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The author or concept searched is found in the following 25 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Action Theory | Habermas | III 369 Action Theory/Analytical Philosophy/Habermas: the analytical action theory ((s) following Grice, Austin) is limited to the atomistic action model of a solitary actor and neglects mechanisms of action coordination through which interpersonal relationships are formed. >P. Grice, >J.L. Austin. III 370 Therefore, it finds hardly any connection to the formation of social scientific concepts. The philosophical problems it creates are too non-specific for the purposes of social theory. >Sociology, >Method. HabermasVsAnalytical Philosophy/HabermasVsAnalytical Theory of Action: it goes back to Kant by asking about causality, intentionality and the logical status of explanations without penetrating into the basic questions of a sociological theory of action. >Causality, >Causal explanation, >Explanation. Instead, questions of coordination of action should be taken as a starting point.(1) >Actions/Habermas, >Action Systems/Habermas. III 371 HabermasVsGrice/HabermasVsBennett/HabermasVsLewis, David/HabermasVsSchiffer: the intentional semantics developed by these authors are not suitable for clarifying the coordination mechanism of linguistically mediated interactions, because it analyses the act of communication itself according to the model of consequence-oriented action. >Intentional Semantics, >St. Schiffer, >D. Lewis, >J. Bennett. Intentional Semantics/HabermasVsGrice: Intentional semantics is based on the contraintuitive idea that understanding the meaning of a symbolic expression can be traced back to the speaker's intention to give the listener something to understand. III 373 Solution/Habermas: Karl Bühler's organon model (see Language/Bühler), ((s) which distinguishes between symbol, signal and symptom and refers to sender and receiver) leads in its theoretical meaning to the concept of an interaction of subjects capable of speech and action mediated by acts of communication. >Interaction, >Subjects. III 384 Action Theory/Habermas: HabermasVsWeber: unlike Weber, who assumes a monological action model, Habermas considers a model that takes into account the coordination of several action subjects. He differentiates between action types according to situation and orientation: Action Orientation: success-oriented - or communication-oriented Action Situation: social - or non-social Instrumental Action/Habermas: is then success-oriented and non-social Strategic action: success-oriented and social (it takes into account the actions and interests of others). >Interest. Communicative Action: is social and communication-oriented (without being success-oriented). >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas, >Agreement, >Success. 1.S. Kanngiesser, Sprachliche Universalien und diachrone Prozesse, in: K. O. Apel (1976), 273ff. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Action Theory | Weber | Habermas III 378 Action Theory/Communicative Action/Weber/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: since Weber assumes a monological model of action, "social action" cannot be explained by the concept of meaning. It is based on the concept of purposive action and must extend it by two provisions to explain social interaction: a) Orientation towards the behaviour of other subjects b) The reflective relationship between the orientations of several interaction participants. >Purposive action, >Purpose rationality, >Action, >Interaction, >Cooperation. Habermas III 379 Act/Action/Weber/Habermas: Weber distinguishes between procedural rational value rational emotional and traditional action. Weber therefore does not start with the social relationship. >Value rationality, >Rationality, cf. >Rationalization. Habermas III 380 Purpose rational action/Weber: the subjective sense here extends to: Means, purposes, values, consequences Value rational action: on means, purposes, values Emotional action: on means and purposes Traditional action: only on the means. Cf. >Purpose-means-rationality, >Purposes, >Goals, >Values, cf. >Consequentialism. Habermas III 381 Habermas: "Inofficial version" of Weber's theory of action ((s) this is a position not explicitly represented by Weber, which could, however, be deduced from his texts): here mechanisms of coordination of action are distinguished, depending on whether only interests or also social agreement are taken as a basis. (1) >Action Theory/Habermas. 1.Vgl. M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, hrsg. v. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964, S.246f. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Communication Media | Habermas | III 458 Communication Media/Sociology/Action Theory/Communicative Action/Habermas: the liberation of communicative action from tradition-based institutions - i.e. from consensus commitments - leads to the replacement of institutions by organisations of a new type: they are formed on the basis of communication media that uncouple action from communication processes and coordinate them via generalised instrumental values such as money and power.(1) >Media, >Institutions, >Society. These control media replace language as a mechanism for coordinating action and move social action away from integration that goes via a consensus of values and convert it to a media-controlled procedural rationalization. >Social action, >Language/Habermas. HabermasVsWeber: he does not recognize money and power as the communication media that enable the differentiation of subsystems of procedural rational action. >M. Weber, >Procedural Rationality/Weber. IV 269 Communication Media/Habermas: In the course of differentiating between understanding and success-oriented action, two types of relief mechanisms are formed, namely in the form of communication media. IV 270 Which either bundle or replace verbal communication. >Agreement/Habermas. For example, reputation and power are primitive generators of readiness to follow (either rationally through trust in valid knowledge or empirically through incentive through expected reward). They are the starting point for media education. >Recognition >Power. The communication media can be generalized themselves and thus form control media. IV 387 Communication media/system theory/Habermas: the structural characteristics of a medium only become apparent to the extent that they are normatively anchored and enable the differentiation of a social subsystem. >Communication Media/Parsons. 1. ((s) See N. Luhmann's systems theory, in which money, power, truth, etc. are understood as symbolically generalized communication media. See in particular C. Baraldi, G. Corsi, E. Esposito GLU, Frankfurt 1997, S. 202ff. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Communicative Action | Habermas | III 128 Communicative action/Habermas: the concept refers to the interaction of at least two subjects capable of speech and action who enter into an interpersonal relationship (by linguistic or non-linguistic means). The actors seek an understanding to coordinate their plans and thus their actions. Language is given a prominent status here. >Agreement, >Language/Habermas. III 143 Problem: there is a danger that social action will be reduced to the interpretive performance of the communication participants, action will be adapted to speech, interaction to conversation. In fact, however, linguistic communication is only the mechanism of action coordination, which brings together the action plans and activities of the ones involved. III 157 In communicative action, the outcome of the interaction itself is dependent on whether the participants can agree among themselves on an intersubjectively valid assessment of their world-relationships. >World/thinking, >Reality. III 158 Interpretation: Problem: for the understanding of communicative actions we have to separate questions of meaning and validity. The interpretation performance of an observer differs from the coordination efforts of the participants. The observer does not seek a consensus interpretation. But perhaps only the functions differed here, not the structures of interpretation. >Observation, >Method, >Interpretation, >Practice. III 385 Communicative Action/Habermas: here the participants are not primarily oriented towards their own success; they pursue their individual goals on the condition that they can coordinate their action plans on the basis of common situation definitions. In this respect, the negotiation of situation definitions is an essential component. >Situations. III 395 Communicative Action/Speech Acts/Perlocution/Illocution/Habermas: Strawson has shown that a speaker achieves his/her illocutionary goal that the listener understands what is being said without revealing his/her perlocutionary goal. This gives perlocutions the asymmetric character of covert strategic actions in which at least one of the participants behaves strategically, while deceiving other participants that he/she does not meet the conditions under which normally illocutionary goals can only be achieved. >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act Therefore, perlocutions are not suitable for the analysis of coordination of actions, which are to be explained by illocutionary binding effects. This problem is solved if we understand communicative action as interaction in which all participants coordinate their individual action plans and pursue their illocutionary goals without reservation. III 396 Only such interactions are communicative actions in which all participants pursue illocutionary goals. Otherwise they fall under strategic action. III 397 HabermasVsAustin: he has tended to identify speech acts with acts of communication, i.e. the linguistically mediated interactions. III 400 Definition Understanding/Communication/Habermas: in the context of our theory of communicative action we limit ourselves to acts of speech under standard conditions, i.e. we assume that a speaker means nothing else than the literal meaning of what he/she says. >Meaning/Intending. Understanding a sentence is then defined as knowing what makes that sentence acceptable. >Understanding. III 457 Communicative action/Rationalization/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: only if we differentiate between communicative and success-oriented action in "social action" can the communicative rationalization of everyday actions and the formation of subsystems for procedural rational economic and administrative action be understood as complementary development. Although both reflect the institutional embodiment of rationality complexes, in another respect they are opposite tendencies. IV 223 Communicative Actions/HabermasVsSystem theory/Habermas: Communicative actions succeed only in the light of cultural traditions - this is what ensures the integration of society, and not systemic mechanisms that are deprived of the intuitive knowledge of their relatives. >Cultural tradition, >Culture. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Decisionism | Weber | Habermas III 358 Decisionism/Justification/Law/Decisionism/Weber/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: Problem: if some form of rational agreement means the "only consistent form of legitimacy of a law", how can legal rule, whose legality is based on a purely decisionist right, be legitimized at all? Solution/Carl Schmitt/N. Luhmann: Weber's answer set a precedent from Carl Schmitt to Niklas Luhmann: through procedures. This does not mean a reduction to formal conditions of moral and practical justification of legal norms, but compliance with procedural rules in jurisdiction, application of law and legislation. >Law, >Justification, >Ultimate justification, >Legitimacy. Habermas III 359 Legitimacy is then based "on the belief in the legality of established orders and the right of instruction of those appointed by them to exercise power". (1) HabermasVsWeber: Problem: Where does the belief in legality find the power to legitimize when legality merely means conformity with a de facto existing legal system, and when this in turn is inaccessible as an arbitrarily positive law of practical moral justification. There is no way out of this circularity. (2) >Circularity, >Justification, >Laws, >Constitution, >Authority, >Democracy, >State. 1.M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, hrsg.v. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964,S. 159 2.J. Winckelmann, Legitimität und Legalität in Webers Herrschaftssoziologie, Tübingen 1952; K. Eder, Zur Rationalisierungsproblematik des modernen Rechts, in: Soziale Welt, 2, 1978, S. 247ff. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Disenchantment | Weber | Habermas III 293 Disenchantment/Worldviews/Religion/Modernity/Weber/Habermas: Weber observes enchantment primarily in the interaction between believers and God. The stronger this is designed as communication, Habermas III 294 the more strictly the individual can systematize his/her inner-worldly relations under the abstract aspects of morality. >Communication/Habermas. This means a) the preparation of an abstract concept of the world b) the differentiation of a purely ethical attitude in which the actor can follow and criticize norms c) the formation of a universalistic and individualistic concept of persons with the correlates of conscience, moral accountability, autonomy, guilt, etc. >Norms, >Validity claims, >Ethics, >Abstraction, >World. The reverent attachment to traditionally guaranteed concrete orders of life can thus be overcome in favour of a free orientation towards general principles. >Principles, >Tradition, >Cultural transmission. Habermas III 295 Cognitive dimension: here, the disenchanting of things and events is accompanied by a demythologization of the knowledge of the existing. All the more reason for individuals to systematize their relationships with the world, this time under the abstract aspects of a cosmological-metaphysical order whose laws govern all phenomena without exception. This means a) the preparation of a formal world concept for the existing as a whole with universals for the legal, space-time context of entities in general, (1) b) the differentiation of a purely theoretical attitude (out of touch with practice), c) the formation of an epistemic ego in general, which, free of affects, worldly interests, prejudices, etc., can surrender itself to the view of the existing.