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The author or concept searched is found in the following 127 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Axioms | Field | I 220 Axiom/Field: a required law can easily be proven by adding it as an axiom - Vs: but then you need for each pair of distinct predicates an axiom that says that the first one and the second does not, e.g. "The distance between x and y is r times that between z and w". Everything that substantivalism or heavy-duty Platonism may introduce as derived theorems, relationism must introduce as axioms ("no empty space"). >Substantivalism >Relationism That leads to no correct theory. Problem of quantities. The axioms used would precisely be connectable if also non-moderate characterizations are possible. The modal circumstances are adequate precisely then when they are not needed. I 249ff Axiom/Mathematics/Necessity/Field: axioms are not logically necessary, otherwise we would only need logic and no mathematics. I 275 Axioms/Field: we then only accept those that have disquotationally true modal translations. - Because of conservativism. >Conservativity. Conservatism: is a holistic property, not property of the individual axioms. Acceptability: of the axioms: depends on the context. Another theory (with the same Axiom) might not be conservative. Disquotational truth: can be better explained for individual axioms, though. >Disquotationalism. I 276 E.g. Set theory plus continuum hypothesis and set theory without continuum hypothesis can each be true for their representatives. - They can attribute different truth conditions. - This is only non-objective for Platonism. >Platonism. The two representatives can reinterpret the opposing view, so that it follows from their own view. >Kurt Gödel, relative consistency. II 142 Axiom/(s): not part of the object language. Scheme formula: can be part of the object language. Field: The scheme formula captures the notion of truth better. >Truth/Field. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Belief Degrees | Field | II 257 Belief Degree/BD/Conditional/Field: the classic laws of probability for belief degrees do not apply with conditionals. - Disquotational Truth/Conditional: refers to the complete: "If Clinton dies, Gore becomes President" is true iff Clinton dies and Gore becomes President. Non-disquotational: behaves like disquotational truth in simple sentences. With conditionals: simplest solution: without truth value. >Disquotationalism, >Truth values, >Conditionals. II 295 Belief Degree/Probability/Field: the classic law of the probability of disjunctions with mutually exclusive disjuncts does not apply for degrees of belief when vagueness is allowed. >Probability, >Probablilty law. II 296 Probability Function/Belief Degree: difference: for probability functions the conditional probability is never higher than the probability of the material conditional. >Probability function. II 300 Indeterminacy/Belief Degree/Field: the indeterminacy of a sentence A is determined by the amount for which its probability and its negation add up to less than 1. ((s) i.e. that there is a possibility that neither A nor ~A applies.) II 302 Indeterminacy/Belief/Field: some: E.g. "belief" in opportunities is inappropriate, because they are never actual. Solution: Acceptance of sentences about opportunities. - Also in indeterminacy. Solution: belief degrees in things other than explanation. II 310 Non-classical Belief Degrees/Indeterminacy/Field: E.g. that every "decision" about the power of the continuum is arbitrary, is a good reason to assume non-classical belief degrees. Moderate non-classical logic: that some instances of the sentence cannot be asserted by the excluded middle. >Excluded middle, >Non-classical logic. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Causal Theory of Reference | Davidson | II 185 (Note) Externalism/Causal Theory/DavidsonVsKripke/DavidsonVsPutnam//Glüer: possible misunderstandings: neither Davidson's externalism nor his characterization of occasional T-equivalences commit him to a causal theory of reference, as advocated, for example, by Kripke, Putnam and Devitt. Externalism/Kripke/Devitt/Putnam: for those, successful reference depends on whether the object and the utterance of the word are connected by the correct causal chain. >Reference, >Externalism, for T-equivalences see >Disquotation scheme. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Conditional | Field | II 253 Conditional/Deflationism/Field: the nonfactualist view is not the only one possible, both classical and non-classical logic can be used. - >Nonfactualism. Disquotational truth: it seems to require truth conditions. - E.g. "If Clinton dies in office, Danny de Vito will become President" is true iff Clinton dies in office and de Vito becomes President. >Disquotationalism. II 254 Conditional/Facts/Stalnaker/Field: (Stalnaker 1984)(1): Thesis: the conditional facts are not expressible in 1st order logic, but in indicative "If .. then .." clauses. >Logic, >Second order logic. II 255 Conditional/Factualism/Field: 1st Variant: assumes that "if A, then B" has the same truth conditions as "~A v B". Factualism: factualism does not accept counterintuitive conclusions - Non-factualism: seems committed to them. II 255 Material Conditional/Paradoxes of Material Implication/Jackson/Field: Best Solution: (Jackson 1979)(2): Thesis: counterintuitive conclusions are unacceptable here: Thesis: the conclusions are not assertible, but nevertheless they are true. There is a conventional implicature for that when we assert "if A, then B", that not only the probability P (A> B) is high, but also the conditional probability P (A > B I A). Field: the requirement that P(A > B I A) should be high is equivalent to the demand of the nonfactualist that P(B I A) is high - "Surface logic" has to do with assertibility. "Deep logic": says what is truth preserving. II 256 Factualism: must then distinguish between levels of total unacceptability (i.e. on the surface) and the acceptability on a deep level. >Acceptability. Deflationism: in the same way the deflationism can then distinguish between non-factualism and factualism without using the concepts "true" or "fact". Factualism: factualism does not accept counterintuitive conclusions - non-factualism: seems committed to them. >Facts. II 257 Non-Factualism/Field: must assume that the acceptance of conditionals is not regulated by the normal probability laws governing the acceptance of "fact sentences". >Probability laws. 1. Robeert C. Stalnaker. Inquiry. Cambridge, Mass: MIT PRess. 2.Frank Jackson, On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals. The Philosophical Review Vol. 88, No. 4 (Oct., 1979), pp. 565-589 |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Context/Context Dependence | Field | II 247 Relativize/contextuality/context-dependent/Field: if the relativization is made explicit, the context dependence (context sensitivity, or dependency of the reference system) is lost. ((s)>complete thought: is Timeless). >Reference systems. E.g. a) "It would be good." b) "It would be good according to my standards." Disquotationally true: may then be a statement that is relativized to my standards. - But no non-relativized evaluative statement can be disquotationally true. >Disquotation, >Disquotationalism, >Tarski-scheme. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Context/Context Dependence | Millikan | I 213 Intentional context/says that/believes that/belief attribution/Millikan: 1. Method: to ask: what characteristics of expressions must be preserved during the translation from direct to indirect speech. E.g. translation of "John said p" to "John said that q". Millikan: thesis: the rule will be to get the reference, no matter what expression must be used. Problem: when a descriptive expression needs to be translated. Then the relational meaning must also be preserved. I 214 2. Method: every indexical expression token in intentional contexts should be read as a shifted (i.e., normal!) adapted referent from the current context, not from the original context. >Belief ascription, >Indirect speech, >Quote, >Translation, >Utterance. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Convention T | Davidson | Glüer II 37 Convention T/Davidson: says that a theory must be translating (translational). ((s) Problem: sentences like "snow is white" and "grass is green" are equivalent.) >Disquotation scheme. Glüer II 38 Convention T allows only extensional language. >Extensionality. II 22 Def " Convention T " /Tarski/Glüer: "A definition of "true" formulated in the metalanguage is factually correct if all the sentences that can be derived from the schema follow from it. S is true, just when p is obtained by inserting a name of any sentence in the object language for the symbol "S" and the translation of this sentence into the meta language for the symbol "p". The convention T tests whether a definition of truth for a language L correctly determines the extension of the predicate "true in L". Neither the convention T nor the "T-equivalences" may be confused with the definition of truth itself. >Truth definition. II 28 Def T-equivalence/DavidsonVsTarski/Glüer : simply true exactly when the linked propositions have the same truth value under all circumstances. The right side does not have to be a translation of the left side. If, on the other hand, a translation would be required, then 1. the circumstances under which the W-equivalences are true are not arbitrary, and 2. the searched meaning would already be presupposed. Def Convention T*/new/Davidson/Glüer: A T-theory formulated in the meta language for an object language L is appropriate if all the sentences that can be derived from the schema (T) S is true gdw. p is obtained by using for the symbol "S" a designation of any proposition of the object language and for the symbol "p" a proposition of the meta language, which is true exactly when S is it. Glüer: here are equivalences, which are not required to translate the sentence on the right the sentence on the left, true iff. II 29 the linked sentences have the same truth value under all circumstances. DavidsonVsTarski/Glüer: Whoever wants to apply Davidson's reinterpreted convention T* must therefore know when T equivalences are true. TarskiVsDavidson: with Tarski, you need to know the meaning of both object and meta-language sentences. ((s) To be able to judge whether there is a correct translation). T-predicate/Davidson/Glüer: for Davidson, on the other hand, the T predicate must be interpreted. Davidson/Glüer: thus presupposes a prior understanding of the concept of truth. Truth/Interpretation/Translation/DavidsonVsTarski/Glüer: a G-theory that fulfils the (new) convention G* can be read as an interpretation theory: it implies for each proposition S of the object language L a T-equivalence derived from its structure, the right side of which indicates the truth conditions under which S is true. >Truth predicate, >Object language, >Metalanguage. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Correctness | Wright | I 272f Def "Correct"/Wright: here: T-predicate for minimally truth-enabled discourses. >Truth predicate, >Truth evaluability, >Minimalism, >Discourse. >Truth. ((s) Truth evaluability: this is about the question whether a truth value (true/false) can be attributed at all in some cases as e.g. moral judgments or assertions about the comical.) Wright I 276 Correctness/Negation/Logics/Truth/Wright: when both truth and correctness are at play, there is a distinction between the a) actual, strict negation: transforms any true or correct sentence into a false or incorrect one that gives another form of negation: b) Negation: works in such a way that a true (or correct) sentence is constructed exactly when its argument reaches no truth. >Negation, >Truth. Negation/WrightVsBoghossian: the proposal (Nonfactualism) actually assumes that ""A" is true" should be complementary to the negation of A in the latter sense. >Nonfactualism. A perfectly reasonable counterproposal, however, is that A should be much more complementary to the strict concept of the former negation. Then, in the event that A is merely correct, the assessment of ""A" is true" is also correct and the application of the predicate of truth will generally be conservative. WrightVsVs: but there are problems elsewhere now: the transition from (i) to (ii): the seemingly unassailable principle that only a sentence with a truth condition can be true would have the form of the conditional: (II) "A" is true > "A" has a truth condition >Truth conditions. I 276/277 And any conservative matrix for "A" is true jeopardizes this principle in the case where A is not truthful but correct. Because then the conservative matrix will rate ""a" is true" as correct. The consequence (II) that "A" has a truth condition (a fact that makes it true) will then probably be incorrect. Meaning Minimalism/correctness/Wright: Correctness cannot regard certain sentences (e.g. about primary qualities of material bodies) as candidates for substantial truth. >Content. The attribution of a truth condition can therefore be correct for such a proposition. Thus, even in a conservative matrix, the assertion "S has the truth condition that P" is true can be correct. But the whole basis of the argumentation is that minimalism of meaning has no choice but to view "S has the truth condition that P" has a truth condition as inevitably at least incorrect otherwise there is no affirmation of (i) as a premise. ((i): It is not the case that "S has the truth condition that P" has a truth condition). The insertion of "S" has the truth condition that "P" for "A" in (II) consequently produces, in a conservative matrix for meaning minimalism itself, a correct antecedence, but an incorrect consequence. I 277/278 WrightVsBoghossian: Summary: If the matrix (truth table) for "true" is not conservative, then the disquotation scheme fails in the decisive direction for the transition from (ii) to (iii), if, on the other hand, the matrix is conservative, the principle that only a sentence with a truth condition is true fails in view of premise (i). (The proposition is incorrect). Finally, if premise (i) is not allowed, there is no argumentation at all. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Correspondence Theory | Field | I 229 Correspondence Theory/Truth/Field: correspondence theory needs an additional concept of the truth theoretical content of psychological states. - And it is used in a way that it cannot occur in the disquotation scheme. >Psychological states, >Tarski-scheme, >Disquotationalism. I 250 Correspondence Theory/FieldVsCorrespondence Theory: even for an inconsistent theory it is consistent when the the correspondence theory is assumed that it is true, because the logical words in it could have been used differently. >Logical constants, >Language use. Therefore, the truth of the correspondence theory should not be applied to disquotational truth, because it is a logical concept itself and the instances of disquotation scheme must be regarded as logical truths. II 199 Correspondence Theory/ontological commitment/Quine/Field: the ontological commitment seems to exclude the correspondence theory. >Ontological commitment. FieldVsQuine: despite the uncertainty we should allow correspondence. - >Partial denotation. IV 416 VsCorrespondence: which one is the right one? Field: which one is relevant may depend on epistemic values, but not on which values are "correct. Field pro "epistemic relativism". IV 419 RelativismVsSkepticism: the question of the "real" justification does not make sense. >Relativism, >Skepticism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Counterfactual Conditionals | Fodor | IV 84 Truth Theory/equivalence/problem of extensionality/Fodor/Lepore: problem: snow is white iff. grass is green. This T-sentence does not support the counterfactual conditional: if grass were not green, snow would not be white. >Disquotation scheme, >Truth theories, >Truth definitions, >Equivalence, >Homophony. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Deflationism | Deflationism: collective term for theories that conceive truth as a property of sentences, not as something that should be realized (> pragmatism). The basis for deflationism is the scheme of Tarki’s definition of truth like "Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white. See also disquotationalism, theories of truth, truth definition, meaning theory, meaning holism, holism, prosentential theory, translation, pragmatism. |
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| Deflationism | Brandom | I 466 Deflationism: Brandom pro: propositional elimination of unnecessary assumptions - Problem: the deflationism undermines itself - not a fact is claimed when "it is true that snow is white" - Definition Deflationism: denies that content can be explained in concepts of truth conditions and compliance with the facts - Problem: the deflationism cannot deny that properties are expressed by predicates. >Truth conditions. I 468 BrandomVsVs: "is true" is a pro-sentence forming operator, not a predicate. >Pro-sentence, >Predicates. I 469 Deflationism/Non-Factualism (BoghossianVs): Brandom: a fact does not make a fact true, only in the derived sense - not semantic fact together with physical fact - facts do not depend on the assertion - BrandomVsBoghossian: there is no situation in which there are no facts. >Disquotationalism, >Minimalism, >Quote/Disquotation. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Deflationism | Dummett | Brandom I 471 Redundancy Theory/Dummett/Brandom: Redundancy theory presupposes the content of the non-semantic assertion in view of which the semantic assertion ("it is true that ...") is redundant. DummettVsDeflationism: Deflationism therefore cannot explain the propositional content by truth conditions (although everything has truth conditions). >Disquotationalism, >Minimalism, >Quote/Disquotation. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Deflationism | Field | I 91 Deflationism/knowledge/Field: Thesis: we do not know the consistency of the axioms e.g. The quantity theory or the theory of the real numbers. - For this would require mathematical entities - Conditional possibility principle/Field: (this would also admit Frege): if non-modal form, then knowledge alone from thinking about the logical form. - Deflationism/Field/(s): leads to that, that we have no mathematical knowledge as far as mathematical entities (m.e.) are concerned, since they do not exist. I 108 VsDeflationism/model theory/proof theory/Field: Problem: because there are no mathematical entities (m.e.) the (platonistic) schemes (MTP) If there is a model for "A", then MA - and (MS). If there is a proof of "~A" in F) then ~ MA - only trivially true - solution: modal surrogates or schemes: (MTP #) If N(NBG > there is a model for "A"), then MA - and (MS#) If N(NBG > there is a proof for "~A" inF) then ~MA - (F: here language) - "A" a sentence - NBG: Neuman/Bernays/Gödel - MA: "possibly A" - I 110 Conclusion: the deflationism has no problem with the model theory if it is about to find out something about possibility and impossibility. I 113 Deflationism/Field: deflationism does not say that the mathematical statements mean something different, but that what they mean cannot be literally known. Deductivism: always asserts that what AQ means is that which follows A from another statement. Deflationism: must not isolate statements - here other statements are not relevant to the meaning of A. II 104 Inflationism: Frege/Russell/Tractatus/Ramsey: truth conditions are central for meaning and content. - Vs: Deflationism: does not need truth conditions. II 108 Deflationism/Field: Main point: that the deflationism does not need truth condtions. - He also does not need any verificationism. Deflationism must also exclude the possibility of a physical reduction of truth conditions. II 114 Logical connection/Deflationism: one main advantage seems to be that deflationism does not have to make the choice between facts. Solution: one can easily explain in his own words what it is that "or" the truth table obeys: It follows from the truth functional logic together with the logic of the disquotational truth-predicate, without mentioning any facts about the use. "P" is true iff p follows by conceptual necessity through the cognitive equivalence of the right and left side. Problem: conceptual necessity is not sufficient to show that "or" the truth table is sufficient. - We still need generalization. II 116 Deflationism/Gavagai: for deflationism there is nothing to explain here - it is simply part of the logic of "refers" that "rabbit" refers to rabbits. II 117 Reference/Deflationism: if truth conditions are unimportant, then reference cannot play a central role. Solution: not reference is the basis but observations about our practice of concluding. - Then reference is purely disquotational - E.g.: "Gödel does not refer to the discoverer of the incompleteness sentence" but "Gödel is not the discoverer ..." - then semantic ascent. II 118 Causal theoryVsDeflationism: the deflationism cannot say that all we need for that, that my word for Hume refers to Hume, is the disquotation scheme. Nevertheless, the deflationist can accept that the causal network that explains what else would be mysterious: the correlation between believe and facts about Hume. II 119 Deflationism: the border to the inflationism is blurred because we have to construct something that could be considered as an inflationist relation "S has the truth conditions p", or not. II 127 VsDeflationism: 1. He cannot distinguish between "Either he is a hairdresser or not a hairdresser" and - "Either he is a fascist or not a fascist". 2. It cannot explain the explanatory power of the truth conditions - (E.g. For behavior and success) 3. It cannot distinguish between vague and non-vague discourse 4. It cannot deal with truth attribution in other languages 5. It gives "true" false modal properties ((s) "necessarily true" or "contingent true") 6. It cannot deal with ambiguity, indices, and demonstrativa 7. It cannot explain learning. --- Ad II 260 Deflationism/Nonfactualism/Conclusion/Field/(s): the deflationism (disquotationalism) does not accept any facts which, for example, are relevant why a word refers to a thing. - For deflationism, it is senseless to ask why "entropy" refers to entropy. - ((s)(use/(s): would be such a fact.) >Disquotationalism, >Minimalism, >Quote/Disquotation. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Deflationism | Horwich | I XVI Deflationism/Horwich: deflationism implies bivalence and even vagueness, e.g. unicorn (DeflationismVsPragmatism, DeflationismVsUsefulness of truth, etc. >Disquotationalism, >Minimalism, >Quote/Disquotation, >Bivalence. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Deflationism | Putnam | Williams II 502 Deflationism/Metaphysical RealismVsDeflationism/Putnam: the deflationism may not regard sounds as representations by virtue of a reference relation. It must represent meaning through assertibility conditions but conditions are no noise. PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: (although this picture is sympathetic): meaning is better in terms of appropriate use in the situation ((s) instead of community). >Disquotationalism, >Minimalism, >Quote/Disquotation. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 EconWilliams I Walter E. Williams Race & Economics: How Much Can Be Blamed on Discrimination? (Hoover Institution Press Publication) Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press 2011 WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Deflationism | Rorty | VI 32 Def Deflationism: the view, Tarski’s work encompasses all the essential features of truth. >Disquotationalism, >Minimalism, >Quote/Disquotation. VI 39 WrightVsDeflationism/Rorty: (like Davidson, but for different reasons) Wright not even mentioned the duty to achieve the truth. That leads to renewed inflation - because one standard need not be met with the other. >Crispin Wright. VI 40 WrightVsTarski: he has not succeeded to specify a standard. >Norms, >Truth. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Deflationism | Searle | III 216 Deflationism/minimalist theory of truth/Searle: thesis: truth is not a property or a relation. The entire content of the concept of truth is disquotation. >Disquotationalism, >Minimalism, >Quote/Disquotation. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Deflationism | Williams | II 497 Deflationism/correspondence/M.Williams: for deflationism, a minimal correspondence is available: the one that ist assumed in the causal theory (of reference). >Disquotationalism, >Minimalism, >Quote/Disquotation. |
EconWilliams I Walter E. Williams Race & Economics: How Much Can Be Blamed on Discrimination? (Hoover Institution Press Publication) Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press 2011 WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Deflationism | Wright | I 26ff Deflationism: is directed against the "inflation" by creating more truth predicates: legitimate assertibility next to truth (> redundancy theory). Thesis: truth is no property, only a means of disquotation. I 46 Deflation/Ramsey: was here first. (Recently: Horwich: "minimalism"): Truth assertorical - claiming, but not supported by adoption of metaphysical objects or situations. Tarski: disquotation is sufficient. Truth is no substantial property of sentences. True sentences like "snow is white" and "Grass is green" have nothing in common. Important: you can use the disquotation scheme without understanding the content. One can "truly" "approximate" the predicate. >Goldbach's conjecture. Deflationism thesis: the content of the truth predicate is the same as the claim, which makes its assertoric use. Deflationism: E.g. Goldbach's conjecture: the deflationism recognizes that there must be said more beyond Tarski. Also, cf. e.g. "Everything he said is true". VsDeflationism: not a theory but a "potpourri". There is no clear thesis. I 47 ff Inflationism: a) "true" is merely a means of affirming, only expresses attitudes towards sentences. It does not formulate a standard. b) The disquotation scheme contains a (nearly) complete explanation of the meaning of the word. ("True"). I 293 Deflationism: every meaningful sentence (i.e. a sentence with truth-condition) is suitable for deflationary truth or falsity. But if truth is not deflationary, "true" must to refer to a substantial property of statements. (Deflationism: truth is no property). --- I 27 Deflationism/Wright: truth is no substantial property. - Disquotation is enough. - "Snow is white" and "Grass is green" have nothing in common. The content of the truth-predicate is the same as the claim which raises its claiming use. Thesis: the truth predicate is prescriptive and descriptive normative. I 33ff Deflationism: the only standards of truth are the ones of legitimate assertibility. >Assertibility. I 51 WrightVsDeflation: "minimalist", > I 97 Vs (classical) Deflationism: no norm of truth-predicate may determine by itself that it is different from assertibility because the normative power of "true" and "assertible" coincides, but may diverge extensionally. - Then the disquotation scheme can play no central role. - >Tarski-scheme, >Disquotation. Therefore statements may be true in a certain discourse, without being super-asserting - then truthmakers must be independent of our standards of recognisability (>realism/Wright). --- Rorty I 38ff Disquotation/Wright: the deflationist thinks through the disquotation principle the content of the truth predicate is completely determined. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Disquotationalism | Disquotationalism: a variant of the theory of truth that is inspired by Tarski's definition of truth and believes that the two sides of the T-scheme must be taken from the same language, e.g. "Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white. See also homophony, homophone truth conditions, truth theory, Tarski, assertibility conditions. |
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| Disquotationalism | Field | II 105 Purely disquotational true: 1. Generalization possible only like this - for example: not every axiom is true - (but one does not yet know which) 2. "True-like-I-understand-it" 3. The concept is use-independent E.g. to say "Snow is white" is true is the same as to call snow white - no property is attributed which would not have it if one uses the sentence differently - everyday language: here we seem to use a different truth-predicate. Use-independency of the truth-predicate: neccessary for the generalization for infinite conjunctions/disjunctions - contingently true: E.g. Euclidean geometry. The axioms could have been wrong - we do not want to say with this, that the speakers could have used their words differently. Ad II 105 Definition disquotational/(s): "literal". Field: heuristic: disquotation means "truth-like-he-understands-it". ((s) So referring to the speaker - this is not a definition of truth in terms of understanding - merely heuristic.) Deflationism: this leads to cognitive equivalence. >Deflationism. Disquotational true/Field: "true, as I understand it". Cf. >Principle of charity, >Understanding. II 123 Field: Disquotational true is unlike Tarski-true. >Tarski-scheme, >Truth definition/Tarski, >Thruth theory/Tarski, >Truth/Tarski. ad II 135 Deflationism/Field/(s): contrast: semantic/disquotational: semantic: not simply repeating something literal, but finding truth, depending on the situation E.g. for index words. Disquotational: only repeating literally; this does not work for indices and demonstratives.# >Index words, >Indexicality. II 152 Disquotational truth: Problem: untranslatable sentences are not disquotationally true. >Translation. II 164 Disquotational true/disquotational reference: corresponds to the thesis that Tarskian truth is not contingently empirical. Necessary: both "p" is true iff p" and "it is true that p iff p" because the equality between possible worlds is not defined. - Truth is here always related to the actual world. >Possible worlds, >Cross world identity, >Actual world, >Actualism, >Actuality. II 223 Radical deflationism/narrow: does not allow interpersonal synonymy - only purely disquotational truth - it is about how the listener understands the sentence, not the speaker. Cf. >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. II 259 Definition disquotationalism/Field: the thesis that the question by which facts e.g. "entropy" refers to entropy, is meaningless. >Reference. II 261 Non-disquotational view/indeterminacy/VsDisquotationalism: the non-disquotational view must assume an indeterminacy of our concepts on a substantial level. >Indeterminacy. II 269 Disquotational view/truth/Reference/Semantics/Logic/Field: N.B.: Truth and reference are not really semantic concepts here, but logical ones. - Because they are applied primarily to our idiolect. >Logic, >Semantics, >Idiolect. Here they function as logical concepts. - (E.g. "true" for generalization) N.B.: that "rabbit" refers to rabbits is then a logical truth, not a semantic truth. - Then there is still indeterminacy in translation. II 272 Disquotational view/disquotationalism: for it, the relevant structure of a language is not to be understood in referential terms, but in terms of stimulus meaning, inferential role and indication relation. >Stimuli, >Stimulus meaning, >Pointing, >Ostension, >Inference, >Inferentialism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Disquotationalism | Putnam | Williams II 502 Truth/PutnamVsDisquotationalism: if we say anything about truth in terms of assertibility conditions, we get no concept of objective correctness, which allows to avoid cultural relativism. >Relativism, >Cultural Relativism, >Correctness, >Assertibility, >Assertibility Conditions, >Objectivity, >Objective Truth. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 EconWilliams I Walter E. Williams Race & Economics: How Much Can Be Blamed on Discrimination? (Hoover Institution Press Publication) Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press 2011 WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Domains | Field | I 247 Truth/domain/deflationism/disquotationalism/Field: "Truth in D" is not disquotational truth. >Disquotationalism, >Deflationism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Entailment | Geach | I 174 Entailment/Quine/Geach: Quine used "implies" instead of "entails". >Implication. Geach: Entailment requires nouns. Quotes are nevertheless noun-similar. >Quote. Entailment requires quotes to include sentences. >Quotation marks. GeachVsPropositions: "entails": is an artificial word; instead you can also use "an if". Example: "A. if Russell is a brother, Russell is male" That avoids looking at partial sentences as a blackening of the paper (letters). - (Otherwise "The proposition that Russell is a Brother ..."). >Blackening of the paper, >Proposition. I 180 Entailment/Geach: truth conditions: thesis: "p entails q" if and only if there is an a priori possibility to know that Cpq, which is not to find out whether either p or q is true. >Truth conditions. Problem: that implies a possibility that we have: "p" is false and "it is possible to find out that p" is true. One can know necessary things without facts and without conceptual analysis. >Necessity. Lewy's First Paradox: Entailment cannot be fully transitive. >Transitivity. I 183 Entailment/Lewy's 1. Paradox: Summary: 1. One can know a priori that Cpq without knowing p v q. 2. one can know a priori that Cqr without knowing p v r. We can conclude from these premises: Conclusion: one can know a priori that Cpr. N.B.: but we cannot add safely: without knowing ("which is not a way to find out") whether p v r. We have the a priori way of finding out that Cpr, derived from our a priori knowledge that Cpq and that Cqr. But that does not allow to answer if p, and figure out that Cqr allows not to figure out whether r. If the truth table provides the same truth values anyway, you cannot speak of a link. There is no reason to believe that we have any knowledge a priori that both Cp(Kpq) and C(Kpq)r, and such that Cpr, with the exception of a priori knowledge, that r. Therefore, there is no reason to believe p entails r. I 184 Transitivity/Geach: Entailment is not transitive, but validity of evidence is transitive. >Validity, >Evidence. FitchVs: Evidence is not transitively valid in order to solve paradoxes of set theory. >Paradoxes, >Set theory. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Equivalence | Field | l 159 Equivalence/Platonism/Nominalism/Field: Question: in what sense are platonist (E.g. "Direction1 = direction2") and nominalistic statements (c1 is parallel to c2) equivalent? >Platonism, >Nominalism. Problem: if there are no directions, the second cannot be a consequence of the first. - They are only equivalent within a directional theory. Cf. >Definition/Frege, >Consequence. Solution/Field: one can regard the equivalences as important, even if the theories are wrong. Problem: for the meaning one should be able to accept truth. >Meaning. Solution: conservative extension (does not apply to the ontology) - this is harmless for consequences that do not mention directions. >Conservativity/Field, >Mention. I 228 Def cognitively equivalent/Field: equivalent by logic plus the meaning of "true". >Truth. Disquotational true/Deflationism: means that the propositions in the Tarski scheme should be cognitively equivalent. - ((s) Plus meaning of true here: the same understanding of true.) >Disquotationalism/Field, >Deflationism. --- II 16 Extensional equivalence/Field: Problem: if we assume extensional equivalence and abstract it from the size, there are infinitely many entities to which a simple theory, such as the chemical valences applies: For example, the number 3 not only applies to molecules but also to larger aggregates etc. >Reference classes. II 106 Redundancy theory/Field: an utterance u and the assertion that u is true (as the speaker understands it) are cognitively equivalent. >Redundancy theory, >Utterance. N.B.: the assertion that an utterance is true, has an existential obligation (ontological commitment): there must be something that is true. >Ontological commitment. While the utterance u itself does not provide an ontological obligation. Therefore, the two are not completely cognitively equivalent. Relatively cognitively equivalent: here: u and the assertion of the truth of u are cognitively equivalent relative to the existence of u. II 106 E.g. "Thatcher is so that she is self-identical and snow is white" is cognitively equivalent to "snow is white" relative to the existence of Thatcher - the verification conditions are the same. N.B.: we do not need any truth conditions. >Verification conditions, >Truth conditions. II 252 Material Equivalence/Field: means that A > B is equivalent to ~ A v B. Problem: most authors do not believe the conclusion of e.g. "Clinton will not die in office" on "When Clinton dies in office, Danny de Vito becomes President". Therefore equivalence does not seem to exist. Solution/Lewis: the truth conditions for indicative conditionals must be radically index-dependent to maintain the surface logic. >Conditionals. Lewis: thesis: the surface logic should not be respected. Lewis: thesis: E.g. Clinton/Vito: truth-maintaining despite absurdity. Solution: probability function: P (Vito I Clinton). >Probability function. II 253 In the case of the indicative conditional, the premise is always presupposed. Adams: intuitively, conclusions with conditionals are correct. >Conditional/Adams. Problem: then they will say less about the world. >Empiricism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Equivalence | Thomson | Horwich I 161 Material equivalent/T-schema/Thomson: "material equivalent" is itself defined in terms of truth. >Definition, >Definability, >Truth, >Disquotational scheme. Horwich I 161 Equivalence/equivalent/Thomson: E.g. twice the same expression, whereby once its definition was used instead of a part of it - that is not the form of instances of Tarski's truth definition. >Truth definition/Tarski, >Truth theory/Tarski, >A. Tarski. |
