Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
---|---|---|---|
Atomism | Ancient Philosophy | Kanitscheider I 115 Atomists/Antiquity/Kanitscheider: Empty space cannot exist. Connection of matter and space! Everything is connected through the plenary, therefore there can be no separate worlds, only one world is possible. Cf. >Possible worlds, >Substantivalism, >Relationism. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
Atomism | Descartes | Duhem I 12 Atomism/CartesiansVsAtomism/Duhem: Atomism considers phenomena as realities. According to Descartes, matter is identical with the extension in length, depth and width. Nothing but different shapes and different movements must be considered. Matter is incompressible and absolutely homogeneous. Empty space and atoms are illusions. >Cf. >Relationism, >Substantivalism. Esfeld I 210 DescartesVsAtomism: There is no smallest indivisible body. There are neither immaterial forms, nor very small bodies, which necessarily remain intact in all changes. Since every body is divisible, there is no physical shape that cannot disappear. ((s) Cf. Atomism in relation to language: >Atomic sentences.) |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
Atomism | Duhem | I 12 Atomism/CartesianVsAtomism/Duhem: Atomism takes phenomena as realities. According to Descartes, the matter is identical with the extension in length, width. One must take into consideration nothing but different figures and different movements. The matter is incompressible and absolutely homogeneous. Empty space and atoms are illusions. Cf. >Substantivalism, >Relationism. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
Axioms | Field | I 220 Axiom/Field: a required law can easily be proven by adding it as an axiom - Vs: but then you need for each pair of distinct predicates an axiom that says that the first one and the second does not, e.g. "The distance between x and y is r times that between z and w". Everything that substantivalism or heavy-duty Platonism may introduce as derived theorems, relationism must introduce as axioms ("no empty space"). >Substantivalism >Relationism That leads to no correct theory. Problem of quantities. The axioms used would precisely be connectable if also non-moderate characterizations are possible. The modal circumstances are adequate precisely then when they are not needed. I 249ff Axiom/Mathematics/Necessity/Field: axioms are not logically necessary, otherwise we would only need logic and no mathematics. I 275 Axioms/Field: we then only accept those that have disquotationally true modal translations. - Because of conservativism. >Conservativity. Conservatism: is a holistic property, not property of the individual axioms. Acceptability: of the axioms: depends on the context. Another theory (with the same Axiom) might not be conservative. Disquotational truth: can be better explained for individual axioms, though. >Disquotationalism. I 276 E.g. Set theory plus continuum hypothesis and set theory without continuum hypothesis can each be true for their representatives. - They can attribute different truth conditions. - This is only non-objective for Platonism. >Platonism. The two representatives can reinterpret the opposing view, so that it follows from their own view. >Kurt Gödel, relative consistency. II 142 Axiom/(s): not part of the object language. Scheme formula: can be part of the object language. Field: The scheme formula captures the notion of truth better. >Truth/Field. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Axioms | Hilbert | Berka I 294 Definition/Axiom/Hilbert: the established axioms are at the same time the definitions of the elementary concepts whose relations they regulate. ((s) Hilbert speaks of relationships, not of the use of concepts). >Definitions, >Definability, >Basic concepts. Independence/Axiom/Hilbert: the question is whether certain statements of individual axioms are mutually dependent, and whether the axioms do not contain common components which must be removed so that the axioms are independent of each other(1). >Independence. 1. D. Hilbert: Mathematische Probleme, in: Ders. Gesammelte Abhandlungen (1935), Vol. III, pp. 290-329 (gekürzter Nachdruck v. S 299-301). --- Thiel I 262 We consider the first three axioms of Hilbert: 1. There are exactly two straight lines at each of two distinct points P, Q, which indicate(2) with P and Q. 2. For every line g and to any point P, which does not indicate with it, there is exactly one line that is indicated with P, but with no point of g. 3. There are three points which do not indicate with one and the same straight line. In Hilbert's original text, instead of points one speaks of "objects of the first kind" instead of straight lines of "objects of the second kind" and instead of the incidence of "basic relation". Thus, the first axiom is now: For each of two different objects of the first kind, there is precisely one object of the second kind, which is in a basic relation with the first two. Thiel I 263 If the axioms are transformed quantifier-logically, then only the schematic sign "π" (for the basic relation) is free for substitutions, the others are bound by quantifiers, and can no longer be replaced by individual names of points or lines. >Quantification, >Quantifiers. They are thus "forms of statements" with "π" as an empty space. >Propositional functions. They are not statements like those before Hilbert's axioms, whose truth or falsehood is fixed by the meanings of their constituents. >Truth values. In the Hilbert axiom concept (usually used today), axioms are forms of statements or propositional schemata, the components of which must be given a meaning only by interpretation by specifying the variability domains and the basic relation. The fact that this can happen in various ways, shows that the axioms cannot determine the meaning of their components (not their characteristics, as Hilbert sometimes says) themselves by their co-operation in an axiom system. Thiel I 264 Multiple interpretations are possible: e.g. points lying on a straight line, e.g. the occurrence of characters in character strings, e.g. numbers. Thiel I 265 All three interpretations are true statements. The formed triples of education regulations are models of our axiom system. The first is an infinite, the two other finite models. >Models, >Infinity. Thiel I 266 The axioms can be combined by conjunction to form an axiom system. >Conjunction. Through the relationships, the objects lying in the subject areas are interwoven with each other in the manner determined by the combined axioms. The regions V .. are thereby "structured" (concrete and abstract structures). >Domains, >Structures (Mathematics). One and the same structure can be described by different axiom systems. Not only are logically equivalent axiom systems used, but also those whose basic concepts and relations differ, but which can be defined on the basis of two systems of explicit definitions. Thiel I 267 Already the two original axiom systems are equivalent without the assumption of reciprocal definitions, i.e. they are logically equivalent. This equivalence relation allows an abstraction step to the fine structures. In the previous sense the same structures, are now differentiated: the axiom systems describing them are not immediately logically equivalent, but their concepts prove to be mutually definable. For example, "vector space" "group" and "body" are designations not for fine structures, but for general abstract structures. However, we cannot say now that an axiom system makes a structure unambiguous. A structure has several structures, not anymore "the" structure. Thiel I 268 E.g. body: the structure Q has a body structure described by axioms in terms of addition and multiplication. E.g. group: the previous statement also implies that Q is also e.g. a group with respect to the addition. Because the group axioms for addition form part of the body axioms. Modern mathematics is more interested in the statements about structures than in their carriers. From this point of view, structures which are of the same structure are completely equivalent. >Indistinguishability. Thiel: in algebra it is probably the most common to talk of structures. Here, there is often a single set of carriers with several links, which can be regarded as a relation. Thiel I 269 E.g. relation: sum formation: x + y = z relation: s (x, y, z). In addition to link structures, the subject areas often still carry order structures or topological structures. Thiel I 270 Bourbaki speaks of a reordering of the total area of mathematics according to "mother structures". In modern mathematics, abstractions, especially structures, are understood as equivalence classes and thus as sets. >N. Bourbaki, >Equivalence classes. 2. Indicate = belong together, i.e. intersect, pass through the point, lie on it. |
Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
Calculus | Field | III 36 Regions/points/Field: solution for the nominalist: individual calculus/Goodman: Regions as sums of points - then there are no empty areas! >Empty space, >Space, >Geometry, >Substantivalism, >Relationism, >Spacetime, >Spacetime points. The region needs not to be contiguous nor measurable. >Measurements. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Cosmological Constant | Kanitscheider | I 151 Einstein universe/Kanitscheider: The Einstein universe starts from a strong, not directly testable initial assumption, with the conviction that locally testable statements can be derived from it. Spherical geometry according to the basic idea of general relativity (GR). Equal distribution of matter, assumption of an "ideal fluid". Especially the low relative velocity of the stars among each other was the reason to approach a global density T00 = ρ despite the tremendously complex matter distribution. Metric: simple static metric of the three-sphere with the constant radius R: I 152 (1) ds² = dt² + R²[dr² + sin²r(dϑ² + sin² ϑdφ²)] If we now look at the sections ϑ,φ = const, so you get a cylinder which the coordinate r goes around from 0 to π and the time t extends along the mantle without restriction into the future and past. Problem: This does not satisfy the field equations of gravity. Einstein had to introduce the cosmological constant λ. The field equation had to be extended with the term λ x gμν. The extension is compatible with the conservation law. In this model, space is spherical, finite and unbounded, while time is open and unaffected by curvature! World without center and without edge, in which spatially everything is finite (volume, number of galaxies, the longest paths). Thus, the otherwise complicated field equations were reduced to simple algebraic relations between the quantities λ, ρ and R. R/notation: Radius of curvature of the world. Cosmological constant λ: associated with the radius of curvature R of the world: λ = 1/R². Also with the matter density ρ: λ = 4πGρ/c². This leads to a value of λ = 10-57 cm -2. For the cylinder world with a radius R of 3 x 1010 light years. Cosmological constant/Kanitscheider: physically it is bound to the stability of a static world with constant density. Then one can ask, what prevents the large masses to agglomerate. Cosmologically, λ > 0 now provides a weak repulsive force! However, Eddington proved that this is not consistent with respect to weak fluctuations. I 154 Cosmological constant/field equations/Kanitscheider: Left side: geometric, here the cosmological constant can mean λ curvature. Right side: " material side": here λ can be negative density. The cosmological constant often gets the meaning of the energy density of the vacuum in the context of quantum field theory. It represents in a certain way a restoration of the universal time destroyed by the SR. I 158 Cosmological constant/Kanitscheider: should ensure the complete dependence of the inertial field gμν on all matter and prevent the field equations from admitting solutions for empty space. It was clear, of course, that the Minkowski spacetime (1) ds² = dt² + R²[dr² + sin²r(dϑ² + sin² ϑdφ²)] as the simplest empty world of Relativity Theory is in any case a strict solution. >Minkowski space. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
Ersatz Worlds | Field | I 226 Ersatz worlds resp. "Ersatz individuals"/Field: i.e. in Stalnaker's way of speaking: "To show how the world could be or could have been". That is, maximally determined properties that an individual might have or might have had in the universe. This can be used to define cross-world congruence. Cf. >Cross world identity. Then "Ersatz matter particles" are properties! Then "congruent" and "between" are higher-order predicates that are applied to properties. >Properties, >Predicates, >Second order logic, >Description levels/Field. Whereby xP is also an ersatz particle, one that is instantiated in the real world by the normal particle x. x is a normal particle, but the "ersatz particle" that corresponds to it, and by which conge and bete are defined, is a property, a "way like x could be" and actually a way how x is up to date. ((s) Ersatz-individual: here not a particular but a property, a "way".) Field: but this does not help relativism (the thesis that empty space is possible) either. >Relativism, >Relationism, cf. >Substantivalism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Existence | Democritus | Adorno XIII 192 Existence/Democritus/Adorno: First principle: nothing ventured, nothing gained and nothing what is, can be destroyed. Cf. >Change/Aristotle, >Change/Gorgias, >Change/Eleatics, >Change/Parmenides. Kant/Adorno: in the system of the principles of Kant, in the first analogy of experience one finds precisely this principle of Democritus. >Principles/Kant. XIII 193 Democritus goes extraordinarily nominalistically from the individual to the whole, in that, as the true being, the parts are viewed as opposed to the whole that is composed of it. Unity/Materialism/Adorno: It can be said that wherever the thought of matter is at the center of a philosophical conception, the participle is made substantial, because the unity moment is always mind, reflection. >Unity/Philosophy. XIII 194 Then the wholeness or the totality of its existence appears as a mere appearance. --- Adorno XIII 198 Existence/Democritus/Adorno: 3. Principle: That nothing exists at all except the atoms and the empty space. Everything else is mere opinion, that is, is appearance, doxa. Appearance/Democritus/Materialism/Adorno: In this concept of appearance, which is criticized, the democritical materialism is not only connected with Plato, but also with the Eleatics (on the not so different concept of unity of nature in Democritus and the being with the Eleatics). >Change/Eleatics, >Existence/Eleatics, >Perception/Eleatics. XIII 199 PlatoVsDemocritus/Adorno: Even in Plato, as in the extreme counter-position to Democritus, on the one hand only the essence, only the idea should have reality, and the spatial world is simply called the "not his". >Reality/Plato, >Idea/Plato. In spite of this, the doctrine of the Methexis is formed by him, than the doctrine that this individual, in space and time, participated in the ideas themselves. That would be unimaginable if it was the absolutely void. >Methexis/Plato. Essence/Being/Democritus/Eleatics/Adorno: The distinction between the intrinsical and the actual being or of the being and the mere doxa is completely common to Democritus and its eleatic opponents. Materialism: one finds this motive of the strictly performed distinction between essence and appearance through history, as, for example, in Marx. >Materialism. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
