Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 19 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Argumentation | Habermas | III 38 Argumentation/Habermas: We call argumentation the type of speech in which the participants thematize controversial claims of validity and try to redeem or criticize them with arguments. An argument contains reasons that are systematically linked with the claim to validity of a problematic statement. The "strength" of an argument is measured, in a given context, by the validity of the reasons; this is shown, among other things, by whether an argument can convince the participants of a discourse, i. e. can motivate them to accept the respective claim to validity. >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories, >Justification, >Reasons, >Persuasion. Rationality: against this background, can be judged according to how a subject behaves as a participant in argumentation. Rational statements can also be improved due to their critical nature. >Rationality. III 45 The logic of argumentation does not refer to the formal, consequent connections between semantic units (sentences) but to internal, also non-deductive relations between pragmatic units (speech acts) from which arguments are composed. III 47 Three aspects: 1. resembles an argumentation of a communication under ideal conditions, which represents a situation to be characterized as an ideal speech situation. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas. General symmetry conditions must be reconstructed here, which every competent speaker must presume to be sufficiently fulfilled. III 48 2. The procedure is a specially regulated form of interaction of the division of labour between the proponent and the opponent. A claim of validity is discussed here in a situation that is relieved of the pressure of action and experience, in which claims are examined with reasons and only with reasons. Cf. >Dialogical logic. 3. Argumentation is designed to produce valid arguments. Definition Argument/Habermas: Arguments are those means by means of which intersubjective recognition for the initially hypothetically raised claim of validity of a proponent can be achieved and thus opinion can be transformed into knowledge. See Arguments/Toulmin, >Intersubjectivity. III 55 HabermasVsKlein, Wolfgang (1): Klein wants to draw up the logic of argumentation as a nomological theory and must therefore assimilate rules to causal regularities and reasons to causes. III 56 HabermasVs: on the other hand, with Toulmin we have to allow a plurality of claims of validity without at the same time denying the critical, space-time and social restrictions transcending sense of validity. >St. Toulmin. III 57 We cannot judge the strength of arguments (...) if we do not understand the meaning of the respective action. (2) III 339 Argumentation/Reason/Justification/Habermas: Arguments or reasons have at least these in common that they, and only they, can unfold the power of rational motivation under the communicative prerequisites of a cooperative examination of hypothetical claims to validity. However, in typical forms of argumentation (depending on the claim to validity of propositional truth, normative correctness, truthfulness and authenticity). >Truthfulness. 1. W. Klein, Argumentation und Argument in. Z. f. Litwiss. u. Ling. H, 38/39, 1980, p. 49f. 2. St. Toulmin, R. Rieke, A. Janik, An Introduction to Reasoning, N.Y. 1979, p.15. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Art | Habermas | III 41 Art/Habermas: reasons have in the context of literary, art and music criticism, the peculiar function of bringing a value or representation to the fore in such a way that it can be perceived as an authentic expression of an exemplary experience, or even as the embodiment of a claim to authenticity. >Authenticity, >Experience, >Individual, >Arts, >Criticism. III 42 Reasons serve in aesthetic criticism to guide perception and to make the authenticity of a work so evident that this experience itself can become a rational motif for the acceptance of appropriate value standards. >Values, >Norms. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Communication Theory | Habermas | Bubner I 196 Habermas/Communication theory/Bubner: Thesis: Thinking of the functioning of the political system according to the model of dialogue. Clear formal conditions which should be transferred to the political system as a whole. 1. Equality of the partners, no relationship between the knowing and the ignorant. >Interaction, >Master/slave dicalectic. 2. This is not to take place, as in Hegel, by laboriously dealing with the relation of master and servant, but rather as a priori, without which there is no interaction at all. 2. Obligation to refrain from influencing, equal scope. 3. Authenticity postulate: obligation to truth. Since intentions are not to be examined, only the course of the dialogue itself can provide the proof. >Discourse, >Argumentation. BubnerVsHabermas: since one builds from the outset on truthfulness, it is obviously more a question of definition, which one wants to allow as a dialogue at all. >Truthfulness, >Truth. Bubner I 198 Communication theory/BubnerVsHabermas: it is claimed that the observance of the formal conditions is guaranteed for the first time in history, 1. in fact, political events are to be transformed structurally according to the paradigm of a philosophical ideal. Idealization because the number of participants must be limited, and this is neither a historical coincidence nor a prejudice of undemocratic eliteism. >Ideal speech community. Bubner I 199 2. the planned entry into the dialogue is characterized by the breaking of previously unquestioned unanimity, yet the controversy must take place in the primary intention of returning to the community. However, efforts to reach consensus are not yet consensus, and consensus is the foundation of collective practice. >Collectives/Habermas, >Practice. In a word: the dialogue is a means, but not the last content of politics. 3. It is not clear what is actually the content of the event. With the tendency to reformulate the flow of practice into a permanent dialogue, the contents that are derived from everyday political life are lost. The content becomes playful as long as they are removed from the practical consequences. BubnerVsCommunication theory: shows that instead of a rationalization proposal for political processes in reality a new determination of the political is intended. The substantial content of the Aristotelianism which was in the community of action-orientated values is seen as historically overtaken or consumed. >Values, >The Good/Aristotle. The signum of modernism, subjectivity, no longer allows the focus on good life, for this reflexive structure of the practice structure does not take into account the particularity of the individual. >Subjectivity, >Individuals. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Correctness | Plato | Gadamer I 350 Correctness/Truth/Formalism/Sophistry/Plato/Gadamer: [Plato has] clearly seen (...) that there is no criterion that is sufficient for argumentation, by which truly philosophical use of speech can be distinguished from sophistic use. In particular, he shows in Letter 7 that the formal refutability of a thesis does not necessarily exclude its truth.