ThomsonJF I James F. Thomson "A Note on Truth", Analysis 9, (1949), pp. 67-72 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 ThomsonJJ I Judith J. Thomson Goodness and Advice Princeton 2003 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Equivalence | Wessel | I 50 Bisubjunction/(biconditional)/Wessel: a biconditional is an operator that makes one formula out of two. >Formulas, >Logical formulas, >Operators. >Contrary to this: Equivalence: an equivalence isno Operator, but a sentence which asserts the equivalence of two formulas. >Assertions, The formulas are not even in the equivalence but quoted: "Formula A" ⇔ "formula B". >Statements, >Mention, >Quotation, >Levels/order. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Fixed Points | Logic Texts | Read III 196 Kripke's Fixed Points/Read: 1. Separate truth and falsehood conditions (i.e. falsehood is not equal to non-truth). 2. Two sentence sets S1: true sentences, S2 false sentences. 3. Do evaluation on each level, therefore you have to choose a higher level. In this way, all sentences are "collected". Fixed point/(s): where evaluation (output) is identical to input. Read: Success: then the extension fails - i.e. the meta language does not contain any further truth-attributions than the object language(1). >Meta language, >Object language, >Levels (Order). III 197 Kripke's Fixed Points/Kripke: the extension fails: the meta language has no further truth-attributions. There is a paradox in the fixed point without truth value. Falsehood does not equal non-truth! >Truth value. Truth-predicate/Kripke's Fixed Points/Read: we separate the truth-predicates truth and falsehood - the truth-predicate is formed by the pair (S1, S2), whereby S1 contains the true sentences and S2 contains the wrong sentences. >Truth predicate. 1st level: here, a sentence has, e.g. ""Snow is white" is true" has no truth value because evaluation at this stage is not possible. >Valuation. Solution: weak matrices for evaluating compound sentences, some of which are without truth value (without truth value) - (A v B) without truth value if one of A or B has no truth value (partial interpretation). III 198 Fixed point/Kripke's Fixed Points/Kripke/Read: the fixed point is reached by transfinite induction - recursive or successive with partial evaluations. 1st transfinite level: all finite partial evaluations of S1 and S2 are collected separately. N.B.: at an early point (before adding all possible sentences), the reinterpretation of the truth-predicate no longer succeeds in adding something new. Special case of the result about fixed points of normal functions over ordinal numbers. Phi/f: represents the operation of expanding by allowing new interpretations. The fixed point here is f(S1, S2) = (S1, S2). III 200 Unfounded assertions: the separation of S1 and S2 leaves some statements without a truth value - e.g. "this statement is true". It has no truth value at the minimum fixed point. One level higher we can give it an arbitrary value-but not to the liar paradox. Paradox/Kripke: follows Tarski: it cannot be expressed in one's own language. The entire discussion belongs to the meta language, as well as the predicates: "paradoxical" and "unfounded". They do not belong to the semantically terminated fixed point. Tarski's truth schema does not work here - (... + ...). >Disquotation schema. 1. Saul Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) in: R.L.Martin (Ed.) Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox Clarendon Oxf/NY 1984 |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Folk Psychology | Schiffer | I 33f SchifferVsFolk Psychology: problem: the theory will often provide the same functional role for different beliefs simultaneously. >Functional role, >Belief. SchifferVsLoar: according to him from Bel T follows #(that snow is = white Bel T #(that grass is green). Then both have the same T#-correlated functional role. (T* = folk psychology). >Meaning theory/Loar, cf. >Homophony. I 276 Here the uniqueness condition is a very weak condition. >Uniqueness condition. It is not sufficient for that one is in a particular belief state that is linked to them: - E.g. "If p is true, one believes that p". N.b. "p" exists inside and outside the belief context. Therefore, the theory will say something clear about p. Problem: in the uniqueness condition the variables for propositions only occur within belief contexts. Then all beliefs of the same logical form have the same functional role. >Opaque context. I 34 All that does not distinguish the belief that dinosaurs are extinct from the fact that fleas are mortal. ((s) Related problem: equivalence in the disquotation scheme: "Snow is white" is true iff grass is green.) >Equivalence, >Disquotation scheme. Schiffer: Problem: there are not enough input rules that are not based on perception. I 38 BurgeVsFolk Psychology/BurgeVsIntention based semantics/BurgeVsGrice/Schiffer: famous example: Alfred believes in w that he has arthritis in his thigh. - But he also covers all proper cases. In w he has a correct use of "Arthrite". Then he has in w not the believe that he has arthrite in his thigh - (because this belief is false). N.b.: in w he is in exactly the same T*-correlated states (T* = folk psychology) as in w. Therefore, he would have to express the same belief. But he does not - hence the common sense functionalism must be false. >Functionalism. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Functional Role | Schiffer | I 21 Functional Property/Schiffer: the concept of the functional property is derived from the notion of a functional role. Def functional role/Schiffer: simply any property 2nd order, of a state-type 2nd order. Its possession means that the possession of this state-type is causal or counterfactual to other state-types, namely, to output, input, distal objects and their properties. 1. A given physical state-type has an indeterminate number of functional roles. 2. Two different physical state-types may have the same functional role. Def functional property/Schiffer: each functional role uniquely determines a functional property-If F is an f role, then the functional property is expressed by the open sentence: x is a token of a state-type which has F. ((s) The functional property is a token of the physical state-type which has this and the role. In short: property = to be token of the type with the role.) Schiffer: Type here is always "physically"). >Type/Token. Properties belong to tokens - roles belong to types. E.g. the neural state-type H (hunger) has different functional roles in different people, because it is not triggered for all by pizza smell (various inputs.) >Input/output. I 23 Then you can correlate propositions with functional roles and a belief-property with a functional property. - For every proposition p, there is a functional role F so that a belief that p = to be a state token of the state-type that has the role F. >Propositions. I 26 The criterion that a state-token n is a belief that p that n is a token of a state-type which has the functional role, which is correlated with the definition of Bel T p. I 29 Verbs for propositional attitudes get their meaning through their functional role. ((s) e.g. "believes..."). >Propositional attitudes. I 30 Folk Psychology: 3 types of generalization: 1. functional roles for influencing beliefs among themselves 2. input conditions for perception (cannot be part of the common knowledge) 3. output conditions for actions. Problem: E.g. blind people can have our belief, but not our folk psychology. >Generalization. I 33f SchifferVsFolk Psychology: problem: the theory will often provide the same functional role for different beliefs (belief) simultaneously. >Folk psychology. SchifferVsLoar: according to him from Bel T follows # (that snow is = Bel T#(that grass is green) - then both have the same T-correlated functional role. >Brian Loar. I 276 N.b.: although the uniqueness condition is a very weak condition. - It is not sufficient for: that one is in a particular belief-state that is linked to them: E.g. "if p is true, one believes that p." N.B.: "p" occurs inside and outside of the belief context - therefore, the theory will say something unique about p. Problem: in the uniqueness condition the variables for propositions only occur within belief contexts. >Uniqueness condition. Then all beliefs of the same logical form have the same functional role. I 34 All that does not differentiate the belief that dinosaurs are extinct, from that, that fleas are mortal. ((s) Related problem: equivalence in the disquotation scheme: "Snow is white" is true iff grass is green.) >Equivalence, >Disquotation scheme. Problem: there is a lack of input: "rules that do not relate to perception". I 35 Twin Earth/SchifferVsFolk Psychology: folk psychology must be false because in the twin earth, a different belief has the same functional role. >Twin earth. E.g. Ralph believes there are cats - twin earth-Ralph believes - "there are cats" (but there are twin earth cats). Therefore twin earth-Ralph does not believe that there are cats - i.e. so two different beliefs but same functional role. Twin earth-Ralph is in the same neural state-type N - the specification of belief might require reference to cats, but the counterfactual nature of the condition would ensure that N is satisfied for twin earth-Ralph. N.B.: that does not follow from a truth about functional roles in general, but with respect to the theory T* (folk psychology). Outside the folk psychology: "every token of "cat" is triggered by the sight of a cat". Wrong solution: platitude: "typically triggered by cats". Thhis cannot be a necessary condition - in addition there are twin earth-examples, where typical belief is unreliable for one's own truth. VsDescription: no solution: "The thing in front of me". >Acquaintance. I 38 f Tyler Burge: no functional role can determine what one believes (this is not about the twin earth, but wrongly used terms). I 286f Belief/SchifferVsLoar: problem: his realization of a theory of belief/desires - (as a function of propositions on physical states) whose functional roles are determined by the theory. Problem: to find a theory that correlates each proposition with a single functional role instead of a lot of roles. Schiffer: thesis: that will not work, therefore the Quine/Field argument is settled. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Gavagai | Field | II 201 Indeterminacy/Gavagai/Theory/Reference/FieldVsQuine: the indeterminacy does not only refer to the absolute sense. - Either a) to the absolute b) to the relative reference. Absolute reference/Field: here there is no fact which decides what Gavagai has as an extension. >Absoluteness/Field, >Reference, >Meaning. II 202 Correspondence theory/indeterminacy/Gavagai/Field: new correspondence theory: partial signification: Gavagai has the relation of partial signification a) to the quantity of rabbits b) to the quantity of rabbit parts. This is only interesting, if one can explain truth with it. - Then "is" is either identity relation or partial identity. >Identity, >Partial identity, >"is", >Truth. Indeterminacy: is then the thesis that there is no fact that decides about it. - This does not mean that there is no disquotation scheme. - Modi fication: "signifies partially a and partially b". Partial signification/everyday language: E.g. "tall man": 180-185cm? >Everyday language. II 204 Problem: relativized signification and denotation leads again to the myth of the museum. >Myth of the museum. For each predicate T, set y (or {x I Fx} and translation manual M: T signifies {x I Fx} relative to M iff M T displays to a term which signifies y (or {x I Fx}). Gavagai/FieldVsQuine: Quine needs a connection between "rabbits" ((s) not "Gavagai") in our language and actual rabbits. But his indeterminacy thesis denies the existence of such a one which does not consist at the same time equally well out of rabbit parts. II 216 Gavagi/metalanguage/Field: we need defined expressions for the description of the partial extension: - E.g. "Rabbit" partly signifies the set of rabbits and partly the set of the unseparated parts of rabbits. >Metalanguage. Question: how can this be understood by someone for whom the last two tokens of "rabbit" are indeterminate? >Indeterminacy. N.B.: The sentence is just as understandable and has the same truth conditions when the metalanguage is indeterminate. >Understanding, >Truth conditions. II 220 Gavagai/indeterminacy/Field: the addition of "is an unseparated part of" to language reduces the indeterminacy. - (This comes from an inflationary view). >Inflationism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Generalization | Field | II 120 Realism/variant/Field: here: "There are sentences in our language that are true, but for which we shall never have a reason to believe them." - Then you need a truth-term to generalize. >Infinite conjunction/disjunction. Anti-Realism/Variant: here would be the opposite position: to identify truth with justifiability in the long run. Cf. >Truth/Peirce, cf. >Assertibility, >Pragmatism. >Ideal justification. Truth-predicate/generalization/truth/Field: For example, the desire to only express true sentences: "I only utter "p" if p." II 121 E.g. "Not every (of infinitely many) axioms is true" - or, for example, they are contingent: "not every one needed to be true". - N.B.: this is only possible with purely disquotational truth. >Disquotationalism. II 205 Partial Denotation/generalization/Field/(s): partial denotation - This is a general case of denotation (not vice versa). >Denotation/Field. II 206 This makes a simple denotation (which is a special case) superfluous. II 207 Partial match: generalization of consistency. >Consistency. II 206 Generalization/Field: E.g. partial denotation is a generalization of denotation. >Generalization. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| I, Ego, Self | Anscombe | Frank I 76 I/Anscombe/Schaede: complicated argumentation: 1) If there is a reference for the expression "I", i.e. a singular entity exists to which "I" refers directly, then Descartes is right, if anyone. VsDescartes: his theory, however, cannot explain specific peculiarities of the expression "I": e.g. the immunity against misidentification. >Misidentification, >incorrigibility. So Descartes is wrong and Elisabeth Anscombe is right. Anscombe thesis "I" has no referees at all! Course of the argumentation: first, Descartes' position is made as strong as possible to make some brief, almost essayistic remarks on Anscombe's own position at the end. I 77 I/Anscombe: why does it have to be certain? E.g. John Smith himself could not know that he is John Horatio Auberon Smith, who is mentioned somewhere. He could quote this text and speak of himself without knowing it! When using "I", only the reference is specified (the speaker), but not the (changing) meaning! >Reference, >Meaning. Question: Does "I" work like a proper name? From a logical point of view (where the meaning is not relevant) it does syntactically! E.g. but only an idiot would sign "I". Uncorrectability (immunity against misidentification): is not yet guaranteed by self-reference. I 82 "I"/Anscombe: the peculiarity of this expression lies in its strict situation-relatedness. It follows that "I" should not be emphatically substantiated to an "I"! The question remains: do "I" thoughts imply thoughts with "here" and "this", or is the implication just reversed? Frank I 99 I/Body/Anscombe: "I" is not identified by the body: e.g. the bishop could mistake the lady's knee for his own, but will he mistake the lady herself for himself? Frank I 100 Then that for which "I" stands would have to be the Cartesian ego. >cogito. Assuming it is my body: e.g. I am in a situation (water tank with lukewarm water, unable to move) where I am practically deprived of my body. However, I can still think, "I do not want this to happen again." The I is thus not identical with the body. >Body, >Self-reference. Thinking is just what is guaranteed by the cogito. I 101 I/Anscombe: for "I" there is only the use! I/Ambrose Bierce: ("The Devil's Dictionary"): ...the idea of two that are I is difficult, but subtle. I 102 I/Anscombe: Thesis solution: "I" is neither a name nor any other type of expression whose logical role it is to refer. (I has no reference). I 103 I/Logic/Anscombe: we still accept the rule of the logician that the proposition is true if the predicates are true. But that is not a sufficient description of "I". Because it does not differentiate between "I" and "A". The truth definition of the whole sentence does not determine the meaning of the individual phrases. Accordingly, the logical rule does not justify the idea that "I" from the mouth of x is another name for x. But the rule means that the question "whose assertion?" was all decisive. For example, a translator could repeat the author's "I". >Quote, >Indirect speech. It follows: "I am E.A." is not at all an assertion of identity. An assertion of identity would be: "This thing is E.A." But there is also the proposition: "I am this thing here". >Quasi-indicator, >He/he himself. |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Indirect Speech | Lyons | I 177 Indirect Speech/Lyons: in antiquity (Latin), it was quite possible that a whole speech was reproduced as indirect, whereby each section must be understood as separate according to the traditional view. All are individually dependent on a "verb of saying". I 257 Indirect Speech/Tradition/Lyons: e.g. Dico te venisse (I say you came) can be created in two steps: 1. direct form: Tu venisti 2. indirect form through "dico". Chomsky: (see below) it is not the sentence itself, but the (Tu) venisti underlying deep structure that is "embedded" as an object to dico. >> embedding, >Deep structure. Embedding/indirect speech/Latin/Tradition/Ambiguity/Lyons: it is known that embedding in indirect speech can lead to ambiguity: Example: Dico Clodiam amare Catullum. ((s) Everyone can be subject as well as object). Neutralization/Problem: both nouns are in the accusative. >Quotation. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Inflationism | Inflationism, philosophy: Inflationism, (usually not so-called), requires, in addition to determining whether a statement is true, the specification of conditions under which it is true. From this a truth-definition is to be obtained. The opposite term is the deflationism, that assumes that the truth schema S <> [p] with the example "snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white sufficient for a truth definition for formal languages. This latter view is also called disquotationalism, because the quotation is deprived of its quotes to the left of the equivalence. |
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| Interpretation | Peacocke | II 168 interpreted language/Peacocke: T-scheme T (s) ↔ p plus satisfaction relation "sats" (even uninterpreted) between series of objects and sentences. >Language, >Satisfaction, >Disquotation scheme, >Sentences, cf. >Statements, >Objects, >Predication. II 171 Variant: an ordered pair whose first component is an interpreted language in the sense of the previous section and whose second component is a function of sentences of the first components to propositional attitudes. >Propositional attitudes. Then the listener takes the statement as a prima facie evidence. >prima facie). |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Language | Peacocke | II 166 Psychologizing of language/Peacocke: Problem: there may be an infinite number of types of situations that are specified psychologically, in which a given semantic predicate is applicable, and which have nothing in common, that is specifiable with psychological vocabulary. >Situations, >Behavior, >Vocabulary. ((s) Question: can you identify these infinitely psychological predicates as psychologically?) PeacockeVsVs: it is not about reduction - the fine propositional adjustments do not have to be attributed before translation. Vgl. >Reduction, >Reductionism. II 168 Interpreted language/Peacocke: we get an interpreted language by using the T-scheme T(s) ↔ p plus performance relation 'sats' (uninterpreted itself) between rows of objects, and sentences. >Interpretation, >Disquotational scheme, >Satisfaction. II 171 Variant: a variant of this is an ordered pair whose first component is an interpreted language in the sense of the previous section and whose second component is a function of sentences of the first components to propositional adjustments. Then the listener takes the utterence as prima facie evidence. >Prima facie, >Evidence. II 168 Language/Community/Peacocke: we get a language community by the convention that the speaker only utters the sentence when he intends to (Schiffer ditto). >Language community, >Language behavior, >Intention, >Meaning/intending, >Language/Schiffer. Problem: the attribution of a criterion presupposes already a theory by the speaker. II 175 Language/Community/Convention/Peacocke: Problem: 'common knowledge': E.g. assuming English *: as English, except that the truth conditions are changed for an easy conjunction: T (Susan is blond and Jane is small) ↔ Susan is blond. >Truth conditions, >Conjunction. Problem: if English is the actual language, then also English* would be the actual language at the same time - because it could be common knowledge that each member that believes p & q therefore believes also p. >Conventions. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Language Acquisition | Putnam | I (e) 146 Truth/meaning/translation/language/Tarski/Putnam: a language learner who knows what "true" means, can learn German by "Schnee ist weiss" (English: snow is white) is true iff snow is white. He/she could also derive a T-sentence: "P is true iff P". >Truth, >Truth theory, >Truth definition, >Meaning, >Meaning theory, >Disquotation scheme. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Laws | Wessel | I 48 Laws/rules/logic/Wessel: Law = tautology, with operators. >Tautologies, >Operators. I 50 Rules: statements about formulas (formulas themselves do not appear as formulas, but as quotations) = equivalences. >Formulas, >Quotes/disquotation, >Levels/order. "Equivalence" is not an operator. >Equivalence. I 345/46 Law/Wessel: always logical form of implication - (x) (P (x) > Q (x) - although not all true implications are laws. When a law has the form of an implication it cannot be a statement of the form Q (a) where a is an individual constant. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Logic | Wright | I 60ff Semantic anti-realism/evidence: in contrast to Putnam might be satisfied now with a "one-way": (EC, epistemic limitation): (EC) If P is true, then there is evidence that it is so. Evidence/WrightVsPutnam: truth is limited by evidence. This leads to a revision of the logic. >Evidence, >Truth. If there is no evidence, Putnam must actually allow by contraposition of EC that it is not the case that P is true, from which follows per negation equivalence that the negation of P must be regarded as true. >Contraposition, >Negation, >Equivalence. I 61 Semantic Anti-Realism: refuses to concede the unlimited validity of the principle of bivalence (true/false). >Bivalence, >Truth value. Semantic Anti-Realism/Wright: there is this scope for reconciliation: who represents EC, is obliged by the negation equivalence, to permit (A): A If no evidence for P is present, then there is evidence for its negation. Wright: this is synonymous to an admission that there is evidence, in principle, both for the confirmation as well as for the rejection of P: But that conceals a suppressed premise: (B) Either there is evidence for P or there is none. This is a case of the excluded third. I 62 Classic, is the conditional (A) an equivalent of the disjunction (C): (C) Either there is evidence for P or there is evidence for its negation. Problem: that it is precisely the case of the excluded third, that is not to be assertible (not assertible): It would not be sufficient to simply reject the principle of the bivalence (true/false). If (B) Either there is evidence for P or there is no unlimited assertible, the embarrassment will occur: the logic must be revised for all cases where evidence is not guaranteed. >Assertibility. I 87f Revision of Logic/Wright: may be required when the Liar or anything alike comes into play. Here one can assume a "weak" biconditional: Definition biconditional, weak: A <> B is weakly valid if it is impossible that one of the two statements may be true, if the other is not, even if A, under certain circumstances has a different valuation from B or no truth value, while B has one. Definition biconditional, strong: A <> B is highly valid if A and B always get necessarily the same valuation. Then it also apllies for discourse areas in which the disquotation scheme and the equivalence scheme are called into doubt that both are still weakly valid. >Discourse. Revision of Logic/Negation: within an apparatus with more than two truth values there can be no objection against the introduction of an operator "Neg", which is subject to the determination that Neg A is false if A is true, but is true in all other cases. >Operations. Then, if A <> B is weakly valid, that also aplies to Neg A <> Neg B. Then there is no obstacle against the derivation of the negation equivalence: Neg (P) is true <> Neg ("P" is true). --- I 89 WrightVs: however, this will not succeed. Not even as an assertion of weak validity when "assertible" is used for "true." >Validity. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Logical Constants | Field | II 114 Logical connectives/Deflationism/Field: a major advantage seems to be that it does not have to make this choice (between facts). Solution: one can easily explain in his own words what it means that "or" obeys the truth value table: It follows from the truth-functional logic, together with the logic of the disquotational truth-predicate, without mentioning of any facts about the usage. "p" is true iff p follows with conceptual necessity by the cognitive equivalence of the right and left side. Problem: Conceptual necessity is not sufficient to show that "or" obeys the truth value table. - We still need generalization. II 275 Logical constants/indeterminacy/Field: E.g. a logic-beginner: nothing in his informal explanations will show whether he is an intuitionist or a representative of classical logic. For example, the full use by people who only have one of two terms, most likely the term completely. The indeterminacy of logical constants is, however, from a non-disquotational point of view, more illuminating than from a disquotational. >Disquotation, >Disquotationalism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Meaning | Boghossian | Wright I 370 Boghossian: we consider a non-factualism that is based exclusively on meaning (not on truth),: there is no property such that a word means something, and consequently no such fact. >Facts, >Nonfactualism, >Words, >Word Meaning, cf. >Use Theory, >Language Use. Now that the truth condition of a sentence is a function of its significance, the non-fakcualism of meaning leads to a non-essential factualism concerning the truth conditions. >Truth conditions. Then we have: For all S, P: "S has truth condition P" is not truth conditional. after Disquotation: For each S: "S" is not truthckonditional. >Truth Conditional Semantics. Intriguing consequence of a non-factualism of meaning: a global non-factualism. And precisely this is what distinguishes a non-factualism of meaning from a non-factualism with respect to any other object |
