. He starts from the outside to explore his inner being. Dennett/Chalmers: (in Dennett, 1991 (2), pp 363-364): what is the point is to explain why things appear to us as they do. And that would explain everything that needs to be explained. Appearing/ChalmersVsDnett: There are two meanings of apparition: a) phenomenal ("how it is ...") b) psychologically (as disposition for judgments). Dennett's theory explains only b). >Psychology, >Disposition, >Judgments, >Behavior, >Explanation. 1. D. Dennett, On the absence of phenomenology,. In: D. Gustafson and B Tapscott, (Eds) Body, Mind, and Method, Dordrecht 1979. 2. D. Dennett, Consciousness Explained, Boston, 1991 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Other Minds | Deacon | I 424 Foreign psychical/Deacon: information about the inner states of other individuals are all indirect. >Attribution, >Foreign attribution, cf. >Self-attribution, >First person. I 425 However, if we look at the problem as a representation problem, we find that both, the representation of foreign and one's own states, depends entirely on the nature of the representation processes. So it is more about what kind of representation is involved. >Representation. When thinking and experience are information processes, the representation of one's own and foreign states is the same problem. >Thinking, >World/thinking, >Experience, >Sensory impressions. I 426 The ability to take a foreign perspective is not innate. >Perspective, >Innateness. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Private Language | Nietzsche | Danto III 142 Thinking/Body/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche tends to assume that just like a thought comes when it wants to and not when I want it to come - my body moves when it moves, and not when I want it to move. >Body/Nietzsche. Danto III 150 Thinking as such does not need to be conscious. The term unconscious thinking is not contradictory.(1) Private language/language/Nietzsche: paradoxically, it follows from this that allegedly private words - words referring to our own inner states - form the basis and main component of our common and public language. >Unconscious. 1. F. Nietzsche, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, KGW V, 2. S. 274. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Privileged Access | Privileged Access, philosophy of mind: what is meant here is the access a human subject has to his own inner states. It is debatable whether there is any privileged access at all. Counter-arguments are put forward by authors who assume that one can only grasp one’s feelings in a public language, that is, with concepts learned in the external world. See also introspection, foreign psychological, private language. |
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| Realism | Bigelow | I VII Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis: pro scientific realism. Logic can also be understood best in this way. Modal Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro: a scientific realist should be a modal realist. ((s) I.e. he/she should assume the existence of possible worlds). >Modal realism, >Possible worlds. I 38 Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: our realism is neutral in relation to reductionism. >>Reductionism. I 275 Metaphysical realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro metaphysical realism, which does not simply interpret the causal relation as a predicate, or as a set of ordered pairs, but as a universal. >Metaphysical realism, >Causal relation, >Ordered pairs, >Predicates, >Universals. I 341 Best explanation/BE/Bigelow/Pargetter: behind it are different kinds of realism. >Best explanation. I 342 Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: many of his varieties are based on a best explanation. Since we are assuming there is something to explain in the explanation. Foundation/fundamental realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: a fundamental class of entities is assumed. These do not explain anything themselves, but provide the material to be explained. >Foundation, >Explanation. Vs: the raw material should be sensations (perception, experience). >Sensations, >Perception, >Experience, >Perception, >Experience, cf. >R. Carnap. Appearance/Bigelow/Pargetter: if we start with it, we can reach the best explanation for any kind of realism by concluding. >Appearance. But it is not "realism about phenomena". Realism always accepts objects. BigelowVsTradition: erroneously assumes that we ourselves are in some way outside and not in the midst of reality. Realism/Explanation/Bigelow/Bigelow/Pargetter: not everything we assume to be real does contribute to explanations at all! ((s) For example redundancies and repetitions are not unreal, tautologies are not unreal either, nor boring stuff. So we cannot assume from the outset that reality is a valid explanation. Neither would we deny the existence of boring stuff.). >Explanations, >Causal explanation. Reality/Bigelow/Pargetter: it is also doubtful whether all things should explain appearances. I 343 Def direct realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis: we perceive objects "directly". I. e. without deducing their existence from anything fundamental by inference. There is some truth in it! (pro: Armstrong 1961(1), discussion in Jackson 1977b(2)). BigelowVsDirect realism: even if we could keep object and appearances apart through reflection, it would be questionable whether the material thing would be the better explanation! >Objects, cf. >Thing in itself. Appearance/Bigelow/Pargetter: dealing with it is tricky. It seems as if we have to find out something about our inner states first. The normal case, however, is the extroverted perceiver. The situation of extroverted perception must also precede introverted reflection. >Perception, >Reflection. Best Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: nonetheless, if we are realists, we will understand material objects as the best explanation of our appearances (or perception). Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: now it shows that there is a hierarchy of two realisms ((s) a) direct, naive, b) reflected, by deduction from appearances) and how this hierarchy is destroyed in practice: we begin with a realism and come to the conclusion of the best explanation to the second realism, and these merge into one and the same reality. >Abduction. The hierarchical order does not remain in things, but becomes an extrinsic characteristic of their relation to us as perceivers. There is also a feedback: the inverse conclusion from the reflected realism on the unreflected. I 344 Holism/Bigelow/Pargetter: that leads to some kind of epistemic holism that we accept. It does not threaten realism. >Holism. Explanation/Best Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: if we accept realism on the basis of conclusions drawn from the best explanation, we must ask what kind of explanation is at issue. It can be about different kinds of (Aristotelian) causes (see above). The most convincing ones are certainly those that are concerned with "efficient" causes: e.g. Cartwright, Hacking: Realism/Cartwright/Hacking: is best supported by causal explanations. >Realism/Cartwright, >Realism/Hacking. Quine/Two Dogmas/Bigelow/Pargetter: Quine has caused many philosophers not only to sit in the armchair, but also to question the experiments that scientists have carried out in real. We reject that. >Two Dogmas, >W.V.O. Quine, >Experiments, >Science, >Certainty, >Method, >Measurements. Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: but we also reject the other extreme, that realism would have to arise solely from causal explanations. >Causal explanation, >Causality. I 345 There may also be formal reasons (formal causes/Aristotle) for realism. >Aristotle. Modality/Bigelow/Pargetter: it is also a legitimate question as to what constitutes modalities in science. Modal realism is the best explanation here for such matters. >Modal Realism. Metaphysics/Platonism/Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: can be supported by the Best Explanation: by inferences on the best explanation we show that we need modalities and universals in the sciences. Modality/Bigelow/Pargetter: their primary source is mathematics. Mathematics/Bigelow/Pargetter: our metaphysics allows a realistic understanding of mathematics. (BigelowVsField). >Mathematics/Hartry Field, >Mathematical entities, >Platonism, >Universals. 1. Armstrong, D. M. (1961). Perception and the physical world. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 2. Jackson, F. (1977b) Perception. A representative theory. Cambridge University Press. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Rylean Ancestors | Pauen | Pauen I 91 Sellars/Pauen: thesis: our seemingly direct experience of mental states is the product of theoretical generalizations. - Question: how could such a theory arise, if one does not know the (everyday psychological postulated) mental states from their own experience? >Mental states, >Generalization, >Experiences, >Everyday psychology. Solution: Rylean ancestors: Step 1: Language and ideas are exclusively linked to behavioral dispositions and verbal expressions. >Behavior, >Dispositions. Step 2: attribution of internal states, so thoughts. >Thoughts, >Internal states. Rylean ancestors/Sellars/Pauen: thesis: we do not know our mental states from own experience. Solution: 1. Language and ideas relate only to behavior 2. after that attribution of "thoughts"- one knows mental states (e.g. thoughts) not from the first-person perspective. >Behaviorism, >First Person. We do not have direct access to our inner states - only mediated through everyday psychology. Cf. >L. Wittgenstein. I 105 VsSellars/VsRylean ancestors/Pauen: implausible, how should one has ever come up with the idea to explain behavior with the attribution of mental states if one had not known them before from own experience. I 106 Sellars disregards that an explanation is conceivable even without such attributions. >Attributions, >W. Sellars. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Sensations | Sensation: ability to detect differences between own inner states related to stimuli. Sensations are fundamentally for perceptions and unlike them not linked to linguistic abilities. See also sensory impression, impression, perception, stimulation, stimuli, emotion, experience. |
