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The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Disquotationalism | Field | II 105 Purely disquotational true: 1. Generalization possible only like this - for example: not every axiom is true - (but one does not yet know which) 2. "True-like-I-understand-it" 3. The concept is use-independent E.g. to say "Snow is white" is true is the same as to call snow white - no property is attributed which would not have it if one uses the sentence differently - everyday language: here we seem to use a different truth-predicate. Use-independency of the truth-predicate: neccessary for the generalization for infinite conjunctions/disjunctions - contingently true: E.g. Euclidean geometry. The axioms could have been wrong - we do not want to say with this, that the speakers could have used their words differently. Ad II 105 Definition disquotational/(s): "literal". Field: heuristic: disquotation means "truth-like-he-understands-it". ((s) So referring to the speaker - this is not a definition of truth in terms of understanding - merely heuristic.) Deflationism: this leads to cognitive equivalence. >Deflationism. Disquotational true/Field: "true, as I understand it". Cf. >Principle of charity, >Understanding. II 123 Field: Disquotational true is unlike Tarski-true. >Tarski-scheme, >Truth definition/Tarski, >Thruth theory/Tarski, >Truth/Tarski. ad II 135 Deflationism/Field/(s): contrast: semantic/disquotational: semantic: not simply repeating something literal, but finding truth, depending on the situation E.g. for index words. Disquotational: only repeating literally; this does not work for indices and demonstratives.# >Index words, >Indexicality. II 152 Disquotational truth: Problem: untranslatable sentences are not disquotationally true. >Translation. II 164 Disquotational true/disquotational reference: corresponds to the thesis that Tarskian truth is not contingently empirical. Necessary: both "p" is true iff p" and "it is true that p iff p" because the equality between possible worlds is not defined. - Truth is here always related to the actual world. >Possible worlds, >Cross world identity, >Actual world, >Actualism, >Actuality. II 223 Radical deflationism/narrow: does not allow interpersonal synonymy - only purely disquotational truth - it is about how the listener understands the sentence, not the speaker. Cf. >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. II 259 Definition disquotationalism/Field: the thesis that the question by which facts e.g. "entropy" refers to entropy, is meaningless. >Reference. II 261 Non-disquotational view/indeterminacy/VsDisquotationalism: the non-disquotational view must assume an indeterminacy of our concepts on a substantial level. >Indeterminacy. II 269 Disquotational view/truth/Reference/Semantics/Logic/Field: N.B.: Truth and reference are not really semantic concepts here, but logical ones. - Because they are applied primarily to our idiolect. >Logic, >Semantics, >Idiolect. Here they function as logical concepts. - (E.g. "true" for generalization) N.B.: that "rabbit" refers to rabbits is then a logical truth, not a semantic truth. - Then there is still indeterminacy in translation. II 272 Disquotational view/disquotationalism: for it, the relevant structure of a language is not to be understood in referential terms, but in terms of stimulus meaning, inferential role and indication relation. >Stimuli, >Stimulus meaning, >Pointing, >Ostension, >Inference, >Inferentialism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Expressions | Tarski | Skirbekk I 142f Linguistic expressions/Tarski: linguistic expressions are physical objects. Proposition: a proposition is an ideal object. Truth: truth is applicable only in respect of a particular language. Truth semantically: semantic truth is fundamentally different from satisfaction, designation, definition. >Satisfaction, >Designation, >Definitions. Mathematics: provability and truth often fall apart. >Provability, >Truth. We need a metalanguage because the object language must not contain the truth predicate ((s) because of possible paradoxes).(1) >Paradoxes, >Metalanguage, >Levels. 1. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in: G. Skirbekk (ed.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977 |