Bogh I Paul Boghossian Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism Oxford 2007 Boghe I Peter Boghossian A manual for Creating Atheists Charlottesville 2013 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Meaning | Loar | II 144 Meaning/Loar: a sentence in a community is a function of psychological and social role. - Other sentences in other languages do not belong to the point. - (Davidson ditto). Whatever is important, it is not something that is generally available in translation relative to the sentence. >Translation, >Language community, >Language use, II 144 Meaningfulness/significance/Loar: regardless of language: e.g. unstructured signals have conventional meaning in a community. >Conventions. Problem: the equivalence of "Snow is white" and "Grass is green". >Tarski scheme, >Quote/Disoquotation, >Truth definition, >Equivalence, >Convention T. Accidental equivalences cannot be ruled out. II 149 Meaning/sentence meaning/Loar: what a sentence means is always relative to a language - ((s) it is not a language-independent proposition). >Propositions, >Sentences. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Meaning | Putnam | I (a) 16 Meaning/Putnam: meaning is not in the head. Proof: the linguistic division of labor shows that I am not the only one who has the criteria ((s) at least I am willing to learn from others). PutnamVsTarski: understanding of the reference must be added. This must be independent of recognition (realistic position). >Reference/Putnam. I (g) 49 Meaning/theory/PutnamVsCarnap/VsPositivismus: the theory does not determine the meaning. Otherwise the term gravity would change if a 10th Planet was discovered. Positivists also require, that the theory is dependent of all additional assumptions, otherwise the schema theory and prediction would collapse. >Theory, >Additional assumptions, >Prediction. I (e) 141ff Meaning/Putnam: meaning results from the deletion of quotes. >Disquotation. I (k) 258 Term Transformation/change of meaning/significance/Putnam: e.g. if aliens had replaced all the stars of the Big Dipper through giant light bulbs, we would say : "that is not really a star" but not "this is not really the Big Dipper". >Meaning change. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Meaning Theory | Davidson | II 40 Meaning Theory/m.th./Davidson: instead of "notes" better: "Theory T includes .. " Then the entailment is a relation between the theory and an utterance of the speaker, claiming the entailment. >Entailment. Then T is a logical consequence of a sentence that is synonymous with my utterance of snow is true ... if ... " which brings the concept of synonymy in, but is not circular, because that is what we wanted for the notion of translation. This is the translation theory we have already attributed to the translator. >Translation. II 41 A meaning theory is impossible because it will cover no strict indexical elements - (this is not a problem for truth theory). >Truth theory. Glüer II 18 Meaning/Meaning Theory: A) truth-conditional semantics (Davidson) B) verification theory of meaning. (Dummett, Putnam, Habermas). All verification theories suppose the verifiability of the assumed relationship- a) powerful version: a sentence is understood by someone who knows that it s true - b) weaker: Understanding is the knowledge of the verification process. (Dummett, Vienna Circle) - or acceptability: Putnam and Habermas) - then a person understands a sentence, who knows how it is verified or when it will be accepted as true. >Verification, >Method, >Verificationism. Dummett III 137 Theory of meaning/axioms/Davidson: "Oxford" means Oxford: is not about the city of Oxford, that is called by the name "Oxford", but the reverse : about the name "Oxford", that it refers to the city of Oxford - which is more than mere knowledge of reference. Schiffer I 3 Meaning Theory/Davidson: thesis: it should have the shape of an extensional, finally axiomatized truth theory of language in the Tarski-style. And somehow be relative to statements. >Disquotation scheme. David Lewis: truth conditions must be taken into account - Schiffer: but nothing follows in terms of the shape of the meaning theory - Dummett: meaning theory and theory of understanding are the same. >Understanding/Dummett. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Meaning Theory | McDowell | Avramides I 12 Meaning Theory/m.th./McDowell: Problem: if meaning is explained in terms of something else, this other must be explained again. - Thesis: indirect access to understanding and general language behavior without the concept of analysis. - Instead, depiction of the relations between concepts we already assume as understood. - With this the concept of meaning does not occur. >Understanding/McDowell, >Definition, >Explanation/McDowell, >Meaning/McDowell, >Circle. --- McDowell II IX Translation semantics/Evans/McDowell: The point of view according to which the meaning theory has the task to frame rules which put sentences with their representations in relation - McDowellVs - E.g. x is a picture of F. - Problem: >Something "is a lion picture". ((s) This carries the singular qualities into the relation.) - instead: Solution/Davidson: satisfies neutrally. - N.B.: that removes the quotes. II IX/X Meaning Theory/m.th./McDowell: makes no relation between a sentence and itself. Instead, the m.th. represents a semantic property of the sentence by using it. - Translation: the knowledge that chauve bare is fulfilled, is no knowledge of a relation. - Instead: empirical relation between chauve and bald men. - This is just the use and not the mention. >Mention, >Use, >Mistake mention/use, >Translation, >Convention T, >Truth theories, >Disquotational scheme. II XII Translation problem/Evans/McDowell: E.g. x "is a picture of F" - Solution/Davidson: "satisfies", the relation of satisfaction neutrally conceived: x satisfies F iff Wx. - W: is an expression of the meta-language. - Problem is still there: x satisfies "is a picture of a lion iff x is a picture of a lion" must be explained (by additional determination). - The manipulations allowed in the theorem must correspond to the meaning of the used object-language expressions. II XVIIf Meaning Theory/m.th./Evans/McDowell: not from truth theory, for radical interpretation at best says that the truth theory is true. - For a foreign language, however, a reliably true truth theory is at the same time a meaning theory. II 43 Truth theory/McDowell: if one had a rule for f in "s, f is iff p" and this f could be replaced by "true". For this we need only the concept of the equality of the sentence-sense. II 50 Truth Theory: must show the content of the speech actions recognizable - ((s) The right side uses part of the world (e.g. the actual nature of snow.) - ((s) Problem: compared with this the language is relatively completed.) II 43ff Meaning Theory/m.th./McDowell: Thesis: a theory of the sense should be a meaning theory at the same time. - In addition: theory of force. (Question, command, etc.) >Theory of force. --- Dummett III 130f Definition "Exuberant Theory"/meaning theory/McDowell: attributes to the speaker knowledge of the conditions that an object must fulfill in order to be a bearer of a name. - Definition "Sober theory"/McDowell: here the speaker knows only about the object that he is the name bearer of. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Mention | Geach | I 74 Mention/Use/Geach: for each x: either x is white or x is not white. Mention: for each object x: either the predicate is "white" or its negation is true of x. "True-of": is a simpler term. Therefore, Tarski begins his defintion of truth with it: >Satisfaction. E.g.,"Proxy": at use - quote: at mention. Mention: "... its negation is true of ..". Negation is mentioned. Use of the negation: "x is ~ F" - ((s) Mention/(s): about the negation: "it is true" - likewise: "has a true negation".) ad I 84 Mention/Use/Quote/Geach/(s) E.g. "is an obscene expression" is not an obscene expression. I 195 Meta-language/mention/use/Geach: if p and q are meta-linguistical variables, then "~ p" means: "the negation of p" and not "it is not the case that p". >Meta language, >Variables, >Object language, >Levels/Order, >Use. I 202 Mention/use/names/sentence/Geach: names of expressions are formed by quotation marks - then at the same time mention and use. - Mentioned by the combination of its own with the quotes - used as part of a complex expression. >Quotation marks, >Name of a sentence, >Quote. Mention/Use: both are no contrasting pair. I 225 Mention/Use: E.g. a class or number is specified by mention (not use) of a property. >Classes, >Properties. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Mention | Grover, D. L. | I Horwich 345 Translation/quote/quotation/Camp, Grover, Belnap/CGB/Grover: most philosophers are of the opinion that foreign-language phrases are only mentioned and never used. CGBVs: this is not right. If we do not have a good translation, we can integrate the sentences directly without quotes. See quotation/disquotation, quotation marks, >Prosentential theory. |
Grover, D. L. Gro I D. Grover, A Prosentential Theory of Thruth, Princeton New Jersey 1992 Kamp/Grover/Belnap D. L. Grover, J L. Camp, N. D. Belnap Philosophical Studies 27 (1) 73 – 125 (1975) See external reference in the individual contributions. |
| Minimalism | Minimalism, philosophy: here, in particular, minimalist truth theories. The thesis of minimalism is that truth can be gained from the W-schema by Tarski Wr (S) <> p (e.g. "snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white) without accepting additional objects. It differs from deflationism in that it does not deny truth any substantial properties. See also deflationism, disquotationalism, inflationism, truth theory, truth definition, truth. |
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| Mistake Mention/Use | Mention/Use: Words are mostly used to mention an object. Words can also be mentioned when the use of language is under discussion. Various logical problems arise from an unconscious use of words while it is unclear whether they are used or mentioned. The confusion of mention and use corresponds to a confusion of words and objects. There are also forms between mention and use. See also object Language, metalanguage, quote/disquotation, reference, type/token. |
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| Mistake Mention/Use | Russell | (according to Rorty): Mention/Use: this distinction is originally from Russell. ((s) Explanation: E.g. number of letters of a sentence: "The cat is on the mat" has n letters. Here the sentence is mentioned. It is not about the meaning of the sentence. E.g. meaning of a sentence: might be given by a paraphrase: My pet is at its favorite place. Object language: the original sentence. Metalanguage: a statement about the number of letters, for instance.) >Meta language, >Object language, >Description level, >Levels(Order), >Meaning, >Quote; cf.>Indirect speech. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |
| Modalities | Field | I 185 Modality/Field: many people believe there can be a simple exchange between modality and ontology: one simply avoids an enrichment of the ontology by modal statements. >Ontology, >Modal logic. I 255 Modalization/Mathematics/Physics/Field: "Possible Mathematics": 1. Does not allow to preserve platonic physics 2. Advantage: This avoids the indispensability argument 3. False: "It is possible that mathematics is true" - but correct: Conservativity of modality. ((s) Mathematics does not change the content of physical statements). 4. For Platonic physics one still needs to use unmodalized mathematics. 5. Field: but we can formulate physics based neither on mathematics nor on modality: comparative predicates instead of numeric functors. - (257 +) >Platonism, >Mathematics, >Physics, >Conservativity. I 272f Modal translation/mathematics/Putnam/Field: the idea is that in the modal translation acceptable sentences become true modal statements and unacceptable sentences false modal statements. Field: then there are two ways of looking at the translations: 1st as true equivalences: then the modal translation shows the truth of the Platonic theorems. (Truth preservation). >Truth transfer. I 273 2nd we can regard the modal translation as true truths: then the Platonic propositions are literally false. ((s) symmetry/asymmetry). N.B.: It does not make any difference which view is accepted. They only differ verbally in the use of the word "true". >Truth. I 274 Truth/mathematical entities/mE/Field: if a modal translation is to be true, "true" must be considered non-disquotational in order to avoid mathematical entities. - True: can then only mean: it turns out to be disquotational true in the modal translation, otherwise the existence of mathematical entities would be implied. - ((s) "Non-disquotational": = "turns out as disquotational.") (No circle). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Nonfactualism | Boghossian | Wright I 267 Rules/Wittgenstein/Wright: whatever Wittgenstein's dialectics exactly achieve, in any case it enforces some kind of restriction for a realistic notion of rules and meaning. >Rules/Wittgenstein, >Rule following/Wittgenstein, >Meaning/Wittgenstein, >Meaning. I 268 And therefore also for truth, since truth is a function of meaning. I 269 Paul Boghossian: he has now presented an approach that could eliminate both concerns: I 270 Boghossian: we consider a non-factualism which is exclusively concerned with meaning (not truth): There is no property of the kind that a word means something, and consequently no such fact. >Facts, >Properties. Since the truth condition of a proposition is a function of its meaning, non-factualism necessarily implies a non-factualism with regard to the truth conditions. >Truth conditions. Then the following results: (5) For all S, P: "S has the truth condition P" is not truth conditional. According to quotation redemption: (4) For each S: "S" is not truth conditional. >Truth conditional semantics. "Fascinating Consequence"/Boghossian: of a non-factualism of the meaning: a global non-factualism. And precisely in this, a non-factualism differs from the meaning of non-factualism with respect to any other object. I 271 WrightVsBoghosian: many will protest against his implicit philosophy of truth, but nothing can be objected to the use of the word alone. Boghossian: Global Minimalism, Non-Factualism: regarding meaning, not truth: There is no property that a word means something, and consequently no fact, is a result of global nonfactualism, as opposed to all other nonfactualisms. Wright I 271 Realism/Wright: so far, the question has been asked which additional realism-relevant properties can make the truth predicate "substantive". We can now use "correctness" ("correct") for the minimum case. (Formal >correctness). The thesis of non-factualism can then be formulated in such a way that any discourse on meaning and related terms is at most capable of being correct, and does not qualify for more substantial properties. (i) It is not the case that "S has the truth condition that P" has a truth condition. As a minimalist, one has to accept this, since truth conditions attribute a semantic, i.e., substantive property, and this is denied by the proposition. >Semantic properties. Next: (ii) It is not the case that "S has the truth condition that P" is true. I 272 This follows from (i) since only one sentence with a truth condition can be true. Next: (iii) It is not the case that S has the truth condition that P This follows, according to Boghossian, "due to the quotation redemption properties of the truth predicate". >Truth predicate, >Disquotation, >Disquotationalism, >Deflationism. I 272ff Nonfactualism/Boghossian/Wright: > then every discourse can be at the most correct. (i) is not the case that "S has the truth condition that P" has a truth condition" - WrightVs: can be reworded with quotation redemption (vi) is not the case that it is not the case that S has the truth condition that P has a truth condition - but denial of truth is not inconsistent with the correctness of the assertion, however, (i) is not correct if both truth and correctness are involved, the matrix for that truth predicate (Definition) does not have to be conservative: i.e. That the value of ""A"is true" becomes false or incorrect in all cases, except where A is attributed with the value true. ((s) Non-conservativity demands truth, not just correctness, >truth transfer. "Correct": truth predicate "correct" is for minimal discourses that can be true. Negation/Logic/Truth/Correctness/Correct: If both truth and correctness are involved, there is a distinction (> negation) between the: a) real, strict negation: it transforms each true or correct sentence into a false or incorrect one, another negation form is: b) negation: it acts so that a true (or correct) proposition is constructed exactly when its argument does not reach any truth. >Negation/Boghossian. |
Bogh I Paul Boghossian Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism Oxford 2007 Boghe I Peter Boghossian A manual for Creating Atheists Charlottesville 2013 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Nonfactualism | Field | II 183 Fact/Nonfactualism/Field: E.g. relativistic mass or net weight in the Special Relativity Theory: - no fact decides which hypothesis is to be assumed. - The laws are, however, in some cases easier to formulate, depending on the choice. >Facts, >Relativity theory. II 224 Fact/discourse without facts/Nonfactualism/Field: 1. Questions of vagueness (Sorites): E.g. there is no fact, to which "bare" precisely refers. 2. assessment questions/morality/ethics. 3. sentences with indicators/index words. 4. Subjunctive conditional/counterfactual conditional >Counterfactual conditionals, >Index words, >Indexicality. >Vagueness, >Sorites. II 241 Nonfactualism/Factualism/Reference Framework/Relativity/Field: Nonfactualist: has a relativized T-predicate - but for him there is no "real" time order. Deflationism: distinguishes nonfactualism/factualism on the basis of accepted sentences. >Deflationism. Problem: also the factualist could have a relativized concept by introducing it as a basic concept. - E.g. "cosmically privileged framework". - Then one can no longer distinguish factualism and nonfactualism. Solution: to ask the factualist why his framework is privileged a) if he speaks of scientific exceptions, it is distinguishable from nonfactualism b) if unscientific, then indistinguishable. II 242 Nonfactualism/ethics: does not have to say that the sentences have no truth values. - It can say that the truth value ascriptions do not have the factual status, as the assertions themselves. >Truth values, >Ethics. Problem: if you only have the disquotation scheme, how should you state what is not entirely supported by facts? Solution: everyday language: also contains an (implicit) fact operator. >Everyday language. FieldVs: the rules for this are unclear. II 243 Nonfactualism/Ethics/non-deflationism/Gibbard/Field: (Gibbard 1990)(1): admits that evaluations have a factual component - factual and nonfactual must be connected in one and the same analysis. Sets of ordered pairs of possible worlds and standard systems, so that an utterance is true in this world according to this norm. Possible world: is here a complete specification of factual information. >Norms, >Possible worlds. II 244 But it does not contain any "normative facts". Complete norm: associates with each evaluative predicate a non-evaluative equivalent - E.g. "maximizes utility". >Utilitarianism. Nonfactualism: Thesis: the real world contains no "normative facts". N.B.: this non-existence is not a normative fact on its part. Otherwise, error theory: Thesis: "It is a fact that there are no facts". - Then: E.g.: "We should do this and that, according to norm N": is itself not norm-dependent but factual. II 254 Factualism/Field: Factualism does not postulate here a realm of facts, which the nonfactualist denies. Everything that the factualist asserts can be expressed by the nonfactualist by "~ A v B" (negation and disjunction). ((s) Then there is no antecedent that is made false by the absence of facts and thus creates a trivially true consequence.) 1. Gibbard, Alan. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Nonfactualism | Wright | I 272ff Non-Factualism/Boghossian/Wright:> if we assume nonfactualism, no discourse can be more than >Correctness, >Correctness/Wright. (i) it is not the case that S has the truth condition that P has a truth condition. WrightVs: this can be reformulated with disquotation into (vi) it is not the case that it is not the case that S has the truth condition that P has a truth condition. >Disquotation, >Tarski scheme, >Truth conditions. But denying the truth is not inconsistent with correctness of the assertion. >Contradictions, >Negation, >Assertibility. But (i) is incorrect, if both truth and correctness are in the game, the matrix for the truth predicate must be non-conservative: i.e. the value of A is true in all cases, false or incorrect, except those where A has the truth value true. >truth transfer, >conservativeness. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Norms | McDowell | I 179 Norms/standards/McDowellVsRorty: it is veiled, that it is precisely the standards that are up for debate. There are normative because the disquotation is the norm of their results. (McDowell: normative, not descriptive). >Norm/Rorty, >New description/Rorty. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Picture (Mapping) | Sellars | II 314 Representation/Sellars: to say of a particular atomic fact it would be represented by a certain elementary statement, we must use a statement in which the elementary statement occurs, but not truth-functional. We have to say something like: (1)S(in L) maps aRb. This mapping relationship cannot be expressed by a statement. Wittgenstein ditto. But not A and B are mapped, but a fact about a and b. Therefore, (1) has the form: (1""")S(in L) maps the fact that aRb. This now presupposes that the fact aRb in a sense, is an object. But then it is an object of a special kind, because: object: is named and not uttered - fact: is uttered and not named. (Although the name of a statement can be made). II 315 ... Thus, the problem of truth is only postponed. Because if facts belong to language (language/world) then "mapping" is a relation between statement and statement (Linguistic Idealism). Then the world must belong to language that would be absurd. >Truth functions, >World/thinking, >Representation, >Presentation, >Knowledge, >Causal theory of knowledge, >Facts, >Statements, >Observation sentence, >Mapping, >Knowledge representation. II 316 Solution: S(in L) means aRb and that aRb is a fact then we can apply our conception of "Picture" to the distinction that we have obtained from the semantic theory. (>disquotation/Tarski). It is well known that Wittgenstein restricted his picture theory to fact statements in the narrower sense. II 317 Thesis: that elementary statements are configurations of proper names that map configurations of objects. This means that statements are not lists of words. II 333 If concluding is an activity, then mapping is no relation. (II 312 > description). And there are those uniformities, by virtue of which a picture is an actual relation between objects in nature. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Popper | Ball | Gaus I 21 Popper/interpretation of Hegel/Ball: It may be instructive to revisit Popper’s Open Society to show how sincerely held present-day concerns can inform – or misinform – our interpretation of ‘classic’ works in political theory. Let us choose from the preceding rogues’ gallery a single example for closer examination: Hegel’s remark in Philosophy of Right that ‘what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational’ (1952: 10)(1). >Philosophy of law/Hegel. Popper quotes Hegel’s remark in English translation and then glosses it as follows: ‘Hegel maintain[s] that everything that is reasonable must be real, and everything that is real must be reasonable.’ Thus Hegel holds that ‘everything that is now real or actual exists by necessity, and must be reasonable as well as good. (Particularly good is … the existing Prussian state)’ (Popper(2). The Prussian state of Hegel’s time was an authoritarian police state that practised censorship, arbitrary arrest and imprisonment without due process of law. That state was real; therefore, in Hegel’s view, that state was rational or reasonable and thus good. In this way, Popper claims, Hegel gave his philosophical blessing to the Prussian prototype of the modern totalitarian state, and so must himself be accounted a ‘totalitarian’ thinker and apologist. Hegel is, in short, an ‘enemy’ of the ‘open society’. BallVsPopper: But is Hegel guilty as charged? The short answer is no. Let us see why. Here is Hegel’s own statement in the original German: ‘Was vernünftig ist, das ist wirklich; und was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig.’ The closest English equivalent is: ‘What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational.’ Note that wirklich is translated not as ‘real’ but as ‘actual’. In everyday German, as in English, there is Gaus I 22 ordinarily no sharp distinction between ‘real’ and ‘actual’. Popper (whose first language was German) fails to note that Hegel was writing not in ordinary non-technical German but in a technical-philosophical idiom. He draws and maintains a sharp distinction between wirklich (actual) and reell (real). In Hegel’s philosophical nomenclature an acorn (for example) is real; but it is not actual until its potential is fully actualized, that is, when it becomes a full-grown oak. In other words, Hegel uses wirklich to mean ‘fully actualized’; he contrasts ‘actual’, not with unreal, but with ‘potential’. Thus Hegel’s (in)famous statement means something like, ‘What is rational is that which fully actualizes its potential; and that which fully actualizes its potential is rational.’ Hermeneutics/BallVsPopper: There is a larger hermeneutical lesson to be learned from Popper’s (and many others’) misreading of Hegel (and Plato, Rousseau, and other theorists). First, it is important to place statements in their proper context – conceptual-philosophical or otherwise. In this instance that means taking note of how Hegel uses an apparently ordinary term in a non-ordinary or technical way. Second, one should beware of any interpreter who, like Popper, has a preset thesis that he then ‘proves’ by selectively quoting and stitching together statements taken out of their textual and linguistic context – a penchant Popper shares, ironically, with the Marxists he so detests. >G.W.F. Hegel, >K. Popper, >Translation, >Citations, >Indeterminacy, >Marxism, >Ideology, >Totalitarianism, >Misinformation, >Actuality, >Reality. 1. Hegel, G. W. F. (1952 [1820]) Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox. Oxford: Oxford University Press. . 2. Popper, Karl R. (1963 [1945]) The Open Society and Its Enemies, 4th edn. New York: Harper and Row. II, 41 Ball, Terence. 2004. „History and the Interpretation of Texts“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Probability Distribution | Field | I 257 Nonfactualism/NF/Field: must assume that acceptance of conditionals is not regulated by the normal probability law, which governs the acceptance of "fact sentences". >Conditionals, >Acceptability, >Probability law. Linearity Principle/Lewis/Field: P(D) = P (D I B). P(B) + P(D I ~ B). P(~ B) - is not acceptable for the nonfactualism if D is a form of A > C. >Nonfactualism. That is, the law for belief degree fails. >Belief degrees, Belief degree/conditional: in conditional conditions, the classical probability laws for belief degrees do not apply. Disquotational truth/conditional: refers to the whole: "when Clinton dies Gore becomes President" is true iff Clinton dies and Gore becomes president. >Disquotational truth. Non-disquotational: with simple sentences such as disquotational truth. For conditionals: simplest solution: without truth value. >Truth values. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Proper Names | Brandom | I 614 Proper names/Name/Brandom: can only be understood in terms of the sortal associated with them - e.g. you can not just point to an equestrian statue and call "it" a "lump". It depends on whether you are referring to the statue, or the lump of clay. >Reference. I 805f Name/Reference/Kripke: if it is determined that the name is used "as usual", different beliefs cannot endanger the reference - BrandomVsKripke: the concept of reference should not be assumed in order to be able to inherit an expression anaphorically - Co-typicity does not guarantee coreference! - (not even for canonically pronominal "he", "it") - in the anaphoric chain, the quote redemption principle is not applicable - BrandomVsKripke: no paradox, but we can use names in a way that is excluded by the disquotation scheme - e.g. "Cicero" (Spy): not all need to belong to the same chain, but you also do not need quasi-names (such as quasi indexical expressions (>Castaneda)). I 807 Name/Frege/Brandom: according to Frege names are supposedly linked with property. - KripkeVs - Brandom: this is not Fregian: according to Frege, properties are part of the meaning (reference), and not of the sense - they are not immediately comprehensible. Brandom: conceptual contents expressed by names are opaque. >Opacity. I 811 Definition Names/Brandom: anaphoric chains of co-typical tokenings. >Anaphora. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Propositional Attitudes | Mates | I 101f Propositional attitudes / opaque context / meaning / significance / Frege / Mates: expression changes meaning depending on the context - after "believe that" an expression has as the meaning, which usually makes up his sense and any sense as something else (indirect meaning). >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >Oblique meaning, >Oblique sense, >Citations, >Sense, >Meaning, >G. Frege, >Propositions, >That-clauses. Meaning: meaning is then the proposition (instead of a truth value) >Truth values. Sense: sense in a opaque context: an indirect sense corresponds to our "direct token", a name or identification. >Opacity, >Occurrence, >Names of sentences, >Descriptions. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
| Prosentential Theory | Prosentential Theory, philosophy: the prosentential theory is a variant of the theory of truth presented by D.L. Grover, J. Camp and N. Belnap (“A prosentential theory of truth, Philosophical Studies”, 27, 73-124, 1975). Instead of the truth predicate "true", a whole sentence "that is true" is accepted, through which a questionable sentence could be supplemented theoretically in order to reaffirm its truth. The decisive point here is that in this way truth is not attributed as a property of sentences. See also redundancy theory, theory of truth, paratactic analysis, deflationism, inflationism, disquotationalism. |
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| Prosentential Theory | Brandom | I 436 Definition pro-sententional theory of truth/Camp/Grover/Belnap/Brandom: is the result if you consider "is true" to be a syncategorematic part of pro-sentences. Analogy to pronouns. Savings - has the same semantic content as its anaphoric predecessor - recognizes its predecessor - e.g. "She stopped." Predecessor: Maria stopped. E.g. "for all you can say is true: if the policeman said it, then it is true". Cf. >Anaphora, >Truth theory. Four Conditions for pro-sentences (analog to pronouns): 1) They must occupy all the grammatical positions (embedded and freestanding) 2) They are generic: every clause of statement may be the predecessor of a pro-sentence, e.g. He is standing, he is his F. 3) They can be used quantificatorily 4) The class of the admissible substituent determines the significance of the pro-sentence - the anaphora is a relation between Tokenings. "This is true" is a response to a Tokening of "I am hungry". - E.g. "everything he said is true" is not accessible for simpler redundancy and quote redemption approaches. I 438 Per: it can explain complicated sentences: E.g. "Something that Hans said is either true, or it was said by Fritz". Cf. >Everything he said... I 441 Prosentential Theory/Brandom: "refers to" is a pro-sentence forming operator. - E.g. "The one Kissinger referred to as "almost third-rated mind" understood as a pronoun whose anaphoric predecessor is a particular quote by Kissinger - nominalization of sentences - ((s) Instead of describing a sentence: the name of a sentence). >Quote/Quotation. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Quantification | Field | II 147 Quantification/quotes/Field: normal quantification does not allow the generalization of names that are both inside and outside of quotation marks. - But we need it for e.g. "each name that came up in the discussion of staffing, referred to a man". >"Everything he said is true", >Quote/Disquotation, >Quotation marks. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Quotation Marks | Black | IV 147 Quotes/Black/Truth Definition/Tarski/(s): the form is shown in quotation marks, content without quotation marks, truth is attributed to the character itself (e.g."to be the case" or "proxy".) >Truth definition, >Quote/Disquotation, >Description levels, cf. >Mention/Use. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Quotation Marks | Mates | I 39 Quotation Marks/Mates: we use them when we want to refer to a particular symbol or expression - then we take them as a name for the symbol in the symbol - e.g. without quotation marks: If j and y are formulas, then (jvy) is a formula. >Levels/order, >Levels of Description, >Metalanguage, >Object language, >Quotation/disquotation. I 40 Here we insert names of expressions for "φ" and use "ψ" , the values are the expressions themselves. Problem: inserting expressions for "φ" and "ψ" results in the nonsense: e.g. ("F" a "v" F "b") (quotation marks set too tight). Solution: > spelling/Quine, >Names of expressions, >Names of sentences. I 75 Quotes/Mates: e.g. values of the statement "φ" ... with quotation marks. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