(1) Cf. >Reflection/Gadamer, >Reflection/Hegel, >Sophists/Plato. Gadamer I 412 Correctness/Word/Language/Thinking/Plato/Gadamer: If one (...) sees (...) the dispute about the "correctness of names" as it is settled by "Cratylos"(2-4), then the theories under discussion there (>Word/Plato, >Names/Plato, >Language/Plato) suddenly gain an interest that goes beyond Plato and his own intention. For both theories, which the Platonic Socrates brings to failure, are not weighed in their full truth weight. A. Conventionalist theory attributes that of words to a naming, a baptism of things in a name, as it were. ((s) Cf. today's >Causal theory of names.) For this theory, the name apparently does not claim any objective knowledge - and now Socrates convicts the advocate of this sober view by allowing him or her, from the difference between the true and the false Logos, to admit the components of the Logos, the words (onomata), as true or false, and also the naming as a part of speaking to refer to the discovery of being (ousia) happening in speaking(4). Gadamer I 413 This is such an assertion that is so incompatible with the conventionalist thesis that it is easy to infer from there, conversely, that the true name and the correct naming is decisive. Socrates himself admits that the understanding of the name thus obtained leads to an etymological intoxication and to the most absurd consequences (...). B. Similarity Theory: (...) its discussion [adheres] entirely within the preconditions of "natural theory", namely to the principle of similarity, and resolves the same only by gradual restriction. For if the "correctness" of names should really be based on the correct, i.e. appropriate, naming of things, even then, as with every such measurement, there are still degrees and gradations of correctness. Now, if only that little bit of rightness still reflects the outline (typos) of the thing in itself, it may be good enough to be useful.(6) But you have to be even more far-reaching. A word can also be understood, obviously out of habit and agreement, if it contains sounds that are not at all similar to the thing - so that the whole principle of similarity is shaken and refuted by examples such as the words for numbers. There, no similarity can be allowed at all, because numbers do not belong to the visible and moving world, so that for them the principle of agreement obviously applies alone. Solution/Plato: The convention, which is presented in practical language and which alone determines the correctness of the words, may make use of the principle of similarity wherever possible, but it is not bound by it.(7) Recognition/Language/Words/Plato: This is a very moderate point of view, but it includes the fundamental premise that words have no real cognitive meaning - a result that points beyond the whole sphere of words and the question of their correctness to the recognition of the matter. Gadamer: This is obviously what Plato alone is concerned with. Gadamer I 414 The handling of the matter at issue here is the revelation of the thing meant. The word is correct when it brings the thing to the point of representation, that is, when it is a representation (mimesis). Now, it is certainly not an imitative representation in the sense of a direct depiction, so that the phonetic or visible appearance would be depicted, but it is the being (ousia), that which is appreciated by the designation to be (einai), which is to be made manifest by the word. Gadamer: But the question is whether the terms used in the conversation, the terms of mimema or deloma understood as mimema, are correct. It is certainly in the nature of mimema that something other than what it represents itself is also represented in it. Mere imitation, "to be like", therefore always contains the possibility for reflection on the distance of being between imitation and model. Neither true nor false/Cratylos: [Cratylos] is quite right when he says that as far as a word is a word, it must be "right", a correctly "lying" (here: to lie down) one. If it is not, that is, if it has no meaning, then it is a mere sounding ore(8). There is really no point in speaking of "wrong" in such a case. ((s) Cf. >Truth value gap). 1. This is the meaning of the difficult exposition of 343 c d, for which the deniers of the authenticity of the 7th letter must accept a second, nameless Plato. (Cf. my detailed presentation "Dialectic and Sophism" in the VII Platonic Letter (vol. 6 of the Ges. Werke, pp. 90-115).21. Krat. 384 d. 3. Krat. 388 c. 4. Krat. 438 d-439 b. 5. Krat. 385 b, 387 c. 6. Krat. 432 a ff. 7. Krat. 434 e. 8. Krat. 429 loc, 430 a. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Criteria | Russell | Horwich I 3 Criterion/definition/truth/truth criterion/Russell: a defined object and criteria for its presence are always different - e.g. when we say that a company has made the article, we do not mean that it has the right stamp. (1) - Russell: (early) I do not believe that truth has such a stamp of authenticity (no outer description). Cf. >Truth criterion, >Definition, >Object/Russell. 1. B. Russell, "On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood", in: Philosophical Essays, New York 1996, pp. 170-185 - reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Cultural Relativism | Weber | Habermas III 258 Cultural Relativism/Weber/WeberVsRelativism/Habermas: When Max Weber speaks of "last points of view" under which life can be rationalized, he does not always mean the cultural values, the contents that develop within a sphere of life in historical configurations, but sometimes also those abstract ideas that are decisive for the autonomy of a value sphere as such: such ideas are truth and success for the cognitive value sphere; justice and generally normative correctness for the moral-practical value sphere, beauty, authenticity, truthfulness for the expressive value sphere. >Value spheres, >Truth, >Success, >Justice, >Rightness, >Norms, >Beauty, >Authenticity, >Truthfulness, >Interest, >Rationalization. Habermas: these ideas (or aspects of validity) must not be confused with the special contents of individual value spheres. >Ideas, >Content. According to Weber, cultural value spheres are important for the development of modern societies because they control the differentiation of social subsystems or spheres of life.(1) Habermas III 259 Habermas: We must not put the aspects of validity on a par with any value content, with historically changing particular value patterns. >Values, >Culture, >Cultural tradition, >Tradition, >History, >Relativism, cf. >Progress. 1.M.Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, Bd. I Tübingen, 1963, S. 259. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Culture | Habermas | III 41 Culture/Habermas: we call a person rational who interprets his or her nature of need in the light of culturally well-coordinated value standards, but especially when he or she is able to adopt a reflexive attitude towards the standards of value that interpret needs. >Rationality/Habermas. Cultural values do not occur like norms of action with a claim to generality. Values candidate at most for interpretations among which a circle of interested parties can describe and standardize a common interest. >Cultural values, >Culture shift, >Interpretation, >Values, >Norms. Therefore, arguments used to justify value standards do not fulfil the conditions of discourses. In the prototypical case they have the form of aesthetic criticism. In the context of literary, art and music criticism, reasons have the peculiar function of presenting a value or representation in such a way that it can be perceived as an authentic expression of an exemplary experience, or even as the embodiment of a claim to authenticity. >Aesthetics, >Art, >Literature, >Experience, >Authenticity. IV 209 Def Culture/Habermas: I call culture the inventory of knowledge from which the communication participants provide themselves with interpretations by communicating about something in a world. Def Society/Habermas: I call society the legitimate orders through which communication participants regulate their affiliation to social groups and thus ensure solidarity. Def Personality/Habermas: By personality I understand the competences that make a subject capable of speaking and acting, i.e. repairing, participating in processes of communication and thereby asserting one's own identity. Semantics/Habermas: the semantic field of symbolic contents form dimensions in which the communicative actions extend. Medium/Habermas: the interactions interwoven into the network of everyday communicative practice form the medium through which culture, society and person reproduce themselves. These reproductive processes extend to the symbolic structures of the lifeworld. We must differentiate between the preservation of the material substrate of the lifeworld. >Life world, >Substrate, >Media, >Society. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Deliberative Democracy | Dryzek | Gaus I 144 Deliberative democracy/Dryzek: Though democracy comes in many varieties, the dominant current in democratic theory is now a deliberative one. Indeed, it is accurate to say that around 1990 the theory of democracy took a deliberative turn. Thus different accounts of democracy can be appraised in terms of the content, strength, and significance of their relation to the deliberative turn - whether in support, opposition, capture, or qualification. With the deliberative turn, the core of democratic legitimacy became instead the right or ability of those subject to a public decision to participate in genuine deliberation (see Manin, 1987(1); Cohen, 1989(2); the term 'deliberative democracy' was first used by Bessette, 1980(3)). Gaus I 145 The deliberative turn in democratic theory occurred in the early 1990s. However, it does have antecedents, reaching back to Aristotle and the Athenian polis, and encompassing conservatives such as Edmund Burke (for whom deliberation connoted mature reflection as opposed to hasty action), as well as liberals such as John Stuart Mill and John Dewey (for a good history, see the introduction to Bohman and Rehg, 1997(4)). There are also continuities in emphasis with participatory democrats such as Carole Pateman (1970)(5) who were dissatisfied with the lack of opportunity for deep democratic experience in contemporary liberal democracies. >Participation/Pateman, >Democratic theory/Pateman. Benjamin Barber's (1984)(6) 'strong democracy' can be seen in retrospect as a bridge between participatory and deliberative democracy, given his emphasis on 'strong democratic talk'. >Participation/Barber, >Democratic theory/Barber. Authenticity: deliberation). The reflective aspect means that preferences, judgements and views that are taken as fixed in aggregative models are treated as amenable to change in deliberation. Authenticity is therefore a central concern: democratic control should ideally be substantive not symbolic, involving uncoerced communication among competent participants (...). The importance of the deliberative turn was confirmed in the 1990s by the announcements of the most important liberal theorist John Rawls, and critical theorist Jürgen Habermas, that they were deliberative democrats (Rawls, 1993(7); 1997(8): 771-2; Habermas, 1996(9)). Given the sheer number of democratic theorists who now sail under the deliberative flag, as well as the historically different schools of thought from which they come (conservatism, liberalism, and critical theory), there really ought to be substantial variety among deliberative democrats. But what is now striking is less the variety than the uniformity. The assimilation happened in three ways (see Dryzek, 2000(10): 10—17). First, a commitment to deliberative principles can be used to justify some (but not all) of the rights long cherished by liberals. Other theorists emphasize deliberation in courts rather than legislatures (for example, Rawls, 1993(7): 231). Gaus I 146 Liberalism/democracy: [e.g, in later Habermas] there is no recognition of any need to democratize the economy, the administrative state, or the legal system, all of which receive easy legitimacy. >Deliberative democracy/Habermas. Dryzek: However invigorating this assimilation of deliberative democracy might be for liberalism, it may be bad news for democracy. Some deliberative liberals are not especially democratic. Notably, Rawls in the end wants to entrust deliberation to experts in public reason such as Supreme Court justices, who only need to deliberate in the personal as opposed to the interactive sense of the word (see Goodin, 2000(11), for an explicit defence of personal as opposed to interactive deliberation). >Deliberative democracy/Rawls. VsDeliberative democracy: see >Democracy/Schumpeter. 1. Manin, Bernard (1987) 'On legitimacy and political deliberation'. Political Theory, 15: 338—68. 2. Cohen, Joshua (1989) 'Deliberation and democratic legitimacy'. In Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit, eds, The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State. Oxford: Blackwell. 3. Bessette, Joseph M. (1980) 'Deliberative democracy: the majoritarian principle in republican government'. In Robert A. Goldwin and William A. Shambra, eds, How Democratic is the Constitution? Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute. 4. Bohman, James and William Rehg (1997) Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 5. Pateman, Carole (1970) Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6. Barber, Benjamin (1984) Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 7. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 8. Rawls, John (1997) 'The idea of public reason revisited'. University ofChicago Law Review, 94: 765-807. 9. Habermas, Jürgen (1996) Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 10. Dryzek, John S. (2000) Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 11. Goodin, Robert E. (2000) 'Democratic deliberation within'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 29: 81—109. Dryzek, John S. 2004. „Democratic Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Democracy | Schumpeter | Brocker I 260 Democracy/Schumpeter: For Schumpeter, the defining feature of democracy consists in placing a "competition for political leadership" (1) at the centre of attention. The core idea is: similar to the way companies compete for the favour of consumers, Brocker I 261 politicians and parties are in competition for the favour of voters (2) - with the important difference that people are usually well informed in economic matters, but usually rationally ignorant in political matters (3). What both systems have in common is the striving for one's own individual advantage. Thesis: Modern democracy is a product of the capitalist process (4); however, two important prerequisites for the functioning of democracy in contemporary capitalism are no longer fulfilled: a) the ideal of the economical state (5) b) the basic social consensus.(6) Because of the expectation of large parts of the electorate to live at the expense of the state.