Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 15 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Causal Theory of Knowledge | Brandom | I 310ff Causal theory of knowledge/GoldmanVs/Barn facades: classic causal theory: Knowledge for the wrong reasons no knowledge. Alvin Goldman: example: residents of real-barn province expresses genuine knowledge - the knowledge of the resident of the fassade province no real knowledge - Problem: mere chance whether real barn - the difference of circumstances has influence, even if they are causally irrelevant. >Barn facades. Quantity: few (unrecognizable) sparrow dummies do not turn a reliable onlooker into an unreliable one; they will, however, when there are many dummies - reliability is the correct term for the barn ((s) The method does not change when many dummies are used.) I 312 Goldman: underlines the possibility of gerrymandering: it depends on whether you are in the center or at the edge of the province when it comes to allocating values. >Gerrymandering. --- II 149 Knowledge/Causal Theory of Knowledge/Goldman/Brandom: objective probability can only specified relative to a reference class - but the world itself does not distinguish such classes - so the choice of the reference class in turn is not determined objectively by naturalistically specifiable facts. >Facts. II 149 f Barn facades/Goldman/Brandom: VsCausal Theory - Pioneer of reliability theories - Causal chain must be ideal - E.g. facades of provinces, each with changed practices: fake/real ... etc. - then it depends entirely on the choice of the reference class, whether the sight of a real barn is knowledge - maximum reliable: the narrowest reference class. Internalism/twin earth: it could be argued that the internal states are similar - Goldman/Brandom: all in all, the presence of fakes (barn facades) in the surroundings is causally irrelevant. >Cf. >Twin earth. II 152 Brandom: the circumstances are external! ((s) so it is true?). BrandomVsQuine: Goldman does not support the naturalistic epistemology, because knowledge is independent of the choice of the reference class - so one argument place remains empty. - It depends on how we describe the convinced person: as a citizen of the country, the state, etc. And that would be just the naturalistically formulated ones. - Definition naturalistic blind spot of the reliability theories/Brandom: whether an observer is reliable or not depends on the choice of reference classes (barn province), and thus on external circumstances that have nothing to do with the object under observation. II 155 Reliability theories: good reason for not separating belief from good inference - difference: knowledge/authorization for knowledge. >Reliability theory. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Circular Reasoning | Brandom | I 313 Theory/Method/Brandom: the concept of regularity cannot distinguish regularities - regularity with respect to reference classes, cannot distinguish reference classes - there are probably facts about probability, but no fact that shows which of the possible reference classes is the right one - (> Nonfactualism). --- II 161 Conceptual blind spot/Reliability theory/Brandom: Solution: significance (connections to objects in the same room) marks the correct representations - naturalistic Blind Spot: Solution: interpersonal inferential structure. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Cognition | Brandom | II 143 Non-cognitive/Brandom: E.g. iron rusts in moist air - e.g. bulls respond to red towels - this uses no concepts - nevertheless they are reliable (>RDRD reliable differential responsive dispositions) - such beings have no knowledge - that: "conceptual blind spot" of the reliability theory. >Terminology/Brandom, >Reliability theory. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Information | Hayek | Sunstein I 14 Information/prices/markets/Hayek/Sunstein: a pricing system, as suggested by Friedrich August von Hayek, can help in solving the problem of how (implicit) pressure is exerted in group discussions to withhold potentially crucial information. This has a pronounced effect on the gathering of information. Markets/Hayek: Markets create prices for goods in a way that processes scattered information distributed among very different people. In markets, participants have an extreme incentive to be right. Some information may remain "hidden", but when it comes to making a profit, this information will not be hidden for customers and investors for long. For this reason, market prices reflect a high degree of information.(1) Sunstein: You could say that markets create something like a "Daily Us" see Filter bubbles/Sunstein. SunsteinVsHayek: However, his argumentation had a blind spot. Markets can also process false information. Styles can lead to inflationary prices. This can also affect land and real estate prices. >Markets/Sunstein, Markets/Hayek. I 132 Prediction markets/forecast markets/Sunstein: Examples where information markets are efficient: For example, to recognize tendencies of air pollution, to observe deficits in public budgets (2). For example, tracking outbreaks of diseases and predicting their spread or monitoring the solvency of institutions.(3) I 137 Manipulation: Candidate Pat Buchanan's supporters bought large quantities of shares in the IEM (Iowa Electronic Market, a prediction market for elections) in 2000 to manipulate the prediction. However, better informed investors subsequently took advantage of this. 1. Friedrich Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, vol. 1: Rules and Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973) p. 13. 2. See Abramowicz, “Prediction Markets, Administrative Decisionmaking, and Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis,” pp. 990–92. 3. ibid. pp. 987-90. |
