Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Metaphysics | Wright | I 255 Def quietism/Wright Crispin: Quietism is the view that a significant metaphysical debate is impossible. One version has it that realistic and anti-realistic tendencies pursue the confused desire to get out of their own skin. >Realism, >Anti-realism. This is a wrong "divine point of view", from which the claim the objectivity of a linguistic practice can be examined. (This thesis is attributed to Wittgenstein, but this attribution again is disputed). >Objectivity, >Divine standpoint, >Relativism, >L. Wittgenstein. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Quietism | Wright | I 255 Def quietism/Wright Crispin: Quietism is the view that a significant metaphysical debate is impossible. >Metaphysics. One version has it that realistic and anti-realistic tendencies pursue the confused desire to get out of their own skin. >Realism, >Anti-realism. This is a wrong "divine point of view", from which the claim the objectivity of a linguistic practice can be examined. (This thesis is attributed to Wittgenstein, but this attribution again is disputed). >Objectivity, >Divine standpoint, >Relativism, >L. Wittgenstein. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Realism | Searle | II 87 Realism, naive/SearleVs: naive realism is right that the material objects and experiences are the typical objects of perception. But the realism overlooks the fact that they can only be it because perception has an intentional content. II 199 Realism/Searle: realism has no hypothesis or belief, realism belongs to the background. >Terminology/Searle. I am set to the background. Realism is a prerequisite for hypotheses and being determined to realism itself is not a hypothesis. III 160f External Realism/Searle: external realism must still differ between representation-independent (e.g. stars) and mind-independent (also stars), e.g. pain is representation-independent but not mind-independent. Cf. >Internal realism. III 165 Realism/Searle: thesis: realism says that there is an independent reality, not about how it is designed, no theory of language, no theory of representation, but ontological. III 163f Realism/Searle: realism should not be confused with the correspondence theory, it is no theory of truth but a condition for our hypotheses. It is compatible with any truth theory because it is a theory of ontology and not the meaning of "true". There is no semantic theory. Putnam understands realism epistemically: the realism asserts that it would be reasonable to assume a divine standpoint. SearleVsPutnam: accepting a mistake that reality determines itself what vocabulary is appropriate. III 165 Searle: realism is not a theory of language. VsTradition: N.B.: realism is not a theory about how the world "really" is. Reason: we could be wrong about all the details, and the realism can nevertheless be true. Definition realism/Searle: the view that there is a way of being of the things that is logically independent of all representations, it does not say how things are. III 166 Realism/Searle: arguments against the existence of things are claims about the external reality like any other. They presuppose the realism just as others do. The non-existence of things ((s) "out there") would be a property of that representation-independent reality. III 191 External Realism/Searle: external realism is a condition for understanding other hypotheses. III 193 ff Realism: thesis: realism has no hypothesis, but conditions for any hypotheses. Realism is part of the background. >Background/Searle. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Reference | Evans | I 314ff To mean/reference/divine standpoint/Wittgenstein/Evans: for example, someone is in love with one of two identical twins - God, if he could look into his/her head, could not tell with which of them the person is in love, if the person itself does not know in a moment. ((s) Because no additional information could be found in the mental state and in the twin.)- Evans: the (description-) theory of the mind cannot explain why erroneous descriptions cannot give the impetus. I 325 Reference/Evans: Reference is also possible if the description is not fulfilled, but not designation. I 328 Reference/Names/Evans: in general, we refer to the thing that is the source of the prevailing information. I 333ff Reference/Evans: reference is defined by information sets, not by fitting. --- Frank I 22 Evans: between Frege and Perry: saves Fregean sense, but meaning = reference! I 24ff Meaning unequal Reference/Evans: e.g. "today": the meaning remains, the speaker changes. > "Fido"-Fido-Theory/Evans: equals the meaning and the reference: > I/Evans. Frank I 503 EvansVsGeach/EvansVsStrawson: one aspect of the reference is to make your audience do something. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Rule Following | Kripke | Wright: Rule sequences/Kripke: Wittgenstein's "skeptical paradox" negates any possibility of rules and meanings containing real limitations. At the end remains the attempt to keep afloat with the Charybdis. Wright I 264 McDowellVsKripke: it is false to understand the destruction of the Scylla (Platonism, divine standpoint) as the logical core of the dispute over rules. In reality, the destruction is merely a logical sentence. >Divine standpoint, >Platonism. McDowell: Wittgenstein’s concern was to show that both horns are based on an inflated conception of fact and objectivity. Wright I 264 ff Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Wright: "Skeptical Paradox": Step 1: debate on any apparent assertion, e.g. that I formally meant addition when I said "+" in the past. Then I have defended this against a skeptic. Now one should conclude that even if I lost this fight, no conclusion about the reality of meanings, rules, and so on would be foreseeable. So the epistemology of assertions about meaning would be no more understandable under the pressure of skepticism than the epistemology of the past or of the material world or the minds of others. >Quaddition. But that would be a mistake! E.g. in attempting to justify that I meant addition with "+" in the past, I am granted a complete reproduction of all aspects of my mental life. All relevant facts would have to show in my behavior and my mental life, and therefore be graspable by me. Now if I lose anyway, it becomes apparent that there are no such facts. Wright: in the argument, no over-objectification of the nature appears as a premise! The only assumption: that facts about my previous meanings must have appeared in my behavior. Wright I 264 ff WrightVsKripke: but that is vulnerable. However, it is not a mistake of sublimation of the rules (raise to a higher level). If anything is unprotected against the skeptical paradox, then a humanized Platonism is no less than the over-objectified version. Quietism/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Wright: Kripke's Wittgenstein is definitely obliged to quietism: because realism (that there are no facts regarding any rules) must be inflated to a comprehensive irrealism. An irrealism of the meaning must therefore trigger an irrealism of the truth. Global Minimalism/WrightVs: that is deceptive simplicity! Properly considered, the result of the irrealism based on Kripke’s skeptical paradox is that the discourse on rules is minimally capable of being true, at most. Wright I 264 ff. Kripke’s Wittgenstein: no behavior allows conclusions on internal rules (in the past) about addition, therefore these are also no rules about meaning, not even in the present, therefore also not on truth as well! >Kripke's Wittgenstein. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kripke, S. A. | McDowell Vs Kripke, S. A. | I 119 Meaning / McDowell: we must not construct it in a "social-pragmatic" or "communitarian" way. (Wittgenstein has not). Otherwise it is not autonomous. Here, unbridled Platonism would be a penchant for the occult. Wittgenstein has not alleged that meaning would be nothing but as approval or rejection by the community. I 120 Kripke's Wittgenstein/McDowellVsKripke: concludes that there is nothing that constituted susceptibility to the claim the meaning poses; instead we need to understand the role of thought in our lives through our participation in the community. Quietism/Wittgenstein /McDowellVsKripke: doesn't notice Wittgenstein's quietism: attitude to accept problems as unsolvable. Rejection of a constructive or doctrinaire ambition. Wright I 264 McDowell's Wittgenstein: intends to open up an escape route out of the debate. Consequences of rules/Kripke: Wittgenstein: "Skeptical Paradox": negates any possibility that rules and meanings comprised real limitations. Wright: In the end remains only the attempt to stay above the water with Charybdis. McDowellVsKripke: error to understand the destruction of Scylla (Platonism, divine standpoint) as the logical core of the dispute over rules. In reality, the destruction is just a logical set. McDowell: Wittgenstein's concern was to show that both horns are based on an inflated conception of fact and objectivity. Kripke's Wittgenstein/Wright: McDowell does not do Kripke justice in every way. I 265 It is not clear whether the skeptical argument can be limited to the destruction of Scylla (divine standpoint, overstatement of rules). "Skeptical Paradox": Step 1: debate on any ostensive assertion. Ex that in the past with "+" I formally meant addition. Then I have the defend that against a skeptic. One should conclude that even if I lose this dispute, no conclusion about the reality of meanings, rules etc. would be so foreseeable. So the epistemology of assertions about meaning under the pressure of skepticism would not be more intelligible than the epistemology of the past or the material world or other minds (Fremdpsychisches) still are. But that would be a mistake! Tradition: insists on the fundamental inaccessibility of other minds (Fremdpsychisches). Hence the examination of Kripke's skeptic must take place under the conditions of cognitive idealization. Ex in the attempt to justify that with "+" I meant addition in the past, I am conceded the perfect playback of all aspects of my mental life. All the relevant facts would indeed be visible in my behavior and mental life, and therefore be tangible for me. If I still lose, that only shows that there are no such facts. It is then concluded that there are no facts with respect to what I mean in the present! And what anybody thinks in the present! And therefore no facts with respect to what any one expression means! (> Meaning/McDowell). I 266 Wright: In the argument no over-objectification of the essence of the rules occurs as a premise! The only assumption: that facts about my previous meanings must have occurred in my behavior. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
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