(7) >Free riders, >State, >Economy, >Society. 1. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York 1942. Dt.: Joseph A. Schumpeter, Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie, Tübingen/Basel 2005 (zuerst: Bern 1946), p. 427. 2. Ibid p. 427-433 3. Ibid p. 407 – 420. 4. Ibid p. 471. 5. Ibid p.. 471f. 6. Ibid p. 473. 7. Ibid p. 472. Ingo Pies, „Joseph A. Schumpeter, Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie (1942)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. Gaus I 148 Democracy/Schumpeter/Dryzek: The model of democracy most popular among comparative politics scholars, especially those in the burgeoning field of democratic transition and consolidation, expects far less from democracy than do the deliberative democrats. >Deliberative democracy This model is essentially that proposed long ago by Schumpeter (1942)(1): democracy is no more than competition among elites for popular approval that confers the right to rule. In the 1950s this idea became the foundation for 'empirical' theories of democracy happy with the generally apathetic role of the ignorant and potentially authoritarian masses (Berelson, 1952(2); Sartori, 1962(3)). Competition models of democracy: Such competitive elitist models have Gaus I 149 long been discredited among democratic theorists - not least those such as Dahl (1989)(4) who had earlier believed in them as both accurate descriptions of United States politics and desirable states of affairs. Yet they live on among transitologists and consolidologists, who see the hallmark of a consolidated democracy as a set of well-behaved parties representing material interests engaged in electoral competition regulated by constitutional rules (see, for example, Di Palma, 1990(5); Huntington, 1991(6); Mueller, 1996(7); Schedler, 1998(8)). The deliberative democrat's concern with authenticity is nowhere to be seen. Active citizens play no role in such models. 1. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1942) Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper. 2. Berelson, Bernard (1952) 'Democratic theory and public opinion'. Public Opinion Quarterly, 16: 313—30. 3. Sartori, Giovanni (1962) Democratic Theory. Detroit: Wayne State Umversity Press. 4. Dahl, Robert A. (1989) Democracy and its Critics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 5. Di Palma, Giuseppe (1990) To Craft Democracies. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 6. Huntington, Samuel (1991) The Third Wave. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. 7. Mueller, John (1996) 'Democracy, capitalism and the end of transition'. In Michael Mandelbaum, ed. Postcommunism: Four Perspectives. New York: Council on Foreign Relations. 8. Schedler, A. (1998) 'What is democratic consolidation?' Journal of Democracy, 9: 91-107. Dryzek, John S. 2004. „Democratic Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
EconSchum I Joseph A. Schumpeter The Theory of Economic Development An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Cambridge/MA 1934 German Edition: Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Leipzig 1912 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Emotions | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 355 "The emotional language games are based on games of expressions of which we cannot say they are lying." >Language games. Hintikka: the simple fact that there are language games with correctable moves makes the distinction primary/secondary necessary. I 356 A child could learn a secondary language game by misleading adults about your feelings. This is in contrast to the introduction (the teaching) of a primary language game with pain expressions. I 359 When one says: "Evidence can only make the authenticity of the emotional expression probable", this does not mean: instead of certainty, only probability, but only the type of reasoning is different; it is related to the character of the language game. >Evidence, >Certainty. I 370 Propositional Attitudes/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the view criticized by Wittgenstein states that each propositional attitude is characterized by a special feeling or other special private experience. And that it is precisely these experiences that we mean by our statements about belief etc...>Propositional attitudes. I 372 At other points Wittgenstein speaks completely realistically of feelings, states of consciousness etc. only here, with the propositional attitudes it is about something completely different. III 148 Human/Description/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Flor: as far as it can be described, it is a series of facts. However, it cannot be said that there is an inner connection between a person's thoughts, feelings and desires, not even between a person's actions and what we normally call the consequences. In describing a person, there will be no description of a thinking or wanting subject, soul or ego. It would only be descriptions of thoughts, feelings and humans. VI 97 Emotions/Wittgenstein/Schulte: are, for their part, facts. They can be described quite objectively and are in no way suitable to give value to what they refer to. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Facts | Morozov | I 118 Facts/truth/fact checking/politics/fake news/Morozov: The Truth Goggles project, developed by an MIT graduate and widely acclaimed in the media, is a step towards automating at least some of the steps involved in verifying the facts. (1) I 119 If the ((s) examined) article contains one of the more than 6,000 (and growing) entries in the PolitiFact database, these facts are highlighted in yellow while the rest of the text is blurred. When you click on the marked claim, a pop-up window is displayed showing what PolitiFact thinks of this particular claim, i. e. whether it is true, half true, mostly true, mostly false, false, etc., and also provides some contextual information. MorozovVsPolitifact/MorozovVsTruth-Goggles: This brings us back to the double-click mentality:"Truth" sneaks magically into our browsers, while the noble efforts of the truth seekers at PolitiFact and the innovators at MIT usually remain invisible and mostly unexplained. But who will observe the truth seekers and innovators? Glenn GreenwaldVsPolitifact/Morozov: PolitiFact called it "mostly false that the American citizens are vulnerable to ... I 120 ...assassination" by their own government, after the operative definition of the Ministry of Defence of al-Qaida and the Taliban had been reformulated in a very vague way. As Greenwald noted (...); many prominent lawyers and the American Civil Liberties Union shared such views. And yet, PolitiFact chose two supposedly neutral "experts" who, if you can believe Greenwald, are anything but neutral and are simply neoconservatives in disguise.