Hayek I Friedrich A. Hayek The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents--The Definitive Edition (The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, Volume 2) Chicago 2007 Sunstein I Cass R. Sunstein Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge Oxford 2008 Sunstein II Cass R. Sunstein #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media Princeton 2017 |
| Knowledge | Goldman | II 149/150 Alvin Goldman/knowledge/BrandomVsGoldman: Goldman's theory paved the way for the reliability theories, but it is a two-edged sword with regard to naturalized epistemology. >Epistemology naturalized, >Reliability theory. For his example, it is important that we assume that the causal chain is an ideal one. II 151-155 For example barn facades: one can imagine the facades of the province as embedded in a country with real barns, this in turn embedded in a state with facades, embedded in a continent with real facades, these on a planet with facades, this in turn embedded in a planet system with real barns and so on. Whether it is about knowledge when seeing a real barn, is then completely dependent on the choice of the reference class. The closest reference class is then highly reliable. There is much to be said against genuine knowledge. This reveals the inadequacy of classical internalism of justification. But e.g. twin earth/Brandom: a modern internalist could claim that the "internal states" are the same. All they have in common is that the subject cannot keep them apart. >Internalism, >Externalism, >Twin Earth. McDowell: but this fact does not have to be considered sufficient to identify their contents! >Content, >Identification. Goldman/Brandom: overall, the presence of barn façades in the area is causally irrelevant. II 152 Barn facades/Goldman: the candidate is not a reliable perceiver of barns. Brandom: the special thing about this case is that the circumstances are external. >Circumstances . BrandomVsGoldman: "Goldman's insight", however, does not support the naturalized epistemology because the knowledge is completely dependent on the choice of the reference class. An argument place therefore remains empty. >Knowledge, >Causal theory of knowledge. It depends on how we describe the convinced: as a member of the country, of the federal state, etc. And that would be precisely the naturalistically formulated facts. They then lead to different judgments about the reliability of the observer. Brandom: situations like those of the example can quite possibly arise. From this follows the: definition "blind spot" of the reliability theories/Brandom: whether or not an observer is reliable is dependent on the choice of reference classes (barn province), and thus on external circumstances which have nothing to do with the observed object. >Reference classes, >Blind spot. |
Gold I Alvin I. Goldman Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology: Essays Oxford 2015 |
| Negotiation | Social Psychology | Parisi I 129 Negotiation/Social psychology/Nadler/Mueller: Out-of-court settlements are achieved through negotiation, a process that has been studied extensively by social psychologists. Biases: Negotiators sometimes suffer from a bias blind spot, which refers to the tendency for people to view others as biased, while being unable to perceive their own biases, even when alerted to the potential for bias in their decisions (see Pronin, 2007(1) for review). The ability to reach a negotiated outcome depends in part on the extent to which participants perceive their opponents as biased, rather than the extent of disagreement or opposing interests. Participants who perceive their opponent as more biased act more competitively toward that opponent, and respond more aggressively (Kennedy and Pronin, 2008)(2). In turn, their responses are then perceived as more biased. This back-and-forth misperception of bias leads to a "conflict spiral" in which both parties are more likely to engage in competitive rather than cooperative behavior, which continues to escalate the conflict. Rapport: Rapport is another interpersonal influence in negotiation, and it is an important determinant of the extent to which negotiators develop the trust necessary to reach mutually beneficial agreements (Nadler, 2004b)(3). Interpersonal rapport has at least three components: mutual attention and involvement, positivity, and coordination. Conflicts: Frequently, negotiations involve mixed-motive conflicts in which negotiators are motivated to cooperate just enough to ensure settlement, but at the same time to compete with each other to claim the greatest possible bargaining surplus for themselves (Thompson and Nadler, 2002)(4). Cooperation: To reach a collectively optimal settlement, parties must coordinate on cooperation (Schelling, 1980)(5), meaning that one has to be willing to share information about one's own preferences and priorities and refrain from issuing ultimatums and threats. The development of rapport can foster the kind of cooperative behavior necessary for achieving effcient negotiated settlements in mixed-motive conflicts (Nadler, 2004b)(3). >Agreement, >Conflicts, >Attention. 