Fields | Field | III 35 Fields/H. Field: space-time points as causal agents. - According to Platonism the behavior of space without matter is to describe by electromagnetic properties (non-empty). >Field theory, >Empty space, >Platonism, cf. >Relationism, >Substantivalism, >Absoluteness/Field. Empty space/field: empty space would be without space time points: useless. >Senseless. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Fields | Genz | II 105 Field/Genz: Field has replaced the ether. It is something that assigns numbers to every place and time, for example, temperature distribution. The field is the assignment itself. Here you need a number per location For example, wind distribution: here you need two numbers per location: one for strength and one for direction. Field/Abstraction/Genz: as an abstraction the field is no problem. Problem: that there are fields that represent the last reality. There is no material substrate here. Reality/Genz: the term is thus forced to change. Field/immaterial: light, for example, can simply be abstract field sizes that oscillate when light propagates, which cannot be traced back to any material reality. II 106/107 Fields: e.g. the speed of a river from shore to shore, e.g. angle of inclination of grasses of a meadow, e.g. the speed of the clouds, e.g. the ups and downs of points of a violin string, e.g. the bow wave of a ship (a moving deformation) e.g. alignment of iron chips by a magnet. Reality/Genz: we attribute them to fields when they obey equations that describe them. >Equations, >Reality. Maxwell's equations/Genz: (for electric and magnetic fields): Maxwell's equations only differ from the equations describing water currents in their mathematical details. Mathematical substrate/Fields/Genz: mathematical substrate could not be found. Thus the fields became more and more the last reality. Field: creates its particles! And they always have to. >Substrate. II 108 Therefore, there is no empty space without fields. Fields: are not a substrate of vibrations, but the vibrations themselves. This is also the reason why elementary particles of the same type are always absolutely identical. Field/Newton: his theory did not use any fields, but instead had to assume instantaneous propagation, i. e. long-distance effect. >Isaac Newton. Transmission/gravity/Field/Genz: the body that exerts an effect usually has already left the place when the force begins to act. For example, the sun is standing in a place 8 minutes away from where it was standing when the effect was exerted by it. Field: one has tried to eliminate fields by assuming the effect of particles on particles. This turned out to be extremely complicated, especially since one had to explain time delay. II 109 Gravitation/Field/Genz: gravity can transfer energy (impulse and angular momentum). Therefore, a theory that would only know cause and effect instead of fields would have to override conservation laws during transmission (?). Fields/Genz: the same applies to all fields. >Gravitation. Existence/Field/Genz: whether they exist is a pointless question outside the theories which accept them. The status of the fields can only be described by if-then sentences. II 115 Field/Genz: Fields can never be completely absent. They have to fluctuate by zero. In their basic state they disappear net but not gross. Material property/object/thing/Genz: that fields must always be present may appear to some as a possible property of a material thing, but not to others. Material/matter/Genz: when something is material, it forms a medium in relation to which an observer is always in a measurable speed. Field/Genz: for fields in the ground state, however, the theory implies that this is impossible, since an observer determines his speed in relation to it. >Matter, >Observation. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
Index Words | Peirce | Berka I 29 Index/indicator/Peirce: E.g. pointing finger - the physical evidence: does not say anything, it just says "there!" >Indexicality, >Ostension, >Pointing, >Ostensive definition. Berka I 30 Conclusion/Peirce: needs in addition to symbol (for truth) and index (both together (for sentence formation) the 3rd character: the icon: because inference consists in the observation that where certain relations exist, some other relations can be found. >Conclusion, >Symbols, >Icons, >Relations. These relations must be represented by an icon - e.g. the middle term of the syllogism must actually occur in both premises.(1) >Syllogisms, >Premises. Berka I 31 E.g. the empty spaces that must be filled with the symbols (x, y, ...) are indices of symbols.(1) >Variables, >Constants, Individual variables, >Individual constants, >Logical operations, >Logical formulas. 1. Ch. S. Peirce, On the algebra of logic. A contribution to the philosophy of notation. American Journal of Mathematics 7 (1885), pp. 180-202 – Neudruck in: Peirce, Ch. S., Collected Papers ed. C. Hartstone/P. Weiss/A. W. Burks, Cambridge/MA 1931-1958, Vol. III, pp. 210-249 |
Peir I Ch. S. Peirce Philosophical Writings 2011 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
Language | Stoicism | Gadamer I 436 Language/Stoa/Gadamer: The struggle of philosophy and rhetoric for Greek youth education, which was decided with the victory of Attic philosophy, also has this side, that thinking about language becomes a matter of a grammar and rhetoric which have always recognized the ideal of scientific concept formation. Thus the sphere of linguistic meaning begins to detach itself from the things encountered in linguistic formation. The Gadamer I 437 stoic logic speaks first of those incorporeal meanings by which the speaking of things takes place (to lekton). Topos: It is highly significant that these meanings are put on the same level as topos, i.e. space: see(1). Just as empty space only now, in thinking away the things that arrange themselves to each other in it, comes to the condition for thinking(2), so also the "meanings" as such are only now thought for themselves and a term is coined for them by thinking away the things mentioned by means of the meaning of the words. The meanings are also like a space in which things are ordered to each other. Such thoughts apparently only become possible when the natural relationship, i.e. the intimate unity of speaking and thinking, is disturbed. Cf. >Language and Thought/Ancient Philosophy, >Language and Thought/Gadamer. One may mention here, as Lohmann(3) has shown, the correspondence of stoic thinking and the grammatical-syntactic formation of the Latin language. That the incipient bilingualism of the Hellenistic Oikumene has played a promoting role in thinking about language is probably undeniable. But perhaps the origins of this development lie much earlier, and it is the emergence of science in general that triggers this process. Then the beginnings of the same will go back to the early days of Greek science. Gadamer: The fact that this is the case speaks for the scientific concept formation in the field of music, metaphysics and physics, because a field of rational representations is measured there, the constructive creation of which brings into being corresponding relationships that can no longer actually be called words. Signs/Word/Antiquity/Gadamer: Wherever the word takes on a mere sign function, the original connection between speaking and thinking, at which our interest is directed, is transformed into an instrumental relationship. This transformed relationship between word and sign underlies the conceptualization of science as a whole and has become so self-evident to us that it requires its own artistic remembrance that, in addition to the scientific ideal of unambiguous designation, the life of language itself continues unchanged. 1. Stoic. vet. fragm. Arnim Il, S. 87. 2. Cf. the theory of the diaphragm still rejected by Aristotle (Phys. A 4, 211 b 14ff.) 3. J. Lohmann has recently made interesting observations, according to which the discovery of the world of sounds, figures and numbers has led to a unique way of forming words and thus to a first increase in language awareness. Cf. J. Lohmann's works: Arch. f. Musikwiss. XIV, 1957, pp. 147-155, XVI, 1959, pp. 148- 173, 261-291, Lexis IV, 2 and last: Über den paradigmatischen Charakter der griechischen Kultur (Festschrift for Gadamer 1960). (In the meantime, reference should be made to the volume "Musike und Logos" Stuttgart 1970 (...) |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
Mathematics | Badiou | Sokal I 204 Mathematics/Politics/Society/Badiou/Bricmont/Sokal: (A. Badiou 1982)(1): here, Badiou applies the continuum hypothesis (of the set theory) to the social situation: Badiou: (Badiou 1982, p. 282f): "What is at stake here is no less than the fusion of algebra (the ordered sequence of cardinal numbers) with topology (the surplus of the divisor compared to with the elementary). The truth of the continuum hypothesis would make a law out of the fact that the surplus within the multiple has no other task than to fill the empty space, than the existence of the non-existent, Sokal I 205 which is in accordance with the original multiple. There would be this asserted branching of unity, that what goes beyond the whole on the inside only designates the border point of this whole. But the continuum hypothesis is not provable. Mathematical triumph of politics over the realism of labor unions." >Continuum hypothesis, >Continuum, >Real numbers, >Numbers. SokalVsBadiou: the "mathematics" in this section are quite meaningless. Sokal I 204 Sokal: we were quite surprised that the philosopher Alain Badiou in all seriousness - so it seems - puts forward very similar thoughts as we did in our parody (see J. Bricmont and A. Sokal 1996(2). For the correct use of the concepts of physics , mathematics, and set theory see >Sokal/Bricmont, >Feynman, >Thorne, >Gribbin, or >Hacking. 1. A. Badiou. Théory du sujet, Paris. 1982. 2. J. Bricmont and A. Sokal. Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity", Social Text 1996. |
Badi I Alain Badiou Théorie du sujet, Paris 1982 German Edition: Theorie des Subjekts Berlin 2014 Sokal I Alan Sokal Jean Bricmont Fashionabel Nonsense. Postmodern Intellectuals Abuse of Science, New York 1998 German Edition: Eleganter Unsinn. Wie die Denker der Postmoderne die Wissenschaften missbrauchen München 1999 Sokal II Alan Sokal Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science New York 1999 |
Meaning | Ancient Philosophy | Gadamer I 436 Meaning/Ancient Philosophy/Gadamer: The struggle of philosophy and rhetoric for Greek youth education, which was decided with the victory of Attic philosophy, also has this side, that thinking about language becomes a matter of grammar and rhetoric, which have always recognized the ideal of scientific concept formation. Thus the sphere of linguistic meaning begins to detach itself from the things encountered in linguistic formation. The Gadamer I 437 stoic logic speaks first of those incorporeal meanings by which the speaking of things takes place (to lekton). >Language and thought/Ancient philosophy. Topos: It is highly significant that these meanings are put on the same level as topos, i.e. space:(1). Just as empty space only now, in thinking away the things that arrange themselves to each other in it, comes to the condition for thinking(2), so also the "meanings" as such are only now thought for themselves and a term is coined for them by thinking away the things mentioned by means of the meaning of the words. The meanings are also like a space in which things are ordered to each other. Such thoughts apparently only become possible when the natural relationship, i.e. the intimate unity of speaking and thinking, is disturbed. Cf. >Language and Thought/Ancient Philosophy, >Language and Thought/Gadamer. 1. Stoic. vet. fragm. Arnim Il, S. 87. 2. Cf. the theory of the diaphragm still rejected by Aristotle (Phys. A 4, 211 b 14ff.) |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
Motion | Bennett | Esfeld I 226 ~ Movement/change/Bennett: e.g. Def"string"/Bennett: be a number of similar points in space in front of a background. Movement/Bennett: a movement is a description of this string.- Not things in the room move, but: there is a loss and acquisition of properties in different individuals. ((s) Vs: then you cannot even to speak of things that acquire or lose these properties). Bennett/Esfeld: Bennett thesis: a moving object is no longer the same. Cf. >Substantivalism, >Relationism, >Empty space, >Matter, >Body, >Objects, >Absoluteness, >Holism, cf. >Four dimensionalism, >World lines. |
Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
Motion | Bigelow | I 63 Movement/change/Bigelow/Pargetter: was always a problem, e.g. movement as a change of location: seems to imply a contradiction. >Change, >Contradictions. For example, the change of a disk from round to square: seems to imply that it is both round and square. Contradiction. Solution/Ockham/MA/Bigelow/Pargetter: different points of time. (Doctrine of changing forms, forma fluens). Problem: what is the difference between a) an alternating form, and b) the change of forms? ((s) one or more). Change: is once the subject itself, once it is the form. >Forms. I 64 NewtonVsOckham: the counterposition was that a moving body has not only a position at a time, but also a speed. Flux/Newton/Bigelow/Pargetter: Theory of "fluxus" was Newton's expression for the differential calculus. Motion/Newton: attributed instantaneous velocities to moving objects: a vector. >I. Newton. Vector/Ockham/Bigelow/Pargetter: also the Ockhamists attributed vectors, but in a weaker sense: as a sequence of positions. But this is then an abstraction and does not correspond to any intrinsic property of movement. Movement/Newton/Bigelow/Pargetter: is according to him a full-fledged property of an object of the 1st level, according to the Ockhamists a property of 2nd level. And this is independent according to Newton from history and "destiny", but not according to the Ockhamists. >William of Ockham. I 65 Spheres/Aristotle/Bigelow/Pargetter: according to Aristotle, there was nothing beyond the spheres (of the stars), not even empty space, which according to Aristotle was a contradiction in itself. >Aristotle. Motion/Aristotle/Bigelow/Pargetter: the universe as a whole cannot have any velocity. Then God cannot have given him one. VsAristotle: to the Church this seemed to be a limitation of God's omnipotence. >Vectors. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
Motion | Leibniz | Holz I 133 Motion/Movement/Leibniz: something takes the place of something else. ((s) It is not replacing a previously "empty space"). I 134 What encompasses all these places is "space". For this, one does not need to assume "absolute reality" of space. Space/time/LeibnizVsKant: Space is the epitome of possible relationships, but not as forms of intuition, but rather real ontological as structures of the relationship of the material being-in-themselves to one another. >Space/Leibniz, cf. >Space/Kant, cf. >Relationism, >Substantivalism. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
Object | Frege | II 30 Object/Frege: the object is the meaning of a declarative sentence. It is at the same time the truth value and value curve of a function. >Truth value, >Value propression. (A school-adequate definition of an object is impossible, because it cannot be disassembled - due to its simplicity.) An object is anything that is not a function, i.e. whose expression does not carry an empty space with it. Truth value: A truth value cannot be a part of a thought any more than the sun, because it is not a sense, but an object. (truth value/Frege: a truth value is an object) Object/Frege: locations, times, time periods are, logically considered, objects. Consequently, the the linguistic designation of a place or date is to be interpreted as a proper name. Def Object: Something that can never be the whole meaning of a predicate, but the meaning of a subject. >Subject, >Predicate, >Meaning. II 72 "The function f(a)" is not a function (but an object). "The concept F" is not a concept (but an object). I am not saying it is wrong to say about an object what is being said here about a concept, but it is impossible, meaningless, neither false nor true. Existence proposition/existence statement/Frege: e.g. "Julius Caesar exists" is neither true nor false, but meaningless. But: "There is a man named Julius Caesar" has a sense. (A concept is needed.) Brandom I 584 Object/Frege: an object should be the result to which the predicates refer according to the judgement. Frege II 57 Object/Frege: e.g. places, times, time periods - hence their linguistic designations are names. II 74 Concept/object/sentence/Frege: one and the same sentence can be interpreted a) as a statement about a concept, b) about an object. The statements are then different. E.g. the sentence "There is at least one root of 4" cannot be changed into "There is at least one concept for the root of 4." -> concept. I 98 Object/concept/property/Frege: e.g. direction: is an object! - "Same direction as": is a predicate (concept). IV 70/71 Body/Frege: bodies are not in need of completion. (>(s) Objects are saturated). >Saturated/unsaturated. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
Objects (Material Things) | Aristotle | Genz II 78 Aristotle/Genz: Thesis: Every thing has a certain place in the universe. The heavy ones on the bottom, the light ones on top. The things "know" where their place is and strive there should they be displaced. Therefore, there cannot be a nothing, an empty space. >Order/Aristotle, >Ontology/Aristotle; For empty space see: >Substantivalism, >Relationism. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
Particulars | Tugendhat | I 422 Particulars/TugendhatVsDonnellan: localizing identifications are fundamental. Cf. >Individuation/Strawson, >Individuation, >Identification, >Localization. With these, there is no longer a distinction between referential and attributive use. >Attributive/referential. Attributive is also referential in a broad sense because, although it does not identify the object, it specifies it (distinguishes it against a background). >Specification. I 426 Einzelding/Identification/TugendhatVsStrawson: "here", "now" suffice to make object and spacetime places existent. >Demonstratives, >Logical proper names. Spacetime places are the most elementary objects. >Ontology. But there must be something there - at least hypothetically, then corresponding question of verification provides for which object the singular term stands. >Singular terms, >Empty space, >Substantivalism, >Relationism. Top-down: the use of all singular terms refers to demonstrative expressions. Bottom-up: when demonstratives denote the verificational situation for the predicate to be true. >Predicates, >Satisfaction, >Situation. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