(2) >Social Media, >Social Networks, >Internet, >Internet culture, >False information. Morozov: Thus, the semi-automatic factual verification offers some solutions - it can reveal factual errors - but these solutions could be at the expense of maintaining ideological frameworks that should be challenged and perhaps even overturned. >Politics. I 122 Facts/hypocrisy/Politics/Ruth Grant/Morozov: Grant's Thesis: The blanket condemnation of hypocrisy must be seen as a political deputy, especially if what counts for an honest policy is not a principled policy, but the sincere self-interest of those realists who are in reality only cynics. (3) I 122 Hypocrisy/Politics/David Runciman/Morozov: Runciman's thesis: Some types of political hypocrisy are even desirable and encouraging. (...) It is not the case that there is more hypocrisy today; it is just that, with a political presence of 24 hours in the media, it is much easier to find. (4) Mendacity/Politics/Martin Jay/Morozov: Martin Jay's thesis: To tell the truth can be a weapon of the powerful while lying is a tactic of the weak. (5) A politics without lies and hypocrisy would not be politics. >Power. Morozov: According to Jay, "Politics, however we choose to define its essence and limit its contours, will never be a completely fibre-free zone of authenticity, sincerity, integrity, transparency and righteousness. And maybe that's a good thing after all." (6) I 123 Ambiguity/Politics/Debora Stone/Morozov: Stone's thesis: Ambivalence has many positive uses in democratic politics; it is more an art than a science. Ambiguity enables the transformation of individual intentions and actions into collective results and purposes. Without them, cooperation and compromise would be far more difficult, if not impossible. (7) For example, defining a policy in vague terms could help politicians to get support from many different sides. "Ambiguity facilitates negotiations and compromises because it allows opponents to claim victory from a single resolution ((s) respectively for themselves).(8) >Ambiguity. 1. see Andrew Phelps, “Are You Sure That’s True? Truth Goggles Tackles Fishy Claims at the Moment of Consumption,” Nieman Journalism Lab, July 12, 2012, http:// www.niemanlab.org/ 2012/ 07/ are-you-sure-thats-true-truth-goggles-tackles-fishy-claims-at-the-moment-of-consumption. 2. Glenn Greenwald, “PolitiFact and the Scam of Neutral Expertise,” Salon, December 5, 2011, http:// www.salon.com/ 2011/ 12/ 05/ politifact_and_the_scam_of_neutral_expertise. 3. Ruth W. Grant, Hypocrisy and Integrity: Machiavelli, Rousseau, and the Ethics of Politics (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1999), 180. 4. David Runciman, Political Hypocrisy: The Mask of Power, from Hobbes to Orwell and Beyond (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010. 5. Martin Jay, The Virtues of Mendacity: On Lying in Politics, reprint ed. (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2012), 180. 6. ibid. ibid., 159. 7. Deborah Stone, Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making, Revised Edition, 3rd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001). 8. ibid. 159 |
Morozov I Evgeny Morozov To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism New York 2014 |
| Minimalist Liberalism | Dryzek | Gaus I 148 Minimalist Liberalism/liberal minimalism/democracy/Dryzek: The model of democracy most popular among comparative politics scholars, especially those in the burgeoning field of democratic transition and consolidation, expects far less from democracy than do the deliberative democrats. This model is essentially that proposed long ago by Schumpeter (1942)(1): democracy is no more than competition among elites for popular approval that confers the right to rule. In the 1950s this idea became the foundation for 'empirical' theories of democracy happy with the generally apathetic role of the ignorant and potentially authoritarian masses (Berelson, 1952(2); Sartori, 1962(3)). Competition models of democracy: Such competitive elitist models have Gaus I 149 long been discredited among democratic theorists - not least those such as Dahl (1989)(4) who had earlier believed in them as both accurate descriptions of United States politics and desirable states of affairs. Yet they live on among transitologists and consolidologists, who see the hallmark of a consolidated democracy as a set of well-behaved parties representing material interests engaged in electoral competition regulated by constitutional rules (see, for example, Di Palma, 1990(5); Huntington, 1991(6); Mueller, 1996(7); Schedler, 1998(8)). The deliberative democrat's concern with authenticity is nowhere to be seen. Active citizens play no role in such models. Popularity/procedure: acceptance of the minimalist model makes life much easier. It can be applied, for example, in Huntington's (1991(6): 267) famous two-election test for consolidated democracy, which requires a freely elected government to cede power in a subsequent electoral defeat. Or it can underwrite a temporal scale for assessing the degree to which democracy is consolidated; Lijphart (1984(9): 38) suggests 30 to 35 years. Perhaps a more important reason for the popularity of liberal minimalism is its consistency with developments that see capitalist marketization and democratization marching together. Lindblom: as Lindblom (1982)(10) among others notes, the capitalist market context automatically punishes governments that pursue policies that undermine the confidence of actual or potential investors by causing disinvestment and capital flight. Thus when it comes to public policy, democracy can only operate in what Lindblom calls an 'unimprisoned' zone. Dryzek: the corollary is that too much state democracy means dangerous indeterminacy in public policy (Dryzek, 1996)(11). Fukuyama: this combination of capitalism and liberal minimalist democracy received perhaps its most positive gloss (and a dash of Hegel) in the triumphalism of Francis Fukuyama's (1989(12); 1992(13)) 'end of history'. Fukuyama's thesis lost plausibility in the ensuing decade, but only in terms of the persistence (or renewal) of challenges such as religious fundamentalisms, ethnic nationalism, and Confucian capitalism. But the basic idea that democracy is globally dominant and that the liberal capitalist model of democracy has few if any plausible challengers that merit the title 'democracy' is still the dominant view among transitologists. Dryzek: The more critical stances that democratic theorists are inclined to take would highlight the limitations on democracy that this global dominance of minimalist liberal democracy plus capitalism entails. But any such critical response is easily countered if it remains devoid of ideas about how such dominance might realistically be challenged (without retreating to ungrounded idealism). Part of the response might involve the strengthening and democratization of international institutions in response to the migration of political power from the state to the transnational political economy. >Democracy/Held, >Minimalist liberalism/Przeworski, >Minimalist liberalism/Riker. Gaus I 151 DryzekVsMinimalism/liberalism/democratic practice/democracy: (...) minimalism fails to do justice to the variety of conceptions that political elites and ordinary people in [post-communist] societies bring to bear when it comes to their expectations of and hopes for democracy (for evidence for 13 post-communist countries, see Dryzek and Holmes, 2002)(14). 1. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1942) Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper. 2. Berelson, Bernard (1952) 'Democratic theory and public opinion'. Public Opinion Quarterly, 16: 313—30. 3. Sartori, Giovanni (1962) Democratic Theory. Detroit: Wayne State Umversity Press. 4. Dahl, Robert A. (1989) Democracy and its Critics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 5. Di Palma, Giuseppe (1990) To Craft Democracies. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 6. Huntington, Samuel (1991) The Third Wave. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. 