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| Thinking | Nietzsche | Danto III 142 Thinking/Body/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche tends to assume that just like a thought comes when it wants to and not when I want it to come - my body moves when it wants to move, and not when I want it to. >Body/Nietzsche. Danto III 150 Thinking as such does not need to be conscious. The term unconscious thinking is not contradictory.(1) Private language/language/Nietzsche: paradoxically, it follows from this that allegedly private words - words referring to our own inner states - form the basis and main component of our common and public language. >Unconscious. 1. F. Nietzsche, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, KGW V, 2. S. 274. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Truth Values | Schiffer | I 127 Truth value/mind state/Schiffer: mind-state tokens also have truth values. >Mental states. ((s) No truth values have: sentences in mentalese/language of thought; inner states like brain states.) >Brain states, >Mentalese. ((s) Also no truth values have: subsentential expressions.) >Subsentetials, >Words, >Open formulas, >Propositional functions. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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| Behaviorism | Searle Vs Behaviorism | I 30 Searle: the ontology of mental states is an ontology of the first person. (SearleVsBehavoirism). I 49 SearleVsBehaviorism: two types of objections: 1. objections of common sense. 2. Technical objections. 1. VsLogical Behaviorism: technical objections: behaviorism never succeeded to fully explain the concept of a "disposition". Circle: if one wants to analyze the belief through behavior then you have to obviously also make reference to the wishing; if one wants to analyze the wishing by behavior, then you have obviously also have to make reference to the belief (Chisholm 1957)(1). I 50 LewisVsBehaviorism: technical objection: behaviorism ignores the causal relationships between mental states and behavior (Lewis 1966)(2). The objections of common sense are ultimately the most embarrassing. The absurdity lies in the denial of the existence of all the inner states of mind. This is against our ordinary experience of how it is to be a human being. I 57 Functionalism: what makes two neurophysiological states relating to occurrences of the same state of mind type, is that they perform the same function throughout the life of the organism. The two mind states must then stand on the following three things in the same causal relations: 1. To the stimulus that the organism receives as input, 2. To the various other "mental" states and 3. To the behavior that the organism produces as output. Note that by the causal relationships two objections are avoided that were put forward VsBehaviorism: the first said that behaviorism neglects the causal relationship of mental states, the other said that in it a circularity was contained, and as convictions against recourse to requests and wishes had to be analyzed by resorting to convictions. VIII 428 Grammar/language/SearleVsBehaviorism/SearleVsEmpiricism: Dilemma: a) Either he relies solely on stimulus-response mechanisms (stimulus response) then he can not explain the acquisition of grammar. Or b) He admits à la Quine that there are innate mechanisms. But once the mechanisms are rich enough, the stimulus-response part is not interesting! 1. R. Chisholm, Perceiving Ithaca, NY, 1957 2. D. Lewis, An argument for the identity theory, Journal of Philosophy 63, 1966: pp.17-25 |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Lewis, D. | Putnam Vs Lewis, D. | I Lanz 291 Functionalism/identity theory: common: recognition of causally relevant inner states. But functionalism Vsidentity theory: the substance is not what plays a causal role for the commitment. (PutnamVsLewis). --- VI 437 "Elite classes"/Nature/Natural Reference/world/language/Lewis/Putnam: thesis, there are certain classes of things "out there" (elite classes) which are intrinsically distinguished, whereby it is a "natural condition" for reference, (incorporated into nature), that as many of our concepts as possible should refer to these elite classes. This does not clearly determine the reference of our terms, because sometimes there are other desiderata, but so the language is "tied to the world". Löwenheim/Putnam: from my ((s) Löwenheim-) argument follows that all our beliefs and experiences would be the same and none of my critics has ever contested that. >Löwenheim/Putnam. N.B.: it follows that Lewis "natural conditions" were not brought in by our interests, but that they are something that works with our interests to fix reference. LewisVsLöwenheim/Putnam: Lewis' thesis boils down to that e.g., the class of cats longs to be designated but not the one of cats*. Reference/PutnamVsLewis: his idea of the elite classes does not solve the problem of reference, but even confuses the materialist picture, by introducing something spooky. >Reference/Lewis. PutnamVsLewis: this does not only affect reference but also justification, relations of simultaneous assertibility, (that something could remain true, while something other is no longer true). All this cannot be fixed by something psychological, by something "in the head". PutnamVsPhysicalism: it cannot say that they are fixed, without falling back into medieval speech of a "clear causal order." Physicalism cannot say how it would be fixed, without falling back into medieval speech. --- Schwarz I 149 "New Theory of Reference/PutnamVsLewis/KripkeVsLewis/Schwarz: Did Kripke and Putnam not prove that, what an expression refers to, has nothing to do with associated descriptions? Then it could be that we are referring with "pain" to a state that does not play the everyday psychological role, which is not caused by injuries, etc., but may play the role that we mistakenly attribute to "joy". Then people would typically smile with pain. Typical