Perception | Frith | I 57 "Subliminal perception": (1960s) subliminal perception was controversial, asserted by advertising professionals. There is no evidence for them. Nevertheless, subtle perception: when two objects are shown briefly at a precisely determined distance,... I 58 ...both objects can be seen, otherwise only one. E.g. Question: what face have I already shown to you: here the answers were random. On the other hand: "Which face do you prefer?": Here the test persons chose the face, which they had previously "subliminally" seen. I 59 Brain/consciousness/Frith: brain scanners showed that an object can cause a change in brain activity without the person being aware of it (in the Amygdala). I 61 Thesis: "Our brain does not tell us everything it knows." I 147 Perception/Frith: thesis: perception is a fantasy which is in harmony with the world. >World/thinking, >World, >Reality. I 179 Blind spot/brain/perception/Frith: the brain invents something for the empty space. E.g. the alphabet is presented very quickly. Then you are sure to have seen the letter A, even if the letter B has appeared instead. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
Possible Worlds | Cresswell | I VII Possible World/possible world/Cresswell: Main problem: how to adapt propositional attitudes. >Propositional attitudes, >Centered worlds, >Cross world identity. I 1 It does not matter if they exist, how it does not matter whether money or surrogate money is needed. I 6 It is pointless to want to decide about existence. LewisVs ersatz world: made from other things - e.g. from space time-points. >Ersatz worlds. I 4 Possible worlds are never part of the actual word. >Actual world, >Actuality, >Actualism. I 30 Therefore, they are also not "out there" (otherwise still part). I 16 We also do not have enough names for all possible worlds to put our empirical data into order. (Analogy: as we must postulate the past in order to arrange our present evidence). I 56f Possible World/Cresswell: we can equate any possible world with the set of things (objects) that exist in it. ((s) not an empty space.) Barcan formula: is valid for quantifiers, which can operate in any possible world on those things which exist in this possible world. >Barcan-Formula, >Possible world semantics, >Modal logic. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
Properties | Aristotle | Millikan I 269 Identity/Properties/Aristotle/Millikan: opposing properties: for Aristotle they serve to explain that nothing can originate from nothing. >Change/Aristotle, >Ontology/Aristole. Def opposite property/Aristotle: are those who mutually withdraw the foundation, make each other impossible. The prevention of another property is this property! Change/conversion/Aristotle/Millikan: when a change occurs, substances acquire new properties which are the opposites of the earlier properties. Opposite/Aristotle: opposite is the potentiality (possibility) of the other property. Then these opposites are bound together at the most fundamental level (in their nature). Millikan pro Aristotle: with the latter he was right. In Aristotle, there is no "beginning" as in Leibniz. >Beginning, >Justification/Leibniz, >Reason/Leibniz, >Ontology/Leibniz, Properties/contrary/Leibniz/Millikan pro Leibniz: he was right in the fact that the assertion that two opposing properties apply to the same substance means to contradict each other. But this is about an indeterminate negation, not about the assertion of a certain absence or; absence is the presence of inconsistency. Example: Zero/0/modern science/mathematics: is not the assertion of nothingness: e.g. zero acceleration, zero point of temperature, empty space, etc. zero represents a quantity. Consistency/Law of Consistency/Millikan: is then a template of an abstract world structure or something that is sufficient for such a template. Epistemology/epistemic/Leibniz/Aristotle/Millikan: the dispute between Leibniz and Aristotle reappears at the level of epistemology: I 270 For example, the assertion "x is red" is equivalent to the assertion "x looks red for a standard observer under standard conditions. >Predication, >Appearance, >Ideal observer, >Idealization. Problem: then it follows from "x is not red": "x does not look red for .. under ...". Ontological/ontology: this corresponds to the fact that being-non-red would be a void, an absence of red - rather than the opposite of red. However, it is about that "x is not red" is equivalent to "x does not look red under standard ..." is either empty or false. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Reality | Genz | II 13 Natural Laws/Laws of Nature/Weinberg: natural laws or laws of nature are as real as chairs. WeinbergVsPositivism. Reality/Weinberg: reality is not under our control. >Reality/Hacking, >Prediction. It is not about reality itself,... II 14 ...but about the reality of the laws of nature. Genz pro: this is the central thesis of this book. >Natural laws. II 115 Reality/Genz: a medium that is present everywhere, but has no measurable velocity, is real, but its reality is not a material one, but a summary of observable effects in the concept of a theory. Such a medium is the field. >Fields/Genz. II 116 Field/acceleration/Genz: acceleration in opposition to the field can be observed. Newton had also suspected this from his empty space, but that would not have been true. >Isaac Newton, >Inertial system, >Relativity theory. The accelerated observer is embedded in a heat radiation that increases with increasing acceleration. II 337 Reality/terms/theory/Genz: thesis: it is the theories that give the terms a reality that expresses itself through correlations of basic sentences. For example, bubble chamber: the bubble chamber interprets the electron as the set of properties of a trace of droplets. Theory: the theory indicates the conditions under which an electron is generated. Electron: an electron interpolated in the language of theory between basic sentences that are in an if-then context. Understanding/Genz: understanding may include the existence of the electron. II 338 But we will never understand elementary particles as we understand macroscopic objects. Elementary particles/Genz: elementary particles have properties that macroscopic objects do not have! If electrons were like chairs, they could not have the properties that are characteristic of them. II 339 Reality/Genz: reality is the reality of the laws, not an opinion. This reality is not one of the wordings by certain terms, but the interrelationships between base sentences, which imply the laws. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
Reality | Lewis | I (c) 50 Ambiguities in connection with reversed spectra are ordinary ambiguities that exist in everyday life when it comes to relativity without clear criterion. E.g. What are "relevant investigations" when it is not clear whether they are relevant to the politics of the day, the emotional well-being or for understanding or whatever. >Inverted spectra, >Ambiguity. --- Rorty VI 208 Objects/Reality/World/Lewis/Rorty: all objects in the universe except the elementary particles are manipulated artifacts. --- Rorty VI 208 LewisVsSellars: even he was too much inclined to label nature as "atoms plus empty space" like Democritus and to invent pseudo-problems about the possibility to reconcile the "scientific" to the "manifest" idea of man. (reductionist view of the non-human nature). >Reductionism, >Nature, >Sellars, cf. >Relationism, >Substantivalism. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
Relationism | Relationism, relationalism, philosophy: is an expression for the thesis that space is formed by the objects and their relations to each other. The assumption of an empty space is incoherent from this point of view. The counter-concept to relativism is substantivalism. See also space, space time. |
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Relationism | Field | I 171 Def Relationism: Thesis: no empty space exists. Def Substantivalism/Field: Thesis: empty space exists. Part-relation: exists in both. >Space, >Absoluteness, >Motion, >Spacetime points. I 181 Relationism/Field: makes field theory impossible - because it excludes empty space. I 182 Putnam: Relationism can take the field as an enormous (because of the infinity of the physical forces) object. - Then for each region one part of it. - FieldVs: this trivializes the relativism. I 183 Field theory/FT/Substantivalism/Field: for the substantivalism the field is not a gigantic object, but no entity at all. Field theory: is for the substantivalism only the attribution of causal predicates to regions. I 216 Problem of Quantities/FieldVsRelationism: the only way to show that there is a (narrow) spatial relation, is to assume that the double distance itself is a spatial relation. But relationism cannot do this because it wants to define it first, and cannot presuppose it as defined. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Signs | Rorty | III 162 Signs/ Heidegger: Danger: that words that were meant as hints and gestures, are be construed as terms in which something other than itself is detected (signs and codes). >Concepts, >Code. VI 475/76 signs / RortyVsDerrida: he should propose terms as a "quasi-people" - (quotation marks by mayself) sign / Derrida: signs would have given us transcendental pseudo-problems - e.g. how intentionality in a world of atoms and empty space was possible. >Sign/Heidegger, >Derrida. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
Space | Space, philosophy: various discussions deal, among others, with the question whether the space is absolute or whether empty space is possible. In different sciences, multi-dimensional spaces with certain properties are used to better calculate like Hilbert spaces in the theory of relativity or multidimensional spaces in mathematical nodal theory. No ontological assumptions are made. See also substantivalism, relativism, movement, absoluteness, compactness, conceptual space, dimensions, logical space, four-dimensionalism. |
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Space | Bennett | Esfeld I 216ff Space/Bennett: (this come from Spinoza): Bodies are properties of regions. - Their respective properties are not identical but "realized as" reconstruction of bodily properties. They are based on properties of regions: e.g. a region of space slimy*: there are slimy (without star) things. The whole matter is a field that is identical to the space. Esfeld: but this does not mean space = field. Esfeld: there is not even a conceptual difference between space and matter! - There is no absolute space without matter (holism of space). Cf. >Substantivalism, >Relationism, >Empty space, >Matter, >Body, >Objects, >Absoluteness, >Holism. |
Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
Space | Field | III 35 Empty Space/Field: would be one without space-time points: senseless! - ((s) only for Platonism). >Platonism, >Spacetime, >Spacetime points. III 35 Space/time/Field: quantification over space-time points is something other than mere quantification over space points when a space point should be something that exists in time. Because that leads to the wrong question: whether a space point is identical to the same point in time - which in turn leads to the wrong question, if there was absolute rest. >Absolute rest, >Absoluteness, >Time. III 36 Regions/points/Field: solution for the nominalist: individual calculus/Goodman: Regions as sums of points. Then there are no empty areas! Regions then need not be contiguous, or can be measured. >Relationism, >Substantivalism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Space | Hume | I 110 Space/Hume: space is realizable in the arrangement of the visible and palpable objects. What is given is not part of the space but space is part of what is given. Expansion: affects only property of perceptions. This is not true for time. >Substantivalism, >Empty Space. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 |
Space | Leibniz | Holz I 132 Space/Leibniz: space is the order. It is not an in-itself, but the structure of a material plurality, which in turn possesses the actual substantial in-itself in the self-limiting nature of the original force. There is no (infinite) "empty space". The idea of this would be a futile action: to work without doing something with it. There would be no observable change for anyone. The space appears only in the mutual representation. Spatiality is something different than space. Space and time are something ideal. cf. >Space/Kant, cf. >Relationism, >Substantivalism. I 133 Space outside the world is just imaginary. (Scholasticism already represented this view). Space/Leibniz: the arrangement of things causes the appearance of space in perception. Appearance/"well-founded"/Leibniz: the appearance of space is "well-founded" when it is related to the multiplicity of things. Space is "imaginary" or "ideal" when the multiplicity is seen as being isolated from the things. (s). e.g. as a set? Movement/Leibniz: something steps into the place of something else. ((s) Not replacing a previously "empty space"). I 134 What encompasses all these places is "space". For this, one does not need to assume "absolute reality" of space. Space/time/LeibnizVsKant: is epitome of possible relationships, but not as forms of intuition, but rather real ontological as structures of the relationship of the material in themselves to one another. In-itself/Leibniz: in-itself is the force. Two aspects: 1. Intensional as a point of force. 2. Extensional in effects. >Intension, >Extension. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
Space | Locke | Euchner I 44 Space/Locke: empty space is possible. II 46 Space: idea - mode: e.g. location. Modes/Locke: are shades of ideas. I 45 Expansion without inertia - unlike body. I 47 Space/time/Locke: correlation opaque - only ideas, not space and time themselves. >Space, >Time, >Idea/Locke, >Body. For empty space see >Substantivalism, >Relationism. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Loc I W. Euchner Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
Space | Newton | Genz II Empty Space/Newton/Genz: Thesis: this opposes acceleration with resistance. MachVsEmpty Space/MachVsNewton: Empty space is not detectable. > Substantivalism., >Relationism. Genz II 338 Space/Newton/Genz: the Newtonian laws, instead of a space, know only one equivalence class of spaces which differ according to direction and constant velocity. |
PhysNewton I Isaac Newton The Principia : Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy Berkeley 1999 Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
Space | Tugendhat | I 106 Space/time/Tugendhat: not negated, not negatable - objects in space-time not negated. >Empty space, cf. >Substantivalism, >Relationism. Senseless: "200 meters from here there is no place" - but possibly: "200 meters from here there is no highway". II 79 Space-time structure/Tugendhat: Space and time form a system for identification, not things and events. >Individuation, >Identification, >Spacetime, >Events, >Objects, >Time. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
Space | Wessel | I 376 Time/space/logic/Wessel: The expression of time and space is no problem for relation predicates: "before", "next", etc. Problem: time and space seen as subjects, where one in turn ascribes predicates: - e.g. "space is curved" - "narrows", "time slows down", etc. >Time, >Spacetime, >Curved space. I 376 Space/Introduction: here whole statements are introduced, not individual terms. >Introduction. E.g. "X iff Y" whereby X contains the space term. - "Space" is not independent. Space terms are not capable of logical explication or they are superfluous. >Explanations, >Definition, >Definability. "Absolute space"/Wessel: Absolute space would depended on the elimination of all objects of a space structure - that is not permitted. Cf. >Substantivalism, >Relationism, >Absoluteness, >Empty space. I 378 Space warp/curved space/Wessel: curved space is meaningless if space is the container of all things. - It is only useful as a curved row of objects, against an uncurved row. I 378/79 Space/existence/Wessel: the space exists iff any given space exists - this requires the simultaneity of objects - analog for the time. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
Species | Darwin | Dennett I 48 Species/Darwin: actually arbitrary! Applied to a number of individuals for convenience. Dennett I, 390ff Speciation/Darwin: Competition between closely related forms Driving force for speciation. So the presence and not the absence of two groups is therefore important. (Not "empty space in the design room"). >Species. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Structures | Wessel | I 379 Structure/existence/time/space/Wessel: the question of the existence of structures is attributed to the existence of order relations a a Rb, and the latter is defined in dependence of the existence of a and b. >Existence, >Space, >Time, >Empty space, cf. >Substantivalism, >Relationism, >Comparisons, >Comparability. Spache: changes of the spatial structure are untestable. >Change. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