| Quotation Marks | Millikan | I 207 Quotation Marks/Mention/Millikan: mentioning quotation marks produce a configuration that has a stabilization function (> terminology/Millikan)... I 208 ...which is not adapted to the stabilization function of the inserted expression. On the other hand: Believes that: here the stabilization function is adapted to that of the embedded expression. Shifted function: in both cases, however, we have a shifted function of the expression. >Expression, >Sentence/Millikan, >Statement, >Proposition, >Quote/Millikan. I 211 Articulation/Quotation marks/Quote/Introduction/Millikan: some signs between quotation marks are articulated, others not: e.g. "the letter "c"". Here the "c" is totally non-articulated, like a name or e.g. "rot" in "the German word "red"". Articulated: if something is presented as a token of a type, it must be articulated ((s) have a structure). Articulated: (between the quotation marks) e.g. "the syllable "red"" e.g. "the expression "the King of France"": articulated in the sense how a sentence is articulated, or a complex marking. MillikanVsDavison: if the filling between quotation marks is without significant semantic structure, it cannot be a singular term. Then it is a description, if you want. Cf. >Indirect speech. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Quotation Marks | Prior | I 57 Quotes/quotation marks/Prior: quotes do not form even the sentence itself, but the name of the sentence. >Names of sentences. Some quotation marks are part of the sentence and change the number of letters of the sentence. Other authors: quotation marks are more like demonstratives: "The cat ... this has n letters." (Quotation marks appeare only once, because of the this). >Sentences, >Quotation/disquotation, >Metalanguage, >Object language, >Levels/order, >Description levels. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Quotation Marks | Putnam | I 141 Meaning/Tarski/Putnam: meaning follows from the deletion of quotation marks. >Disquotation. --- II 66 Point Quotation Marks/Sellars: (as Frege’s >"indirect sense"): a word in point quotation marks denotes its own role. Putnam: this is not showing the reference. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Quotation Marks | Quine | VII (f) 112 Quotes/Quine: square quotation marks: notation [] only upper half: is an expression marked as a noun m- variables are nouns if they occupy the place of names of sentences (Greek letters). See also Quote/Disquotation, Second Intention. X 33 Quotation Marks/Quine: it depends on them whether we are talking about words or the world. Quotation Marks/Quine: create the name of a sentence containing a name of snow, namely "snow". Truth-Predicate/Quine: by calling the sentence true, we call the snow white. Truth-Predicate: cancels the quotes. Sentence: we can say it simply by pronouncing it. Therefore we can dispense with quotation marks and truth-predicates. Truth-Predicate/Quine: we need it if we want to claim an infinite set of sentences that we can only define by talking about the sentences. Example: "All sentences of the form 'p or not p' are true". We need it to restore the reference to an object when we have used semantic ascension for generalization. >Truth Predicate/Quine Quotation Marks/Quine: the Tarski example cannot be generalized as follows: p' is true iff p because if you write the schema letter 'p' in quotation marks, you get the name of the 16th letter of the alphabet and not a general expression for sentences. III 67 Quotation Marks/Quine: form names (designations) e.g. we write "lies close to" not between Mannheim and Heidelberg, but between their designations (names). III 68 Rhyme/Quine: "Erden" (earth) rhymes with "werden" (become). Without quotation marks it would not only be wrong but ungrammatic and pointless. See also >Implication/Quine, >Conditional/Quine, >Mention/Quine, >Use. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Quotation Marks | Strobach | I 69 Quotes/quotation marks/Strobach: indicate that we do not have an object-language expression itself, but a picture of an object-language expression. >Object language, >Metalanguage, >Levels/order, >Description levels, >Quote/disquotation. By the picture you use, you mention the object-language expression. |
Stro I N. Strobach Einführung in die Logik Darmstadt 2005 |
| Quotation Marks | Tugendhat | II 109 Quotation marks/TugendhatVsHeidegger: In Heidegger the quotation marks are misleadingly omitted: E.g. "What you actually mean when you use the expression "being"". Tugendhat: Then it is ambiguous whether the sense of the word or of being is meant. - This is a shift typical for Heidegger. >Quotation, >Levels, >Sense, >Reference, >Description levels. Now when Heidegger asks for the sense of being, he asks for the sense2 of a sense1 of the word. - He asks for the sense2 (which is in any case not the sense of a word) of something we mean when we speak of the being of a being - and what this something is is left open. >Being/Heidegger, >Being, >Martin Heidegger, >Words, >Word meaning, >Meaning. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Quote/Disquotation | |||
| Quote/Disquotation | Brandom | I 800 Principle of disquotation: "P " should occur simultaneously inside and outside quotation marks. If a speaker agrees with "p", then he believes that p. I 801 BrandomVs: the combination of translation and disquotation (= type repetition) is not generally suitable as an analysis of the relation between the reported and the reporting token in indirect speech attributions. >Attribution, >Inderect speech. Three types of exceptions - ambiguities: 1st example: Cicero, Roman orator, or "Cicero" spy in World War II. The arrangement corresponds to the Paderewski case, but the double use of "Cicero" does not allow for any inconsistency or paradox. Paderewski is coreferent, the two "Cicero" is not. I 799 For example, someone hears from the pianist Paderewski, and thinks he is musical. Later he hears about a politician who was also prime minister of the Polish government in exile and does not consider him musical. (In reality it is both times Ignaz Paderewski). The parallel would not be that the inventor of the bifocal spectacles would not have invented the lightning rod, but that the inventor of the lightning rod would not have invented the lightning rod. I 801 Quote/indirect speech/Brandom: quote redemption = repetition of types - three types of exceptions - 1) "Cicero": spy: not co-referential with Roman orator, but no inconsistency or paradox because of double occurrence - 2) Paderewski: co-referential. I 803 3) Kripke's dilemma: only occurs under adequacy conditions: the speaker must be able to distinguish his case by "pure logic" or "semantic introspection". Brandom: why should we not rightly conclude that proper names are sometimes used in such a way that the principle of citation extinction is not applicable, because of the dual use of not only the "Cicero" type but also the "Paderewski" type? You can't find an answer. >Proper names, >Causal theory of names, >Description levels. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Quote/Disquotation | Cresswell | I 99 Quote/possible world semantics/Cresswell: e.g. he told us that he was older than he was. This can be made true by "I am 50". >Truthmakers. Problem: but no connection to the sentence "He was older than he was". I 166 Quotation/Quote theory/Bigelow: Thesis: things themselves can be temporarily added to the language as a name in it. E.g. the (deictic) use of them is necessary if a certain woman is added to the language. >Deixis. Anaphora/Bigelow: thesis: whenever the context can make something, also be the anaphora can be added. ((s), if the clarification has already been done by the context.) E.g. "I, Claudius". > |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Quote/Disquotation | Davidson | Frank I 644 Proposition/DavidsonVsAlston: the original text does not need to express the same proposition as the quotation. >Propositions. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica 38 (1984), 101-111 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Quote/Disquotation | Frege | II 64 Quotation/Frege: a quotation has no truth value in itself. >Oblique sense, >Oblique meaning, >Truth value, >Terminology/Frege. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Quote/Disquotation | Goodman | I 59 f Quote/Goodman: a quote is the name of a sentence, not a sentence itself (SearleVs). I 60 A quote must designate and include something (a that-phrase does not name). >That-clause, >Designation, >Proper names, >Sentences, >Quotation marks, >Denotation, >Naming. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Quote/Disquotation | Grover, D. L. | Horwich I 345 Quote/Camp, Grover, Belnap/CGB: quotes in the normal English should probably not be considered as a reference to expressions but that will not be further pursued here. >Reference, >Expressions. |
Grover, D. L. Gro I D. Grover, A Prosentential Theory of Thruth, Princeton New Jersey 1992 Kamp/Grover/Belnap D. L. Grover, J L. Camp, N. D. Belnap Philosophical Studies 27 (1) 73 – 125 (1975) See external reference in the individual contributions. Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Quote/Disquotation | Kripke | III 362 Quote/relation/Kripke: the quote process Q (x1, a1) does not define a relation. For each t, which can be used for x1, the result is a monadic predicate with free referential variables whose extension is (t). On the other hand: denotation: induces a relation, if the formula is transparent. The quote-name of a term works radically different from a structural-descriptive name. >structural-descriptive name, >Denotation/Kripke. III 364 A quote-name contains the term as part, a structural-descriptive name does not. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Quote/Disquotation | Millikan | I 209 Quotation marks/quotation/Davidson/Millikan: (D. Davidson Quotation, 1979)(1) thesis: mentioning quotation marks are indexical or "demonstrative". Their filling is semantically outside the sentence. Just like when I point at a fish and say "I caught this fish" the fish lies outside the sentence. >Quotation marks/Millikan. I 210 Mentioning quotation marks/Davidson: something like e.g. "the expression with the form shown here". >Mention. MillikanVsDavidson: Suppose the quotation marks alone get the indexing. Then the indexical matching relation is a relation to a type of filling ((s) the content does not matter). But if the filling is considered as part of the sentence, then the question is what is the criterion for where the sentence ends and where the environment of the sentence begins? E.g. "I caught this fish today" is a complete sentence with and without fish. On the other hand, ""___" has five letters" is not a complete sentence. ((s) The demonstrative therefore needs not to be fulfilled in the sentence, but can be supplemented by ostension, but the filling of quotation marks is indispensable in the sentence. Quotation marks/Davidson/Millikan: thesis: Quotation marks refer to the form of the expression (filling) between them. MillikanVsDavidson: that is inadequate because you have no clear concept of an expression type. Expressions are never categorized by the form. Millikan: Thesis: a strength of my approach is that linguistic units can be grouped into types. But this is not about form, but about the lowest types or genetic families. Millikan: when we say "he first drew this ... and then that...", we need demonstratives and ostension, not quotation marks. >Terminology/Millikan. 1.Davidson, D. Quotation. Theory and Decision 11 (1):27-40 (1979) |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Quote/Disquotation | Prior | I 56f Quote/Prior: with a sentence in the sentence: there is no sentence structure! >Levels/order, >Description levels. A quoted statement is not a component. Cf. >Compositionality. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Quote/Disquotation | Putnam | Rorty VI 87 Truth/Putnam: we cannot get around, that there is some sort of truth, any kind of accuracy, that has substance, and not merely owes the "disquotation". This means that the normative cannot be eliminated. Putnam: this accuracy cannot only apply for a time and a place (RortyVsPutnam). Cf. >Deflationism, >Norms/Putnam. --- Putnam I (e) 144f Disquotation/Putnam: the disquotation says that >criterion T is correct, but not how one can define "true" so that the criterion will be met. The disquotation does not allow, to remove the predicate "true" from all contexts. E.g. with what sentence, which does not contain "true", shall this be equivalent: "If the premises of a conclusion of the form p or q, not p, so q, are both true in S, then the conclusion is also true in S"? Tarski's theory goes beyond disquotation because it provides an equivalence with variables and quantifiers that alone does not provide the disquotation. >Truth theory/Tarski, >Truth definition/Tarski, >Truth/Tarski, >Truth theories, >Tarski. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Quote/Disquotation | Quine | I 366 Beliefs and quotes can be understood as infinitely many different things (>Vagueness). >Beliefs/Quine. I 377 Indirect speech: to put oneself in the mind state of the speaker, is not a measure of accuracy (translation) - no objectively correct translation. VI 97 Spelling/Quine: dissolves the syntax and the lexicon of each content sentence and merges it with the language of the interpreter - it then has no more complicated syntax than e.g. the addition sign. VI 98 (3) (Ex)(Pirmin believes "x is a spy") - Quote: what is quoted in (3) is nothing more than the name of a sequence with twelve letters. The "x" in it has nothing to do with the outer "E.g." - therefore spelling - QuineVs propositional attitude de re. >Propositional Attitude/Quine, >de re/Quine. VII (c) 53+ Quote/Quine: any nonsense can appear as a quote within normal language - problem: then it is part of the normal sentence - then it is no longer possible to exclude it from the set of meaningful strings - solution: a) narrow the term normality b) narrow the term appear - problem: we have an interest in not limiting the strings on the already known. VII (h) 141 Quote/Quine: does not necessarily destroy reference: E.g. "Giorgione" appoints a chess player (is true when he played chess). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Quote/Disquotation | Rorty | IV 40 Def Disquotation principle/Rorty: that B by the utterance of S says something true, A can only say if A could also say something that has the same meaning as S. Its applicability boils down to the question of whether all sentences are on the same level, or whether you have to say "true for phlogiston theorists, but not true for me". Rorty: I would refuse such a formulation. Instead: "Do not stand in line with the beliefs and desires of .. but with mine." >Beliefs/Rorty, >Truth/Rorty, cf. >Pragmatism. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Quote/Disquotation | Searle | II 228f Name/object/direct speech/quote/tradition/Searle: e.g. the sheriff spoke the words "Mr. Howard is an honest man". II 231 For the traditional conception the direct speech here involves no words (but names of words do). >Description level, cf. >Indirect speech. II 232 SearleVsTradition: of course we can talk about words with words. >Metalanguage. Also, no new names are created here, the syntactic position often not even allows to set up a name. II 233 E.g. Gerald said he would Henry (is ungrammatical). Solution: a simple repetition of the words, not the name of a proposition. >Proposition. III 229 Disquotation: disquotation is not sufficient for the analysis of a fact: e.g. that this object is red. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Quote/Disquotation | Tarski | Berka I 399 Tarski-Schema/Tarski: the statement x is true iff p "x" is replaced by a name of the statement "p". >Names of sentences. This name that belongs to the meta language. The name of a statement is construed in everyday language with quotation marks.(1) >Quotation marks, >Metalanguage, >Levels, >Truth definition, >Everyday language. 1. A.Tarski, „Grundlegung der wissenschaftlichen Semantik“, in: Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique, Paris 1935, VOl. III, ASI 390, Paris 1936, pp. 1-8 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Quote/Disquotation | Wright | Horwich I 110 Horwich: "Snow is white" is true because snow is white. WrightVsHorwich: this is not a sentence about truth, but a sentence about physical laws, laws of nature, and it does not help us here. Cf. >Tarski-scheme. Wright I 85 Tarski/Disquotation scheme/semantic definition of truth, disquotation: it is well known that it is incompatible with it, to accept a failure of bivalence (true/false). >Bivalence. E.g. if "P" is neither true nor false, then the assertion that "P" is true will be probably wrong and its biconditional probably incorrect. Disquotation scheme (DS): is the producer platitude for all other: thus correspondence, negation, distinction between truth and assertibility. >Correspondence, >Truth, >Assertibility, >Negation. It itself is neutral in terms of stability and absoluteness. Wright I 27ff Disquotation/Tarski/Wright: one does not need to understand the content. >Content, >Understanding. I 33 The disquotation scheme does not exclude that there will be a divergence in the extension: the aiming on an object with the property F does not need not be the aiming on a property with G - they only coincide normatively in relation to practice. >Practice, >Norms, >Language community, >Community, >Convention. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Radical Interpretation | Davidson | I (d) 70f Radical Interpretation/RI/Davidson: first, to find out the topic independently, then ask whether true - because the situation, which usually gives rise to belief, also determines the truth conditions. I (e) 112 Radical Interpretation/Davidson: it is not about a creation of a relationship formulated in meta-language between utterances of two languages, but about a structurally revealing theory of the interpretation of an object language - the reference to the known language is omitted. >Object language, >Metalanguage. Glüer II 40 Translation/Interpretation/Radical Interpretation/Davidson/Glüer: Translation knowledge is not interpretive knowledge - E.g. Nabokov "My sister, do you remember the mountain and the tall oak, and the Ladore?" - translation of the Russian sentence "..." - from the fact that this is correct, it does not follow that I only understand one of the two sentences. >Understanding, >Translation. Glüer II 40 Radical Interpretation/RI/Davidson/Glüer: Problem: mutual dependence on belief and meaning - not one without the other can be opened up - starting point: minimal belief: that a sentence is true at a certain time (occasion) - a) opportunity sentences: allows construction of hypothetical truth-equivalences. >Disquotation scheme. Glüer II 66 Radical Interpretation/DavidsonVsQuine: there is a general truth subordination -> Externalism: the belief contents are not independent from the world. Frank I 626ff Radical Interpretation/Davidson: the content of mental states is not to be determined independently from the linguistic behavior - the truth of the believed sentences is presupposed - otherwise no evidence can be derived from the environment and behavior would be meaningless. - The knowledge of the truth conditions is presupposed by the speaker, otherwise behavior cannot be interpreted. See other autors on externalism. Frank I 634 + Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica38 (1984), 101-111 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Redundancy Theory | Redundancy theory: comprises the thesis that nothing is added to a true sentence when it is said that it is true. In other words, each sentence asserts its own truth; the appending of the truth predicate "is true" would thus be redundant. See also judgment, truth theory, truth definition, deflationism, minimalism, disquotationalism, all that he said is true, predication. |
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| Redundancy Theory | Putnam | Field IV 407 PutnamVsRedundancy Theory: the redundancy theory does not explain our understanding. >Understanding/Putnam. --- Putnam VII 430 Redundancy Theory: truth is not a property. cf. >Deflationism, >Disquotationalism, >Disquotation. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Redundancy Theory | Quine | VII (i) 164 Redundancy Theory/Quine: it is doubtful whether the connection of "Fa" with "Fa is true" is analytic. XIII 214 Redundancy Theory/QuineVsRedundancy Theory/truth/Quine: the truth has been said to disappear, because the truth of the sentence is simply the sentence. ("Disapearance theory of truth") This is wrong: the quotation marks must not be taken lightly. We can only say that the adjective "true" is dispensable if it is applied to sentences that explicitly lie before us. Truth-predicate/true/generalization/Quine: is necessary to say that all sentences of a certain form are wrong. Or For example, a sentence that is not literal (not literally passed down) is true or false. Or E.g. that the slander paragraphs cannot be applied to true sentences or E.g. that you will tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. N.B.: if you translate such sentences into the predicate logic, the subject of the truth- predicate is not a quotation, but a variable. These are the cases where the truth-predicate is not superfluous. Disquotation/truth/definition/Quine: the disquotational approach may still be useful when it comes to defining truth. Truth-Definition/truth/Quine: it identifies all discernible truths that the truth of the sentence is communicated by the sentence itself. But that is not a strict definition; it does not show us who could eliminate the adjective "true" XIII 215 from all contexts in which it can occur grammatically. It only shows us where we can eliminate it in contexts with quotations. Paradox/Quine: we have seen above (see liar paradox) that definability can contain a self-contradiction. It is remarkable how easily definable we found truth in the present context. How easy it can be and at the same time possibly fatal. Solution/Tarski: Separation object language/meta language. Recursion/Tarski/Quine: shows how the truth-term is first applied to atomic sentences and then to compositions of any complexity. Problem: Tarski could not yet define truth because of the variables. Sentences with variables can be true in some cases and false in others. (Open Sentences). Only closed sentences (where all variables are bound by quantifiers) can be true or false. Fulfillment/Recursion/Tarski/Quine: what Tarski recursively defines is fulfillment of a sentence by an object; is not truth. These objects are then the possible values of the free variables. After that, truth trivially results as a waste product. Def Truth/Fulfillment/Tarski: a closed sentence is true if it is fulfilled by the sequence of length 0, so to speak. Liar Paradox/Tarski/Quine: Tarski's construction is masterly and coherent, but why doesn't it ultimately solve the paradox? This is shown by the translation into symbolic logic when the sentence is formulated in object language (see paradoxes above, last section). Paradox/logical form/liar/Quine: the word "true" has the context "x is true" in the explicit reconstruction where "x" is the subject of quantifiers. Problem: the recursive definition of truth and fulfillment does not show how to "fulfill x". XIII 216 or "x is true" is eliminated. Solution: this only works if "x is true" or "fulfilled" is predicated by an explicitly given open or closed sentence. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Redundancy Theory | Searle | III 216 Def Redundancy Theory: there is no difference between the statements "p" and "it is true that p". (SearleVsRedundancy Theory). III 217 These two theories are believed to be usually incompatible with the correspondence theory. >Correspondence theory. III 219 Disquotation/Searle: disquotation tells us only for each individual case, what it is what makes statements true. >Disquotation. III 223 SearleVsRedundancy Theory: the illusion of redundancy arises from the fact that at disquotation the left side looks like the right. III 227 SearleVsRedundancy Theory: "true" is not redundant, we need a metalinguistic predicate to evaluate the success. >Metalanguage. III 223ff SearleVsRedundancy Theory: there is the illusion that in the disquotation the right side looks as the left. "Is true" is an evaluation of statements. > Rorty: "is true" is a "compliment". >Truth/Rorty. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Reference | Wright | I 27 Deflationism/e.g. Goldbach’s conjecture: the deflationism recognizes, of course, that in addition to Tarski, something must be said, even e.g. "Everything he said is true." >Goldbach's conjecture, >Deflationism, >"Everything he said", >Truth/Tarski, >Definition of truth/Tarski, >Theory of truth/Tarski, >Tarski scheme, >Disquotation. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Relativization | Field | II 205 Relativity/relative/absolute/Quine/Field: Ontological relativity on a background language). Disanalogy: Places can only be understood by relations of objects - but this does not apply to words. No "linguistic relation" which would rule out indeterminacy. Real indeterminacy/Field: E.g. no fact decides which translation is the best for Newton's "mass" (net weight or relativistic mass). E.g. a) impulse = mass times velocity and b) mass is invariant (independent of the reference system). The two exclude each other. Solution: Mass partly denotates the one and partially the other. >Partial denotation. II 208 Consistency: is here no question of empirical linguistics. E.g. a) "it would be good" b) "it would be good according to my standards". Analog: disquotational truth: can then be a statement that is relativized to my norms - but no non-relativized evaluative statement can be disquotational true. >Disquotationalism/Field. II 254 Relativization/Field: Problem: in a relativization to a mere subjective probability law we do not get a truth value, but only conditional probability laws. >Probability law, >Truth values. Solution: conditional probability laws of B I A & R, where R is the totality of all truths (known or unknown) of a particular type, then conditionalities are perceivable that are believed only from a misunderstood background (not wrong!) Field: we better do it completely without relativation. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Reliability Theory | Schiffer | I 83 SchifferVsReliability: (as the key to representation, e.g. fuel gauge: there are false truth conditional functions possible: E-functions that do not ascribe situations but false words: E.g. "snow is white"/"Coal is white" (for mentalese). - Even under "optimal conditions". - Then it is uncertain whether the reliability has come about on the wrong way. >Fuel gauge example, >Mentalese/Language of thought. I 83ff Arthritis/reliability/mentalese/relation theory/SchifferVsFodor: ... + ... - Alfred thinks in his idiolect that he has arthritis in his thigh. Supposing there is a second function g that assigns a condition to arthrite that we connect with shmarthritis (rheumatic-like). Then: you cannot determine if Alfred is more reliable according to f (attribution of truth conditions) or g (attribution of false words). Condition (c): an M-function f is the truth conditional function for x' lingua mentis M iff the head-reliability and world-head reliability of x (thinking in M) with respect to f is greater than with respect to any other M-function. This is neither sufficient nor necessary. We do not know by which attribution function the speaker proceeds. Cf. >Quaddition. I 87 Quaddition/reliability/relation theory/belief/Schiffer: if Ralph does not understand anything about mathematics: there is no difference between two attribution functions a) correct addition, b) quaddition. Because they provide the same values for manageable numbers - and are not discernible for inconceivably large numbers because they are incomprehensible. >Reliability theory. I 104 SchifferVsReliability Theory: the functional relation that is correlated by the reliability theory with "true of" has, as one of its realizations. >arthritis/"shmarthritis". Solution: there must be an "designated role". I 104 Reliability Theory/Schiffer: Solution: adequacy by disquotation schema. - The probability that an M-function f* exists is high, given that x s believes and f*(s) e.g. is about the stock market. ((s), i.e. we assume that the people usually believe and know something true what they are talking about.) I 105 Hartry Field: if there is a functional theory for mentalese, then the reliability theory is indispensable. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Rules | Wessel | I 48 Laws/rules/logic/Wessel: Law = tautologies with operators. >Laws, >Tautologies, >Operators. I 50f Rules: sentences about formulas (the formulas are even not present as formulas but as quotations) = equivalences. >Quote/disquotation, >Levels/order, >Description levels, >Formulas, >Logical formulas. "Equivalence" is not an operator. >Equivalence. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Semantics | Field | II 133 Meaning/synonymy/deflationism/Field: a full-fledged deflationism should not rely on inter-personal synonymy, let alone inter-personnel attributable meanings - ((s) instead homophony and "as-I-understand-it". >Meaning, >Synonymy, >Deflationism, >Disquotationalism/Field, >Understanding. II 134 Then truth vulues are not semantical. >Truth values. II 168 Proposition/semantics/Field: false: to assume semantic relations between expressions and propositions. >Expressions, >Propositions. II 231 Non-semantical/Field: e.g. causally - e.g. assignment to an extension. Semantical: non-disquotational. >Causal theory of reference, >Causal theory of knowledge, >Reference, cf. >Speaker meaning. III 40 Semantics: e.g. conservativity - e.g. logical consequence relation. >Conservativity. Syntax, syntactic: e.g. derivability, e.g. provability. >Derivability, >Probvability. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Signs | Cresswell | II 14 Plus/Plus Sign/ + /Meaning/Cresswell: the meaning of "+" is simply the infinite list (function). >Functions, >Symbols, >Mathematical entities, cf >Equal sign. II 15 Operation: is what the meaning of the whole expression is. The number that is associated with the pair of numbers that are its parts. Meaning of "5 + 7 "is the number "12".((s) quotation marks sic). >Quotes, >Numbers, >Description levels, >Levels, >Meaning, >Operators. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Statements | Austin | I 228 Sentence/statement/Austin: a sentence is made of words, a statement is made with words - we use the same sentence to make various statements - "the statement that S" but the sentence "S" (quotes). >Sentences, >Quotes. I 238 Statement/Austin: No statement: e.g. definition, formula in a calculus, performatorical statements, value judgment, expression in a novel. E.g. "the cat is possibly on the mat" - neither true nor false. I 240 Truth/Austin: "true" is used while talking about statements that are not about sentences. (Strawson ditto). >Truth. |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Statements | Goodman | I 60 Denoting/Goodman: a that-clause does not denote: e.g. "the fact that triangles have three sides" (hence no quote). >Quotation, >Denotation, >That-clauses, >Clauses, >Sentences. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Substitutional Quantification | Field | I 245 Substitutional quantification/Field: Solution for the formulation of infinite conjunctions. >Conjunction. I 245 Def Disquotational truth with substitutional quantification: (P: for all sentences, not objects) applies: S is true iff p (if S = p then p). >Disquotationalism/Field, >Disquotationalism, cf. >Referential quantification. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Tarski | Davidson | Rorty VI 32 Davidson/Rorty: Tarski's "true in -L" specifies extension and thus no reference to future or general cases. >Extensions, >Disquotation scheme. Rorty VI 123 ff Truth Theory/Davidson/Rorty: Theory of truth for a Language: simple: "a theory that makes it possible to predict with some success what noise a speaker will make in what situation". >Truth theory. Rorty VI 193 Rorty: Fact/Davidson/Rorty: Tarski's great merit is, to have shown that we can do without the concept of facts. >Facts. Glüer II 50f Meaning/Tarski/Davidson: Tarski-like theories do not refer to meaning as fixed entities. (Davidson pro: meaning ultimately not fixable) - Consequences: 1. DavidsonVsTarski: actually spoken language is ultimately irrelevant. 2. the trivial thesis that meaning is conventional, must be abandoned. >Meaning/Davidson. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Tarski | Field | I 33f Tarski/Field: According to Tarski the following two sentences are a contradiction because he needs quantities for his definition of implication: a) "Snow is white" does not imply logically "grass is green". b) There are no mathematical entities like quantities. ((s) Therefore, Field must be independent of Tarski.) Solution Field: Implication as a basic concept. >Mathematical entities, >Ontology/Field, >Tarski-scheme. --- II 124 Tarski/Truth: Tarski's truth theory is unlike disquotational truth: only for a fragment. >Disquotationalism/Field. Unrestricted quantifiers and semantic concepts must be excluded. >Quantifiers. Problem: we cannot create infinite conjunctions and disjunctions with that. (Tarski-Truth is not suitable for generalization). >Generalization. DeflationsimVsTarski/QuineVsTarski. >Deflationism. Otherwise, we must give up an explicit definition. Deflationism: uses a generalized version of the truth-schema. TarskiVsDeflationism: pro compositionality. (Also Davidson) >Compositionality. Tarski: needs recursion to characterize e.g."or". >Logical constants. II 125 Composition principle/Field: E.g. A sentence consisting of a one-digit predicate and a referencing name is true, iff the predicate is true of what the name denotes. This goes beyond logical rules because it introduces reference and denotation. >Reference, >Denotation. Tarski: needs this for a satisfying Truth-concept. Deflationism: Reference and danotation is not important for it. >Compositionality). II 141 Truth-Theory/Tarski: Thesis: we do not get an adequate Truth-theory if we take only all instances of the schema as axioms. - This does not give us the generalizations we need, e.g. that the modus ponens receives the truth. II 142 Deflationism/Tarski/Field. Actually, Tarski's approach is also deflationistic. --- Soames I 477 FieldVsTarski/Soames: Tarski hides speech behavior. Field: Tarski introduces primitive reference, and so on. >language independence. SoamesVsField: his physicalist must reduce every single one of the semantic concepts. - For example, he cannot characterize negation as a symbol by truth, because that would be circular. E.g. he cannot take negation as the basic concept, because then there would be no facts about speakers (no semantic facts about use) that explain the semantic properties. FieldVsTarski: one would have to be able to replace the semantic terms by physical terms. >Semantics. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
| Tarski | Soames | I 481 VsTarski/Soames: two kinds of critique: 1st: FieldVsTarski: semantic properties should be dependent on speakers in a way that Tarski's are not. 2nd: Other authors VsTarski: Importance and truth conditions should be contingent, but analytically connected, characteristics of a sentence in a way that it is incompatible with Tarski. SoamesVsVs: both can be rejected. >Truth definition, >Quote/Disquotation, >Tarski scheme, >Truth theory, >Semantic properties, >Semantic facts, >Language dependence, >Speaker meaning, >Circumstances, >Logical constants/Soames. |
Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