cause of pain would be the fulfillment of wishes. LewisVsPutnam: thinks this is nonsense. When a state plays the role of joy, it is joy. --- Putnam III 176 Possible Worlds/Lewis: I believe in what is claimed by permissible reformulations of my beliefs. Does one take the reformulation at face value, I believe in the existence of entities that could be called "ways, how things could have turned out". These entities, I call "possible worlds". (Realistic interpretation possible worlds.) PutnamVsLewis: "way" does not necessarily need to be interpreted as a different world. III 177 Possible Worlds/David Lewis: we already know what our world is all about, other worlds are things of the same kind, which do not differ in kind, but only by the processes that take place in them. We call our world, therefore the real world, because it is the world in which we live. Possible world/PutnamVsLewis: a possible "way" of world development could also be perceived as a property, not as a different world. This property could be (no matter how complicated) a feature that could correspond to the whole world. Possible World/PutnamVsLewis: if a "way of possible world development" would be a property (a "state description" of the whole world), and the Eiffel Tower would have a different height, then the property "is a world in which the Eiffel Tower is 150 meters high" must follow from the property that the Eiffel tower in our world is not 150 meters high. Lewis: claims, properties would have to be something simple, and the statement that a property follows from another, boils down to the assertion that there is a necessary relationship between various simple ones, and that is, as Lewis says, "incomprehensible". So the properties would have to be in turn interpreted as complexes. But Lewis is unable to see in how far properties could be complexes, because of what should they be made? III 178 PutnamVsLewis: Lewis has not answered here in the "analytical" style. He did not say normal things. I have no idea what is going on with the intuitive ideas claimed by Lewis, why something works intuitively and something else works incomprehensible. The argument that something simple cannot enter a relationship, is according to my impression far from possessing practical or spiritual significance. I find these intuitive ideas not only alien; I even feel I do not understand what it means. --- Putnam I (g) 187 Counterfactual conditionals/unreal conditionals/Lewis: Suggestion: analyze "cause" based on unreal conditional sentences: "If A had not happened, B would not have happened". Counterfactual conditional/PutnamVsLewis: there are situations in which it is simply not true that B would not have happened if A had not happened. I (g) 201 E.g. B could have been caused by another cause. E.g. Identical twins: it is so that both always have the same hair color. But the hair of one is not the cause of the other. Lewis cannot separate this. Counterfactual conditionals/unreal conditionals/truth conditions/Lewis/Stalnaker: Lewis follows Stalnaker and provides truth condition for unreal conditional clauses: for this he needs possible worlds and a similarity measure. Definition truth condition/Lewis: "If X would have happened, Y would have happened" is true if and only if Y, in all closest worlds where X is the case, is really true. PutnamVsLewis: an ontology, which requires parallel and possible worlds, is at least not a materialistic ontology. Besides it also sounds pretty much like science fiction. I (g) 188/189 The notion of an intrinsic similarity measure, i.e. a measure that is sensitive to the fact of what we deem relevant or normal, is again in such a way that the world is like a ghost or impregnated with something like reason. This then requires a metaphysical explanation and is therefore idealism. And objective idealism can hardly be "a bit true". "It is all physics, except that there is that similarity measure makes simply no sense. I (g) 189 Identity/nature/essence/Lewis: Proposal: the aggregation of molecules and "I" are identical for a period of time, similar to Highway 2 and Highway 16, which are identical for some time. VsLewis: but not every property of aggregation is a property of mine. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Realism | Bigelow Vs Realism | I 343 Def Direct realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis: we perceive objects "directly". That means inferring their existence from something basic. There is some truth in that! (pro: Armstrong 1961, discussion in Jackson 1977b). BigelowVsDirect realism: even if we could tell thing and phenomenon apart by reflection, it would be questionable whether the material thing would be the better explanation! Appearance/Bigelow/Pargetter: handling it is tricky. It seems as if we must first find out something about our inner states. However, the normal case is the extroverted perceiver. The situation of the extroverted perception must also precede the introverted reflection. Best explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: nevertheless, if we are realists, we will perceive all material objects as the BE of our appearances (or perception). |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Tradition | Davidson Vs Tradition | Frank I 677 Subjectivity/Tradition/Davidson: the concept of the subjective seems to fall apart because of the externalism: on the one hand the true inner states about which the mind reserves authority, on the other hand the ordinary