Substantivalism | Field | I 13 Def substantivalism/Field: asserts that literal speech about space can be taken at face value, even without physical objects. Then it is also useful to say that the space is empty. >Space, >Empty Space, >Relationism. I 14 FieldVsSubstantivalism: is forced to answer a relationist in his own terms. I 47 Substantivalism/Field: (the thesis that there are empty spacetime regions). Space time regions are known as causally active: e.g. field theories such as classical electromagnetism or the general relativity theory or quantum field theory. Resnik: we should not ask "What properties of the spacetime points ..?" but "What is the structure of space-time?" FieldVsResnik: that's wrong. The theory of the electromagnetic field is also that of the properties of the parts of the space time that are not occupied by objects. I 171 Definition Substantivalism/Field: Thesis: empty space exists. - Definition Relationism: Thesis: there is no empty space. Part-of-relation: exists in both. >Part-of-relation. I 181 Substantivalism/Field: favors the field theory. >Field theory. I 184 Substantivalism/Newton pro: E.g. bucket experiment: shows that we need the concept of absolute acceleration and the one of the equality of place over time - (space that exists through time). --- III 34f Field pro substantivalism: there is empty space time. - Spacetimepoints are entities in their own right. - Field: that is compatible with the nominalism. - VsRelationism: this cannot accept Hilbert's axioms. VsRelationism: cannot accept physical fields. - Platonism: assumes at fields spacetime points with properties. - VsRelationism: this one cannot do it. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Time | Locke | Euchner I 47 Space/time/Locke: Correlation opaque - only ideas, not space and time in themselves. >Space, >Time, >Idea/Locke, >Body. For empty space see: >Substantivalism, >Relationism. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Loc I W. Euchner Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
Zero | Millikan | I 269 Zero/0/modern science/mathematics: zero is not the assertion of nothingness: e.g. zero acceleration, zero point of temperature, empty space, etc. zero represents a quantity. ((s) When zero is the result of a calculation we would not say that the calculation has no result.) >Numbers, >Empty set. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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Armstrong, D. | Lewis Vs Armstrong, D. | V 353 "New Work for a Theory of Universals" (Armstrong 1983)(1): Universals/Armstrong: Armstrong's theory of universals is supposed to be the solution for the problem of the One and the Many >Universals/Armstrong, >Universals/Lewis. LewisVsArmstrong: but it allows for either nominalist solutions or for no solution of any kind. --- Schwarz I 71 Combinatorialism/Armstrong: combinatorialism merely consists of several fundamental properties for which - contrary to colours - any combination should be possible (1986(2), §7). LewisVs: 1986a(3), 86, HellerVs (1998)(4): it is unclear whether this is actually possible. LewisVsArmstrong: as such the problem is not solved, it only allows different interpretations of the descriptions: when does a set of sentences represent the fact that there are donkeys if there is no mention of donkeys? It does represent this fact if the sentences imply the existence of donkeys (1986e(5), 150-157). Problem: modality is required. VsVs: it could be stated that the relationship between the distribution of fundamental properties and of all other truths is analytic, and can be characterized without requiring primitive modal vocabulary. (2002b(6), Heller 1996, see below Chapter 11, LewisVs: 1992a(8), 209). Schwarz I 118 Laws of Nature/LoN/DretskeVsLewis/TooleyVsLewis/ArmstrongVsLewis: there is something missing in Lewis’ laws of nature: for Lewis, laws of nature are simple regularities. But they should be more than that. Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong-Theory: thesis: laws of nature are based on fundamental relations between universals, therefore properties. Since regularities are logically independent from local events, possible worlds with precisely the same local events can nicely differ in their laws of nature. For one world, it may be a regularity, for the other, a relation of universals. Relation of universals: is the foundation for everything and cannot be analyzed. To state that there is a relation between F's and G's because all F's are G's is not enough. This would be the regularity theory. SchwarzVs: this leads to problems with not instantiated universals (Mellor 1980(9), §6). Laws of Nature/LewisVsArmstrong/LewisVsTooley/LewisVsDretske: if laws of nature express fundamental relations between universals which are logically independent from observable regularities why do we assume that physics will tell us something about laws of nature? Schwarz I 119 What is the use of universals? Physicists only want to observe regularities. And what is then the relation between universals and regularities? Additional explanations will then be needed! How could a rule-maker exclude that N(F,G) is valid, but some F's are nevertheless not G's. It is not resolved by giving a name to the "rule-maker" like Armstrong does with the term "necessitation". Laws of Nature/LewisVsArmstrong: better: regularities which are justified because of a primitive relation between universals. It is a relationship which also exists in possible worlds in which laws of nature are not valid. It is rather more obscure, but at least not a miracle anymore that all F's are G's if a law of nature demands it. Schwarz I 124 Probability/LewisVsArmstrong: VsFundamental probability property: fundamental properties cannot fulfill the role which we attribute to probability. Schwarz I 139 Cause/causation/Armstrong: absence is not a real cause. LewisVsArmstrong: yes, it is. However, it is so common that is it ignored. Problem: numerous absences in vacuum. Schwarz I 140 Solution/Lewis: absences are absolutely nothing, there is nothing. Problem: if absence is only an empty space-time region, why would oxygen - and not nitrogen- only exist because of absence? Solution/Lewis: "influence", small increase of probability. Schwarz I 141 Counterfactual dependence as well between the how, when and where of the event. Schwarz I 231 Def Principle of truth-maker/to make truth/Armstrong/Martin/Schwarz: all truths must be based on the ontology. Strong form: for each truth, there is something that makes it true. Its existence necessarily implies the truth. LewisVsArmstrong: that is too strong, e.g. the example "no unicorns exist" is true, not because there is something specific, but because unicorns really do not exist (1992a(8), 204, 2001b(10), 611f). Truthmaker: a truthmaker would be an object here which only exists in worlds in which there are no unicorns. Problem: why is it not possible for this object to also exist in worlds in which there are unicorns? Answer: such an object would be a contradiction to the principle of recombination. SchwarzVsLewis: but this is not true: the truth-maker for "no unicorns exist" could be an object which essentially lives in a possible world without unicorns. However, the object could very well have duplicates in the possible worlds with unicorns. The counterpart relation is not a relation of intrinsic resemblance. To make truth/predicate/Armstrong/Schwarz: (Armstrong 1997(11), 205f): if object A has the property F, an object must exist which implies the existence of this fact. LewisVsArmstrong: why can this object not exist, although A is not F (1998b)(12)?. If A is F in one world, but it is not so in the other world, why is it always necessary to have something that exists in one possible world, but is missing in the other world. Two possible worlds are only different on the grounds of the characteristics the objects have in their worlds. ((s) So different characteristics in an area that remains constant). Characteristics/truth-maker/Lewis: a truth-maker is not needed for something that has a (basic) characteristic: the sentence "A is F" is true because A has the characteristic F. That is all (1998b(12), 219). Def principle of truth-maker/LewisVsArmstrong/Schwarz: only the following will then remain: truth supervenes upon the things that exist, and upon perfect natural characteristics which it chooses to instantiate (1992a(8), 207, 1994a(13), 225, Bigelow 1988(14), §25). Whenever two possibilities are different from each other, there are either different objects in them or these objects have different fundamental characteristics (1992a(8), 206, 2001b(10), §4). Schwarz I 232 N.B.: if there are possibilities that are qualitatively indistinguishable, but numerically different (which Lewis neither states nor denies, 1986e(5), 224), the principle must be limited to qualitative truths or characteristics (1992a(8), 206f). If there are none, simplification is possible: no other two possibilities are exactly the same regarding which objects exist as well as the fundamental characteristics are instantiated. ((s) If the distribution of fundamental characteristics sets everything, then the objects are set as well. As such, the possible worlds are only different regarding their characteristics, but these are naturally set.) Schwarz: this can be amplified. 1. D. M. Armstrong [1983]: What is a Law of Nature?. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. D. M. Armstrong [1986]: “The Nature of Possibility”. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 16: 575–594. 3. D. Lewis [1986a]: “Against Structural Universals”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64: 25–46. 4. Mark Heller [1998]: “Property Counterparts in Ersatz Worlds”. Journal of Philosophy, 95: 293–316. 5. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell. 6. D. Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97. 7. Mark Heller [1996]: “Ersatz Worlds and Ontological Disagreement”. Acta Analytica, 40:35–44. 8.D. Lewis [1992a]: “Critical Notice of Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 70: 211–224. In [Lewis 1999a] als “Armstrong on Combinatorial Possibility”. 9. David H. Mellor [1980]: “Necessities and universals in natural laws”. In David H. Mellor (Hg.) Science, belief and behaviour, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10. D. Lewis [2001b]: “Truthmaking and Difference-Making”. Noˆus, 35: 602–615. 11. D. M. [1997]: A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 12. D. Lewis [1998b]: “A World of Truthmakers?” Times Literary Supplement , 4950: 30. 13. D. Lewis [1994a]: “Humean Supervenience Debugged”. Mind, 103: 473–490. 14. John Bigelow [1988]: The Reality of Numbers: A Physicalist’s Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
Atomism | Kant Vs Atomism | Esfeld I 224 Atom/Democritus: Introduces the ontology of atoms in empty space, so the room is not one of the things that exist in it: I 225 The empty space is non-being. The Being, the atoms can exist but only on the basis of the space, namely in the space. EsfeldVsDemokrit: Comes to the paradoxical conclusion that the non-existence just exist as well as the Being. KantVsAtomisten: The empty space of the atomists is an absurdity, something that is there, without there being anything real. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
Derrida, J. | Rorty Vs Derrida, J. | III 222 Deconstruction/RortyVsDerrida: not a new procedure. One can learn deconstruction just as one can learn to discover sexual symbols, bourgeois ideology etc. in texts. Reading did not become easier or harder, just as cycling does not become easier or harder if one makes discoveries about the nature of energy during it. Recontextualisation/RortyVsDerrida: has existed for a long time: Socrates recontextualised Homer, Augustine the pagan virtues, Hegel Socrates and Augustine, Proust himself, and Derrida all. Why does it sound so frightening when Derrida does it as opposed to Hegel? Because Derrida uses the "accidental" material form of words while Hegel no longer wanted to abidy by the rule that the "opposition" relation applies only to sentences, and not to cconcepts, but nevertheless subjugated to the other rule that no weight has to be attached to the sound and form the words. Derrida: in communicating with other people one has to comply to these rules, of course, but not when communicating with other philosophers. IV 9 Metaphysics/RortyVsDerrida: too dramatic s presentation of the role played by metaphysics in our culture. He puts too much emphasis on the particular kind of centripetal thinking that ends in philosophizing that is oriented towards justification. IV 118 Scripture/Derrida/Rorty: we should "think about a writing without presence and without absence, without history, cause IV 119 arché telos which deranged the entire dialectic, theology and ontology (sic)." Such scripture would be literature, which no longer would be contradictory to philosophy. Scripture/Text/RortyVsDerrida: dilemma: either he can forget about philosophy IV 120 and the What of scripture would lose its wit, or he must accept the dependence of the text of philosophy on its edges. When Derrida recounts such tragicomedy he shows himself at his best. His weakest points are the ones where he begins to imitate what he hates and claims he would offer "rigorous analyses". IV 121 SearleVsDerrida/Rorty: his arguments are simply awful. Rorty: that's right! RortyVsSearle: underestimates Derrida; he does not even seek knowledge bases! RortyVsSearle: the idea that there were such a thing as an "intellectual content" measurable by general and ahistorical standards links him with Plato and Husserl, but separates him from Derrida. The weakness of his arguments Derrida is that he believes that he would be pursuing amateurish philosophy of language. He did not notice that Derrida poses metaphilosophical questions about the value of such a philosophy. IV 122 RortyVsDerrida: every new type of scripture that can do without arché and without telos is also left without object! IV 123 RortyVsDerrida: Dilemma: another meta vocabulary is a) either prudocing a further philosophical seclusiveness or b) more openness than we can handle. Derrida is aware of that. Therefore, he distances himself from Heidegger who has failed to write about philosophy unphilosophically. DerridaVsHeidegger: "there will be no unique name, even not of existence". IV 125 Heidegger never goes beyond a set of metaphors that he shares with Husserl. These metaphors suggest that deep down we all possess the "truth of being"! Calling and listening also do not escape the circle of mutually explicable concepts. (so.). IV 126 Scripture/dialectic/RortyVsDerrida: "primacy of scripture" not much more than a cricket: not more than the assertion that certain features of discourse are more evident in the case of writing, as in the spoken language. IV 127 This is no more than a stale dialectic of reversal that Hegel disproved already in his phenomenology and that Kierkegaard called "tricks of a dog". IV 129 RortyVsDerrida: the distinction between relationships contitioned by conclusion and associations not conditioned by conclusion is just as unclear and blurred as the one between word and sentence or between the metaphorical and the literal. IV 130 But Derrida has to do something with all these distinctions. He must ensure that they look distinct enough. He is concerned about being the first to turn to this issue, while all previous authors have done nothing more than to build the same old building again and again. IV 129 sentence/Rorty: the distinction between sentence and non-sentence is blurred. ((s) But supra. IV 49 World/Rorty: amount of non sentences. - This presupposes a clear distinction.). IV 131 Text/scripture/RortyVsDerrida: it is simply not true that the text sequence that makes up the canon of tradition is trapped in a metaphor that has remained unchanged since the Greeks. The procedure to speak multiple languages at the same time and to write several texts at the same time is exactly what all important, revolutionary, original thinkers have practiced. IV 135 Text/RortyVsDerrida: virtually all thinkers have written several texts simultaneously. Also "glass" is not new, but the realistic representation of a site on which we have lived for some time. IV 136/137 RortyVsDerrida: he can not perform an argumentative confrontation without turning into a metaphysician. Being/DerridaVsHeidegger: Being has always only had "meaning" as something hidden in the being. The "differance" is in a certain and very strange way "older" than the ontological difference or than the truth of being. IV 138 Trace/Derrida: neither a reason nor a justification nor an origin. (Claimed to have "proven" that. RortyVsDerrida: how can he prove it? IV 139 "Differance"/Derrida: "neither a word nor a concept". RortyVsDerrida: First of all it was a typo. That it is not anymore is because it has actually become a word. Also, any word that has a use refers to a concept. IV 140 Concept/Wittgenstein/Rorty: we have learned from Wittgenstein that every word is interwoven with others. RortyVsDerrida: Opposition: Derrida is trying to utilize the explanation of the language game of the concept of meaning and to grant some magic words privileges at the same time. RortyVsDerrida: does nothing more than to avoid simply neutralizing the binary oppositions of metaphysics. IV 142 RortyVsDerrida: that all does not mean that the word games are not funny, but only that the accompanying sound of urgency is inappropriate. VI 475 Order/Searle: a blurred distinction can still be useful. VsDerrida, who makes no distinctions in his opinion.) VI 476 Sign/RortyVsDerrida: should not depict concepts as quasi People. ((s) that bring concepts mischief). Sign/Derrida: would have given us transcendental pseudo-problems. E.g. how intentionality were possible in a world of atoms and of empty space. RortyVsDerrida: should not even ask the question "What is the Political?". Just as the "piety" of Euthyphro it presumes sime kind of being of which one would assume that it would only be of interest to Phallogozentristen! Concept/Derrida: wants to write without concepts as "agents". VI 477 RortyVsDerrida: one should not write about the adventures of concepts, but about the adventures of people. He should not argue frequently used words stood for incoherent concepts, because there is no better proof for the consistency than the use, that this language game is actually being played. Derrida is itself quite transcendental, while he criticized others for ot. VI 480 Shine/to seem/appearance/RortyVsDerrida: in accordance with Wittgenstein and Davidson we can do our work without even mentioning this dubious distinction (Being/appearance)! VI 500 Text/Concept/RortyVsDerrida: if there really is a world in which concepts live and weave and exist regardless of the language behavior of word users, namely that world which is the transcendental condition of the possibility of transcendental philosophy, the question arises: Why can it also be an empirical fact that a concept is nothing more than the use we miserable existing individuals make of a word. If the world in which a concept is nothing more than this use is real, the question is: How is it possible that that other world is also real? |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