1. Pronin, E. (2007). "Perception and Misperception of Bias in Human Judgment." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 1 1 (1): 37-43. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.11.001. 2. Kennedy, K. A. and E. Pronin (2008). "When Disagreement Gets Ugly: Perceptions of Bias and the Escalation of Conflict." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 34(6): 83 3-848. doi:10.1177/0146167208315158. 3. Nadler, J. (2004b). "Rapport: Rapport in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution." Marquette Law Review 87(4), 875-1025. 4. Thompson, L. and J. Nadler (2002). "Negotiating via Information Technology: Theory and Application“. Journal of social Issues 58(1): 109-124. 5. Schelling, T. C. (1980). The Strategy ofConflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Observation | Luhmann | Observation/Luhmann: = Operation - Observers: System. The system forms itself when operators form sequences. The observer is in the reality, not above her. Observation: = distinction - E.g. system/environment - e.g sign/signified - E.g. medium/form. --- AU Cas 7 Distinction/observation/Luhmann: peculiar asymmetry: it does not work without two sides, it does not go without their unit, but it only works on one side and not at the same time on the other side. If there were both sides be present at the same time, there would be no difference anymore. Cf. >Asymmetry. Transcendental philosophy/Kant/Luhmann: introduces it through the need for asymmetry: the conditions of empirical knowledge cannot be empirical conditions by themselves. E.g. If you think about, that the seller must be seen business and not morally, you cannot ask the same time, what is the unity of the distinction between morality and business. You cannot observe yourself in the moment of observation as someone who handles the distinction. A reflection of the distinction is quite possible, but by another distinction. - E.g. We speak now of distinctions - but against a background of things that are not differentiated. Cf. >Distinctions. --- AU Cas 7 Observation/Luhmann: E.g. The economy observes by means of prices the customers and the competition. - Second order observation: E.g. One can observe a shift of the blind spot. >Blind spot. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Perception | Frith | I 57 "Subliminal perception": (1960s) subliminal perception was controversial, asserted by advertising professionals. There is no evidence for them. Nevertheless, subtle perception: when two objects are shown briefly at a precisely determined distance,... I 58 ...both objects can be seen, otherwise only one. E.g. Question: what face have I already shown to you: here the answers were random. On the other hand: "Which face do you prefer?": Here the test persons chose the face, which they had previously "subliminally" seen. I 59 Brain/consciousness/Frith: brain scanners showed that an object can cause a change in brain activity without the person being aware of it (in the Amygdala). I 61 Thesis: "Our brain does not tell us everything it knows." I 147 Perception/Frith: thesis: perception is a fantasy which is in harmony with the world. >World/thinking, >World, >Reality. I 179 Blind spot/brain/perception/Frith: the brain invents something for the empty space. E.g. the alphabet is presented very quickly. Then you are sure to have seen the letter A, even if the letter B has appeared instead. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
| Reality | Luhmann | Reese-Schäfer II 28 Real/Reality/Luhmann/Reese-Schäfer: redefined "actualized distinction. Real is what is practiced as a distinction, decomposed by it, is made visible and invisible through them: the world". - Which resolves the controversy between realism and constructivism. >Realism, >Constructivism, >Observation/Luhmann, >Distinction. Not sufficient: the reality of the operation - this is a blind spot for itself. Reese-Schäfer II 29 Blind spot: the distinction that was made for the purpose of observing, can not be perceived again. >Circle, >Blind spot. AU Cass 14 Reality/Luhmann: So we have a fully observer-relative view, but this is mitigated by the fact that we say the system, which is observed also is observing itself. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 |
