Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conservativity | Field | I 4 Conservativity/Field: Conservativity includes some features of necessary truth without actually ever involving truth. >Truth transfer. I 44 Def Conservativity/Mathematics/Field: means that every internally consistent combination of nominalist statements is also consistent with the mathematics. - If we can also show that mathematics is not indispensible, we have no reason to believe in mathematical entities anymore. >Mathematical entities. I 58 Def Conservative/Conservativity/Theory/Mathematics/Field: conservative is a mathematical theory that is consistent with every internally consistent physical theory. - This is equivalent to: a mathematical theory is conservative iff for each assertion A about the physical world and each corpus N of such assertions, A does not follow from N + M, if it does not follow from N alone. ((s) A mathematical theory adds nothing to a physical theory.) M: mathematical theory N: nominalistic physical theory. >Nominalism. Def Anti-Realism/Field: (new): an interesting mathematical theory must be conservative, but it must not be true. >Anti-Realism. Conservative theory: 1) It facilitates inferences 2) It can substantially occur in the premises of the physical theories. I 59 Conservativity: necessary truth without truth simpliciter. - (i.e. it is has the properties of a necessarily true theory without existing entities.) >Truh/Field. Unlike mathematics: science is not conservative. - It must also have non-trivial nominalist consequences. >Science. I 61 Truth does not imply conservativity, nor vice versa. I 63 The fact that mathematics never leads to an error shows that it is conservative, not that it is true. - From conservativity follows that statements with physical objects are materially equivalent to statements of standard mathematics. - N.b.: they need not have the same truth value! >Truth values. I 75 Conservativity: can explain what follows, but not what does not follow. I 59 Mathematics/Truth/Field: Thesis: good mathematics is not only true, but necessarily true. - N.B.: Conservativity: necessary truth without truth simpliciter. >Bare truth. I 159 Conservative expansion does not apply to ontology. >Expansion. III XI Def Conservative/Science/Field: every inference from nominalistic premises on a nominalistic conclusion that can be made with by means of mathematics can also be made without it - with theoretical entities, unlike mathematical entities, there is no conservativity principle - i.e. conclusions that are made with the assumption of theoretical entities cannot be made without them. >Nominalism, >Theoretical entities. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Equivalence | Geach | I 189f Equivalence/Biconditional/GeachVsBlack: "is materially equivalent" is not synonymous with "if and only if". >Equivalence. "Three line" symbol ≡ is often read as "materially equivalent". But equivalence exists only between sentences, not names of sentences. Problem: Tom loves Mary ↔ Mary loves Tom" is only significant if "≡" (thee line) is read as "iff" (if and only if) rather than "materially equivalent".(⇔) cf. >Material, >Formal, >Description level, >Content, cf. >Formalism, >Formal language, >Formal speech, >Conditional. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Black, Max | Dummett Vs Black, Max | III (a) 7 Truth Value/Tr.val./BlackVsFrege: if two seentences are materially equivalent, they have the same truth value. Problem: according to Frege certain sentences would have a meaning that they would not have according to normal conception: E.g. "If oysters are inedible, then the wrong thing". DummettVsBlack: if sentences stand for truth value, but there are also expressions (not sentences) for Truth Value, then this is a grammatical problem, not a logical one. Truth Value/Grammar/Dummett: we can easily transform it from a noun into an adjective: "make true". |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
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