| Tarski | Wright | Rorty I 38ff WrightVsTarski: he did not succeed to specify a standard. >Truth/Tarski, >Definition of truth/Tarski, >Theory of truth/Tarski. Wright: there are two standards: legitimate assertibility and truth. >Truth, >Assertibility. Difference: the pursuit of one is necessary also a striving for the other, but a success in one is not necessarily a success with the other. --- Wright I 85 VsWright: Tarski requires bivalence, assertions can also be undecidable. (Vs Platitude: assertion = putting something forward as true). >Bivalence, >Tarski scheme, >Decidability. WrightVsVs: the deflationismus precisely does not accept the (disquotation scheme). >Deflationism, >Disquotation. There are no problems with indefinite truth values, but with additional ones or gaps. >Multivalued logic, >Truth value gaps. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| That-Clauses | Millikan | I 211 Believes that/says that/quotation marks/Millikan: 1. in a particular context, an expression may have a shifting function that is indexical. 2. We already know three ways how expressions can be grouped into types. Could there not be another way that stands across to families or languages? E.g. "says that" instead of mentioning quotation marks? >Quotation marks/Millikan, >Quotes/Millikan, >Context, >Indexicality. I 212 E.g. "Galileo said "Eppur si muove" and not "the earth is moving". Family/function/classification/grouping/Millikan: E.g. Human hearts and fish hearts can be grouped together, although they are elements of different families. 3. Belief attribution/quote/Millikan: "believes that .." "says that ..." are representations. Could there not be a way to classify representations that stand across to the distinction inside/outside? Problem: "believes that" does not always correspond to an inner representation. E.g. John believes that Cicero is Tullius. ((s) Identity statements are not representations). So we cannot say that the term alone "believes that" indicates an own type. Classification/Millikan: if it is not to happen according to families, there are obvious alternatives: 1. Classification according to stabilization function: I 213 Question: What about the referring expressions in the sentence? These have Fregean sense. Fregean Sense/Millikan: there are two types of indexical expressions: A) relational meaning and B) adapted meaning. Intension: here, too, there are two indexical expressions. A) language-bound B) fully-developed (language-independent). Which of the four types is meant in "says that"? There will be different methods of classification. >Fregean sense, >Intension, >Classification. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Translation | Field | II 147ff Untranslatable/Translation/Extension/Deflationism/Field: Problem: Incorporation of untranslatable sentences. - Solution: potential extension of one's own language by accepting truth-preservation in conclusion. >Truth transfer, >Extensions, >Deflationism, >Language dependence. II 148 Names by index: "Georg-i": the George, to which Mary refered at the occasion of Z. Cf. >Situation semantics. II 149 Per sentence theory: "UTT Guru, Z": the sentence the Guru uttered at Z. - The special sentence is then superfluous. II 152 Disquotational truth: Problem: untranslatable sentences are not disquotational true. >Disquotational truth, >Disquotationalism. II 161 Def Quasi-translation/Def Quasi-meaning/FieldVsChurch/FieldVsSchiffer/Field: this is what most understand as meaning: not literal translation but reproduction as the interpreter understands the use of the corresponding words in his own language at the point of time in his actual world. >Stephen Schiffer. Comparison: is preserved in the quasi-translation at the moment, not in a literal translation. >Comparisons, >Comparability. Sententialism/Sententionalism/Field: Thesis: If we say that someone says that snow is white, we express a relation between the person and the sentence. 1. Quasi-translation and quasi-meaning instead of literal. 2. "La neige est blanche" quasi-means the same as #Snow is white# - (#) what stands between #, should be further translated (quasi-). - In quasi-translation, the quasi-meaning is preserved. >Speaker intention, >Intention-based semantics, >Truth conditions. II 273 Translation/Parameter/Field: in many cases, the relativization of the translation to a parameter is necessary to make it recognizable as a translation. - E.g. "finite": the non-standard argument tells us that there are strange models, so that "is in the extension of "finite" in M" functions as a "translation" of "finite" which maintains the inferential role of all what we say in pure mathematics. N.B.: "Is in the extension of "finite" in M" is a parameterized expression. Solution: what we are doing is to "translate" the one-digit predicate "finite" into the two-digit predicate "is in the extension of "finite" in x", along with the statements to determine the value of x on a model M with the necessary characteristics. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Translation | Grover, D. L. | Horwich I 345 Translation/quote/Camp, Grover, Belnap/CGB/Grover: most philosophers: foreign-language sentences are only mentioned and never used. - KGBVs: that s not right. - If we do not have a good translation, we can integrate the sentences directly without quotes. See >Quote/disquotation, >Quotation marks, >Use, >Mention. |
Grover, D. L. Gro I D. Grover, A Prosentential Theory of Thruth, Princeton New Jersey 1992 Kamp/Grover/Belnap D. L. Grover, J L. Camp, N. D. Belnap Philosophical Studies 27 (1) 73 – 125 (1975) See external reference in the individual contributions. Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Truth | Goodman | I 31 Truth/Goodman: provided that a world consists of statements, truth may be relevant. But truth cannot be defined or be checked by compliance with "the world". Truth is a docile and an obedient servant, no severe master. >Reality, >World, >Nature, >Correspondence theory. I 34 The scientist who assumes he is especially looking for truth deceives himself. He does not care about trivial truths he could grind out. "The truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth": this would be a wrong and paralyzing policy for any world producer. The whole truth would be too much, it is too large, too variable and too burdened by trivial. Nothing but the truth would be too little, for some right versions are not true (they are either false or neither true nor false). I 147 GoodmanVsTarski: Tarski must be revised: "'Snow is white' is true according to a version if and only if snow is in accordance with this version of white". >Truth definition/Tarski, >Disqotation scheme. I 149 Truth/Goodman: truth is like intelligence exactly what the tests test. I 146 ff GoodmanVsPragmatism: then the pragmatist thesis loses at the moment of victory its force: because that truths best meet the purpose of acquiring truths is as empty as it is obvious. Accuracy/Goodman: Goodman suggests high acceptability as an accuracy scale. >Acceptability. --- III 242 The truth of a hypothesis is a matter of fitting. Of fitting to a theory building and the fitting of hypotheses and theory to the existing data and the facts one will encounter. Truth/Goodman: we should reserve truth for the symbols in sentence form. --- IV 208 Accuracy/Goodman: accuracy does not seek a formal definition. Accuracy is a matter of fitting and activity. IV 205 Accuracy and truth sometimes go apart even in statements. Although snow is white, the statement 'snow is white' can sometimes be incorrect. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Truth | Prior | I 21 Truth/belief/Prior: Truth cannot only be applied to propositions, but also to belief: logical form: "(X thinks that) p and p" (bracket). - But determination of truth does not ascribe a property to any proposition (always facts are decisive). >Propositions, >Facts. A fact is possible without a believed proposition. >Beliefs, >Thinking. Problem/Moore: if no one believes that the belief must be false, even if it would be correct if someone believes that! ((s) This is due to non-existence). PriorVs: this is a misconception of belief as a relation to facts. >Relation theory. I 98 Truth/PriorVsTarski: you could also see it as an adverb (quasi-property) instead regarding it as a property: E.g. "when someone says that snow is white, he says it truthfully". Cf. >Truth/Tarski, >Truth definition/Tarski. Prior: with me there is no mention, only use. >Quotation marks, >Quotation/disquotation, >Disquotation scheme, >Mention/use. Prior: the sentencenly >snow is white" is only about snow, not about truth. - There is no metalanguage. >Metalanguage. PriorVsTarski: for me the truth is as much about the things that someone thinks, fears, etc. - Then you can also think that you think something wrong. >Thinking, >Self-reference. I 106 Truth/meaning/Buridan: every sentence means that it is true itself (in addition to what else it means). Prior: we have to admit that a sentence can have several meanings at the same time. >Meaning, >Sentence meaning, >Ambiguity. Then the sentence is non-paradoxically wrong (contradictorily) if it is to mean that it is wrong. - But there is no "secondary meaning" and "principle B". Cf. >Paradoxes. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Truth | Searle | Perler I 142 True/false/Searle: true and false are meta-intentional predicates. There are not only in the metalanguage. >Meta-language, >Object-language, >Intentionality/Searle. III 177 Truth/Searle: all true statements about the world can be asserted without contradiction at the same time. Yes, if they cannot be asserted without contradiction at the same time, they cannot all be true. Of course, there are always problems of vagueness, indeterminacy, family similarity, open texture, contextual dependency, incommensurability of theories, ambiguity, idealization, under determination of the theory by the evidence. >Context dependence, >Incommensurability, >Ambiguity, >Vagueness, >Idealization. But these are characteristics of our systems of representation, not of reality independent of representation! Truth in a scheme is a property of the scheme and not a real inconsistency. >Reality/Searle, VsSearle: >Reality/Seel, >Representation/Searle, >Underdetermination/Quine. III 185 Truth/Reality/Searle: there is a simple but deep reason why truth and reality cannot coincide as the naive external realist must believe, according to many philosophers. Every representation a forteriori and every true representation is bound to certain aspects, but not to others! They are always within the framework of a certain conceptual scheme and from a certain point of view. ((s) QuineVs, DavidsonVs). There is an infinite number of different points of view (Searle pro). Each representation has an aspect. But an ontologically objective reality seems to have no point of view. III 218 Truth/Searle: truth applies to statements, truth is a term that implies evaluation, trustworthiness and quoting gives us a criterion of trustworthiness. >Disquotation, >Truth definitions, >Truth theories. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Perler I Dominik Perler Markus Wild Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005 |
| Truth | Wright | Rorty VI 41 Truth/Wright: Truth is a selfstanding standard. >Assertibility, >Justified assertibility, >Superassertibility. Rorty VI 50 Truth/Wright: concession to deflationism: truth is no metaphysically heavyweight term. >Deflationism, cf. >Disquotationalism. Truthmaker/Wright: Wright does not doubt the existence of isolable "truth-makers". >Truthmakers. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Truth Conditions | Rescher | In: Skirbekk, Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996 I 342 Truth conditions/Tarski: The condition does not provide a definition of truth at all, but an adequacy criterion. - ((s) Truth conditions alternate with propositions and facts). >Adequacy, >Criteria, >Truth, >Facts, >Propositions. Definition of truth/Rescher: We rather need "that-p is true gdw. p" than the original schema "x is true gdw. p". >Disquotation, >Disquotational scheme. Quine/Church: X believes "there are unicorns" is not equivalent to "X believes the proposition that there are unicorns is true in German". >Equivalence. At most systematic correspondence of truth values - language dependence of truth. ((s) Other authors: criterion not equal to condition.) |
Resch I Nicholas Rescher The Criteriology of Truth; Fundamental Aspects of the Coherence Theory of Truth, in: The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford 1973 - dt. Auszug: Die Kriterien der Wahrheit In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Resch II N. Rescher Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kant’ s Theory of Rational Systematization Cambridge 2010 |
| Truth Definition | Black | IV 151 Truth-Definition/Tarski/Black: Tarski's truth definition cannot be given for the everyday language, because there is no list of names available. >Lists, >Completeness. The truth of a sentence with a new name would not be defined. - In everyday language, the truth definition would fluctuate with random changes. IV 160 Truth-definition/Tarski/Black: a list of instances is not enough. - Black: we need a "principle of the definition". - This must be formulated in the meta language. - It is not identical with what we understand when we understand the truth definition. >Understanding, >Disquotation scheme, >Truth/Tarski, >Definitions, >Metalanguage, >cf. >Meaning theory. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Truth Definition | Chisholm | II 69 Tarski: in the T-schema, the T-sentence initially expresses no reference to something non-verbal - for this one has to replace the T-sentence: "X is true" by "everything satisfies x".(> model) - >satisfaction. ((s) Satisfaction introduces world terms). T-Sentence/Tarski: E.g. "Snow is white" is true iff snow is white. T-Schema/Tarski: "S" is true iff p. (iff: "if and only if"). See also Quote/Disquotation. Sauer, W. Über das Analytische und das synthetische Apriori bei Chisholm. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Truth Definition | Logic Texts | Read III 40 T-Scheme/Tarski/Read: metaphysically neutral, not facts correlated with statements. T-scheme: >Disquotational scheme. Sainsbury V 196 T-Scheme/Liar-Paradox/Tarski/Sainsbury: the T-scheme allows the Liar paradox. Because it does not initially distinguish between levels. This shows that the everyday language is not coherent. >Everyday language, >Richness of a language, >Meta language, >Object language, >Paradox. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sai I R.M. Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 German Edition: Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993 |
| Truth Predicate | Field | II 28 "True"/Truth-Predicate/Purpose/Generalization/Generality/Quine/Field: (Quine, 1970)(1): above all, the truth-predicate has the role of generalization. - That is his whole value. - Leeds dito. Field: E.g. "All true sentences of this theory are theorems". Camp/Grover/Belnap/CGB: (CGB, 1975(2), dito). E.g.: "There are true sentences that no one will ever have a reason to believe". --- II 120 Truth-Predicate/Generalization/Truth/Field: E.g. the desire to express only true sentences: "I utter "p" only if p". --- II 121 E.g. "Not every (of infinitely many) axioms is true". - Or, for example, they are contingent: "Not every had to be true". - N.B.: this is only possible with purely disquotational truth. >Disquotationalism, >Disquotational truth, >Speaker meaning. 1. Quine, W.V.O. 1970. Philosophy of Logic. Harvard University Press (1970) 2. Dorothy L. Grover, Joseph L. Camp & Nuel D. Belnap. 1975. A Prosentential theory of truth. Philosophical Studies 27 (1):73--125. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Truth Predicate | Kripke | III 400 Truth predicate: because all the sentences T (f) biconditional f can be derived, the predicate may be interpreted as truth and Sat1 (x) can be interpreted only as the satisfaction (of a variable). >Disquotation scheme, >Satisfaction, >Variables. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Truth Predicate | Soames | I 479 Truth predicate/T-predicate/Tarski/Soames: the T-predicate is purely quantitative theory. - There are no conditions for the meanings. E.g. ["Snow is white" is T] and "snow is white" are necessary equivalent in elemental modal logic. >Equivalence, >Tarski scheme, >Quote/Disquotation. I 480 T-predicate/Soames: it was a discovery that it applies exactly to the true sentences. >Discoveries, >Empiricism, >Truth. |
Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
| Truth Theory | Davidson | II 34 Truth Theory/Tarski/Davidson: shows how the truth values of the sentences of L depend on their structures, and why some sentences contain others, and how words perform their function through their relationship to things in the world. >Truth values. Tarski: Meaning as the basic concept. II 35 FosterVsDavidson: Mistake: to overlook that someone could have a clear theory without knowing it. - Then there is no meaning theory. - (Davidson ditto). >Meaning theory. II 37 Truth Theory/Davidson: ""Snow is white" is true" is not an accidental fact about a sentence but a fact that interprets it. - This shows that the ability to interpret does not equal translation. >Interpretation, >Disquotation scheme. I (e) 111 Tarski: defines Truth - Davidson: Truth is an undefined basic concept. - "mine", "wanting to say": presupposes the concept of meaning. l (e) 111 Tarski: proceeds formally, Davidson empirical (laws instead of axioms, empirically verifiable). Glüer II 28f Truth Theory/DavidsonVsTarski/Glüer: Conversely: it is not required of T-equivalences that the right-hand side translates the left-hand side. - Definition Truth-Equivalence/Tarski: true iff the linked sentences (in the schema) have the same truth value under all circumstances. Glüer II 29 Then one must know for Davidson's reinterpreted convention truth (provides only true equivalences) when truth-equivalences are true. - It is therefore not necessary to know the meaning of both object language sentences and meta-language sentences. - ((s) the meaning is not presupposed. TarskiVsDavidson: the meaning of the sentence of both the object language and the meta-language must be known - truth-predicate/DavidsonVsTarski: his truth-predicate must be interpreted - Davidson: then the truth theory is an interpretation theory which, for each statement sentence S, a truth-equivalence derived from its structure, whose right-hand side indicates the truth conditions under which the left-hand side (S) is true. Glüer II 45 Truth Theory/Davidson/Glüer: for unknown language: 3 steps: 1. The totality of the data must be available, interpreter transmits his logic to the foreign language - basis: observations on sentences that are believed to be true at all times ) - 2. Predicates identified as such become the object of the interpretation (fulfillment conditions are approximated via opportunity sentences) - 3. Extension to general sentences (indirectly developed truth conditions). >Truth conditions. Glüer II 54/55 Truth Theory/Davidson: because of malapropisms: not structure, but intension has priority. >Intensions. Glüer II 56 Truth Theory: in principle, only for certain occasions correct - problem: for a theory of competence: there is no distinction anymore between the ability to know a language and to know about the world - language competency fuses with worlds. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Truth Theory | Tarski | Skirbekk I 144 T-Schema/Tarski: left side: name of the statement (in quotes). This can also be marking or spelling. "p": any statement "x": replaces the name of this statement. Then we ask for the logical relationship between the statements "x is true" and "p". Skirbekk I 145 "p" will be replaced by a statement and "x" by the name of that statement. The schema itself is not the truth-definition.(1) >Tarski scheme, >Truth definition, >Disquotation scheme. 1. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in: G. Skirbekk (ed.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977 |
| Unintended Models | Field | II 264 Unintended/Non-standard model/NSM/Field: Problem: we cannot simply say that the non-standard model is unintended. >Models, >Model theory. II 265 Non-disquotational view: here it is only meaningful to speak of "unintended", if we can state by what facts about our practice these models are unintend - and precisely because these models make each of our sentences just as true, the specification of such facts appears to be impossible. >Disquotationalism. II 267 Applying/Explanation/Observing/Field: our observation practice explains how our physical vocabulary applies to all that and only that to which it applies to. - That explains why some non-standard models are unintended. >Observation, >Observation sentences, >Observation language, >Satisfaction. II 319 Unintended Model/Interpretation/Putnam/Field: there is nothing in our use of the set theoretical predicates. That could make an interpretation "unintended". (VsObjectivity of mathematics). FieldVsPutnam: but this cannot be extended to the number theory. >Number theory. II 320 Not every objective statement is formalizable. - E.g. Consequences with the quantifier "only finitely many". >Formalization. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Use | Use, philosophy: words are used to mention something. The distinction use/mention is important in the philosophy of language because words or phrases in turn may be mentioned, as in a quote or a correction. Within logical formulas parts are used, others are mentioned. See also mentioning, use theory, meaning, meaning theory, language, quote/disquotation, quotation marks, quasi-quotation, object language, metalanguage. |
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| Vagueness | Field | II 227 Vagueness/revision of the logic/Field: some authors: to allow double negation, to prohibit explicit contradictions, thus also not to allow negations of the law of the excluded middle (l.e.m.). >Negation, >Double negation, >Contradictions, >Stronger/Weaker, >Excluded middle. Then old version: if Jones is a limiting case for "Jones is bald", we cannot claim either "bald" or "not-bald", so we can now. New: neither claim: E.g. "Jones is bald or not bald" nor "It is not the case that Jones is either bald or not bald." On the other hand: Field: with definite-operator (definite): "It is not the case that Jones is either definitely bald or definitely not bald". - Without law of the excluded middle: "neither bald nor not bald". II 228 Limiting case/vagueness/definite-Operator/Field: we need the definite-operator to avoid a limiting case of the a limiting case. >dft-operator, >Terminology/Field. II 228 Def Weakly true/vagueness/truth/truth-predicate/Field: to be able to say general things about borderline cases. Not only that somebody represents a certain limiting case. >Generalization. Def paradigmatic borderline case: definitely a borderline case. Not weakly true/deflationism: e.g. "Either bald or not-bald is true". Then the Truth-predicate itself inherits the vagueness. It is not definitely true whether or not. Def Strongly true/Field: assuming, Jones is a limiting case: then neither "bald" nor its negation (strongly) plus classical logic: then the disjunction "bald or not bald" should be true even in strong interpretation. Law of the excluded middle: if we give it up: a) weakly true: then the disjunction is not true b) strongly true: then the disjunction is without truth value. Strongly true: is less vague, does not inherit the vagueness. Correctness: which interpretation is the correct one is only dependent on utility. >Correctness. Per weak truth: allows infinite conjunction and disjunction. This corresponds more to the theory of validity. - Only the weak Truth-concept is supplied by the disquotation scheme. Deflationism: deflationism additionally requires the definite-operator to declare the predicate strongly true. >Deflationism. II 230 Inflationism/Vagueness/FieldVsInflationism: Problem: the I. needs a thing that is "neither bald nor not bald". Inflationism: explains e.g. "weakly true" compositional. >Inflationism. Supervaluation/Sorites/Inflationism: "candidate of an extension". >Supervaluation. Def strongly true: is a sentence with a vague predicate then iff it is true relative to each of the candidates of an extension. - Then the limiting case without definite-operator: "Jones is bald in some extensions but not in all". II 233 Vagueness/Ontology/Field: Thesis: vgueness is a deficiency of language, not of the world. >Language dependence. II 234 Vagueness/radical non-classical logic/Field: here we do not need a definite-operator or distinction between strong/weak truth: e.g. Jones is a limiting case iff it is not the case that he is either bald or not bald. Deflationism/Field: seems to save a lot of trouble, because there is no definite-operator, one would have to understand. Vs: that deceives: the trouble is only postponed: here the logical rules for "not", etc. are much more complicated. ... + ... II 228 Weakly true:...++... |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| World/Thinking | Putnam | McDowell I 177 PutnamVsDavidson: when the cause-effect description is complete, then the sounds that we utter, cannot be more than a mere "expression of our subjectivity". RortyVsPutnam: Putnam understands by a "declaration of X" still a synopsis, the synthesis of external and internal position. Representatives of disquotation believe that people can only be described in a behaviorist manner. But why should it be impossible to consider supplements by normative representations? (Putnam's philosophy was ultimately traditional.) >Disquotation, >Behaviorism, >Norms/Putnam. McDowell I 177 Causality/Putnam: the desire to tell a story about the causal relationships of human pronouncements and environment, does not rule out that one invents a story, after the speakers are expressing thoughts, and make assertions, and try to not make mistakes. These stories are then eventually not distinguishable. >Causal theory of knowledge, >Pragmatism. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Boghossian, Paul | Wright Vs Boghossian, Paul | I 270 Boghossian: let us consider a non factualism exclusively related to meaning (not truth): there is no property of the kind that a word means something, and consequently no such fact. Since now the truth condition of a proposition is a function of its meaning, non-factualism regarding meaning necessarily requires a non-factualism regarding truth conditions. Then it results: (5) For all S,P: "S has the truth condition P" is not truth conditional. after disquotation: (4) For each S: "S" is not truth conditional. "Fascinating consequence"/Boghossian: of a non-factualism of meaning: a global non-factualism. And this is precisely where a non-factualism of meaning differs from a non-factualism with reference to any other object... I 271 WrightVsBoghossian: many will protest against his implicit philosophy of truth, but there is nothing against the use of the word alone. Global Minimalism/WrightVsBoghossian: Problem: 1. Can the required notion of substantial truth be completely understandable if there are no examples of it at all? ((s) Because that is just denied by the thesis). 2. The status of the justification is even more difficult. Does an advocate not have to demand that the reasoning be valid? Such a justification, however, must at least show cognitive coercion and thus exceed minimalism. I 273 WrightVsBoghossian: with the principle that only a sentence with a truth condition can be true, we can go over to it: (iv) It is not the case that S is true and then, by using (i) - the premise of reasoning - for S (v) It is not the case that (i) is true. From this follows the "disquotation properties": (vi) It is not the case that it is not the case that "S has the truth condition that P" has a truth condition. But is this a reductio ad absurdum of (i)? This is not a stupid question! If truth is understood as substantial, and contrasted with an inferior surrogate, then the denial of truth is not necessarily inconsistent with the assertion of its correctness. A correct reductio should show that (i) is not even correct. Boghossian is thus faced with a dilemma: a) if it is a reductio of (i), it shows that the minimalism of meaning is incoherent, I 274 b) if it is not reductio - if the negation in (vi) rejects a substantial truth and not merely negates correctness - then (iii) can no longer be an expression of global minimalism (meaning and truth), for (iii) is consistent with the correctness of the assertion that certain propositions possess substantial truth conditions. (iii) Can at most require that any statement that can only be correct cannot itself be considered correct. WrightVsBoghossian: the "fascinating consequence" is nowhere in sight. 1. Minimalism of meaning does not cancel itself out. 2. There is also not logically necessary a minimalism regarding the distinction between discourses that are suitable for substantial truth and those that are not. Problem: that Boghossian has to work with different truth predicates ("true" and "correct"). Of course, this is important for his differentiation, but it has a potential effect on the disquotation, which is so important for him. Wright: "strong need": a philosophy that distinguishes between the substantially true and the merely correct must itself be substantial. I 275 WrightVsBoghossian: the details: the move from (ii) to (iii) is a modus tollens on the right left section of the disquotation scheme (DS): (I) A > "A" is true. Question: can we safely assume that this principle is at least correct when both truth and correctness are involved? No: if A is just correct, the claim that "A" is true will at best reflect its status incorrectly! Decisive: for the transition from (ii) to (iii) is the relevant substitute for "A": "S" has the truth condition that "P" is a sentence which, according to minimalism of meaning, allows only correctness and not truth. Negation/WrightVsBoghossian: the proposal actually assumes that ""A" is true" should be complementary to the negation of A in the latter sense. A perfectly reasonable counterproposal, however, is that A should be much more complementary to the strict notion of the former negation. Then, in the event that A is merely correct, the assessment of ""A" is true" is also correct and the application of the truth predicate will generally be conservative. WrightVsVs: but now there are problems to be found elsewhere: the transition from (i) to (ii): the seemingly unassailable principle that only a sentence with a truth condition can be true would have the form of the conditional: (II) "A" is true > "A" has a truth condition I 276/277 And any conservative matrix for ""A" is true" jeopardizes this principle in the case where A is not truthful but correct. Because then the conservative matrix will rate ""a" is true" as correct. The consequence (II) that "A" has a truth condition (a fact that makes it true) will then probably be incorrect. I 277/278 WrightVsBoghossian: Conclusion: If the matrix (truth table) for "true" is not conservative, then the citation scheme fails in the decisive direction for the transition from (ii) to (iii), If, on the other hand, the matrix is conservative, the principle that only a sentence with a truth condition is true fails in view of premise (i). (The sentence is incorrect). Finally, if premise (i) is not allowed, there is no argument at all. I 293 Deflationism: any significant sentence (i.e. a sentence with a truth condition) is suitable for deflationary truth or falsehood. But if truth is not deflationary, "true" must refer to a substantial property of statements. (Deflationism: Truth is not a property). WrightVsBoghossian: his problem is that he must reconcile both. Is the reasoning not simply a game of "refers to a property"? (to avoid truth as property.) |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Coherence Theory | Williams, M. Vs Coherence Theory | Horwich I 488 Coherence Theory/M. Williams: has to do with skepticism. The coherence theory says that the analysis of truth in non-epistemic terms makes it inaccessible. M. Williams: if that were true, disquotationalism, but also the richer correspondence theory, would be excluded. I 489 Truth/justification/acceptability/Arthur Fine: when one sees that the realistic T-concept creates a gap that keeps the epistemic approach ((s) justification) always out of reach, one might be tempted to redefine truth in epistemic terms to literally make it accessible. M. WilliamsVs: as an epistemic thesis, skepticism can only be derived under skeptical premises! Truth/Skepticism/M. Williams: no concept of truth makes it inaccessible by itself: one always needs epistemic premises! Gap/M. Williams: the gap Fine means is probable: even the best justified belief can be wrong. M. WilliamsVs: nevertheless, why should this lead to radical skepticism? ((s) Everyone can be wrong, but not all can be wrong). Correspondence Theory/Skepticism/M. Williams: combined with a Cartesian dualism it leads to skepticism. But if representations can only be compared with other representations, this leads to the coherence theory ((s) Berkeley> Coherence Theory). Correspondence Theory/M. Williams: modern form: tends towards naturalism and physicalism by identifying reference with a causal relation. (Causal Theory of Reference). I 490 Correspondence Theory: argues with the impossibility of an alternative. Coherence theory does the same! M. Williams: both do not answer the question: why not be satisfied with deflationism? Deflationism/M. Williams: can share many of the criticisms of Correspondence TheoryVsCoherence Theory and vice versa. Because he neither shapes the idea of truth as correspondence nor shows that truth is an epistemic property. I 495 Correspondence Theory/Putnam/M. Williams: Putnam: because the truth of our beliefs explains success, a correspondence theory can explain, I 496 what is the contribution of language behaviour to the success of overall behaviour. Truth/Explanation: this is how success explains it: (i) if we have true beliefs about our goals, we will generally achieve them. (ii) We have true beliefs about how we achieve our goals. (iii) We generally achieve our goals. Horwich: admits that truth actually has an explanatory role here. Putnam would be right if there were no alternative explanation. VsPutnam/VsCorrespondence Theory: yet there is no obvious connection between his argument and a physicalistic correspondence theory: Truth/Law/M. Williams: you can save Putnam's argument by assuming that (i) involves a generalization that may even be lawful. BoydVsPutnam: does not want truth to appear in any laws. ((s) The theory explains success as well as the truth of the theory. Instead, the theories could simply be listed. - Vs: that would only work without generalization.) M. Williams: I do not believe that (i) is a law. That is because it is not really an empirical position. Belief/Content/Truth/Davidson: determining their content is not independent of giving meaning to our general behaviour and therefore most must be true. Ad (i): is then not an empirical law but a reflection of a condition of interpretation. I 497 Correspondence Theory/Putnam: it is not the explanation of our success that motivates the correspondence theory itself, but the consideration of Premise (ii): that most beliefs are true. Belief/PutnamVsDavidson: that most are true is not guaranteed by the methodology of interpretation, because the stock of beliefs is constantly changing. Therefore, we can only give (ii) meaning if we explain the reliability of learning and only realism can do that. Causal Theory/Correspondence/Putnam: the reliability of learning: would present us as reliable signal generators. What would the truth theory contribute? It communicates that the proposition is true iff the state exists. This is the correspondence involved in causal theory, it is exactly the correspondence established by the T-Def. Deflationism/Correspondence/M. Williams: to him this minimal correspondence is also available. I.e. Putnam's argument does not guarantee physical correspondence or any other substantial theory. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Correspondence Theory | Williams, M. Vs Correspondence Theory | Horwich I 487 Deflationism/M. Williams: (pro) However, we should not call it theory but perspective. He is interesting, not because he tells us something new, but because he denies that we need something beyond that. (VsCorrepsondence Theory, VsCoherence Theory). I 488 Question: What could a substantial truth theory (which goes beyond deflationism) say that deflationism cannot? Correspondence TheoryVsCoherence Theory/M.Williams: appeals to "intuition", which is not a helpful term. (Also Correspondence TheoryVsPragmatism). "Intuition": should be here that even ideally justified beliefs can be wrong. ((s) Whereby the term "ideal" is kept rigid.) Correspondence Theory: then follows realism by saying that truth has nothing to do with justification or acceptability, but with a non-epistemic relation to the world. ((s) Example causation). M.WilliamsVs: if this were the case: even if all philosophers shared this intuition, why should it be more than a cultural prejudice in favor of correspondence theory? Def Epistemic/(s): e.g. justification, acceptability. Instead of e.g. causation. M.WilliamsVsCorrespondence Theory: the intuition against epistemic access to truth is not automatically an argument for correspondence theory. At best it excludes an identification of truth with an epistemic property. Thus it becomes acceptable for deflationism, which does not make this identification either. Disquotationalism//M.Williams: this shows that even disquotational truth is "realistic". That is, truth is not an epistemic property (justification or acceptability, M. WilliamsVsPutnam), just as it is not in a full-fledged correspondence theory. Someone who believes that truth must be epistemic can regard disquotationalism as a "minimal realism". |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Davidson, D. | Rorty Vs Davidson, D. | VI 88 Truth/disquotation/DavidsonVsRorty: had interpreted him wrongly when he depicted him as a representative of disquotation. Rorty had missed the part of the contents of the concept of truth that is detected by truth theories. >Truth Theory, >Disquotation. VI 89 RortyVsDavidson: no idea why Davidson believes "truth" is more central to the explanation of linguistic behavior than the remaining terms (meaning, belief, affirmation, etc.). |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Deflationism | Davidson Vs Deflationism | Horwich I 457 Reduction/Reductionism/Rorty: all authors who try to strike a balance between reductionism and anti-reductionism like Davidson are constantly attacked by both sides. Davidson: One must distinguish: standards are one thing and descriptions are another. This assumes the following form: I 457/458 Truth/DavidsonVsDeflationism/Rorty: we get to know infinitely more about what truth is if we say that we now know more than tomorrow, than we learn from Tarski’s disquotation scheme. Rorty: this parallel between Dewey and Davidson is exacerbated by the NI of Leeds: Naturalistic instrumentalism/NI/Leeds/Rorty: (see above): the combination of the view similar to Quine that the only objective relative to which our methods can be rational, is the objective of predicting observations - with the assertion that the world literally consists of the entities of current science. The NI has to do with: Semantics/Explanation/Prediction/Theory/Leeds/Arthur Fine/Rorty: you cannot use semantics to explain the success of predictions. That would be circular. The circle comes from attempt to be simultaneously inside and outside of our investigations. That leads to: Action theory/Davidson/Rorty: you do not need to choose between these two descriptions (external/internal), we just have to distinguish them consistently. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 Rorty VI 32 Def Deflationism/Rorty: the view that Tarski’s work encompasses all essential characteristics of the truth. DavidsonVsTarski/Rorty: Tarski’s "true in L" is the extension and thus no indication of future or general cases! >Disquotationalism, >Minimalism, >Quote/Disquotation. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Deflationism | Field Vs Deflationism | I 102 Applicability/Mathematics/VsDeflationism: Problem: (see above): Deflationism cannot explain the benefits of the proof theory without having to assume it truth ((s) and thus the existence of mathematical entities (ME). Two attempts at a solution:. 1) there may be a nominalist proof theory which is just as good as the Platonic one. But that would only be a change of subject, as long as nothing more is explained. 2) trying to the explain Platonic proof th. without assuming that it is true. Field II 126 VsDeflationism/Field: 1) Vs: if one simply accepts the T-sentences, that has nothing to do with the content. ((s) Due to equivalence which requires only equal truth values). So the language is cut off from the world. E.g. "There are gravitational waves" is true iff there are gravitational waves has, disquotationally seen, nothing to do with gravitational waves. So we should have a connection between our use of the term "gravitational waves" and gravitational waves, regardless of the scheme. DeflationismVsVs/Field: but Deflationism allows that precisely: it allows for facts that II 127 Refer sentences on gravitational waves regardless of the disquotational truth. E.g. laws of physics. The use is not the only fact that exists here. 2) VsDeflationism/Field: (most important): it cannot explain the explanatory power of the truth conditions E.g. for explanation of behavior, or the explanation of how far behavior is successful. 3) VsDeflationism/Field: it cannot distinguish between a vague and non-vague discourse or between a discourse which is based on facts and one that is not. The following are less important and are discussed in the following sections. 4) VsDeflationism: it cannot handle truth attributions in other languages. 5) VsDeflationism: it gives "true" false modal properties (s) "necessarily true" or "contingently true"). 6) VsDeflationism: it cannot handle ambiguity, indices and demonstratives. 7) VsDeflationism: it cannot explain how we learn from others. FieldVsVs: 4 - 7 per Deflationism. Here my version of Deflationism is radical. II 135 Index Words/Demonstratives/Truth Conditions/Deflationism/Field: we must distinguish two stages of sentences that contain them: 1) focuses on sentence types: there must be no unrelativized T predicate here E.g. a sentence type like "I do not like her" has no truth value. Solution: we can associate a truth value corresponding to a pair of objects : then the sentence is true relative to if b dislikes x. Field: this is not "strictly disquotational", because it involves a grammatical change. 2) Then we need access of unrelativized truth for sentence tokens. That means we must assign an object to each index element. I/Now: is no problem here: that’s "the author of the utterance" or "the time of the utterance". But that is not possible with the others. VsDeflationism: for assigning "this" or "he" we need semantic terms, i.e. it does not work in a purely disquotational way. II 137 Learning/VsDeflationism/Field: Thesis: you need inflationism to explain the learning from others, because we assume that most of what other people tell us is true. ((s) so it is purely disquotational, not merely a repetition, or "true, if the sentence is repeated, because you do not learn meanings from repetition, you need something like paraphrases.). VsDeflationism/Field: 1) with learning some kind of translation must be involved so that a certain inter-personal synonymy is presumed in the inference. 2) even purely disquotational truth + synonymy is not sufficient: E.g. My friend Charley said that in Alabama (a southern state) there was a feet of snow (which never happens). II 138 VsDeflationism/Solution: the reformulated inference works, because a more substantial property is attributed than merely disquotational truth. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Deflationism | Wright Vs Deflationism | I 26 Truth: is there a concept of truth that is free of metaphysical obligations and yet assertoric? Deflation/Deflationism/Deflationary Approach: Ramsey was the first here. (Recently: Horwich: "Minimalism"): Truth assertoric (asserting, but not supported by assumption of metaphysical objects or facts). Tarski's quoting is sufficient. Truth is not a substantial property of sentences. True sentences like "snow is white" and "grass is green" have nothing in common! Important: you can use the disquotation scheme without understanding the content! You can "approach" the predicate "true". (Goldbach's conjecture). Deflationism Thesis: the content of the predicate of truth is the same as the claim its assertoric use makes. WrightVsDeflationism: instead "minimal truth ability", "minimal truth" here "minimalism": core existence of recognized standards. I 35 Legitimate Assertiveness/Assertibility/Negation: Example "It is not the case that "P" is T then and only if it is not the case that "P" is T. This is not valid for legitimate assertiveness from right to left! Namely, if the level of information is neutral (undecidable). (But for truth)(neutrality, >undecidability). It is then correct to claim that it is not the case that P is assertible, but incorrect to claim that the negation of P is justifiably assertible. Therefore, we must distinguish between "T" and "assertible". "("assertible": from now on for "legitimate assertible"). (VsDeflationism that recognizes only one norm.) I 47 VsDeflationism: not a theory, but a "potpourri". There is no unambiguous thesis at all. I 48 InflationismVsDeflationism: (uncertain) DS' "P" is true(E!P)("P" says that P & P) (! = that which exists enough for P) I 53 Minimalism/Wright: recognizes, in contrast to deflationism, that truth is a real property. The possession of this property is normatively different from legitimate assertiveness. (VsDeflationism). I 97 WrightVsDeflationism Thesis: the classical deflationary view of truth is in itself unstable. No norm of the predicate of truth can state that it differs from legitimate assertiveness. With this consequence, however, the central role ascribed to the quotation scheme - and thus also to negation equivalence - is not compatible. The normative power of "true" and "justifiably claimable" coincides, but can potentially diverge extensionally. |
WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Deflationism | Brendel Vs Deflationism | I 35 Deflationismus/BrendelVsDeflationismus: gibt mit der Ablehnung eines philosophisch gehaltvollen W-Begriffs gleichzeitig die semantische Eigenschaft von Wahrheit mit auf. a) Prosatz-Theorie/Brendel: These Wahrheit ist überhaupt keine Eigenschaft b) Redundanztheorie/Brendel: These Wahrheit hat nur syntaktische Funktion. (Disquotationstheorie: dito, Quine: dito (> semantischer Aufstieg)). BrendelVsDeflationismus: kann gar nicht auf einen semantischen W-Begriff verzichten. Ohne ihn ist er unverständlich. (s.u.). Daher kann er auch nicht Basis für den Begriff des Wissens dienen. >Disquotationalism, >Minimalism, >Quote/Disquotation. |
Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Disquotation | Brandom Vs Disquotation | I 800 Disquotation principle: "P" is to appear simultaneously inside and outside of quotation marks. When a speaker agrees to "p", he believes that p. I 801 BrandomVs: the combination of translation and disquotation (= type repetition) is not generally good as an analysis of the relation between the reported and the reporting tokening in indirect-speech attributions. I 803 Three types of exceptions! Ambiguities: E.g. Cicero, Roman orator, or "Cicero", spy during WW2. The arrangement corresponds to the Paderewski case, but the double use of "Cicero" does not allow any inconsistency and no paradox. Paderewski is co-referential, the two "Cicero" are not. But Kripke’s dilemma only occurs with strong adequacy conditions: the speaker must be able to distinguish his case through "pure logic" or "semantic introspection". Brandom: why should one not conclude rightly that proper names are sometimes used in a way that hte disquotation principle is not applicable, because of the dual use of not only the "Cicero" type, but also of the "Paderewski" type? An answer is impossible to find. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Disquotation | Putnam Vs Disquotation | Putnam VII 431 Truth/Putnam: the only reason one can have to deny that truth is a property would be that one is physicalist or phenomenalist. Or maybe a culture-relativist. Truth/property/Putnam: only reductionist theories deny that truth is a property. (PutnamVsDisquotationalism: >Disquotationalism). Truth/Putnam: is a property - >PutnamVsDeflationism - Rorty: (R. Rorty, The Mirror of Nature): truth is no property. --- Horwich I 455 Divine perspective/outside/PutnamVsGods perspective/Rorty: Putnam is amused as James and Dewey about such attempts. Rorty: but he has a problem when it comes to PutnamVsDisquotationalism: this one is too reductionist, to positivistic, to "behaviorist" for him ("transcendental Skinnerism"). Truth/Putnam: if a philosopher says, truth is something other than electricity because there is probably room for a theory of electricity but not for a truth theory, Horwich I 456 and that the knowledge of the truth conditions was everything what one could know about the truth, then he denies that truth is a property. Thus, there is then no property of the correctness or accuracy ((s)> Deflationism, PutnamVsDeflationism, PutnamVsGrover. PutnamVs: that is, to deny that our thoughts are thoughts and our assertions assertions. Theory/existence/reduction/Putnam/Rorty: Putnam assumes here that the only reason to deny is that one needs a theory for an X, to say that the X is "nothing but Y". ((s) eliminative reductionism). PutnamVsDavidson: Davidson must show that assertions can be reduced to noise. Then the field linguist must reduce acts on motions. Davidson/Rorty: but he does not say that assertions were nothing but noise. Instead: Truth/explanation/Davidson: unlike electricity truth is no explanation for something. ((s) A phenomenon is not explained that a sentence which it claims, is true). Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 --- Horwich I XIV VsDeflationism/Horwich: provides no explicit truth-definition, but is only based on a scheme (disquotational scheme). Horwich I XVI Truth/simple/unanalysable/Russell/Moore/Cartwright/Horwich: if truth is unanalysable basic concept (VsDeflationism), then it is completely independent of awareness. That is, truth gets something metaphysical. Problem: then we cannot assume that the propositions which we believe, have this property. Then the skepticism follows. --- Horwich I 457 Correctness/PutnamVsDavidson: although he shares his distaste for intentionalist terms, (and therefore does not consider truth as an explanation), he nevertheless wishes a representation of what kind of statement it is, to be correct. Putnam/Rorty: he wants that because he is afraid that the "inside view" of the language game where "true" is an appreciative term - is weakened, if it is not philosophically supported. Because: If language is only production of noise - without normative element - then the noises that we utter are nothing but "an expression of our subjectivity". Normativity/standard/language/Putnam: why should there be no normative elements in the language game? That would be the inside view of the language game. RortyVsPutnam: thus it still depends on a synoptic God's perspective to be brought together in the inner view and outside view of the language game. Norm/JamesVsPutnam/DeweyVsPutnam: we cannot take such a God's perspective. That is, we cannot solidify our standards in that we support them metaphysically or scientifically. Truth/appreciation/PragmatismVsPlato/DeweyVsPlato/RortyVsPutnam: we should not repeat Plato's error, and interpret expressions of appreciation as the names of esoteric entities. --- Williams II 497 Belief/PutnamVsDavidson: that most are true, is not guaranteed by the methodology of interpretation, because the stock of beliefs is constantly changing. Therefore, we can only give a sense (ii) if we explain the reliability of learning and that can only do the realism. Causal theory/correspondence/Putnam: the reliability of learning: would represent us as reliable signal transmitters. What would the truth theory add? It announced that the sentence is true iff the condition exists. This is the correspondence, which is involved in the causal theory, it is precisely the correspondence that is established by the truth definition. Deflationism/correspondence/M. Williams: the minimal correspondence is also available for him. That is, Putnam's argument does not guarantee physical correspondence or another substantive theory. Williams II 502 Truth/Putnam: must be substantial ((s) explanatory role, truth as a property, PutnamVsDeflationism). Otherwise it leads to cultural relativism. PutnamVsCultural relativism: an extreme culture-relativist may himself not even consider a thinker or speaker, as opposed to a mere noise maker. ((s) speaking not distinguishable from sound). This is mental suicide. PutnamVsDisquotationalism: has no explanatory power, unless something is said about the concept of assertion. M. WilliamsVsPutnam: do we need that? Putnam: to be able to view ourselves as thinkers, speaking must be more than noise-making and then we must be able to explain to ourselves what it means to understand a sentence. PutnamVsmetaphysical Realism/M. Williams: although Putnam finds this picture sympathetic, he prefers to explain meaning in terms of situation appropriate use. Problem: that we do not stop that there are various inguistic practices ((s) different communities) and therefore different ways of justification. Solution: ideal justification. And that is how Putnam understands truth. Truth/PutnamVsDisquotationalism: if we say nothing about the truth in terms of assertibility conditions, we do not get a concept of objective truth, which allows the cultural relativism to escape. Then we identified truth implicitly with assertibility relative to the norms of a particular community. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 EconWilliams I Walter E. Williams Race & Economics: How Much Can Be Blamed on Discrimination? (Hoover Institution Press Publication) Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press 2011 WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Disquotation | Cresswell Vs Disquotation | Cresswell I 99 VsQuotational theory/Belief/Cresswell: other problems: 1. Belief de re, or quantification in into belief contexts. possible world semantics/Semantics of possible worlds/Cresswell: Advantage: it allows such quantification. Problem: it does not help in hyper-intensional cases (where the sets of possible worlds l are too coarse). 2. VsQuotational theory/Self-reference/Cresswell: Richmond Thomason: Thesis: indirect speech cannot be quotational. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Donagan, A. | Rorty Vs Donagan, A. | Horwich I 452 Explanation/Truth/Causality/Donagan/Rorty: Although it could be said that the fact that most of the beliefs of the natives and field linguists are true is an explanation for the fact that they can communicate. RortyVsDonagan: but that is not an explanation that requires a causally effective property. Explanation/Rorty: this is like an explanation of communication by the fact that, e.g., people populate the same spacetime region. Problem: we do not know what it would be like for these people if it were not like this, just as we do not know, e.g., what it would be like if most beliefs were wrong. Causal Explanation/Rorty: the only candidates for causally effective properties are such properties that we can think away! ((s) >it must be possible to abstract from properties). >Causal explanation. Important argument: therefore "truth" ("true") has no explanatory use. Truth/DavidsonVsPragmatism/VsJames: but besides the normative use it also has disquotational use. Truth/RortyVsTradition: it mixes disquotational and normative use and tries to explain both through the use of "true" to designate a non-causal relation of "correspondence". This is a false attempt to have "inside" and "outside" of the language game at the same time. Rorty I 120 Sensation/Wittgenstein/Donagan/Rorty: Wittgenstein clarified the situation by conceding "that sensations are private, non-dispositional concomitants of the behavior, which is their natural expression", but refusing "to subsume processes under these concomitants, which can be explored regardless of the circumstances that produced them." I 121 RortyVsDonagan: that is correct, but you have to go one step further: a "private, non-material medium" is obscure. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Field, H. | Tarski Vs Field, H. | Field II 142 T-Theory/TarskiVsField: its variant is purely axiomatic. FieldVsTarski/FefermanVsTarski: approach with schematic letters instead of pure axioms: Advantages: 1. we have the same advantage as Feferman for schematic disquotation and schematic meta language: extensions of the language are automatically considered. 2. the use of ""p" is true iff p" (now as schema formula as part of language instead of axiom) seems to better grasp the notion of truth. 3. (most importantly) is not dependent on a compositional approach to the functioning of the other parts of the language. While this is important, it is not omitted by my approach. FieldVsTarski: an axiomatic theory is hard to get for beliefs. Horwich I 484 TarskiVsField/Soames: Tarski's semantic properties are not dependent on facts about speakers, thereby nothing gets lost. One should approach semantics abstractly and leave the interpretation of speaker behavior to pragmatics. Advantage: you get a T-predicate for metatheoretical discussion, and you keep the opportunity to ask philosophical questions in other areas.(1) 1. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Field, H. | Verschiedene Vs Field, H. | Field I 51 Infinity/Physics/Essay 4: even without "part of" relation we do not really need the finity operator for physics. VsField: many have accused me of needing every extension of 1st level logic. But this is not the case. I 52 I rather assume that the nominalization program has not yet been advanced far enough to be able to say what the best logical basis is. Ultimately, we are going to choose only a few natural means that go beyond the 1st level logic, preferably those that the Platonist would also need. But we can only experience this by trial and error. I 73 Indispensability Argument/Logic/VsField: if mE may be dispensable in science, they are not in logic! And we need logic in science. Logical Sequence Relation/Consequence/Field: is normally defined in terms of model theory: (Models are mE, semantic: a model is true or not true.) Even if one formulates them in a proven theoretical way ("there is a derivation", syntactically, or provable in a system) one needs mE or abstract objects: arbitrary sign sequences of symbol tokens and their arbitrary sequences. I 77 VsField: some have objected that only if we accept a Tarski Theory of truth do we need mE in mathematics. FieldVsVs: this led to the misunderstanding that without Tarskian truth mathematics would have no epistemic problems. Mathematics/Field: indeed implies mE itself, (only, we do not always need mathematics) without the help of the concept of truth, e.g. that there are prime numbers > 1000. I 138 Logic of Part-of-Relation/Field: has no complete evidence procedure. VsField: how can subsequent relations be useful then? Field: sure, the means by which we can know that something follows from something else are codifiable in an evidentiary procedure, and that seems to imply that no appeal to anything stronger than a proof can be of practical use. FieldVsVs: but you do not need to take any epistemic approach to more than a countable part of it. I 182 Field Theory/FT/Relationalism/Substantivalism/Some AuthorsVsField: justify the relevance of field theories for the dispute between S/R just the other way round: for them, FT make it easy to justify a relationalist view: (Putnam, 1981, Malament 1982): they postulate as a field with a single huge (because of the infinity of physical forces) and a corresponding part of it for each region. Variant: the field does not exist in all places! But all points in the field are not zero. FieldVsPutnam: I do not think you can do without regions. Field II 351 Indeterminacy/Undecidability/Set Theory/Number Theory/Field: Thesis: not only in the set theory but also in the number theory many undecidable sets do not have a certain truth value. Many VsField: 1. truth and reference are basically disquotational. Disquotational View/Field: is sometimes seen as eliminating indeterminacy for our present language. FieldVsVs: that is not the case :>Chapter 10 showed that. VsField: Even if there is indeterminacy in our current language also for disquotationalism, the arguments for it are less convincing from this perspective. For example, the question of the power of the continuum ((s)) is undecidable for us, but the answer could (from an objectivist point of view (FieldVs)) have a certain truth value. Uncertainty/Set Theory/Number Theory/Field: Recently some well-known philosophers have produced arguments for the impossibility of any kind of uncertainty in set theory and number theory that have nothing to do with disquotationalism: two variants: 1. Assuming that set theory and number theory are in full logic of the 2nd level (i.e. 2nd level logic, which is understood model theoretically, with the requirement that any legitimate interpretation) Def "full" in the sense that the 2nd level quantifiers go over all subsets of the 1st level quantifier range. 2. Let us assume that number theory and the set theory are formulated in a variant of the full logic of the 2nd level, which we could call "full schematic logic of level 1". II 354 Full schematic logic 1st Level/LavineVsField: denies that it is a partial theory of (non-schematic!) logic of the 2nd level. Field: we now better forget the 2nd level logic in favour of full schematic theories. We stay in the number theory to avoid complications. We assume that the certainty of the number theory is not in question, except for the use of full schemata. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Field, H. | Schiffer Vs Field, H. | I 105 SchifferVsField: wrong is his suggestion: physical relations as an explanation for the reference relation would also cover relations to things of which they are not true. (E.g. >"Arthritis"/"shmarthritis", E.g. >Addition/Quaddition. - FieldVsPhysicalism). Conclusion: no functional relation, which operates without disquotation scheme will be appropriate for the "true-of" relation. ((s) Anyway not the relation, but the theory works, if at all with the disquotation scheme.). I 109 Def Conceptual Role/c.r./Field: (Field 1977): the subjective conditional probability-function of an agent Two mental representations S1 and S2 have the same cr for one person, iff. their (the person’s) subjective conditional prblty-function is so that s for any mental representation, given the subjective probability of s1 s is the same as that of s2 where s. SchifferVsField: This is of little use, because not two people have the same conditional probability function. But Field is anyway pessimistic with respect to a precise concept of intersubjective sameness of mental content that goes beyond sameness of referential significance. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Field, H. | Leeds Vs Field, H. | Field II 304 Indeterminacy/Set Theory/ST/Leeds/Field: e.g. somebody considers the term "set" to be undetermined, so he could say instead: The term can be made "as large as possible". (Leeds 1997,24) (s) "everything that is included in the term"). As such the term can have a wider or narrower definition. Cardinality of the continuum/Indeterminacy/Field: This indeterminacy should at least contain the term set membership. LeedsVsField: It is not coherent to accept set theory and to qualify its terms as indetermined at the same time. And it is not coherent to then apply classical logic in set theory. Field: It could also look like this: the philosophical comments should be separated from mathematics. But we do not need to separate theory from practice, e.g. if the belief in indeterminacy is expressed in whether the degree of the mathematician's belief in the continuum hypothesis and his "doubt degree" adds up to 1 ((s) So that there is no space left for a third possibility). Problem: A mathematician for whom it adds up to 1 could ask himself "Is the continuum hypothesis correct?" and would look for mathematical proof. A second mathematician, however, whose degree of certainty adds up to 0 ((s) since he believes in neither the continuum hypothesis nor its negation) will find it erroneous to look for proof. Each possibility deserves to be analyzed. The idea behind indeterminacy however is that only little needs to be defined beyond the accepted axioms. ((s) no facts.) Continuum Hypothesis/Field: Practical considerations may prefer a concept over one another in a particular context and a different one in another context. Solution/Field: This is not a problem as long as those contexts are hold separate. But is has been shown that its usefulness is independent from the truth. II 305 Williamsons/Riddle/Indeterminacy/Leeds/Field: (LeedsVsField): (e.g. it must be determined whether Joe is rich or not): Solution/Leeds: i) we exclude the terms in question, e.g. rich (in this example) from the markup language which we accept as "first class" and ii) the primary (disquotional) use of "referred" or "is true of" is only used for this markup language. Indeterminacy/Leeds: Is because there is no uniform best way to apply the disquotional scheme in order to translate into the markup language. Field: This is genius: To reduce all indeterminacy on the indeterminacy of the translation. FieldVsLeeds: I doubt that a meaning can be found. Problem: To differentiate between undetermined termini and those which are only different regarding the extension of the markup language. Especially if we have a number of translations which all have different extensions in our markup language. Solution/Disquotationalism: It would integrate the foreign terms in its own language. We would then be allowed to cite.(Quine, 1953 b, 135. see above chap. IV II 129-30). Problem: If we integrate "/" and "", the solution which we obtained above may disappear. FieldVsLeeds: I fear that our objective - to exclude the indeterminacy in our own language- will not be reached.It even seems to be impossible for our scientific terms! e.g. the root –1/√-1/Brandom/Field: The indeterminacy is still there; We can simply use the "first class" markup language to say that -1 has two roots without introducing a name like "i" which shall stand for "one of the two". FieldVsLeeds: We can accept set theory without accepting its language as "first class". ((s) But the objective was to eliminate terms of set theory from the first class markup language and to limit "true of" and "refer" to the markup language.) Field: We are even able to do this if we accept Platonism (FieldVsPlatonism) : II 306 e.g. we take a fundamental theory T which has no vocabulary of set theory and only says that there is an infinite number of non-physical eternally existing objects and postulates the consistency of fundamental set theory. Consistency is then the basic term which is regulated by its own axioms and not defined by terms of set theory. (Field 1991). We then translate the language of set theory in T by accepting "set" as true of certain or all non-physical eternally existing objects and interpret "element of" in such a way that the normal axioms remain true. Then there are different ways to do this and they render different sentences true regarding the cardinality of the continuum. Then the continuum hypothesis has no particular truth value. (C.H. without truth value). Problem: If we apply mathematical applications to non-mathemtical fields, we do not only need consistency in mathematics but in other fields as well. And we should then assume that the corresponding theories outside mathematics can have a Platonic reformulation. 