| Reliability Theory | Brandom | I 308f Regularity theories/Regth/Brandom: Assessment of truth based on the correct or incorrect use of concepts. >Regularities, >Regularity theory. Reliability theories: already presume the concept of correct asserting and application. >Assertions. Authorisation: derived from accuracy of assertion. >Score keeping model. VsReliability theory: gerrymandering: there is an infinite number of patterns for explaining a regularity - there must be privileged regularities (uniformities, UF). >Gerrymandering. I 312/313 Reliability/Goldman/Brandom: objective property - it is based on the probabilities, not on the perception. >Objectivity, >Perception. I 324 Reliability theory: E.g. Monique has learned to recognize white beech by its leaves, but is unsure herself - in that case, she has knowledge even though she denies it - the knowledge status is external - SellarsVs, Brandom pro - Reliability theory: Monique has knowledge - Sellars: it is always located in the space of reasons (instead of non-inferential, direct perception) - so it is always about justification. >Justification. --- II 59 Reliability theories/Definition "basic insight"/Brandom: reliably formed true beliefs may qualify as knowledge, even though the one who knows cannot justify them. Goldman/Brandom: Attributions of reliability must be qualified to reference classes. Definition "conceptual blind spot": over-generalization of the basic insight of reliability theory to semantics. - It is wrongly assumed that one could understand the content of knowledge claims, just because there may be knowledge in cases, in which the one who knows himself does not have an inferential justification. - In order to avoid that, he must be shown that inferential significance plays a role for the distinction of representations. Definition "Naturalistic Blind Spot": wants to see the basis of a fully naturalized epistemology that requires no standards or reasons in the reliabtility approach. In order to avoid this it is necessary to recur to interpersonal inference. >Inference. II 127ff Reliability theoryVsGettier/Brandom: not whether justified true beliefs are necessary together, but whether they are necessary individually - "basic insight": there are at least some cases of knowledge without justification. II 128f E.g. chicken sexers (odour) - E.g. country sayings. II 130 Reliability theory/Brandom: externalist, because facts decide whether we know something. >Externalism, >Facts. II 140 Cases of knowledge without knowledge about are only possible as a local, not as a global phenomenon - otherwise notion of reliability would not be possible - and, a fortiori, not of knowledge. II 144 Reliability itself cannot assume the explanation role ((s) >Circular reasoning.). |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Self- Reference | Luhmann | Baraldi I 163f Self reference/Luhmann/GLU: there are systems that relate through every of their operations to themselves: Social, psychological, organic systems that can observe the reality only because of this self-contact. Self-reference is present when the operation of the observation is included in what is referred to. >Observation/operation/Luhmann. Self-reference is neither analytic nor characteristic of a transcendental subject: the subject of the system theory is neither the human nor the subject. >Analyticity, >Subject/Luhmann, >Systems theory. Self-reference is not a tautology. - It does not refer directly to itself - e.g. if self-reference refers to a process: there is the distinction before/after. >Distinctions. --- Reese-Schäfer II 163 Blind Spot/Luhmann/Reese-Schäfer: the failure of observation in all situations in which action must be taken or decided by you. - Action for security is certainly necessary and possible, but not as scientifically secured action. - Here, the system theory has its limits. >Blind spot; cf. >Circle. --- AU Cass 4 Def self-reference/Luhmann: message: "What is in the system?". - Def external reference: information (past or external system states). Self-reference/external reference: hence there is the distinction between what a system can distinguish as the environment, and what an observer might see as environment. >Environment/Parsons, >System/Luhmann. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Baraldi I C. Baraldi, G.Corsi. E. Esposito GLU: Glossar zu Luhmanns Theorie sozialer Systeme Frankfurt 1997 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 |