(2) >I, Ego, Self, >Rationality, >Rationalization. Habermas III 296 HabermasVsWeber: Weber has never analyzed in more detail the cognitive structures that emerge on the obstinate rationalization paths of religious and metaphysical worldviews. It is therefore not sufficiently clear that there is still another step between the results of world view rationalization and that world understanding that is "modern" in a specific sense. >Modernity, >Modernization, >Worldviews. Habermas III 297 Modernity/Habermas: Modernity has no reserves in ethics or science that would be exempt from the critical force of hypothetical thought. First, however, a generalization of the level of learning, which has been achieved with the terminology of religious-metaphysical worldviews, is required. >Generalization, >Criticism. 1. A Koyré, Von der geschlossenen Welt zum unendlichen Universum, Frankfurt 1969. 2. H. Blumenberg, Säkularisierung und Selbstbehauptung, Frankfurt 1974. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Foundation | Weber | Habermas III 358 Foundation/law/decisionism/Weber/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: Problem: if some form of rational agreement means the "only consistent form of legitimacy of a law", how can legal rule, whose legality is based on a purely decisionist right, be legitimized at all? Solution/Carl Schmitt/N. Luhmann: Weber's answer set a precedent from Carl Schmitt to Niklas Luhmann: through procedures. This does not mean a reduction to formal conditions of moral and practical justification of legal norms, but compliance with procedural rules in jurisdiction, application of law and legislation. >Law, >Justification, >Ultimate justification, >Legitimacy. Habermas III 359 Legitimacy is then based "on the belief in the legality of established orders and the right of instruction of those appointed by them to exercise power". (1) HabermasVsWeber: Problem: Where does the belief in legality find the power to legitimize when legality merely means conformity with a de facto existing legal system, and when this in turn is inaccessible as an arbitrarily positive law of practical moral justification. There is no way out of this circularity. (2) >Circularity, >Justification, >Laws, >Constitution, >Authority, >Democracy, >State. 1.M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, hrsg. v. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964, p. 159 2. J. Winckelmann, Legitimität und Legalität in Webers Herrschaftssoziologie, Tübingen 1952; K. Eder, Zur Rationalisierungsproblematik des modernen Rechts, in: Soziale Welt, 2, 1978, p. 247ff. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Freedom | Weber | Habermas III 320 Freedom/Weber/Habermas: Weber's thesis of the loss of freedom: in his present diagnosis, Weber is concerned that the subsystems of procedural rational action break away from their value-rational foundations and become self-dynamically independent. Weber relates this to the fact that the structures of consciousness, differentiated into independent cultural value spheres, are embodied in correspondingly antagonistic orders of life. >Society/Weber, >Systems, >Systems theory, >Purpose rationality, >Rationalization. Habermas IV 432 Freedom/Weber/Habermas: Thesis: in modern societies, the disintegration of religious and metaphysical worldviews threatens the relationships of solidarity and the identity of individuals who can no longer align their lives with "last ideas". >Ideas, >Individuals, Talcott ParsonsVsWeber: see Freedom/Parsons. Method/Habermas: we did not need to be interested in this dispute when it came to descriptions of global trends that were difficult to verify. Parson's differing position, however, results deductively from his description of the modernization process. See Modernism/Parsons, >T. Parsons. Habermas IV 454 Freedom/Weber/Habermas: Weber's thesis of the loss of freedom: both prevail in bureaucratization: the highest form of social rationality and the most effective subsumption of the acting subjects under the material violence of an apparatus that has become independent above their heads. HabermasVsWeber: the thesis owes its plausibility solely to the ambiguous use of the term "rationalization". Its meaning shifts, depending on the context, from the rationality of action to the rationality of the system. On the one hand it is about the perspective of members, on the other hand about the image of a rationally working machine.(1) Habermas IV 455 "Hard as steel housing"/Weber/Habermas: Together with the dead machine, the living machine of the independent bureaucracy is working to create that "housing of bondage". HabermasVsWeber: the talk of the living machine is metaphorical. However, Weber intuitively anticipated the distinction between system and purpose rationality. 1. M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, hrsg. v. J. Winckelmann, Köln, 1964, S. 1060. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Law | Weber | Habermas III 231 Law/Weber/Habermas: Weber calls rationalization the cognitive independence of law and moral, i.e. the replacement of moral-practical insights of ethical and legal doctrines, principles, maxims and decision rules of world views in which they were initially embedded. Cosmological, religious and metaphysical worldviews are structured in such a way that the internal difference between theoretical and practical reason cannot yet come into effect. >Morality, >Ethics, >Worldviews, >Rationalization, >Rationality. Habermas III 232 The autonomisation of law and moral leads to formal law and to profane ethics of conviction and responsibility. >Ethics of conviction, >Responsibility. Of course, this autonomization is still in the making even within religious systems of interpretation. This leads to the dichotomization between a search for salvation, which is oriented towards inner salvation goods and means of salvation, and the realization of an outer, objectified world. Weber shows how ethics of conviction approaches develop from this religiousness of conviction. (1) >Religion. Habermas III 278 Law/Weber/Habermas: for the emergence of modern law, Weber must postulate a process that is assumed in parallel, even if not simultaneously by him for the rationalization of worldviews. >World View/Weber. The availability of post-traditional legal concepts is not yet identical with the enforcement of a modern legal system. Only on the basis of rational natural law can legal matters be reconstructed in basic concepts of formal law in such a way that legal institutions can be created that formally satisfy universalist principles. These must regulate private commercial transactions between the owners of goods and the complementary activities of the public administration. HabermasVsWeber: this does not show the parallelism of these two processes clearly enough. Habermas III 332 Law/Weber/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: Weber's theoretical position of law in his theory of rationalization is ambiguous in that it simultaneously permits the institutionalization of procedural rational economic and administrative action and also seems to make the detachment of subsystems from their moral-practical foundations possible. Cf. >Natural Justice. The dialectical explanation of the conflicting developments of the development of science and religion cannot be applied to the development of law, since it appears from the outset in a secularized form. Habermas: Weber reinterprets