1. This would be possible if they are substituted by a nominal (!) theory. 2. The Platonic theorie could be substituted by the demand that all nominal consequences of T-plus-set theory are true. FieldVs: The latter looks like a cheap trick, but the selected set theory does not need to be the one deciding the cardinality of the continuum. The selected set theory for a physical or psychological theory need not to be compatible with the set theory of another domain. This shows that the truth of the metalanguage is not accepted in a parent frame of reference. It's all about instrumental usefulness. FieldVsLeeds: We cannot exclude indeterminacy - which surpasses vagueness- in our own language even if we concede its solution. But we do not even need to do this; I believe my solution is better. I 378 Truth/T-Theory/T-concept/Leeds: We now need to differentiate between a) Truth Theory (T-Theory) ((s) in the object language) and b) theories on the definition of truth ((s) metalinguistic) . Field: (1972): Thesis: We need a SI theory of truth and reference (that a Standard Interpretation is always available), and this truth is also obtainable. (LeedsVsStandard Interpretation/VsSI//LeedsVsField). Field/Leeds: His argument is based on an analogy between truth and (chemical)valence. (..+....) Field: Thesis: If it would have looked as if the analogy cannot be reduced, it would have been a reason to abandon the theory of valences, despite the theory's usefulness! Truth/Field: Thesis: (analogous to valence ): Despite all we know about the extension of the term, the term also needs a physicalistic acceptable form of reduction! Leeds: What Field would call a physicalistic acceptable reduction is what we would call the SI theory of truth: There always is a Standard Interpretation for "true" in a language. Field/Leeds: Field suggests that it is possible to discover the above-mentioned in the end. LeedsVsField: Let us take a closer look at the analogy: Question: Would a mere list of elements and numbers (instead of valences) not be acceptable? I 379 This would not be a reduction since the chemists have formulated the law of valences. Physikalism/Natural law/Leeds: Does not demand that all terms can be easily or naturally explained but that the fundamental laws are formulated in a simple way. Reduction/Leeds: Only because the word "valence" appears in a strict law there are strict limitations imposed on the reduction. Truth/Tarski/LeedsVsTarski: Tarski's Definitions of T and R do not tell us all the story behind reference and truth in English. Reference/Truth/Leeds: These relations have a naturalness and importance that cannot be captured in a mere list. Field/Reduction/Leeds: If we want a reduction à la Field, we must find an analogy to the law of valences in the case of truth, i.e. we need to find a law or a regularity of truth in English. Analogy/Field: (and numerous others) See in the utility of the truth definition an analogy to the law. LeedsVsField: However, the utility can be fully explained without a SI theory. It is not astonishing that we have use for a predicate P with the characteristic that"’__’ is P" and "__"are always interchangeable. ((s)>Redundancy theory). And this is because we often would like to express every sentence in a certain infinite set z (e.g. when all elements have the form in common.) ((s) "All sentences of the form "a = a" are true"), > Generalization. Generalization/T-Predicate/Leeds: Logical form: (x)(x e z > P(x)). Semantic ascent/Descent/Leeds: On the other hand truth is then a convenient term, same as infinite conjunction and disjunction. I 386 Important argument: In theory then, the term of truth would not be necessary! I believe it is possible that a language with infinite conjunctions and disjunctions can be learned. Namely, if conjunctions and disjunctions if they are treated as such in inferences. They could be finally be noted. I 380 Truth/Leeds: It is useful for what Quine calls "disquotation" but it is still not a theory of truth (T-Theory). Use/Explanation/T-Theory/Leeds: In order to explain the usefulness of the T-term, we do not need to say anything about the relations between language and the world. Reference is then not important. Solution/Leeds: We have here no T-Theory but a theory of the term of truth, e.g. a theory why the term is seen as useful in every language. This statement appears to be based solely on the formal characteristics of our language. And that is quite independent of any relations of "figure" or reference to the world. Reference/Truth/Truth term/Leeds: it shows how little the usefulness of the truth term is dependent on a efficient reference relation! The usefulness of a truth term is independent of English "depicts the world". I 381 We can verify it: Suppose we have a large fragment of our language, for which we accept instrumentalism, namely that some words do not refer. This is true for sociology, psychology, ethics, etc. Then we will find semantic ascent useful if we are speaking about psychology for example. E.g. "Some of Freud's theories are true, others false" (instead of using "superego"!) Standard Interpretation/Leeds: And this should shake our belief that T is natural or a standard. Tarski/Leeds: This in turn should not be an obstacle for us to define "T" à la Tarski. And then it is reasonable to assume that "x is true in English iff T (x)" is analytic. LeedsVsSI: We have then two possibilities to manage without a SI: a) we can express facts about truth in English referring to the T-definition (if the word "true" is used) or b) referring to the disquotional role of the T-term. And this, if the explanandum comprises the word "true" in quotation marks (in obliqua, (s) mentioned). Acquaintance/Russell/M. Williams: Meant a direct mental understanding, not a causal relation! This is an elder form of the correspondence theory. I 491 He was referring to RussellVsSkepticism: A foundation of knowledge and meaning FieldVsRussell/M. WilliamsVsRussell: das ist genau das Antackern des Begriffsschemas von außen an die Welt. Field/M. Williams: His project, in comparison, is more metaphysical than epistemic. He wants a comprehensive physicalistic overview. He needs to show how semantic characteristics fit in a physical world. If Field were right, we would have a reason to follow a strong correspondence theory, but without dubious epistemic projects which are normally linked to it. LeedsVsField/M. Williams: But his argument is not successful. It does not give an answer to the question VsDeflationism. Suppose truth cannot be explained in a physicalitic way, then it contradicts the demand that there is an unmistakable causal order. Solution: Truth cannot explain (see above) because we would again deal with epistemology (theory of knowledge).(>justification, acceptability). |
Leeds I Stephen Leeds "Theories of Reference and Truth", Erkenntnis, 13 (1978) pp. 111-29 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Frege, G. | Searle Vs Frege, G. | II 285 Index words/I/SearleVsFrege: what little Frege says about indexicality is wrong and incompatible with his theory. About "I", he says, this calls for a public and a private sense. "Yesterday" and "Today": if we want to express the same proposition today, we must use the word "yesterday". So he accepted apparently an de re theory of indexical propositions. II 286 Frege does not notice the self-reference of these expressions. (Unlike morning star/evening star). The idea that expressions have a meaning that cannot be notified, is profoundly anti Frege! Sense is open to the public. That is what the concept was introduced for. II 301 The descriptive theory was directed against the three traditional views: VsMill, VsFrege, Vstraditionel Logic. 1. Mill: Names no connotation, but only denotation. 2. Frege: meaning of a name is recognized by individual with it associated identification. 3. logic textbooks: the meaning of the name "N" is simply "called N". (Regress). Searle: No. 1 refuses to answer, No. 3 brings infinite regress.. II 303 Names/Frege/Searle: his theory is the most promising, I developed it further. There always must exist an intentional content in proper names. SearleVsFrege: Weak point: the semantic content must always be put into words. II 228 Identity/fact/statement/Searle: the identity of the fact depends on the specific properties of the fact being the same as those that are called by the corresponding statement. III 229 Facts/Searle: are not the same as true statements. (SearleVsFrege). 1. Facts have a causal function, true statements do not. 2. The relation of a fact to the statement is ambiguous, the same fact can be formulated by different statements. Disquotation/Searle: the analysis of a fact as that e.g. this object is red, requires more than disquotation. V 116 SearleVsFrege: wrong: that the word "that" initiates something that has to be considered as "Name of a proposition" (virtually all subordinate clauses). (SearleVsTarski too). V 117 Regress/quotation marks/Searle: if "Socrates" is the name of Socrates, then I can only talk about it, that means the above-mentioned, when I put it again in quotation marks..: „“Socrates““. Then again I could only speak about this in quotation marks: "" "Socrates" "". - "Xxx" is not the name of a word! It is not a reference! The word refers to neither anything nor to itself. E.g. an ornithologist, "the sound, the Californian jays produces is ....". What completed the sentence, would be a sound, not the proper name of the sound! V 144 SearleVsFrege: failed to distinguish between the meaning of an indicative expression and the by it's statement transmitted proposition! V 152 Predicate/SearleVsFrege: he tried to unite two philosophical positions that are fundamentally incompatible. He wants a) to extend the distinction between meaning and significance to predicates (predicates that have a meaning, an object) and simultaneously b) explain the functional difference between pointing and predicative expressions. Why does Frege represent position a). - That means why does he say, predicates have a meaning? Reason: his theory of arithmetic: the need for quantification of properties. (> Second order logic). V 155 Concept/Frege: ascribe a property via the use of a grammatical predicate. SearleVsFrege: contradiction: once term = property (a) once feature of the attribution of a property (b). Properties/SearleVsFrege: properties are not essential predication: you might as well point to them through singular nominal terms. V 156 Solution/Searle: if you no longer insist that predicate expressions would have to be indicative, everything dissolves. Predicate expressions do not mean properties! They ascribe to a property! V 172 Summary: 1. Frege: is right: there is a significant difference between the function of an indicative expression and a predicate expression. V 173 2. VsFrege: his performance is inconsistent when he tries to show that a predicate expression is also indicative. 3. By letting go of this assertion Frege's representation of arithmetic (here he needs quantification of properties) is not questioned. The letting go of the claim is not a denial of universals. 4. There is at least an interpretation which exist according to universals. 5. There is no class of irreducible existence conditions. V 256 Names/Descriptive support/Searle: E.g. Everest = Tschomolungma: the descriptive support of both names refers to the same object. Names/SearleVsFrege: mistake: that proper names are just as strong and clear as certain descriptions. To be blamed is his famous example morning star/evening star. They are not paradigms for proper names, they lie rather on the boundary between certain descriptions and names. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Grice, P.H. | Field Vs Grice, P.H. | II 223 Radical Deflationism/RD/Terminology/Field: within Deflationism it is disputed whether the W concept must always be disquotational. Narrow Deflationism/Radical Deflationism/Field: Deflationism is uninteresting if it is not considered narrowly (radically). Radical Deflationism only permits purely disquotational truth and Vsinter personal synonymy. Truth/Translation/Radical Deflationism/Field: yet "true" and "satisfied" can be applied to other languages as well. Non-Radical Deflationism/Field: can remain non-trivial if it explains inter-personal synonymy as equality of the computational role. FieldVsSpeaker Intention/Understanding/Truth/Deflationism/Field: the radical deflationism which I favor declares it to be meaningless to ask whether a proposition is true in the sense that the speaker understands it. It’s all about how the listener understands it. II 224 Ambiguity/Deflationism/Solution: according to this, a sentence is true in some uses, but not in others. Translation/RD/Field: the concept of a "good translation" makes sense, but strongly interest-relative and contextual. It should not be understood as a correct translation. Correctness/Translation/Deflationism: the question of the correctness of inter-personal translation is useless. Non-Radical Deflationism/Translation/Field: thinks here that there is an objective concept of synonymy for good translation. VsDeflationism/Utility Theory/Field: it could be argued that it is a contingent fact that we use "snow is white" in a way that the sentence is true if snow is white. So our use of "true" is not purely disquotational. (Because of (2)). VSVs: It’s true that we could have used the sentence differently! ((s) But we do not do it. And it’s about actual use in the actual world). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Leeds, St. | Field Vs Leeds, St. | II 281 Indeterminacy/Own Language/Theory Change/Leeds/Field: (Leeds, Steven 1997), Section IV) LeedsVs indeterminacy within a theory (within one language): Field: Leeds view seems to be disquotational, i.e. the reference of our own expressions should be determined according to the following scheme: (R) if b exists, then "b" refers to b and nothing else. Foreign Language/Theory Change: In this case, it only makes sense relative to a correlation between the concept of the two theories. More Moderate View/Field: we might as well have an unrelativized concept of reference that extends beyond our own concepts, this will, however, be very vague. FieldVsLeeds: it seems very reasonable to assume that the concepts of our currently best theories are vague. Simply because many aspects still have room for improvement. E.g. Ricci tensor: will probably not just refer directly to something, but it will not be without any reference either. Falseness/Theory/False Theory/Field: E.g. "mass"/"weight" makes it clear that if a theory is false, it is often because of the vagueness of terms. Correctness/Translation/Theory/Field: the concept of a "correct translation" is nonsense: E.g. root -1, "i"/"-i" "/" / "" (see above). This is not about an epistemic limitation. There is no "subtle fact" that we cannot know, it is rather the case that there is no certain fact that makes a difference. The example is interesting in the context of Leeds: it seems as if also our own terms "i" and "-i" would be indeterminate, because: Chauvinism/Theory/Theory Change/Asymmetry/Field: it would be chauvinistic to assume that our own theory is determined if we attest indeterminacy to the other theory. FieldVsLeeds: he cannot avoid the accusation of chauvinism, because he denies our own theory indeterminacy. II 282 Solution: In the process of language acquisition (learning, use) we learn to accept (R) and that creates no connection between "refers" as applied to "/" and "i". Asymmetry/Chauvinism/Field: we get this asymmetry without chauvinism: our term "i" is as indeterminate as the foreign term "/", it is just that the indeterminacy is "hidden" in our normal semantic statements, because these semantic concepts contain a compensating indeterminacy! (f..o.th. compensation). Indeterminacy/FieldVsLeeds: this dissolves the doubts regarding the indeterminacy of our own language. The fact that "i" refers to i does not show that "i" is determined, it is therefore compatible with the fact that "i" and "refers disquotationally" are both indeterminate. Caution: This only shows how a prior indeterminacy of "i" would lead to an indeterminacy of "refers disquotationally". Indeterminacy/Own Language/FieldVsLeeds: the possibility of indeterminacy of our own language can also be shown regardless of the theory of reference, and thus also of disquotationality: surely, vagueness is a kind of indeterminacy, and that is everywhere. Vagueness: it can also be problematic itself: Vagueness/Williamson’s Riddle/Field: (Williamson 1994): there are people who consider the riddle to be so serious that it would be doubtful whether II 283 the phenomenon of vagueness (or, more generally, of indeterminacy) would be a real phenomenon. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 |
| Linguisticism | Field Vs Linguisticism | II 163 Vs Quasi-Translation/Truth Conditions/tr.cond./Truth/Linguistic View/Field: One could argue that you need additional premises to say that "snow is white" means that it is true that snow is white. But this will be trivial for our own sentence and it will not imply that our own sentence is only true if snow is white. Therefore, it could be argued that the linguistic point of view leaves out a key feature in the attribution of meanings: the truth conditions! Equally it can be said that the attribution of meaning to singular terms or predicates, which does not rely on the conditions under which he or it refers at all, leaves out something important. FieldVsVs: I do not see why the uncontested background assumption. II 164 That "snow is white" is true iff snow is white should not be sufficient. But even if not: Solution/Field: disquotational truth (+ disquotational reference, etc.): according to this view, the Tarski scheme expresses no contingent empirical truth. (accordingly for reference): E.g. "teacher of Alexander" only refers to something if the person was a teacher of Alexander. This is not an empirical coincidence. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Moser, P. | Brendel Vs Moser, P. | I 82 Wahrheit/Nichtexistenz/Fiktion/Mathematik/Logik/Paul Moser/Brendel: Problem: wie Wahrheit von Nichtbestehendem (Bsp Mathematisch-logisches, Bsp Fiktives, Bsp Normatives) aufzufassen ist. Problem: Korrespondenz kann dann nicht isomorphe Repräsentation sein. Lösung/Moser: Def "minimale Wahrheit"/Moser: p ist wahr iff sich die Dinge tatsächlich so verhalten wie sie durch p beschrieben werden. Das impliziert die Konvention (W). Die Definition ist frei von epistemischen Ausdrücken. I 83 Es wird nur das Bestehen von states of affairs konstatiert. Der Begriff soll auch neutral sein in Bezug auf die anderen Bedingungen für Wissen. BrendelVsMoser: seine T-Def führt zur Lügner-Antinomie. Adäquatheitsbedingung: Problem: sie kann nicht in folgender Form formuliert werden: (T)* T("A") < > A. VsDisquotation theory/VsDisquotationalism/Disquotationalism/Brendel: "Wahrheit" ist keine disquotation function in L, die auf den Anführungsnamen einer beliebigen Aussage A von L angewendet, A ergibt. I 229 Wissen/internalist/externalist/Moser/Brendel: (Mischform von Internalism und Externalism) (Moser 1989) internalist: die Rechtfertigung muss dem Subjekt kognitiv zugänglich sein. P muss "evidentiell wahrscheinlicher" sein für S als nicht-p. externalist: "Wahrheitsresistenz". Def Wissen/Moser/Brendel: S weiß dass p iff (i) S der Überzeugung ist, dass p (aufgrund der Evidenz E) (ii) p wahr ist und (iii) S rechtfertigende Belege für p besitzt, die wahrheitsresistent sind. I 230 Def Wahrheitsresistenz/wahrheitsresistent/Moser/Brendel: (1989, 245): rechtfertigende Belege sind wahrheitsresistent iff es für jede wahre Proposition T die, wenn sie mit E konjugiert wird, S Rechtfertigung für p aufgrund von E zunichte macht, eine wahre Proposition T’ gibt, die, wenn sie mit E & T konjugiert wird, die Rechtfertigung von p für S so wiederherstellt, dass S tatsächlich in der Meinung, dass p, gerechtfertigt ist. I 231 Bsp Gettier: die rechtfertigenden Belege von Smith dafür, dass Jones einen Ford hat und in Barcelona ist, sind nicht wahrheitsresistent. Die Rechtfertigung wird nicht dadurch wiederhergestellt, dass Brown sich in Barcelona aufhält, denn die Belege gelten nur für das erste Disjunktionsglied. Smith hat gar keine Anhaltspunkte dafür dass Brown in Barcelona ist. BrendelVsMoser: 1. (wie VsLehrer): Bsp aus Moser’s Definition von Wahrheitsresistenz folgt, dass eine Person bereits weiß, dass p, wenn ihre rechtfertigenden Belege mindestens einen wahrheitsresistenten Grund liefern. Problem: das gilt auch, wenn die Person überwiegend absurde Überzeugungen hat. I 232 BrendelVsMoser: 2. nach seiner Definition für Ignoranz und Bestehen von Wissensdefiziten eher zu Wissen als Neugier und Informiertheit. Bsp zwei Leute beobachten einen Teil eines Zwillingspaars, der eine ist eher bereit, ungerechtfertigte Verdächtigungen in Kauf zu nehmen als der andere und kennt nicht die (zwar falsche) entlastenden Aussage der Mutter, dann hat er zufällig das Wissen, dass der eine Zwilling das Buch gestohlen hat, … I 233 Lösung/Brendel: wir brauchen Kriterien, welche Tatsachen berücksichtigt werden müssen. Wissen/Moser/Brendel: seine Definition geht von der "Totalität aller Wahrheiten" aus. (Menge aller Wahrheiten). BrendelVsMoser: diese gibt es nicht. (s.o.). |
Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Pragmatism | Brandom Vs Pragmatism | I 196 BrandomVsPragmatism: you can know what follows from an assertion, for example, that an act is immoral without having understood the claim. ((s) Overemphasis on the consequences). Horwich I 444 Truth/Pragmatism/Rorty: has no explanatory role. a) it has confirmatory (endorsing) use b) warning use: E.g. "Your belief is justified, but perhaps not true," I 445 c) disquotationale use: designed to meta-linguistically express "S is true iff. __ ". JamesVs b) and c). Relativism/Rorty: that is why pragmatism was equaled with relativism. Truth/Pragmatism/Davidson/Rorty: Davidson accepts all three, without the idea that usefulness of beliefs could be explained by truth. BrandomVsPrimitive pragmatism/Rorty: (truth = assertibility): is refuted by the use of "true" in the antecedent of conditionals. Brandom: an evolution of Frege and CGB (pro-sentence theory, Camp, Grover, Belnap) receives Dewey’s intentions. Pro-sentence theory/Brandom: receives the anti-descriptive approach of pragmatism ((s) truth not a property). Brandom/Rorty: shows how the pro-sentence theory can be reconciled with Davidson’s disquotationalism. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Propositions | Davidson Vs Propositions | Field II 167 Meanings as intentional entities/DavidsonVsPropositions/Field: (Davidson 1967): Thesis: It is impossible to come up with a non-trivial theory of these intentional entities. E.g. meanings as intentional entities. E.g. How are meanings to be combined in form combinations? Meaning Combinations/MC/Davidson: ((s) instead of syntactic combinations): the most obvious is still to assume that meaning equality requires equal MC to be constructed of synonyms parts in the same way. Then we need a link operation for meanings. Like otherwise only for expressions ((s) syntactically). Of course, we could set up something like this: E.g. for all expressions E1 and E2: if E1 means m1 and E2 means m2, thenE1^E2 means m1^m2. How exciting! We can expand this "theory" by combining meaning equality with equality of meaning characterization. Problem: this does not yet create a connection between these meanings on the one hand and truth conditions (TC) and reference conditions on the other hand. That must yet be added. E.g. nothing tells us that the meaning associated with "Plato" picks out Plato. We have to add that through another theory of reference. (Which could be disquotational). Wrong solution: it would not help to introduce the concept "Plato" in a way that no intentional entity can be "Platon" if it does not single out Plato. Vs: If we did that, it would no longer be trivial that the meaning associated with "Plato" is iPlatoni. We would need an additional explanation as to why this is so, and it is not clear why this should be self-evident. "Theory of Reference"/Field: we would have to add that for other expressions, such as predicates and logical symbols. E.g. a theory that explains how the corresponding truth functions for "or" is singled out. T theory/Field: we would then have to add a T theory that explains how the meanings of composite expressions contribute to the TC. Conclusion: Hasn’t all the interesting work been done by the theories of reference and truth, plus access to equivalence relations on the set of meaning characterizations after this is subjected to translation? Horwich I 461 "Propositional assumption"/Propositional assumption/Terminology/Dummett/Devitt/Rorty: this is how Devitt called Dummett’s assumption that language understanding consists in the knowledge that the proposition is true in L in such and such circumstances. Understanding/Truth conditions/Tr.cond/Circumstances/Situation/DavidsonVsDummett: it is hopeless to try and isolate such circumstances because of the holism. Dummett: gives a non-holistic representation of "Davidsonean truth conditions" Dummett/Devitt: tries to infer: E.g. from "X knows the meaning of S" and "The meaning of S = the TC of X" to "S knows that the TC of X are TC". Rorty: this is only possible if we construct "S knows the meaning of S" as "There is an entity that is the meaning of S, and thus X is known." This is the propositional assumption. DavidsonVsPropositions//Rorty: Davidson would not accept them. And therefore he is not a TC theorist in Dummett’s sense. Devitt: assumes that Davidson accepts the propositional assumption. Rorty: this goes back to the fact that Davidson identified the meaning of theory with a theory of language understanding in his early articles. But they are incompatible with holism, and as misleading as E.g. the metaphor that billiard balls have "internalized" the laws of mechanics. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Prosentential Theory | Verschiedene Vs Prosentential Theory | Horwich I 344 Quote/VsProsentential Theory/Camp, Grover, Belnap/VsCGB: one accuses the prosentential theory of ignoring cases where truth of quotes, i.e. names of sentences is stated. Example (27) "Snow is white" is true. CGB: we could say here with Ramsey that (27) simply means that snow is white. CGBVsRamsey: this obscures important pragmatic features of the example. They become clearer when we use a foreign-language translation. Example (28) If „Schnee ist weiß“ is true, then… Why (28) instead of If it’s true that snow is white, then Or If snow is white, then… CGB: there are several possible reasons here. We may want to make it clear that the original sentence was written in German. Or it could be that there is no elegant translation, or we do not know the grammar of German well enough. Or example: "Snow is white" must be true because Fritz said it and everything Fritz says is true. I 345 Suppose English* has a way of formally presenting a sentence: E.g. „Betrachte __“ („Consider____"). (29) Consider: Snow is white. This is true. CGB: why should it not work the same as "snow is white is true" in normal English? VsCGB: you could argue that it requires a reference to sentences or expressions because quotation marks are name-forming functors. Quotation marks/CGB: we deviate from this representation! Quotation marks are not name-forming functors. ((s) not for CGB). Quote/CGB: should not be considered as a reference to expressions in normal English. But we do not want to follow that up here. I 346 VsCGB: one has accused the prosentential theory of tunnel vision: Maybe we overlooked certain grammatically similar constructions? Example (30) John: there are seven legged dogs Mary: that's surprising, but true. (31) John: the being of knowledge is the knowledge of being Mary: that is profound and it is true. Ad (30): of course the first half is "that is surprising" in no way prosentential. It is a characterization! VsCGB: Ad (31) "is profound" expresses a quality that Mary attributes to the sentence. Why shouldn't "true" be understood in the same way? CGB: it makes sense to take "this" here as referring to a sentence. But that would make things more complicated because then we would have to treat "that" and "it" differently in "that's true" and "it's true". CGBVsVs: 1. it is just not true that the "that" in "that's surprising" refers to an utterance (in the sense of what was said, or a proposition). What is surprising here? Facts, events or states of affairs. Statement/Surprise/CGB: a statement can only be surprising as an act. I 347 The surprising thing about the statement is the fact reported. ((s) But then the content rather than the act of testimony.) CGBVs(s): it is not the fact that there are seven legged dogs claimed to be true in (30), because that fact cannot be true! Proposition/CGB: (ad (31) Propositions are not profound. Acts can be profound. For example insights or thoughts. Truth/Act/Action/Statement/CGB: but statements in the sense of action are not what is called true. ((s) see also StrawsonVsAustin, ditto). Reference/Prosentential Theory/CGB: even if we consider "that's surprising, but it's true" as referring, the two parts don't refer to the same thing! And then the theory is no longer economic. Reference/Prosentential Theory/CGB: are there perhaps other cases where it is plausible that a pronoun refers to a proposition? Example (32) John: Some dogs eat grass. Mary: You believe that, but it's not true. Proposition: is often understood as a bearer of truth, and as an object of belief. (CGBVs). I 348 However, if "that" is understood here as a referencing pronoun, then the speaker must be a proposition. CGBVs: we can interpret "that you believe" also differently: as prosentential anaphora (as above in the example "that is wrong", with preceding negation prefix). Then we have no pronominal reference. N.B.: the point is that no property is attributed. Truth is not a property. VsCGB: another objection: it is also a "tunnel vision" that we only have "that is true" but not "that is right" in view. Or the example "exaggerated" by Austin. Example: a child says I've got 15 logs That is right. I 349 Question: should this (and e.g. "This is an exaggeration!") be understood prosententially? CGBVsVs: "that is right" is here the statement that the child counted right, that it did something right. Sometimes this can overlap with the statement that a statement is true. The overlap must exist because there is no clear boundary between language learning and use. I 349 Anaphora/Prosentential Theory/VsCGB: could not one split the prosody and take the individual "that" as an anaphora? CGBVsVs: then one would also have to split off "is true" and no longer perceive it as referencing, but as characterizing ((s) And thus attributing it as property). CGBVs: then we would have to give up our thesis that speech about truth is completely understandable without "carrier of truth" or "truth characteristic". Moreover: Reference/CGB: it is known that not every nominalization has to be referencing ((s) E.g. Unicorn). Predication/CGB: also not every predication has to be characterizing. Divine Perspective/outside/PutnamVsGod's point of view/Rorty: Putnam amuses himself like James and Dewey, about such attempts. Rorty: But he has a problem when it comes to PutnamVsDisquotationalism: it smells too reductionist, too positivist, too "behaviorist" ("transcendental skinnerism"). Truth/Putnam: when a philosopher says truth is something other than electricity because there is room for a theory of electricity but not for a truth theory, I 456 and that knowledge of the truth condition is all that could be known about truth, then he denies that truth is a property. So there is also no property of correctness or accuracy ((s) >Deflationism, PutnamVsDeflationism, PutnamVsGrover.) PutnamVs: that is, to deny that our thoughts are thoughts and our assertions are assertions. Theory/Existence/Reduction/Putnam/Rorty: Putnam here assumes that the only reason to deny is that you need a theory for an X is to say that the X is "nothing but Y" ((s) eliminative reductionism). PutnamVsDavidson: Davidson must show that claims can be reduced to sounds. Then the field linguist would have to reduce actions to movements. Davidson/Rorty: but this one does not say that claims are nothing but sounds. Instead: Truth/Explanation/Davidson: other than electricity, truth is no explanation for something. ((s) A phenomenon is not explained by the fact that a sentence that claims it is true). |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Putnam, H. | Rorty Vs Putnam, H. | McDowell I 175 Coherence Theory/Rorty pro Davidson: Beliefs: can a) be seen from the outside, perspective of the field researcher, causal interactions with the surroundings - b) from the inside, from the perspective of the natives, as rules of action. The inside view is normative, in the space of reasons. RortyVsPutnam: he attempts to somehow think this together. >Exterior/interior, Coherence Theory. McDowell I 178 RortyVsPutnam: By an "explanation of X" Putnam still understands a synopsis, the synthesis of external and internal position. Representatives of >disquotation believe that people could only be described in a behavioral manner. But why should it be impossible to consider supplements by normative representations? (Putnam's philosophy was ultimately traditional). Causality/Putnam: the desire to tell a story about the causal relationships of human pronouncements and environment does not rule out that a story is invented according to which the speakers express thoughts and make assertions, and try not to make mistakes. But these stories may then be indistinguishable! (PutnamVsRorty) Rorty Thesis: from a causal standpoint we cannot subdue our beliefs to standards of investigation. >Causality/Putnam, >Causality/Rorty. Rorty I 304 RortyVsPutnam: he provokes a pseudo-controversy between an "idealistic" and realistic theory of meaning. I 307 Putnam/Rorty: follows 3 thoughts: 1) against the construction of 'true' as synonymous with 'justified assertibility' (or any other "soft" concept to do with justification). This is to show that only a theory of the relationship between words and the world can give a satisfactory meaning of the concept of truth. 