7. Mueller, John (1996) 'Democracy, capitalism and the end of transition'. In Michael Mandelbaum, ed. Postcommunism: Four Perspectives. New York: Council on Foreign Relations. 8. Schedler, A. (1998) 'What is democratic consolidation?' Journal ofDemocracy, 9: 91-107. 9. Lijphart, Arend (1984) Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty- One Countries. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 10. Lindblom, Charles E. (1982) 'The market as prison' Journal of Politics, 44: 324-36. 11. Dryzek, John S. (1996) Democracy in Capitalist Times: Ideals, Limits, and Struggles. New York: Oxford University Press. 12. Fukuyama, Francis (1989) 'The end of history?' National Interest, Summer: 3—18. 13. Fukuyama, Francis (1992) The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press. 14. Dryzek, John S. and Leslie Holmes (2002) Postcommunist Democratization: Political Discourses across Thirteen Countries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dryzek, John S. 2004. „Democratic Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Populism | Holmes | Krastev I 22 Populism/Post-communist era/Krastev/Holmes: But focusing on the corrupt practices and strategies for evading responsibility adopted by the illiberal governments in the region will not help us understand the sources of popular support for national populist parties. The origins of populism (...) partly lie in the humiliations associated with the uphill struggle to become, at best, an inferior copy of a superior model. Discontent with the ‘transition to democracy’ was also inflamed by visiting foreign ‘evaluators’ with an anaemic grasp of local realities. Authenticity: These experiences have combined to produce a nativist reaction in the region, a reassertion of ‘authentic’ national traditions allegedly suffocated by second-hand and ill-fitting Western forms. The post-national liberalism associated especially with EU enlargement has allowed aspiring populists to claim exclusive ownership of national traditions and national identity. Striving for alternatives: (...) a subsidiary factor was also involved, namely, the unargued assumption that, after 1989, there were no alternatives to liberal political and economic models. This presumption spawned a contrarian desire to prove that there were, indeed, such alternatives. |
LawHolm I Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. The Common Law Mineola, NY 1991 Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Populism | Krastev | Krastev I 22 Populism/Post-communist era/Krastev: But focusing on the corrupt practices and strategies for evading responsibility adopted by the illiberal governments in the region will not help us understand the sources of popular support for national populist parties. The origins of populism (...) partly lie in the humiliations associated with the uphill struggle to become, at best, an inferior copy of a superior model. Discontent with the ‘transition to democracy’ was also inflamed by visiting foreign ‘evaluators’ with an anaemic grasp of local realities. Authenticity: These experiences have combined to produce a nativist reaction in the region, a reassertion of ‘authentic’ national traditions allegedly suffocated by second-hand and ill-fitting Western forms. The post-national liberalism associated especially with EU enlargement has allowed aspiring populists to claim exclusive ownership of national traditions and national identity. Striving for alternatives: (...) a subsidiary factor was also involved, namely, the unargued assumption that, after 1989, there were no alternatives to liberal political and economic models. This presumption spawned a contrarian desire to prove that there were, indeed, such alternatives. |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Protagoras | Plato | Gaus I 307 Protagoras/Plato/Keyt/Miller: the Platonic dialogue bearing Protagoras' name contains a long passage (Prot. 320c-328d), customarily referred to as Protagoras' 'Great Speech' , filled with ideas relating to political philosophy. The authenticity of the Great Speech is difficult to gauge since the work or works of Protagoras on which it might be based are lost. (For a recent defence of its authenticity see Nill, 1985: 5-22.) Techne: the Great Speech is an answer to two Socratic arguments that the political art (hé politiké techné), which Protagoras claims to teach, cannot in fact be taught. Myth: The answer is given first in myth (mythos) (Prot. 320c—324d) - not to be taken literally, given Protagoras' well-known agnosticism about the gods (DK 4 and Tht. 162e) - and then in argument (logos) (Prot. 324d—328d). The mythological answer is that the gifts of Zeus, justice and shame (aidös) and the rest of political virtue (politiké areté), unlike the technical skills such as metallurgy, spinning, and weaving distributed by Prometheus, are given to everyone. Demythologized, the gifts of the gods are the gifts of teachers, and the point of the myth is that political virtue is taught to everybody by everybody. Politics: the Great Speech touches upon most of the antitheses that structure Greek political philosophy. Education: persuasion and force are the means by which justice and shame are taught (Prot. 325d5). Plato's Protagoras, supposedly an advocate of the art of persuasion, is a surprisingly strong believer in the efficacy of the use of force. The child who resists his teachers' admonitions about the unjust, impious, and base, 'is straightened by threats and blows, like a piece of bent or warped wood' (Prot. 325d; see also 322d, 325ab, 327d). Cf. >Coercion/Plato. Nomos/physis/virtues: although nomos and physis are not explicitly distinguished until later in the dialogue (Prot. 337d), one of the themes of the Great Speech is that justice and shame come not by nature but by teaching (Prot. 323c-d). Since these virtues make possible 'the bonds of friendship' the Protagorean version of (Prot. 322c3) - homonoia - these bonds and the poleis they hold together do not exist by nature either. Cf. >Protagoras the philosopher. 1. Nill, Michael (1985) Morality and Self-Interest in Protagoras, Antiphon, and Democritus. Leiden: Brill. Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Religious Belief | Horkheimer | Habermas III 465 Religion/Religious Belief/Horkheimer/Habermas: As soon as the knowledge of God, in which the aspects of the true, good, perfect are still indivisible, confronts those knowledge systems which are specialized according to propositional truth, normative correctness and authenticity or beauty, the mode of adherence to religious beliefs loses the casualness which is given to a conviction solely by good reasons. >God, >Truth, >The Good, >Completeness, >Perfection, >Correctness, >Propositions, >Authenticity, >Justification, >Ultimate Justification. Religious Belief/Adorno/Horkheimer: is then characterized by moments of blindness, mere opinion and overwhelming - belief and knowledge diverge.(1) >Knowledge, >Beliefs. 1. M. Horkheimer, Th. W. Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklärung, Amsterdam 1947, S. 31f. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Terminology | Adorno | Grenz I 14 Adorno/Terminology/Grenz: Physiognomical: expressing Negating: determined. >Negation/Adorno. Grenz I 31 Sociology/Freud/Grenz: applied psychology AdornoVsFreud: "Society is not directly one of human beings, but the relations between the humans have become independent and are overpowering to all individuals.