Kant | Strawson Vs Kant | Rorty VI 359 StrawsonVskKant/Rorty: shows that thanks to the progress since Kant some concepts are no longer that attractive: e.g. "in the mind", "created by the mind" (Wittgenstein, Ryle have dissuaded us from this). --- Strawson V 9 StrawsonVsKant: appears to violate his own principles by attempting to set sense limits from a point which is outside of them, and that, if they are properly marked, cannot exist. --- V 16 Continuous determination/Kant/Strawson: everywhere through the mind guaranteed applicability of the concepts. StrawsonVsKant: seed for the disastrous model of determination of the whole universe. --- V 19 StrawsonVsKant: this one had unlimited confidence in a certain complicated and symmetrical scheme, which he freely adopted from the formal logic as he understood it, and forced upon this the whole extent of his material. --- V 23 StrawsonVsKant: this one is constantly trying to squeeze out more of the arguments in the analogies than there is. --- V 25 StrawsonVsKant: the whole deduction is logically incorrect. The connection to the analysis is thin and is, if at all, brought about by the concept of "synthesis". --- V 37 Dialectic/Kant: primary goal: exposing the metaphysical illusion. Instrument: the principle of sense. Certain ideas that do not have any empirical application, are sources of appearance, yet they can have a useful or even necessary function for the extension of empirical knowledge. E.g. we think of internal states of affair, as if they were states of affair of an immaterial substance. ("regulative ideas"). StrawsonVsKant: which is obviously quite implausible. But why did he represent it? --- V 29 StrawsonVsKant: It is not clear that there is no empirical mediation of antinomies. --- V 32 Kant: I really appear to myself in the time but I do not really appear to myself in time. StrawsonVsKant: incomprehensible what "to appear" means here. It is no defense of an incomprehensible doctrine to say that its incomprehensibility is guaranteed by a product obtained from its principle. --- V 33/34 Space/time/StrawsonVsKant: Kant: things themselves not in space and time. Strawson: thereby the whole doctrine becomes incomprehensible. --- V 35 Synthetically a priori/StrawsonVsKant: Kant himself has no clear conception of what he means with it. The whole theory is not necessary. Instead, we should focus on an exploration and refining of our knowledge and social forms. --- V 36 Limit/StrawsonVsKant: to set the coherent thinking limits it is not necessary to think from both sides of these limits as Kant tried despite his denials. --- V 49 Space/Kant: our idea of space is not recovered from the experience, because the experience already presupposes the space. StrawsonVsKant: that is simply tautological. If "to presuppose" means more than a simple tautology, then the argument is not enlightening. --- V 50 StrawsonVsKant: he himself admits that it is contradictory to represent a relational view of space and time and to deny its transcendental ideality at the same time. --- V 58 StrawsonVsKant: there are the old debates about "inherent" ideas of space and time. They are unclear. There is the argument that the acquisition of skills presupposes the ability to acquire skills. Experience/space/time/properties/Kant/Strawson: problem: the manifestation of the corresponding trait in experience, his appearance in the world, can be ascribed only to our cognitive abilities, the nature of our skills, not to the things themselves. StrawsonVsKant: problem: then these ideas must themselves be prior to all experience in us. --- V 66 Categories/Strawson: we have to understand them here in the way that to the forms of logic the thought of their application is added in judgments. StrawsonVsKant: his subdivision of the categories puts quite a bit on the same level, which certainly cannot be regarded as equivalent as e.g. affirmative, negative, infinite. --- V 73 StrawsonVsKant: he thinks it is due to the (failed) metaphysical deduction (see above) entitled to identify "pure" concepts. --- V 75 StrawsonVsKant: why should the objects of consciousness not be understood as realities that are distinguished from the experiences of consciousness existence, even if sequence and arrangement coincide point by point with the experiences of consciousness? --- V 83 StrawsonVsKant: unity of the different experiences requires experience of objects. Can his thesis withstand the challenge? Why should not objects (accusatives) form such a sequence that no differentiation between their order and the corresponding experiences has to be made? E.g. Such items may be sensory data: red, round spots, tickling, smells, lightning, rectangles. --- V 84 Why should the terms not simply be such sensory quality concepts? StrawsonVsKant: it is very easy to imagine that experience exactly has this sort of unrelated impressions as its content. Impressions that neither require nor permit, to become "united in the concept of an object". StrawsonVsKant: the problem with the objects of experience is that their ESSE is at the same time entirely their percipi how their percipi nothing but their ESSE. That is, there is no real reason for distinguishing between the two. --- V 106 Room/persistence/Kant: The space alone is persistent. Any time determination presupposes something persistent. StrawsonVsKant: unclear. For the concept of self-consciousness the internal temporal relations of the sequence are completely insufficient. We need at least the idea of a system of temporal relations, which includes more than these experiences themselves. But there is no access for the subject itself to this broader system than by its own experiences. --- V 107 StrawsonVsKant: there is no independent argument that the objective order must be a spatial order. --- V 116 Causality/StrawsonVsKant: its concept is too rough. Kant is under the impression that he is dealing with a single application of a single concept of "necessity", but he shifts in his application, the meaning of this concept. The required sequence of perceptions is a conceptual, but the necessary sequence of changes is a causal one. --- V 118 Analogies/StrawsonVsKant: fundamental problem: the conditions of the possibility of objective determination of time. Possible objects/Kant: Problem: whether there should be a "at the same time" or "not at the same time" of possible and actually perceived objects. If there is no "at the same time", there can be no distinction made between possible and real objects. --- V 124 Pure space/Kant: is itself not an object of empirical perception. StrawsonVsKant: element of deceptive logic: Kant seems to think that certain formal properties of the uniform spatiotemporal frame must have direct correlates in the objects themselves. --- V 128 StrawsonVsKant: its entire treatment of objectivity is under considerable restriction, he relies nowhere on the factor onto which, for example, Wittgenstein strongly insists: the social nature of our concepts. --- V 157 StrawsonVsKant: but assuming that the physical space is euclidic, the world could be finite in an otherwise infinite empty space. And that would be no meaningless question. --- V 163 Antinomies/StrawsonVsKant: from the fact that it seems to be the case that there are things which are ordered in time or space in a certain way, it does not follow that it either seems that all things appear as members of a limited series, neither that it seems that all things exist as members of an infinite series. In fact, neither of the two members of the disjunction is true. --- V 164 Antinomies/StrawsonVsKant: certainly the notion of a sequential order is justified, but it does not follow that the concept for the "whole series" of things must apply. --- V 178 Antinomies/StrawsonVsKant: he was mistaken that the antinomies are the field, on which the decisive battles are fought. --- V 184 Existence/Kant: "necessity of existence can only be recognized from the connection with what is perceived according to general laws of experience." StrawsonVsKant: this is a deviation from the critical resolution of antinomies and has to do with the interests of "pure practical reason": that is, with morality and the possibility of free action. --- V 194 StrawsonVsKant: we can draw the conclusion from the assertion that when a being of endless reality exists, it does not exists contingently, not reverse in that way that if something exists contingently, it is a character of endless reality. --- V 222 Transcendental idealism/Kant: claims, he is an empirical realism. Confidence must include an awareness of certain states of consciousness independent of objects. StrawsonVsKant: this is certainly a dualistic realism. This dualism questions the "our". --- V 249 StrawsonVsKant: to say that a physical object has the appearance, a kind of appearance of a physical character, means, trying to brighten an unclear term by another dubious, namely the one of the visual image. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
Leibniz, G.W. | Field Vs Leibniz, G.W. | I 39 Metaphysical Possibility/Essentialism/Modality/Leibniz/Field: Leibniz’s modal argument VsSubstantivalism: (see above: "empty space real", not merely a logical construction): E.g. question: it is useful to assume the possibility of a world that is just like our actual world, just shifted one mile throughout its entire history? (LeibnizVsAbsolute Space: No!). Every possible world that is qualitatively identical with our world would simply be the real world. LeibnizVsSubstantivalism: it must deny this: it must regard two such possible worlds as genuinely separate. And that seems absurd. FieldVsLeibniz: that seems convincing at first glance. But (Horwich, 1978) is it not quite as strong an argument against the existence of electrons? E.g. (DS) There is a possible world, different from our actual world but qualitatively identical with it, merely shifted one mile in its entire history. (DE) There is a possible world, different from our actual world but qualitatively identical with it, it only differs from it in that electron A and electron B were reversed during its entire history. I 40 FieldVsLeibniz: that seems to be a difference! ((s) Vs: (> Feynman): the electrons must differ at least in the pulse (or one other parameter)). If they share all properties, it’s pointless. Field: But if the reality of spacetime regions implies (DS), does the reality of electrons not imply (DE) then? The "Leibniz argument against electrons" does not seem to be good! But why? Because the existence of electrons does not imply (DE) (Field pro), or because (DE) is ultimately not such a bad conclusion? (DE): can also be formulated without mention of possible worlds: it could have been possible in the actual world, that A and B had been reversed. (Similarly for (DS)). Leibniz Principle/Field: we accept that as a convention. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Leibniz, G.W. | Millikan Vs Leibniz, G.W. | I 261 VsLeibniz/VsLeibniz' law/principle/identity/indistinguishability/the indistinguishable/Millikan: the classic objection VsLeibniz is to point out the possibility that the universe might be perfectly symmetrical, in which case there would be a perfectly identical ((S) indistinguishable) individual at another place. ((S) That is, there would be something indistinguishable from x, which would still not be identical to x, against Leibniz principle). Variants: Ex a time-repetitive universe etc. Ex two identical drops of water, two identical billiard balls at various locations. Property/Leibniz: thesis: a reference to space and time leads to a property that is not purely qualitative. Millikan: if one disregards such "impure" properties ((S) does not make a reference to space and time), the two billiard balls have the same properties! VsLeibniz' principle/law/R. M. Adams/Millikan: thesis: the principle that is used when constructing such symmetrical worlds, is the principle that an individual can not be distinguished (separated) from themselves, therefore, the two halves of the world can not be one and the same half. Leibniz' law/VSVS/Hacking/Millikan: (recent defense of Hacking): The objections do not respond to the fact that there could be a curved space instead of a duplication. Curved space/Hacking/Millikan: here emerges one and the same thing again, there is no duplication as in Euclidean geometry. MillikanVsHacking: but that would not answer the question. I 262 But there are still two interesting options: Leibniz' law/principle/identity/ indistinguishability/Millikan: 1. symmetrical world: it could be argued that there is simply no fact here, which determines whether space is curved or doubled. ((s)> Nonfactualism). Pointe: this would imply that Leibniz's principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary, and that its validity is only a matter of convention. 