| Intuitionism | Heyting | I 59ff Intuitionism/Heyting: Brouwer studied the conceptual mathematical construction as such, without questioning the nature of things, for example, whether these things exist independently of our knowledge of them. >L. Brouwer. I 60 Sentence of the excluded middle: e.g. the invalidity of the sentence of the excluded middle: if we compare the definitions of two natural numbers, k and l then: (A) k is the largest prime number such that k 1 is also a prime number, if there is no such number, k = 1. (B) l is the largest prime number such that l 2 is also a prime number, if there is no such number, l = 1. Intuitionists reject (B) as a definition of an integer. K can be really calculated (k = 3), while we have no method of determining l, since it is not known whether the sequence of the prime number twins is infinite or not. The intuitionists regard something as well-defined only when a method of determination is given. >Law of the Excluded Middle, >Numbers. Classical mathematics: one can argue that the extent of our knowledge about the existence of the last twin is purely coincidental. And completely irrelevant in questions of mathematical truth. Existence/intuitionism/Heyting: the argument of the representative of classical mathematics is of a metaphysical kind. If existing does not mean "constructible", it must have a metaphysical meaning. Cf. >Constructivism. I 61 Classical mathematics/VsIntuitionism/Heyting: assuming that on January 1st, 1970, it is proved that there are infinitely many twins, l is equal to 1. Was that not already the case before the date (Menger, 1930)? Intuitionism/Heyting: a mathematical assertion states that a certain construction is possible. Before the construction exists, the construction is not there. Even the intuitionists are convinced that mathematics is based on eternal truths in some sense, but when one attempts to define this meaning one gets entangled in metaphysics. >Metaphysics. I 62 Formalism/Carnap/Heyting: there always remains the doubt, which conclusions are correct, and which are not (Carnap, 1934(1), S. 44; 1937(2), S. 51). >Correctness. I 63 Intuitionism: we are not interested in the formal side, but precisely in the nature of inferences in meta-mathematics. There is a fundamental ambiguity in the language. Classical mathematics: the semanticists are even worse relativists than the formalists and intuitionists. Cf. >Semantic truth, >Truth conditions. I 65 Intuitionism: there is an intuitionist logic, e.g. transitivity. Conclusion: logic is a part of mathematics and therefore cannot be taken as its basis. >Blackening of the paper, >Formalism, >Evidence, >Proofs, >Provability, >VsFormalism, cf. >Foundation. 1. R. Carnap, Logische Syntax der Sprache, Wien 1934, p. 44. 2. R. Carnap, Testability and Meaning, in: Philosophy of Science 4, 1937, p. 51. 3. Karl Menger. Der Intuitionismus. Blätter Für Deutsche Philosophie 4:311--325 (1930) |
Heyting I Arend Heyting "Disputation", in: Intuitionism, Amsterdam 1956 German Edition: Streitgespräch In Kursbuch 8/1967, H. M. Enzensberger Frankfurt/M. 1967 Heyting II Arend Heyting Intuitionism: An Introduction (Study in Logic & Mathematics) 1971 |
| Semantics | Quine | VII (c) 48 Semantics/Quine: has nothing to do with meaning but with synonymy. >Synonymy, >Meaning. VII (g) 130 Semantics/Quine: divided into theory of reference and theory of meaning - "semantics" would be a good name for "meaning, but just Tarski's semantic theory (semantic truth definition) belongs to the theory of reference. IV 427 Quine: "Nature's facts go beyond our theories and all kinds of observations - whereas traditional semantics goes beyond the facts of language. VI 52 Behaviorism/Quine: in psychology you still have the choice whether you want to be a behaviorist, in linguistics you have to be. Language is acquired through the behaviour of others, which is evaluated in the light of a common situation. It literally doesn't matter what kind of psychic life is next to other kinds! Semantics/Quine: the semantic meaning will therefore not be able to include more than what can be deduced from perceptible behaviour in observable situations. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Semantics | Sellars | I VII Semantics/Sellars: functionalist semantics versus reference theory. (Like Wittgenstein). (VsTheory of reference). >Reference, >Reference theory, >Functionalism. II 302 Semantic Truth Theories: are characterized by the question: is there something specifically linguistic about truth? >Truth, >Truth theories. II 304f Semantic Theory of Truth: in semantic truth theories there are no expressions like "that p" or "it is true that p". According to Max Black the key is in the peculiarity of Carnap’s explication of statements of the form: Expression A (in L) means x. This means that you must specify a list: E.g. W word (in English), X: either W = "and" and x = and or W = "white" and x = white or W = "or", and x = or ....... ad infinitum. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Truth | Geach | I 15 Truth/GeachVsAristotle: Aristotle confused two pairs of concepts: a) sentences: true/false b) predication: "true-of" Tarski: "true-of" is basic. >Satisfaction. I 76 Truth/Tarski: satisfaction ("true-of"): cannot be applied to components, but only to whole sentences. Even complex sentences correspond to a propositional function. >Propositional functions. Semantic truth definition: relevant relation: predicate to the thing of which it is predicated to be true: it is about a sentence but not a fact. >Truth definition, >Sentence/Geach, >Facts/Geach. I 258 Truth/Oxford school: only for few allegations. GeachVs: then "p v q" would not be truth-functional! >Truth functions. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Truth | Lorenzen | Berka I 270 Truth/Dialogical Logic/Lorenzen: with the infinite inductive definitions, one can transform, e.g. the semantic concept of truth into a dialogically definite concept. >Dialogical Logic, >Semantic Truth. There are two sets, the set T of the true formulas and the set F of the wrong formulas. Cf. >Truth/Kripke. I 271 If the formulas with the logical particles are constructed from decision-definite prime formulas, then T (true) and F (false) are defined infinitely inductively as follows: A e T u B e T > A u B e T A e F > A u B e F B e F > A u B e F (correcpondingly for v) A e F > i A e T A e T > i A e F (n)A(n) e T > (x)A(x) e T A(n) e F > (x)A(x) e F (correspondingly for (Ex)). Foundation/Lorenzen: for this definition one does not need ordinal numbers as step numbers, because the definition scheme is "sound". That is, one gets after a finite number of steps to a prime formula.(1) >Foundation, >Step number. 1. P. Lorenzen, Ein dialogisches Konstruktivitätskriterium, in: Infinitistic Methods, (1961), 193-200 |
Lorn I P. Lorenzen Constructive Philosophy Cambridge 1987 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hintikka, J. | Verschiedene Vs Hintikka, J. | Cresswell II 40 T-Predicate/Cresswell: Thesis: We should identify the semantic truth predicate with the truth predicate for indirect speech: because of the existence of sentences of the following kind: (18) Jeremy believed that the proposition expressed by Miriam and that which Mary implied was equivalently true. Problem: here we are definitely dealing with paradoxes and have to deal with them. Solution/Hintikka: has developed an epistemic logic that deals with it. But it only applies in a community of logically omniscient people. Richmond ThomasonVsHintikka: Such a community cannot exist if knowledge is conceived that way. Logical Omniscience/Cresswell: then in any case only "that0" is needed. Prior I 84 Preface Paradox/Prior: (similar to Moore's Paradox). Variants: a) Preface b) simply book as a whole The author says in the book that p and he says in the book that q and that r etc.. and in the preface that either not p, or not q or not r etc... and that is inconsistent. The whole set cannot be true together. This can also be formulated as a paradox of belief. Rationality/Belief/Hintikka: "Rationality of belief" should avoid the preface paradox. MakinsonVsHintikka: it can be very rational to represent contradictory beliefs at the same time. I 85 This may be about probability: it may be rational to believe that two things are more likely than their non-existence, but their combination is less likely than their non-existence. VsHintikka: rationality should not be equated with consistency! |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Putnam, H. | Brendel Vs Putnam, H. | I 70 Truth-Definition/WT/PutnamVsTarski/Putnam/Brendel: Tarski's theory is contraintuitive from the start: this also applies to the model-theoretical variants. They do not do justice to our intuitive concept of "true". I 71 His truth concept is not even "semantic". BrendelVsPutnam: his concept of "intuitive truth" is itself quite unclear. I 105 Disquotation Theory/Disquotation Theory/Disquotationalism/Putnam/Brendel: Thesis: is only a variant of redundancy theory. BrendelVsPutnam/Brendel: this is an error: because redundancy theory assumes an operator and a concept of truth based on disquotation theory cannot be a propositional operator and thus not a redundancy theory. I 278 Brains in a vat/BIV/PutnamVsSkepticism/Putnam: Thesis: the statement that we are brains in a vat cannot turn out to be true because representations have no intrinsic connection to their representatives ("magic reference") - is independent of causation. I 279 SkepticismVsPutnam/Brendel: Skepticism does not have to be impressed. It can classify Putnam's argument as a transcendental argument: it refers to the premises of the possibility of formulating the sentence "We are brains in a vat". StroudVsPutnam/Brendel: such transcendental arguments already presuppose certain verificationist assumptions. I 280 Problem: one cannot yet conclude from this that the world actually exists. One would also have to assume that principles constituting knowledge necessarily describe the world as it actually is. StroudVsTranscendental Argument/Brendel: petitio principii. I 281 BrendelVsStroud: Solution: Semantic Truth/Brendel: the skeptical hypothesis is not a meaningful truthful statement in the sense of semantic truth. Brains in a vat/BIV/Putnam/Brendel: Putnam himself admits that brains in a vat is physically possible. But what does that mean, except that there is such a possible description? I 282 BrendelVsPutnam: no physical possibility is shown at all, only a black box. (David WardVsPutnam Ward, 1995, 191f). He should show the possibility or impossibility of thinking. ((s) Because he himself ultimately proceeds from an argument of the impossibility of thinking (impossibility of reference). Thought experiment/Brendel: that something is physically possible is not yet an argument for the legitimacy of thougt experiment either. I 283 Conceptual Analysis/Brendel: can only be confirmed or refuted by conceptual possibilities. I 284 BrendelVsPutnam: the world of brains in a vat is not so closed to us, we have an idea of what it would be like. I 285 Understanding/Skepticism/BrendelVsPutnam/Brendel: therefore the skeptical hypothesis is not incomprehensible to us at all. And then also truthful. "Everything different"/Brendel: but this is where the limits of our imagination come in. |
Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Rorty, R. | Brendel Vs Rorty, R. | I 136 Semantic Truth/pragmatist/Rorty/BrendelVsRorty/Brendel: Thesis: Rorty's approach is less radical than he himself claims, and also compatible with a semantic truth-concept. Truth-Def/RortyVsTruth-Def/Brendel: his rejection of a truth-definition is mainly based on his anti-essentialism. Definition/BrendelVsRorty: is attached to the outdated notion, a definition must capture the "essence". That is outdated nowadays. Definition/Today/Brendel: modern definition theory does not require the comprehension of an "essence". |
Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Tarski, A. | Brendel Vs Tarski, A. | I 49 Truth-Def/Tarski/Brendel: contains no object constants and only one relation expression for class inclusion. Testimony/Property/Name/Model Theory/Brendel: compared to Tarski we need some changes: 1. Statements no longer result from the fact that free variable n AF are bound by universal quantification, but e.g. that object constants are assigned property or relation expressions. Example "Hans loves Paula". 2. Property/Model Theory: here you also have to specify for each property what it means that I 50 a sequence of objects satisfies this property or relation. 3. Naming/Model Theory: a semantic relation of the naming of objects by object constants must be formulated. Interpretation/Model Theory/Brendel: (instead of fulfillment) new: now the constants as well as the variables and the property and relation expressions can be used as descriptive signs. This is done by a function of assignment. (Assignment function). Variables/Model Theory: new: now also variables are interpreted semantically. Therefore also formulas with free variables are truthful statements. Truth-Def/Modell Theory/BrendelVsTarski: new: now also a recursive truth definition about the structure of statements is possible. Example for the language L with countable infinite property and relation expressions ...+.... I 51 Model Theory/T-Def/BrendelVsTarski: this model theoretical truth definition is more general than Tarski's definition, since it cannot only make statements about set-theoretical entities. Semantic: but it is also because "truth" is defined by "interpretation in an area of objects", i.e. a function is described that connects linguistic entities with non-linguistic ones. I 58 Semantic Truth/T-Concept/Brendel: should be ontologically neutral in relation to truth value-bearers. VsRealism: should the T-concept force a realistic position, it could not function as minimal consensus of all knowledge conceptions. VsTarski: he is often accused of his T-concept being based on an uncritical realism. (Because of the existence of state of affairs as truth makers.) TarskiVsVs: no realism is implied, but only that if a statement is rejected, then also the assertion of the truth of this statement. (Tarski 1944, 169). I 59 JenningsVsTarski: his T-term is ambivalent: a) semantic, as relation between statements and the state of affairs b) that only an equivalence of two statements (e.g. "snow is white" and, "sn..."is true") (Jennings 1987). I.e. the assertiveness conditions are the same. But then the semantic dimension is abandoned! Brendel: Thesis: we should keep the semantic T-concept, which however is not ontologically neutral. |
Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Derived Intent. | Searle, J.R. | Fod / Lep IV 125 derived intentionality / Searle: the intentionality of speech acts is derived. I.e. the semantic truth conditions must be attributed to tr.c. of belief and intentions. |
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