states of belief, wishing, meaning, of the intention which is contaminated by its external links to social environment. By analogy, there is an experts for sunburn who cannot detect whether the sun or any other cause is responsible. Def "Senburn"/Terminology/Davidson: is constituted just like a sunburn, only the sun must not necessarily be involved in the cause: "Sun or other cause", disjunction. Important argument: the expert can recognize a senburn by simply looking at it, but not a sunburn. DavidsonVsTradition: this solution works for sunburn because, unlike with objects of the mind, it is not necessary to havve a very special person who can recognize just by he looks (first person authority) whether the condition exists or not. Mental states/DavidsonVsTraditionVsMyth of the subjective: here the solution is even simpler: Of course people have beliefs, but these are not entities that the mind has in mind. Fra I 678 Ontology/Davidson: Not of interest here. We will always need an unlimited supply of objects that help us to describe attitudes (externalism), belief sentences are thus relational. But these objects are not "psychological objects". Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Tradition | Ryle Vs Tradition | Lanz I 275 Ryle: psychological statements are hypothetical statements. They are also verifiable from the perspective of the third person. It is not about causes, but about criteria and standards for skills and achievements. I 276 They denote behavioral dispositions and non-internal events that would be the causes of behavior. Intelligence/Tradition: intelligent action: rule or method knowledge, so to know a set of positions. That is, intelligent action would be action with an intelligent cause. (RyleVs). Intelligence/Ryle: there are many examples of intelligent action without consideration: E.g. quick-witted replies, spontaneously correct deciding (fast chess) practically clever behavior in games, in sports and others. I 277 RyleVsTradition: Regress: if intelligent action was the application of intelligence, then this application would again be an action for which intelligence would be necessary, ad infinitum. Definition Intelligence/Ryle: action with a certain level, with a certain quality. The actor possesses corresponding ability and uses them. Ryle I 373 Memory/Presentation/RyleVs trace theory: their followers should try to imagine the case in which someone has a melody stuck in his head. Is this a reactivated trace of auditory sensation, or a series of reactivated traces of a series of auditory sensations? Ryle I 66 Mental state/mind/RyleVsTradition/Ryle: even if there were the mythical inner states and activities assumed by some, one could not draw any likelihoods of their occurrence among others. --- I 84 VsVolition/VsActs of will/act of will/Ryle: both voluntary and involuntary acts of will are absurd. If my act of will is voluntary in the sense of theory, another act of will must have preceded it, ad infinitum (regress) It has been proposed for the avoidance that the act of will can be neither described as voluntary nor as involuntary. "Act of will" is a term that cannot accept predicates such as "virtuous", "vicious", "good" or "wicked," which may embarrass those moralists who use the acts of will as the emergency anchor of their systems. I 85 In short: the theory of acts of will is a causal hypothesis, and the question of voluntariness is a question of the cause. I 86 RyleVsTradition: some well-known and truly occurring events are often confused with acts of will: people are often in doubt what to do. The final choice is sometimes referred to as an act of will. But equality is untenable, for most voluntary actions do not come from a state of indifference! Weakness of will/akrasia/Ryle: it is also known that someone can decide, but the action is not carried out becacuse of weakness of will. Or he does not carry it out because of new circumstances. RyleVsTradition: Problem: According to the theory of acts of will, it would be impossible for them to sometimes not lead to results. Otherwise all new executed operations would have to be postulated which explains that voluntary actions are sometimes actually carried out. If a choice was called voluntary, it must have been preceeded by another choice, ad infinitum. Ryle I 87 If the action is not carried out, according to the theory (tradition) there is also no act of will. Ryle I 182 Introspection/Attention/RyleVsTradition: In the case of an inspection, one would have to ask again whether it is attentive or inattentive. (Regress) Vs: That also pretends that there is a difference in having an irritation of the throat and the statement that one has it. Not only is attention far from being a kind of inspection or listening, but inspecting and listening are themselves specific ways of exercising attention. Whether metaphorically or literally, a viewer can always be attentive or inattentive. To do something with attention is not to link an activity with a bit of theorizing, exploring, inspecting, or knowing. Otherwise, any action done with attention would involve an infinite number of activities. VsIntellectualist tradition: as if the exercise of theory is the essential function of mind and contemplation the essence of this activity. Ryle I 215 Consciousness/Tradition/Ryle: According to the traditional theory, soul processes are not aware in the sense that we can report about them later, but that the opening up of their own incident is a feature of these incidents and cannot come after them. I 216 Tradition/Ryle: these alleged revelations would be expressed in the present and not in the past, if they were dressed in words at all. At the same time as I discover that my watch stands still, I also discover that I discover it. RyleVsTradition: this is a myth! 1. We usually know what we are doing. No "phosphorescence" theory is necessary. 