2. Symmetrical world: one could say that the example does not offer a general solution, but rather the assumption of a certain given symmetrical world: here, there would very much be a fact, whether the space is curved or not. Because a certain given space can not be both! Pointe: then the Leibniz principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary. Pointe: but in this case this is then no matter of convention, but a real fact! MillikanVsAdams/MillikanVsArmstrong/Millikan: neither Adams nor Armstrong consider that. Curved space/Millikan: what is identical is then necessarily identical ((S) because it is only mirrored). Here the counterfactual conditional would apply: if one half would have been different, then the other one, too. Here space generally seems to be double. Duplication/Millikan: when the space is mirrored (in Euclidean geometry) the identity is random, not necessary. Here one half could change without the other half changing. ((S) No counterfactual conditional). Identity: is given when the objects are not indistinguishable because a law in situ applies, but a law of nature, a naturally necessary agreement. I 263 Then identity of causality applies in the second option. (X) (y) {[NN (F) ⇔ Fx Fy] ⇔ x = y} Natural necessity/notation: naturally necessary under naturally possible circumstances. MillikanVsVerifikationismus: if my theory is correct, it must be wrong. Truth/world/relationship/Millikan: thesis: ultimately, meaningfulness and truth lie in relations between thought and the world. I 264 Therefore, they can not be in the head, we can not internalize them. I 268 Properties/Millikan: thesis: Properties (of one or more parts) that fall into the same area, are properties that are opposites of each other. Certainly, an area can contain another area. Ex "red" includes "scarlet" instead of excluding it and Ex "being two centimeters plus minus 1 millimeter" includes "being 2.05 centimeters plus minus 1 millimeter" rather than excluding this property. The assumption that two properties may be the same only if the complete opposite regions from which they come coincide, implies that the identity of a property or property area is linked to the identity of a wider range from which it comes, and therefore is bound to the identity of their opposites. Now we compare Leibniz' view with that of Aristotle: Identity/Leibniz/Millikan: all single properties are intrinsically comparable. However, perhaps not comparable in nature, because God has just created the best of all possible worlds - but they would be metaphysically comparable. complex properties/Leibniz/Millikan: that would be properties that are not comparable. They also include absences or negations of properties. They have the general form "A and not B". ((S) Comparison/comparability/comparable/Millikan/(S): composite properties are not comparable Ex "A and not B".) Of course, it is incompatible with the property "A and B". Pointe: thus the metaphysical incompatibility rests on the logical incompatibility. That is, on the contradiction. I 269 Necessity/Leibniz/Millikan: then God has first created logical necessity and later natural necessity. ("In the beginning…"). opposite properties/opposite/property/Leibniz/Millikan: according to Leibniz opposite properties are of two kinds: 1. to attribute both contradictory properties to one thing then would be to contradict oneself ((S) logically) or 2. the contradiction between the properties would lie in their own nature. But that would not lie in their respective nature individually but would be established by God, which prevented the properties from ever coming together. MillikanVsLeibniz. Identity/Properties/Aristotle/Millikan: opposite properties: for Aristotle, they serve to explain that nothing can be created from nothing. Def opposite property/Aristotle: are those which defy each others foundation, make each other impossible. The prevention of another property is this property! Alteration/transformation/change/Aristotle/Millikan: when a change occurs, substances acquire new properties, which are the opposites of the previous properties. Opposite/Aristotle is the potentiality (possibility) of the other property. Then, these opposites are bound at the most fundamental level (in nature) to each other. Millikan pro Aristotle: he was right about the latter. In Aristotle there is no "beginning" as in Leibniz. Properties/Opposite/Leibniz/Millikan pro Leibniz: was right about the assertion that two opposite properties that apply to the same substance is a contradiction. But this is about an indefinite negation, not the assertion of a specific absence. Or: the absence is the existence of an inconsistency. Ex Zero/0/modern science/mathematics: is not the assertion of nothing: Ex zero acceleration, zero temperature, empty space, etc. Zero represents a quantity. Non-contradiction/law of non-contradiction/Millikan: then, is a template of an abstract world structure or something that is sufficient for such a template. Epistemology/epistemic/Leibniz/Aristotle/Millikan: the dispute between Leibniz and Aristotle appears again at the level of epistemology: I 270 Ex the assertion "x is red" is equivalent to the statement "x looks red for a standard observer under standard conditions". Problem: from "x is red" follows that "x does not look red for ... under ...". ontologically/ontology: equally: not-being-red would be an emptiness, an absence of red - rather than an opposite of red. But it is about "x is non-red" being equivalent to "x does not look red under standard conditions" is either empty or incorrect. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Lewis, C.I. | Schwarz Vs Lewis, C.I. | Schwarz I 31 Personal identity/SchwarzVsLewis: his criterion is not accurate and provides in interesting cases no answer. E.g. continuity after brain surgery, etc. But Lewis does not want that. Our (vague) everyday term should only be made explicitly. Beaming/Teleportation/Doubling/Lewis: all this is allowed by his theory. Schwarz I 60 Identity/Lewis/Centered world/Possible world/Schwarz: my desire to be someone else, does not refer to the whole world, but only to my position in the world. E.g. Twin Earth/Schwarz: one of the two planets is blown tomorrow, the two options (that we are on the one or the other) do however not correspond to two possible worlds! Detailed knowledge would not help out where we are, because they are equal. ((s) so no "centered world"). Actually, we want to know where we ourselves are in the world. (1979a(1),1983b(2),1986e(3):231 233). SchwarzVsLewis: says too little about these perspective possibilities. It is not enough here to allow multiple counterparts (c.p.) in a world. It should not just be possible that Humphrey is exactly as the actual Nixon, he should also to be allowed to be different. Humphrey may not be a GS of himself. (> Irreflexive counterpart relation,> see below Section 9.2. "Doxastic counterparts". Similarity relation. No matter what aspects you emphasize: Nixon will never be more similar to Humphrey than to himself. Schwarz I 100 Fundamental properties/SchwarzVsLewis: this seems to waver whether he should form the fE to the conceptual basis for the reduction of all predicates and ultimately all truths, or only a metaphysical basis, on which all truths supervene. (>Supervenience, >Reduction). Schwarz I 102 Naturalness/Natural/Property/Content/Lewis: the actual content is then the most natural candidate that matches the behavior. "Toxic" is not a perfectly natural property (p.n.p.), but more natural than "more than 3.78 light years away" and healthy and less removed and toxic". Naturalness/Degree/Lewis: (1986e(3):, 61,63,67 1984b(4):66): the naturalness of a property is determined by the complexity or length of their definition by perfectly natural properties. PnE: are always intrinsically and all their Boolean combinations remain there. Problem: extrinsic own sheep threaten to look unnatural. Also would e.g. "Red or breakfast" be much more complicated to explain than e.g. "has charge -1 or a mass, whose value is a prime number in kg. (Although it seems to be unnatural by definition). Naturalness/Property/Lewis: (1983c(5), 49): a property is, the more natural the more it belongs to surrounding things. Vs: then e.g. "cloud" less natural than e.g. "table in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant or clock showing 7:23". Schw I 103 Naturalness/Properties/Lewis: (1983c(5): 13f): naturalness could be attributed to similarity between characteristics: E.g. a class is more natural, the more the properties of its elements resemble each other. Similarity: Lewis refers to Armstrong: similarity between universals 1978b(6),§16.2,§21, 1989b(7): §5.111997 §4.1). Ultimately LewisVs. Naturalness/Lewis/Schwarz: (2001a(8):§4,§6): proposing test for naturalness, based on similarity between individual things: coordinate system: "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" axis. A property is then the more natural, the more dense and more compact the appropriate region is. Problem: 1. that presupposes gradual similarity and therefore cannot be well used to define gradual naturalness. 2. the pnE come out quite unnatural, because the instances often do not strongly resemble each other. E.g. if a certain mass property is perfect, of course, then all things with this mass build a perfectly natural class, no matter how dissimilar they are today. SchwarzVsLewis: it shows distinctions between natural and less natural properties in different areas, but does not show that the distinction is always the same. Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: could also depend on interests and biological expression. And yet, can in various ways the different types of natural - be determined by perfect naturalness. That is not much, because at Lewis all, by definition, by the distribution of p.n.p. is determined. ((s)>Mosaic). Schwarz I 122 Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: not reasonable to assume that it was objectively, regardless of how naturally it appears to us. Lewis introduced objective naturalness as a metaphysical basis for qualitative, intrinsic similarity and difference, as some things resemble each other like eggs and others do not. (see above 5.2). Intrinsic Similarity: also qualitative character and duplication: these terms are intended to be our familiar terms by Lewis. SchwarzVsLewis: but if objective naturalness is to explain the distinction of our opinions about similarity, one cannot ask with sense the question whether the distinction serves exactly this. So although there are possible beings (or worlds) whose predicates express relatively unnatural properties and therefore are wrong about natural laws, without being able to discover the error. But we can be sure a priori that we do not belong to them. Problem: the other beings may themselves believe a priori to be sure that their physical predicates are relatively natural. Solution: but they (and not we) were subject to this mistake, provided "natural" means in their mouth the same as with us. ((s) but we also could just believe that they are not subject to error. Respectively, we do not know whether we are "we" or "they"). Schwarz: here is a tension in our concept of natural law (NL): a) on the one hand it is clear that we can recognize them empirically. b) on the other hand they should be objective in a strong sense, regardless of our standards and terms. Problem: Being with other standards can come up with the same empirical data to all other judgments of NL. Schwarz I 134 Event/SchwarzVsLewis: perhaps better: events but as the regions themselves or the things in the regions: then we can distinguish e.g. the flight from the rotation of the ball. Lewis appears to be later also inclined to this. (2004d)(9). Lewis: E.g. the death of a man who is thrown into a completely empty space is not caused by something that happens in this room, because there is nothing. But when events are classes of RZ regions, an event could also include an empty region. Def Qua thing/Lewis/Schwarz: later theory: “Qua-things” (2003)(10): E.g. „Russell qua Philosoph“: (1986d(9a),247): classes of counterpieces – versus: LewisVsLewis: (2003)(10) Russell qua Philosoph and Russell qua Politician and Russell are identical. Then the difference in counterfactual contexts is due to the determined by the respective description counterpart relation. These are then intensional contexts. (Similar to 1971(11)). counterfactual asymmetry/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis' analysis assumes similarity between possible worlds. HorwichVsLewis: (1987(15),172) should explain why he is interested in this baroque dependence. Problem/SchwarzVsLewis: so far, the analysis still delivers incorrect results E.g. causation later by earlier events. Schwarz I 139 Conjunctive events/SchwarzVsLewis: he does not see that the same is true for conjunctive events. Examples A, B, C, D are arbitrary events, so that A caused B and C caused D. If there is an event B&C, which exactly occurs when both B and C happen, then A is the cause of D: without A, B would not have happened, neither B&C. Likewise D would not have happened without B&C. Because causation is transitive, thus any cause causes any effect. Note: according to requirement D would not happen without C, but maybe the next possible world, in which B&C are missing, is one in which C is still taking place? According to Lewis the next possible world should however be one where the lack of cause is completely extinguished. Schwarz: you cannot exclude any conjunctive events safely. E.g. a conversation or e.g. a war is made up of many events and may still be as a whole a cause or effect. Lewis (2000a(13), 193) even used quite unnatural conjunctions of events in order to avoid objections: E.g. conjunction from the state of brain of a person and a decision of another person. Absence/Lewis/Schwarz: because Lewis finds no harmless entities that are in line as absences, he denies their existence: they are no events, they are nothing at all, since there is nothing relevant. (200a, 195). SchwarzVsLewis: But how does that fit together with the Moore's facts? How can a relationship be instantiated whose referents do not exist?. Moore's facts/Schwarz: E.g. that absences often are causes and effects. Something to deny that only philosopher comes to mind. I 142 Influence/SchwarzVsLewis: Problem: influence of past events by future. Example had I drunk from the cup already half a minute ago, then now a little less tea would be in the cup, and depending on how much tea I had drunk half a minute ago, how warm the tea was then, where I then had put the cup, depending on it the current situation would be a little different. After Lewis' analysis my future tea drinking is therefore a cause of how the tea now stands before me. (? Because Ai and Bi?). Since the drinking incidents are each likely to be similar, the impact is greater. But he is not the cause, in contrast to the moon. Schwarz I 160 Know how/SchwarzVsLewis: it is not entirely correct, that the phenomenal character must be causal effect if the Mary and Zombie pass arguments. For causal efficacy, it is sufficient if Mary would react differently to a phenomenally different experience ((s) >Counterfactual conditional). Dualism/Schwarz: which can be accepted as a dualist. Then you can understand phenomenal properties like fundamental physical properties. That it then (as above Example charge 1 and charge 1 switch roles in possible worlds: is possible that in different possible worlds the phenomenal properties have their roles changed, does not mean that they are causally irrelevant! On the contrary, a particle with exchanged charge would behave differently. Solution: because a possible world, in which the particle has a different charge and this charge plays a different role, is very unlike to our real world! Because there prevail other laws of nature. ((s) is essential here that besides the amended charge also additionally the roles were reversed? See above: >Quidditism). SchwarzVsLewis: this must only accept that differences in fundamental characteristics do not always find themselves in causal differences. More one must not also accept to concede Mary the acquisition of new information. Schwarz I 178 Content/Individuation/Solution/LewisVsStalnaker: (1983b(2), 375, Fn2, 1986e(3), 34f), a person may sometimes have several different opinion systems! E.g. split brain patients: For an explanation of hand movements to an object which the patient denies to see. Then you can understand arithmetic and logical inference as merging separate conviction fragments. Knowledge/Belief/Necessary truth/Omniscience/SchwarzVsLewis/SchwarzVsFragmentation: Problem: even within Lewis' theory fragmentation is not so easy to get, because the folk psychology does not prefer it. Schwarz I 179 E.g. at inconsequent behavior or lie we do not accept a fragmented system of beliefs. We assume rather that someone changes his beliefs or someone wants to mislead intentionally. E.g. if someone does not make their best move, it must not be the result of fragmentation. One would assume real ignorance contingent truths instead of seeming ignorance of necessary truths. Fragmentation does not help with mathematical truths that must be true in each fragment: Frieda learns nothing new when she finally finds out that 34 is the root of the 1156. That they denied the corresponding proposition previously, was due to a limitation of their cognitive architecture. Knowledge/Schwarz: in whatever way our brain works, whether in the form of cards, records or neural networks - it sometimes requires some extra effort to retrieve the stored information. Omniscience/Vs possible world/Content/VsLewis/Schwarz: the objection of logical omniscience is the most common objection to the modeling mental and linguistic content by possible worlds or possible situations. SchwarzVsVs: here only a problem arises particularly, applicable to all other approaches as well. Schwarz I 186 Value/Moral/Ethics/VsLewis/Schwarz: The biggest disadvantage of his theory: its latent relativism. What people want in circumstances is contingent. There are possible beings who do not want happiness. Many authors have the intuition that value judgments should be more objective. Solution/Lewis: not only we, but all sorts of people should value under ideal conditions the same. E.g. then if anyone approves of slavery, it should be because the matter is not really clear in mind. Moral disagreements would then in principle be always solvable. ((s)>Cognitive deficiency/Wright). LewisVsLewis: that meets our intuitions better, but unfortunately there is no such defined values. People with other dispositions are possible. Analogy with the situation at objective probability (see above 6.5): There is nothing that meets all of our assumptions about real values, but there is something close to that, and that's good enough. (1989b(7), 90 94). Value/Actual world/Act.wrld./Lewis: it is completely unclear whether there are people in the actual world with completely different value are dispositions. But that does not mean that we could not convince them. Relativism/Values/Morals/Ethics/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis however welcomes a different kind of relativism: desired content can be in perspective. The fate of my neighbor can be more important to me than the fate of a strangers. (1989b(14), 73f). Schwarz I 232 Truthmaker principle/SchwarzVsLewis: here is something rotten, the truth maker principle has a syntax error from the outset: we do not want "the world as it is", as truth-makers, because that is not an explanation, we want to explain how the world makes the truth such as the present makes propositions about the past true. Schwarz I 233 Explanation/Schwarz: should distinguish necessary implication and analysis. For reductive metaphysics necessary implication is of limited interest. SchwarzVsLewis: he overlooks this when he wrote: "A supervenience thesis is in the broader sense reductionist". (1983,29). Elsewhere he sees the difference: E.g. LewisVsArmstrong: this has an unusual concept of analysis: for him it is not looking for definitions, but for truth-makers ". 