| Signs | Luhmann | AU Cas 4 Definition mark/Luhmann: difference of signifier and signified. - Not "the designated"! Character: a form with two sides: one always uses the inner side of the form. > G. Spencer-Brown 1969(1). 1. Spencer-Brown, George (1969). Laws of Form. London: Allen & Unwin. --- AU Cass 12 Character/world/ontology/Saussure/Luhmann: signs and signified are both linguistically internal. One could not have words, if one does not mean something with them. >Words, >Language/Luhmann, >Communication/Luhmann, >Information/Luhmann. On the other hand: you can make any decisions without anything getting doubled. The sign means what it means in use, so the meaning of apple, is not the apple itself. - That is ambiguous. Sense of the apple or speaker's intention? >Sense/Luhmann, >Speaker intention, >Speaker meaning. AU Cass 12 Sign/re-entry/Luhmann: Re-entry: the distinction between signifier and signified as a distinction is the sign. - The sign is the unity of distinction. - The signifier is not the sign. This corresponds with a 2nd order observation. >Observation/operation/Luhmann, >Blind spot. I designate characters. - I designate my distinction - blind spot: the user of the sign cannot really use the unit as a unit. - For this he would need the concept of the sign. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Substitutional Quantification | Quine | V 140 Substitutional quantification/Quine: is open for other grammatical categories than just singular term but has other truth function. - Referential quantification: here, the objects do not even need to be specifiable by name. >Referential quantification, >Truth functions, >Singular terms. --- V 141 Language learning: first substitution quantification: from relative pronouns. - Later: referential quantification: because of categorical sentences. Substitution quantification: would be absurd: that every inserted name that verifies Fx also verifies Gx - absurd: that each apple or rabbit would have to have a name or a singular description. - Most objects do not have names. --- V 140 Substitutional Quantification/Referential Quantification/Truth Function/Quine: referential universal quantification: can be falsified by one single object, even though this is not specifiable by a name. - The same substitutional universal quantification: in contrast, remains true. - Existential quantification: referential: may be true due to a non-assignable value. - The same in substitutional sense: does not apply for lack of an assignable example. --- V 146f Substitutional Quantification/Quine: Problem: Blind spot: substitutional universal quantification: E.g. none of the substitution cases should be rejected, but some require abstention. - Existential quantification: E.g. none of the cases is to be approved, but some abstention is in order.- then neither agree nor abstain. (Equivalent to the alternation). --- Ad V 170 Substitutional Quantification/(s): related to the quantification over apparent classes in Quine’s meta language? --- V 175 Numbers/Classes/Quantification/Ontology/Substitutional quantification/Quine: first substitutional quantification through numbers and classes. - Problem: Numbers and classes can then not be eliminated. - Can also be used as an object quantification (referential quantification) if one allows every number to have a successor. - ((s) with substitution quantification each would have to have a name.) Class quantifier becomes object quantifier if one allows the exchange of the quantifiers (AQU/AQU/ - EQu/EQu) - so the law of the partial classes of one was introduced. --- X 124 Substitutional quantification/Quine: requires name for the values of the variables. Referential quantification/(s) speaks of objects at most. - Definition truth/Substitutional Quantification/Barcan/Quine: applying-Quantification - is true iff at least one of its cases, which is obtained by omitting the quantifier and inserting a name for the variable, is true. - Problem: almost never enough names for the objects in a not overly limited world. - E.g. No Goedel numbers for irrational numbers. - Then substitutional quantification can be wrong, because there is no name for the object, but the referential quantification can be true at the same time - i.e. both are not extensionally equal. X 124 Names/logic/substitutional quantification/Quine: Problem: never enough names for all objects in the world: e.g. if a set is not determined by an open sentence, it also has no name. - Otherwise E.g. Name a, Determination: x ε a - E.g. irrational numbers cannot be attributed to integers. - (s) > substitution class. --- XII 79f Substitutional Quantification/Quine: Here the variables are placeholders for words of any syntactic category (except names) - Important argument: then there is no way to distinguish names from the rest of the vocabulary and real referential variables. ((s) Does that mean that one cannot distinguish fragments like object and greater than, and that structures like "there is a greater than" would be possible?). XII 80 Substitutional Quantification/Quine: Problem: Assuming an infinite range of named objects. - Then it is possible to show for each substitution result of a name the truth of a formula and simultaneously to refute the universal quantification of the formula. - (everyone/all). - Then we have shown that the range has at least one unnamed object. - ((s) (> not enough names). - Therefore QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification. E.g. assuming the range contained the real name - Then not all could be named, but the unnamed cannot be separated. - The theory can always be strengthened to name a certain number, but not all - referential quantification: attributes nameless objects to itself. - Trick: (see above) every substitution result with a name is true, but makes universal quantification false. ((s) Thus an infinite number of objects secured). - A theory of real names must be based on referential quantification. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| World | Luhmann | Baraldi I 205f World/Luhmann: from the perspective of an observer the world is the unity of the difference between system and environment. >Observation/Operation/Luhmann, >Reality/Luhmann, >Environment/Talcott Parsons, >Systems theory. As a unity it can never be observed. It is the blind spot of each observer. >Blind spot. Reese-Schäfer II 41 Def World/Luhmann/Reese-Schäfer: the world is the last horizon all meaning. The world is related to sense as environment is related to a system. - It is an open term for all that is opposed to the mind. - But not the universe. - There is no wholeness. Cf. >Horizon. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Baraldi I C. Baraldi, G.Corsi. E. Esposito GLU: Glossar zu Luhmanns Theorie sozialer Systeme Frankfurt 1997 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 |
| World/Thinking | Luhmann | Baraldi I 205f World/Luhmann: from the perspective of an observer the world is the unity of the difference between system and environment. >Observation/Operation/Luhmann, >Reality/Luhmann, >Environment/Talcott Parsons, >Systems theory. As a unit, it can never be observed. It is the blind spot of each observer. >Blind spot. With the modernism, the term loses the reference to "things" and is based on the indeterminacy of meaning. World is a paradoxical concept, imagine the combination of definiteness and indefiniteness. >Indeterminacy, >Distinctiveness, >Paradox/Luhmann. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Baraldi I C. Baraldi, G.Corsi. E. Esposito GLU: Glossar zu Luhmanns Theorie sozialer Systeme Frankfurt 1997 |
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| Analyticity | Quine Vs Analyticity | Danto I 239 QuineVsAnalyticity: we do not anticipate at which time we have to change the conditions under which we use a word. There is simply no clue. Lanz in Metz I 272 The lot of concepts is not independent of their use in empirical theories! There are no conceptual truths that would be immune to the transformation of such theories. Philosophy and science are on one and the same continuum. McDowell I 158 QuineVsFirst Dogma: (distinction analytic/synthetic) against the notion that the truth of a synthetic sentence depended on two things: the meaning and the world. ((s) you cannot have meaning before you have the world). Quine, however, preserves duality: Apparently, the truth depends both on the language and on extra-linguistic facts. McDowell: Quine does not claim that these two factors do not exist, we simply cannot distinguish them sentence by sentence. Quine IV 407 QuineVsAnalyticity: reflects a failed notion of scientific theories and their reference to experience. There is no strict separation analytic/synthetic. "Roots of Reference": if you consistently proceed empirically, you gain an epistemologically harmless notion of analyticity. Analytic/Kant: does not even mention the meaning of concepts in this context! II 407/408 Analytic/Quine: Kant should rather have said that a statement is analytic if it is true because of meanings and regardless of of facts. This explicitly draws a connection between analyticity and meaning. QuineVsAnalyticity: considerable difficulties exist with sentences like: Ex "No bachelor is married", "cats are animals." Obviously, these are not logical truths, their negation would be no formal objection. (IV 410) Ex Quine: "I do not know whether the statement 'Everything green is extended' is analytic or not. This is not because of the ambiguity of "green" and "extended", but because of the ambiguity of "analytical". Artificial languages: semantic rules for determining analyticity are only interesting if we already understand analyticity. False notion: the idea that with the truth of a statement it is generally possible to distinguish between a linguistic and a fact component. The whole difficulty is perhaps only a symptom of a false notion of the relationship between language and the world. V 113 Logic/Frege/Carnap: the laws of logic apply because of language. I.e. its sentences are analytic. QuineVsAnalyticity/QuineVsFrege/QuineVsCarnap: the concept of meaning has not been given empirical meaning. Thus neither this linguistic theory of logic. Solution/Quine: through our observation of language learning: we learn truth functions by finding connections between dispositions. Alternation/Language Learning: the law that an alternation is implied by each of its components is learned with the word "or" itself. Something similar applies to the other laws. (>logical particles >logical constants). Analyticity/Analytical/Language Learning/Quine: Ex we learn "bachelor" by learning that our parents agreed under precisely the circumstances under which they agreed to "unmarried man". QuineVsAnalyticity: Important Argument: there are even disagreements about logical truths: Ex between classical logicians and intuitionists. Maybe we think that some truths are analytic and others are not? Law of the Excluded Middle/SaD/Language Learning/Quine: the law of the excluded middle rejected by intuitionism is not linked in such a way with learning "or"! It is rather due to the blind spot of alternation. Important Argument: perhaps the law of the excluded middle (Quine "law") which is true only in our point of view should only be seen as synthetic. V 116 Analytic/Analyticity/Quine: the analytic propositions are a subclass of stimulus analytic propositions agreeing to which is a disposition of any speaker of a language community. QuineVsCarnap: but even now we do not have such strict contrast to the synthetic propositions. Solution/Quine: Thesis: sentences that have been learned by many first are closer to analyticity than sentences that have only been learned by a few. The analytic propositions are those which are learned by all like that. These extreme cases, however, do not differ significantly from the neighboring ones. One cannot always specify which ones they are. >Two Dogmas/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Introspection | McGinn Vs Introspection | II 160 Introspection can not even say that I have a brain! >Mind Body Problem II 162 McGinnVsIncorrigibility/introspection: appearance and reality do not coincide in the consciousness! Thesis Aware that there is a level of reality that is not available to us, which is well beyond appearances. Consciousness has a hidden structure.This does not mean that it are both a conscious and an unconscious mind. >Incorrigibility. Consciousness/McGinn: if we were completely transparent that would constitute something unique in nature! Everything else in nature allows a distinction between its outer appearance and its reality. Nature has its unobserved side. >Consciousness/McGinn. II 164 There are two separate areas, which shut out introspection: the consciousness associated with the unconscious and the flipside of consciousness itself. >Nature/McGinn. The very conscious desire has its own hidden dimension that is not revealed to us. The introspection suffers then from a double blindness in respect to the whole truth about the mind. >Blind Spot. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Various Authors | Luhmann Vs Various Authors | Habermas I 436 VsParsons: simply reproduces the classical model through systems. (Social system = action system). Luhmann instead: human as part of the environment of society. This changes the premises of all questions. Methodical anti-humanism. Habermas I 440 LuhmannVsHumanism: "Cardinal Error". A fusion of social and material dimensions. Reese-Schäfer II 28 LuhmannVsDualism: of observer and object. Universality/Vs: the total view, the universality had to be given up and was replaced by "critique", with which the subject's point of view on universality is rounded up again". Foundation/Luhmann: there is no last stop. (Like Quine, Sellars, Rorty). Reese-Schäfer II 42 VsMarx: rejects the speech of "social contradictions": it is simply about a conflict of interests. Competition is not a contradiction either: two people can certainly aspire to the same good. Contradiction/Luhmann: arises only from the self-reference of sense. Not as in Marx. Contradictions/Legal System: does not serve for the avoidance, but for the regulation of conflicts. Reese-Schäfer II 78 Freedom of Value: (Max Weber): the renunciation of valuations is, so to speak, the blind spot of a second level observation. Reese-Schäfer II 89 Vs Right Politics: here there is no theory at all that would be able to read other theories. There is only apercus or certain literary guiding ideas. Reese-Schäfer II 90/91 VsGehlen: we do not have to subordinate ourselves to the institutions. Reese-Schäfer II 102 VsAction Theory: a very vague concept of individuals that can only be defined by pointing at people. Thus language habits are presented as language knowledge: because language requires us to employ subjects. LL. Language. Reese-Schäfer II 103 Reason/VsAdorno: one should not resign oneself (dialectic of the Enlightenment) but ask whether it does not get better without reason! Reese-Schäfer II 112 Overstimulation/LuhmannVsTradition: cannot take place at all. For already the neurophysiological apparatus drastically shields the consciousness. The operative medium sense does the rest. Reese-Schäfer II 138 Human/Gehlen: tried to determine the human from its difference to the animal. (LuhmannVs). AU Cass. 3 VsParsons: Terminology limited by structural functionalism: one could not ask about the function of structures, or examine terms such as inventory or inventory prerequisite, variable or the whole methodological area. Limitation by the fact that a certain object was assumed as given. There were no criteria for the existence of the object - instead the theory must be able to contain all deviance and dysfunction. (not possible with Parsons) - Question: in which time period and which bandwidths is a system identifiable? (e.g. Revolution: is society still the same society afterwards?) Inventory criteria Biology: Definition by death. The living reproduces itself by its own means. Self-reference (important in