(1) Grenz I 39 Reification/Terminology/Lukàcs/Grenz: Lukàcs familiarizes a broad public with Marx's concept of abstraction in the exchange value under the name of the reification. >Reification, >G. Lukács. Grenz I 65 Innervate/Terminology/Adorno/Grenz: innervate means to react subjectively but physically mediated on history, to perceiev the historical state of rationality and subjectivity. I 65 Constellation/Terminology/Adorno/Grenz: the historical, which is innervated, is called social or aesthetic constellation in Adorno. Grenz I 69 Tradition/Adorno/Grenz: Tradition is what, as a seemingly natural implication of the possible, projects into the present: the "present oblivion"(2). >History/Adorno. I Grenz 129 Positivity/Terminology/Adorno: positivity is conceived as a contradiction of claim and being. Grenz I 195 Aura/Terminology/AdornoVsBenjamin/Grenz: Benjamin's criterion for aura is modified by Adorno. Not the immediate certainty of the authenticity of a single given but its content should make up the aura of a work. This is an extension of the concept. It is necessary because the concept of the subject which produces the real is inscribed in the concept of authenticity. >W. Benjamin. 1. Th.W. Adorno. Gesammelte Schriften Bd. 8 p. 89. 2. Th.W. Adorno. Philosophie der Neuen Musik p. 117f. --- XII 118 World view/Adorno: ideas of the essence and of the connection of things, which measure themselves with the subjective need for unity, after explanation. In other words, the opinion raised to the system. XII 119 While Kant never speaks of "my philosophy", this is done by Fichte, Schopenhauer, and, of course, Nietzsche. >I. Kant, >A. Schopenhauer, >J.G. Fichte. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 A X Friedemann Grenz Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen. Auflösung einiger Deutungsprobleme Frankfurt/M. 1984 |
| Terminology | Weber | Habermas III 286 Ethics/Worldviews/Weber/Habermas: a world attitude (Weber distinguishes it from worldviews) expresses rationalisation to the extent that it is directed towards nature and society as a whole and thus presupposes a systematic concept of the world. A worldview can be considered rationalized to the extent that it highlights the "world" as a sphere of moral probation under practical principles and separates it from all other aspects. It presents the world a) As a field of practical activity at all b) As a stage on which the actor can fail ethical, c) As a totality of situations to be judged according to "last" moral principles and to be dealt with according to moral judgements and therefore d) As an area of objects and occasions of moral action. Habermas III 228 Def Rationalization/Max Weber/Habermas: Weber calls rationalization any expansion of empirical knowledge, of forecasting ability and of instrumental and organizational control of empirical processes. Habermas III 351 Def Positivity/Habermas: positively set law is not generated by interpretation of recognized and sacred traditions, it rather expresses the will of a sovereign Habermas III 352 Def Legalism/Habermas: legal entities are not subject to any moral motives other than general legal obedience. It protects their private inclinations within sanctioned boundaries. Not only bad convictions, but also actions that deviate from the norm are sanctioned, assuming accountability. Def Formality/Law/Habermas: Modern law defines areas of legitimate arbitrariness of private individuals. The arbitrary freedom of legal entities in a morally neutralized area of private actions with legal consequences is assumed. Habermas III 318 Def Ethics of Conviction/Weber/Habermas: According to Weber, ethics of conviction is characterized by the following attitude: "The Christian does right and places success in God's hands."(1) Habermas: Weber thus enters into a philosophical discussion that was able to work out the stubbornness of moral-practical questions, the logic of the justification of norms of action, after morality and law had separated themselves from the terminology of religious (and metaphysical) world views. Habermas III 322 Value spheres/Weber/Habermas: The different (cultural) value spheres are: cognitive, normative and aesthetic ideas. Ideal goods exist within the scientific community, the religious community and the art business. Habermas III 258 Def Ideas/Cultural Relativism/Weber/WeberVsRelativism/Habermas: When Max Weber speaks of "last points of view" under which life can be rationalized, he does not always mean the cultural values, the contents that develop within a sphere of life in historical configurations, but sometimes also those abstract ideas that are decisive for the autonomy of a value sphere as such: such ideas are truth and success for the cognitive value sphere; justice and generally normative correctness for the moral-practical value sphere, beauty, authenticity, truthfulness for the expressive value sphere. Habermas: these ideas (or aspects of validity) must not be confused with the special contents of individual value spheres. Habermas III 258 value spheres/Weber: - cognitive value sphere: decisive: truth and success - moral-practical value sphere: decisive: justice and normative correctness in general - expressive value sphere: decisive: beauty, authenticity, truthfulness. Habermas III 231 Def rtionalization/law/Weber/Habermas: Weber calls rationalization the cognitive independence of law and moral, i.e. the replacement of moral-practical insights of ethical and legal doctrines, principles, maxims and decision rules of world views in which they were initially embedded. Cosmological, religious and metaphysical worldviews are structured in such a way that the internal difference between theoretical and practical reason cannot yet come into effect. Gaus I 195 State/Weber/Morris: [a „definition“ of the state most often is] an abbreviated version of Max Weber's well-known characterization of the state as 'a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory' (1919(2): 78). Weber says that 'the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it. The state is considered the sole source of the "right" to use violence. Habermas III 244 Def Value rationality/Max Weber/Habermas: Weber: "He who acts purely value rationally, regardless of the consequences to be foreseen, in the service of his conviction of what seems to command duty, dignity, beauty, religious instruction, reverence, or the importance of a 'thing' of whatever kind. ... value rational acting is acting according to 'bids' or according to 'demands', which the actor has posed for him- or herself."(3) Habermas III 152 Procedural Rationality/Max Weber/Habermas: Weber subjectively refers to a purpose-oriented action, "which is exclusively oriented towards (subjectively) as appropriately presented means for (subjectively) unambiguously conceived purposes."(4) Habermas III 245 Weber calls actions that satisfy the conditions of the rationality of means and choice 'procedural rational' and actions that satisfy the conditions of normative rationality are called 'value-rational'. Both aspects can vary independently of each other. Progress in the dimension of procedural rationality can be made at the expense of value-rational actions.(5) 1. M. Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, Bd. I Tübingen, 1963, S.552. 2. M. Weber (1946 [1919]) 'Politics as a vocation'. In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociologv, eds and trans. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University 3. M.Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, hrsg. v. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964. 4. M Weber, Methodologische Schriften, Frankfurt/M. 1968, p. 170. 5. M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, hrsg. v. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964, S. 22. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Utterances | Habermas | III 171 Utterances/Interpretation/action/observation/sociology/Habermas: If we ignore an actor's expressions as claims of validity, we neutralize the claims to truth and success by treating opinions and intentions as expressive utterances; and this could only be objectively judged in terms of truthfulness and authenticity. >Interpretation, >Action, >Observation, >Sociology, >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas, >Validity claims. III 172 If, on the other hand, we take the statements of the actor just as seriously as he means them rationally, we subject his (supposed) chances of success to criticism based on our knowledge. >Statements, >Assertions, >Judgments, cf. >Scorekeeping. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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| Goodman, N. | Verschiedene Vs Goodman, N. | Introduction Putnam II IV Some PhilosophersVsGooodman: they do not appreciate his dependence on the actual history of past inductive projections in culture. They say: a valid inductive derivation must not contain disjunctive predicates. PutnamVs: this does not work: being disjunctive, from the standpoint of logic, is a relational attribute of predicates. Whether a predicate is disjunctive depends on the truth of a language. Sainsbury V 129 Grue/SainsburyVsGoodman: To complain about a lack of anchoring would be too strong a blockade on future scientific innovation! Intuitively, the strongest lack of the predicate "grue" is that it is only true by virtue of the fact that the objects are already examined. Anne-Kathrin Reulecke (Hg) Fälschungen Frankfurt 2006 I 358 Perfect Forgery/Goodman: (Spr. d. KU, 105).): Thesis: that later I might be able to see a difference that I do not perceive yet, now states a significant aesthetic difference for me. It cannot be concluded that the original is better than the copy, but it is aesthetically valued higher. ((s) The original also contains the inventive achievement. But the copy could be more successful from a design point of view.) I 359 Römer: The investigation of forgeries should therefore not begin with the question of the relationship to the original, but with the representation that we produce according to Goodman (i.e. we do not copy a construct or an interpretation). Def genuine scientific fiction/Vaihinger: 1. contradiction to reality up to self-contradiction 2. provisional nature 3. without claim to factuality 4. expediency. RömerVsGoodman: his "scientific fiction" of a perfect forgery does not eliminate the hierarchy original/forgery. Nor does he draw any consequence from the aesthetic difference on the representation system. When a perfect forgery appears in the context of originals, its authenticity is rather confirmed. I 360 Then the forgery is a product of the representation system just like the original, only that it violates the prevailing morality. Forgery/Klaus Döhmer: (late 70s): Thesis: Forgery makes use of legitimate artistic methods while changing its objective, thus it is not an objective-material, but a subjective-intentional category. (Zur Soz. d. Knst- Fälschung, Zeitschr. f. Ästh. .u. allg. Kunst-Wiss 21/1 (1978),S 76-95). Römer: this is tantamount to a paradigm shift: forgery as a methodical problem. Anne-Kathrin Reulecke (Hg) Fälschungen Frankfurt 2006 I 406ff Def Forgery/Bolz: Forgery: deliberately represent something unreal for real. Question: Who will be harmed? Directly the collector/museum director, indirectly the art historian. Perfect Forgery/BolzVsGoodman: he does not succeed in making it clear that the concept of the original does not include any superiority over the forgery. It is not about real quality but about authenticity shaped by the history of production. 407 Aura/Bolz: in order to explain why this is important for aesthetic enjoyment, Goodman would have to resort to Benjamin's concept of aura. (Bolz pro Aura). Aura/Bolz: does not lead to the opposition original/forgery, but to uniqueness/technical reproducibility. Putnam I 256 Israel ShefflerVsGoodman: asks: "Does Goodman's philosophy result in us creating the stars?" Goodman/Putnam: G. answers: not like the brick is burning, but in a way they are already created by us. We did not create the big bear, but we made a constellation out of it. |
Sai I R.M. Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 German Edition: Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Truth Criterion | Russell Vs Truth Criterion | Horwich I 3 Truth criterion/criteria/truth/Russell: when we ask what constitutes the truth or falsity of a belief (constitutes), I do not ask for a criterion. Criterion: is a quality (property), which is itself different from the truth that belongs to all, whatever is true, and nothing else, but at the same time is not identical with truth. It is a hallmark (trademark, characteristic), a relatively obvious characteristic which ensures the authenticity. ((s) Criteria: always there, never absent, never at something else, but unidentical:> Carnap "companion". Many authors:. Unequal definition ((s) E.g. Definition being-an-even-number. Divisibility by 2 (definition against: Criterion: last digit 0,2,4,6 or 8) If it says "all and only... have ...". then it is not yet clear whether the criterion or the essential is mentioned). Truth/Truth criterion/Russell: But when we say that this and this company has made the product, we do not mean that the product has the right stamp. ("To mean", mean): I 4 Therefore, there is a difference between truth and truth criterion, and just this distinction is helpful. RussellVsTruth Criterion: I do not believe that truth has such a hallmark. But that is not what I want, I do not want to know which external characteristics truth has, with which we can recognize them but what truth itself is. Truth/mind/judgment/Russell: what relation has truth to mind? Always on judgments. Thus, truth is mind dependent. ((s) So here truth not as the basic concept). Nevertheless, it does not depend on the manner in which a single individual judges. So truth and falsity of judgments has any objective reason. And it is quite natural to ask whether there are not objective truths and falsehoods as objects of judgments (judgment object). Russell: that is plausible in the case of truth, but not in falsehood. (1) 1. B. Russell, "On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood", in: Philosophical Essays, New York 1996, pp. 170-185 - reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Forgery | Grafton, A. | Anne-Kathrin Reulecke (Hg) Fälschungen Frankfurt 2006 S 39 Forgery / Grafton, Anthony: (Forgers and Critics, 1990, standard work) thesis: interdependence, competition and complicity, connects philology and forgery, counterfeiting and critics. Voluntary cooperation: in the modification of authenticity criteria. Each work edition has a hypothetical element. Authenticity criteria are timeless GaddisVsGrafton. 309 Forgery / Grafton: It is not true that past eras had a different concept of truth than ours. (Many authors VsGrafton). |
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