modern law in such a way that it is separated from the evaluative value sphere. Habermas III 346 HabermasVsWeber: Weber empirically reinterprets the problem of legitimacy and decouples the political system from forms of moral-practical rationality; he also cuts the formation of political will back to processes of power acquisition and power competition. >Legitimacy, >Justification, >Ultimate justification. Law/Weber: as far as the normative agreement is based on tradition, Weber speaks of conventional community action. To the extent that this is replaced by success-oriented, purpose-oriented action, the problem arises as to how these new scopes can in turn be legitimate, i.e. normatively bindingly ordered. Rational social action takes the place of conventional community action. >Purpose rationality, >Conventions, >Community. Habermas III 347 Only the procedure of coming into being justifies the assumption that a normative agreement is rationally motivated. Only within normatively defined limits may legal entities act rationally without regard to conventions. HabermasVsWeber: Weber fluctuates here between discursive agreement and arbitrary statute. Habermas III 351 Modern civil private law/Weber/Habermas: is characterised by three formal features: positivity, legalism and formality. Def positivity/Habermas: positively set law is not generated by interpretation of recognized and sacred traditions, it rather expresses the will of a sovereign Habermas III 352 legislator, which uses legal organisational means to regulate social offences conventionally. Def Legalism/Habermas: legal entities are not subject to any moral motives other than general legal obedience. It protects their private inclinations within sanctioned boundaries. Not only bad convictions, but also actions that deviate from the norm are sanctioned, assuming accountability. Def Formality/Law/Habermas: Modern law defines areas of legitimate arbitrariness of private individuals. The arbitrary freedom of legal entities in a morally neutralized area of private actions with legal consequences is assumed. Private law transactions can therefore be regulated negatively by restricting authorisations that are recognised in principle (instead of a positive regulation of concrete obligations and material bids). Anything that is not prohibited by law is permitted in this area. Habermas: the system functionality corresponding to these characteristics results from legal structures in which procedural rational action can become general. It does not explain how these legal structures themselves are possible. Habermas III 353 Rather, the form of modern law is explained by the post-traditional structures of consciousness it embodies. HabermasVsWeber: Weber would have to understand the modern legal system as an order of life, which is assigned to the moral-practical way of life. But Weber's attempt to view the rationalization of law exclusively from the point of view of rationality of purpose contradicts this. Habermas: only at a post-conventional level does the idea of the fundamental critiqueability and need for justification of legal norms emerge. Habermas III 354 Modern Law/Weber/Habermas: separates morality and legality. This requires practical justification. The moral-free sphere of law refers to a moral based on principles. The achievement of making something positive is to shift justification problems, i.e. to relieve the technical handling of the law of justification problems, but not to eliminate these justification problems. This justification, which has become structurally necessary, is expressed in the catalogue of fundamental rights contained in the civil constitutions alongside the principle of popular sovereignty. Habermas III 357 Modern Law/Weber: For Weber, modern law in the positivist sense is to be understood as the law that is set by decision and completely detached from rational agreement, from concepts of justification, no matter how formal they may be. ((s) > Carl Schmitt's Decisionism/Weber). WeberVsNatural justice: Thesis: There can be no purely formal natural justice. Being-Should/Weber: The supposed to be valid is considered to be identical with that which in fact exists everywhere on average; the 'norms' obtained by logical processing of concepts of legal or ethical, belong in the same sense as the 'natural laws' to those generally binding rules which 'God himself cannot change' and against which a legal system must not attempt to rebel. (2) >Natural Justice. Habermas III 358 HabermasVsWeber: Weber confuses the formal characteristics of a post-traditional level of justification with particular material values. Nor does he sufficiently distinguish between structural and content-related aspects in rational natural justice and can therefore equate "nature" and "reason" with value contents, from which modern law, in the strict sense, is detached as an instrument for asserting any values and interests. >Foundation/Weber. Habermas III 362 Procedural legitimacy/procedural rationality/law/HabermasVsWeber: as soon as the rationalization of law is reinterpreted as a question of the procedural rational organization of procedural rational management and administration, questions of the institutional embodiment of moral-practical rationality cannot only be pushed aside, but downright turned into its opposite: These now appear as a source of irrationality, at least of "motives that weaken the formal rationalism of law".(3) Habermas: Weber confuses the recourse to the establishment of legal rule with a reference to particular values. Habermas IV 122 Law/Weber/Habermas: Question: How can a contract bind the parties if the sacred basis of the law has been removed? Solution/Hobbes/Weber/Habermas: the standard answer since Hobbes and up to Max Weber is that modern law is compulsory law. The internalization of moral corresponds to a complementary transformation of the law into an externally imposed, state-authorized power based on the state sanction apparatus. The quasi automatic enforceability of the fulfilment of legal claims Habermas IV 123 is to guarantee obedience. >Obedience. DurkheimVsHobbes/DurkheimVsWeber/Habermas: Durkheim is not satisfied with that. Obedience must also have a moral core. The legal system is in fact part of a political order with which it would fall if it could not claim legitimacy. >E. Durkheim. 1. M. Weber, Gesammelte Ausätze zur Religionssoziologie, Vol. I. 1963, p. 541. 2.M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Ed. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964, p. 638 3.Ibid p. 654 |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Legal Positivism | Weber | Habermas III 355 Legal positivism/Weber/Habermas: Weber defines modern law and legal rule so narrowly that the principle of need for justification is ignored in favour of the principle of statutes. Weber emphasizes above all the structural characteristics that are connected with the formalism of a technically systematized law and with the positivity of set norms (characteristics: positivity, legality and formality). HabermasVsWeber: Weber neglects the moment of need for justification. In doing so, he excludes the very rational ideas that arose with the right of reason in the 17th century and have since been characteristic, if not for all legal norms, then nevertheless for the legal system as a whole, especially for the public-law foundations of legal rule. >Rational law, >Rationality, >Rationalism, >Law, >Justification, >Ultimate justification. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Legitimacy | Weber | Habermas III 359 Legitimacy/Weber/Habermas: "Legitimacy can be considered legitimate [by the participants]: a) by agreement of the interested parties for them; b) by imposition (due to a rule of people over people considered legitimate) and submissiveness".(1) >Convention, >Interest, >Governance, >Ultimate justification, >Justification. Habermas: in both cases it is not legality as such that creates legitimacy, but either (a) a rational agreement, which already underlies the legal order, or (b) an otherwise legitimized rule of those who impose the legal order. Weber: The transition from an agreed on to an imposed order is smooth. (2) Habermas III 360 Habermas: even with flowing transitions, the two sources of legitimacy - agreement or imposition of a powerful will - can be analytically separated. Solution/Weber: the latter presupposes the belief in an authority that is legitimate in any sense. (3) Belief/HabermasVsWeber: the belief in the legality of a procedure cannot generate legitimacy per se, i.e. by virtue of positive statutes. This is already apparent from the logical analysis of the concepts of legitimacy and legality. How did Weber come to this? I only find one argument that does not hold up either: that everyday techniques are usually no longer understood in their inner reasons. Weber points this out.(4) Habermas III 361 According to Weber, we can understand the belief in legality as a secondary traditionalism that no longer poses any problems for institutions with prerequisites. >Culture, >Cultural tradition. Ultimately, however, rational foundations of the legal system are again assumed.(5) >Rationality. Habermas: Ultimately, experts are needed to justify where laypersons are not able to do so ad hoc. >Justification. HabermasVsWeber/HabermasVsDecisionism: Legality based on positive statutes alone can indicate an underlying legitimacy, but cannot replace it. Belief in legality is not an independent type of legitimacy. (6) Habermas III 363 Legitimation/Weber: thesis: the "ignorance of the ever-increasing technical content of the law" extends the path of legitimacy ((s), i.e. legitimation and legitimacy is more difficult for the individual citizen to see through, for the institutions it is more difficult to prove). Habermas III 364 Habermas: the extension of the legitimation paths does not mean, however, that the belief in legality could replace the belief in the legitimation of the legal system as a whole. Weber/Habermas: consequently understands the reversal of polarity from ethical to purely utilitarian orientations of action as a decoupling of the motivational foundations or the moral-practical value sphere. But instead of welcoming contrary tendencies, Weber sees them as a danger to the formal qualities of the law.(7) >Utilitarianism, >Value Spheres. 1. M. Weber, Methodologische Schriften, hrsg. v. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen, 1968, S.316 2. Ibid p. 317. 3. Ibid p. 318 4. Ibid p. 212f 5. Ibid p. 214 6. W. Schluchter (following H. Heller) introduces "legal principles" which are intended to act as a bridge between positive law and the foundations of an ethics of responsibility (1979, p. 155ff). HabermasVsSchluchter: the status of these principles remains unclear. Within Max Weber's system they are a foreign element. 7. M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, hrsg.v. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964, p. 655 |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Natural Justice | Habermas | III 278 Natural Law/Habermas: the emergence of rational natural law cannot be explained solely by the ethical rationalization of world views. >Worldviews/Weber. It depends to a large extent on the development of science and requires an analysis of the relationship between cognitive and moral-practical components of the world view. >Science, >Progress, >Morality, >Thinking, >Knowledge. HabermasVsWeber, Max: Weber neglects this aspect. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Organisation | Weber | Habermas IV 453 Organisation/Weber/Habermas: Weber still imagined the activities of organisations as a kind of purpose-rational action on a large scale. >Institutions, >Institutionalization, >Purpose rationality. Rationality/Weber: an organization is measured by the extent to which a company or institution enables or ensures purpose-rational action by its members. HabermasVsWeber: this purpose model has been abandoned because it cannot explain why organisations cannot solve their conservation problems only through the purpose-rational behaviour of their members. >Purposes, >Action, >Teleology. Habermas IV 454 Solution/Habermas: Nowadays, the reference point of system rationality is chosen: the rationalisable "knowledge" expresses itself in the ability of social systems to control themselves. >System rationaly. As a result, purpose-rational behavior loses importance. Instead, it is about the functional contributions of places, programs and decisions that any states and elements can make to solve system problems.(1) >Freedom/Weber. 1. N. Luhmann, Zweck – Herrschaft –System, Der Staat, 1964, S. 129ff. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Philosophy of Science | Weber | Habermas III 221 Philosophy of science/Weber/Habermas: Weber criticizes concepts of progress and evolution exactly when they play an implicit normative role in empirical sciences. >Progress, >Evolution. HabermasVsWeber: The sensitivity to naturalistic fallacy in the ethical field sharpened by Kant and the Neo-Kantianism value philosophy, III 222 and at all the mixing of descriptive and evaluative statements has, of course, its downside. Weber combines it with a completely non-Kantian, almost historistic distrust against the argumentative power of practical reason. On a methodological level, Weber firmly rejects both ethical cognitivism and ethical naturalism. >Reason, >Reason/Kant, >I. Kant, >Neo-Kantianism, >Cognitivism, >Naturalism. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Politics | Weber | Habermas III 346 Politics/Power/Weber/HabermasVsWeber: Weber empirically reinterprets the problem of legitimation and decouples the political system from forms of moral-practical rationality; he also cuts the formation of political will back to processes of power acquisition and power competition. >Legitimacy, >Power, >Rule, >Law, >Society. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Protestant Ethics | Weber | Habermas III 299 Protestant Ethics/Weber/Habermas: in traditional society, the cognitive potential created by the rationalized worldviews within which the disenchantment process takes place cannot yet become effective. It is only delivered in modern societies. This process means the modernisation of society.