2) a certain type of sociological facts requires explanation: the reliability of normal methods of scientific research, the usefulness of our language as a means, and that these facts can be explained only on the basis of realism. 3) only the realist can avoid the inference from "many of the terms of the past did not refer" to "it is very likely that none of the terms used today refers". >Reference/Putnam. I 308 RortyVsPutnam: that is similar to the arguments of Moore against all attempts to define "good": "true, but not assertible" with reason" makes just as much sense as "good, but not conducive to the greatest happiness". I 312 Theoretical Terms/TT/Reference/Putnam/Rorty. We must prevent the disastrous consequence that no theoretical term refers to anything (argument 3), see above). What if we accepted a theory according to which electrons are like phlogiston? We would have to say that electrons do not exist in reality. What if this happened all the time? Of course, such a conclusion must be blocked. Granted desideratum of reference theory. I 313 RortyVsPutnam: puzzling for two reasons: 1) unclear from which philosophical standpoint it could be shown that the revolutionary transformation of science has come to an end. 2) even if there were such a standpoint, it remains unclear how the theory of reference could ever provide it. I 314 In a pre-theoretical sense we know very well that they have referred to such things. They all tried to cope with the same universe. I 315 Rorty: We should perhaps rather regard the function of an expression as "picking of entities" than as "description of reality". We could just represent things from the winning perspective in a way that even the most primitive animists talked about the movement of molecules and genes. This does not appease the skeptic who thinks that perhaps there are no molecules, but on the other hand it will also be unable to make a discovery about the relations between words and the world. Reference/Rorty: Dilemma: either we a) need the theory of reference as a guarantor of the success of today's science, or b) the reference theory is nothing more than a decision about how to write the history of science (rather than supplying its foundation.) I 319 Reference/RortyVsPutnam/RortyVsKripke: if the concept of "really talking about" is confused with the concept of reference, we can, like Kripke and Putnam, easily get the idea that we have "intuitions" about the reference. Rorty: in my opinion, the problem does not arise. The only question of fact that exists here, relates to the existence or non-existence of certain entities that are being talked about. I 320 Fiction/Reference/RortyVsKripke/RortyVsPutnam: of course there can be no reference to fictions. This corresponds to the technical and scientific use. But then "reference" has basically nothing to do with "talking about", and only comes into play after the choice between different strategies is made. Reference is a technical term, and therefore we have no intuitions about it! Real existence issues are also not affected by the criterion of Searle and Strawson! What then is the right criterion? Rorty: there is none at all! We cannot talk about non-existent entities, but we can also find out that we have actually talked about them! Talking about X in reality and talking about a real X is not the same thing. I 324 Realism/PutnamVsPutnam/Self-Criticism/Rorty: metaphysical realism collapses at the point where it claims to be different from Peirce's realism. I.e. the assertion that there is an ideal theory. I 326 Internal Realism/Putnam/Rorty: position according to which we can explain the "mundane" fact that the use of language contributes to achieving our goals, to our satisfaction, etc. by the fact that "not language, but the speakers reflect the world, insofar as they produce a symbolic representation of their environment. (Putnam). By means of our conventions we simply represent the universe better than ever. RortyVsPutnam: that means nothing more than that we congratulate ourselves to having invented the term lithium, so that lithium stands for something for which nothing has stood all the time. I 327 The fact that based on our insights we are quite capable of dealing with the world, is true but trivial. That we reasonably reflect it is "just an image". Rorty V 21 Analytic/Synthetic/Culture/Quine/Rorty: the same arguments can also be used to finish off the anthropological distinction between the intercultural and the intra-cultural. So we also manage without the concept of a universal transcultural rationality that Putnam cites against relativists. V 22 Truth/Putnam: "the very fact that we speak of our different conceptions of rationality sets a conceptual limit, a conceptual limit of the ideal truth." RortyVsPutnam: but what can such a limit do? Except for introducing a God standpoint after all? Rorty VI 75 Idealization/Ideal/Confirmation RortyVsPutnam: I cannot see what "idealized rational acceptability" can mean other than "acceptability for an ideal community". I.e. of tolerant and educated liberals. (>Peirce: "community of researchers at the ideal end of the research"). VI 76 Peirce/Terminology: "CSP" "Conceptual System Peirce" (so called by Sellars). Idealization/Ideal/Confirmation/RortyVsPutnam: since forbids himself to reproduce the step of Williams back to approaching a single correct result, he has no way to go this step a la Peirce! VI 79 Human/Society/Good/Bad/Rorty: "we ourselves with our standards" does not mean "we, whether we are Nazis or not", but something like "language users who, by our knowledge, are improved remakes of ourselves." We have gone through a development process that we accept as rational persuasion. VI 80 This includes the prevention of brainwashing and friendly toleration of troublemakers à la Socrates and rogues à la Feyerabend. Does that mean we should keep the possibility of persuasion by Nazis open? Yes, it does, but it is no more dangerous than the possibility to return to the Ptolemaic worldview! PutnamVsRorty: "cope better" is not a concept according to which there are better or worse standards, ... it is an internal property of our image of justification, that a justification is independent of the majority ... (Rorty: I cannot remember having ever said that justification depends on a majority.) RortyVsPutnam: "better" in terms of "us at our best" less problematic than in terms of "idealized rational acceptability". Let's try a few new ways of thinking. VI 82 Putnam: what is "bad" supposed to mean here, except in regard to a failed metaphysical image? VI 87 Truth/Putnam: we cannot get around the fact that there is some sort of truth, some kind of accuracy, that has substance, and not merely owes to "disquotation"! This means that the normative cannot be eliminated. Putnam: this accuracy cannot apply only for a time and a place (RortyVsPutnam). VI 90 Ratio/Putnam: the ratio cannot be naturalized. RortyVsPutnam: this is ambiguous: on the one hand trivial, on the other hand, it is wrong to say that the Darwinian view leaves a gap in the causal fabric. Ratio/Putnam: it is both transcendent and immanent. (Rorty pro, but different sense of "transcendent": going beyond our practice today). RortyVsPutnam: confuses the possibility that the future transcends the present, with the need for eternity to transcend time. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Putnam, H. | Brendel Vs Putnam, H. | I 70 Truth-Definition/WT/PutnamVsTarski/Putnam/Brendel: Tarski's theory is contraintuitive from the start: this also applies to the model-theoretical variants. They do not do justice to our intuitive concept of "true". I 71 His truth concept is not even "semantic". BrendelVsPutnam: his concept of "intuitive truth" is itself quite unclear. I 105 Disquotation Theory/Disquotation Theory/Disquotationalism/Putnam/Brendel: Thesis: is only a variant of redundancy theory. BrendelVsPutnam/Brendel: this is an error: because redundancy theory assumes an operator and a concept of truth based on disquotation theory cannot be a propositional operator and thus not a redundancy theory. I 278 Brains in a vat/BIV/PutnamVsSkepticism/Putnam: Thesis: the statement that we are brains in a vat cannot turn out to be true because representations have no intrinsic connection to their representatives ("magic reference") - is independent of causation. I 279 SkepticismVsPutnam/Brendel: Skepticism does not have to be impressed. It can classify Putnam's argument as a transcendental argument: it refers to the premises of the possibility of formulating the sentence "We are brains in a vat". StroudVsPutnam/Brendel: such transcendental arguments already presuppose certain verificationist assumptions. I 280 Problem: one cannot yet conclude from this that the world actually exists. One would also have to assume that principles constituting knowledge necessarily describe the world as it actually is. StroudVsTranscendental Argument/Brendel: petitio principii. I 281 BrendelVsStroud: Solution: Semantic Truth/Brendel: the skeptical hypothesis is not a meaningful truthful statement in the sense of semantic truth. Brains in a vat/BIV/Putnam/Brendel: Putnam himself admits that brains in a vat is physically possible. But what does that mean, except that there is such a possible description? I 282 BrendelVsPutnam: no physical possibility is shown at all, only a black box. (David WardVsPutnam Ward, 1995, 191f). He should show the possibility or impossibility of thinking. ((s) Because he himself ultimately proceeds from an argument of the impossibility of thinking (impossibility of reference). Thought experiment/Brendel: that something is physically possible is not yet an argument for the legitimacy of thougt experiment either. I 283 Conceptual Analysis/Brendel: can only be confirmed or refuted by conceptual possibilities. I 284 BrendelVsPutnam: the world of brains in a vat is not so closed to us, we have an idea of what it would be like. I 285 Understanding/Skepticism/BrendelVsPutnam/Brendel: therefore the skeptical hypothesis is not incomprehensible to us at all. And then also truthful. "Everything different"/Brendel: but this is where the limits of our imagination come in. |
Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Redundancy Theory | Brandom Vs Redundancy Theory | I 434 E.g. Vsredundancy theory "Goldbach s conjecture is true". I 438 This sentence is not interchangeable with "Goldbach s conjecture".VsRamsey. E.g. »everything the oracle says is true," is not open to simpler approaches of redundancy and disquotation. I 468 Brandom: "true" expresses a pro-sentence-forming operator. Its syntax and grammar is very different from that of a predicate. Just as "no" is not the necessary grammatical form to pick out a person . |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Redundancy Theory | Searle Vs Redundancy Theory | III 216 Def Redundancy Theory: there is no difference between the statements "p" and "it is true that p". (SearleVsRedundancy Theory). III 217 These two theories are believed to be usually incompatible with the correspondence theory. >Correspondence theory. III 219 Disquotation/Searle: disquotation tells us only for each individual case, what it is what makes statements true. >Disquotation. III 223 SearleVsRedundancy Theory: the illusion of redundancy arises from the fact that at disquotation the left side looks like the right. III 227 SearleVsRedundancy Theory: "true" is not redundant, we need a metalinguistic predicate to evaluate the success. >Metalanguage. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Synonymy | Deflationism Vs Synonymy | Field II 223 Enger Deflationismus/radikaler Deflationismus/Field:. Deflationismus wird uninteressant, wenn er nicht eng (radikal) gefaßt wird. Radikaler Deflationismus läßt nur rein disquotationale Wahrheit zu und Vsinter-personelle Synonymie. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Tarski, A. | Kripke Vs Tarski, A. | III 337 Expansion/Language/Kripke: Here we need Set Theory, at least the sets of the expressions of L. (As Tarski, who is dealing, however,with referential language). DavidsonVsTarski/Kripke: he needs less ontology and less richness of metalanguage. III 367 Substitutional quantification/sQ/KripkeVsTarski: substitution quantification together with the formula Q(p,a) solves Tarski’s problem to define a "true sentence". III 410 Language/Kripke: When a language is introduced, an explicit definition of W is a necessary and sufficient condition that the language has mathematically defined (extensional) semantics. Otherwise, the language can be explained in informal English. The semantics is then intuitive. Before Tarski, semantics have generally been treated that way. Convention T/DavidsonVsTarski/Kripke: for Davidson the axioms must be finite in number. Kripke: his work is much more controversial than that of Tarski. Field I 245 Def disquotational truth/dW/Field: can be defined with the help of substitution quantification (∏/(s): for all sentences, not objects .... is valid) for all sentences, not objects") definiert werden. S is true iff ∏p(if S = "p", p). where "p" sentences are substituents. But which sentences?. Konjunctions/Understanding/Paradoxies/Field: Konjunctions of sentences: makes only sense if the sentences have been understood beforehand, i.e. that the conjunctions themselves (and sentences constructed from them) are not allowed as conjuncts. (>Semantic Paradoxes, (s) >Everything he said is true). Solution: Tarski similar hierarchy of T-predicates. Predicates: then the definition of the dW by substitutional quantification (sQ)is typically ambiguous: each element of the hierarchy is provided by the corresponding sQ. KripkeVsTarski: (Kripke 1975): he is to restrictive for our aim: as such we do not obtain all ueK that we need. Solution/Kripke: others, quasi imprädikative Interpretation von dW. Analog für Field I 246 Substitutional Quantification/sQ/Kripke: Authorizes sentences to be a part of themselves and things, which are build from those sentences, to be conjuncts. However, the truth value of those quasi impredicative conjuncts are to be objectively indeterminate until the truth value is assigned to a certain level. sQ/Field: Allows then ueK without semantic ascent. If we want to talk about the non-linguistic world, why should we use sentences which we do not need?. → sQ: Could then be used as a basic term. → Basic term/Field: This means that a) the basic term is not defined by even more basic termini. → b) the basic term does not try to explain even more basic terms in theory (Field for each a) and b). → If we accept a), we need, however, to explain how the term obtains its meaning. Perhaps from logical laws which regulate its use. If we accept a), it is not a problem to accept b) as well. → Explanation/Field: e.g. the issue regarding mentalistic terms is not to give a meaning, but to show that the term is not primitive (basal). The ideology in logical terms does not need to be reduced that much. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Tarski, A. | Verschiedene Vs Tarski, A. | Eigen VII 303 v. WeizsäckerVsTarski: for the description of the meta language one needed again a meta language. Recourse. Sainsbury V 180 Tarski: the ordinary everyday concept of truth is incoherent: it must be replaced by a hierarchical series of predicates of truth. The object language must not contain a predicate that applies exactly to its true sentences. SainsburyVsTarski: some authors think that our everyday language is not really deficient, but already contains the required hierarchy. e.g. with turns like "What you just said isn't true." It seems too radical to reject our ordinary concept of truth. On the other hand, it is probably not correct to assume that our everyday concept already contains the whole separation. Reinforced LiarVsTarski : (L2: "L2 is not true"). Despite Tarski we could formulate: LN: LN is not trueN Version 1: If that is flawed because it does not respect the separation of levels, then it is not trueN. But that is what it says, it has to be trueN! Version 2: A sentence that breaks through the levels is semantically flawed and therefore not true. So you can always construct an amplified liar sentence to disprove an approach about levels! Horwich I 122 Truth Definition/T-Def/VsTarski: Objections about alleged lack of correctness are directed against the semantic T-concept in general. VsTarski: the T-Def is circular, because in the form "p iff q" truth occurs implicitly: namely, because the equivalence applies when either both sides are true or both sides are false. TarskiVsVs: if this objection would be valid, there would be no formally correct T-Def at all, because we cannot form a composite sentence without the help of connections and other logical terms defined with their help. I 123 Solution/Tarski: a strict deductive development of logic is often initiated by an explanation of the conditions under which propositions of the form "if p then q" etc. are considered true. (truth value tables). I 123 Solution/Tarski: a strict deductive development of logic is often initiated by an explanation of the conditions under which propositions of the form "if p then q" etc. are considered true. (Truth-value-tables). Horwich I 127 VsTarski: because of his scheme, which obliges him to facts, he is committed to realism. (GonsethVsTarski). TarskiVsVs: that the expression ... Snow is "actually" white...was wrongly inserted by my critics. Truth conditions/T-Def/Tarski: the reference to facts is deliberately missing in the T-scheme! It is not about truth conditions. T-Schema/Tarski: only implies that if we use the sentence (1) Snow is white we claim or negate that we then also have the correlated sentence (2) The sentence "snow is white" is true we have to claim or negate it. I 128 N.B: with it we can keep our respective epistemological attitude: we can remain realists, idealists, etc., if we have been before. Realism/Tarski: the semantic T-concept does not commit us to naïve realism. ((s) If truth is disquotation, then the "disciplines" must be distinguishable by sentences that are disquotationally true instead of "immanently true"). TarskiVsVs: reductio ad absurdum: if there were another T-concept (according to the will of these critics, then it would have to be somehow different and then it would ultimately come out that "snow is white" is true, iff snow is not white! Otherwise it would not be another T-concept but the same T-concept! Nevertheless, such a "new" T-concept would not necessarily be absurd. In any case, any T-concept that is incompatible with the semantic T-Def would have such consequences. Tarski I 160 VsTarski: Question: Is the semantic conception of truth the only "right" one? TarskiVsVs: I must confess that I do not understand this question because the problem is so vague that no clear solution is possible. I 162 VsTarski: in the formulation of the definition, we necessarily use statement links like "if..., then...", "or" etc.. These occur in definitions. However, it is well known that the meaning of propositional connections in logic is explained by the words "true" and "false". (Circle). TarskiVsVs: it is undoubtedly the case that a strictly deductive development of logic is often preceded by certain statements that explain the conditions under which statements of the form "if, then..." are true or false. However, these findings are outside the system of logic and should not be regarded as a definition of the terms in question! I 163 These findings influence in no way the deductive development of logic. Because here we do not discuss the question whether a statement is true, but whether it is provable! (Truth/Proofability). I 163 Logical Connection/Statement/Tarski: the moment we are in the deductive system of logic (or semantics based on logic), we treat the propositional connections either as undefined terms, or we define them with the help of other propositional connections. However, we do not define the connections using terms such as "true" or "false". (p or q) exactly when (if not p, then q). This definition obviously does not contain semantic terms. Error: the schema (T) X is true exactly when p. for a definition of truth! VsTarski: a critic, who commits this mistake, considered this alleged definition to be "inadmissibly short", i.e.: "incomplete". I 164 It is not necessary to decide whether 'equivalence' means a logical formal relationship or a non-logical relationship. He suggests to add: (T') X is true exactly when p is true. ((s) Vs: here "true" occurs twice). (T'') X is true exactly when p is the case. TarskiVsVs: this is a misunderstanding regarding the nature of the statement connections. (Confusion of name and subject matter/confusion of statements and their names, mention/use). ((s) p (right) is the statement itself, not the assertion of its truth. This has nothing to do with the correctness of redundancy theory). I 168 VsTarski: but the formal definition of truth has nothing to do with the "philosophical problem of truth". It gives necessary and sufficient conditions, but not the "essence" of this concept. TarskiVs: I am not able to understand what the "essence" of a term should be. ((s) FregeVsTarski: Terms have necessary characteristics.) I 172 Criterion/criterion of truth/VsTarski: some argue that definitions do not provide us with general criteria for deciding whether an object falls under the defined terms. And the term "true" is of this kind, since no universal criterion of truth emerges directly from the definition. (> criterion of truth). ((s) RescherVsTarski). Tarski: this is completely correct, but it does not distinguish the term from many terms of science such as theoretical physics. (> term). I 174 Semantics/Tarski: Semantic terms are actually contained in many areas of the sciences and especially empirical sciences. |
Eigen I M. Eigen Ruth Winkler Laws of the Game : How the Principles of Nature Govern Chance, Princeton/NJ 1993 German Edition: Das Spiel München 1975 Sai I R.M. Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 German Edition: Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 |
| Wright, Cr. | Rorty Vs Wright, Cr. | VI 40 WrightVsTarski/Rorty: he has not succeeded to specify a standard. Wright: two standards: legitimate assertibility and truth. Difference: the pursuit of one is necessarily also the pursuit of the other, but success with one is not necessarily a success with the other. Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: "metaphysical activism". Wants to keep correspondence and representation alive. RortyVsWright: from the fact that beliefs can be justified without being true (admittedly) it does not follow that two standards are followed. Nor that we have two obligations. 1) to justify actions, and 2) another obligation to do the right thing. It simply shows that what is justified with one audience is not necessarily so in front of another. Disquotation/Deflationism/Wright: the deflationist thinks that by the disquotation principle the content of the truth predicate is completely fixed. Wright: There is a "biconditional connection between the claim a proposition is true, and the appropriate use of this sentence produced by the disquotation principle, which serves and the purpose of explanation." VI 41 "Any genuine assertion practice is just the same as it would be if truth were the goal consciously set." Rorty: Wright believes that two choices can be distinguished by asking whether they are "de facto" not "guided" by one but by other consideration. RortyVsWright: is it sufficient for the actual existence of such a power, however, if the player believes the relevant fact is given? E.g. I believe I fulfill the will of the gods by a certain behavior. My critic - Atheist - says there is no will of the gods, so it could not be my standard. VI 42 I reply that this is reductionist and that my own belief of what standard I fulfill makes the difference. RortyVsWright: he should not be happy about this defense strategy of atheists. An imaginative player will always have more and more control systems in function than you can tell apart. VI 42/43 Wright: must either admit that his goal is then normative in a descriptive sense when the player believes this, or specify another criterion (recourse). Wright: the thesis that possession of truth consists in the "fulfillment of a normative condition distinct from the claim authorization" is equal to the thesis that "truth is a real property". Truth/Wright: thesis: truth is an independent standard. (Sic, VI 42/43) WrightVsDeflationism, Wright pro type of minimalism with truth as an independent standard in addition to a mere property of sentences. VI 45 Representation/Convergence/RortyVsWright: but his example is highly revealing: he thinks, e.g. what the "intuitive" linking of representationality with convergence is based on is the following "truism" about "convergence/representation": "If two devices for representation fulfill the same function, a different output is generated in favorable conditions when there is a different input." VI 46 Wright: must distinguish here between different discourses (for example, about physics or the comical), in which the cognitive is appropriate or not. The humor (the "base") could be different, although people could not be blamed for that. Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: such questions can only be decided a priori. Namely: e.g. the question of the cognitive status of a discourse! VI 46/47 Crispin Wright/RortyVsWright: he defines a cognitive commandment according to which a speaker is to function like a well oiled representation machine. This follows the pattern of all epistemologists by whom prejudice and superstition are like sand in the gears. Ultimately, for them humans are machines! Rorty: right Input/Output function is fulfilled by countless functions in an uninteresting manner. What Wright needs: we should recognize a priori: What are the proper functions (through knowledge of the content). VI 48 PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: Pragmatism doubts that cognitivity is more than a historically contingent consensus about the appropriate rationale. VI 48/49 Content/RortyVsWright: he believes philosophers could consider the "content" of a discourse and then say whether it complied with the cognitive commandment. Representation/RortyVsWright: fundamentally different outputs can be considered a representation of the same inputs. Basically anything can be a representation of anything. You only have to previously agree on it. Cognitivity/Rorty: the content is of minor importance when it comes to the determination of cognitivity. It is almost exclusively about approval of conventions. Therefore, it is a historical sociological term. VI 50 WrightVsWittgenstein/Rorty: (Following a rule) "in metaphysic perspective a killjoy" (Evans also). Only concession to the "Qietisten": that truth and falsehood are even possible where realism is not up for debate. (Comedy, morality). Two varieties of Wittgenstein's spoilsport: Kripke and McDowell. McDowellVsNoncognitivism/Rorty: the moral non-cognitivist is "driven by an erroneous interpretation of ethical facts and ethical objectivity". The same applies for him as for his Platonic opponents, the moral realists: VI 51 struggles with the quest for an independent position. That is impossible. (McDowellVsRealism of moral). Wright/Rorty: Wright is against this attempt "to undermine the debate between realism and anti-realism in general". Advantage of his concept of the cognitive commandment: does not include an overly objectified fact concept" (as would be criticized by Wittgenstein and McDowell). We refer to what we can understand as the range of possible causes of these differences of opinion. Representation/Relevance/Cognition/Function/RortyVsWright: this is not enough to rebut McDowell: to arrive at a concept of the range of possible causes we must first specify an Input Output function, otherwise we cannot distinguish the smooth functioning of a representative machine from a malfunction. Wittgenstein has shown that the "relevant object area" is never in the relevant sense "there". Therefore question: whether there is a way to isolate the input without reference to the "evaluative standpoint". World/Thinking/Davidson/DeweyVs: we do not have the ability to separate the contribution by "the world" to the process of judgment from our own contribution. VI 52 True Making/Wright/Rorty: does not doubt the existence of isolated "truth-makers". (WrightVsDavidson). VI 56 PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: here there are only historical sociologically variable differences between patterns of justifications. These patterns should not be introduced into the concept of truth. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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| Disquotationalism | Pro | Horwich I 445 Davidson per disquotationalismu |
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| Disquotationalism | Versus | Horwich I 431 PutnamVsDisquotationalism |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Disquotationalism | II 259 Field Def Disquotationalism / Field: the thesis that the question in virtue of which facts e.g. "entropy" refers to entropy, is meaningless. |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 theses of the more related field of specialization.
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| Disquotationalism | Field, Hartry | II 164 Disquotational true/disquotational reference/Field: corresponds to the thesis that Tarskian truth is not contingent empirical - necessary: both "p" is true iff p - as well as: It is true that p iff p - because the equality between possible worlds is not defined - is always related to an actual world. II 259 Def Disquotationalism/Field: the thesis that the question by which facts "entropy" refers to entropy is meaningless. |
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| Disquotationalism. | Grover, D. | II 231 Disquotationalismu / Grover: Thesis: the role of the T-predicate could be transferred to the prosentential theory. We have shown above. |
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| Truth | James, W. | Horwich I 444 Truth / pragmatism / Rorty: has no explanatory role. a) it has confirmatory use b) use of warning: e.g. "Your belief is justified, but perhaps not true." I 445 c) disquotational use: to express meta-linguistic "S is true iff _.". JamesVs b) and c). Stegm IV 495 Truth / James: often depends on our personal behavior. (> Morality). |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Prosentential Th. | Kamp/Grov/Beln | Field II 149 Prosentential Theory/Camp/Grover/Belnap/Field: (CGB 1975): in such cases, (with demonstratives, indices or unspeakable sentences) I can say instead: For example, "His utterance is true" to incorporate it into my language (indirectly). ((s) Different from "Everything he said"?). CGB: Thesis: This is the most important function of the truth predicate. ((s) The truth-predicate serves the generalization). FieldVsCGB: the most important is the disquotational function. Horwich I 315 Prosentential Theory/CGBVsTradition: is an alternative to the conventional analysis of "x is true" as a grammatical subject-predicate form. Subject: "X" , predicate "is true". CGB: this grammatical analysis is sometimes misleading, sometimes it limits our philosophical intuitions. Our approach eliminates some, if not all, problems. I 324 Pro sentence/CGB: Thesis: normal English (everyday language) has pro sentences! But not atomic ones. We start with atomic pro sentences here (i.e. "true" cannot be extracted from "is true", and there is no modification of the times). Example "It is true", example "This is true". I 324 Prosentential Theory/CGB: Thesis: We want to say in the spirit of Ramsey that all talk about truth can be understood to involve only the prosentential use of "This is true". |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Coherence | Williams, M. | Horwich I 488 Coherence theory / M Williams: has to do with skepticism. The theory says that the analysis of truth in non - epistemic terms makes truth inaccessible. M. Williams: if that were true, the disquotationalism, and also richer correspondence theory would be excluded. I 489 M. WilliamsVs: as epistemic thesis, the skepticism in general can only be derived under skeptical assumptions. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Inflationism | Wright, Cr. | I 47 Def inflationism: a) "true" is merely a means of affirming - only expresses attitudes towards sentences. (Rorty)?. Expresses no norm. b) The disquotational scheme contains an (almost) complete explanation of the meaning of the word. |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Truth | Friedman, M. | Horwich I 498 Truth / FriedmanVsDeflationsm: can not be shelved so: the disquotation scheme alone does not show the use of language. Compositionality / T-theory / Friedman: Thesis: truth theory requires a compositional meaning theory. Truth / Deflationism / M. Williams: That is not to say that a richer (substantial) T-phrase is required. This shows the case of Davidson. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
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