modern system theory) is not possible within the framework of the Parsons' model. Therefore we need interdisciplinary solutions. VsAction Theory: the concept of action is not suitable because an actor is assumed! But it also exists without an observer! In principle, an action can be presented as a solitary thing without social resonance! - Paradox/Luhmann: the procedure of the dissolution of the paradox is logically objectionable, but is constantly applied by the logicians themselves: they use a change of levels. The only question that must not be asked is: what is the unity of the difference of planes? (AU Cass. 4) VsEquilibrium Theories: questionable today; 1. from the point of view of natural science: it is precisely the imbalances which are stable, equilibrium is rather metaphor. (AU Cass. 6) Tradition: "Transmission of patterns from generation to generation". Stored value patterns that are offered again and again and adopted by the offspring. However, these patterns are still the same. VsTradition: Question: Where does identity come from in the first place? How could one talk about selfhood without an external observer? That will not be much different either with the assumptions of a reciprocal relationship with learning. Luhmann: instead: (Autopoiesis): Socialization is always self-socialization. AU Cass 6 Information/Luhmann: the term must now be adapted to it! In the 70s one spoke of "genetic information", treated structures as informative, the genetic code contained information. Luhmann: this is wrong, because genes only contain structures and no events! The semantic side of the term remained unexplained for a long time, i.e. the question of what information can choose from. Reese-Schäfer II 76 LuhmannVsMarx/Reese-Schäfer: rejects the talk of "social contradictions": it is simply about a conflict of interests. Competition is not a contradiction either: two people can certainly strive for the same good. AU Cass 11 Emergence/Reductionism/System Theory/Luhmann: this does not even pose the actual question: what actually distinguishes an emergent system? What is the characteristic for the distinction from the basal state? What is the criterion that enables emergence? Will Martens: (Issue 4, Kölner Zeitschrift f. Sozialforschung): Autopoiesis of social systems. It deals with the question following the concept of autopoiesis and communication. Communication/Luhmann: Tripartite structure: Information, Communication, Understanding (not action sequences). (Comes from linguistics, but also antiquity!). Martens: this tripartite division is the psychological foundation of communication. Communication must first be negotiated in the individual head, I must see what I assume to be unknown and what I want to choose, and my body must also be in good shape. Marten's thesis: sociality only comes about in the synthesis of these three components. Social things arise when information, communication and understanding are created as a unit with repercussions on the participating mental systems, which must behave accordingly. The unity is only the synthesis itself, while the elements still have to be described psychologically or biologically etc. Without this foundation it does not work. LuhmannVsMartens: I hope you fall for it! At first that sounds very plausible. But now comes the question: What is communicated in the text by Martens? Certainly not the blood circulation! There is also no blood in the text! The editors would already fight this off, there is also no state of consciousness in the text! So I cannot imagine what the author was thinking! I can well imagine that he was supplied with blood and sat in front of the computer. And that he wanted to take part in the discussion. Luhmann: these are all constructions which are suggested in communication, but which are not actually present in communication. (>Interpenetration). Communication/LuhmannVsMartens: Question: what is actually claimed in the text, and does it not actually refute it itself? Paradox: the text that tells of blood and thoughts claims to bring blood and thoughts, but it only brings letters and what a skilled reader can make of the text. That is communication. That is all I can actually see! Communication/Luhmann: if you think realistically and operatively, you cannot see more in the text. We have to put the words together from the letters ourselves. When psychic systems respond to communication, they change their internal states accordingly. Communication/Luhmann: if one has received this message (from Martens), one can say: everything is actually correct, one could describe a communication completely on the basis of physical or psychological facts. Nothing would be missing, with the exception of autopoiesis itself. Question: we have to explain how communication maintains itself without incorporating psychological and physical operations! Luhmann: this reproduction of communication through communication goes only through total exclusion from physical, psychological, etc. operations. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 |
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