(1) >Rationality, >Rationalization, >Tradition, >Cultural Tradition, >Modernity, >Modernization, >Society. Habermas III 307 Profession/Protestantism/Weber: modern professional culture is precisely that implementation of ethics of conviction that ensures motivationally the procedural rationality of entrepreneurial action in a way that has consequences for the capitalist enterprise. >Ethics of conviction. Habermas III 308 Weber does not want to explain why the Catholic inhibitions against commercial profit-seeking have fallen, but what made the conversion possible. He discovered the corresponding teachings in Calvinism and around the Protestant sects. In religious community life he finds the institutions that ensured the socializing effectiveness of the teachings in the supporting layers of early capitalism.(2) >Institutions, >Religion. Habermas III 310 Profession/Weber/Habermas: professional work as a whole is ethically charged and dramatised. The sphere of the profession is released from traditional morality and becomes the sphere of procedural professional probation. This is connected with an ethics of conviction limited to individual graces, which eliminates the Catholic coexistence of monk, priest and lay ethics in favour of an elitist separation between virtuoso and mass religiosity. >Purpose rationality, >Value spheres. Consequences are the inner loneliness of the individual and the understanding of one's neighbor as another neutralized in strategic contexts of action. (3) Habermas III 311 Protestant ethics/Schluchter: the ethics of ascetic Protestantism puts the relationship of the individual to God above his relationships to people and gives these relationships a new meaning: they are no longer interpreted in piety terms.(4) Habermas: even the objectification of these relationships destroys the basis of legitimacy of piety. It degrades all traditional norms to mere conventions. However, this does not require the special objectification required for capitalist economic transactions and which allows segmentation of a legally organized area of strategic action. HabermasVsWeber: Weber denies such a possibility of development. Habermas III 312 This is because of the structural incompatibility of any consistently ethicized religion of redemption with the impersonal orders of a rationalized economy and objective politics. >Economy, >Politics. 1.Vgl. H.V. Gumbrecht, R. Reichardt, Th. Schleich (Hrg), Sozialgeschichte der Französischen Aufklärung, 2 Bde, München, 1981 2. M. Weber, Die protestantische Ethik, hrsg. v. J. Winckelmann, Bd 2, Hamburg 1972, p. 232. 3. Schluchter, Die Entwicklung des okzidentalen Rationalismus, Tübingen 1979, p. 250f. 4. Schluchter ibid p. 251. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Rationalization | Habermas | III 22 Rationalization/Sociology/Habermas: Understanding rational action orientations becomes the point of reference for understanding all action orientations. For sociology, this means the following relationship between meta-theoretical and methodological level: a) At the metatheoretical level, it chooses basic concepts that are tailored to the increase in rationality of modern life. b) At the methodological level, the understanding of rational action orientations becomes a reference point for the understanding of all action orientations (>Theory of Meaningful Understanding). This is about internal relationships between meaning and validity. >Sociology, >Levels/order, >Levels of Description, >Theory, >Method. III 209 Rationalization/HabermasVsMarx/VsAdorno/VsHorkheimer/VsWeber/Habermas: the concept of rationality of these authors is too narrow to grasp the comprehensive social rationality they have in mind. >Rationality/Habermas, >Rationality/Adorno, >Rationality/Weber, >HabermasVsAdorno, >HabermasVsMarx, >HabermasVsWeber. The term would have to be used at the same level as the productive forces, the subsystems of functional rational action, the totalitarian bearers of instrumental reason. >Productive Forces/Habermas. That is not happening. The concept of action of these authors is not complex enough for this. >Actions/Habermas, >Action Systems/Habermas, >Action theory/Habermas. In addition, basic concepts of action and system theory must not be confused: LuhmannVsMarx, LuhmannVsWeber, LuhmannVsAdorno: the rationalization of action orientations and lifeworld structures is not the same as the increase in complexity of action systems.(1) >LuhmannVsWeber. III 457 Communicative action/rationalization/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: only when we differentiate between communicative and success-oriented action in "social action" can the communicative rationalization of everyday actions and the formation of subsystems for procedural rational economic and administrative action be understood as complementary development. Although both reflect the institutional embodiment of rationality complexes, in another respect they are opposite tendencies. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas III 459 Rationalization/Habermas: the paradox of rationalization, of which Weber spoke, can be understood abstractly in such a way that the rationalization of the world allows a kind of system integration ((s) of subsystems with non-linguistic communication media such as money and power) that competes with the integration principle of ((s) linguistic) understanding and under certain conditions has a disintegrating effect on the world of life. >Lifeworld. IV 451 Rationalization/Modernism/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: Weber could not classify the problems of legitimacy that a positivistically undermined legal rule raises within the pattern of rationalization of modern societies, because he himself remained imprisoned by legal-positivist views. >Legitimicy/Habermas. Solution/Habermas: Thesis: (p) The emergence (...) of modern societies requires the institutional embodiment of moral and legal concepts of a post-traditional nature, but (q) capitalist modernization follows a pattern according to which cognitive-instrumental rationality penetrates beyond the realms of economy and state into other, communicatively structured areas of life and takes precedence there at the expense of moral-practical and aesthetic-practical rationality. (r) This causes disturbances in the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld. IV 452 Problem: a progressively rationalised lifeworld is simultaneously decoupled and made dependent on increasingly complex, formally organised areas of action such as economics and state administration. This takes sociopathological forms of internal colonization. To the extent that critical imbalances can only be avoided at the cost of disturbances in the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld (i.e. of "subjectively" experienced crises or pathologies threatening identity). IV 486 Paradoxically, rationalization releases both at the same time - the systemically induced reification and the utopian perspective from which capitalist modernization has always inherited the stigma that it dissolves traditional forms of life without saving their communicative substance. >Reification 1.N. Luhmann, Zweckbegriff und Systemrationalität, Tübingen 1968. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Rationalization | Weber | Habermas IIII 208 Rationalization/WeberVsMarx/Weber/Habermas: Weber assesses the institutional framework of the capitalist economy and the modern state differently: not as production conditions that capture the rationalization potential, but as the subsystems of procedural rational action in which occidental rationalism develops socially. >Capitalism, >K. Marx. Of course, as a result of the bureaucratisation, he fears that social conditions will become reificationary, which suffocates the motivational impetus of rational living. >Reification, >Bureaucracy, >Rationality, >Purpose rationality. Horkheimer and Adorno, later also Marcuse, interpreted Marx from Webers' perspective. In the sign of an independent instrumental reason, the rationality of natural domination merges with the irrationality of class domination, the unleashed productive forces stabilise the alienating production conditions. >Rationalization/Marx, >Instrumental Reason. Habermas III 228 Definition Rationalization/Max Weber/Habermas: Weber calls rationalization any expansion of empirical knowledge, of forecasting ability and of instrumental and organizational control of empirical processes. Habermas III 238 Rationalization/Max Weber/Habermas: Weber wants to explain the institutionalization of procedural-rational action in terms of a process of rationalization. >Institutionalization, >Institutions, >Organisation. Initial situation: the methodological lifestyle of entrepreneurs and civil servants oriented towards professional ethics as well as the organisational means of formal law. The corresponding structures of consciousness are embodied in institutions on the one hand and personality systems (dispositions of action and value orientations) on the other. Ultimately, for Weber, ethical and legal rationalism is the result of a process of disenchantment reflected at the level of worldviews. III 239 There are two major waves of rationalization: 1. rationalization of world views, 2. translation of cultural into social rationalization. >Worldviews. Habermas III 306 Rationalization/Weber/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: in the transition from cultural to social rationalization, Weber's theory of action, which is tailored to the type of procedural rational action, narrows the concept of rationality with many consequences. He begins directly with the actual figures of Western rationalism without reflecting them on the counterfactual possibilities of a rationalized world. >Lifeworld. If, however, he needs standards for his further investigations for measuring a shrunken rationality, these problems reappear. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Sense | Weber | Habermas III 22 Sense/Rationality/Max Weber/Habermas: Weber's hierarchy of action terms is based on the type of purpose-driven action, so that all other actions can be classified as specific deviations from this type. >Purpose rationality. Weber analyzes the method of understanding the sense in such a way that the more complex cases can be related to the borderline case of understanding purpose-rational action: The understanding of the subjectively success-oriented action requires at the same time its objective evaluation (according to standards of correctness rationality). >Success, >Rightness, >Rationality. Habermas III 229 Sense/Weber/Habermas: the empirical and completely mathematically oriented world view develops in principle the rejection of any viewpoint that asks for a 'sense' at all of the inner world happening. Wherever rational empirical recognition has consistently carried out the de-enchantment of the world and its transformation into a causal mechanism, tension finally emerges against the claims of the ethical postulate: that the world is a God-ordered, thus a somehow ethically meaningful cosmos. (1) >Ethics, >Justification, >Ultimate justification. Habermas III 315 Sense/Rationality/Weber/Habermas: That the world as a cosmos meets the requirements of rational religious ethics, or has some 'meaning', had nothing more to do with religious recognition. The cosmos of natural causality and the postulated cosmos of ethical equal causality were incompatible. The intellect created an unbrotherly aristocracy of rational cultural heritage independent of all personal ethical qualities of human beings.(2) >Protestant Ethics/Weber, Rationalization/Weber. HabermasVsWeber: this explanation of social rationalization is unsatisfactory: Weber fails to prove that a principle-driven moral consciousness can only survive in religious contexts. Habermas III 335/336 Sense/Weber/Habermas: Weber, Thesis of the loss of meaning: in view of the rational laws of modern life orders, both the ethical and theoretical unification of the world - whether in the name of religion or in the name of science - is no longer possible. >Unity, >Unification. Weber sees (in reference to the late work of J. St. Mill) a new polytheism, an objective figure of an antagonism between impersonal value and life orders. (3) Habermas: this reflects the generation-typical experience of nihilism. >Nihilism. Habermas III 337 Habermas: Weber justifies the thesis of the loss of meaning in this way: reason itself splits into a plurality of value spheres and destroys its own universality. The individual should now try to create this unit, which objectively can no longer be produced, in the privacy of his/her own biography. >Value spheres. Habermas III 377 Sense/Weber/Habermas: Weber introduces "sense" as an (undefined) basic concept for defining action. Thus, Weber has no theory of meaning behind him, but an intentionalist theory of consciousness. I.e. he does not refer to linguistic understanding but to the opinions and intentions of a subject of action. Habermas III 378 So it is a matter of purposive action, not communication. Communication can then only be constructed secondarily with the help of a concept of intention. (4) 1. M. Weber, M. Weber, Die protestantische Ethik, (Ed) J. Winckelmann, Vol. 2, Hamburg 1972, p. 569. 2. M. Weber, Gesammelte Ausätze zur Religionssoziologie, Bd. I. 1963, p. 569. 3.M. Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, (Ed) J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1968, p. 603f. 4.M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, (Ed) J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964, p. 3. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Subjectivism | Weber | Habermas III 317 Subjectivism/Weber/Habermas: Weber assumes an argumentation determined by the positivism of his time, according to which ethical value judgements merely express subjective attitudes and are not capable of an intersubjectively binding reasoning. >Positivism. VsSubjectivism/Habermas/HabermasVsWeber: His own arguments for the superiority of responsibility ethics over ethics of conviction, which have their limits in religious ethics of brotherhood, contradict this. >Ethics of conviction, >Responsibility. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Subsystems | Habermas | III 457 Subsystems/Communicative Action/Rationalization/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: only when we differentiate between communicative and success-oriented action in "social action" can the communicative rationalization of everyday action and the formation of subsystems for purpose-rational economic and administrative action be understood as complementary development. Although both reflect the institutional embodiment of rationality complexes, in another respect they are opposite tendencies. IV 247 Examples of subsystems are market economy and modern administration. IV 399 Subsystems/Habermas: are indicators of a successful formation of subsystems: - the crisis-like fluctuations in the quantitative ratio of the values embodied by the medium (here: money) and the real values represented by them (i.e. the dynamics of inflation and deflation) - The reflexive upgrading of the medium, which makes capital markets possible, for example. A subsystem such as the economy can only become more differentiated via the medium of money if markets and forms of organisation emerge that bring the system's inherent traffic with the relevant environments under monetary control. This regulation does not necessarily require a double relation in the sense of an exchange of pairs of factors and products, which runs over two different media. E.g. it is not foreseen that in the relationship between the economy and the private household sector, labour enters the economic system through a non-monetary medium such as value retention. >Marxism/Habermas, >Systems, >Systems theory. IV 400 Subsystems/Habermas: for the development of a media-controlled subsystem it seems sufficient that boundaries are created across through which a simple exchange with all environments can take place controlled by a (single) medium. This also triggers changes in the interaction areas that form environments for the subsystem. >Communication Media/Habermas, >Control Media. IV 418 Subsystems/Lifeworld/Media/Technocracy/Habermas: Subsystems that are differentiated via media such as power and money can become independent from a lifeworld forced into the system environment. From the perspective of the lifeworlds, the conversion of action to the media appears both as a relief of communication effort and risk and as a conditioning of decisions in extended contingency scope. In this sense, they appear as a mechanization of the lifeworld. On the other hand, a generalization of the inlfuence of the medium cannot have such an effect. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Systems | Weber | Habermas III 337 Systems/Subsystems/present diagnosis/Weber/Habermas: Weber puts forward the thesis of the subsystems becoming independent of procedural rational action, which threatens the freedom of the individual. However, it does not necessarily result from the thesis of loss of meaning. >Sense/Weber. Weber thesis: "One of the constitutive components of the modern capitalist spirit (...): the rational lifestyle based on the idea of the profession is (...) born from the spirit of Christian asceticism (...).By transferring asceticism from the monk's cells into professional life and beginning to dominate morality within the world, it helped (...) to build that mighty cosmos of modern economic order linked to the technical and economic prerequisites of mechanical machine production, which today determines the lifestyle of all individuals (...) with overwhelming compulsion. >Christianity, >Coercion, >Ideas, >Norms, >Rule. Habermas III 338 (...) By transforming (...) the world, asceticism gained increasing and ultimately inescapable power over humans. (...) Today its spirit [the spirit of asceticism] has escaped from this housing. In any case, since it rests on a mechanical basis, victorious capitalism no longer needs this support. (...) Then, however, for the 'last humans' of this cultural development, the word could become the truth: 'experts without spirit, bon vivants without heart': this nothing imagines having reached an unprecedented level of humanity". (1) ((s) Key passage for the keywords: "The housing as hard as steel", "inner-wordly asceticism". >Internal world, >External world, >Society. Habermas III 339 HabermasVsWeber: The thesis is not plausible in itself: Weber goes too far when he concludes from the loss of the substantial unity of reason that there is a polytheism of struggling powers of belief. >Sense/Weber). Habermas III 340 Weber has not sufficiently differentiated between the particular value content of cultural traditions and those universal value standards under which the cognitive, normative and expressive components of culture become spheres independently of value and form stubborn complexes of rationality. >Cultural tradition, >Value spheres, >Values, >Norms. 1. M. Weber, Die protestantische Ethik, J.Winckelmann (Ed) Vol. I, p. 187-189. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Value Rationality | Weber | Habermas III 244 Value rationality/Max Weber/Habermas: Weber: "He who acts purely value rationally, regardless of the consequences to be foreseen, in the service of his conviction of what seems to command duty, dignity, beauty, religious instruction, reverence, or the importance of a 'thing' of whatever kind. ... value rational acting is acting according to 'bids' or according to 'demands', which the actor has posed for him- or herself."(1) >Actions, >Morals, >Ethics, >Norms, >Principles. Habermas III 344/345 Value Rationality/Purpose Rationality/Law/Weber/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: In connection with Weber's treatment of law, there is an unclear interference of two different questions under which Weber understands processes of modernization as processes of rationalization: a) as rationalization in all areas of life as a rationalization of means for purposes that are required under particular values, b) under the aspect of a value-rational transformation of the institutional system. >Law/Weber, >Rationalization. HabermasVsWeber: From Weber's economic, state and legal sociology one must gain the impression that in modern societies rationalization processes can only begin with empirical-theoretical knowledge and the instrumental and strategic aspects of action, while practical rationality cannot be institutionalized independently, i.e. with a subsystem-specific stubbornness. >Rationality, >Purpose rationality. 1. M.Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, hrsg. v. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Values | Weber | Habermas IV 430 Values/Weber/Habermas: Weber takes a sceptical view of values according to which a moral consciousness guided by principles can neither be philosophically explained nor socially stabilized without being embedded in a religious world view. >Values, >Norms, >Morals, >Ethics, >Religion. HabermasVsWeber/RawlsVsWeber/KantVsWeber/Habermas: this view cannot be maintained in view of the cognitivistic approaches from Kant to Rawls. >I. Kant, >J. Rawls. It is also empirically refuted by the spread of a humanistically enlightened consciousness since the days of the Enlightenment. >Enlightenment. ParsonsVsWeber/Habermas: Parsons secularization theory is more plausible. >Secularization/Parsons. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Weber | Habermas | III 207 Weber/Habermas: HabermasVsWeber: the following inconsistency is instructive: Weber analyses the process of disenchantment in the history of religion, which should fulfil the necessary internal conditions for the appearance of occidental rationalism, with the help of a complex but largely unclear concept of rationality;... III 208 ...on the other hand, in his analysis of social rationalization, as it prevails in modernity, he is guided by the limited idea of purpose-rationality. >Rationalization/Weber, >Procedural rationality, >Western rationalism. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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