1. David Lewis [1979a]: “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se”. Philosophical Review, 88: 513–543. 2. David Lewis [1983b]: “Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation”. Philosophical Review, 92: 3–32. 3. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 4. David Lewis [1984b]: “Putnam’s Paradox”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377 5. David Lewis [1983c]: “New Work for a Theory of Universals”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377. 6. David M. Armstrong [1978b]: Universals and Scientific Realism II: A Theory of Universals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 7. David M. Armstrong [1989b]: Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder: Westview Press 8. David Lewis [2001a]: “Redefining ‘Intrinsic’ ”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63: 381-398 9. David Lewis [2004d]: “Void and Object”. In [Collins et al. 2004], 277–291 9a. David Lewis [1986d]: “Events”. In [Lewis 1986f]: 241–269 10. David Lewis [2003]: “Things qua Truthmakers”. Mit einem Postscript von David Lewis und Gideon Rosen. In Hallvard Lillehammer und Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (Hg.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D.H. Mellor, London: Routledge, 25–38. 11. David Lewis [1971]: “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies”. Journal of Philosophy, 68: 203–211. 12. David Lewis [1987]: “The Punishment that Leaves Something to Chance”. Proceedings of the Russellian Society, 12: 81–97. 13. David Lewis [2000a]: “Causation as Influence”. Journal of Philosophy, 97: 182–197. Gekürzte Fassung von [Lewis 2004a] 14. David Lewis [1989b]: “Dispositional Theories of Value”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 63: 113-137. 15. Paul Horwich [1987]: Asymmetries in Time. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
Quantum Mechanics | Verschiedene Vs Quantum Mechanics | Kanitscheider II 108 Quantum ChemistryVsQuantum Mechanics: Weak point of orthodox quantum mechanics: v. Neumann's traditional Hilbert-Space formulation (1929) is limited to closed systems with finite degrees of freedom, which means the neglect of the environment of the quantum system. Hennig Genz Gedankenexperimente, Weinheim 1999 VIII 208 Completeness/Quantum Mechanics/QM: the quantum mechanics is complete in the sense that more cannot be said about the locations of the particles than the probability distributions of the quantum mechanics permit. Problem: how can it be that Gretel's unsuccessful search not only creates the reality that it is not with her, but also the reality that it is in Hänsel's area? Einstein-Podoski-Rosen/EPR: that is impossible! She cannot instantly create reality in the distant territory. Reality must have existed before the first experiment. EPRVsQM: incomplete as it does not take into account existing realities. Instead, we need a theory that is real, local and causal. It should only concern properties of measurable physical objects. John Gribbin Schrödingers Kätzchen Frankfurt/M 1998 III 135 Quantum Electrodynamics/QED: (best confirmed theory of all times) provides information about the interaction of electrons with electromagnetic radiation. It explains everything except gravity and the behaviour of atomic nuclei (e.g. radioactive decay). III 137 Feynman: we only have three things to take care of: 1. the probability with which a photon moves from one place to another. 2. the probability with which an electron changes location, 3. the probability with which a photon is absorbed or emitted by an electron. III 138 Feynman realized that we had to take into account every possible route (Fig III 138). A lot of convolutions on the way from A to B. (Feynman diagrams). In the double-split experiment, we added the probabilities with which the light passed one of the columns. III 139 Feynman: why not cut more slits in the screen until there is no obstacle at all, since all the "slits" now overlap. Now that the screen has disappeared, we have to add all probabilities of all possible paths. For the complicated paths, the probabilities are very small and usually cancel each other out. Feynman showed with a mirror that their influence is still noticeable! III 140 The light chooses the most time-saving path. III 141 Gribbin: it actually happens that the light continues to travel at a different, flatter angle at the same time, other photons hit the eye perpendicularly... That we do not observe this is solely due to the fact that the paths in the vicinity of the shortest path are on the one hand more probable, and on the other hand mutually reinforce each other. But that is not the end of the story! III 142 Measurements show that reflected photons actually arrive from the far corner of the mirror, although they cancel each other out! III 142/143 Although neighboring parts of the mirror corner cancel each other out, you can still find mirror strips where the probabilities add up. How large the distance between the strips must be depends on the wavelength of the light: this is a nice confirmation of the wave particle dualism, since we consider the light here as photons. (diffraction grid). III 145 Similarly, all optical phenomena can be interpreted as the addition of probabilities, including lenses, diffraction and deceleration of light entering water, Poisson's spot, double-split experiment. III 150 VsQuantifier-Electrodynamics/VsQED: it is not completely flawless: difficulty in moving an electron: it would cause an endless addition of probabilities, the results would grow into infinity, that would be nonsense. III 145 Def magnetic moment of the electron: measure of the interaction of an electron with a magnetic field. III 147 Nature/Physics/Feynman: "The enormous diversity of nature can be derived from the monotonous repetition of the combination of only three basic processes" (see above). III 148 Feynman-Diagram: bizarre: two electrons interact by exchanging a photon, but we may just as well say that the second electron emits the photon "in the future" and this goes backwards in time so that it is absorbed by the first electron "in the past". It is well known that an electron can change into a pair of particles with positrons. The corresponding equations are symmetrical as usual. III 149 Feynman now realized that the whole interaction can be described with reference to a single electron: an electron moves from one place to another and interacts with a high-energy photon. Through this interaction, the electron is sent backwards in time until it interacts with another high-energy photon, becoming "reversed" and travelling again into the future. Three things seem to be involved in both interactions: positron, electron, photon. Similar to when a ray of light bounces off a mirror: two rays of light forming the appropriate angle and the mirror itself. Analogy: But just as in reality there is only one ray of light reflected back into space, there is also only one electron. Photons can act as "time mirrors" for electrons. Def Re-Normation: Method to get rid of the infinite. One divides both sides of the equation by infinity. Feynman: "Crazy". Hennig Genz Gedankenexperimente, Weinheim 1999 VII 275 Re-Normation: unfortunately also has to be applied to the vacuum, because the QED tells us that here the energy density is infinite. If you include the relativity theory, the situation gets even worse: there are still infinite quantities, but they cannot be renormalized anymore. Twistor Theory/Penrose: Try to explain both the particles and the long empty distances within an object with the same theory. Measure/Length Unit: a universal length unit is obtained by combining the gravitational constant, Planck's Constant and the speed of light: "quantum of length". VII 276 Planck's Length: about 1035. Planck's time, etc. It is pointless to speak of a time or length that is shorter. Quantum Foam/Wheeler: quantum fluctuations in the geometry of space are completely negligible on the level of atoms, even particles, but on this very fundamental level one can imagine space itself as a foam of quantum fluctuations. >Twistor Theory/Penrose: Thesis: then one could imagine that all matter particles are no more than twisted fragments of empty space. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
Relationalism | Field Vs Relationalism | III 35 FieldVsRelationalism: it has never really been executed. Not even if one assumes a completely Platonic apparatus of quantities. Problem: electromagnetic field (classical electromagnetism): Field/Platonism: every spacetime point is attributed a property (or a number or vector or tensor). Thus sp.t. points are apparently assumed. Relationalism: may then not accept any fields (which is difficult in modern physics) or must describe them totally different. Only Solution/Field: (see below in connection with Newton’s theory of gravitation): try to do without properties, vectors or tensors, but not without sp.t. points. III 114 Field/Causality/Sp.T. Points/Field: theories that take the concept of the field seriously, must assume sp.t. points as fully valid causal agents! Field/Platonism: according to this, the behavior of matter can be entirely described by electromagnetic properties of unproven ((see below, not empty) space regions. A change of these properties leads to other causal consequences. Empty Space/Field:!.. Would be one without sp.t. points. FieldVs. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Russell, B. | Quine Vs Russell, B. | Chisholm II 75 Predicates/Denote/Russell: denoting expressions: proper names stand for individual things and general expressions for universals. (Probleme d. Phil. p. 82f). In every sentence, at least one word refers to a universal. QuineVsRussell: confusion! II 108 Theory of Descriptions/VsRussell/Brandl: thus the whole theory is suspected of neglecting the fact that material objects can never be part of propositions. QuineVsRussell: confusion of mention and use. Quine II 97 Pricipia mathematica, 1903: Here, Russell's ontology is rampant: every word refers to something. If a word is a proper name, then its object is a thing, otherwise it is a concept. He limits the term "existence" to things, but has a liberal conception of things which even includes times and points in empty space! Then there are, beyond the existent things, other entities: "numbers, the gods of Homer, relationships, fantasies, and four-dimensional space". The word "concept", used by Russell in this manner, has the connotation of "merely a concept". Caution: Gods and fantasies are as real as numbers for Russell! QuineVsRussell: this is an intolerably indiscriminate ontology. Example: Take impossible numbers, e.g. prime numbers that are divisible by 6. It must be wrong in a certain sense that they exist, and that is in a sense in which it is right that there are prime numbers! Do fantasies exist in this sense? II 101 Russell has a preference for the term "propositional function" against "class concept". In P.M. both expressions appear. Here: Def "Propositional Function": especially based on forms of notation, e.g. open sentences, while concepts are decidedly independent of notation. However, according to Meinong Russell's confidence is in concepts was diminished, and he prefers the more nominalistic sound of the expression "propositional function" which is now carries twice the load (later than Principia Mathematica.) Use/Mention/Quine: if we now tried to deal with the difference between use and mention as carelessly as Russell has managed to do sixty years ago, we can see how he might have felt that his theory of propositional functions was notation based, while a theory of types of real classes would be ontological. Quine: we who pay attention to use and mention can specify when Russell's so-called propositional functions as terms (more specific than properties and relations) must be construed as concepts, and when they may be construed as a mere open sentences or predicates: a) when he quantifies about them, he (unknowingly) reifies them as concepts. For this reason, nothing more be presumed for his elimination of classes than I have stated above: a derivation of the classes from properties or concepts by means of a context definition that is formulated such that it provides the missing extensionality. QuineVsRussell: thinks wrongly that his theory has eliminated classes more thoroughly from the world than in terms of a reduction to properties. II 102 RussellVsFrege: "~ the entire distinction between meaning and designating is wrong. The relationship between "C" and C remains completely mysterious, and where are we to find the designating complex which supposedly designates C?" QuineVsRussell: Russell's position sometimes seems to stem from a confusion of the expression with its meaning, sometimes from the confusion of the expression with its mention. II 103/104 In other papers Russel used meaning usually in the sense of "referencing" (would correspond to Frege): "Napoleon" particular individual, "human" whole class of such individual things that have proper names. Russell rarely seems to look for an existing entity under any heading that would be such that we could call it the meaning that goes beyond the existing referent. Russell tends to let this entity melt into the expression itself, a tendency he has in general when it comes to existing entities. QuineVsRussell: for my taste, Russell is too wasteful with existing entities. Precisely because he does not differentiate enough, he lets insignificance and missed reference commingle. Theory of Descriptions: He cannot get rid of the "King of France" without first inventing the description theory: being meaningful would mean: have a meaning and the meaning is the reference. I.e. "King of France" without meaning, and "The King of France is bald" only had a meaning, because it is the short form of a sentence that does not contain the expression "King of France". Quine: actually unnecessary, but enlightening. Russell tends commingle existing entities and expressions. Also on the occasion of his remarks on Propositions: (P.M.): propositions are always expressions, but then he speaks in a manner that does not match this attitude of the "unity of the propositions" (p.50) and of the impossibility of infinite propositions (p.145) II 105 Russell: The proposition is nothing more than a symbol, even later, instead: Apparently, propositions are nothing..." the assumption that there are a huge number of false propositions running around in the real, natural world is outrageous." Quine: this revocation is astounding. What is now being offered to us instead of existence is nothingness. Basically Russell has ceased to speak of existence. What had once been regarded as existing is now accommodated in one of three ways a) equated with the expression, b) utterly rejected c) elevated to the status of proper existence. II 107 Russell/later: "All there is in the world I call a fact." QuineVsRussell: Russell's preference for an ontology of facts depends on his confusion of meaning with reference. Otherwise he would probably have finished the facts off quickly. What the reader of "Philosophy of logical atomism" notices would have deterred Russell himself, namely how much the analysis of facts is based on the analysis of language. Russell does not recognize the facts as fundamental in any case. Atomic facts are as atomic as facts can be. Atomic Facts/Quine: but they are composite objects! Russell's atoms are not atomic facts, but sense data! II 183 ff Russell: Pure mathematics is the class of all sentences of the form "p implies q" where p and q are sentences with one or more variables, and in both sets the same. "We never know what is being discussed, nor if what we say is true." II 184 This misinterpretation of mathematics was a response to non-Euclidean geometry. Numbers: how about elementary arithmetic? Pure numbers, etc. should be regarded as uninterpreted. Then the application to apples is an accumulation. Numbers/QuineVsRussell: I find this attitude completely wrong. The words "five" and "twelve" are nowhere uninterpreted, they are as much essential components of our interpreted language as apples. >Numbers. They denote two intangible objects, numbers that are the sizes of quantities of apples and the like. The "plus" in addition is also interpreted from start to finish, but it has nothing to do with the accumulation of things. Five plus twelve is: how many apples there are in two separate piles. However, without pouring them together. The numbers "five" and "twelve" differ from apples in that they do not denote a body, that has nothing to do with misinterpretation. The same could be said of "nation" or "species". The ordinary interpreted scientific speech is determined to abstract objects as it is determined to apples and bodies. All these things appear in our world system as values of variables. II 185 It even has nothing to do with purity (e.g. of the set theory). Purity is something other than uninterpretedness. XII 60 Expression/Numbers/Knowledge/Explication/Explanation/Quine: our knowledge of expressions is alone in their laws of interlinking. Therefore, every structure that fulfills these laws can be an explication. XII 61 Knowledge of numbers: consists alone in the laws of arithmetic. Then any lawful construction is an explication of the numbers. RussellVs: (early): Thesis: arithmetic laws are not sufficient for understanding numbers. We also need to know applications (use) or their embedding in the talk about other things. Number/Russell: is the key concept here: "there are n such and suches". Number/Definition/QuineVsRussell: we can define "there are n such and suches" without ever deciding what numbers are beyond their fulfillment of arithmetic addition. Application/Use/QuineVsRussell: wherever there is structure, the applications set in. E.g. expressions and Gödel numbers: even the mention of an inscription was no definitive proof that we are talking about expressions and not about Gödel numbers. We can always say that our ostension was shifted. VII (e) 80 Principia Mathematica(1)/PM/Russell/Whitehead/Quine: shows that the whole of mathematics can be translated into logic. Only three concepts need to be clarified: Mathematics, translation and logic. VII (e) 81 QuineVsRussell: the concept of the propositional function is unclear and obscures the entire PM. VII (e) 93 QuineVsRussell: PM must be complemented by the axiom of infinity if certain mathematical principles are to be derived. VII (e) 93/94 Axiom of infinity: ensures the existence of a class with infinitely many elements. Quine: New Foundations instead makes do with the universal class: θ or x^ (x = x). 