2. That we know it does not imply that we are constantly thinking about it. 3. It does not imply that when we know something about ourselves, we encounter some ghostly phenomena. RyleVsTradition: The basic objection against the traditional theory which claims that the mind must know what it does because mental events are consciously or metaphorically "self-luminous" is that there are no such events. I 217 There are no events that take place in a world of any other kind. Consequently, there is also no need for such methods to make the acquaintance of inhabitants of such a world. RyleVsTradition/RyleVsTradition/Ryle: No one would ever want to say that he had gained some knowledge "out of his consciousness". It is a grammatical and logical abuse of the word "knowing" that the consciousness of my mental states is that I know them. It is nonsense to say that someone knows this thunderstorm, this colored surface or this act of concluding. This is just the wrong accusative for the verb "to know". The metaphor of light does not help here. Ryle I 388 Intellect/mind/use of symbols/Ryle: in practice, we do not regard every expression as an intellectual, but only the one understood as work. Border problems do not pose a problem for us. Some problem solving is intellectual, searching for the thimble is not, bridge is in the middle. Thinking/mind/intellect/RyleVsTradition/Ryle: for us, this is important: it means that both theories are wrong, the old with the special, occult organ, and the newer ones, which speak of particular intellectual processes such as judgments, conceptual perception, assumption, thinking through, etc. They pretend to have identification signs for things they cannot always identify in reality. Ryle I 391 Theory/Theories/Ryle: Nothing would be gained with the assertion that Einstein, Thucydides, Newton, and Columbus were concerned with the same activity. Sherlock Holmes's theories have not been constructed by the same means as those of Karl Marx. Both agreed, however, that they wrote theories in didactic prose. Theory/Tradition: To have a theory means to have learned one and not to forget it. To be at the place of destination. It does not mean doing something yourself. Theory/RyleVsTradition: Having a pen is to be able to write with it. Having a theory or a plan means being ready to communicate or apply it when the opportunity arises. Difference: the intelligent listener then acquires a theory, if he is wise, has understood it, he does not have to accept it at all. But we do not set up a theory primarily to be able to put it into words. Columbus did not go on journeys to increase the material for geographic studies. Definition having a theory/Ryle: is the ability to solve additional tasks. To be a Newton follower would not only mean saying what Newton had said, but also to do the same and say what he had said. --- Flor I 263 Can, to be able to/RyleVsTradition: "Legend": that an action can only be carried out intelligently if it is based on or accompanies a theoretical, intellectual performance. (Dualistic). Division in private, theoretical part of the activity and a practical, public. Can, to be able to: (know-how): cannot be determined by theoretical insight! (Knowing that this or that applies). Theoretical insight is itself a form of practice and cannot itself be intelligent or not intelligent! It is not plausible that any action, in which intelligence or its deficiency can be demonstrated, should include the consideration of theoretical statements, norms, or rules. There are also many actions for which there are no formulated rules or criteria for intelligent executio Flor I 264 Regress/Ryle: according to the dualistic notion, an intelligent action presupposes that there has been a theoretical consideration of statements, norms, or rules by which the activity is then carried out. This consideration, however, is itself an action that can be more or less intelligent. This leads to regress. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Mentalese | Harman, G. | Cresswell II 160 Thought Language/Mentalese/HarmanVsFodor/Cresswell: (Harman 1982) Thesis: The language of thought is simply the public language. FodorVsHarman: (1975, 56). Skipper I 74 Mentalese/Harman: (1978, 58) Thesis: But it is not implausible to assume that our inner states of representation have elements and structure, in a way analogous to the way in which sentences have elements and structure. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Rylean ancestors | Sellars, W. | Pauen I 91 Sellars / Pauen: Thesis: our seemingly direct experience of mental states is the product of theoretical generalizations. Question: how could such a deep theory emerge, if we do not know the mental states from our own experience (aw postulated by folk psychology)? Solution: Rylean ancestors: Step 1: language and ideas relate solely to behavioral dispositions and verbal utterances. Step 2: attribution of inner states, i.e. "thoughts". |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
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