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. VII (f) 122 Propositional Functions/QuineVsRussell: ambiguous: a) open sentences b) properties. Russell no classes theory uses propositional functions as properties as value-bound variables. IX 15 QuineVsRussell: inexact terminology. "Propositional function", he used this expression both when referring to attributes (real properties) and when referring to statements or predicates. In truth, he only reduced the theory of classes to an unreduced theory of attributes. IX 93 Rational Numbers/QuineVsRussell: I differ in one point: for me, rational numbers are themselves real numbers, not so for Russell and Whitehead. Russell: rational numbers are pairwise disjoint for them like those of Peano. (See Chapter 17), while their real numbers are nested. ((s) pairwise disjoint, contrast: nested) Natural Numbers/Quine: for me as for most authors: no rational integers. Rational Numbers/Russell: accordingly, no rational real numbers. They are only "imitated" by the rational real numbers. Rational Numbers/QuineVsRussell: for me, however, the rational numbers are real numbers. This is because I have constructed the real numbers according to Russell's version b) without using the name and the designation of rational numbers. Therefore, I was able to retain name and designation for the rational real numbers IX 181 Type Theory/TT/QuineVsRussell: in the present form our theory is too weak to prove some sentences of classical mathematics. E.g. proof that every limited class of real numbers has a least upper boundary (LUB). IX 182 Suppose the real numbers were developed in Russell's theory similar to Section VI, however, attributes were now to take the place of classes and the alocation to attributes replaces the element relation to classes. LUB: (Capters 18, 19) of a limited class of real numbers: the class Uz or {x:Ey(x ε y ε z)}. Attribute: in parallel, we might thus expect that the LUB of a limited attribute φ of real numbers in Russell's system is equal to the Attribute Eψ(φψ u ψ^x). Problem: under Russell's order doctrine is this LUB ψ is of a higher order than that of the real numbers ψ which fall under the attribute φ whose LUB is sought. Boundary/LUB/QuineVsRussell: You need LUB for the entire classic technique of calculus, which is based on continuity. However, LUB have no value for these purposes if they are not available as values of the same variables whose value range already includes those numbers whose upper boundary is wanted. An upper boundary (i.e. LUB) of higher order cannot be the value of such variables, and thus misses its purpose. Solution/Russell: Axiom of Reducibility: Def Axiom of Reducibility/RA/Russell/Quine: every propositional function has the same extension as a certain predicative one. I.e. Ey∀x(ψ!x φx), Eψ∀x∀y[ψ!(x,y) φ(x,y)], etc. IX 184 VsConstruktivism/Construction/QuineVsRussell: we have seen Russell's constructivist approach to the real numbers fail (LUB, see above). He gave up on constructivism and took refuge in the RA. IX 184/185 The way he gave it up had something perverse to it: Axiom of Reducibility/QuineVsRussell: the RA implies that all the distinctions that gave rise to its creation are superfluous! (... + ...) IX 185 Propositional Function/PF/Attribute/Predicate/TT/QuineVsRussell: overlooked the following difference and its analogs: a) "propositional functions": as attributes (or intentional relations) and b) proposition functions: as expressions, i.e. predicates (and open statements: e.g. "x is mortal") Accordingly: a) attributes b) open statements As expressions they differ visibly in the order if the order is to be assessed on the basis of the indices of bound variables within the expression. For Russell everything is "AF". Since Russell failed to distinguish between formula and object (word/object, mention/use), he did not remember the trick of allowing that an expression of higher order refers straight to an attribute or a relation of lower order. X 95 Context Definition/Properties/Stage 2 Logic/Quine: if you prefer properties as sets, you can introduce quantification over properties, and then introduce quantification over sets through a schematic context definition. Russell: has taken this path. Quine: but the definition has to ensure that the principle of extensionality applies to sets, but not to properties. That is precisely the difference. Russell/QuineVsRussell: why did he want properties? X 96 He did not notice at which point the unproblematic talk of predicates capsized to speaking about properties. ((s) object language/meta language/mention/use). Propositional Function/PF: Russell took it over from Frege. QuineVsRussell: he sometimes used PF to refer to predicates, sometimes to properties. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
Simons, P. | Wiggins Vs Simons, P. | Simons I 216 Superposition/Simons: it is not just a pragmatic resistance that lets us assume that two objects cannot be superposed and yet have no common part. Simons: nevertheless pro, WigginsVsSuperposition/WigginsVsSimons: he makes this clear in the following principle: Principle/Wiggins: A and a real part or component B of a third thing C, where A unequal C and A ≠ B and where no part or component of A is a part or component of B or of C, cannot completely occupy the same space at the same time. Simons: where does this lead? rta: be the container from a to t. This means that space can become the object of timeless operators and predicates of extensional mereology. Frame of Reference: we assume it as fixed, so that identity of spaces can be determined. Then we can apply all axioms of CEM (Extensional Mereology), also the Sum-Axiom and the SSP are not contradictory. (…+…) I 217 SimonsVsWiggins: that does not seem particularly frightening. It even seems to be able to be amplified. For example, we can assume a Strong Supplement Principle (SSP) that is relativized to times: (…+…) SimonsVsCoincidence Principle: if it were correct, it would establish a very close conceptual link between mereological relations and spatial relations between continuants. Simons pro Wiggins: in any case we can agree that "space" can only be mapped by reference to its occupants. ((s) >no "empty space"). Thus, the conceptual utility of the part-whole relations between continuants will consist in their necessity for the formation of spatial concepts. Coincidence Principle/Simons: it is neat and it provides a seductive simplification. SimonsVsCoincidence Principle/SimonsVsWiggins: one pays too high a price. I 218 But with his rejection we must also reject one of the premises, WP, PP or SSP. Which one? I would reject SSP (see below). But first we want to test WP against a hypothetical counter-example from Sharvy. I 220 WigginsVsSuperposition/Simons: his argument for WP goes like this: Suppose A and B were distinct and at the same place at the same time. Then they cannot be distinguished by location. Then they have to be distinguished by their properties. Problem: no space region (volume) can be described simultaneously by different predicates (be it color, form, texture etc.). (s) It cannot be spherical and cube-shaped at the same time). I 221 Simons: the latter may be true, but that does not speak against the possibility of a perfect mixture, because its qualities do not have to be those of its ingredients in isolation, which is proved by the imperfect mixtures every day. ((s) Contradiction to above I 218: there mixture of compound is distinguished by the fact that the properties of the ingredients are largely preserved in the mixture.) Superposition/Simons: Assuming that it would be possible that the occupation of space by a mass would be a gradual matter, then it would be possible that different masses occupy the same region Simons: although the occupation would have different intensity distributions. Simons: if this were the case, Wiggins' principle would be wrong and then we would have to doubt its necessity. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
Substantivalism | Leibniz Vs Substantivalism | Field I 39 Metaphysical Possibility/Essentialism/Modality/Leibniz/Field: the modal argument of Leibniz VsSubstantivalismus: (see above: "empty space is real", not only a logical construction): e.g. question: Does it make sense to accept the possibility of a possible world (poss.w.), which is exactly like our actual one, with the exception of its history which is shifted one mile. (LeibnizVsabsolute space: No!). Every poss.w. which is qualitatively identical with our world would simply be the actual world. LeibnizVsSubstantivalism: He must deny this: Substantivalism needs to take two of those poss.w. as truly separate. And this seems absurd. FieldVsLeibniz: That seems convincing at first glance. But (Horwich, 1978) is it not a strong argument against the existence of electrons as well? e.g. (DS) There is a poss.w. which is distinct from our actual world, but is exactly like our actual one, with the exception of its history which is shifted one mile. (DE) There is a poss.w. which is distinct from our actual world, but is exactly like our actual one. The only difference between the two is that in the poss.w. electron A and B were reversed during all its history. I 40 FieldVsLeibniz: There seems to be a difference. Hennig Genz Gedankenexperimente, Weinheim 1999 VIII 57 Symmetry/Equilibrium/Genz: a balance scale can also be stable in a slanted position! - equilibrium is indifferent ->Sombrero- Leibniz Vs: e.g. >Buridan's donkey. If there is no sufficient reason for a deviation, then there will not be one - Leibniz: there is no indifferent equilibrium > LeibnizVsSubstantivalism: there can be no independent space - because then the universe could be shifted (pointless) - today: VsLeibniz – Solution: spontaneous symmetry breaking. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Thomas Aquinas | Smart Vs Thomas Aquinas | Fraassen I 210 Aquinas: fourth way (Fraassen: undoubtedly the most difficult, the most subtle but also the most confused): Aquinas: (based on the gradation in the things found): in the things there are better, worse and truer and less truer things, etc. But gradations are ascribed to things according to agreement with something else (namely a maximum) (>similarity, >comparisons). So there must be something that is best, truest, noblest, etc. (namely God). Most Real Thing/Aquinas: refers to Aristotle: what is greatest in truth has most reality. (FN 11) Fraassen: there is a subtle analogy here: Smart: I want to defend the image of the physicist not just as ontologically respectable, but as a more true image than the image of our everyday language. Susan StebbingVsEddington: ~ the table is who it is for us (in our everyday world). Eddington: Thesis: the truer view is that, as an aggregate of molecules, it consists largely of empty space. (FN 13). Explanation/Smart: what we need is not for micro-theory to explain a macro-theory of macro-laws to which it is linked by correspondence rules, but (with Sellars and Feyerabend) to explain why observable things obey these macro-laws. |
Smart I J. J. C. Smart Philosophy and Scientific Realism London 2013 Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
Various Authors | Descartes Vs Various Authors | Duhem I 12 CartesianismVsAtomism: The physical atomism takes appearances as realities. According to Descartes matter is identical with the expansion in length depth, width. One must take into consideration nothing but different shapes and different movements. The matter is incompressible and absolutely homogeneous. Empty space and atoms are illusions. >Space/Descartes. Duhem I 14 DescartesVsDistance Effect Cartesian school Vs Rigidness of atoms, Vs distinction of filled and empty space (Leibniz: "of the extent and the mere change"). Cf. >substantivalism, >relationism. Duhem I 14 Duhem: Each successive school refers to the essential elements of its predecessor as "mere words". |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
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Relationism | Def relationism / relationalism: theory there is no empty space - space time only given by objects - FieldVs |
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Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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Space Time | Field, Hartry | I 70 Spacetime points/Field: thesis: have complete causal action capability. They are not an arena in which electrons act, but one can even do without electrons as independent agents (or entities). I 171 Relationism/R/Spacetime/Time/Field: Thesis: there is no spacetime beyond the accumulation of physical objects or aggregates. This does not mean that there are no spacetime regions. But: Prerequisite: that we find a method how to "logically construct" regions from aggregates of matter. Thesis: spacetime only logical construction. There is no spacetime! Substantivalism/S/Field: thesis: that beyond ("over an above") the physical entities there is an ("empty", for itself existing) spacetime. This also means that the spacetime is not merely "logically constructed" from aggregates of matter. I 175 Def Monadicism/Horwich/Field: (Horwich, 1978): Thesis: denies, like relationism, that space time exists. ((s) empty, for itself existing spacetimes). Spacetime only logical construction! VsRelationalism: no aggregates of matter or relations between them. Instead: primitive monadic properties of spacetime locations. ((s) As basic concept). III 34 Relationism: thesis: that there is no empty spacetime >substantivalismVs). a) reductive relationism: points and regions of spacetime are only set theoretical constructions. b) eliminative relationism: one must not quantify via points and regions of the spacetime at all. FieldVsRelationalism: I support substantivalism: spacetime points (or spacetime regions) are entities in their own right. Def Substantivalism/Field: External: Field I: 13 (Def thesis that speech about space is literally true (independent of physical objects, then (empty) space is self-perceptible, empty space exists). Field pro. |
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Substantivalism. | Field, Hartry | I 47 Substantivalism/Field: the thesis, that there are empty space-time- regions. |
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Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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Reality | Eddington, A. | Fraassen IV 210 Eddington: the truer view is that the table seen as an aggregate of molecules consists mostly of empty space. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |