Dictionary of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute

[german]

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

Enhanced Search:

Search term 1: Author or Term Search term 2: Author or Term

The author or concept searched is found in the following 742 entries.

Disputed term/author/ism	Author	Entry	Reference
Ability	Klahr	Slater I 64 Abilities/Children/problem-solving/circumstances/VsPiaget/Klahr: We need to consider - more than Piaget did - the types of inferences a child can draw from his or her knowledge of daily environmental conditions. We need to investigate when children are able to build a purpose-resource chain by notiving relevant features of the environment and organizing a wide range of facts, constraints, and simple inferences in so systematic manner. The TOH (Tower of Hanoi) provides an ideal context in which to explore these issues. VsPiaget: we must guard against the problem of false positive interpretations (i.e., attributing an ability to the child that she or he does not have). >Problem solving/developmental psychology/Klahr. David Klahr, ”Revisiting Piaget. A Perspective from Studies of Children’s Problem-solving Abilities”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Abstract Art	Gadamer	I 97 Comment Abstract Art/Gadamer: The contemporary discussion about abstract art is, in my opinion, in the process of drifting into an abstract opposition of "representational" and "non-representational". There is in fact a polemical accent on the concept of abstractness. Polemics, however, always presupposes common ground. In this way, abstract art does not detach itself from the reference to representationalism per se, but holds it in the form of privation. It cannot go beyond this, provided that our seeing is and remains a seeing of objects. There can only be aesthetic vision in the absence of the habits of practically directed seeing - and what one refrains from, one must see, indeed, keep an eye on. The theses of Bernhard Berenson are similar: "What we generally call 'seeing', is a convenient arrangement." "The fine arts are a compromise between what we see and what we know" (Berenson, Sehen und Wissen, Die Neue Rundschau, 1959, pp. 55-77). >Form and Content/Gadamer, >Art, >Artworks, >Aesthetics, >Beauty.	Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Accelerator Theory	Keynes	Rothbard III 868 Accelerator Theory/Keynes/Rothbard: The "acceleration principle" has been adopted by some Keynesians as their explanation of investment, then to be combined with the "multiplier" to yield various mathematical "models" of the business cycle. >Investment Multiplier/Keynes, >Investments/Keynes. Before Keynes: The acceleration principle antedates Keynesianism, however, and may be considered on its own merits. It is almost always used to explain the behavior of investment in the business cycle. Rothbard: The essence of the acceleration principle may be summed up in the following illustration: Let us take a certain firm or industry, preferably a first-rank producer of consumers' goods. Assume that the firm is producing an output of 100 units of a good during a certain period of time and that 10 machines of a certain type are needed in this production. If the period is a year, consumers demand and purchase 100 units of output per year. The firm has a stock of 10 machines. Suppose that the average life of a machine is 10 years. Equilibrium: In equilibrium, the firm buys one machine as replacement every year (assuming it had bought a new machine every year to build up to 10).⁽¹⁾ Rothbard III 869 Demand: Now suppose that there is a 20-percent increase in the consumer demand for the firm's output. Consumers now wish to purchase 120 units of output. Assuming a fixed ratio of capital investment to output, it is now necessary for the firm to have 12 machines (maintaining the ratio of one machine: 10 units of annual output). In order to have the 12 machines, it must buy two additional machines this year. Add this demand to its usual demand of one machine, and we see that there has been a 200-percent increase in demand for the machine. A 20-percent increase in demand for the product has caused a 200-percent increase in demand for the capital good. Capital goods/demand: Hence, say the proponents of the acceleration principle, an increase in consumption demand in general causes an enormously magnified increase in demand for capital goods. Or rather, it causes a magnified increase in demand for "fixed" capital goods, of high durability. Stagnation: Now suppose that, in the next year, consumer demand for output remains at 120 units. There has been no change in consumer demand from the second year (when it changed from 100 to 120) to the third year. And yet, the accelerationists point out, dire things are happening in the demand for fixed capital. For now there is no longer any need for firms to purchase any new machines beyond what is necessary for replacement. Needed for replacement is still only one machine per year. As a result, while there is zero change in demand for consumers' goods, there is a 200-percent decline in demand for fixed capital. Causality/Keynesianism: And the former is the cause of the latter. Business cycles/crises: To the upholders of the acceleration principle, this illustration provides the key to some of the main features of the business cycle: the greater fluctuations of fixed capital-goods industries as compared with consumers' goods, and the mass of errors revealed by the crisis in the investment goods industries. Rothbard III 870 1. VsAccelerator theory/Rothbard: The acceleration principle is rife with error. An important fallacy at the heart of the principle has been uncovered by [W.H.] Hutt.⁽²⁾ We have seen that consumer demand increases by 20 percent; but why must two extra machines be purchased in a year? What does the year have to do with it? If we analyze the matter closely, we find that the year is a purely arbitrary and irrelevant unit even within the terms of the example itself. We might just as readily take a week as the period oftime. Then we would have to say that consumer demand (which, after all, goes on continuously) increases 20 percent over the first week (…). Rothbard III 871 2.Vs: Secondly, the acceleration principle makes a completely unjustified leap from the single firm or industry to the whole economy. A 20-percent increase in consumption demand at one point must signify a 20-percent drop in consumption somewhere else. Comsumption demand: For how can consumption demand in general increase? Consumption demand in general can increase only through a shift from saving. But if saving decreases, then there are less funds available for investment. If there are less funds available for investment, how can investment increase even more than consumption? In fact, there are less funds available for investment when consumption increases. Consumption and investment compete for the use of funds. Explanation/physics/economics: The acceleration principle simply glides from a demonstration in physical terms to a conclusion in monetary terms.⁽³⁾ RothbardVs: Furthermore, the acceleration principle assumes a constant relationship between "fixed" capital and output, ignoring substitutability, the possibility of a range of output, the more or less intensive working of factors. It also assumes that the new machines are produced practically instantaneously, thus ignoring the requisite period of production. 1. It is usually overlooked that this replacement pattern, necessary to the acceleration principle, could apply only to those firms or industries that had been growing in size rapidly and continuously. 2. See his brilliant critique of the acceleration principle in W.H. Hutt, Co-ordination and the Price System (unpublished, but available from the Foundation for Economic Education, Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y., 1955), pp. 73-117. 3. Neglect of prices and price relations is at the core of a great many economic fallacies.	EconKeyn I John Maynard Keynes The Economic Consequences of the Peace New York 1920 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Actions	Minsky	I 166 Actions/cross-exclusion/Artificial Intelligence/Minsky: if several urgent needs occur at once, there must be a way to select one of them. (…) cross-exclusion, (…) appears in many portions of the brain. In such a system, each member of a group of agents is wired to send inhibitory signals to all the other agents of that group. >Software-Agents/Minsky, >Society of Minds/Minsky. Cross-exclusion arrangements could provide a basis for the principle of noncompromise in regions of the brain where competitive mental agents lie close together. Cross-exclusion groups can also be used to construct short-term memory-units. Whenever we force one agent of such a group into activity, even for a moment, it will remain active (and the others will remain suppressed) until the situation is changed by some other strong external influence. Weaker external signals will have scarcely any effect at all because of resistance from within. Why call this a short-term memory if it can persist indefinitely? Because when it does get changed, no trace will remain of its previous state. >Motivation/Minsky.	Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003
Addition	Thiel	I 312 The fact that systems with categorically different objects have the same structure does not seem more surprising than the occurrence of structural similarities between areas of categorically different objects. >Structures. Thiel I 312 In modern mathematics one speaks not only of "the" addition, but of "an addition" and introduces linking signs. For example, one writes addition as "$" if it is associative and commutative, if it is not the case, one might prefer to write the operation as multiplication "§" or something else. >Junctions, >Connectives, >Definitions, >Definability, cf. >Equal sign. I 312/313 Ontology/object/mathematics/Thiel: the validity of such laws does not turn the subject area into a number area, just as the validity of any set-theoretical laws transforms the (ranges of) numbers into (ranges of) sets. >Mathematical entities. The registration of the possible types of operations does not provide any fundamental discipline.	T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995
Adjectives	Gärdenfors	I 116 Adjective/Noun/Word Classes/Gärdenfors: Thesis: the main semantic difference between adjectives and nouns is that adjectives such as "red", "big" and "round" typically refer to a single area and thus represent properties, while nouns such as "dog", "apple" and "city" contain information on several areas and therefore... --- I 117 ...represent object categories. But this is only a rule of thumb. > Categories/Gärdenfors. --- I 135 Adjectives/Word Classes/Functions/Gärdenfors: can A) be regarded as a means of specifying objects B) on a second level (for the coordination of similarities), the adjective has an informative function: e.g. The oven is hot. Logical form: in this case, the adjective is a complement to the copula "is". Problem: it is not clear that these two functions (specification and information) can be exercised by the same word class. (Dixon 2004, p. 30)⁽¹⁾. There are adjectives that can only be used specifically (e.g., alive), and those that are used only informatively (predicatively), e.g. "absolute". (Paradis, 2005)⁽²⁾ Specification: can also be performed by nouns. --- I 136 Gärdenfors: Thesis on Adjectives: the meaning of an adjective can be represented in a convex region of a single area. E.g. colour words: no language has only one word for what is called "green" and "orange" in German. Conceptual Space/Colour words/Gärdenfors: for my thesis that there is a single area for adjectives, evidence has been found: I 137 See Taft and Sivik (1997)⁽³⁾, Sivik & Taft (1994)⁽⁴⁾, Jäger (2010)⁽⁵⁾, Cook, Kay & Regier (2005)⁽⁶⁾ Problem: Adjectives like "healthy" are at the limit of many dimensions e.g. having no pain,... --- I 138 ...having no infection, etc. Therefore, the importance of "healthy" of the one-area thesis for adjectives does not seem to apply here. Solution Gärdenfors: a) one can assume an area disease-health. This is how doctors proceed. Vs: Problem: we cannot create a product room here. B) A "health dimension" can be assumed as a diagonal in the product space, which covers all dimensions involved in disease and health. GärdenforsVs: I find this less attractive. 1. Dixon (2004) Dixon, R. M. W. (2004). Adjective Classes in typological perspective. In R. M. W. Dixon & A. Y. Aikhenvald (Eds.) Adjective classes: A cross-linguistic typology (pp. 1-49) Oxford. 2. Paradis, C. (2005) Ontologies and construals in lexical semantics. Axiomathes, 15, 541-573. 3. Taft, C., & Sivik, L. (1997). Salient color terms in four languages. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 38, 26–31. 4. Sivik, L., & Taft, C. (1994). Color naming: A mapping in the NCS of common color terms. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 35, 144–164. 5. Jäger, G. (2010). Natural color categories are convex sets. Amsterdam Colloquium 2009, LNAI 6042 (pp. 11–20). Berlin: Springer. 6. Cook, R. S. Kay, P., & Regier, T. (2005) The World Color Survey database: History and use. In H. Cohen & C. Lefebvre (Eds.) Handbook of categorization in cognitive science (pp. 223-242). Amsterdam.	Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014
Adulthood	Cognitive Psychology	Upton I 137 Adulthood/logic/Cognitive psychology/Upton: (…) we now recognize that cognitive development goes beyond [the years of childhood (>Cognitive development/Piaget)] and a fourth stage of cognitive development has been suggested by a number of theorists (e.g. Commons et al.(1), 1984; Sinnott, 1994⁽²⁾; Yan and Arlin, 1995)⁽³⁾. Called ‘post-formal thought’, this stage has been suggested to be typified by relativistic thinking, whereby adults recognize that knowledge depends on the subjective perspective of each individual and that there is, therefore, no absolute truth (…). Perry (1970)⁽⁴⁾ studied cognitive growth in college students and found that there was a shift from the initial assumption when entering college that there was an absolute truth to be found, to a gradual recognition that questions might have many answers. (…) we move from absolutist to relativist thinking and, according to some theorists, this results in the use of a greater variety of thinking styles (Zhang, 2002)⁽⁵⁾. Furthermore, it is suggested that advanced thinkers relish the challenge of finding the paradoxes and inconsistencies in ideas so as to attempt to reconcile them (Basseches, 1984)⁽⁶⁾. 1. Commons. ML, Richards, FA and Armon, C (1 984) Beyond Formal Operations: Late adolescent and adult cognitive development. New York: Praeger. 2. Sinnott J.D. (2002) Postformal Thought and Adult Development. In: Demick J., Andreoletti C. (eds) Handbook of Adult Development. The Springer Series in Adult Development and Aging. Springer, Boston, MA 3. Yan. B and Arlin PK (1995) Nonabsolute/relativistic thinking: a common factor underlying models of postformal reasoning? Journal of Adult Development, 2: 223-40. 4. Perry, WG (1970) Forms of Intellectual and Ethical Development in the College Years. New York: Holt, Rhinehart. 5. Zhang, LF (2002) Thinking styles and cognitive development. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 163: 179-95. 6. Basseches, M (1984) Dialectical Thinking and Adult Development. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Further reading: Kitchener, KS, Lynch, CL, Fischer, KW and Wood, PK (1993) Developmental range of reflective judgment: the effect of contextual support and practice on developmental stage. Developmental Psychology, 29:893—906. Available online at https ://gseweb.harvard.edu/ —ddl/articles Copy! Kitchener-etal 1993 DevRangeReflectjudgem.pdf.	Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011
Adverse Selection	Barr	Gaus I 213 Adverse Selection/public goods/welfare state//Barr/Moon: [in a welfare state] voluntary welfare provision may (...) be unable to cover everyone in a society. Many people in the heyday of mutual aid societies were not members, and non-members were often among the least advantaged, those without steady jobs and a secure place within the community. >Welfare state, >Society. Adverse selection: organizations offering protection recognize that those most likely to need protection have Gaus I 213 the greatest incentive to seek it, and so to join a mutual aid society or to purchase insurance, while those facing the lowest risks have an incentive to stay out. As a result of this process of 'adverse selection' , risks tend to be spread over a smaller and smaller part of the population, and premiums must rise accordingly. This process of adverse selection can continue to the point where most of those in need of protection are unable to afford it, because premiums have to rise so high that all but the most vulnerable drop out. The welfare state can combat the problem of adverse selection by making membership compulsory: 'because low risks cannot opt out, it makes possible a pooling solution' (Barr, 1992⁽¹⁾: 755). >Insurances. Moral hazard: adverse selection is reinforced by a second process or condition, called 'moral hazard'. People who are insured against a certain risk may be more willing to take chances than they would be in the absence of insurance. Knowing that if I get sick or injured, my medical bills will be covered, may make me more willing to engage in risky behaviour, such as downhill skiing. To the extent that this occurs, organizations may face higher claims, thereby forcing them to raise their charges, and discouraging others from purchasing protection. More obviously, unemployment insurance schemes are subject to moral hazard, for knowing that I will be covered in the event that I am unemployed, I have an incentive to quit (or arrange to be fired) and/or not to seek or accept employment. Of course, state schemes are subject to moral hazard as well, but the key point is that if the genuine risk of losing one's job is to be covered at all, it must be covered through a public programme (see Barr, 1998(2): 190—2). >Moral Hazard. 1. Barr, Nicholas (1992) 'Economic theory and the welfare state'. Journal of Economic Literature, 30 (2): 741-803. 2. Barr, Nicholas (1998) The Economics of the Welfare State, 3rd edn. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Aesthetic Consciousness	Gadamer	I 91 Aesthetic Consciousness/Gadamer: What we call a work of art and experience aesthetically is based (...) on an achievement of abstraction. By disregarding everything in which a work is rooted in its original context of life, of all religious or profane function in which it stood and in which it had its meaning, it becomes visible as the "pure work of art". The abstraction of the aesthetic consciousness thus achieves a positive achievement for itself. It lets us see and is for itself what the pure work of art is. I call this, its achievement, the "aesthetic distinction". >Truth of Art/Gadamer, >Truth of Art/Schiller. This is intended to designate - in contrast to the distinction that a content-filled and certain taste exercises in selecting and rejecting - the abstraction that selects solely on the basis of aesthetic quality as such. It takes place in the self-consciousness of the "aesthetic experience". What the aesthetic experience is aimed at is to be the actual work - what it is not aimed at are the non-aesthetic moments inherent in it: purpose, function, meaning of content. These moments may be significant enough, as long as they integrate the work into its world and thus determine the whole range of meaning that it originally owns. But the artistic nature of the work must be distinguishable from all that. It virtually defines the aesthetic consciousness, that it carries out precisely this distinction of the aesthetically meant from all that is non-aesthetic. It abstracts from all conditions of access under which a work shows itself to us. Such a distinction is therefore itself a specifically aesthetic one. It distinguishes the aesthetic quality of a work from all content-related moments that determine our position in terms of content, morality or religion, and only means itself in its aesthetic existence. >Aesthetics, >Art, >Art works. The aesthetic consciousness therefore has the character of simultaneity, because it claims that everything that has artistic value is gathered in it. I 92 The "aesthetic distinction" which it operates as aesthetic consciousness also creates its own external existence. It proves its productivity by preparing its sites for simultaneity, the "universal library" in the field of literature, the museum, the standing theatre, the concert hall etc. I 93 Thus, through "aesthetic distinction", the work loses its place and the world to which it belongs by becoming part of the aesthetic consciousness. This corresponds on the other hand to the fact that the artist also loses his/her place in the world. I 105 Aesthetic Consciousness/Gadamer: [In the aesthetic experience] there is no progress and no final exhaustion of what is contained in a work of art. >Aesthetic Experience/Gadamer. The experience of art knows that about itself. Nevertheless, the aesthetic consciousness should not simply assume what it thinks of as its experience. For it perceives it, as we have seen, ultimately as the discontinuity of experience. But we have recognized this consequence as unacceptable. >Truth of Art/Gadamer.	Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Affect	Carver	Corr I 428 Affect/control processes/feedback/Carver/Scheier: Affect pertains to one’s desires and whether they are being met (Clore 1994⁽¹⁾; Frijda 1988(2); Ortony, Clore and Collins 1988⁽³⁾). But what is the internal mechanism by which feelings arise? Answers range from neurobiological (e.g., Davidson 1992⁽⁴⁾) to cognitive (Ortony, Clore and Collins 1988⁽³⁾). We (Carver and Scheier 1990⁽⁴⁾, 1998⁽⁵⁾) (…) used feedback control (…) but now we suggest that feelings arise as a consequence of another feedback process that operates simultaneously with the behaviour-guiding process and in parallel to it. >Control processes/Carver/Scheier, >Feedback/Carver/Scheier. Corr I 429 It operates automatically and without supervision. The easiest characterization of what this second process is doing is that it is checking on how well the first process is doing. The input for this second loop, thus, is the rate of progress in the action system over time. As in other feedback loops, the comparison checks for deviation from the standard. If there is a discrepancy, the output function changes. We believe the error signal in this loop is manifest as affect, a positive or negative valence. A rate of progress below the criterion creates negative affect. >Criteria/Carver/Scheier. Corr I 430 As have Higgins (e.g., 1987⁽⁶⁾, 1996⁽⁷⁾) and his collaborators, we argue for two dimensions of affect, one concerning approach, the other concerning avoidance (Carver 2001⁽⁸⁾; Carver and Scheier 1998⁽⁵⁾). Approach yields such positive affects as elation, eagerness and excitement, and such negative affects as frustration, anger and sadness (Carver 2004)⁽⁹⁾. Avoidance yields such positive affects as relief, serenity and contentment and such negative affects as fear, guilt and anxiety. This description implies a natural connection between affect and action; that is, if the input of the affect loop is a rate of progress in action, the output function of the affect loop must be a change in rate of that action. Thus, the affect loop has a direct influence on what occurs in the action loop. 1. Clore, G. C. 1994. Why emotions are felt, in P. Ekman and R. J. Davidson (eds.),The nature of emotion: fundamental questions, pp. 103–111. New York: Oxford University Press 2 Frijda, N. H. 1994. Emotions are functional, most of the time, in P. Ekman and R. J. Davidson (eds.), The nature of emotion: fundamental questions, pp. 112–26. New York: Oxford University Press 3. Ortony, A., Clore, G. L. and Collins, A. 1988. The cognitive structure of emotions. New York: Cambridge University Press 4. Carver, C. S. and Scheier, M. F. 1990. Origins and functions of positive and negative affect: a control-process view, Psychological Review97: 19–35 5. Carver, C. S. and Scheier, M. F. 1998. On the self-regulation of behaviour. New York: Cambridge University Press 6. Higgins, E. T. 1987. Self-discrepancy: a theory relating self and affect, Psychological Review94: 319–401 7. Higgins, E. T. 1996. Ideals, oughts, and regulatory focus: affect and motivation from distinct pains and pleasures, in P. M. Gollwitzer and J. A. Bargh (eds.), The psychology of action: linking cognition and motivation to behaviour, pp. 91–114. New York: Guilford Press 8. Carver, C. S. 2001. Affect and the functional bases of behaviour: on the dimensional structure of affective experience, Personality and Social Psychology Review 5:345–56 9. Carver, C. S. 2004. Negative affects deriving from the behavioural approach system, Emotion 4: 3–22 Charles S. Carver and Michael F. Scheier, “Self-regulation and controlling personality functioning” in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Affect	Scheier	Corr I 428 Affect/control processes/feedback/Carver/Scheier: Affect pertains to one’s desires and whether they are being met (Clore 1994⁽¹⁾; Frijda 1988(2); Ortony, Clore and Collins 1988⁽³⁾). But what is the internal mechanism by which feelings arise? Answers range from neurobiological (e.g., Davidson 1992⁽⁴⁾) to cognitive (Ortony, Clore and Collins 1988⁽³⁾). We (Carver and Scheier 1990⁽⁴⁾, 1998⁽⁵⁾) (…) used feedback control (…) but now we suggest that feelings arise as a consequence of another feedback process that operates simultaneously with the behaviour-guiding process and in parallel to it. >Control processes/Carver/Scheier, >Feedback/Carver/Scheier. Corr I 429 It operates automatically and without supervision. The easiest characterization of what this second process is doing is that it is checking on how well the first process is doing. The input for this second loop, thus, is the rate of progress in the action system over time. As in other feedback loops, the comparison checks for deviation from the standard. If there is a discrepancy, the output function changes. We believe the error signal in this loop is manifest as affect, a positive or negative valence. A rate of progress below the criterion creates negative affect. >Criteria/Carver/Scheier. Corr I 430 As have Higgins (e.g., 1987⁽⁶⁾, 1996⁽⁷⁾) and his collaborators, we argue for two dimensions of affect, one concerning approach, the other concerning avoidance (Carver 2001⁽⁸⁾; Carver and Scheier 1998⁽⁵⁾). Approach yields such positive affects as elation, eagerness and excitement, and such negative affects as frustration, anger and sadness (Carver 2004)⁽⁹⁾. Avoidance yields such positive affects as relief, serenity and contentment and such negative affects as fear, guilt and anxiety. This description implies a natural connection between affect and action; that is, if the input of the affect loop is a rate of progress in action, the output function of the affect loop must be a change in rate of that action. Thus, the affect loop has a direct influence on what occurs in the action loop. 1. Clore, G. C. 1994. Why emotions are felt, in P. Ekman and R. J. Davidson (eds.),The nature of emotion: fundamental questions, pp. 103–111. New York: Oxford University Press 2 Frijda, N. H. 1994. Emotions are functional, most of the time, in P. Ekman and R. J. Davidson (eds.), The nature of emotion: fundamental questions, pp. 112–26. New York: Oxford University Press 3. Ortony, A., Clore, G. L. and Collins, A. 1988. The cognitive structure of emotions. New York: Cambridge University Press 4. Carver, C. S. and Scheier, M. F. 1990. Origins and functions of positive and negative affect: a control-process view, Psychological Review97: 19–35 5. Carver, C. S. and Scheier, M. F. 1998. On the self-regulation of behaviour. New York: Cambridge University Press 6. Higgins, E. T. 1987. Self-discrepancy: a theory relating self and affect, Psychological Review94: 319–401 7. Higgins, E. T. 1996. Ideals, oughts, and regulatory focus: affect and motivation from distinct pains and pleasures, in P. M. Gollwitzer and J. A. Bargh (eds.), The psychology of action: linking cognition and motivation to behaviour, pp. 91–114. New York: Guilford Press 8. Carver, C. S. 2001. Affect and the functional bases of behaviour: on the dimensional structure of affective experience, Personality and Social Psychology Review 5:345–56 9. Carver, C. S. 2004. Negative affects deriving from the behavioural approach system, Emotion 4: 3–22 Charles S. Carver and Michael F. Scheier, “Self-regulation and controlling personality functioning” in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Affect	Shoda	Corr I 477 Affects/Social Cognition/Shoda/Smith: Early information-processing models developed within cognitive psychology focused on ‘cool cognitions’, such as facts and propositions processed in a logical fashion. These models changed as it became clear that affects, or emotions, profoundly influence many aspects of behaviour, including how stimuli are encoded and the expectancies that are evoked by situational cues (Forgas 1995)⁽¹⁾. Cognitions about the self and one’s future are inherently affect laden, or ‘hot’ (Shoda and Mischel 1998)⁽²⁾. Moreover, affective responses can influence a wide range of behaviours, including evaluative responses and social behaviour, in a pre-conscious fashion that occurs automatically and outside of awareness (Gollwitzer and Bargh 1996)⁽³⁾. Shoda/Smith: Emotions also affect other CAPS (Cognitive-affective processing system) components. >Encoding/Shoda/Smith, >Social Cognition/Shoda/Smith. Anxiety, for example, can significantly lower outcome expectancies in performance situations (Smith 2006)⁽⁴⁾. >Control processes/Shoda/Smith. 1. Forgas, J. P. 1995. Mood and judgment: the affect-infusion model (AIM), Psychological Bulletin 117: 39–66 2. Shoda, Y. and Mischel, W. 1998. Personality as a stable cognitive-affective activation network: characteristic patterns of behaviour variation emerge from a stable personality structure, in S. J. Read and L. C. Miller (eds.), Connectionist and PDP models of social reasoning and social behaviour, pp. 175–208. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 3. Gollwitzer, P. M. and Bargh, J. A. (eds.) 1996.The psychology of action: linking motivation and cognition to behaviour. New York: Guilford Press 4. Smith, R. E. 2006. Understanding sport behavior: a cognitive-affective processing systems approach, Journal of Applied Sport Psychology 18: 1–27 Ronald E. Smith and Yuichi Shoda, “Personality as a cognitive-affective processing system“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Affect	Smith	Corr I 477 Affects/Social Cognition/Shoda/Smith: Early information-processing models developed within cognitive psychology focused on ‘cool cognitions’, such as facts and propositions processed in a logical fashion. These models changed as it became clear that affects, or emotions, profoundly influence many aspects of behaviour, including how stimuli are encoded and the expectancies that are evoked by situational cues (Forgas 1995)⁽¹⁾. Cognitions about the self and one’s future are inherently affect laden, or ‘hot’ (Shoda and Mischel 1998)⁽²⁾. Moreover, affective responses can influence a wide range of behaviours, including evaluative responses and social behaviour, in a pre-conscious fashion that occurs automatically and outside of awareness (Gollwitzer and Bargh 1996)⁽³⁾. Shoda/Smith: Emotions also affect other CAPS (Cognitive-affective processing system) components. >Encoding/Shoda/Smith, >Social Cognition/Shoda/Smith. Anxiety, for example, can significantly lower outcome expectancies in performance situations (Smith 2006)⁽⁴⁾. >Control processes/Shoda/Smith. 1. Forgas, J. P. 1995. Mood and judgment: the affect-infusion model (AIM), Psychological Bulletin 117: 39–66 2. Shoda, Y. and Mischel, W. 1998. Personality as a stable cognitive-affective activation network: characteristic patterns of behaviour variation emerge from a stable personality structure, in S. J. Read and L. C. Miller (eds.), Connectionist and PDP models of social reasoning and social behaviour, pp. 175–208. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 3. Gollwitzer, P. M. and Bargh, J. A. (eds.) 1996.The psychology of action: linking motivation and cognition to behaviour. New York: Guilford Press 4. Smith, R. E. 2006. Understanding sport behavior: a cognitive-affective processing systems approach, Journal of Applied Sport Psychology 18: 1–27 Ronald E. Smith and Yuichi Shoda, “Personality as a cognitive-affective processing system“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	EconSmith I Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010 EconSmithV I Vernon L. Smith Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009 Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Affectional Bond	Ainsworth	Slater I 15 Affectional Bond/Ainsworth: Ainsworth (1989)⁽¹⁾ emphasized that affectional bonds differed on the basis of the behavioral system that motivated bond formation. Whereas children’s bonds with caregivers were motivated by the attachment system, the adult’s bond to the child was motivated by the caregiving system. Bonds to a peer may be motivated by either affiliation in the case of friends or sexual and reproductive systems in the case of adult pair bonds. >Attachment theory. Slater I 18 A major advance in both human and animal models of early social experience was the recognition that there was naturally occurring variability in maternal caregiving behavior. In her observations of mothers and their infants in the home environment, Mary Ainsworth developed codes for discriminating between sensitive and insensitive caregiving behavior (Ainsworth et al., 1978)⁽²⁾. Infants who experienced sensitive caregiving were subsequently classified as secure in laboratory tests using the Strange Situation paradigm (>Situation/Ainsworth) at 12 and 18 months. Infants’ security in the Strange Situation, in turn, has predicted aspects of subsequent child adaptation in preschool, childhood, and adolescence (Sroufe et al., 2005)⁽³⁾. The notion that individual differences in the quality of care received from the mother can have long-term effects on psychosocial outcomes has generally been supported in several major longitudinal studies (Belsky & Fearon, 2002)⁽⁴⁾. >Stages of development. 1. Ainsworth, M. S. (1989). Attachments beyond infancy. American Psychologist, 44, 709–716. 2. Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E., & Wall, S. (1978). Patterns of attachment: A psychological study of the strange situation. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 3. Sroufe, L. A., Carlson, E., Egeland, B., & Collins, A. (2005). The development of the person: The Minnesota study of risk and adaptation from birth to adulthood. New York, NY: Guilford Press 4. Belsky, J., & Fearon, R. M. P. (2002). Early attachment security, subsequent maternal sensitivity, and later child development: Does continuity in development depend upon continuity of caregiving? Attachment & Human Development, 4, 361–387. Roger Kobak, “Attachment and Early Social deprivation. Revisiting Harlow’s Monkey Studies”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Aggregate Capital	Economic Theories	Harcourt I 155 Aggregate capital/Economic theories/Harcourt: (…) once heterogeneity of capital goods is introduced, the parables based on jelly no longer necessarily apply. ((s) Here the (neoclassical) „parables“ again:) Harcourt I 122 (1) an association between lower rates of profits and higher values of capital per man employed; (2) an association between lower rates of profits and higher capital-output ratios; (3) an association between lower rates of profits and (through investment in more 'mechanized' or 'round-about' methods of production) higher sustainable steady states of consumption per head (up to a maximum); (4) that, in competitive conditions, the distribution of income between profit-receivers and wage-earners can be explained by a knowledge of marginal products and factor supplies. Harcourt I 156 In particular, it may no longer be argued that r equals the marginal product of 'capital' (even in an equilibrium situation), nor may the distribution of income be deduced from a knowledge of the elasticity of the FpF envelope alone. >Elasticity. Furthermore, we are now unable in general to start from the FpF envelope and derive an as if, well-behaved, production function from it. This has led some writers to look elsewhere than to the concept and properties of an aggregate production function ('as if or real) and marginal productivity concepts to explain the distribution of income (…). Harcourt I 157 The* backlash to this argument has been the contention that the existence or not of an aggregate production function (in the sense of a unique relationship between value capital per head and output per head) and marginal productivity relations in distribution theory are not one and the same thing, as Champernowne [1953-4]⁽¹⁾ showed long ago. Bliss [1968b]⁽²⁾, for example - but he is only the leading species of a large genus - argues that if we assume equilibrium (a most important proviso) and price-taking, cost-minimizing, profit-maximizing behaviour under perfectly competitive conditions in linear models, factors as a matter of logic must receive their marginal products, suitably defined, even though an aggregate production function may not be shown to exist. The key points of the argument are two: 1) first, that we impose strict equilibrium assumptions; 2) secondly, that businessmen are profit-maximizers and price-takers. A subsidiary point is that in linear models, marginal products at points (corners) may only be defined as lying within a range that is given by the partial derivatives that lie on either side of them. Factors/revenues/costs: Within this range of indeterminancy, it is obvious that if any factor was not paid the value of its marginal product, a change in output consequent upon using more or less of it would add more to (or subtract less from) revenues than to (from) costs, so violating the assumptions that profits are maximized and that the economy is at equilibrium. (That the economy may not in fact get to an equilibrium position even if one can be shown to exist, that these relationships do not apply in out-of-equilibrium positions and that the real world is usually in the latter state, no one would deny.) Solow: Solow makes the same point as Bliss in several of his papers cited earlier, Solow [1962a⁽³⁾, 1963b(4)] and Solow, Tobin, von Weizsacker, and Yaari [1966]⁽⁵⁾, where typical marginal productivity results are obtained without any reference to aggregate capital - or its marginal product. His latest statement may be found in his reply [1970⁽⁶⁾] to Pasinetti [1969]⁽⁷⁾. Having stated that he does not hold 'a peculiar version of "marginal-productivity" theory' - 'peculiar because it seems to insist (as a matter of principle, not of convenience) on aggregating the whole stock of capital into one number, and because it means by marginal productivity the derivative of net output with respect to the value of this stock of capital' (Solow [1970]⁽⁶⁾, p. 424) - he concludes his article as follows: Harcourt I 158 „. . . nobody is trying to slip over on [Pasinetti] a theory according to which the rate of profits is higher or lower according to whether the existing 'quantity of capital' is lower or higher, and as such represents a general technical property of the existing 'quantity of capital'. That is just what neoclassical capital theory in its full generality can do without.“ (pp. 427-8.) Garegnani/Pasinetti: Garegnani [1966⁽⁸⁾, 1970a⁽⁹⁾, 1970b]⁽¹⁰⁾ and Pasinetti [1969⁽⁷⁾, 1970⁽¹²⁾] in particular, have come back strongly on this one (no suggestion of reswitching is implied). Garegnani points out that, in their formulation of marginal productivity theory, not all the neoclassical economists (early, late, or neo-neo) were either groping for or using an aggregate production function which could be interpreted 'as if it behaved like a well-behaved, one-commodity one. Thus its destruction both at an economy and at an industry level (which he demonstrates in his paper [1970a]⁽¹⁰⁾) is not a conclusive refutation of the marginal productivity theory of value and distribution. 'Expressing the conditions of production of a commodity in terms of a production function with "capital" as a factor is a feature of only some versions of the traditional theory . . .' (Garegnani [1970a]⁽¹⁰⁾, p. 422.) He mentions Marshall and J. B. Clark 'who thought that the principle of substitution, drawn from a reformulation of the Malthusian theory of rent in terms of homogeneous land and "intensive" margins, could be applied without modification to labour and "capital".' But this transition foundered on the fact that 'capital' cannot be measured in a physical unit but must be measured as a value, one which, moreover, changes whenever r and w change, i.e. one which is not independent of distribution. Moreover, it changes in such a way as not to allow us to say that the marginal products of 'capital' and labour are equal to their respective rates of remuneration. All is not yet safe, because, Garegnani argues, 'traditional theory - reduced to its core as the explanation of distribution in terms of demand and supply-rests in fact on a single premise', what Pasinetti [1969]⁽¹²⁾, p. 519, calls 'an unobtrusive postulate': „This premise is that any change of system brought about by a fall in r must increase the ratio of 'capital' to labour in the production of the commodity: 'capital' being the value of the physical capital in terms of some unit of consumption goods, a value which is thought to measure the consumption given up or postponed in order to bring that physical capital into existence.“ (Pasinetti [1969]⁽¹²⁾, S. 519) >Capital demand/Garegnani. 1. Champernowne, D. G. [1953-4] 'The Production Function and the Theory of Capital: A Comment', Review of Economic Studies, xxi, S. 112-35 2. Bliss, C. J. [1968b] 'Rates of Return in a Linear Model', Cambridge: unpublished paper. 3. Solow, R. M. [1962a] 'Substitution and Fixed Proportions in the Theory of Capital', Review of Economic Studies, xxrx, pp. 207-18. 4. Solow, R. M. [1963b] 'Heterogeneous Capital and Smooth Production Functions: An Experimental Study', Econometrica, xxxi, pp. 623-45. 5. Solow, R. M., Tobin, J., von Weizsacker, C. C. and Yaari, M. [1966] 'Neoclassical Growth with Fixed Factor Proportions', Review of Economic Studies, xxxm, pp. 79-115. 6. Solow, R. M [1970] 'On the Rate of Return: Reply to Pasinetti. Economic Journal, LXXX, pp.423-8. 7. Pasinetti, L. L. [1969] 'Switches of Technique and the "Rate of Return" in Capital Theory', Economic Journal, LXXIX, pp. 508-31. 8. Garegnani, P. [1966] 'Switching of Techniques', Quarterly Journal of Economics,LXXX, pp. 554-67. 9. Garegnani, P. [1970a] 'Heterogeneous Capital, the Production Function and the Theory of Distribution', Review of Economic Studies, XXXVII (3), pp. 407-36. 10. Garegnani, P. [1970b] 'A Reply', Review of Economic Studies, XXXVII (3), p. 439. 11. Pasinetti, L. L. [1970] 'Again on Capital Theory and Solow's "Rate of Return" ', Economic Journal, LXXX, pp. 428-31.	Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972
Aggregate Production Function	Champernowne	Harcourt I 29 Aggregate production function/equilibrium/CampernowneVsRobinson/Campernowne/Harcourt: Champernowne [1953-4] accepted the logic of Joan Robinson's approach and measure but objected to the possibility that the same physical capital could have a different value as between two situations 'merely' because it was associated with a different set of equilibrium rates of wages and profits. >Aggregate production function/Robinson, >Aggregate production function/Solow. Harcourt I 30 HarcourtVsChampernowne: This objection is valid from the point of view of the theory of production, i.e. the ability to predict the rate of flow of output from a knowledge of factor supplies, but it is neither valid nor relevant for 'capital' viewed as value property, i.e. as reflecting the institutions of capitalist society. There is a real difference between the two situations and value capital ought to reflect it. The economic significance of a given plant may vary from one economic environment to another. Harcourt: Nevertheless Champernowne appears to have been searching for a unit which could do both tricks at the same time. Measure of capital: Thus he further felt it would be convenient - and more in keeping with the orthodox neoclassical tradition - to have a measure of capital such that the rewards to the factors of production could be obtained by partial differentiation of the relationship between output and capital (so measured), on the one hand, and labour, on the other. Comparability: Furthermore, despite the strictures on using comparisons to analyse processes, he was keen to analyse the process of accumulation and deepening, tracing the development of capitalism over time, approaching its 'crisis' as real wages rose and rates of profits fell. Even if, in fact, equilibrium were ruptured repeatedly, Champernowne hoped to make the process slow enough to proceed as if this had not occurred, to measure capital each step on the way and to provide a means of comparing capital stocks over time as well as between different situations of stationary equilibrium. Measurements: Such an all-purpose measure is provided in a chain index whereby the 'normal' concave relationship between output per head of a constant labour force and capital per head would be established, provided that any one technique, having been the most profitable or equi-so at a given rate or range of interest rates, could never reappear again at another rate or range of rates, and that, of two techniques which are equi-profitable at a given rate of interest, it is the one with the higher output per head and higher value of capital per head that is the more profitable at a lower rate of interest. Harcourt I 32 Formalization/indexes: This series of index numbers shows the changes in the 'quantity' of capital after the effects on the value of capital of different rates of wages and profits have been removed. Output/labour: Output may now be expressed as a unique function of labour and chain index capital and the rewards of the factors of production correspond to the partial derivatives of the appropriate branches of the function. In the 'pure' cases, the coefficients of the production function set the upper or lower limits to the factor prices: see Champernowne [1953-4]⁽¹⁾, p. 127.) Equilibrium wage rate: The partial derivative of output with respect to labour equals the equilibrium wage rate and the partial derivative of output with respect to capital equals the equilibrium rate of profits multiplied by the 'price' of 'capital'. Price: The price itself is a chain index price since the chain index removes, as it were, the 'quantity' of capital from the coefficient of the capital term. Capital/ChampernowneVsRobinson/Harcourt: In effect Champernowne has removed the 'zigs' - the horizontal stretches - from Joan Robinson's real-factor-ratio curve (…) and changed the slopes of the 'zags' - the upward-sloping stretches - so that they now equal the relevant equilibrium values of the 'price' of 'capital'. >Method/Champernowne. 1. Champernowne, D. G. [1953-4] 'The Production Function and the Theory of Capital: A Comment', Review of Economic Studies, xxi, pp. 112-35.	Champernowne I David Gawen Champernowne Uncertainty and estimation in economics (Mathematical economics texts) Edinburgh 1969 Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972
Aggression	Developmental Psychology	Slater I 179 Aggression/Developmental psychology: Bandura’s work (Bandura et al 1961)⁽¹⁾ (..) had an impact on the study or the development of aggression by introducing the concept that aggressive behavior can be the result of forces outside the realm of behaviorism. >Bobo doll study/Bandura, >Aggression/psychological theories. For example, not only could aggression result from imitative learning from an aggressive model in a laboratory setting, but aggression could be learned through witnessing interparental violence (Jouriles, Norwood, McDonald, Vincent, & Mahoney, 1996)⁽²⁾, experiencing corporal punishment (Gershoff, 2002)⁽³⁾, living in a dangerous neighborhood (Colder, Mott, Levy, & Flay, 2000)⁽⁴⁾, and a host of other experiences that have now come to represent a range of factors that put a child at risk for developing aggressive behavior problems. >Aggression/Molecular Genetics. Slater I 180 (…) developmental models of aggression following Bandura’s work have focused on a range of factors that contribute to trajectories of aggression over time (e.g., Loeber & Stouthamer-Loeber, 1998⁽⁵⁾; Moffitt, 1993⁽⁶⁾; Patterson, 1982⁽⁷⁾). Moffitt (1993)(6) proposed a life course-persistent versus adolescence-limited developmental taxonomy of aggression. The hallmark of life-course-persistent offenders is the continuity of antisocial behavior across the life-course, with the form this behavior takes changing with development (e.g., biting and hitting at age four, robbery and rape at age 22; Moffitt, 1993)⁽⁶⁾. 1. Bandura, A., Ross, D., & Ross, S. A. (1961). Transmission of aggression through imitation of aggressive models. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63, 575—582. 2. Jouriles, E. N., Norwood, W. D., McDonald, R., Vincent, J. P., & Mahoney, A. (1996). Physical violence and other forms of marital aggression: Links with children’s behavior problems. Journal of Family Psychology, 10, 223-234. 3. Colder, C. R., Mott, J., Levy, S., & Flay, B. (2000). The relation of perceived neighborhood danger to childhood aggression A test of mediating mechanisms. American Journal of Community Psychology, 28, 83—103. 4. Loeber, R., & Stouthamer-Loeber, M. (1998). Development of juvenile aggression and violence: Some common misconceptions and controversies. American Psychologist, 53, 242—25 9. 5. Moffitt, T. E. (1993). Adolescence-limited and life-course-persistent antisocial behavior: A developmental taxonomy. Psychological Review, 100, 674—701. 6. Patterson, G. R. (1982). Coercive family process. Eugene, OR: Castalia. Jenifer E. Lansford, “Aggression. Beyond Bandura’s Bobo Doll Studies“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Aging	Cognitive Psychology	Upton I 139 Aging/Cognitive psychology/Upton: (…) elderly adults have been found to perform more poorly than younger adults on Piagetian cognitive tasks (>Stages of development/Piaget), for example (Blackburn and Papalia, 1992)⁽¹⁾. However, there is some debate about the extent to which this decline is an inevitable part of ageing. It has been proposed, for example, that this difference is actually caused by a cohort effect, brought about because the older adults who participated in these studies generally had less formal schooling than most younger adults today. (…) other studies that have taken a longitudinal approach have found that cognitive skills either stay stable or improve over time (Salthouse. 2009)⁽²⁾. This idea is also supported by studies that have shown that older adults in college perform as well as their younger classmates on cognitive tests (Blackburn. 1985)⁽¹⁾. However, it has also been suggested that cognitive decline actually begins in early adulthood (Salthouse, 2009)⁽²⁾, although not all aspects of cognitive functioning are thought to show early age-related declines. Upton I 140 Decline of cognitive skills: ttraining studies, (…) have shown that cognitive decline in older people can be reversed in many cases (Blaskewicz Boron et al., 2007)⁽⁽³⁾. Perhaps cognitive decline is caused by a lack of use? This is what Bielak (2010)⁽⁴⁾ calls the fuse it or lose it’ hypothesis of cognitive ageing. Def crystalized abilities: the information, knowledge and skills that are acquired through experience in a cultural environment. [They] are consistently found to increase until at least the age of 60. Def fluid abilitites: fluid abilities fluid intelligence or fluid reasoning is the ability to think logically and solve problems in novel situations, independent of acquired knowledge. It is the ability to analyse novel problems, identify patterns and relationships that underpin these problems and so find a solution using logic. One of the largest studies of age-related changes in functioning, the Seattle Longitudinal Study (e.g. Schaie, 2006⁽⁵⁾; Willis and Schaie, 2006)⁽⁶⁾, has suggested that there is no uniform pattern of age-related changes across all intellectual abilities. The study findings suggest that both cohort and age effects are important in determining changes in cognitive ability across the lifespan. This body of work also confirms the trend observed by Salthouse (2009)⁽²⁾ that, in general, crystallized abilities tend to decline later than fluid abilities in intelligence. Upton I 141 A number of factors have also been shown to reduce the risk of cognitive decline in old age, including the absence of cardiovascular and other chronic diseases (Wendell et al., 2009)⁽⁷⁾; higher socio-economic status (Fotenos et al., 2008)⁽⁸⁾; and involvement in a complex and intellectually stimulating environment (Valenzuela et al., 2007)⁽⁹⁾. It has also been suggested that the modern sedentary lifestyle may increase the ageing process; evidence from the British cohort study has shown that maintaining an active lifestyle can help to slow the process of cognitive decline linked to ageing (Richards et al.. 2003)⁽¹⁰⁾. 1. Blackburn, JA and Papalia, DE (1992) The study of adult cognition from a Piagetian perspective, in Sternberg, RJ and Berg, CA (eds) Intellectual Development. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2. Salthouse, TA (2009) When does age-related cognitive decline begin? Neurobiology of Aging, 30: 507-14. 3. Blaskewicz Boron, J, Turiano, NA, Willis, SL and Schaie, KW (2007) Effects of cognitive training on change in accuracy in inductive reasoning ability. Journal of Gerontology, 6 2(3): 179-86. 4. Bielak, AM (2010) How can we not ‘lose it’ if we still don’t understand how to use it’? Unanswered questions about the influence of activity participation on cognitive performance in older age: a mini-review. Gerontology, 56: 507-19. 5. Schaie. KW (2006) Inteffigence, in Schultz, R (ed.) Encyclopedia of Aging (4th edn). New York: Springer. 6. Willis, SL and Schaie, KW (2006) Cognitive functioning among the baby boomers: longitudinal and cohort effects, in Whitbourne, SK and Willis, SL (eds) The Baby Boomers. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum. 7. Wendell, C, Zonderman, A, Metter, J, Najjar, SS and Waldstein, SR (2009) Carotid intimal medial thickness predicts cognitive decline among adults without clinical vascular disease. Stroke,40: 3-180. 8. Fotenos, AF, Mintun, MA, Synder, AZ, Morris,JC and Buckner, RL (2008) Brain volume decline in aging: evidence for a relation between socioeconomic status, preclinical Alzheimer disease, and reserve. Neurology, 6 5(1): 113-20. 9. Valenzuela, M, Breakspear, M and Sachdev, P (2007) Complex mental activity and the aging brain: molecular, cellular and cortical network mechanisms. Brain Research Reviews, 56: 198- 213. 10. Richards, M, Hardy, R and Wadsworth, ME (2003) Does active leisure protect cognition? Evidence from a national birth cohort. Social Science and Medicine, 56:785-92. Further reading: Kitchener, KS, Lynch, CL, Fischer, KW and Wood, PK (1993) Developmental range of reflective judgment: the effect of contextual support and practice on developmental stage. Developmental Psychology, 29:893-906. Available online at https :/ /gseweb.harvard.edu/ -ddl/articles Copy! Kitchener-etal 1993 DevRangeReflectjudgem.pdf.	Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011
Alienation	Flusser	I 107 Alienating/Estrangement/Distancing/Flusser: Alienation 1: the human being is expelled from the "world", tries to bridge the abyss with pictures (Magic Consciousness). >Pictures/Flusser, >Techno-image/Flusser. Alienation 2: The mediation performance of the image is disturbed, the human leaves the world of images and tries to bridge the abyss with texts. >Texts/Flusser, >World/Thinking. I 109 New point of view: historical awareness. Over time, the texts become opaque, unimaginable (>Alienation 3). Our texts no longer mediate, because behind them we no longer see images, but ourselves as creators. >Mediation, >Conceivability. I 110 E.g. there is no image of nature behind classical physics, but Newton, behind Hegel's philosophy is not an image of the human, but Hegel, behind the Karamazov brothers not an image of the human soul, but Dostoyevsky. We are alienated from the world of texts because we see them as a world created by us. Cf. >Constructivism. I 133 Alienation 3/Flusser: the madness of living within an impenetrable wall of books is nothing less terrible than the madness from which the books wanted to free us. >Literature.	Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996
Altruism	Mayr	I 319 Behavior/Genes/Mayr: genes also contribute to the behavior and personality of man. E.g. mathematical gifts, craftsmanship, musicality, clumsiness. >Genes, >Personality, >Personality traits. I 323 Natural selection: if it only rewards self-interest, how could ethics and, for example, altruism develop? >Selection. Huxley was right with his presumption that the self-interest of the individual somehow contradicted the benefit of society. Cf. >Altruism. I 324 Def altruism: (Trivers, 1985)⁽¹⁾: action that benefits another organism at the expense of the actor, with the costs and benefits being defined as reproductive success. Altruism/Comte: Care for the welfare of others. >A. Comte. Altruism/Mayr: is not limited to cases of danger or harm to the altruist. Three things need to be distinguished (already Darwin): Selection/Individual: An individual is the object of selection in three respects: as an individual, as a family member (reproducer), and as member of a social group. The human dilemmas are only to be understood with regard to this triad. I 325 Altruism/Overall Suitability: is found in many animals, especially with parental care and large families. Defense of the offspring by the mother. This behavior is favored by natural selection, since it improves the fitness of the common genotype of the altruist and its beneficiaries. Selection of relatives. Indirectly rather self-serving. Seemingly altruistic. >Altruism. Some authors believe that human ethics replaced altruism directed towards overall suitability. Mayr: I recognize many actions directed toward overall suitability in the behavior of humans: for example mother's love, moral attitude towards strangers. However, only a small part of today's ethics systems. Social animals: possess a remarkable ability to recognize their relatives. I 327 Reciprocal altruism: in solitary animals. Synergy of two non-related animals for mutual benefit. E.g. cleaner wrasse, alliance of two individuals fighting a third. For primates: a kind of consideration: if I help this individual, it will help me. Perhaps a root of human morality. Human/Mayr: all the great achievements of mankind were accomplished by less than one per cent of the total population. Without reward and recognition our society would soon break apart. I 328 Human: The entire history of the hominids is characterized by strong group-selection (already Darwin). I 329 Altruism/Behavior/Mayr: In contrast to individual selection, group selection can reward genuine altruism and other virtues. Ethical behavior is adaptive in humans. >Adaption. Sociality: not all collections of animals are social. E.g. schools of young fish and the huge herds of African ungulates are not. Real altruism: can be extended to non-relatives. For example, baboons. Some hominids must have discovered that larger groups have more chances. I 330 Norms: To be able to apply group norms, the brain had to develop the ability to think. >Norms, >Thinking. Ethics: two conditions for ethical behavior (Simpson, 1969)⁽²⁾: 1) There are alternatives 2) The alternatives can be assessed 3) The person can decide freely This means that consequences are anticipated and responsibility is assumed. >Responsibility, >Prediction. Ethics/Cause: it is not possible to determine the cause and effect of ethics. >Ethics, >Morals. 1. R. L. Trivers (1985). Social evolution. Menlo Park: Benjamin/Cummings. 2. G. G. Simpson (1969). On the Uniqueness of Man: Biology and Man. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World.	Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998
Altruism	Nagel	Rawls I 190 Altruism/Society/Justice/Benevolence/Th. Nagel/Rawls: Thomas Nagel's thought is that a benevolent person is guided by principles that someone would choose if he/she knew that he/she would divide into the many members of a society, so to speak. (See Th. Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, Oxford, 1970, pp. 140f.) Rawls I 191 Rawls: But memories and expectations remain those of individuals. What principles would such a person choose? If the person loves the plurality of persons just as much as he/she loves himself/herself, his/her principles would be characterized through benevolence. RawlsVsNagel: 1. it would still be unclear how a person decides, 2. the two principles of justice... Rawls I 61 Principles/Justice/Rawls: 1. every person must have the same right to the widest possible fundamental freedom, insofar as it is compatible with the same freedom for others. 2. social and economic inequalities shall be arranged in such a way that they (a) are reasonably expectable for everyone's benefit; and (b) are linked to positions and administrative procedures that can be held by anyone. I 191 ...are then a more plausible choice than the classical principle of utility. Benevolence/RawlsVsNagel: the situation is still unclear because love and benevolence are second order concepts. The goods are already given in the situation ((s) it is only about distribution). This shows us that benevolence does not bring a profit in the initial situation of a society to be established. >Principles/Rawls.	NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Ambiguity	Montague	Hintikka I 106 Quantification/quantifiers/ambiguity/any/HintikkaVsMontague: on the whole, the Montague semantics show how ambiguity arises through the interplay of quantifiers and intensional expressions. E.g. (12) A woman loves every man. (13) John is looking for a dog. >Intensions, >Quantifiers, >Quantification, cf. >Opacity, >Quantification into opaque contexts. HintikkaVsMontague: explains only why certain expressions can be ambiguous, but not which are actually ambiguous. He generally predicts too many ambiguities. For he is not concerned with the grammatical principles, which often resolve ambiguities with quantifiers. >Grammar. Scope/Hintikka: the scope determines the logical order. >Scope, >Narrow/wide scope. Quantifier/Quantification/everyone/he/Montague/Hintikka: E.g. (14) If he makes an effort, he will be happy. (15) If everyone makes an effort, he will be happy. Problem: in English, "if" has precedence with respect to "everyone" so that "everyone" in (15) cannot precede the "he" as a pronoun ("pronominalize"). >Pronouns, >Operators. I 107 HintikkaVsMontague: we need additional rules for the order of application of the rules.	Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Ambiguity	Quine	I 231 Ambiguity: The name Paul is not ambiguous. It is not a general term but a singular term with dissemination. Ambiguity Action/Habit: are ice skaters, delivery (action, object). I 232 Truth is not ambiguous but general. A true confession is as true as math. Law: There is a difference between laws and confessions! Also, "existence" is not ambiguous. I 233 Circumstances/Quine: circumstances are important for ambiguities. I 236 Ambiguities: "a" (can be "any"). "Nothing" and "nobody" are undetermined singular terms (E.g. Polyphemus). I 244 An ambiguous scope cannot be decided by parentheses. Undetermined singular terms are: a, any, every member - "not a"/"not every" - "I think one is so that ..." / "one is so that I think ... ". IX 184 "Systematic (or type-wise) ambiguity/Russell: a solution for the problem are relations: the type is only fixed when we state the type of things from the left end of the range and from the right end of the range. There is one problem however: the two-dimensionality can add up to growths: E.g. type of a relation of things of type m to things of type n: (m, n). The type of a class of such relations should be called ((m, n)), then [((m,n))] is the type of a relation of such classes to such classes. Orders were obviously even worse. IX 194 Systematic Ambiguity/theoretical terms/Quine: (context: polyvalent logic, 2nd order logic) Systematic ambiguity suppresses the indices and allows to stick to the simple quantifier logic. A formula like "∃y∀x(xεy)", which is treated as a type-wise ambiguous, can simply be equated with the scheme ∃y^{n + 1} ∀xⁿ (xⁿ ∃y^{n + 1}), where "n" is a schematic letter for any index. Its universality is the schematic universality that it stands for any of a number of formulas: ∃y1 "x0 (x0 ε Y1), ∃y2 "x1(x1 ε y2). It does not stand for the universality that consist in the fact that it is quantified undivided over an exhaustive universal class. A formula is meaningless if it cannot be equipped with indices that comply with the theoretical terms. Problem: then also the conjunction of two meaningful formulas can become meaningless. Systematic ambiguity/theoretical terms: we can always reduce multiple variable types to a single one if we only take on suitable predicates. "Universal variables" that we restrict to the appropriate predicate are: "T_nx" expresses that x is of type n. The old formulae: "∀xⁿFxⁿ" and "∃xⁿFxⁿ". New is: "x(T_nx > Fx)", e.g.(T_nx u Fx). >Indeterminacy/Quine.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Analog/Digital	Dyson	Brockman I 35 Analog/digital/Dyson, George: Electronics underwent two fundamental transitions over the past hundred years: from analog to digital and from vacuum tubes to solid state. That these transitions occurred together does not mean they are inextricably linked. Just as digital computation was implemented using vacuum tube components, analog computation can be implemented in solid state. Analog computation is alive and well, even though vacuum tubes are commercially extinct. There is no precise distinction between analog and digital computing. Many systems operate across both analog and digital regimes. A tree integrates a wide range of inputs as continuous functions, but if you cut down that tree, you find that it has been counting the years digitally all along. In analog computing, complexity resides in network topology, not in code. Information is processed as continuous functions of values such as voltage and relative pulse frequency rather than by logical operations on discrete strings of bits. Brockman I 36 Digital computing, intolerant of error or ambiguity, depends upon error correction at every step along the way. Analog computing tolerates errors, allowing you to live with them. Nature uses digital coding for the storage, replication, and recombination of sequences of nucleotides, but relies on analog computing, running on nervous systems, for intelligence and control. The genetic system in every living cell is a stored-program computer. Brains aren’t. Analog computers also mediate transformations between two forms of information: structure in space and behavior in time. There is no code and no programming. (…) nature evolved analog computers known as nervous systems, which embody information absorbed from the world. They learn. Dyson, G. “The Third Law”. In: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press.	Dyson I Esther Dyson Release 2.1: A Design for Living in the Digital Age New York 1998 Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019
Analysis	Lyons	I 130 Def Prosodic Analysis/Linguistics/Lyons: this is a third phonological theory (Firth) particularly suitable for Turkish. Thesis: The phoneme plays no role at all, neither as the smallest unit of description, nor as a distinctive characteristic. Cf. >Phonemes. I 131 Vocal harmony/Turkish: the eight vowels of Turkish can be described by three articulatory oppositions: high/low - front/back - rounded/not rounded. The vocal harmony is effective in Turkish throughout the entire word. ((s) Example ev-ler/dat-lar). I 134 Prosodic Analysis/Lyons: is multidimensional: (not one-dimensional sequence of phonemes) but several layers of prosodia are superimposed and effective over areas of different lengths. (syllables, words, even phrases and sentences). Phonemics/Lyons: (classical orthodox American) thesis: phonological analysis should precede and be independent of grammatical analysis. VsPhonemics: Today: almost all Vs: that is unnecessarily rigid. I 135 The occurrence of words depends on their grammatical function (as nouns, verbs, etc.) and their meaning. Phonology/Function/Lyons: often very different phonological contrasts are important for different grammatical classes. I 135 Def Grammatical function/Lyons: a word functions as noun, verb, adjective, etc. >Grammar. I 161 Analysis/Grammar/Lyons: a body of utterances can only be described if it is considered a sample of the sentences generated by the grammar. Therefore, there is no contradiction between generative and descriptive grammar. >Generative Grammar. Synthesis/Grammar/Lyons: here a lexicon will be useful, in which you can easily find the corresponding units for a word class symbol, e.g. N {man, boy, chimpanzee....} >Lexicon, >Synthesis. Analysis/Lexicon: here the lexicon should be arranged completely differently; namely alphabetically! I 162 For example, there are many English words ending in -ness. Therefore, one could establish a formula for the derivation: Ax + ness = Ny. "Every word consisting of an element of the word class Ax and -ness is an element of the word class Ny". Then all words that can be derived in this way can be deleted from the lexicon. Synthesis: Problem: here we have to decide which adjectives belong to the Ax class: I 163 Example "trueness" and "strongness" in addition to "truth" and "strength"?. Grammar/Analysis/Synthesis/Lyons: that grammar is neutral between analysis and synthesis does not mean that analysis is simply the inversion of synthesis. There is not simply a computer program that proceeds in one case "from top to bottom" (from grammar to lexicon) and in the other case "from bottom to top". Both in production and in recognition (for listeners and speakers) I 164 feedback is important.	Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995
Analyticity/Syntheticity	Strawson	Wright I 198 Strawson/Grice: E.g. our daily talk of analyticity is a sociological fact and therefore has enough discipline to be considered minimally capable of truth. >Minimalism, >Convention. StrawsonVsQuine/GriceVsQuine: it is hopeless to deny that a distinction exists, if it is not used within linguistic practice in a pre-arranged way that is capable of mutual agreement. >Analyticity/Quine, >Language use, >Language behavior, >Language community. QuineVsStrawson/QuineVsGrice: this is fully consistent with a cognitive psychology of the practical use of the distinction, which does not assume that we respond to exemplifications of the distinctions.	Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Animals	Rothbard	Rothbard III 171 Animals/economics/Rothbard: Animals are “economic land,” because they are equivalent to physical land in being original, nature-given factors of production. Yet will anyone deny title to a cow to the man that finds and domesticates her, putting her to use? For this is precisely what occurs in the case of land. Previously valueless “wild” land, like wild animals, is taken and transformed by a man into goods useful for man. The “mixing” of labor gives equivalent title in one case as in the other. >Nature/Rothbard, >Land/Rothbard, >Production/Rothbard. Production/Rothbard: We must remember, also, what “production” entails. When man “produces,” he does not create matter. He uses given materials and transforms and rearranges them into goods that he desires. >Production/Rothbard, >Labour/Rothbard. If animals are also “land” in the sense of given original nature factors, so are water and air. We have seen that “air” is inappropriable, a condition of human welfare rather than a scarce good that can be owned. However, this is true only of air for breathing under usual conditions. For example, if some people want their air to be changed, or “conditioned,” then they will have to pay for this service, and the “conditioned air” becomes a scarce good that is owned by its producers.	Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Anthropic Principle	Gould	IV 314 Anthropic Principle/Gould: (physicist Freeman Dyson took this term from an opponent): Dyson: "I don't feel like a stranger in this universe; I find more and more evidence that the universe somehow must have known we were coming".⁽¹⁾ Only evidence: there are some laws of nature that would have prevented life if the initial conditions had been a little different. Example Dyson: "Suppose the distances of the galaxies were 10 times smaller (than an average of 32 trillion km), then it would be very likely that in the 3.5 billion years at least one celestial body would have come so close that it would have directed the Earth out of orbit around the Sun and destroyed all life."⁽²⁾ Dyson: "The special harmony between the structure of the universe and the needs of life and intelligence is a manifestation of the meaning of the mind in the scheme of things".⁽³⁾ IV 315 GouldVsAnthropic principle: that is an argument that has already been moth-eaten. Central error: results from the nature of history: every complex historical event represents a summation of improbabilities and thus becomes absolutely improbable itself. But something must always happen, even if a certain "something" amazes us by its improbability. We could look at any event and say, "Isn't that amazing?" For example, let us assume that the universe consists of little more than diprotons. Would that be bad? Would we have to conclude that some God looked or loved like coupled hydrogen nuclei, or that no God or Spirit existed at all? But if there is a God, why does he have to prefer a cosmos that creates a life like ours? Why should diprotons not be witnesses of a pre-existent intelligence, even if no chronicler could be found? Does all intelligence have to have an uncontrollable urge to embody itself in a universe of its choice? 1. F. Dyson,. (1979). Disturbing the universe. New York: Harper and Row. 2. F. Dyson, ibid. 3. F. Dyson, ibid.	Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989
Anthropomorphism	Comparative Psychology	Corr I 275 Anthropomorphism/comparative psychology/animals/Gosling: many people, especially those working in sciences, have been reluctant to concede that personality exists in non-human animals. Their concerns range from philosophical arguments regarding the uniqueness of humans to methodological concerns about the perils of anthropomorphism (Gosling 2001)⁽¹⁾. To address concerns about the existence of personality in animals, Gosling, Lilienfeld and Marino (2003⁽²⁾; see also Gosling and Vazire 2002⁽³⁾). >Animals, >Animal studies, >Animal models, >Animal language, >Personality, >Personality traits, >S.D. Gosling, >K. Sterelny, >J. Proust, >D. Radner. 1. Gosling, S. D. 2001. From mice to men: what can we learn about personality from animal research?, Psychological Bulletin 127: 45–86 2. Gosling, S. D., Lilienfeld, S. O. and Marino, L. 2003. Personality, in D. Maestripieri (ed.), Primate psychology: the mind and behaviour of human and nonhuman primates, pp. 254–88. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 3. Gosling, S. D. and Vazire, S. 2002. Are we barking up the right tree? Evaluating a comparative approach to personality, Journal of Research in Personality 36: 607–14 Samuel D. Gosling and B. Austin Harley, “Animal models of personality and cross-species comparisons”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Anthropomorphism	Yudkowsky	Bostrom I 112 Anthropomorphism/superintelligence/Yudkowsky/Bostrom: Even if we recognize that a superintelligence can have all the skills and talents we find in the human distribution, along with other talents that are not found among humans, the tendency toward anthropomorphizing can still lead us to underestimate the extent to which a machine superintelligence could exceed the human level of performance. Eliezer Yudkowsky (…) has been particularly emphatic in condemning this kind of misconception: our intuitive concepts of “smart” and “stupid” are distilled from our experience of variation over the range of human thinkers, yet the differences in cognitive ability within this human cluster are trivial in comparison to the differences between any human intellect and a superintelligence.⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾ >Superintelligence, >Artificial intelligence, >Strong artificial intelligence, >Human level AI. 1. Yudkowsky, Eliezer. 2008a. “Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk.” In Global Catastrophic Risks, edited by Nick Bostrom and Milan M. Ćirković, 308–45. New York: Oxford University Press. 2. Yudkowsky, Eliezer. 2013. Intelligence Explosion Microeconomics, Technical Report 2013–1. Berkeley, CA: Machine Intelligence Research Institute.	Bostrom I Nick Bostrom Superintelligence. Paths, Dangers, Strategies Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017
Archeology	Foucault	II 193ff History of ideas/Foucault: It is now possible to reverse the procedure (after examining the discourse). >Discourse/Foucault. One can walk downhill. The general theory is sketched, now we can reach the possible fields of application. It is about separating oneself from it. Instead: archeology. FoucaultVsHistory of ideas: indefinite object, ill-drawn boundaries, history of secondary positions. Rather, the history of alchemy than of chemistry. Analysis of the opinions more than knowledge, the errors more than the truth, not the thought forms, but the mentality types. Also analysis of the silent origin, the distant correspondences, the permanences. Archeology/Foucault: the attempt to write a completely different history: four differences: 1. With regard to the determination of novelty 2. Analysis of contradictions 3. The comparative descriptions 4. Finding the Transformations. Archeology: 1. Does not try to define thoughts, ideas, images, themes that are hidden or manifest in discourses. But those discourses themselves. Discourse not as a sign for something else but as a monument. No interpretative discipline, it does not seek a "different discourse." It is not "allegorical". 2. Archeology does not seek to find a continuous transition. 3. It is not ordered according to the sovereign form of the work. The authority of the creative subject as a principle of its unity is alien to it. 4. It is not looking for the restoration of what people have thought, wanted, felt, desired. It does not seek that volatile core. Archeology: creates the tribe of a discourse. E.g. the natural history: 1. As leading statements, it will set the statements concerning the definition of the observable structures and the field of possible objects. 2. Those who prescribe the forms of the description. 3. Those who make the most general characterization possibilities appear, and thus open up a whole range of terms. 4. Those who, by making a strategic choice, leave room for a very large number of later options. This is not a deduction from axioms. Nor is it a general idea or a philosophical core.	Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981
Arrow’s Theorem	D’Agostino	Gaus I 242 Arrow’s Theorem/pluralism/diversity/D’Agostino: Consider a collection of individuals, each of whom has well-behaved preferences (or judgements) over a domain of alternative social arrangements. The problem of collective choice is to specify a procedure, meeting (at least) minimal conditions of fairness, that will deliver a rating of these alternative arrangements, based on individuals' assessments, that is sufficiently determinate to warrant the selection of one of them as the collectively binding arrangement for this group. Arrow: What Arrow shows, and what much subsequent tinkering has confirmed, is that there is no formal procedure of amalgamation that can be relied on for this purpose (see Arrow, 1979⁽¹⁾; and, for helpful commentary, see Mueller, 1989⁽²⁾, and Sen, 1970⁽³⁾). In so far as a procedure fairly recognizes the antecedent assessments of the various individuals, it will, on certain profiles of assessments, fail to achieve determinacy, and, hence, will fail to identify a collectively binding social arrangement. D’Agostino: I tried elsewhere (D' Agostino, 1996)⁽⁴⁾ to show that this result provides a model for theorizing about ideals, such as 'public reason', that are, at least nowadays, directly associated with liberalism per se (see also Gaus, 1996⁽⁵⁾; and D' Agostino and Gaus, 1998⁽⁶⁾). Democracy/diversity/procedures/Arrow/D’Agostino: the point of Arrow's Theorem is not that formal procedures never work, but rather that they don't always work. And this point is ethico-politically significant for two reasons. 2) When we apply a procedure in concrete circumstances, we typically will not be able to tell, antecedently, whether or not it will work in these circumstances. 2) Even if we can determine that it will not work in these circumstances, we have, according to Arrow's Theorem, no alternative procedure (of the same type) to use instead, except, of course, another that also will not work. Example: e.g., Three Individuals (A, B, C) Gaus I 243 and three possible social arrangements (S1 , S2, S3), and (...) individuals' assessments of these arrangements. Given [a specific problematic] 'profile' of preferences (or deliberative judgements) [chosen for the sake of the argument], no merely 'mechanical' procedure of combination will produce a non-arbitrary (and hence legitimately collectively binding) ranking of the alternative social arrangements: Table I of preferences S1: A 1st – B 3rd – C 2nd S2: A 2nd – B 1st – C 3rd S 3: A 3rd – B 2nd - C 1st Procedures: S1/S2 then S3: Winner: S3 S1/S3 then S2: Winner: S2 S2/S3 then S1: Winner S1 Problem/D’Agostino: (...) it is clear that, on this profile of preferences, a collectively binding choice can be determined mechanically only on an ethico-politically arbitrary basis - e.g. by fixing the order in which alternatives are compared. (The alternative to such arbitrariness is simple indeterminacy: none of the options can be identified as the collectively binding best for the group.) Cf. >Chaos Theorem/Social Choice Theory. Elections/democracy/solutions: (...) once such diversity among individuals' assessments is 'managed', exactly the indeterminacy of such formal procedures as voting (and other modes of amalgamation) disappears. Suppose, for instance, that through some programme of socialization and education, individuals' assessments are sufficiently 'homogenized' that one of the alternative social arrangements that individuals are assessing is 'dominant' in the sense that it is best from all relevant points of view. In this case, we might have the configuration in Table II of preferences. Table II of preferences S1: A 1st – B 1st – C 1st S2: A 2nd – B 3rd – C 3rd S 3: A 3rd – B 2nd - C 2nd Given this configuration, there would be no difficulty with collective choice, either statically or dynamically. There is a unique collectively best option whose identification as such is not dependent on arbitrary factors and whose selection as such cannot be destabilized (so long as individuals' assessments themselves remain constant). Value monism/pluralism//D‘Agostino: Of course, Arrow's Theorem, and its extensions, can be read as an argument for monism. Arrow courts chaos in providing, as pluralists would insist, for the recognition of diversity. (For D’Agostino’s solution see >Diversity/Liberalism.) 1. Arrow, Kenneth (1979) 'Values and collective decision making'. In Frank Hahn and Martin Hollis, eds, Philosophy and Economic Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Mueller, Dennis (1989) Public Choice 11. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Sen, Amartya (1970) Collective Choice and Social Welfare. San Francisco: Holden-Day. 4. D'Agostino, Fred (1996) Free Public Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Gaus, Gerald (1996) Justificatory Liberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 6. D' Agostino, Fred and Gerald Gaus, eds (1998) Public Reason. Aldershot: Dartmouth. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Arrow’s Theorem	Weale	Gaus I 243 Arrow’s theorem/Weale/D’Agostino: I [Fred D’Agostino] said that Arrow's Theorem might be considered a parable; that it might suggest something, vividly, for liberalism about the implications of diversity (and hence pluralism). ((s) For a presentation of the problems in relation to Arrow’s theorem see >Arrow’s Theorem/D’Agostino). What, to this effect, does it actually show? Weale: Albert Weale (1992)⁽¹⁾ provides a helpful analysis whose upshot also applies to specifically liberal modalities of collective deliberation. He notes, in particular, that the conditions which Arrow imposes on formalistic procedures for collective choice should be understood as involving two distinct requirements - 'of coherence and Gaus I 244 representativeness', which, as he says, 'come into conflict'. He continues: 'Coherence requires decision-makers to know their own mind all things considered, but representativeness pushes towards the inclusion of considerations that may make knowing one's own mind impossible' (1992⁽¹⁾: 213). a) Representativeness, in other words, requires, of any approach to collective decision-making, that it make adequate provision for reasonable antecedent diversity of preferences or judgements. b) Coherence, on the other hand, requires of such an approach that it make adequate provision for the identification of collectively binding social arrangements. Arrow/Weale: What Arrow's Theorem itself shows is that the specifically formalistic approaches to collective decision-making that are illustrated, for instance, in systems of voting cannot, in fact, satisfy both these desider- ata reliably. D’Agostino: What, treated as a parable, Arrow's Theorem suggests is a conundrum: how can we reconcile the demand for coherence in social arrangements with the fact of evaluative diversity? 1. Weale, Albert (1992) 'Social choice'. In Shaun Hargreaves Heap, Martin Hollis, Bruce Lyons, Robert Sugden and Albert Weale, eds, The Theory of Choice: A Critical Guide. Oxford: Blackwell. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Articles	Russell	Cresswell I 179 Definite Article/theory of descriptions/Russell: requiring that a sentence e.g. "the φ is ψ" provided that "the φ" has a wide range, entails that there exists a unique φ. >Scope, >Narrow scope, >Wide Scope. Russell I X Russell/Gödel: (K.Gödel, Preface to Principia Mathematica) Russell avoids any axioms about the particular articles "the", "the", "that". - Frege, on the other hand, must make an axiom about it! The advantage for Russell, however, remains only as long as he interprets definitions as mere typographical abbreviations, not as the introduction of names. >Proxy, >Names, >Logical proper names, >Axioms, Typographical abbreviation: >"blackening of the paper", >Formalism.	Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Artificial Consciousness	Minsky	Minsky I 41 Soul/artificial intelligence/AI/Minsky: People ask if machines can have souls. And I ask back whether souls can learn. It does not seem a fair exchange - if souls can live for endless time and yet not use that time to learn — to trade all change for changelessness. And that's exactly what we get with inborn souls that cannot grow: a destiny the same as death, an ending in a permanence incapable of any change and, hence, devoid of intellect. >Self/AI/Minsky. What are those old and fierce beliefs in spirits, souls, and essences? They're all insinuations that we're helpless to improve ourselves. To look for our virtues in such thoughts seems just as wrongly aimed a search as seeking art in canvas cloths by scraping off the painter's works. >Mind/AI/Minsky. I 160 Artificial Consciousness/Minsky: When people ask, Could a machine ever be conscious? I'm often tempted to ask back, Could a person ever be conscious? I mean this as a serious reply, because we seem so ill-equipped to understand ourselves. Long before we became concerned with understanding how we work, our evolution had already constrained the architecture of our brains. E.g. (…) we simply aren't very good at dealing with the kinds of situations that need […] memory-stacks. This could be why we get confused when hearing sentences like this: This is the malt that the rat that the cat that the dog worried killed ate. The very same words can be rearranged to make an equivalent sentence anyone can understand: This is the dog that worried the cat that killed the rat that ate the malt. The first sentence is hard to understand because so many verb processes interrupt one another that when the end of the sentence comes, three similar processes are still active — but they have lost track of what roles should be assigned to all the remaining nouns, namely, the rat, cat, and malt. Why do visual processes so rarely encounter similar difficulties? >Seeing/Philosophical theories. I 186 Artificial consciousness/Minsky: [Must machines be logical?] What's wrong with the old arguments that lead us to believe that if machines could ever think at all, they'd have to think with perfect logic? We're told that by their nature, all machines must work according to rules. We're also told that they can only do exactly what they're told to do. Besides that, we also hear that machines can only handle quantities and therefore cannot deal with qualities or anything like analogies. >Intelligence, >Superintelligence, >Artificial Intelligence, >Artificial Consciousness, >Strong Artificial Intelligence, >Artificial Neural Networks, >Artificial General Intelligence, >AI Research, >ChatGPT. I 165 Most such arguments are based upon a mistake that is like confusing an agent with an agency. When we design and build a machine, we know a good deal about how it works. When our design is based on neat, logical principles, we are likely to make the mistake of expecting the machine to behave in a similarly neat and logical fashion. But that confuses what the machine does inside itself — that is, how it works — with our expectations of how it will appear to behave in the outer world. Being able to explain in logical terms how a machine's parts work does not automatically enable us to explain its subsequent activities in simple, logical terms. Logic/Minsky: We use it to simplify and summarize our thoughts. We use it to explain arguments to other people and to persuade them that those arguments are right. We use it to reformulate our own ideas. But I doubt that we often use logic actually to solve problems or to get new ideas. >Reasoning/Minsky.	Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003
Artificial Intelligence	Deutsch	Brockman I 116 Artificial Intelligence/Deutsch: Misconceptions about human thinking and human origins are causing corresponding misconceptions about AGI (artificial general intelligence) and how it might be created. For example, it is generally assumed that the evolutionary pressure that produced modern humans was provided by the benefits of having an ever-greater ability to innovate. But if that were so, there would have been rapid progress as soon as thinkers existed, just as we hope will happen when we create artificial ones. >Imitation/Deutsch, >Knowledge/Popper. But instead, there were hundreds of thousands of years of near stasis. Progress happened only on timescales much longer than people’s lifetimes, so in a typical generation no one benefited from any progress. Brockman I 119 A present-day AI is not a mentally disabled AGI (artificial general intelligence), so it would not be harmed by having its mental processes directed still more narrowly to meeting some predetermined criterion. (…) all the effort that has ever increased the capabilities of AIs has gone into narrowing their range of potential “thoughts.” (E.g., Chess engines); their basic task has not changed from the outset (…). >Artificial General Intelligence/Deutsch. For general problems with programming AI: >Thinking/Deutsch, >Obedience/Deutsch. Brockman I 123 Test for Artificial General Intelligence: (…) I expect that any testing in the process of creating an AGI risks being counterproductive, even immoral, just as in the education of humans. I share Turing’s supposition that we’ll know an AGI when we see one, but this partial ability to recognize success won’t help in creating the successful program. >Artificial General Intelligence/Deutsch. Deutsch, D. “Beyond Reward and Punishment” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press.	Deutsch I D. Deutsch Fabric of Reality, Harmondsworth 1997 German Edition: Die Physik der Welterkenntnis München 2000 Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019
Artificial Neural Networks	Norvig	Norvig I 728 Artificial Neural Networks/Norvig/Russell: Neural networks are composed of nodes or units (…) connected by directed links. A link from unit i to unit j serves to propagate the activation ai from i to j. Each link also has a numeric weight wi,j associated with it, which determines the strength and sign of the connection. Just as in linear regression models, each unit has a dummy input a0 =1 with an associated weight w0,j . Norvig I 729 Perceptrons: The activation function g is typically either a hard threshold (…), in which case the unit is called a perceptron, or a logistic function (…), in which case the term sigmoid perceptron is sometimes used. Both of these nonlinear activation function ensure the important property that the entire network of units can represent a nonlinear function (…). Forms of a network: a) A feed-forward network has connections only in one direction—that is, it forms a directed acyclic graph. Every node receives input from “upstream” nodes and delivers output to “downstream” nodes; there are no loops. A feed-forward network represents a function of its current input; thus, it has no internal state other than the weights themselves. b) A recurrent network, on the other hand, feeds its outputs back into its own inputs. This means that the activation levels of the network form a dynamical system that may reach a stable state or exhibit oscillations or even chaotic behavior. Layers: a) Feed-forward networks are usually arranged in layers, such that each unit receives input only from units in the immediately preceding layer. b) Multilayer networks, which have one or more layers of hidden units that are not connected to the outputs of the network. Training/Learning: For example, if we want to train a network to add two input bits, each a 0 or a 1, we will need one output for the sum bit and one for the carry bit. Also, when the learning problem involves classification into more than two classes—for example, when learning to categorize images of handwritten digits—it is common to use one output unit for each class. Norvig I 731 Any desired functionality can be obtained by connecting large numbers of units into (possibly recurrent) networks of arbitrary depth. The problem was that nobody knew how to train such networks. This turns out to be an easy problem if we think of a network the right way: as a function hw(x) parameterized by the weights w. Norvig I 732 (…) we have the output expressed as a function of the inputs and the weights. (…) because the function represented by a network can be highly nonlinear—composed, as it is, of nested nonlinear soft threshold functions—we can see neural networks as a tool for doing nonlinear regression. Norvig I 736 Learning in neural networks: just as with >Bayesian networks, we also need to understand how to find the best network structure. If we choose a network that is too big, it will be able to memorize all the examples by forming a large lookup table, but will not necessarily generalize well to inputs that have not been seen before. Norvig I 737 Optimal brain damage: The optimal brain damage algorithm begins with a fully connected network and removes connections from it. After the network is trained for the first time, an information-theoretic approach identifies an optimal selection of connections that can be dropped. The network is then retrained, and if its performance has not decreased then the process is repeated. In addition to removing connections, it is also possible to remove units that are not contributing much to the result. Parametric models: A learning model that summarizes data with a set of parameters of fixed size (independent of the number of training examples) is called a parametric model. No matter how much data you throw at a parametric model, it won’t change its mind about how many parameters it needs. Nonparametric models: A nonparametric model is one that cannot be characterized by a bounded set of parameters. For example, suppose that each hypothesis we generate simply retains within itself all of the training examples and uses all of them to predict the next example. Such a hypothesis family would be nonparametric because the effective number of parameters is unbounded- it grows with the number of examples. This approach is called instance-based learning or memory-based learning. The simplest instance-based learning method is table lookup: take all the training examples, put them in a lookup table, and then when asked for h(x), see if x is in the table; (…). Norvig I 738 We can improve on table lookup with a slight variation: given a query xq, find the k examples that are nearest to xq. This is called k-nearest neighbors lookup. ((s) Cf. >Local/global/Philosophical theories.) Norvig I 744 Support vector machines/SVM: The support vector machine or SVM framework is currently the most popular approach for “off-the-shelf” supervised learning: if you don’t have any specialized prior knowledge about a domain, then the SVM is an excellent method to try first. Properties of SVMs: 1. SVMs construct a maximum margin separator - a decision boundary with the largest possible distance to example points. This helps them generalize well. 2. SVMs create a linear separating hyperplane, but they have the ability to embed the data into a higher-dimensional space, using the so-called kernel trick. 3. SVMs are a nonparametric method - they retain training examples and potentially need to store them all. On the other hand, in practice they often end up retaining only a small fraction of the number of examples - sometimes as few as a small constant times the number of dimensions. Norvig I 745 Instead of minimizing expected empirical loss on the training data, SVMs attempt to minimize expected generalization loss. We don’t know where the as-yet-unseen points may fall, but under the probabilistic assumption that they are drawn from the same distribution as the previously seen examples, there are some arguments from computational learning theory (…) suggesting that we minimize generalization loss by choosing the separator that is farthest away from the examples we have seen so far. Norvig I 748 Ensemble Learning: > href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=2497863&a=$a&first_name=&author=AI%20Research&concept=Learning">Learning/AI Research. Norvig I 757 Linear regression is a widely used model. The optimal parameters of a linear regression model can be found by gradient descent search, or computed exactly. A linear classifier with a hard threshold—also known as a perceptron—can be trained by a simple weight update rule to fit data that are linearly separable. In other cases, the rule fails to converge. Norvig I 758 Logistic regression replaces the perceptron’s hard threshold with a soft threshold defined by a logistic function. Gradient descent works well even for noisy data that are not linearly separable. Norvig I 760 History: The term logistic function comes from Pierre-Francois Verhulst (1804–1849), a statistician who used the curve to model population growth with limited resources, a more realistic model than the unconstrained geometric growth proposed by Thomas Malthus. Verhulst called it the courbe logistique, because of its relation to the logarithmic curve. The term regression is due to Francis Galton, nineteenth century statistician, cousin of Charles Darwin, and initiator of the fields of meteorology, fingerprint analysis, and statistical correlation, who used it in the sense of regression to the mean. The term curse of dimensionality comes from Richard Bellman (1961)(1). Logistic regression can be solved with gradient descent, or with the Newton-Raphson method (Newton, 1671(2); Raphson, 1690(3)). A variant of the Newton method called L-BFGS is sometimes used for large-dimensional problems; the L stands for “limited memory,” meaning that it avoids creating the full matrices all at once, and instead creates parts of them on the fly. BFGS are authors’ initials (Byrd et al., 1995)(4). The ideas behind kernel machines come from Aizerman et al. (1964)(5) (who also introduced the kernel trick), but the full development of the theory is due to Vapnik and his colleagues (Boser et al., 1992)(6). SVMs were made practical with the introduction of the soft-margin classifier for handling noisy data in a paper that won the 2008 ACM Theory and Practice Award (Cortes and Vapnik, 1995)(7), and of the Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO) algorithm for efficiently solving SVM problems using quadratic programming (Platt, 1999)(8). SVMs have proven to be very popular and effective for tasks such as text categorization (Joachims, 2001)(9), computational genomics (Cristianini and Hahn, 2007)(10), and natural language processing, such as the handwritten digit recognition of DeCoste and Schölkopf (2002)(11). As part of this process, many new kernels have been designed that work with strings, trees, and other non-numerical data types. A related technique that also uses the kernel trick to implicitly represent an exponential feature space is the voted perceptron (Freund and Schapire, 1999(12); Collins and Duffy, 2002(13)). Textbooks on SVMs include Cristianini and Shawe-Taylor (2000)(14) and Schölkopf and Smola (2002)(15). A friendlier exposition appears in the AI Magazine article by Cristianini and Schölkopf (2002)(16). Bengio and LeCun (2007)(17) show some of the limitations of SVMs and other local, nonparametric methods for learning functions that have a global structure but do not have local smoothness. Ensemble learning is an increasingly popular technique for improving the performance of learning algorithms. Bagging (Breiman, 1996)(18), the first effective method, combines hypotheses learned from multiple bootstrap data sets, each generated by subsampling the original data set. The boosting method described in this chapter originated with theoretical work by Schapire (1990)(19). The ADABOOST algorithm was developed by Freund and Schapire Norvig I 761 (1996) (20)and analyzed theoretically by Schapire (2003)(21). Friedman et al. (2000)(22) explain boosting from a statistician’s viewpoint. Online learning is covered in a survey by Blum (1996)(23) and a book by Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006)(24). Dredze et al. (2008)(25) introduce the idea of confidence-weighted online learning for classification: in addition to keeping a weight for each parameter, they also maintain a measure of confidence, so that a new example can have a large effect on features that were rarely seen before (and thus had low confidence) and a small effect on common features that have already been well-estimated. 1. Bellman, R. E. (1961). Adaptive Control Processes: A Guided Tour. Princeton University Press. 2. Newton, I. (1664-1671). Methodus fluxionum et serierum infinitarum. Unpublished notes 3. Raphson, J. (1690). Analysis aequationum universalis. Apud Abelem Swalle, London. 4. Byrd, R. H., Lu, P., Nocedal, J., and Zhu, C. (1995). A limited memory algorithm for bound constrained optimization. SIAM Journal on Scientific and Statistical Computing, 16(5), 1190-1208. 5. Aizerman, M., Braverman, E., and Rozonoer, L. (1964). Theoretical foundations of the potential function method in pattern recognition learning. Automation and Remote Control, 25, 821-837. 6. Boser, B., Guyon, I., and Vapnik, V. N. (1992). A training algorithm for optimal margin classifiers. In COLT-92. 7. Cortes, C. and Vapnik, V. N. (1995). Support vector networks. Machine Learning, 20, 273-297. 8. Platt, J. (1999). Fast training of support vector machines using sequential minimal optimization. In Advances in Kernel Methods: Support Vector Learning, pp. 185-208. MIT Press. 9. Joachims, T. (2001). A statistical learning model of text classification with support vector machines. In SIGIR-01, pp. 128-136. 10. Cristianini, N. and Hahn, M. (2007). Introduction to Computational Genomics: A Case Studies Approach. Cambridge University Press. 11. DeCoste, D. and Schölkopf, B. (2002). Training invariant support vector machines. Machine Learning, 46(1), 161–190. 12. Freund, Y. and Schapire, R. E. (1996). Experiments with a new boosting algorithm. In ICML-96. 13. Collins, M. and Duffy, K. (2002). New ranking algorithms for parsing and tagging: Kernels over discrete structures, and the voted perceptron. In ACL-02. 14. Cristianini, N. and Shawe-Taylor, J. (2000). An introduction to support vector machines and other kernel-based learning methods. Cambridge University Press. 15. Schölkopf, B. and Smola, A. J. (2002). Learning with Kernels. MIT Press. 16. Cristianini, N. and Schölkopf, B. (2002). Support vector machines and kernel methods: The new generation of learning machines. AIMag, 23(3), 31–41. 17. Bengio, Y. and LeCun, Y. (2007). Scaling learning algorithms towards AI. In Bottou, L., Chapelle, O., DeCoste, D., and Weston, J. (Eds.), Large-Scale Kernel Machines. MIT Press. 18. Breiman, L. (1996). Bagging predictors. Machine Learning, 24(2), 123–140. 19. Schapire, R. E. (1990). The strength of weak learnability. Machine Learning, 5(2), 197–227. 20. Freund, Y. and Schapire, R. E. (1996). Experiments with a new boosting algorithm. In ICML-96. 21. Schapire, R. E. (2003). The boosting approach to machine learning: An overview. In Denison, D. D., Hansen, M. H., Holmes, C., Mallick, B., and Yu, B. (Eds.), Nonlinear Estimation and Classification. Springer. 22. Friedman, J., Hastie, T., and Tibshirani, R. (2000). Additive logistic regression: A statistical view of boosting. Annals of Statistics, 28(2), 337–374. 23. Blum, A. L. (1996). On-line algorithms in machine learning. In Proc.Workshop on On-Line Algorithms, Dagstuhl, pp. 306–325. 24. Cesa-Bianchi, N. and Lugosi, G. (2006). Prediction, learning, and Games. Cambridge University Press. 25. Dredze, M., Crammer, K., and Pereira, F. (2008). Confidence-weighted linear classification. In ICML- 08, pp. 264–271.	Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010
Assertibility	Strawson	Nagel I 71 Crispin Wright: considers the view that truth could range further than assertibility to be too extreme: how can a sentence be unrecognizably true? (VsRealism) >Realism, >Assertibility, >Truth. StrawsonVs this draws the image of what Wittgenstein has reportedly asserted: it simply does not correspond with our most evident experience. We understand the meaning of what we say and hear well enough to at least occasionally recognize inconsistencies and conclusions in what was said which are attributable solely to the sense or the meaning of what was said. >Sense, >Meaning, >Understanding, >Language community. Wright I 77 Wright: Assertibility/Strawson: the assertibility-conditional conception has "no explanation for what a speaker actually does when he utters the sentence". >Language behavior, >Behavior, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. StrawsonVsSemantic Anti-Realists: it only makes sense to consider an assertion to be justified if this assertion supports the commitment to something that lies beyond its justification. ((s) "background", single, isolated sentences are not assertible but neither are they sensibly debatable.) cf. >Background.	Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Assertibility Conditions	Searle	VII 101 Searle: assertibility conditions are not the same as truth conditions: e.g. the use of "voluntarily" (> Ryle-Austin-Searle-Hare-Cavell-Fodor; see SearleVsAustin). VsUse Theory: use is too vague. The circumstances are beyond the language. >Truth condition. VII 96 Intention/Searle: thesis: the strangeness or deviation that is a condition for the utterance: "X was done intentionally", provides at the same time a reason for the truth of the utterance of: "X wasn't done on purpose." Condition of assertiveness: it is the condition of utterance for one assertion precisely because it is a reason for the truth of the others. >Assertibility condition. >Truth conditions/Searle, >Conditions of satisfaction/Searle, >Assertibility.	Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Atomism	Logic Texts	Read III 28ff Atomism: the leading thought is that facts are autonomous. The truth of the conjunction is simply the result of the truth of each member of the conjunction. Reduction: each link corresponds to a fact. >Conjunction, >Truth, >Fact, >Reduction. The dream of the logical atomists, Russell and Wittgenstein, was to thus retain the truth of atomic and elementary statements after a great reduction. Wittgenstein later abandoned atomism (as well as realism and correspondence theory). >Realism, >Correspondence theory. VsReductionism: this would have to explain the truth of a negative statement like "Ruby did not kill Kennedy" as the result of the truth of another statement that would be inconsistent with "Ruby killed Kennedy". RussellVsVs: Russell objected to such argumentation that recourse is threatened: "B is incompatible with A" is itself a negative statement. To explain its truth, we would need a third statement C, which would be incompatible with "C is incompatible with A", and so on. Read III 31 ReadVsRussell: this is a strange objection, because it would also apply against any conjunction. And then truth conditions for conjunctive and disjunctive statements must not be conjunctive or disjunctive. >Disjunction, >Conjunction, >Truth condition.	Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Attachment Theory	Ainsworth	Corr I 228 Attachment theory/Ainsworth/Shaver/Mikulincer: Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters and Wall (1978)⁽¹⁾ added important ideas and assessment procedures, which allowed her and Bowlby’s theory to be rigorously tested, revised and expanded for more than thirty years. AinsworthVsBowlby. >J. Bowlby, >Experiments, >Method. 1. Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E. and Wall, S. 1978. Patterns of attachment: assessed in the Strange Situation and at home. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Attachment Theory	Bowlby	Corr I 29 (XXIX) Personality/attachment theory/Bowlby: Bowlby’s insight was that the child’s pattern of relationships with its primary care-giver affected adult personality; secure attachment to the care-giver promoted healthy adjustment in later life. The theory references many of the key themes of this review of personality. Attachment style may be measured by observation or questionnaire; a common distinction is between secure, anxious and avoidant styles (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters and Wall 1978)⁽¹⁾. It also corresponds to standard traits; for example, secure attachment correlates with Extraversion and Agreeableness (Carver 1997)⁽²⁾. Attachment likely possesses biological aspects (evident in ethological studies of primates), social aspects (evident in data on adult relationships), and cognitive aspects (evident in studies of the mental representations supporting attachment style). >Relationships, >Social relations, >Extraversion, >Affectional bond. 1. Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E. and Wall, S. 1978. Patterns of attachment: a psychological study of the strange situation. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 2. Carver, C. S. 1997. Adult attachment and personality: converging evidence and a new measure, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 23: 865–83 Corr I 228 Attachment theory/Bowlby/Shaver/Mikulincer: Bowlby’s attachment theory (Bowlby 1973⁽¹⁾, 1980⁽²⁾, 1982/1969⁽³⁾) was then elaborated and empirically tested by Mary Ainsworth and her colleagues (e.g., Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters and Wall 1978⁽⁴⁾). See also Attachment theory/Ainsworth. Question: why separations from mother early in life causes so much psychological difficulty for children, adolescents and adults later in life (e.g., Bowlby 1951⁽⁵⁾, 1958⁽⁶⁾). 1. Bowlby, J. 1973. Attachment and loss, vol. II, Separation: anxiety and anger. New York: Basic Books 2. Bowlby, J. 1980. Attachment and loss, vol. III, Sadness and depression. New York: Basic Books 3. Bowlby, J. 1982. Attachment and loss, vol. I, Attachment, 2nd edn. New York: Basic Books (original edn 1969) 4. Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E. and Wall, S. 1978. Patterns of attachment: assessed in the Strange Situation and at home. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 5. Bowlby, J. 1951. Maternal care and mental health. Geneva: World Health Organization 6. Bowlby, J. 1958. The nature of the child’s tie to his mother, International Journal of Psychoanalysis 39: 350–73 Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Attachment Theory	Cultural Psychology	Upton I 58 Attachment Theory/Cultural Psychology/Upton: cross-cultural research has highlighted variations in attachment classifications, even in Western cultures (van Ijzendoorn and Kroonenberg, 1988)⁽¹⁾. >Strange Situation/Attachment Theory. Ratios of Secure (%)/ Insecure-avoidant (%) / Insecure-resistant (%) – patterns of attachment: USA: 65 – 21 - 14 Germany: 57 – 35 - 8 Japan: 68 – 26 - 27 UK: 75 – 22 – 3⁽¹⁾ Upton I 59 However, in each country the majority of attachments are rated secure and this has been demonstrated in other studies (e.g. Thompson, 2006)⁽²⁾. This is often taken as evidence that the meaning of attachment relationships is universal and cultural variations simply illustrate how different caregiving patterns lead to varying percentages of secure and insecure attachments. Secure/insecure attachment/Interpretation: another interpretation of this data is that what qualifies as secure or insecure attachment varies across cultures. Japan: In Japan, for example, mothers respond differently to their babies when compared to Western mothers (Rothbaum et al., 2000)⁽³⁾. Japanese mothers usually have much closer contact with their infants and strive to anticipate their infants’ needs rather than react to their infants’ cries as Western mothers tend to do. Social routines and independent exploration are given less emphasis than in the West. VsAinsworth: The Strange Situation has been criticised for being ethnocentric in its approach and assumptions, as it does not take into account the Upton I 60 diversity of socialising contexts that exist in the world. Cultural values influence the nature on attachment. (Cole and Tan, 2007)⁽⁴⁾. Africa: in Nigeria, for example, Hausa infants are traditionally cared for by the grandmother and siblings as well as the mother and tend to develop attachments to a large number of carers (Harkness and Super, 1995)⁽⁵⁾. Western countries: In Western cultures, increasing numbers of children spend time being looked after by someone other than the mother – either with relatives or in day care (Hochschild and Machong, 1989)⁽⁶⁾. Might this influence their response to maternal separation? What does this then suggest about all those children classified as insecurely attached? 1. van Ijzendoorn, M. and Kroonenberg, P. (1988) Cross cultural patterns of attachment: a meta-analysis of the Strange Situation. Child Development, 59: 147—56. 2. Thompson, R.A. (2006) The development of the person, in Eisenberg, N (ed.) Handbook of Child Psychology, Vol. 3: Social, emotional, and personality development (6th edn). New York: Wiley. 3. Rothbaum, F, Weisz, J, Pott, M, Miyake, K and Morelli, G (2000) Attachment and culture: security in the United States and Japan. American Psychologist, 55: 1093—1104. 4. Cole, P.M. and Tan, P.Z. (2007) Emotion socialization from a cultural perspective, in Grusec, J.E. and Hastings, P.D. (eds) Handbook of Socialization. New York: Guilford. 5. Harkness, S and Super, CM (1995) Culture and parenting, in Bornstein, MH (ed.) Handbook of Parenting, Vol. 3. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 6. Hochschild, A and Machong, A (1989) The Second Shift: Working parents and the revolution at home. New York: Viking Penguin.	Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011
Attachment Theory	Psychological Theories	Corr I 228 Attachment theory/psychological theories/Shaver/Mikulincer: attachment theory provided an alternative psychodynamic framework for conceptualizing human motivation and socio-emotional bonds, but it might not have captured the attention of developmental, personality, social and clinical researchers if it had done only that. What captured research psychologists’ attention were the patterns or styles of attachment emphasized in Bowlby’s (1973⁽¹⁾, 1980⁽²⁾) theory and operationalized in Ainsworth’s research on mother-infant dyads (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters and Wall 1978)⁽³⁾. See >Behavioral system/Bowlby, >Attachment theory, >J. Bowlby. 1. Bowlby, J. 1973. Attachment and loss, vol. II, Separation: anxiety and anger. New York: Basic Books 2. Bowlby, J. 1980. Attachment and loss, vol. III, Sadness and depression. New York: Basic Books 3. Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E. and Wall, S. 1978. Patterns of attachment: assessed in the Strange Situation and at home. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Attitudes and Behavior	LaPiere	Haslam I 27 Attitudes and behavior/hospitality study/LaPiere: Initially, researchers simply assumed that there would be a strong correspondence between attitudes and action. Indeed, one of the reasons that individuals are interested in knowing the attitudes of others is precisely because of this assumption: if you know how a person feels about an issue, then this should be a good basis for predicting (and perhaps understanding) how they are going to behave in relation to that issue. (…) a single piece of research (…) produced a particularly dramatic disconfirmation of the attitude–behaviour link: Richard LaPiere’s (1934)⁽¹⁾ hospitality study. LaPiere found a strong divergence in the rejection of strangers depending on whether he asked hotels for rooms in writing or spoke in person at hotels accompanied by Chinese. Def Attitude/LaPiere: ‘a social attitude is a behaviour pattern [exhibited in response to] … designated social situations’ (1934⁽¹⁾: p. 230). In other words, he reasoned that one can only determine how an individual feels about a particular attitude object by observing the individual’s response in relevant social situations. Haslam I 28 [LaPiere’s] rationale for looking at hotel policies was that, for economic reasons, hotel proprietors might be motivated to reflect the broader attitudes of society at the time – in particular, wanting to ensure that their White clientele were not offended by the hotel’s policy of admitting or rejecting non-White guests. >Attitudes and Behavior/psychological theories, >Attitudes/psychological theories. 1. LaPiere, R.T. (1934) ‘Attitudes versus actions’, Social Forces, 13: 230–7. Joanne R. Smith and Deborah J. Terry, “Attitudes and Behavior. Revisiting LaPiere’s hospitality study”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Attitudes and Behavior	Psychological Theories	Haslam I 31 Attitudes and behavior/psychological theories: are attitudes and action related? LaPiere’s 1934 study⁽¹⁾ was widely interpreted as showing that attitudes do not always predict behavior. LaPiere found a strong divergence in the rejection of strangers depending on whether he asked hotels for rooms in writing or spoke in person at hotels accompanied by Chinese. Alan Wicker (1969)⁽²⁾ reviewed 42 experimental studies and found that the average correlation between attitudes and behaviour was only very low (r ≈ .15). On this basis, he concluded that ‘taken as a whole, these studies suggest that it is considerably more likely that attitudes will be unrelated or only slightly related to overt behaviours than that attitudes will be closely related to actions’ (1969⁽²⁾: 65). At the same time, however, other researchers maintained that attitudes did predict behaviour and sought to understand the weak relations identified in the literature. Some researchers highlighted methodological issues related to the measurement of attitudes and behaviour. More specifically, researchers argued that there was no simple attitude–behaviour relationship and that in order to predict behaviour accurately it is necessary to take other variables into account. The most dominant of these ‘other variables’ approaches are the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975⁽³⁾) and the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991)⁽⁴⁾. According to both these theories, the most immediate determinant of behaviour is a person’s intention to engage in that behaviour. Intention, in turn, is determined by attitudes (i.e., the person’s evaluation of the target behaviour), subjective norms (i.e., the person’s perception that others would approve of the behaviour), and, in the theory of planned behaviour, Haslam I 32 perceived behavioural control (i.e., the person’s perception that the behaviour is under his or her control). See meta-analyses by Albarracin et al., 2001⁽⁵⁾; Armitage and Conner, 2001⁽⁶⁾; Hagger et al., 2002⁽⁷⁾). Attitudes correlate well with intentions (the average correlation, r, ranges between .45 and .60). The same is true for correlations between subjective norms and intentions (.34 < r < .42), and between perceived behavioural control and intentions (.35 < r < .46). Indeed, overall, in combination, attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control turn out to be very good predictors of intentions (.63 < r < .71). Furthermore, Sheeran (2002)⁽⁸⁾ observes that intentions are themselves good predictors of behaviour (average r = .53). Scheme: Attitude/Subjective norm/Perceived behavioral control > Intention > Behavior (With an additional direct influence of perceived behavioral control on behavior). Haslam 33 VsLaPiere: LaPiere’s study (>Attitudes and behavior/LaPiere) was criticized for several reasons: First, there is the issue of the six-month interval between the two assessment points. Practically, we have no way of knowing whether the same individual responded to both the face-to-face request for service and the questionnaire request. (Schwarz 1978)⁽⁹⁾. Other researchers have argued that the two measures of ‘attitude’ that LaPiere administered did not actually address the same attitude object. In particular, Ajzen and colleagues (1970)⁽¹⁰⁾ note that a different result might have been obtained if the verbal attitude measure more accurately reflected the behaviour of interest. Haslam I 34 People who hold negative attitudes towards particular groups may be reluctant to express these attitudes in their public behaviour because they also adhere to widely held norms of tolerance or politeness. Haslam I 35 VsLaPiere: LaPiere (1934)⁽¹⁾ assessed behavior and then attitudes rather than assessing attitudes and the behavior. Had LaPiere been interested in testing whether attitudes predict behaviour, then this would constitute a serious limitation to his work. Haslam I 36 VsLaPiere: LaPiere believed that one could only truly assess attitudes by looking at individuals’ behaviour because verbal and behavioural responses to an attitude object arise from a single ‘acquired behavioural disposition’ (Campbell, 1963⁽¹¹): 97). In these terms, attitudes and behaviour are seen to be formally rather than causally related – that is, they are related because they are reflections of the same underlying state, not because one leads to the other. Contemporary social psychologists tend to conceptualize attitudes as evaluative dispositions (e.g., Eagly and Chaiken, 1993)⁽¹²⁾, and this conceptualization has driven, and continues to drive, the way in which attitudes are measured. >Attitudes/psychological theories. 1. LaPiere, R.T. (1934) ‘Attitudes versus actions’, Social Forces, 13: 230–7. 2. Wicker, A.W. (1969) ‘Attitudes versus actions: The relationship of verbal and overt behavioural responses to attitude objects’, Journal of Social Issues, 25: 41–78. 3. Fishbein, M. and Ajzen, I. (1975) Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behaviour: An Introduction to Theory and Research. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 4. Ajzen, I. (1991) ‘The theory of planned behaviour’, Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes, 50: 179–211. 5. Albarracin, D., Johnson, B.T., Fishbein, M. and Muellerleile, P.A. (2001) ‘Theories of reasoned action and planned behaviour as models of condom use: A meta-analysis’, Psychological Bulletin, 127: 142–61. 6. Armitage, C.J. and Conner, M. (2001) ‘Efficacy of the theory of planned behaviour: A meta-analytic review’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 40: 471–99. 7. Hagger, M.S., Chatzisarantis, N.L.D. and Biddle, S.J.H. (2002) ‘A meta-analytic review of the theories of reasoned action and planned behaviour in physical activity: Predictive validity and the contribution of additional variables’, Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 24: 3–32. 8. Sheeran, P. (2002) ‘Intention–behaviour relations: A conceptual and empirical review’, European Review of Social Psychology, 12: 1–36. 9. Schwartz, S. (1978) ‘Temporal stability as a moderator of the attitude–behaviour relationship’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36: 715–24. 10. Ajzen, I., Darroch, R.K., Fishbein, M. and Hornik, J.A. (1970) ‘Looking backward revisited: A reply to Deutscher’, The American Sociologist, 5: 267–73. 11. Campbell, D.T. (1963) ‘Social attitudes and other acquired behavioural dispositions’, in S. Koch (ed.), Psychology: A Study of a Science, Vol. 6. New York: McGraw-Hill. pp. 94–172. 12. Eagly, A.H. and Chaiken, S. (1993) The Psychology of Attitudes. Belmont, CA: Thomson. Joanne R. Smith and Deborah J. Terry, “Attitudes and Behavior. Revisiting LaPiere’s hospitality study”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Attribution	Peacocke	Avramides I 92 Beliefs/Desires/Attributions/Radical Interpretation/Peacocke/Avramidis: Suppose we could attribute beliefs and desires before the knowledge of the language. In this case, simultaneous attribution of propositional attitudes would still be necessary. >Propositional attitudes, >Thinking without language, >Desires, >Beliefs. But not particular propositional attitudes before language. >Language, >Understanding, >Language use. PeacockeVs "actual language relation": this supposedly needs no semantic vocabulary. >Reference, cf. >Primitive reference, >Semantics. Peacocke later: Gricean intentions cannot be used as evidence for radical interpretation, but that's not VsGrice. >Intentions/Grice, >P. Grice. Peacocke I 78f Propositional Attitudes/Attribution/Peacocke: Problem: instead of one set of propositional attitudes another can also be attributed. Solution/Peacocke: Relation of Closeness/Narrowness. E.g. someone who rearranges something on the table usually does not respond to the compass direction. - The concepts may then have different expressiveness. Important point: if it is a rotating table, the space-relative concepts can change while the table-relative ones remain constant. ((s) The concepts do not change, but their truth values.) More expressive: the space-relative concepts. - Problem: if they are used here, there may be an explanatory gap. >narrow concepts. I 83 We should not attribute any wider concepts if there more narrow ones are available. >Narrow/wide.	Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989
Attributive/referential	Donnellan	I 183 Def Referential/Donnellan: is supposed to enable the listener to single out the person the speaker is talking about. - E.g. "The killer of Schmidt is insane": in any case, the person who rioted in court, even if he is not the killer. - Here, empty descriptions do not fail. - ((s) The description may also be wrong, and still identify the person.) Attributive/Donnellan: "whoever it is": E.g. An absent murderer can be anyone, but definitely the murderer - ((s), the description must be apply). >Descriptions. I 191 Referential/Donnellan: Here it is probable that the speaker believes that the reference is satisfied. An incorrect description would mislead the listeners. Attributive/Donnellan: the same possibility of incorrect description does not exist here: "Whoever it is" cannot be described incorrectly, the speaker believes a disjunction: "him or him or him..." - attributively used descriptions may fail and yet express something true. E.g. "The House of Deputies (correctly House of Representatives) includes representatives of two parties" - No problem, if it is clear what the speaker means, you can correct him. >Meaning (Intending). I 195 Intent/Intention/Meaning/Donnellan: it's not about what someone wanted to say - otherwise you could take any description - nevertheless, the intention decides about referential or attributive use. I 199 Champagne Example/Donnellan: attributively no problem. I ~ 202 Referential/Donnellan: could also be called a weak reference: whatever - real reference: attributive. >Champagne example. I 202 Problem of the Statement/Donnellan: E.g. (Linsky): her husband is kind to her (in the café, but he is not her husband) - referentially true - attributive: if phi, then psi, but there is no phi, then it's not correct to say: he says of him... (de re) - but referential: he said correctly of the so described that he ... ((s) also de re!) - Kripke: precisely not like distinction de re/de dicto - E.g. If the described person is also the president of the college, it is true of the president that he is kind - referential: here the speaker does not even have to agree. Wolf I 18 Name/Description/Donnellan: a) referential use: the reference can succeed, even if the description is not true: E.g. The man in court is not the murderer, but he is correctly determined as the one who behaves wildly. b) attributive use: "whoever it was" applies if we have no specific person in mind. ((s)> role functional role: what ever it is.) >Roles, >Functional role. Chisholm II 109 Donnellan/referential/attributive/Brandl: can the distinction not be explained by the fact that in one instance reference is made by signs and in another instance by speakers? No, then the referential use would only have drawn attention to a problem of pragmatics. Then Russell could have simply expanded his theory pragmatically. Brandl: one can make the distinction referential/attributive even more pronounced if one applies it to precisely those signs with which the speaker makes it clear from the outset that he/she is not referring to a whole range of objects. Newen I 94 Referential/Predicative/Singular Terms/Identification/Name/Strawson: Thesis: Proper names/demonstratives: are largely used referentially - descriptions: have at most predicative, i.e. descriptive, meaning (but can also refer simultaneously) Ad Newen I 94 Referential/(s): selecting an object - attributive/(s): attributing properties. Newen I 95 Attributive/Donnellan/(s): in the absence of the subject matter in question - referential/(s): in the presence of the subject matter in question Newen I 95 DonnellanVsRussell: he has overlooked the referential use. He only considers the attributive use, because... Descriptions/Russell: ...are syncategorematic expressions for him, which themselves cannot refer. >Syncategorematic. Newen I 96 Referential/description/KripkeVsDonnellan: the referential use of descriptions has absolutely nothing to do with the semantics of descriptions. Referential use is possible and communication can succeed with it, but it belongs to pragmatics. Pragmatics: examines what is meant (contextual). It does not examine the context-independent semantics. Solution/Kripke: to make a distinction between speaker reference and semantic reference. >Speaker reference, >Reference. Semantic meaning: is given by Russell's truth conditions: the murderer of Schmidt is insane iff the murderer of Schmidt is insane. >Truth conditions.	Donnellan I Keith S. Donnellan "Reference and Definite Descriptions", in: Philosophical Review 75 (1966), S. 281-304 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Auctions	Coase	Kiesling I 30 Auctions/spectrum allocation/Coase/Kiesling: „A private-enterprise system cannot function properly unless property rights are created in resources, and, when this is done, someone wishing to use a resource has to pay the owner to obtain it. Chaos disappears; and so does the government except that a legal system to define property rights and to arbitrate disputes is, of course, necessary.“ (1959⁽¹⁾: 14) Markets/Coase: Why use markets? Markets reveal the opportunity cost of the license and factor that opportunity cost into the decision-making of incumbent and entrant license holders. A right to use a frequency would have to be defined precisely in order to be transacted (Coase, 1959⁽¹⁾: 25). Kiesling I 31 Thirty-four years after Coase proposed using markets to allocate spectrum, Congress passed legislation allowing non-broadcast spectrum licenses to be allocated using auctions. Licenses for the most valuable bandwidth are “flexible use” licenses, where the specific use is not stipulated in the license. The FCC moved away from the lottery system and began spectrum license auctions in 1994. Each license was defined by a particular frequency and geographic location. As a result of the liberalization of property rights in the licenses and their allocation by auctions, market participants now determine how airwaves are used and how interference conflicts are managed. >Auctions/Economic theories. Kiesling I 32 Coase’s 1959 analysis did not delve into the particular details of auction theory or market design. Institutions/Coase: Rather, he provided a detailed institutional description and analysis of the existing license allocation method, identified the loss of economic welfare arising from that institutional arrangement, and asked the deceptively simple question: why not use markets to allocate use rights to different frequency bands in the spectrum? He argued that government planning of spectrum allocation was unnecessary, and that flexible rights issued to competitive market participants would be a better approach. Today: The digital world we inhabit today has been built in part on the innovation unleashed by competitive spectrum license auctions. 1. Coase, Ronald H. (1959). The Federal Communications Commission. Journal of Law and Economics 2: 1-40.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Authors/Titles	Garegnani	Garegnani, Pierangelo	Garegnani I Pierangelo Garegnani The Theory of Value and Distribution in Economics: Discussions between Pierangelo Garegnani and Paul Samuelson Milton Park 2012
Autism	Happé	Slater I 154 Autism/Happé: In the Strange Stories test (Happé, 1994)⁽¹⁾, (…) participants are asked to justify why a character might have chosen to say what he says in a complex mentalistic situation. For example, a soldier gets captured by enemy troops and upon being asked where the rest of his camp is hidden, he decides to reveal the exact location in the hope that the enemy will believe that he is lying and therefore send troops to the opposite location. Understanding this use of “double bluff” is a complex mindreading achievement that turns out to be especially challenging for individuals with autism, including for those individuals who do pass second-order theory of mind tests. >Autism/Baron-Cohen, >False Belief Task/psychological theories, >Theory of Mind/ToM/psychological theories, >Theory of Mind/Dennett. 1. Happé, F. (1994). An advanced test of theory of mind: Understanding of story characters’ thoughts and feelings by able autistic, mentally handicapped, and normal children and adults. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 24, 129—154. Coralie Chevallier, “Theory of Mind and Autism. Beyond Baron-Cohen et al’s. Sally-Anne Study”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Average Utility	Rawls	I 161 Average utility/Rawls: the principle of average utility differs from that of contract theory. Applied to the initial situation of a society to be built, in which the individuals are behind a veil of ignorance in relation to their later position, the principle of average utility requires that institutions be arranged in such a way that the absolute weighted sum of the expectations of the relevant representative individuals is maximized. I 162 This sum increases as the number of people in a society grows. Utilitarianism: here expectations are measured by the sum of actual and predictable satisfaction. >Utilitarianism. Theory of justice as fairness: on the other hand, this is a list of primary public goods (e. g. freedoms, infrastructure, etc.). Classical theory of average utility: was represented by Mill and Wicksell^(1)(2)(3). >J. St. Mill. Sum of Benefits/Population Growth/Rawls: the sum will not grow if we apply it to the fractions of society with certain positions, as long as the percentage of these fractions does not change. Population growth: only when a population changes there is a difference between the classical theory and the theory of justice as fairness. I 166 Average benefit/Rawls: the assumption of an initial situation of a society to be built, in which all are behind a veil of ignorance, argues for the introduction of the average principle and against the classical view. However, the average theory is not teleological, like the classical theory. Average Principle: it is not that it requires the same kind of risk-taking from all participants. I 171 Average Benefits/Rawls: It seems that the average principle must be tied to the principle of insufficient reason (see Risks/Rawls). We need something like the Laplace rule for decisions under uncertainty: the possibilities are determined in a natural way and everyone is given a probability. This does not assume general information about the company^(4)(5)(6). >Probability/Rawls. I 188 Average Benefit/Ideal Observer/Rawls: From the point of view of individuals in the initial situation, there is no reason to agree with the assessments of a compassionate ideal observer. Such an accordance would have all the disadvantages of the classical utility principle. However, if the participants are considered complete altruists, i.e. those who agree with the goals of the compassionate ideal observer,... --- I 189 ...then the classical principle would be adopted. The greatest amount of bliss satisfies the observer as well as the altruist within the system. This gives us the surprising result that, while the principle of average utility corresponds to the ethics of the individual, the classical utilitarian doctrine is one of altruistic ethics! >Altruism, >Altruism/Rawls. 1. See for this: Gunnar Myrdal, The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory London, 1953, pp.38f.; 2. J. C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, Cambridge, 1961, p. 18.; 3. J.C. Harsanyi „Cardinal Utilitry in Welfare Economics and the Theory of Risk Taking“, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 61, 1953. 4. Cf. W. Feller, Profitability and Profit, pp. 210-233.; 5. L.J. Savage, The Foundations of Statistics, New York, 1954.; 6. H.E. Kyburg, Probability and Inductive Logic, Riverside, 1970.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Balance of Payment	Rothbard	Rothbard III 821 Balance of payment/Rothbard: (…) an individual's income can be called his exports, and the physical sources of his income his goods exported; while his expenditures can be termed his imports, and the goods purchased his goods imported.⁽¹⁾ >Cash balance/Rothbard, >Consumption/Rothbard. We also saw that it is nonsensical to call a man's balance of trade "favorable" if he chooses to use some of his income to add to his cash balance, or "unfavorable" if he decides to draw down his cash balance, so that expenditures are greater than income. Every action and exchange is favorable from the point of view of the person performing the action or exchange; otherwise he would not have engaged in it. A further conclusion is that there is no need for anyone to worry about anyone else's balance of trade. Rothbard III 822 Balance of trade/balance of payments: A person's income and expenditure constitute his "balance of trade," while his credit transactions, added to this balance, comprise his "balance ofpayment." Credits: Credit transactions may complicate the balance, but they do not alter its essentials. When a creditor makes a Ioan, he adds to his "money paid" column to the extent of the Ioan - for purchase of a promise to pay in the future. He has purchased the debtor's promise to pay in exchange for transferring part of his present cash balance to the debtor. The debtor adds to his "money receipts" column - from the sale of a promise to pay in the future. These promises to pay may fall due at any future date decided upon by the creditor and the debtor; generally they range from a day to many years. On that date the debtor repays the Ioan and transfers part of his cash balance to the creditor. This will appear in the debtor's "money paid" column - for repayment of debt - and in the creditor's "money received" column - from repayment of debt. Interest: Interest payments made by the debtor to the creditor will be similarly reflected in the respective balances of payments. Rothbard: More nonsense has been written about balances of payments than about virtually any other aspect of economics. Problem: This has been caused by the failure of economists to ground and build their analysis on individual balances of payments. Rothbard III 823 National balance of payment: Instead they have employed such cloudy, holistic concepts as the "national" balance of payment without basing them on individual actions and balances. Solution/Rothbard: Balances of payments may be consolidated for many individuals, and any number of groupings may be made. In these cases, the balances of payments only record the monetary transactions between individuals of the group and other individuals, but fail to record the exchanges of individuals within the group. Rothbard III 824 Consolidated balance of payments: The consolidated balance tells less about the activities of the members of the group than do the individual balances, since the exchanges within the group are not revealed. This discrepancy grows as the number of people grouped in the consolidated balance increases. The consolidated balance of the citizens of a large nation such as the United States conveys less information about their economic activities than is revealed by the consolidated balance of the citizens of Cuba. World balance of payment: Finally, if we lump together all the citizens of the world engaged in exchange, their consolidated balance of payments is precisely zero.⁽²⁾ 1. To say that "exports pay for imports" is simply to say that income pays for expenditures. 2. For an excellent and original analysis of balances of payments along these lines, see Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. pp. 44--49.	Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Balance of Power	Social Choice Theory	Gaus I 291 Balance of Power/political realism/social choice theory/Brown: to be punished one way or another. The imperatives imposed by a self-help system will drive states to behave rationally and selfishly: states are obliged to treat each other as potential enemies, although, if a balance of power can be sustained, a degree of stability may emerge. The beauty of this approach is that by marginally recasting its assumptions, a version of liberal internationalism can also be defended. Neorealists argue that rational egoists cannot co-operate under anarchy, while neoliberals argue that, given a degree of institutionalization and improved information flows, co-operation is possible, albeit at suboptimal levels (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985⁽¹⁾; Keohane, 1989;⁽²⁾ Mearsheimer, 2001⁽³⁾). >Balance of Power/Waltz, >State/Waltz. Brown: The shift from Augustinian to 'rational choice realism' has had important consequences. (Cf.>International relations/Niebuhr). 1)On the positive side, it has undermined the assumption that international relations theory is, in some strong sense, sui genens, unconnected with the other social sciences and based on a kind of ethnomethodology of diplomatic practice to which social theory more generally cannot contribute. 2)On the other hand, the dominance of neorealist/ neoliberal thought has significantly narrowed the range of questions that theorists of international relations deem appropriate or answerable. Whether states pursue relative gains or absolute gains (one way of distinguishing between neorealist and neoliberal assumptions) is an interesting question, but can hardly form a satisfactory basis for an examination of the foundations of the current international order (Grieco, 1988)⁽⁴⁾. 1. Axelrod, R. and R. O. Keohane (1985) 'Achieving cooperation under anarchy: strategies and institutions'. World Politics, 38: 226-54. 2. Keohane, R. O. (1989) International Institutions and State Power. Boulder, CO: Westview. 3. Mearsheimer, J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton. 4. Grieco, J. M. (1988) 'Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism'. International Oganisation, 42:485—508. Brown, Chris 2004. „Political Theory and International Relations“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Bank Reserve	Mises	Rothbard III 1010 Bank reserve/credit expansion/Mises/Rothbard: How does the narrow range of a bank's clientele limit its potentiality for credit expansion? The newly issued money-substitutes are, of course, Ioaned to a bank's clients. The client then spends the new money on goods and services. The new money begins to be diffused throughout the society. Eventually - usually very quickly - it is spent on the goods or services of people who use a different bank. Money-substitutes: Thus, while gold or silver is acceptable throughout the market, a bank's money-substitutes are acceptable only to its own clientele. Clearly, a single bank's credit expansion is limited, and this limitation is stronger (a) the narrower the range of its clientele, and (b) the greater its issue of money-substitutes in relation to that of competing banks. Rothbard III 1011 Bankruptcy: (…), the greater the degree of relative credit expansion by any one bank, the sooner will the day of redemption - and potential bankruptcy - be at hand and they are impelled to spend a great proportion of the new money. (…) clients are impelled to buy more from nonclients and less from one another; while nonclients buy less from clients and more from one another. The result is an "unfavorable" balance of trade from clients to nonclients.⁽¹⁾ Bank reserve: The purpose of banks' keeping any specie reserves in their vaults (assuming no legal reserve requirements) now becomes manifest. It is not to meet bank runs - since no fractional-reserve bank can be equipped to withstand a run. It is to meet the demands for redemption which will inevitably come from nonclients. Mises/Rothbard: Mises has brilliantly shown that a subdivision of this process was discovered by the British Currency School and by the classical "international trade" theorists of the nineteenth century. These older economists assumed that all the banks in a certain region or country expanded credit together. Prices: The result was a rise in the prices of goods produced in that country. Balance of trade: A further result was an "unfavorable" balance of trade, i.e., an outflow of standard specie to other countries. Currency drain: Since other countries did not patronize the expanding country's banks, the consequence was a "specie drain" from the expanding country and increased pressure for redemption on its banks. International trade: Like all parts of the overstressed and overelaborated theory of "international trade," this analysis is simply a special subdivision of "general" economic theory. And cataloging it as "international trade" theory, as Mises has shown, underestimates its true significance.⁽²⁾⁽³⁾ Free banking: Thus, the more freely competitive and numerous are the banks, the less they will be able to expand fiduciary media, even ifthey are left free to do so. (…) such a system is known as "free banking“.⁽⁴⁾ VsMises: A major objection to this analysis of free banking has been the problem ofbank "cartels." If banks get together and agree to expand their credits simultaneously, the clientele limitation vis-ä-vis competing banks will be removed, and the clientele of each bank will, in effect, increase to include all bank users. MisesVsVs: Mises points out, however, that the sounder banks with higher fractional reserves will not wish to lose the goodwill of their own clients and risk bank runs by entering into collusive agreements with weaker banks.⁽⁵⁾ Banks/Rothbard: This consideration, while placing limits on such agreements, does not rule them out altogether. For, after all, no fractional-reserve banks are really sound, and if the public can be led to believe that, say, an 80-percent-specie reserve is sound, it can believe the same about 60-percent- or even 10-percent-reserve banks. Indeed, the fact that the weaker banks are allowed by the public to exist at all demonstrates that the more conservative banks may not lose much good will by agreeing to expand with them. >Central banks/Rothbard. 1. In the consolidated balance ofpayments of the clients, money income from sales to nonclients (exports) will decline, and money expenditures on the goods and services of nonclients (imports) will increase. The excess cash balances of the clients are transferred to non-clients. 2. Older economists also distinguished an "internal drain" as well as the "external drain," but included in the former only the drain from bank users to those Who insist on standard money. 3. See Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. pp. 434-35. 4. For various views on free and central banking, see Vera C. Smith, The Rationale of Central Banking (London: P.S. King and Son, 1936). 5. Mises, Human Action, p. 444.	EconMises I Ludwig von Mises Die Gemeinwirtschaft Jena 1922 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Barcan-Formula	Stalnaker	I 150 Barcan formula/BF/Stalnaker: the Barcan formula involves the interaction of the universal quantifier with the necessity operator: (BF) " NF x ^ > N " x ^ F. Conversely: (CBF) N " F ^ x > " x ^ NF (Kripke 1963)⁽¹⁾: Kripke's semantics showed that semantic assumptions are also needed. He also showed a fallacy in the proofs that they supposedly deduced, in which these assumptions were missing. It is valid if wuU, Du < Dw, i.e. if the subject matter of the accessible possible world is a subset of the range of the output possible world - vice versa for the converse. Qualified converse of Barcan-Formula/Stalnaker: a qualified converse with the Barcon-Formula is made with the existence adoption: ( QCBF ) N "x ^ F> " x ^ N ex > F). Existence predicate e: Ey ^ (x = y ). I 151 Barcan-Formula/qualified converse/Stalnaker: if in possible world w it is necessary that everything satisfies F, then everything that must exist in w, must satisfy F in any accessible possible world, in which this individual exists. That is valid in our semantics but it is not a theorem because it is a variant of the invalid semantics. This is what we examine here. 1. S. A. Kripke, 1963. Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic I Normal Modal Propositional Calculi. Mathematical Logic Quarterly Volume 9, Issue 5‐6	Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Bargaining	Rothbard	Rothbard III 363 Bargining/Rothbard: (…) [in] the theory of bargaining [,] [w]e are in a very analogous situation to the two-person barter (…). For what we have is not relatively determinate prices, or proportions, but exchange ratios with wide zones between the “marginal pairs” of prices. The maximum price of one is widely separated from the minimum price of the other. >Price, >Costs, >Costs of production, >Opportunity cost. What the final decision will be cannot be indicated by praxeology. >Praxeology/Rothbard. There is, for all practical purposes, no theory of bargaining; all that can be said is that since the owner of each factor wants to participate and earn some income, all will most likely arrive at some sort of voluntary contractual arrangement. >Factors of production/Rothbard. This will be a formal type of partnership agreement if the factors jointly own the product; or it will be the implicit result if a pure capitalist purchases the services of the factors. Economists have always been very unhappy about bargaining situations of this kind, since economic analysis is estopped from saying anything more of note. We must not pursue the temptation, however, to condemn such situations as in some way “exploitative” or bad, and thereby convert barrenness for economic analysis into tragedy for the economy. Whatever agreement is arrived at by the various individuals will be beneficial to every one of them; otherwise, he would not have so agreed.⁽¹⁾ Factors of production/Rothbard: It is generally assumed that, in the jockeying for proportionate shares, labor factors have less “bargaining power” than land factors. The only meaning that can be seen in the term “bargaining power” here is that some factor-owners might have minimum reservation prices for their factors, below which they would not be entered in production. In that case, these factors would at least have to receive the minimum, while factors with no minimum, with no reservation price, would work even at an income of only slightly more than zero. Now it should be evident that the owner of every labor factor has some minimum selling price, a price below which he will not work. >Production/Rothbard, >Production theory/Rothbard, >Production costs/Rothbard. Labor/Rothbard: In the real world, labor, (…) is uniquely the nonspecific factor, so that the theory of bargaining could never apply to labor incomes.⁽²⁾ Rothbard III 365 Not only is bargaining theory rarely applicable in the real world, but zones of indeterminacy between valuations, and therefore zones of indeterminacy in pricing, tend to dwindle radically in importance as the economy evolves from barter to an advanced monetary economy. The greater the number and variety of goods available, and the greater the number of people with differing valuations, the more negligible will zones of indeterminacy become.⁽³⁾ 1. Little of value has been said about bargaining since Böhm-Bawerk. See Böhm-Bawerk, Positive Theory of Capital, pp. 198–99. This can be seen in J. Pen’s “A General Theory of Bargaining,” American Economic Review March, 1952, pp. 24 ff. Pen’s own theory is of little worth because it rests explicitly on an assumption of the measurability of utility. Ibid., p. 34 n. 2. Contrast the discussion in most textbooks, where bargaining occupies an important place in explanation of market pricing only in the discussion of labor incomes. 3. Any zone of indeterminacy in pricing must consist of the coincidence of an absolutely vertical supply curve with an absolutely vertical market demand curve for the good or service, so that the equilibrium price is in a zone rather than at a point. As Hutt states, “It depends entirely upon the fortuitous coincidence of . . . an unusual and highly improbable demand curve with an absolutely rigid supply curve.” W.H. Hutt, The Theory of Collective Bargaining (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954), pp. 90, and 79 - 109.	Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Bayesian Networks	Norvig	Norvig I 510 Bayesian Networks/belief networks/probabilistic networks/knowledge map/AI research/Norvig/Russell: Bayesian networks can represent essentially any full joint probability distribution and in many cases can do so very concisely. Norvig I 511 A Bayesian network is a directed graph in which each node is annotated with quantitative probability information. The full specification is as follows: 1. Each node corresponds to a random variable, which may be discrete or continuous. 2. A set of directed links or arrows connects pairs of nodes. If there is an arrow from node X to node Y,X is said to be a parent of Y. The graph has no directed cycles (and hence is a directed acyclic graph, or DAG. 3. Each node Xi has a conditional probability distribution P(Xi \|Parents(Xi)) that quantifies the effect of the parents on the node. The topology of the network - the set of nodes and links - specifies the conditional independence relationships that hold in the domain (…). >Probability theory/Norvig, >Uncertainty/AI research. The intuitive meaning of an arrow is typically that X has a direct influence on Y, which suggests that causes should be parents of effects. Once the topology of the Bayesian network is laid out, we need only specify a conditional probability distribution for each variable, given its parents. Norvig I 512 Circumstances: The probabilities actually summarize a potentially Norvig I 513 Infinite set of circumstances. Norvig I 515 Inconsistency: If there is no redundancy, then there is no chance for inconsistency: it is impossible for the knowledge engineer or domain expert to create a Bayesian network that violates the axioms of probability. Norvig I 517 Diagnostic models: If we try to build a diagnostic model with links from symptoms to causes (…) we end up having to specify additional dependencies between otherwise independent causes (and often between separately occurring symptoms as well). Causal models: If we stick to a causal model, we end up having to specify fewer numbers, and the numbers will often be easier to come up with. In the domain of medicine, for example, it has been shown by Tversky and Kahneman (1982)⁽¹⁾ that expert physicians prefer to give probability judgments for causal rules rather than for diagnostic ones. Norvig I 529 Inference: because it includes inference in propositional logic as a special case, inference in Bayesian networks is NP-hard. >NP-Problems/Norvig. There is a close connection between the complexity of Bayesian network inference and the complexity of constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs). > Constraint satisfaction problems/Norvig. Clustering algirithms: Using clustering algorithms (also known as join tree algorithms), the time can be reduced to O(n). For this reason, these algorithms are widely used in commercial Bayesian network tools. The basic idea of clustering is to join individual nodes of the network to form cluster nodes in such a way that the resulting network is a polytree. Norvig I 539 (…) Bayesian networks are essentially propositional: the set of random variables is fixed and finite, and each has a fixed domain of possible values. This fact limits the applicability of Bayesian networks. If we can find a way to combine probability theory with the expressive power of first-order representations, we expect to be able to increase dramatically the range of problems that can be handled. Norvig I 540 Possible worlds/probabilities: for Bayesian networks, the possible worlds are assignments of values to variables; for the Boolean case in particular, the possible worlds are identical to those of propositional logic. For a first-order probability model, then, it seems we need the possible worlds to be those of first-order logic—that is, a set of objects with relations among them and an interpretation that maps constant symbols to objects, predicate symbols to relations, and function symbols to functions on those objects. Problem: the set of first-order models is infinite. Solution: The database semantics makes the unique names assumption—here, we adopt it for the constant symbols. It also assumes domain closure - there are no more objects than those that are named. We can then guarantee a finite set of possible worlds by making the set of objects in each world be exactly the set of constant Norvig I 541 Symbols that are used. There is no uncertainty about the mapping from symbols to objects or about the objects that exist. Relational probability models: We will call models defined in this way relational probability models, or RPMs. The name relational probability model was given by Pfeffer (2000)⁽²⁾ to a slightly different representation, but the underlying ideas are the same. >Uncertainty/AI research. Norvig I 552 Judea Pearl developed the message-passing method for carrying out inference in tree networks (Pearl, 1982a)⁽³⁾ and polytree networks (Kim and Pearl, 1983)⁽⁴⁾ and explained the importance of causal rather than diagnostic probability models, in contrast to the certainty-factor systems then in vogue. The first expert system using Bayesian networks was CONVINCE (Kim, 1983)⁽⁵⁾. Early applications in medicine included the MUNIN system for diagnosing neuromuscular disorders (Andersen et al., 1989)⁽⁶⁾ and the PATHFINDER system for pathology (Heckerman, 1991)⁽⁷⁾. Norvig I 553 Perhaps the most widely used Bayesian network systems have been the diagnosis and- repair modules (e.g., the PrinterWizard) in Microsoft Windows (Breese and Heckerman, 1996)⁽⁸⁾ and the Office Assistant in Microsoft Office (Horvitz et al., 1998)⁽⁹⁾. Another important application area is biology: Bayesian networks have been used for identifying human genes by reference to mouse genes (Zhang et al., 2003)⁽¹⁰⁾, inferring cellular networks Friedman (2004)⁽¹¹⁾, and many other tasks in bioinformatics. We could go on, but instead we’ll refer you to Pourret et al. (2008)⁽¹²⁾, a 400-page guide to applications of Bayesian networks. Ross Shachter (1986)⁽¹³⁾, working in the influence diagram community, developed the first complete algorithm for general Bayesian networks. His method was based on goal-directed reduction of the network using posterior-preserving transformations. Pearl (1986)⁽¹⁴⁾ developed a clustering algorithm for exact inference in general Bayesian networks, utilizing a conversion to a directed polytree of clusters in which message passing was used to achieve consistency over variables shared between clusters. A similar approach, developed by the statisticians David Spiegelhalter and Steffen Lauritzen (Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 1988)⁽¹⁵⁾, is based on conversion to an undirected form of graphical model called a Markov network. This approach is implemented in the HUGIN system, an efficient and widely used tool for uncertain reasoning (Andersen et al., 1989)⁽⁶⁾. Boutilier et al. (1996)⁽¹⁶⁾ show how to exploit context-specific independence in clustering algorithms. Norvig I 604 Dynamic Bayesian networks (DBNs): can be viewed as a sparse encoding of a Markov process and were first used in AI by Dean and Kanazawa (1989b)⁽¹⁷⁾, Nicholson and Brady (1992)⁽¹⁸⁾, and Kjaerulff (1992)⁽¹⁹⁾. The last work extends the HUGIN Bayes net system to accommodate dynamic Bayesian networks. The book by Dean and Wellman (1991)⁽²⁰⁾ helped popularize DBNs and the probabilistic approach to planning and control within AI. Murphy (2002)⁽²¹⁾ provides a thorough analysis of DBNs. Dynamic Bayesian networks have become popular for modeling a variety of complex motion processes in computer vision (Huang et al., 1994⁽²²⁾; Intille and Bobick, 1999)⁽²³⁾. Like HMMs, they have found applications in speech recognition (Zweig and Russell, 1998⁽²⁴⁾; Richardson et al., 2000⁽²⁵⁾; Stephenson et al., 2000⁽²⁶⁾; Nefian et al., 2002⁽²⁷⁾; Livescu et al., 2003⁽²⁸⁾), Norvig I 605 genomics (Murphy and Mian, 1999⁽²⁹⁾; Perrin et al., 2003⁽³⁰⁾; Husmeier, 2003⁽³¹⁾) and robot localization (Theocharous et al., 2004)⁽³²⁾. The link between HMMs and DBNs, and between the forward–backward algorithm and Bayesian network propagation, was made explicitly by Smyth et al. (1997)⁽³³⁾. A further unification with Kalman filters (and other statistical models) appears in Roweis and Ghahramani (1999)⁽³⁴⁾. Procedures exist for learning the parameters (Binder et al., 1997a⁽³⁵⁾; Ghahramani, 1998⁽³⁶⁾) and structures (Friedman et al., 1998)⁽³⁷⁾ of DBNs. 1. Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1982). Causal schemata in judgements under uncertainty. In Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., and Tversky, A. (Eds.), Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press. 2. Pfeffer, A. (2000). Probabilistic Reasoning for Complex Systems. Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University 3. Pearl, J. (1982a). Reverend Bayes on inference engines: A distributed hierarchical approach. In AAAI- 82, pp. 133–136 4. Kim, J. H. and Pearl, J. (1983). A computational model for combined causal and diagnostic reasoning in inference systems. In IJCAI-83, pp. 190–193. 5. Kim, J. H. (1983). CONVINCE: A Conversational Inference Consolidation Engine. Ph.D. thesis, Department of Computer Science, University of California at Los Angeles. 6. Andersen, S. K., Olesen, K. G., Jensen, F. V., and Jensen, F. (1989). HUGIN—A shell for building Bayesian belief universes for expert systems. In IJCAI-89, Vol. 2, pp. 1080–1085. 7. Heckerman, D. (1991). Probabilistic Similarity Networks. MIT Press. 8. Breese, J. S. and Heckerman, D. (1996). Decisiontheoretic troubleshooting: A framework for repair and experiment. In UAI-96, pp. 124–132. 9. Horvitz, E. J., Breese, J. S., Heckerman, D., and Hovel, D. (1998). The Lumiere project: Bayesian user modeling for inferring the goals and needs of software users. In UAI-98, pp. 256–265. 10. Zhang, L., Pavlovic, V., Cantor, C. R., and Kasif, S. (2003). Human-mouse gene identification by comparative evidence integration and evolutionary analysis. Genome Research, pp. 1–13. 11. Friedman, N. (2004). Inferring cellular networks using probabilistic graphical models. Science, 303(5659), 799–805. 12. Pourret, O., Naım, P., and Marcot, B. (2008). Bayesian Networks: A practical guide to applications. Wiley. 13. Shachter, R. D. (1986). Evaluating influence diagrams. Operations Research, 34, 871–882. 14. Pearl, J. (1986). Fusion, propagation, and structuring in belief networks. AIJ, 29, 241–288. 15. Lauritzen, S. and Spiegelhalter, D. J. (1988). Local computations with probabilities on graphical structures and their application to expert systems. J. Royal Statistical Society, B 50(2), 157–224. 16. Boutilier, C., Friedman, N., Goldszmidt, M., and Koller, D. (1996). Context-specific independence in Bayesian networks. In UAI-96, pp. 115–123. 17. Dean, T. and Kanazawa, K. (1989b). A model for reasoning about persistence and causation. Computational Intelligence, 5(3), 142–150. 18. Nicholson, A. and Brady, J. M. (1992). The data association problem when monitoring robot vehicles using dynamic belief networks. In ECAI-92, pp. 689–693. 19. Kjaerulff, U. (1992). A computational scheme for reasoning in dynamic probabilistic networks. In UAI-92, pp. 121–129. 20. Dean, T. and Wellman, M. P. (1991). Planning and Control. Morgan Kaufmann. 21. Murphy, K. (2002). Dynamic Bayesian Networks: Representation, Inference and Learning. Ph.D. thesis, UC Berkeley 22. Huang, T., Koller, D., Malik, J., Ogasawara, G., Rao, B., Russell, S. J., and Weber, J. (1994). Automatic symbolic traffic scene analysis using belief networks. In AAAI-94, pp. 966–972 23. Intille, S. and Bobick, A. (1999). A framework for recognizing multi-agent action from visual evidence. In AAAI-99, pp. 518–525. 24. Zweig, G. and Russell, S. J. (1998). Speech recognition with dynamic Bayesian networks. In AAAI-98, pp. 173–180. 25. Richardson, M., Bilmes, J., and Diorio, C. (2000). Hidden-articulator Markov models: Performance improvements and robustness to noise. In ICASSP-00. 26. Stephenson, T., Bourlard, H., Bengio, S., and Morris, A. (2000). Automatic speech recognition using dynamic bayesian networks with both acoustic and articulatory features. In ICSLP-00, pp. 951-954. 27. Nefian, A., Liang, L., Pi, X., Liu, X., and Murphy, K. (2002). Dynamic bayesian networks for audiovisual speech recognition. EURASIP, Journal of Applied Signal Processing, 11, 1–15. 28. Livescu, K., Glass, J., and Bilmes, J. (2003). Hidden feature modeling for speech recognition using dynamic Bayesian networks. In EUROSPEECH-2003, pp. 2529–2532 29. Murphy, K. and Mian, I. S. (1999). Modelling gene expression data using Bayesian networks. people.cs.ubc.ca/˜murphyk/Papers/ismb99.pdf. 30. Perrin, B. E., Ralaivola, L., and Mazurie, A. (2003). Gene networks inference using dynamic Bayesian networks. Bioinformatics, 19, II 138-II 148. 31. Husmeier, D. (2003). Sensitivity and specificity of inferring genetic regulatory interactions from microarray experiments with dynamic bayesian networks. Bioinformatics, 19(17), 2271-2282. 32. Theocharous, G., Murphy, K., and Kaelbling, L. P. (2004). Representing hierarchical POMDPs as DBNs for multi-scale robot localization. In ICRA-04. 33. Smyth, P., Heckerman, D., and Jordan, M. I. (1997). Probabilistic independence networks for hidden Markov probability models. Neural Computation, 9(2), 227–269. 34. Roweis, S. T. and Ghahramani, Z. (1999). A unifying review of Linear GaussianModels. Neural Computation, 11(2), 305–345. 35. Binder, J., Koller, D., Russell, S. J., and Kanazawa, K. (1997a). Adaptive probabilistic networks with hidden variables. Machine Learning, 29, 213–244. 36. Ghahramani, Z. (1998). Learning dynamic bayesian networks. In Adaptive Processing of Sequences and Data Structures, pp. 168–197. 37. Friedman, N., Murphy, K., and Russell, S. J. (1998). Learning the structure of dynamic probabilistic networks. In UAI-98.	Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010
Bayesian Networks	Russell	Norvig I 510 Bayesian Networks/belief networks/probabilistic networks/knowledge map/AI research/Norvig/Russell: Bayesian networks can represent essentially any full joint probability distribution and in many cases can do so very concisely. Norvig I 511 A Bayesian network is a directed graph in which each node is annotated with quantitative probability information. The full specification is as follows: 1. Each node corresponds to a random variable, which may be discrete or continuous. 2. A set of directed links or arrows connects pairs of nodes. If there is an arrow from node X to node Y,X is said to be a parent of Y. The graph has no directed cycles (and hence is a directed acyclic graph, or DAG. 3. Each node Xi has a conditional probability distribution P(Xi \|Parents(Xi)) that quantifies the effect of the parents on the node. The topology of the network - the set of nodes and links - specifies the conditional independence relationships that hold in the domain (…). >Probability theory/Norvig, >Uncertainty/AI research. The intuitive meaning of an arrow is typically that X has a direct influence on Y, which suggests that causes should be parents of effects. Once the topology of the Bayesian network is laid out, we need only specify a conditional probability distribution for each variable, given its parents. Norvig I 512 Circumstances: The probabilities actually summarize a potentially Norvig I 513 Infinite set of circumstances. Norvig I 515 Inconsistency: If there is no redundancy, then there is no chance for inconsistency: it is impossible for the knowledge engineer or domain expert to create a Bayesian network that violates the axioms of probability. Norvig I 517 Diagnostic models: If we try to build a diagnostic model with links from symptoms to causes (…) we end up having to specify additional dependencies between otherwise independent causes (and often between separately occurring symptoms as well). Causal models: If we stick to a causal model, we end up having to specify fewer numbers, and the numbers will often be easier to come up with. In the domain of medicine, for example, it has been shown by Tversky and Kahneman (1982)⁽¹⁾ that expert physicians prefer to give probability judgments for causal rules rather than for diagnostic ones. Norvig I 529 Inference: because it includes inference in propositional logic as a special case, inference in Bayesian networks is NP-hard. >NP-Problems/Norvig. There is a close connection between the complexity of Bayesian network inference and the complexity of constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs). >Constraint satisfaction problems/Norvig. Clustering algirithms: Using clustering algorithms (also known as join tree algorithms), the time can be reduced to O(n). For this reason, these algorithms are widely used in commercial Bayesian network tools. The basic idea of clustering is to join individual nodes of the network to form cluster nodes in such a way that the resulting network is a polytree. Norvig I 539 (…) Bayesian networks are essentially propositional: the set of random variables is fixed and finite, and each has a fixed domain of possible values. This fact limits the applicability of Bayesian networks. If we can find a way to combine probability theory with the expressive power of first-order representations, we expect to be able to increase dramatically the range of problems that can be handled. Norvig I 540 Possible worlds/probabilities: for Bayesian networks, the possible worlds are assignments of values to variables; for the Boolean case in particular, the possible worlds are identical to those of propositional logic. For a first-order probability model, then, it seems we need the possible worlds to be those of first-order logic—that is, a set of objects with relations among them and an interpretation that maps constant symbols to objects, predicate symbols to relations, and function symbols to functions on those objects. Problem: the set of first-order models is infinite. Solution: The database semantics makes the unique names assumption—here, we adopt it for the constant symbols. It also assumes domain closure - there are no more objects than those that are named. We can then guarantee a finite set of possible worlds by making the set of objects in each world be exactly the set of constant Norvig I 541 Symbols that are used. There is no uncertainty about the mapping from symbols to objects or about the objects that exist. Relational probability models: We will call models defined in this way relational probability models, or RPMs. The name relational probability model was given by Pfeffer (2000)⁽²⁾ to a slightly different representation, but the underlying ideas are the same. >Uncertainty/AI research. Norvig I 552 Judea Pearl developed the message-passing method for carrying out inference in tree networks (Pearl, 1982a)⁽³⁾ and polytree networks (Kim and Pearl, 1983)⁽⁴⁾ and explained the importance of causal rather than diagnostic probability models, in contrast to the certainty-factor systems then in vogue. The first expert system using Bayesian networks was CONVINCE (Kim, 1983)⁽⁵⁾. Early applications in medicine included the MUNIN system for diagnosing neuromuscular disorders (Andersen et al., 1989)⁽⁶⁾ and the PATHFINDER system for pathology (Heckerman, 1991)⁽⁷⁾. Norvig I 553 Perhaps the most widely used Bayesian network systems have been the diagnosis and- repair modules (e.g., the PrinterWizard) in Microsoft Windows (Breese and Heckerman, 1996)⁽⁸⁾ and the Office Assistant in Microsoft Office (Horvitz et al., 1998)⁽⁹⁾. Another important application area is biology: Bayesian networks have been used for identifying human genes by reference to mouse genes (Zhang et al., 2003)⁽¹⁰⁾, inferring cellular networks Friedman (2004)⁽¹¹⁾, and many other tasks in bioinformatics. We could go on, but instead we’ll refer you to Pourret et al. (2008)⁽¹²⁾, a 400-page guide to applications of Bayesian networks. Ross Shachter (1986)⁽¹³⁾, working in the influence diagram community, developed the first complete algorithm for general Bayesian networks. His method was based on goal-directed reduction of the network using posterior-preserving transformations. Pearl (1986)⁽¹⁴⁾ developed a clustering algorithm for exact inference in general Bayesian networks, utilizing a conversion to a directed polytree of clusters in which message passing was used to achieve consistency over variables shared between clusters. A similar approach, developed by the statisticians David Spiegelhalter and Steffen Lauritzen (Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 1988)⁽¹⁵⁾, is based on conversion to an undirected form of graphical model called a Markov network. This approach is implemented in the HUGIN system, an efficient and widely used tool for uncertain reasoning (Andersen et al., 1989)⁽⁶⁾. Boutilier et al. (1996)⁽¹⁶⁾ show how to exploit context-specific independence in clustering algorithms. Norvig I 604 Dynamic Bayesian networks (DBNs): can be viewed as a sparse encoding of a Markov process and were first used in AI by Dean and Kanazawa (1989b)⁽¹⁷⁾, Nicholson and Brady (1992)⁽¹⁸⁾, and Kjaerulff (1992)⁽¹⁹⁾. The last work extends the HUGIN Bayes net system to accommodate dynamic Bayesian networks. The book by Dean and Wellman (1991)⁽²⁰⁾ helped popularize DBNs and the probabilistic approach to planning and control within AI. Murphy (2002)⁽²¹⁾ provides a thorough analysis of DBNs. Dynamic Bayesian networks have become popular for modeling a variety of complex motion processes in computer vision (Huang et al., 1994⁽²²⁾; Intille and Bobick, 1999)⁽²³⁾. Like HMMs, they have found applications in speech recognition (Zweig and Russell, 1998⁽²⁴⁾; Richardson et al., 2000⁽²⁵⁾; Stephenson et al., 2000⁽²⁶⁾; Nefian et al., 2002⁽²⁷⁾; Livescu et al., 2003⁽²⁸⁾), Norvig I 605 genomics (Murphy and Mian, 1999⁽²⁹⁾; Perrin et al., 2003⁽³⁰⁾; Husmeier, 2003⁽³¹⁾) and robot localization (Theocharous et al., 2004)⁽³²⁾. The link between HMMs and DBNs, and between the forward–backward algorithm and Bayesian network propagation, was made explicitly by Smyth et al. (1997)⁽³³⁾. A further unification with Kalman filters (and other statistical models) appears in Roweis and Ghahramani (1999)⁽³⁴⁾. Procedures exist for learning the parameters (Binder et al., 1997a⁽³⁵⁾; Ghahramani, 1998⁽³⁶⁾) and structures (Friedman et al., 1998)⁽³⁷⁾ of DBNs. 1. Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1982). Causal schemata in judgements under uncertainty. In Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., and Tversky, A. (Eds.), Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press. 2. Pfeffer, A. (2000). Probabilistic Reasoning for Complex Systems. Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University 3. Pearl, J. (1982a). Reverend Bayes on inference engines: A distributed hierarchical approach. In AAAI- 82, pp. 133–136 4. Kim, J. H. and Pearl, J. (1983). A computational model for combined causal and diagnostic reasoning in inference systems. In IJCAI-83, pp. 190–193. 5. Kim, J. H. (1983). CONVINCE: A Conversational Inference Consolidation Engine. Ph.D. thesis, Department of Computer Science, University of California at Los Angeles. 6. Andersen, S. K., Olesen, K. G., Jensen, F. V., and Jensen, F. (1989). HUGIN—A shell for building Bayesian belief universes for expert systems. In IJCAI-89, Vol. 2, pp. 1080–1085. 7. Heckerman, D. (1991). Probabilistic Similarity Networks. MIT Press. 8. Breese, J. S. and Heckerman, D. (1996). Decisiontheoretic troubleshooting: A framework for repair and experiment. In UAI-96, pp. 124–132. 9. Horvitz, E. J., Breese, J. S., Heckerman, D., and Hovel, D. (1998). The Lumiere project: Bayesian user modeling for inferring the goals and needs of software users. In UAI-98, pp. 256–265. 10. Zhang, L., Pavlovic, V., Cantor, C. R., and Kasif, S. (2003). Human-mouse gene identification by comparative evidence integration and evolutionary analysis. Genome Research, pp. 1–13. 11. Friedman, N. (2004). Inferring cellular networks using probabilistic graphical models. Science, 303(5659), 799–805. 12. Pourret, O., Naım, P., and Marcot, B. (2008). Bayesian Networks: A practical guide to applications. Wiley. 13. Shachter, R. D. (1986). Evaluating influence diagrams. Operations Research, 34, 871–882. 14. Pearl, J. (1986). Fusion, propagation, and structuring in belief networks. AIJ, 29, 241–288. 15. Lauritzen, S. and Spiegelhalter, D. J. (1988). Local computations with probabilities on graphical structures and their application to expert systems. J. Royal Statistical Society, B 50(2), 157–224. 16. Boutilier, C., Friedman, N., Goldszmidt, M., and Koller, D. (1996). Context-specific independence in Bayesian networks. In UAI-96, pp. 115–123. 17. Dean, T. and Kanazawa, K. (1989b). A model for reasoning about persistence and causation. Computational Intelligence, 5(3), 142–150. 18. Nicholson, A. and Brady, J. M. (1992). The data association problem when monitoring robot vehicles using dynamic belief networks. In ECAI-92, pp. 689–693. 19. Kjaerulff, U. (1992). A computational scheme for reasoning in dynamic probabilistic networks. In UAI-92, pp. 121–129. 20. Dean, T. and Wellman, M. P. (1991). Planning and Control. Morgan Kaufmann. 21. Murphy, K. (2002). Dynamic Bayesian Networks: Representation, Inference and Learning. Ph.D. thesis, UC Berkeley 22. Huang, T., Koller, D., Malik, J., Ogasawara, G., Rao, B., Russell, S. J., and Weber, J. (1994). Automatic symbolic traffic scene analysis using belief networks. In AAAI-94, pp. 966–972 23. Intille, S. and Bobick, A. (1999). A framework for recognizing multi-agent action from visual evidence. In AAAI-99, pp. 518–525. 24. Zweig, G. and Russell, S. J. (1998). Speech recognition with dynamic Bayesian networks. In AAAI-98, pp. 173–180. 25. Richardson, M., Bilmes, J., and Diorio, C. (2000). Hidden-articulator Markov models: Performance improvements and robustness to noise. In ICASSP-00. 26. Stephenson, T., Bourlard, H., Bengio, S., and Morris, A. (2000). Automatic speech recognition using dynamic bayesian networks with both acoustic and articulatory features. In ICSLP-00, pp. 951-954. 27. Nefian, A., Liang, L., Pi, X., Liu, X., and Murphy, K. (2002). Dynamic bayesian networks for audiovisual speech recognition. EURASIP, Journal of Applied Signal Processing, 11, 1–15. 28. Livescu, K., Glass, J., and Bilmes, J. (2003). Hidden feature modeling for speech recognition using dynamic Bayesian networks. In EUROSPEECH-2003, pp. 2529–2532 29. Murphy, K. and Mian, I. S. (1999). Modelling gene expression data using Bayesian networks. people.cs.ubc.ca/˜murphyk/Papers/ismb99.pdf. 30. Perrin, B. E., Ralaivola, L., and Mazurie, A. (2003). Gene networks inference using dynamic Bayesian networks. Bioinformatics, 19, II 138-II 148. 31. Husmeier, D. (2003). Sensitivity and specificity of inferring genetic regulatory interactions from microarray experiments with dynamic bayesian networks. Bioinformatics, 19(17), 2271-2282. 32. Theocharous, G., Murphy, K., and Kaelbling, L. P. (2004). Representing hierarchical POMDPs as DBNs for multi-scale robot localization. In ICRA-04. 33. Smyth, P., Heckerman, D., and Jordan, M. I. (1997). Probabilistic independence networks for hidden Markov probability models. Neural Computation, 9(2), 227–269. 34. Roweis, S. T. and Ghahramani, Z. (1999). A unifying review of Linear GaussianModels. Neural Computation, 11(2), 305–345. 35. Binder, J., Koller, D., Russell, S. J., and Kanazawa, K. (1997a). Adaptive probabilistic networks with hidden variables. Machine Learning, 29, 213–244. 36. Ghahramani, Z. (1998). Learning dynamic bayesian networks. In Adaptive Processing of Sequences and Data Structures, pp. 168–197. 37. Friedman, N., Murphy, K., and Russell, S. J. (1998). Learning the structure of dynamic probabilistic networks. In UAI-98.	Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010
Beauty	Kant	Gadamer I 50 Beauty/Kant/Gadamer: Kant's teaching of free and affectionate beauty⁽¹⁾ [is] strange and much disputed.Kant discusses here the difference between "pure" and "intellectual" taste judgement, which corresponds to the opposition of "free" and "attached" beauty (attached to a concept). Pure beauty of pure taste judgement/Kant: For example, the free beauty of nature and - in the field of art - ornament. "Attached" (conceptually defined) beauty/Kant: e.g. human, animal, building. Gadamer I 51 Gadamer: (...) this is an indirect description of what an "object under a certain concept" represents and therefore belongs to the conditional, unfree beauty: the whole realm of poetry, the fine arts and architecture, as well as all natural things that we do not look at for their beauty alone like the ornamental flower. >Art Beauty/Kant, >Natural Beauty/Hegel. Gadamer I 52 Conceptual beauty/Kant/Gadamer: (...) certainly there is no talk of beauty where a certain concept of understanding is schematically sensitized by the imagination, but only where the imagination is in free agreement with the understanding, i.e. where it can be productive. But this productive formation of the imagination is richest not where it is absolutely free, (...) but where it lives in a latitude which the unifying striving of the intellect does not so much erect as a barrier to it as it does to stimulate its play. Ideal of Beauty/Kant: An ideal of beauty exists (...) only of the human form: in the 'expression of morality' "without which the object would not generally be pleasing". Judgement according to an ideal of beauty is then, as Kant says, of course not merely a judgement of taste. Gadamer I 53 Only of the human form, precisely because it alone is capable of a beauty fixed by a concept of purpose, is there an ideal of beauty! This doctrine, established by Winckelmann and Lessing⁽²⁾, gains a kind of key position in Kant's foundation of aesthetics. For it is precisely this thesis that shows how little a formal aesthetic of taste (arabesque aesthetics) corresponds to Kant's thought. Normal idea/ Kant: The doctrine of the ideal of beauty is based on the distinction between the normal idea and the idea of reason or ideal of beauty. The aesthetic normal idea can be found in all genres of nature. How a beautiful animal (...) has to look (...), that is a guideline for judging the individual specimen. This normal idea is thus a single view of the imagination as the "image of the genus floating between all individuals". But the representation of such a normal idea does not please by beauty, but only because "it does not contradict any condition under which alone a thing of this genre can be beautiful". It is not the archetype of beauty, but merely of correctness. Human Gestalt: This also applies to the normal idea of the human figure. But in the human form, there is a real ideal of beauty in the "expression of the moral". (...) take this, together with the later teaching of aesthetic ideas and beauty, as a symbol of morality. Then one realizes that with the teaching of the ideal of beauty, the place is also prepared for the essence of art. Gadamer I 54 Gadamer: What Kant obviously wants to say is this: in the depiction of the human Gestalt, the depicted object and that which speaks to us as artistic content in this depiction are one. There can be no other content of this representation than that which is already expressed in the form and appearance of the portrayed person. Gadamer I 55 Ideals/Kant/Gadamer: It is precisely with this classicist distinction between the normal idea and the ideal of beauty that Kant destroys the basis from which the aesthetic of perfection finds its incomparably unique beauty in the perfect meaningfulness of all being. Only now is "art" able to become an autonomous phenomenon. >Art/Kant, >Art/Hegel. Gadamer I 492 Beauty/Kant/Gadamer: Kant's fundamental definition of aesthetic pleasure as an uninterested pleasure does not only mean the negative, that the object of taste is neither used as useful nor desired as good, but it means positively that "existence" cannot add anything to the aesthetic content of pleasure, to the "pure sight", because it is precisely the aesthetic being that is representing itself. Morality: Only from the moral point of view there is an interest in the existence of the beautiful, e.g. in the song of the nightingale, whose deceptive imitation is something morally offensive according to Kant. Truth/GadamerVsKant: Whether it really follows from this constitution of aesthetic being that truth must not be sought here because nothing is recognized here, is of course the question. In our aesthetic analyses, we have described the narrowness of the concept of knowledge that causes Kant's question here, and from the question of the truth of art we had found our way into hermeneutics, in which art and history merged for us. >Hermeneutics/Gadamer. 1. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, § 16ff. 2. Lessing, Entwürfe zum Laokoon Nr. 20 b; in Lessings Sämtl. Schriften ed. Lachmann, 1886ff., vol. 14, p. 415.	I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Behavior	Benkler	Benkler I 386 Behavior/Institutional Ecology/Law/Society/Equilibrium/Path Dependence/Benkler: First, law affects human behavior on a micro-motivational level and on a macro-social organizational level. This is in contradistinction to, on the one hand, the classical Marxist claim that law is epiphenomenal, and, on the other hand, the increasingly rare simple economic models that ignore transaction costs and institutional barriers and simply assume that people will act in order to maximize their welfare, irrespective of institutional arrangements. >Epiphenomenalism. Second, the causal relationship between law and human behavior is complex. Simple deterministic models of the form “if law X, then behavior Y” have been used as assumptions, but these are widely understood as, and criticized for being, oversimplifications for methodological purposes. However, they also shape social norms with regard to behaviors, psychological attitudes toward various behaviors, the cultural understanding of actions, and the politics of claims about behaviors and practices. Some push back and nullify the law, some amplify its I 387 effects; it is not always predictable which of these any legal change will be. Third, and as part of the complexity of the causal relation, the effects of law differ in different material, social, and cultural contexts. The same law introduced in different societies or at different times will have different effects. It may enable and disable a different set of practices, and trigger a different cascade of feedback and counter-effects. Fourth, the process of lawmaking is not exogenous to the effects of law on social relations and human behavior. One can look at positive political theory or at the history of social movements to see that the shape of law itself is contested in society because it makes (through its complex causal mechanisms) some behaviors less attractive, valuable, or permissible and others more so. Different societies will differ in initial conditions and their historically contingent first moves in response to similar perturbations, and variances will emerge in their actual practices (…). The term “institutional ecology” refers to this context-dependent, causally complex, feedback-ridden, path-dependent process. I 388 The possibility of multiple stable equilibria alongside each other evoked by the stories of radio and print media is a common characteristic to both ecological models and analytically tractable models of path dependency. Both methodological approaches depend on feedback effects and therefore suggest that for any given path divergence, there is a point in time where early actions that trigger feedbacks can cause large and sustained differences over time. >Path dependence.	Benkler I Yochai Benkler The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom New Haven 2007
Behavior	Mayr	I 319 Behavior/Genes/Mayr: genes also contribute to the behavior and personality of man. E.g. mathematical gifts, craftsmanship, musicality, clumsiness. >Genes, >Personality, >Personality traits. I 323 Natural selection: if it only rewards self-interest, how could ethics and, for example, altruism develop? >Selection. Huxley was right with his presumption that the self-interest of the individual somehow contradicted the benefit of society. Cf. >Altruism. I 324 Def altruism: (Trivers, 1985)⁽¹⁾: action that benefits another organism at the expense of the actor, with the costs and benefits being defined as reproductive success. Altruism/Comte: Care for the welfare of others. >A. Comte. Altruism/Mayr: is not limited to cases of danger or harm to the altruist. Three things need to be distinguished (already Darwin): Selection/Individual: An individual is the object of selection in three respects: as an individual, as a family member (reproducer), and as member of a social group. The human dilemmas are only to be understood with regard to this triad. I 325 Altruism/Overall Suitability: is found in many animals, especially with parental care and large families. Defense of the offspring by the mother. This behavior is favored by natural selection, since it improves the fitness of the common genotype of the altruist and its beneficiaries. Selection of relatives. Indirectly rather self-serving. Seemingly altruistic. >Altruism. Some authors believe that human ethics replaced altruism directed towards overall suitability. Mayr: I recognize many actions directed toward overall suitability in the behavior of humans: for example mother's love, moral attitude towards strangers. However, only a small part of today's ethics systems. Social animals: possess a remarkable ability to recognize their relatives. I 327 Reciprocal altruism: in solitary animals. Synergy of two non-related animals for mutual benefit. E.g. cleaner wrasse, alliance of two individuals fighting a third. For primates: a kind of consideration: if I help this individual, it will help me. Perhaps a root of human morality. Human/Mayr: all the great achievements of mankind were accomplished by less than one per cent of the total population. Without reward and recognition our society would soon break apart. I 328 Human: The entire history of the hominids is characterized by strong group-selection (already Darwin). I 329 Altruism/Behavior/Mayr: In contrast to individual selection, group selection can reward genuine altruism and other virtues. Ethical behavior is adaptive in humans. >Adaption. Sociality: not all collections of animals are social. E.g. schools of young fish and the huge herds of African ungulates are not. Real altruism: can be extended to non-relatives. For example, baboons. Some hominids must have discovered that larger groups have more chances. I 330 Norms: To be able to apply group norms, the brain had to develop the ability to think. >Norms, >Thinking. Ethics: two conditions for ethical behavior (Simpson, 1969)⁽²⁾: 1) There are alternatives 2) The alternatives can be assessed 3) The person can decide freely This means that consequences are anticipated and responsibility is assumed. >Responsibility, >Prediction. Ethics/Cause: it is not possible to determine the cause and effect of ethics. >Ethics, >Morals. 1. R. L. Trivers (1985). Social evolution. Menlo Park: Benjamin/Cummings. 2. G. G. Simpson (1969). On the Uniqueness of Man: Biology and Man. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World.	Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998
Behavior	Sterelny	I 371 Behavior/prediction/control/mind/representation: a) simple case: the attribution and prediction of the behavior of other animals is initially more efficient if instead of an explicit representation only a "hidden variable" is assumed. b) complex case: if the behavior becomes more complex however, the representation of foreign mental states is more efficient! >Theory of mind, >Explanation. If one can trace the inner state, one no longer needs to trace every single connection between stimulus and behavior. I 372 Attention/Animal/Sterelny: it seems that the representation of attention is not very demanding. However, it turns out that chimpanzees in the experiment do not differ significantly between attentive and inattentive coaches. E.g. coach with bucket over his head, or constantly turned away, etc. The chimpanzees solved all the tasks by chance. I 374 Sterelny: you should not just explain this with input/output behavior, you have to ask whether sounds or gestures were involved. I 375 Overall, the whole problem will be a knowledge rather than a knowledge of acting. Attention happens on many channels. >Experiments, >Method. Reaction range/Behavior/Sterelny: I doubt that any behavior is absolutely necessary, because the motivational state of a mind reader also plays a role. The reaction range depends on: 1. Spectrum of the other characteristics of the actor which are pursued by the mind reader. 2. The extent to which the reaction is also dependent on the other environment. 3. Under certain circumstances, the ability to imitate. >Reaction range. Environment/Animal/Sterelny: how does an animal categorize its environment? Are the categories concrete, sensuous or functional? >Environment/Psychology.	Sterelny I Kim Sterelny "Primate Worlds", in: The Evolution of Cognition, C. Heyes/L. Huber (Eds.) Cambridge/MA 2000 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Sterelny II Kim Sterelny Dawkins vs. Gould: Survival of the Fittest Cambridge/UK 2007
Behavioral System	Ainsworth	Slater I 15 Behavioral System/Ainsworth: Control systems theory in turn guided systematic observations of human infants in the village and home environment (Ainsworth, 1967)⁽¹⁾. It also led to the development of a laboratory paradigm that tested infants’ abilities to use their caregiver as a source of safety and base for exploration (Ainsworth, Blehar, Wall, & Waters, 1978)⁽²⁾. The development of Ainsworth’s Strange Situation paradigm (>Situation/Ainsworth) – in which infants’ responses to separation from, and subsequent reunion with, their mother, and their reactions to an unfamiliar woman were recorded – in turn became a paradigm for assessing individual differences in the security of infants’ relationships with their primary caregiver. >Control processes, >Strange situation, >Stages of development. 1. Ainsworth, M. S. (1967). Infancy in Uganda. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2. Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E., & Wall, S. (1978). Patterns of attachment: A psychological study of the strange situation. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Roger Kobak, “Attachment and Early Social deprivation. Revisiting Harlow’s Monkey Studies”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Behavioral System	Bowlby	Corr I 232 Behavioral System/attachment theory/Bowlby/Shaver/Mikulincer: According to Bowlby (1973)⁽¹⁾, the ability of a behavioural system to achieve its set-goal depends on a person’s transactions with the external world. Although behavioural systems are innate intrapsychic mechanisms, which presumably operate mainly at a subcortical level and in an automatic, reflexive manner, they are manifested in actual behaviour, guide people’s transactions with the social world, and can be affected or shaped by others’ responses. >Social relationships, >Social behaviour, >Socialization, >Relationships. Over time, social encounters mould the parameters of a person’s behavioural systems in ways that produce fairly stable individual differences in strategies and behaviours; that is, a person’s neural and behavioural capacities become ‘programmed’ to fit with major close relationship partners, or attachment figures. Representation/Bowlby: Bowlby (1973)⁽¹⁾ assumed that the residues of such social encounters are stored as mental representations of person-environment transactions, which he called working models of self and other, and that these representations shape the functioning of a person’s behavioural system and the way he or she behaves in particular social situations. >Representation, >Situations. 1. Bowlby, J. 1973. Attachment and loss, vol. II, Separation: anxiety and anger. New York: Basic Books Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press Slater I 15 Behavioral System/Bowlby: Bowlby (1969⁽¹⁾) formalized Harlow’s work into a theory of control systems that were activated and terminated by environmental conditions. Bowlby’s theory emphasized contextual factors that both activated and terminated behavioral systems. In infancy, he viewed the attachment, fear, and exploratory systems as each having set goals that needed to be maintained based on ongoing monitoring of and feedback from the environment. Control systems theory in turn guided systematic observations of human infants in the village and home environment (Ainsworth, 1967⁾⁽²⁾. It also led to the development of a laboratory paradigm that tested infants’ abilities to use their caregiver as a source of safety and base for exploration (Ainsworth, Blehar, Wall, & Waters, 1978)⁽³⁾. The development of Ainsworth’s Strange Situation paradigm (>Situation/Ainsworth) – in which infants’ responses to separation from, and subsequent reunion with, their mother, and their reactions to an unfamiliar woman were recorded – in turn became a paradigm for assessing individual differences in the security of infants’ relationships with their primary caregiver. Cf. >Control processes. 1. Bowlby, J. (1969). Attachment and loss: Vol. 1. Attachment. New York, NY: Basic Books. 2. Ainsworth, M. S. (1967). Infancy in Uganda. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 3. Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E., & Wall, S. (1978). Patterns of attachment: A psychological study of the strange situation. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Roger Kobak, “Attachment and Early Social deprivation. Revisiting Harlow’s Monkey Studies”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Beliefs	Boer	I 20 Believe/Boer: (instead of mental reference): here it is not so clear whether this is an existence-independent relation, solely because of the fact that we have the being/existening-distinction. Thought content: Problem: we still do not know what thought contents are. Platonism/N.B.: If we assume that ideas can be equated with propositions, states, or properties, and that they would be accepted as platonic in existence, without having to participate in the world, we would not have to assume the believe relation as existence-independent. But we need a proper theory of the nature of belief contents and attitude relations to them. --- I 21 Mental reference/concept dependency/Boer: is it also dependent on the concept? Concept dependency/logical form/Boer: according to (D5): it would be sufficient that mental reference (thinking about) implies that for a representation z, an intrinsic property of z and a behavior-determining relation Q: A) x has Q to z B) z contains something that expresses or maps y for x C) whether x has the relation Q to a representation of y depends on whether the representation has one or more of a range of intrinsic features. But this presupposes believe as a concept-dependent relation. Belief/question: whether believe is a relation mediated by representations. So B) z has a fulfillment condition defined by y and C) as above. Believe/Representation/Boer: to clarify whether believe is a representation-mediated relation, we need a theory of propositional attitudes.	Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986
Bible Criticism	Spinoza	Gadamer I 184 Bible Criticism/Bible/Hermeneutics/Spinoza/Gadamer: The actual problem of understanding obviously breaks open when the question of reflection arises in the effort to understand the content: How does he come to his opinion? For it is clear that such a question poses a strangeness of quite different species and ultimately means a renunciation of common meaning. >Understanding, >Sense, >Hermeneutics. Spinoza's Bible criticism is a good example of this (and at the same time one of the earliest documents). In Chapter 7 of the "Tractatus theologico-politicus"⁽¹⁾, Spinoza develops his method of interpreting Sacred Scripture on the basis of the interpretation of nature. From the historical data one must infer the meaning (mens) of the authors - to the extent that in these books things are told (history of miracles as well as revelations) that cannot be deduced from the principles known to natural reason. Even in these things, which are in themselves incomprehensible (imperceptibiles), everything that matters can be understood, notwithstanding the fact that the Scripture unquestionably has a moral sense as a whole, if we only recognize the spirit of the author "historically", that is to say, by overcoming our prejudices, we can think of no other things than those that the author could have in mind. Gadamer I 185 Euclid would not be interpreted by anyone as to mean that the life, studies and customs (vita, studium et mores) of the author were to be taken into account, and this also applied to the spirit of the Bible in moral matters (circa documenta moralia). Just because there are incomprehensible things (res imperceptibiles) in the narratives of the Bible, their understanding is dependent on the fact that we determine the understanding of the author's meaning from the whole of his writing (ut mentem auctoris percipiamus). And there it indeed does not matter whether what is meant corresponds to our insight, for we only want to recognize the meaning of the sentences (the sensus orationum), but not their truth (veritas). This requires the elimination of all bias, even the bias caused by our reason (all the more so, of course, by our prejudices).(§ 17). Gadamer I 185 Gadamer: The "naturalness" of the understanding of the Bible is thus based on the fact that the insightful (German: "Einsichtige") can be seen and the undiscerning (German: "Uneinsichtige") becomes "historically" understandable. >Bible. 1. Spinoza: Theologisch-politische Abhandlung. Berlin 1870 Höffe I 238 Bible Criticism/Spinoza/Höffe: Spinoza is also an “enlightener” regarding the critical analysis of the Holy Scriptures. Historical-critical biblical scholarship was already well advanced at that time, so that Spinoza's method, compared with Calvin's, for example, is not new. What is new, perhaps even revolutionarily new, is the political mandate given to the hermeneutics of the Bible: It must submit to the political goal of peace, which in turn must be philosophised in the service of freedom. To this end, Spinoza undermines the authority of the learned theologians and declares every person free to interpret Sacred Scripture for himself - provided the person fulfils a political condition: that his interpretation strengthens obedience to (secular) law. For otherwise neither insurrections nor civil wars can be cut short. VsRevelation: To the extent that Spinoza engages with the content of the Holy Scriptures, it takes away the rank of a timeless revelation from their basic idea. Rather, the scripture consists primarily of pictorial speeches that are directed at the imagination and the capacity of the contemporaries of the time. Insofar as the texts are merely pictorial speeches, a further-reaching hermeneutics, a second-level exegesis, seeks out their hidden subtext, the rational core. According to Spinoza, it is moral and only moral: the commandments of Scripture are meant to guide to righteousness, namely to justice and charity. Religion/Spinoza: Here, religion appears as a means of moral cultivation of people, which results in a perfecting tolerance: Whoever, like Spinoza, commits religion to the moral cultivation of man can remain faithful to his or her own religion and denomination, while at the same time recognizing those of others, for their differences have become irrelevant.	Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016
Bioethics	Ecological Theories	Norgaard I 344 Bioethics/Rights-Based Ethics:/Ecological Theories: (…) Vanderheiden (2006: 343)⁽¹⁾ notes that ‘neither spatial nor temporal distance between agents and their victims can excuse acts of intentional or predictable harm.’ A related interpretation is provided by Caney (2008: 538)⁽²⁾, who argues that climate stabilization is necessary to secure and defend at least three kinds of fundamental human rights. In particular, Caney argues that climate change: 1. Violates people's right to subsistence by imposing risks of ‘widespread malnutrition’ that are well documented by the scientific literature. 2. Threatens people's capacity to ‘attain a decent standard of living’ (emphasis added), a point that resonates with the economic arguments advanced by Weitzman (2009)⁽³⁾. 3. Poses unacceptable risks to human health due to a range of mechanisms that include heat stress and the increased incidence of tropical diseases. >Environmental ethics, >Ethics. 1. Vanderheiden, S. 2006. Conservation, foresight, and the future generations problem. Inquiry 49: 337–52. 2. Caney, S. 2008. Human rights, climate change, and discounting. Environmental Politics 17: 536–55. 3. Weitzman, M. L. 2009. On modeling and interpreting the economics of catastrophic climate change. Review of Economics and Statistics 91: 1–19. Howarth, Richard: “Intergenerational Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.	Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011
Body	Butler	Brocker I 745 Body/Gender/Butler: Butler has worked out the concept of the performativity of gender. Therefore, she questions those theories that locate both subversion and "sex" in the body. In these theories the body is simultaneously given as biological and shaped by education. ButlerVs: this repeats the contradiction to read "gender" as a powerful social identity category of bodies. Butler: Question: can bodies and discursive actions also be used in acts of subversion of their arrangement?⁽¹⁾ >Gender/Butler. 1. Judith Butler, Gender Trouble. Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, New York/London 1999 (zuerst 1990); Dt. Judith Butler, Das Unbehagen der Geschlechter, Frankfurt/M. 1991, chap 3. Christine Hauskeller, “Judith Butler, Das Unbehagen der Geschlechter“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Brain	Gershenfeld	Brockman I 166 Brain/computers/Gershenfeld: (…) both brains and computer chips are hard to understand by watching their inner workings; they’re easily interpreted only by observing their external interfaces. We come to trust (or not) brains and computer chips alike based on experience that tests them rather than on explanations for how they work. >Review, >Verification, >Function, >Functional explanation. Brockman I 167 What’s interesting about amino acids is that they’re not interesting. They have attributes that are typical but not unusual, such as attracting or repelling water. But just twenty types of them are enough to make you. In the same way, twenty or so types of digital-material part types - conducting, insulating, rigid, flexible, magnetic, etc. - are enough to assemble the range of functions that go into making modern technologies like robots and computers. >Life, >Computers, >Robots, >Technology, >Computer model, >Computation. Gershenfeld, Neil „Scaling”, in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press.	Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019
Bricolage	Lévi-Strauss	I 29 Definition Bricolage/Lévi-Strauss: uses materials that are out of line with those used by the specialist. The peculiarity of mythical thinking now consists in expressing oneself with the help of means whose composition is strange and which, although they are comprehensive, remain limited. Nevertheless, it must make use of them, whatever the problem is, because it has nothing else at hand. It thus appears to be a kind of intellectual craft. >Structure/Lévi_Strauss, >System/Lévi-Strauss, >Order/Lévi-Strauss, >Classification/Lévi-Strauss. I 30 The rule of the game is to get along with what is at hand (for the craftsman) at all times, i. e. with a limited selection of tools and materials, which are also heterogeneous. The means of the craftsman are not determinable as in view of a project....; they can be determined only by their tool character..... Such elements are only half purposive. I 32 Order/Structure/Bricolage: every choice (of the craftsman) entails a complete reorganization of the structure. I 33 Knowledge: both the craftsman and the scientist are waiting for messages. For the craftsman, however, this has to be temporary in some way (like the rules for merchants, which allow to react to new situations). (See also Analogy/Lévi-Strauss).	LevSt I Claude Lévi-Strauss La pensée sauvage, Paris 1962 German Edition: Das Wilde Denken Frankfurt/M. 1973 LevSt II C. Levi-Strauss The Savage Mind (The Nature of Human Society Series) Chicago 1966
Bullionism	Rothbard	Rothbard II 160 Bullionism/central banks/inflation/gold standard/Rothbard: The political controversies (…) centred on explaining the price inflation and depreciation and on assessing the role of the Bank of England. The ‘bullionists’ pointed out that the cause of the price inflation, the rise in the price of bullion over par, and the depreciation of the pound was the fiat money expansion. They further maintained that the central Rothbard II 161 role in that inflation was played by the Bank of England, freed of its necessity to redeem in specie. >Central Banks, >Gold standard. VsBullionism: Their opponents, the ‘anti-bullionists’, tried absurdly to absolve the government and its privileged bank of all blame, and to attribute all unwelcome consequences to specific problems in the particular markets involved. Depreciation in foreign exchange was charged to the outflow of bullion caused by excessive imports or by British war expenditures abroad (presumably unrelated to the increased amount of paper pounds or to the lowered purchasing power of the pound). The rise in the price of bullion was supposedly caused by an increased ‘real’ demand for gold or silver (again unrelated to the depreciated paper pound). The increases in domestic prices received less attention from the two sides of the debate, but they were attributed by the anti-bullionists to wartime disruptions and shortages in supply. >Inflation. In short, the anti-bullionists reverted to mercantilist worry about ad hoc causes and the balance of trade on the market. The previous hard-won analysis of money and overall prices went by the board. >Money, >Monetarism, >Money supply, >Demand for money. Rothbard II 162 The price of food rose substantially in 1799, but it was easy for the anti-bullionists and other administration apologists to dismiss this rise in a flurry of pamphlets as the product of crop failure and wartime disruption in the import of grain. The first phase of the bullionist controversy (1800–4) started when one of the best of the bullionists [Walter Boyd (c.1754–1837) (…) one of the prominent sufferers from its allegedly tight money] published his remarkable pamphlet on the cause of the depreciation. Body/Rothbard: (…) Boyd put the blame for his failure not on his own reckless feeding at the public trough, but on the niggardly policies of the Bank of England. In November 1800, Boyd wrote A Letter to the Rt. Hon. William Pitt published in 1801, which won quick fame (…). With Boyd's Letter, the bullionist controversy was born, Boyd now denouncing the Bank of England not for overly tight credit but to the contrary for generating the inflation and monetary depreciation in the first place. >Money/Walter Boyd, >Money/Adam Smith. Rothbard II 176 Rothbard: (…) the correct analysis of complete bullionism (such as presented by Boyd and later by Lord King) stresses monetary factors leading to monetary equilibrium, while showing that real factors can only have temporary effects. The analysis of real factors is integrated with, and at all times subordinated to, the monetary factors, and short-run and long-run monetary processes are integrated as well. Henry Thornton: In Thornton's moderate anti-bullionist position (often miscalled 'moderate bullionist'), however, both real and monetary causal factors and processes are presented as separate and independent of each other, with real factors presented as empirically more important. Short-run factors are similarly stressed, to the neglect of long-run forces. >Time/Rothbard. Rothbard II 187 After 1804, the Bank of England dampened its expansionist policy for a few years, and inflation and depreciation abated as well. As a result, the bullionist controversy about England and Ireland died down. Phase 1 of the great bullionist controversy was over. There had appeared on the scene three schools of monetary thought and opinion: first, the anti-bullionist apologists of the British government and the Bank of England, whose views can scarcely be dignified by the name of 'theory' and who simply denied that monetary issue had any relation to the evils of inflation and depreciation. Ranged against them, were, second, the complete bullionists, headed by Lord King and by Walter Boyd, who trenchantly applied supply and demand for money analysis to the new conditions of irredeemable fiat money, and Who attacked the Bank of England's over-issue as the cause of the evils, with 'real' factors also playing a temporary and subordinate role. In the middle were, third, the moderates, consisting largely of Henry Thornton and Francis Horner, theoretical agnostics who claimed that either monetary or real factors might be responsible for any given inflation, and emphasized empirically and ad hoc which set of factors might be the culprits in any given situation. Starting as a moderate anti-bullionist, the empirical weight shifted quickly for Horner, at least, to enter the moderate bullionist camp by 1803. Before Phase 1 had ended, however, a fourth school of thought, and the third strand of bullionism, had emerged: mechanistic bullionism. The great error of mechanistic bullionism was not simply to neglect all real influences, and to insist that monetary factors and monetary factors alone determined price levels and exchange rates. If that had been the only flaw, the error would have been a relatively minor one. The main problem was thatthe mechanists were also moved to neglect all other causal factors than the money supply - many of them of great importance. In brief, they neglected the demand for money, in all its subtle variations, and such vital 'distribution' effects - even in the long run - as changes in relative assets and incomes and changes in relative prices. In sum, the mechanists claimed that, in the short run and in the long, the only causal factors on price and exchanges were changes in the quantity ofmoney. Hence their erroneous and distorted view that changes in price 'levels' are exactly quantitatively proportionate to changes in the quantity of money.	Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Bystander Effect	Psychological Theories	Haslam I 206 Bystander effect/Psychological theories: VsLatané, VsDarley: the apparently robust five-step model (see below) fails to provide researchers with any clues about how to increase the likelihood of bystander interventions in violent emergencies: Haslam I 205 (Latané and Darley, 1970⁽¹⁾): 1) Notice that something is happening. 2) Interpret the event as an emergency. 3) Take responsibility for providing help. 4) Decide how to act. 5) Provide help. Haslam I 206 Method/CherryVsLatané/CherryVsDarley: Frances Cherry (1995)⁽²⁾ offers a fascinating analysis of the way in which the Genovese murder ((s) >Helping behavior/Darley) was translated into experimental analogues. She points out that there were a number of important features of the attack, only some of which were identified as key events worthy of experimental analysis. Cherry suggests that this gendered aspect of the event and of the violence was almost invisible to researchers at the time.We are now very familiar with the concept of domestic violence – and with concerns about male violence towards women in both public and private spaces. However, in the early 1960s, these were social concerns that had yet to be identified. In the handful of studies that do examine the role of violence and/or gender (Borofsky et al., 1971⁽³⁾; Shotland and Straw, 1976⁽⁴⁾; and more recently Fischer et al., 2006⁽⁵⁾; Levine and Crowther, 2008)⁽⁶⁾, a far more nuanced story emerges. For example, bystanders are more likely to intervene if they think the perpetrator and victim are strangers rather than intimates (Shotland and Straw, 1976)⁽⁴⁾ or when they share group membership with the victim (Levine and Crowther, 2008)⁽⁶⁾. Haslam I 207 Levine: there are several possible narratives for the murder case, e. g. , one in which the colour of the victim and the murderers would have been mentioned or not mentioned. Accordingly, it may be the case that the limited utility of bystander research can be attributed to researcher’s failure to explore these alternative narratives. In the Genovese murder case (>Helping behavior/Darley) Rachel Manning and colleagues (2007)⁽⁷⁾ have revisited the evidence and found that there actually were much less than 38 witnesses (as reported by Latané and Darley). At the trial, only five witnesses were called and if these, only actually saw the victim and the murderer together. There is also no evidence that witnesses watched for half an hour in awe and fascination. Haslam I 209 Finally, there is evidence that, far from observing passively, bystanders made several attempts to intervene. ((s) Anyway the criticism was directed against the newspaper reporting, not against the researchers. Popular group psychology: Moreover, the development of thinking about bystander non-intervention added to this picture by seeming to indicate that the presence of others can also lead to behavioural ‚inhibition’. (…) groups could now be accused of producing the perfect storm of negative consequences – in simultaneously both unleashing anti-social behaviour and suppressing pro-social behaviour. Manning et al. (2007⁽⁷⁾ argue that this negative image of the group continues to populate the imaginations both of researchers and of students to the present day. >Bystander effect/Social identity theory. Haslam I 213 Levine: Latané and Darley’s bystander effect appears to be one of the most robust and reliable findings in social psychology. And yet for all its robustness, it has seemed to lack any practical utility – appearing simply to point to the inevitably negative impact that groups have on individual behaviour. Indeed, in line with this perspective, Zimbardo (2004)(8) could find no place for the bystander effect in his catalogue of positive contributions that psychology has made to improving social life. >B. Latané, >J.M. Darley. 1. Latané, B. and Darley, J.M. (1970) The Unresponsive Bystander: Why Doesn’t He Help? New York: Meredith Corporation. 2. Cherry, F. (1995) The ‘Stubborn Particulars’ of Social Psychology. London: Routledge. 3. Borofsky, G.L., Stollak, G.E. and Messe, L.A. (1971) ‘Sex differences in bystander reactions to physical assault’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 7: 313–18. 4. Shotland, R.L. and Straw, M.G. (1976) ‘Bystander response to an assault: When a man attacks a woman’, Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 101: 510-27. 5. Fischer, P., Greitemeyer, T., Pollozek, F. and Frey, D. (2006) ‘The unresponsive bystander: Are bystanders more responsive in dangerous emergencies?’, European Journal of Social Psychology, 36: 267–78. 6. Levine, M. and Crowther, S. (2008) ‘The responsive bystander: How social group membership and group size can encourage as well as inhibit bystander intervention’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95: 1429–39. 7. Manning, R., Levine, M. and Collins, A. (2007) ‘The Kitty Genovese murder and the social psychology of helping: The parable of the 38 witnesses’, American Psychologist, 62: 555–62. 8. Zimbardo, P.G. (2004) ‘Does psychology make a significant difference in our lives?’, American Psychologist, 59: 339–51. Mark Levine, „ Helping in Emergencies. Revisiting Latané and Darley’s bystander studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications	Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Capabilities	Sen	Brocker I 890 Skills/Sen: in order to revive a qualitatively oriented economic science, the distinction between "capabilities" and "functionings" must be introduced. Functions/Sen: The term 'functions' [...] reflects the various things a person likes to do or likes to be. The desirable functions may range from elementary conditions such as adequate nutrition or freedom from avoidable diseases to very complex activities or personal states such as being able to participate in community life and having self-respect. A person's 'chances of realization' refer to the possible connections of the functions he or she is able to perform. I 891 Def Realization Chances/Sen: (=abilities): are thus expressions of freedom: namely the [...] [essential] freedom to realize alternative combinations of functions (or, expressed less formally, the freedom to realize different lifestyles).⁽¹⁾ For Sen, the idea of "essential freedom" includes in particular the "procedural freedom" to define the concrete freedoms and opportunities that a community seeks to grant its members. (cf. ⁽²⁾) >Freedom/Sen. I 892 Sen: the political dispute over the respective situation-appropriate definition of basic economic needs must not be avoided, but should be sought, because it creates the epistemic and political conditions necessary for their realization.⁽³⁾ 1. Amartya Sen, Ökonomie für den Menschen. Wege zu Gerechtigkeit und Solidarität in der Marktwirtschaft, München 2000, p. 95 2. B. Giovanola »Personhood and Human Richness. Good and Well-Being in the Capability Approach and Beyond«, in: Review of Social Economy 63/2, 2005, 249-267. 3. Sen 2000, p. 182 Claus Dierksmeier, „Amartya Sen, Ökonomie für den Menschen (1999)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	EconSen I Amartya Sen Collective Choice and Social Welfare: Expanded Edition London 2017 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Capital	Austrian School	Harcourt I 149 Capital/reswitching/capitalreversing/Neoclassicals/Austrian School/Harcourt: Why did the original neoclassical parables omit the double-switching and capital-reversing possibilities and why, essentially, must they be supposed to occur in comparisons of technologies such as those actually used? Here the „parables“ again: Harcourt I 122 (1) an association between lower rates of profits and higher values of capital per man employed; (2) an association between lower rates of profits and higher capital-output ratios; (3) an association between lower rates of profits and (through investment in more 'mechanized' or 'round-about' methods of production) higher sustainable steady states of consumption per head (up to a maximum); (4) that, in competitive conditions, the distribution of income between profit-receivers and wage-earners can be explained by a knowledge of marginal products and factor supplies. Harcourt I 150 Capital/Austrian school: The basic Austrian concept of capital may be expressed by supposing,… Time:… first, that labour is applied uniformly through time to produce (say) a unit of output and, … Labour: …secondly, that the greater is the time taken for the final product to emerge, the smaller is the total amount of labour that is needed overall. This is the basis of the Austrian measure of 'capital' in terms of an average period of production. Rate of profit/wage rates: It follows that at very high rates of profits (and low real-wage rates), techniques which use more total labour but less time will be cheapest; while at low rates of profits, the more time-intensive methods of production will be the most profitable. With discreteness in technology, one technique may be the most profitable for a range of values of r; but once it disappears, it never reappears again. Harcourt I 151 Though we are only making comparisons of equilibrium positions, we nevertheless always start with a high rate of profits and move to situations with low ones and it is sometimes hard to remember that we are not being told about an actual process, for example, how an economy may move, through accumulation and deepening, from a high r, scarce capital position to a low r, abundant capital one - and what we may hope to achieve by this process. Reswitching/Harcourt: Now consider the case where we compare two methods, in neither of which is labour applied uniformly over time. Then it is clear that the ratio of the costs of the methods of producing a unit of net output at different values of r can fall below and rise above unity.* A. (…) method A - has a large input of labour at the beginning of its (two-period) gestation period, B. method B - has a larger gestation period (three periods) than A, a small input of labour at the start and a large one towards the end which is, however, less than the total input in A. The total input of labour in A is less than that in B. Then at very high values of r, interest on interest on interest on the cost of labour employed at the start of method B must exceed the wage and interest costs of method A, so that A is preferred to B. Capital cost: (If we ignore wage costs and talk instead in terms of real capital, we would say that the real capital cost of B is greater than that of A. Since both methods produce the same output, clearly A will be preferred.) Input/labour/time: At very low or zero values of r, A will also be preferred because it has the lower total input of labour (and time!). But there is an intermediate range of values of r where the investment of most of B's labour for a shorter period than A's at moderate rates of interest makes B's total cost less than A's. Hence B is preferred. The analogy between this result and the possibility of multiple rates of return to investment in present value calculations has been noticed by several writers, for example, Bruno, Burmeister and Sheshinski [1966](1), pp. 528 and 533. >Reswitching. * In Samuelson's example, w does not change as r does. Sraffa [1960], pp. 34-8, however, llustrates the same phenomena, though, admittedly, in a different context, in an example in which w does change (in a manner determined by its functional relationship with r) and the same result is obtained. 1. Bruno, M., Burmeister, E. and Sheshinski, E. [1966] 'Nature and Implications of the Reswitching of Techniques', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXX, pp. 526-53. Coyne I 15 Capital/Austrian School/Coyne/Boettke: Beginning with Carl Menger’s work in 1871, Austrian economists have emphasized the unique characteristics of capital, which refers to goods that are valued because of their contribution to producing subsequent consumer goods. In his Principles of Economics, Menger presented production as a sequential process that involved capital goods (what he called “goods of a higher order”), which are combined to produce final consumer goods (what he called “goods of the first order”). Coyne I 17 In fact, improvements in economic well-being require changes to the capital structure in response to changes in economic conditions, more accurate knowledge of those conditions, and improvements in technology and organizational forms. Cf. >Capital structure/Lachmann. The result is the need for ongoing capital substitution and re-grouping in the face of changing circumstances. The problem with traditional neoclassical methods of studying the capitalist production process lies in either treating capital as a homogeneous blob, or relying on a momentary snapshot of the capital structure at some period of time. In contrast to either the blob method or period analysis, Austrian economists emphasize that we need to focus on the process by which combinations of heterogeneous and specific capital are shuffled and reshuffled in the broader context of the capital structure. Capital stock: The concept of the capital structure stands in contrast to the idea of a "capital stock," which refers to an aggregate measure of all capital at a point in time. >Capital stock/Austrian School.	Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 Coyne I Christopher J. Coyne Peter J. Boettke The Essential Austrian Economics Vancouver 2020
Capital Reversing	Economic Theories	Harcourt I 124 Reswitching/reverse capital/Economic theories/Harcourt: The phenomena of double- (or re-) switching and capital-reversing were first noticed in the literature by Joan Robinson [1953-4⁽¹⁾,1956⁽²⁾], Champernowne [1953-4]⁽³⁾ and Sraffa [1960]⁽⁴⁾(whose book, it will be remembered, though published in 1960, had an enormously long gestation period dating back at least to the mid-1920s). >D. G. Champernowne, >Joan Robinson, >Piero Sraffa. Double-switching is associated essentially with the possibility that the same method of production may be the most profitable of a number of methods of production at more than one rate of profits (r) even though other methods are more profitable at rates in between. Capital-reversing is the value of capital moving in the same direction, when alternative rates of interest are considered, so that a technique with a lower degree of mechanization, as measured, for example, by its level of output per head and value of capital per head, is associated with a lower rate of profits. That is to say, it is the most profitable technique at this rate of profits and, in particular, is more profitable than a more mechanized technique (in the two senses above) which was either equi-profitable or more profitable than this one at higher rates of profits. (All these comparisons must be taken to occur in the neighbourhood of a switch point.) Joan Robinson [1956⁽²⁾], pp. 109- 10, called this a 'perverse' relationship, a curiosum, and acknowledged Ruth Cohen for pointing out the possibility to her, so that it has become known in the literature as the Ruth Cohen curiosum (RCC). Harcourt I 125 In the same passages she describes (but does not name) double-switching (which is not the same thing as capital-reversing) but the implications of the phenomena were neither realized nor spelt out: see Robinson [1970a]⁽⁵⁾, pp. 309-10. Both phenomena imply that the same physical capital goods may have more than one value, because a different real-wage rate and set of relative prices will be associated with each rate of profits and the capital goods associated with the method have to be valued at their appropriate set of prices. Double-switching and capital-reversing may occur in an industry (Sraffa's example in Sraffa [1960]⁽⁴⁾, chapter xn) and in an economy (the original cases discussed by Joan Robinson [1953-4⁽¹⁾, 1956⁽²⁾] and Champernowne [1953-4]⁽³⁾ in a context, one ought to add, that goes back at least to Wicksell and probably to Ricardo: see Sraffa [1960]⁽⁴⁾). Before entering the realm of controversy, it may clarify the subsequent arguments if we give now some very simple examples of the two phenomena. >Wicksell effects, >David Ricardo. (…) we show the w-r relationships of two techniques, one of which is a straight line (bb), the other, concave to the origin {ad). Technique b has a higher output per man than technique a, i.e. qb{= wbmax)>qa{ = wamax). It will be recalled that the value of kb is constant (the price Wicksell effect is neutral), no matter what are the values of r and w, and that ka is smaller, the smaller is the value of r (a negative price Wicksell effect). At a rate of profits greater than rba technique b is the more profitable; at rba the two are equi-profitable, while below rba (and above rab) technique a is the more profitable. In the lower half of the figure we plot in an unbroken line the values of capital per head (in terms of the consumption good) of the technique that would actually be in use at each value of r. Harcourt I 127 We repeat the analysis, this time measuring capital in terms of labour time per head, i.e. as real capital per head, kx. With our present assumptions, the value of kx of any given technique, no matter what is the shape of its w-r relationship, is smaller, the smaller is the value of r. Harcourt I 128 Reverse capital/double switching: When only two techniques are considered, and we are comparing stationary states, capital-reversing implies double-switching and vice versa. However, when more than two are considered, it is possible to have capital-reversing without double-switching, i.e. any one technique is the most profitable of all for a self-contained range of values of r and once it retires it never makes a comeback. Def Ruth Cohen curiosum: This refers to the possibility that as we change the interest rate producers switch the process of production from a to ft, but as we change it further in the same direction they return to a. Harcourt I 129 This would have the unfortunate consequence that we could no longer say that the lowering of the interest rate brings about a process of 'deepening' and each process is more capital-intensive than its predecessors. Harcourt I 130 This curiosum is also discussed by Piero Sraffa in chapter 12 of his book⁽⁴⁾. He shows that producers may shift from one activity to another as the interest rate changes but return to the first activity as it changes further in the same direction. The phenomenon may indeed be observed in the production of a single good. But (…) it is impossible with the whole basis of production. Levhari: We cannot switch from one matrix to another in response to a change in the interest rate and then return to the first matrix in response to further changes in the same direction. So even though we cannot order the activities according to 'degree of mechanization', we can do so with the matrices. (Levhari [1965]⁽⁶⁾, p. 99 HarcourtVsLevhari: That is to say, Levhari claimed to have shown that double-switching was impossible in an 'indecomposable' or 'irreducible' technology, 'a situation in which every single output requires, directly or indirectly as input for its production something .. . of every single other output'. (Levhari and Samuelson [1966]⁽⁷⁾, pp. 518-19.) This proposition was shown conclusively to be false (except under very special conditions) in a series of papers in the 1966, 1967 and 1968 issues of the Quarterly Journal of Economics by Pasinetti [1966a]⁽⁸⁾, Morishima [1966]⁽⁹⁾, Bruno, Burmeister and Sheshinski [1966]⁽¹⁰⁾, Garegnani [1966]⁽¹¹⁾, Samuelson [1966a]⁽¹²⁾, Robinson and Naqvi [1967]⁽¹³⁾, Bruno, Burmeister and Sheshinski [1968]⁽¹⁴⁾. >P.A. Samuelson. Harcourt I 131 Production: Suppose that there is more than one method available for producing directly or indirectly a commodity which will be in surplus and therefore part (or even the whole) of the net product of the year's production, after account has been taken of the amount of commodities used up as means of production in the production process. The forces of competition are assumed to ensure that the same rates of profits and wages will be paid in all industries. (Samuelson [1966a](12), p. 575, attributes this result to the workings of ruthless competition, allied with geometry.) Notice that this implies nothing about what determines their actual sizes or the distribution of income. Neoclassical theory: Then the neoclassical parables (>Neoclassicals/Samuelson) lead us to believe that as we arbitrarily consider lower rates of profits, methods associated with higher outputs per head become eligible, values of capital per head and per unit of output become greater and the distribution of income may be obtained by multiplying the quantities of factors by their respective marginal products which may be treated as if they were equal to the equilibrium real wage and rate of profits. Or, rather, the distribution of income, which, under very special circumstances, equals the simple Marshallian elasticity of the factor-price frontier envelope, may be treated as equivalent to that which would be obtained by this alternative procedure. >A. Marshall, >Factor price frontier, >Equilibrium/Neoclassical economics, >Neo-neoclassicals, >Reswitching/Samuelson, >Cambridge Capital Controversy, >Reswitching, >Capital reversing, >Neo-Keynesianism. 1. Robinson, Joan (1953-4). 'The Production Function and the Theory of Capital', Review of Economic Studies, xxi. 2. Robinson, Joan [1957] 'Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation - A Comment', Economic Record, xxxm, pp. 103-8. 3. Champernowne, D. G. [1953-4] 'The Production Function and the Theory of Capital: A Comment', Review of Economic Studies, xxi, pp. 112-35 4. Sraffa, Piero[1960] Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 5. Robinson, Joan, [1970a] 'Capital Theory Up to Date', Canadian Journal of Economics, in, pp. 309-17. 6. Levhari, D. [1965] 'A Nonsubstitution Theorem and Switching of Techniques', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXIX, pp. 98-105. 7. Levhari, D. and Samuelson, P. A. [1966] 'The Nonswitching Theorem is False', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXX, pp. 518-19. 8.Pasinetti, L.L. [1966a] 'Changes in the Rate of Profit and Switches of Techniques', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXX, pp. 503-17. 9. Morishima, M. [1966] 'Refutation of the Nonswitching Theorem', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXX, pp. 520-5. 10. Bruno, M., Burmeister, E. and Sheshinski, E. [1966] 'Nature and Implications of the Reswitching of Techniques', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXX, pp. 526-53. 11. Garegnani, P. [1966] 'Switching of Techniques', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXX, pp. 554-67. 12.Samuelson, P.A. [1966a] 'A Summing Up', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXX. pp. 568-83. 13. Robinson, Joan and Naqvi, K. A. [1967] 'The Badly Behaved Production Function', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXXI, pp. 579-91. 14. Bruno, M., Burmeister, E. and Sheshinski, E. [1968] 'The Badly Behaved Production Function: Comment', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXXII, pp. 524-5.	Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972
Capital Reversing	Neoclassical Economics	Harcourt I 145 Reswitching/capital reversing/Neoclassical economics/Harcourt: Unfortunately, for the neoclassical revivalists, all these results (see Reswitching/Economic theories) disappear when we drop our very special assumption (which is, however, related to Marx, vols. I and n, in which the organic composition of capital is uniform in all uses) that each w-r relationship is a straight line.* >Reswitching/Economic theories, >Cambridge Capital Controversy, >Labour/Marx, >K. Marx, >Value theory/Marx. Harcourt: For now the possibility that the same method will be the most profitable at two (or more) values of r, while others are more profitable in between, becomes inevitable. (Note, though, that it is the possibility which is inevitable: curved w-r relationships do not automatically imply that double-switching will occur.) >Reswitching/Economic theories. Reswitching: A case where it does occur is (…) [this]: technique b (which has a straight-line w-r relationship) comes back after giving way to technique a (which has a curved one) between the rates of profits of rba and rab. It will be noticed that qb - output per man of technique b - exceeds qa. If, therefore, we were to compare the sustainable steady states of consumption per head at different rates of profits, instead of obtaining the neoclassical parable …. For the „parables“ see >Neoclassicals/Harcourt, >Neo-neoclassicals/Harcourt. …- investment in more roundabout methods of production as r falls allows higher sustainable standards of living in the long run - we would have instead a 'dip' over the range rba-rab (…). Reverse capital: While reswitching will do the trick, capital-reversing is all that is needed to obtain 'perverse' steady-state movements: see Bruno, Burmeister and Sheshinski [1966]⁽¹⁾, Pasinetti [1966a]⁽²⁾. It should also be obvious, all too painfully so, perhaps, that either reswitching or capital-reversing, or the two combined, destroy parables (1) and (2) as well. Here, the parables again: Harcourt I 122 (1) an association between lower rates of profits and higher values of capital per man employed; (2) an association between lower rates of profits and higher capital-output ratios; (3) an association between lower rates of profits and (through investment in more 'mechanized' or 'round-about' methods of production) higher sustainable steady states of consumption per head (up to a maximum); (4) that, in competitive conditions, the distribution of income between profit-receivers and wage-earners can be explained by a knowledge of marginal products and factor supplies. Harcourt I 146 As the destruction by capital-reversing of parable (1) - from Pasinetti [1966a]⁽²⁾, pp. 516-17: Harcourt I 147 „The conclusion simply is that, on this problem, the whole theory of capital seems to have been caught in the trap of an old mode of thinking. Without any justification, except that this is the way economists have always been accustomed to think, it has been taken for granted that, at any given state of technical knowledge, the capital goods that become profitable at a lower rate of profits always entail a higher 'quantity of capital' per man. The foregoing analysis shows that this is not necessarily so; there is no connection that can be expected in general between the direction of change of the rate of profits and the direction of change of the 'quantity of capital' per man.“ (pp. 516-17). * It would be ironic if, nearly 100 years later, the rival theory of value to that of Ricardo and Marx should founder on the assumption which Bohm-Bawerk found so objectionable in Marx's theory. On this, see Dobb [1940]⁽³⁾, p. 74 nl, and generally for a brilliant - and highly relevant - account of the historical and analytical background to the present debate. 1. Bruno, M., Burmeister, E. and Sheshinski, E. [1966] 'Nature and Implications of the Reswitching of Techniques', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXX, pp. 526-53. 2. L.L. Pasinetti [1966a] 'Changes in the Rate of Profit and Switches of Techniques', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXX, pp. 503-17. 3. Dobb, M. H. [1940] Political Economy and Capitalism (London: Routledge).	Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972
Capital Value	Rothbard	Rothbard III 291 Capital value/Rothbard: In the case of the durable good and its services, there is an equilibrium-price relation, which the market tends to establish. The market price of the good as a whole is equal to the present value of the sum of its expected (future) rental incomes or rental prices. At this point, we shall define the “price of the good as whole” (…). Def Captial value/Rothbard: The capital value of any good (be it consumers’ consumers’ or capital good or nature-given factor) is the money price which, as a durable good, it presently sells for on the market. The concept applies to durable goods, embodying future services. The capital value of a consumers’ good will tend to equal the present value of the sum of expected unit rentals. >Relative Price/Rothbard, >Renting/Rothbard, >Durable goods/Rothbard, >Price/Rothbard, >Indirect exchange/Rothbard, >Money/Rothbard, >Value/Rothbard, >Service/Rothbard, >Goods/Rothbard. Rothbard III 292 The capital value at any time is based on expectations of future rental prices. Speculation: What happens when these expectations are erroneous? Suppose, for example, that the market expects the rental prices of this house to increase in the next few years and therefore sets the capital value higher than 200 ounces. Suppose, further, that the rental prices actually decline instead. This means that the original capital value on the market had overestimated the rental income from the house. Those who had sold the house at, say, 250, have gained, while those who bought the house in order to rent it out have lost on the transaction. Thus, those who have forecast better than their fellows gain, while the poorer forecasters lose, as a result of their speculative transactions. It is obvious that such monetary profits come not simply from correct forecasting, but from forecasting more correctly than other individuals. If all the individuals had forecast correctly, then the original capital value would have been below 200, say, 150, to account for the eventually lower rental prices. In that case no such monetary profit would have appeared. (…) the gains or losses are the consequences of the freely undertaken action of the gainers and losers themselves. >Speculation/Rothbard. Rothbard III 293 Equilibirum: The equilibrium relation between the capital value on the market and the sum of expected future rents is a day-to-day equilibrium that tends always to be set by the market. It is similar to the day-to-day market equilibrium price for a good set by supply and demand. On the other hand, the equilibrium relation between present capital value and actual future rents is only a long-range tendency fostered by the market’s encouragement of successful forecasters. This relation is a final equilibrium, similar to the final equilibrium prices that set the goal toward which the day-to-day prices tend. Demand/renting: The demand for the durable good (…) will now be, not only for direct use, but also, on the part of others, demand for investment in future renting out. Similarly, the reserved demand for the good as a whole will be not only for direct use or for speculative price increases, but also for future renting out of the good. Rothbard III 294 Stock keeping: The capital value of the good will be such as to clear the total stock, and the total of all these demands for the good will be in equilibrium. The reserved demand of the buyers will, as before, be due to their reserved demand for money, while the sellers of both the good as a whole and of its unit services will be demanding money in exchange. Market: (…) for any consumers’ good, the possessors have the choice of either consuming it directly or selling it for money. In the case of durable consumers’ goods, the possessors can do any one of the following with the good: use it directly, sell it whole, or hire it out - selling its unit services over a period of time. Supply/Equilibrium: The shape of the supply curves in both the capital and rental markets will be either rightward- and upward-sloping or vertical, since the greater the expected income, the less will be the amount reserved for direct use. It is clear that the supply schedules on the two markets are interconnected. They will tend to come into equilibrium when the equilibrium-price relation is established between them. >Equilibrium price/Rothbard, >Entrepreneurship/Rothbard, >Allocation/Rothbard. Rothbard III 316 Renting/speculation/investments: Not only do the renting and selling of consumers’ goods rest on appraisement and on hope of monetary profits, but so does the activity of all the investing producers, the keystone of the entire productive system. (…) that the term “capital value” applies, not only to durable consumers’ goods, but to all nonhuman factors of production as well—i.e., land and capital goods, singly and in various aggregates. The use and purchase of these factors rest on appraisement by entrepreneurs of their eventual yield in terms of monetary income on the market, and it will be seen that their capital value on the market will also tend to be equal to the discounted sum of their future yields of money income.⁽¹⁾ Rothbard III 526 Capital value/production/Rothbard: Net saving (…) increases gross investment in the economy. This increase in gross investment at first accrues as profits to the firms doing the increased business. These profits will accrue particularly in the higher stages, toward which old capital is shifting and in which new capital is invested. An accrual of profits to a firm increases, by that amount, the capital value of its assets, just as the losses decrease the capital value. The first impact of the new investment, then, is to cause aggregate profits to appear in the economy, concentrated in the new production processes in the higher stages. >Production structure/Rothbard, >Capital structure/Rothbard. Land: (…) a progressing economy will lead to an increase in the real rents of ground land and a fall in the rate of interest. >Rent/Rothbard, >Interest rate/Rothbard, >Investments/Rothbard. Rothbard III 527 These two factors, in conjunction, both impel a rise in the real capital value of ground land. Future rises in the real values of rents can be either anticipated or not anticipated. To the extent that they are anticipated, the rise in future rents is already accounted for, and discounted, in the capital value of the whole land. A rise in the far future may be anticipated, but will have no appreciable effect on the present price of land, simply because time preference places a very distant date beyond the effective “time horizon” of the present. To the extent that rises in the real rate are not foreseen, then, of course, entrepreneurial errors have been made, and the market has undercapitalized in the present price.⁽²⁾ >Land/Rothbard. Rothbard III 528 The only unique aspect to ground land (…) is that it is found and first put on the market at some particular time, so that the first user earns pure rent as a result of his initial discovery and use of the land. All later increases in the capital value of the land are accounted for in the value, either as entrepreneurial profits resulting from better forecasting or as interest return. >Capitalization/Rothbard, >Capital structure/Rothbard. 1. On appraisement and valuation, cf. Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. pp. 328–30. 2. For a view of capitalized gains similar to the one presented here, see Roy F. Harrod, Economic Essays (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1952), pp. 198–205.	Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Carbon Taxation	Fankhauser	Fankhauser I 1 Carbon Taxation/EU/US/Carattini/Carvalho/Fankhauser: Carbon taxation, in conjunction with other regulatory measures, could be an effective way of closing policy gaps in sectors that are not already covered by a functioning emissions trading system. In the EU, carbon taxes could play a role in reducing Fankhauser I 2 emissions outside the EU ETS [Emissions Trading System], where much of the future policy effort must lie, according to the European Environment Agency (2016)⁽¹⁾. In the United States, senior Republicans have laid out their arguments for a US $40 carbon tax in The Conservative Case for Carbon Dividends (Baker III, Feldstein, Halstead, et al., 2017)⁽²⁾. >Emissions Trading. A carbon tax is a relatively simple instrument to impose on the individual emitters, including the many smaller ones that dominate the non-ETS sectors and are less likely than large emitting facilities or sources to engage in carbon trading. According to the expertise collected by the World Bank, cap-and-trade systems—like the EU ETS—are best suited for industrial actors that have the capacity and skills to engage in the market actively (World Bank, 2016)⁽³⁾. With their high transaction costs, such systems are less appealing for sectors with a large number of small emission sources, such as transportation and buildings (Goulder & Parry, 2008)⁽⁴⁾. Economists advocate the use of carbon taxes because they provide the price incentive to reduce emissions without being technologically prescriptive, are simpler to administer, and do not draw on government budgets (Aldy & Stavins, 2012⁽⁵⁾; Baranzini et al., 2017⁽⁶⁾; Baumol & Oates, 1971⁽⁷⁾; Goulder & Parry, 2008⁽⁴⁾; Mankiw, 2009⁽⁸⁾; Metcalf, 2009⁽⁹⁾; Weitzman, 2015⁽¹⁰⁾). Fankhauser I 4 The required tax level is determined by the environmental objective and more specifically by the marginal costs of meeting a given emissions target (Bowen & Fankhauser, 2017)⁽¹¹⁾. Fankhauser I 2 VsCarbon Taxation/VsCarbon Tax/Objections to Carbon Taxation/Carattini/Carvalho/Fankhauser: Despite these advantages, carbon taxes are one of the least used climate policy instruments. Carbon tax proposals have been undone, sometimes at an advanced political stage, for example in Australia (in 2014), France (in 2000), Switzerland (in 2000 and 2015), and most recently in the United States in Washington State (in 2016). Objections to carbon taxation are often not about the introduction of the tax itself, but about its design (Dresner, Dunne, Clinch, & Beuermann, 2006)⁽¹²⁾ and the way relevant information is shared. Sociopsychological factors—such as perceived coerciveness, equity, and justice—all affect the extent to which voters accept different climate policy instruments (Drews & van den Bergh, 2015)⁽¹³⁾. Factoring them into the design from the outset could make carbon tax legislation easier to pass. Opposition by vested interests has proved to be very effective in limiting public intervention in a wide range of environmental issues (Oates & Portney, 2003)⁽¹⁴⁾, and their lobbying efforts can influence voters' views, preventing the passage, or even revoking the implementation of a carbon tax. Other studies, for instance by Hammar, Löfgren, and Sterner (2004)⁽¹⁵⁾, Van Asselt and Brewer (2010)⁽¹⁶⁾, Dechezleprêtre and Sato (2017)⁽¹⁷⁾, and Neuhoff et al. (2015)⁽¹⁸⁾, provide insights into how vested interests and other political economy aspects have affected the design of carbon pricing in recent times. Fankhauser I 3 Recognizing that there are variations in attitudes and perceptions across individuals, we identify five general reasons for aversion to carbon taxes that have been recurrently emphasized in the literature. 1. VsCarbon Taxation: The personal costs are perceived to be too high. A Swedish survey by Jagers and Hammar (2009)⁽¹⁹⁾ found that people associate carbon taxes with higher personal costs, more than they do with alternative policy instruments. A discrete choice experiment by Alberini, Scasny, and Bigano (2016)⁽²⁰⁾ showed that Italians had a preference, among climate policy instruments, for subsidies over carbon taxes. Participants in a lab experiment by Heres, Kallbekken, and Galarraga (2015)⁽²¹⁾ similarly expected higher payoffs from subsidies than from taxes, especially when there was uncertainty on how tax revenues would be “rebated.” Ex ante, individuals tend to overestimate the cost of an environmental tax, and underestimate its benefits (Carattini et al., 2018⁽²²⁾; Odeck & Bråthen, 2002⁽²³⁾; Schuitema, Steg, & Forward, 2010⁽²⁴⁾). The literature in social psychology also suggests that individuals prefer subsidies because they are perceived as less coercive than taxes. Taxes are “pushed” onto polluters, imposing a mandatory cost, while subsidies are seen as “pull” measures, which supposedly reward climate-friendly behavior (de Groot & Schuitema, 2012⁽²⁵⁾; Rosentrater et al., 2012⁽²⁶⁾; Steg et al., 2006⁽²⁷⁾). 2. VsCarbon Taxation: Carbon taxes can be regressive. [Voters] perceive, rightly, that without counterbalancing measures carbon taxes may have a disproportionate negative impact on low-income households. These counterbalancing measures can, however, offset the adverse distributional effects of carbon taxes, and even make them progressive. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that alternative climate policy instruments such as subsidies for renewable energy can also have similar regressive effects and may not generate revenues to counter them (Baranzini et al., 2017)⁽²⁸⁾. 3. VsCarbon Taxation: Carbon taxes could damage the wider economy. This has been illustrated in Switzerland, where, in two different instances more than 10 years apart, concern about the potential competitiveness and employment effects of energy taxes contributed to their rejection in public ballots, even in the context of very limited unemployment (Carattini, Baranzini, Thalmann, Varone, & Vöhringer, 2017⁽²⁹⁾; Thalmann, 2004⁽³⁰⁾). While these concerns are partly justified, voters may tend to overestimate competitiveness and job effects. [This] may also result from specific information campaigns led by energy-intensive companies, as in the case of Australia (cf. Spash & Lo, 2012)⁽³¹⁾. 4. VsCarbon Taxation: Carbon taxes are believed not to discourage high-carbon behavior (…) (Klok, Larsen, Dahl, & Hansen, 2006⁽³²⁾; Steg et al., 2006⁽²⁷⁾). [Individuals] consider low-carbon subsidies to be a more powerful way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, especially if the cost of switching from consuming high-carbon goods to low-carbon goods is considered high. [They] believe that the price elasticity of demand for carbon-intensive goods is close to zero. The expectation that carbon taxes do not work is one of the main reasons for their rejection by people in surveys and real ballots (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017⁽⁶⁾; Carattini et al., 2017⁽²⁹⁾; Hsu, Walters, & Purgas, 2008⁽³³⁾; Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010⁽³⁴⁾; Kallbekken & Sælen, 2011⁽³⁵⁾). Fankhauser I 4 5. VsCarbon Taxation: Governments may want to tax carbon to increase their revenues. [Individuals] assume—as a direct consequence of concern 4 above—that the purpose of introducing a carbon tax is not to reduce greenhouse gases but to increase government revenues (Klok et al., 2006)⁽³²⁾. Trust issues sometimes concern the specific environmental tax proposal under consideration, but they may also be broader, related to people's general view of tax policy or even to trust in the government itself (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017⁽⁶⁾; Beuermann & Santarius, 2006⁽³⁶⁾; Dietz, Dan, & Shwom, 2007⁽³⁷⁾; Hammar & Jagers, 2006⁽³⁸⁾). VsVs: Some of these perceptions are incorrect. There is evidence that carbon pricing does in fact reduce emissions (J. Andersson, 2015⁽³⁹⁾; Baranzini & Carattini, 2014⁽⁴⁰⁾; Martin, de Preux, & Wagner, 2014⁽⁴¹⁾) and has so far had a minimal impact on the wider economy, in terms of adversely affecting the competitiveness of domestic industry, at least in the presence of adjustments and specific measures tailored to support the most exposed firms (Dechezleprêtre & Sato, 2017)⁽¹⁷⁾. On the other hand, voters are right to suspect that governments would probably welcome the extra revenues. Indeed, its benign fiscal implications are often highlighted as one of the merits of a carbon tax (Bowen & Fankhauser, 2017)⁽¹¹⁾. It is also the case that carbon taxes are often regressive; without counter measures they may affect poor households disproportionately (Gough, Abdallah, Johnson, Ryan Collins, & Smith, 2012⁽⁴²⁾; Metcalf, 2009⁽⁹⁾; Speck, 1999⁽⁴³⁾; Sterner, 2011⁽⁴⁴⁾). (…) the accuracy of public perceptions is less important than the fact that they are widely held and can hinder the adoption of otherwise desirable policies. People's attitudes to carbon taxes appear to be influenced more by the direct personal cost of the measure than by an appreciation of the environmental objective (Kallbekken, Kroll, & Cherry, 2011)⁽⁴⁵⁾. Consequently, the public acceptability of an environmental tax depends heavily on its policy stringency, since the proposed tax rate determines the direct costs to consumers. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. European Environment Agency (2016). Chapter 1. Overall progress towards the European Union's 20-20-20 climate and energy targets. In Trends and projections in Europe 2016—Tracking progress towards Europe's climate and energy targets (pp. 1–12). Brussels, Belgium: Author. 2. Baker, J. A. III, Feldstein, M., Halstead, T., Mankiw, N. G., Paulson, H. M. Jr., Schultz, G. P., … Walton, R. (2017). The conservative case for carbon dividends. Washington, DC: Climate Leadership Council. 3. World Bank. (2016). State and trends of carbon pricing 2016. Washington, DC: Author. 4. Goulder, L. H., & Parry, I. W. H. (2008). Instrument choice in environmental policy. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2(2), 152–174. 5. Aldy, J. E., & Stavins, R. N. (2012). The promise and problems of pricing carbon: Theory and experience. The Journal of Environment and Development, 21(2), 152–180. 6. Baranzini, A., & Carattini, S. (2017). Effectiveness, earmarking and labeling: Testing the acceptability of carbon taxes with survey data. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 19(1), 197–227. 7. Baumol, W. J., & Oates, W. E. (1971). The use of standards and prices for protection of the environment. The Swedish Journal of Economics, 73(1), 42–54. 8. Mankiw, N. G. (2009). Smart taxes: An open invitation to join the Pigou club. Eastern Economic Journal, 35(1), 14–23. 9. Metcalf, G. E. (2009). Designing a carbon tax to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 3(1), 63–83. 10. Weitzman, M. L. (2015). Voting on prices vs. voting on quantities in a World Climate Assembly (NBER Working Paper No. 20925). Boston, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 11. Bowen, A., & Fankhauser, S. (2017). Good practice in low-carbon policy. In A. Averchenkova, S. Fankhauser, & M. Nachmany (Eds.), Climate change legislation (pp. 123–140). London, England: Edward Elgar. 12. Dresner, S., Dunne, L., Clinch, P., & Beuermann, C. (2006). Social and political responses to ecological tax reform in Europe: An introduction to the special issue. Energy Policy, 34(8), 895–904. 13. Drews, S., & van den Bergh, J. C. J. M. (2015). What explains public support for climate policies: A review of empirical and experimental studies. Climate Policy, 16(7), 1–20. 14. Oates, W. E., & Portney, P. R. (2003). The political economy of environmental policy. In K.-G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (Eds.), Handbook of environmental economics (pp. 325–354). Elsevier Science B.V. 15. Hammar, H., Löfgren, A., & Sterner, T. (2004). Political economy obstacles to fuel taxation. The Energy Journal, 25(3), 1–17. 16. van Asselt, H., & Brewer, T. (2010). Addressing competitiveness and leakage concerns in climate policy: An analysis of border adjustment measures in the US and the EU. Energy Policy, 38(1), 42–51. 17. Dechezleprêtre, A., & Sato, M. (2017). The impacts of environmental regulations on competitiveness. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 11(2), 183–206. 18. Neuhoff, K., Ancygier, A., Ponssardet, J., Quirion, P., Sartor, O., Sato, M., & Schopp, A. (2015). Modernization and innovation in the materials sector: Lessons from steel and cement. Berlin, Germany: Climate Strategies and DIW Berlin. Retrieved from http://climatestrategies.org/publication/modernization-and-innovation-in-thematerials- sector-lessons-from-steel-and-cement/ 19. Jagers, S. C., & Hammar, H. (2009). Environmental taxation for good and for bad: The efficiency and legitimacy of Sweden's carbon tax. Environmental Politics, 18(2), 218–237. 20. Alberini, A., Scasny, M., & Bigano, A. (2016). Policy vs individual heterogeneity in the benefits of climate change mitigation: Evidence from a stated-preference survey (FEEM Working Paper No. 80.2016). Milan, Italy: FEEM 21. Heres, D. R., Kallbekken, S., & Galarraga, I. (2015). The role of budgetary information in the preference for externality-correcting subsidies over taxes: A lab experiment on public support. Environmental and Resource Economics, 66(1), 1–15. 22. Carattini, S., Baranzini, A., & Lalive, R. (2018). Is taxing waste a waste of time? Evidence from a supreme court decision. Ecological Economics, 148, 131–151. 23. Odeck, J., & Bråthen, S. (2002). Toll financing in Norway: The success, the failures and perspectives for the future. Transport Policy, 9(3), 253–260. 24. Schuitema, G., Steg, L., & Forward, S. (2010). Explaining differences in acceptability before and acceptance after the implementation of a congestion charge in Stockholm. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 44(2), 99–109. 25. de Groot, J. I. M., & Schuitema, G. (2012). How to make the unpopular popular? Policy characteristics, social norms and the acceptability of environmental policies. Environmental Science and Policy, 19–20, 100–107. 26. Rosentrater, L. D., Sælensminde, I., Ekström, F., Böhm, G., Bostrom, A., Hanss, D., & O'Connor, R. E. (2012). Efficacy trade-offs in individuals' support for climate change policies. Environment and Behavior, 45(8), 935–970. 27. Steg, L., Dreijerink, L., & Abrahamse, W. (2006). Why are energy policies acceptable and effective? Environment and Behavior, 38(1), 92–111. 28. Baranzini, A., van den Bergh, J. C. J. M., Carattini, S., Howarth, R. B., Padilla, E., & Roca, J. (2017). Carbon pricing in climate policy: Seven reasons, complementary instruments, and political economy considerations. WIREs Climate Change, 8(4), 1–17. 29. Carattini, S., Baranzini, A., Thalmann, P., Varone, P., & Vöhringer, F. (2017). Green taxes in a post-Paris world: Are millions of nays inevitable? Environmental and Resource Economics, 68(1), 97–128. 30. Thalmann, P. (2004). The public acceptance of green taxes: 2 million voters express their opinion. Public Choice, 119, 179–217. 31. Spash, C. L., & Lo, A. Y. (2012). Australia's carbon tax: A sheep in wolf's clothing? The Economic and Labour Relations Review, 23(1), 67–86. 32. Klok, J., Larsen, A., Dahl, A., & Hansen, K. (2006). Ecological tax reform in Denmark: History and social acceptability. Energy Policy, 34(8), 905–916. 33. Hsu, S. L., Walters, J., & Purgas, A. (2008). Pollution tax heuristics: An empirical study of willingness to pay higher gasoline taxes. Energy Policy, 36(9), 3612–3619. 34. Kallbekken, S., & Aasen, M. (2010). The demand for earmarking: Results from a focus group study. Ecological Economics, 69(11), 2183–2190. 35. Kallbekken, S., & Sælen, H. (2011). Public acceptance for environmental taxes: Self-interest, environmental and distributional concerns. Energy Policy, 39(5), 2966–2973. 36. Beuermann, C., & Santarius, T. (2006). Ecological tax reform in Germany: Handling two hot potatoes at the same time. Energy Policy, 34(8), 917–929. 37. Dietz, T., Dan, A., & Shwom, R. (2007). Support for climate change policy: Social psychological and social structural influences. Rural Sociology, 72(2), 185–214. Doda, B. (2016). How to price carbon in good times ... and bad! WIREs Climate Change, 7(1), 135–144. 38. Hammar, H., & Jagers, S. C. (2006). Can trust in politicians explain individuals' support for climate policy? The case of CO2 tax. Climate Policy, 5(6), 613–625. 39. Andersson, J. (2015). Cars, carbon taxes and CO2 emissions (Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment Working Paper 212/Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy Working Paper 238). London, England: London School of Economics and Political Science. 40. Baranzini, A., & Carattini, S. (2014). Taxation of emissions of greenhouse gases: The environmental impacts of carbon taxes. In B. Freedman (Ed.), Global environmental change (pp. 543–560). Heidelberg, Germany and New York, NY: Springer. 41. Martin, R., de Preux, L. B., & Wagner, U. J. (2014). The impact of a carbon tax on manufacturing: Evidence from microdata. Journal of Public Economics, 117, 1–14. 42. Gough, I., Abdallah, S., Johnson, V., Ryan Collins, J., & Smith, C. (2012). The distribution of total greenhouse gas emissions by households in the UK, and some implications for social policy. London, England: Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion. 43. Speck, S. (1999). Energy and carbon taxes and their distributional implications. Energy Policy, 27(11), 659–667. 44. Sterner, T. (Ed.). (2011). Fuel taxes and the poor: The distributional effects of gasoline taxation and their implications for climate policy. Abingdon, England: Routledge. 45. Kallbekken, S., Kroll, S., & Cherry, T. L. (2011). Do you not like Pigou, or do you not understand him? Tax aversion and revenue recycling in the lab. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 62(1), 53–64. Stefano Carattini, Maria Carvalho & Sam Fankhauser, 2018: “Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes”. In: Stéphane Hallegatte, Mike Hulme (Eds.), WIREs Climate Change, Vol. 9/5, pages 1-26.	Fankhauser I Samuel Fankhauser Stefano Carattini Maria Carvalho, Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes 2018
Carbon Taxation Strategies	Fankhauser	Fankhauser I 6 Carbon Taxation Strategies /Carattini/Carvalho/Fankhauser: Another defining feature of a carbon tax is how its revenues are proposed to be spent. The literature has explored three revenue recycling strategies in particular: the earmarking of revenues to support emission reduction projects, the redistribution of revenues to achieve a fairer (less fiscally regressive) outcome, and the reduction of other taxes to achieve a revenue-neutral outcome. Using tax revenues for additional emissions reduction reassures voters that the tax will be effective and the environmental objective will be met (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017⁽¹⁾; Kallbekken et al., 2011⁽²⁾; Sælen & Kallbekken, 2011⁽³⁾). 1. Earmarking proceeds: The attractiveness of earmarking carbon tax revenues has been established in a range of contexts (cf. Baranzini & Carattini, 2017⁽¹⁾; Beuermann & Santarius, 2006(4); Bristow, Wardman, Zannia, & Chintakayalab, 2010⁽⁵⁾; Carattini et al., 2017⁽⁶⁾; Clinch & Dunne, 2006⁽⁷⁾; Deroubaix & Lévèque, 2006⁽⁸⁾; Dresner, Jackson, & Gilbert, 2006(9); Gevrek & Uyduranoglu, 2015⁽¹⁰⁾; Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010(11); Kallbekken & Sælen, 2011⁽³⁾; Klok et al., 2006⁽¹²⁾; Thalmann, 2004⁽¹³⁾). The interest in earmarking reflects two voter concerns. The first is a lack of trust in government [.] The second concern is doubt about the effectiveness of carbon taxes (…). Earmarking signals to the public that efforts are being made to make low-carbon options both technologically and commercially more viable and so will reduce the personal cost of changing behavior (Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010)⁽¹¹⁾. Earmarking is also seen as a potential solution to a perceived underinvestment in low-carbon research and development. It should, however, be noted that earmarking revenues for environmental purposes may not be a universal solution. A Swedish survey conducted by Jagers and Hammar (2009)(14) showed that respondents were unwilling to increase carbon tax rates, as they felt the carbon taxes they paid on transport fuels were high enough already. Respondents preferred alternative Fankhauser I 7 such as decreasing taxes on clean energy sources, expanding public transport, and increasing information campaigns about vehicles' contribution to climate change. Additional evidence suggests that preferences for revenue recycling may be context dependent. Carattini et al. (2017)⁽⁶⁾ found that providing information about the environmental effectiveness of different carbon tax designs reduces the preference for environmental earmarking. 2. Compensating low-income households: Several strategies have been put forward in the literature to address potential adverse distributional effects of a carbon tax, including in the influential perspectives of Speck (1999)⁽¹⁵⁾, Baranzini, Goldemberg, and Speck (2000)⁽¹⁶⁾, and Metcalf (2009)⁽¹⁷⁾. [There are two main options on compensation:] compensation via lump-sum transfers and social cushioning. Fankhauser I 8 (…) when there is a clear trade-off in the use of revenues between environmental earmarking and socially progressive redistribution forms, people tend to prefer to use revenues for environmental earmarking (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017⁽¹⁾; Sælen & Kallbekken, 2011⁽³⁾). In the study by Carattini et al. (2017)⁽⁶⁾, the most favored options for using revenue were redistribution through lump-sum transfers, and social cushioning. 3. Cutting other taxes and secur[ing …] full or partial revenue neutrality: Empirical studies show that cutting other taxes is the least popular redistribution strategy among the public (Beuermann & Santarius, 2006⁽⁴⁾; Dresner, Jackson, & Gilbert, 2006⁽⁹⁾; Klok et al., 2006⁽¹²⁾; Thalmann, 2004⁽¹³⁾). This is in contrast to many economists, for whom using tax revenues to reduce distortionary taxes is the ideal solution. By using carbon tax revenues levied on “bads,” such as greenhouse gas emissions, to reduce distortionary taxes on labor, profits, or consumption, which discourage desirable activities, one can hope to achieve higher economic output on top of emissions abatement, and so obtain a “double dividend” (cf. Goulder, 1995)⁽¹⁸⁾. One reason for public opposition is that voters do not necessarily buy into the logic behind the double dividend. They perceive these to be separate problems requiring separate solutions. Another reason for public opposition is a lack of trust in politicians and fiscal authorities (Hammar & Jagers, 2006)(19). Once the policy is implemented, governments could use information devices to increase the visibility of the tax shift. Compensation can be made visible by displaying the amount of income that is rebated on payslips, tax slips, or in contributions to social insurance (Clinch, Dunne, & Dresner, 2006⁽²⁰⁾; Dresner, Dunne, et al., 2006⁽²¹⁾; Hsu et al. 2008⁽²²⁾). Below we [Carattini, Carvalho, Fankhauser] offer some concrete design options that appear particularly promising to increase public support. Fankhauser I 9 1. Phasing in carbon taxes over time: By phasing in carbon taxes gradually, policymakers can take advantage of the fact that aversion tends to abate once people have experienced a policy. A slow ramp-up, or even a trial period, provides individuals with the opportunity to gauge the costs and benefits of the tax. Taxes can then be raised progressively until they reach the level required to meet the environmental objective. Note that this may imply renouncing to allowing the carbon tax rate to fluctuate depending on the business cycle, although this type of flexibility might be welfare improving (cf. Doda, 2016)(23). The risk with this strategy is that carbon taxes may be frozen at a level that is not sufficient to achieve their intended objectives. There are two potential, and complementary, solutions to overcome this risk. The first solution relies on societal learning. The second solution uses commitment devices. 2. Earmarking tax revenues for additional climate change mitigation: Voters have a preference for earmarking tax revenues and using the proceeds for additional greenhouse gas emissions reductions. They are particularly keen on support for low-carbon research and development, along with subsidies to promote deployment. The demand for environmental earmarking may decrease over time as people observe the impact of the tax and update their beliefs. Governments can again support this process by providing effective information about emissions trends, the distributional effects of the tax, and any ancillary benefits. Revenues may then be freed up gradually to address other sources of voter aversion, or to obtain economic gains. Tapering the degree of earmarking can also allay a government's concerns about fiscal management. 3. Redistributing taxes to improve fairness: Carbon taxes can be made more acceptable if tax revenues are used to address important societal concerns. Fankhauser I 10 While the objective of a carbon tax is to address the climate externality, and not to address the issue of raising inequalities, there may still be the expectation that carbon taxes are designed in a way that at least does not lead to a more unequal distribution. Carbon taxes can be designed to be both revenue neutral and progressive through lump-sum transfers and social cushioning measures to reduce costs for low-income households. Some voters may, however, be suspicious about a government's long-term commitment to redistribution. To allay those fears, governments can use commitment devices, such as explicit plans on how revenues are to be redistributed. 4. Information sharing and communication: A final suggestion applies to all efforts to implement a carbon tax, regardless of the use of revenues, or level of stringency. As soon as policymakers start considering the design of a carbon tax, they should provide detailed information (obtained through analysis and perhaps model simulations) to navigate the process of public consultations and to pre-emptively address voter concerns. This disclosure would ideally occur before voters are called to a ballot, or before lawmakers consider a carbon tax bill in the parliament. Fankhauser I 11 Communication efforts need to continue once the policy is implemented. Because the effects of carbon taxes are often not visible, governments are encouraged to measure their effects regularly and inform their citizens about them transparently. Communication strategies may need to be adapted to the beliefs and worldviews of the targeted population (Cherry et al., 2017)⁽²⁴⁾, and also take into account the potential implications of political polarization and bipartisan divides (Hart & Nisbet, 2012⁽²⁵⁾; Kahan et al., 2011⁽²⁶⁾). >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Baranzini, A., & Carattini, S. (2017). Effectiveness, earmarking and labeling: Testing the acceptability of carbon taxes with survey data. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 19(1), 197–227. 2. Kallbekken, S., Kroll, S., & Cherry, T. L. (2011). Do you not like Pigou, or do you not understand him? Tax aversion and revenue recycling in the lab. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 62(1), 53–64. 3. Sælen, H., & Kallbekken, S. (2011). A choice experiment on fuel taxation and earmarking in Norway. Ecological Economics, 70(11), 2181–2190. 4. Beuermann, C., & Santarius, T. (2006). Ecological tax reform in Germany: Handling two hot potatoes at the same time. Energy Policy, 34(8), 917–929. 5. Bristow, A. L., Wardman, M., Zannia, A. M., & Chintakayalab, P. K. (2010). Public acceptability of personal carbon trading and carbon tax. Ecological Economics, 69(9), 1824–1837. 6. Carattini, S., Baranzini, A., Thalmann, P., Varone, P., & Vöhringer, F. (2017). Green taxes in a post-Paris world: Are millions of nays inevitable? Environmental and Resource Economics, 68(1), 97–128. 7. Clinch, J. P., & Dunne, L. (2006). Environmental tax reform: An assessment of social responses in Ireland. Energy Policy, 34(8), 950–959. 8. Deroubaix, J.-F., & Lévèque, F. (2006). The rise and fall of French ecological tax reform: Social acceptability versus political feasibility in the energy tax implementation process. Energy Policy, 34, 940–949. 9. Dresner, S., Jackson, T., & Gilbert, N. (2006). History and social responses to environmental tax reform in the United Kingdom. Energy Policy, 34(8), 930–939. 10. Gevrek, Z. E., & Uyduranoglu, A. (2015). Public preferences for carbon tax attributes. Ecological Economics, 118, 186–197. 11. Kallbekken, S., & Aasen, M. (2010). The demand for earmarking: Results from a focus group study. Ecological Economics, 69(11), 2183–2190. 12. Klok, J., Larsen, A., Dahl, A., & Hansen, K. (2006). Ecological tax reform in Denmark: History and social acceptability. Energy Policy, 34(8), 905–916. 13. Thalmann, P. (2004). The public acceptance of green taxes: 2 million voters express their opinion. Public Choice, 119, 179–217. 14. Jagers, S. C., & Hammar, H. (2009). Environmental taxation for good and for bad: The efficiency and legitimacy of Sweden's carbon tax. Environmental Politics, 18(2), 218–237. 15. Speck, S. (1999). Energy and carbon taxes and their distributional implications. Energy Policy, 27(11), 659–667. 16. Baranzini, A., Goldemberg, J., & Speck, S. (2000). A future for carbon taxes. Ecological Economics, 32(3), 395–412. 17. Metcalf, G. E. (2009). Designing a carbon tax to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 3(1), 63–83. 18. Goulder, L. H. (1995). Environmental taxation and the double dividend: A reader's guide. International Tax and Public Finance, 2(2), 157–183. 19. Hammar, H., & Jagers, S. C. (2006). Can trust in politicians explain individuals' support for climate policy? The case of CO2 tax. Climate Policy, 5(6), 613–625. 20. Clinch, J. P., Dunne, L., & Dresner, S. (2006). Environmental and wider implications of political impediments to environmental tax reform. Energy Policy, 34(8), 960–970. 21. Dresner, S., Dunne, L., Clinch, P., & Beuermann, C. (2006). Social and political responses to ecological tax reform in Europe: An introduction to the special issue. Energy Policy, 34(8), 895–904. 22. Hsu, S. L., Walters, J., & Purgas, A. (2008). Pollution tax heuristics: An empirical study of willingness to pay higher gasoline taxes. Energy Policy, 36(9), 3612–3619. 23. Doda, B. (2016). How to price carbon in good times ... and bad! WIREs Climate Change, 7(1), 135–144. 24. Cherry, T. L., Kallbekken, S., & Kroll, S. (2017). Accepting market failure: Cultural worldviews and the opposition to corrective environmental policies. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 85, 193–204. 25. Hart, P. S., & Nisbet, E. C. (2012). Boomerang effects in science communication: How motivated reasoning and identity cues amplify opinion polarization about climate mitigation policies. Communication Research, 39(6), 701–723. 26. Kahan, D., Wittlin, M., Peters, E., Slovic, P., Ouellette, L., Braman, D., & Mandel, G. (2011). The tragedy of the risk-perception commons: Culture conflict, rationality conflict, and climate change (SSRN Scholarly Paper). Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. Stefano Carattini, Maria Carvalho & Sam Fankhauser, 2018: “Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes”. In: Stéphane Hallegatte, Mike Hulme (Eds.), WIREs Climate Change, Vol. 9/5, pages 1-26.	Fankhauser I Samuel Fankhauser Stefano Carattini Maria Carvalho, Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes 2018
Cartels	Rothbard	Rothbard III 636 Cartels/Rothbard: (…) is not monopolizing action a restriction of production, and is not this restriction a demonstrably antisocial act? Let us first take what would seem to be the worst possible case of such action: the actual destruction of part of a product by a cartel. This is done to take advantage of an inelastic demand curve and to raise the price to gain a greater monetary income for the whole group. >Elasticity, >Demand/Rothbard. We can visualize, for example, the case of a coffee cartel burning great quantities of coffee. In the first place, such actions will surely occur very seldom. Actual destruction of its product is clearly a highly wasteful act, even for the cartel; it is obvious that the factors of production which the growers had expended in producing the coffee have been spent in vain. Clearly, the production of the total quantity of coffee itself has proved to be an error, and the burning of coffee is only the aftermath and reflection of the error. Yet, because of the uncertainty of the future, errors are often made. Man could labor and invest for years in the production of a good which, it may turn out, consumers hardly want at all. If, for example, consumers' tastes had changed so that coffee would not be demanded by anyone, regardless of price, it would again have to be destroyed, with or without a cartel. Error is certainly unfortunate, but it cannot be considered immoral or antisocial; nobody aims deliberately at error. If coffee were a durable good, it is obvious that the cartel would not destroy it, but would store it for gradual future sale to consumers, thus earning income on the "surplus" coffee. >Durable goods/Rothbard, >Consumer goods/Rothbard. Rothbard III 637 Free market: The whole concept of "restricting production," then, is a fallacy when applied to the free market. In the real world of scarce resources in relation to possible ends, all production involves choice and the allocationof factors to serve the most highly valued ends. In Short, the production of any product is necessarily always "restricted." Such "restriction" follows simply from the universal scarcity of factors and the diminishing marginal utility of any one product. But then it is absurd to speak of "restriction" at all.⁽¹⁾ Rothbard: We cannot, then, say that the cartel has “restricted production.” Rothbard III 638 If there are anticartelists who disagree with this verdict and believe that the previous structure of production served the consumers better, they are always at perfect liberty to bid the land, labor, and capital factors away from the jungle-guide agencies and rubber producers, and themselves embark on the production of the allegedly “deficient” 40 million pounds of coffee. Since they are not doing so, they are hardly in a position to attack the existing coffee producers for not doing so. As Mises succinctly stated: „Certainly those engaged in the production of Steel are not responsible for the fact that other People did not likewise enter this field of production.... If somebody is to blame for the fact that the number of people who joined the voluntary civil defense organization is not larger, then it is not those who have already joined but those who have not.“ Rothbard III 640 Free market/Rothbard: Criticism of steel owners for not producing "enough" steel or of coffee growers for not producing "enough" coffee also implies the existence of a caste system, whereby a certain caste is permanently designated to produce Steel, another caste to grow coffee, etc. Only in such a caste society would such criticism make sense. Yet the free market is the reverse of the caste system; indeed, choice between alternatives implies mobility between alternatives, and this mobility obviously holds for entrepreneurs or lenders with money to invest in production. Rothbard III 642 VsCartels: A common argument holds that cartel action involves collusion. For one firm may achieve a "monopoly price" as a result of its natural abilities or consumer enthusiasm for its particular product, whereas a cartel of many firms allegedly involves "collusion" and "conspiracy." >Monopolies. RothbardVs: These expressions, however, are simply emotive terms designed to induce an unfavorable response. What is actually involved here is co-operation to increase the incomes of the producers. For what is the essence of a cartel action? Individual producers agree to pool their assets into a common lot, this single central organization to make the decisions on production and price policies for all the owners and then to allocate the monetary gain among them. But is this process not the same as any sort ofjoint partnership or theformation ofa Single corporation? What happens when a partnership or corporation is formed? >Corporations/Rothbard. Rothbard III 644 Merger/cartel/Rothbard: Yet an industry-wide merger is, in effect, a permanent cartel, a permanent combination and fusion. On the other hand, a cartel that maintains by voluntary agreement the separate identity of each firm is by nature a highly transitory and ephemeral arrangement and, (…) generally tends to break up on the market. In fact, in many cases, a cartel can be considered as simply a tentative step in the direction of permanent merger. And a merger and the original formation of a corporation do not (…) essentially differ. The former is an adaptation of the size and number of firms in an industry to new conditions or is the correction of a previous error in forecasting. The latter is a de novo attempt to adapt to present and future market conditions. >Mergers/Rothbard. Rothbard III 651 Instability: Analysis demonstrates that a cartel is an inherently unstable form of operation. Ifthe joint pooling of assets in a common cause proves in the long run to be profitable for each of the individual members of the cartel, then they will act formally to merge into one large firm. The cartel then disappears in the merger. On the other hand, if the joint action proves unprofitable for one or more members, the dissatisfied firm or firms will break away from the cartel, and (…) any such independent action almost always destroys the cartel. The cartel form, therefore, is bound to be highly evanescent and unstable. Rothbard III 652 If the cartel does not break up from within, it is even more likely to do so from without. To the extent that it has earned unusual monopoly profits, outside firms and outside producers will enter the same field of production. Outsiders, in short, rush in to take advantage of the higher profits. Rothbard III 657 The problem of „The One Big Cartel“: (…) the free market placed definite limits on the size of the firm, i.e., the limits of calculability on the market ((s) see above III 612). In order to calculate the profits and losses of each branch, a firm must be able to refer its internal operations to external markets for each of the various factors and intermediate products. When any of these external markets disappears, because all are absorbed within the province of a single firm, calculability disappears, and there is no way for the firm rationally to allocate factors to that specific area. The more these limits are encroached upon, the greater and greater will be the sphere of irrationality, and the more diffcult it will be to avoid losses. One big cartel would not be able rationally to allocate producers' goods at all and hence could not avoid severe losses. Consequently, it could never really be established, and, if tried, would quickly break asunder. Rothbard III 660 Production factors: What about the factors? Could not their owners be exploited by the cartel? In the first place, the universal cartel, to be effective, would have to include owners of primary land; otherwise whatever gains they might have might be imputed to land. To put it in its strongest terms, then, could a universal cartel of all land and capital goods "exploit" laborers by systematically paying the latter less than their discounted marginal value products? Could not the members of the cartel agree to pay a very Iow sum to these workers? Ifthat happened, however, there would be created great opportunities for entrepreneurs either to spring up outside the cartel or to break away from the cartel and profit by hiring workers for a higher wage. This competition would have the double effect of (a) breaking up the universal cartel and (b) tending again to yield to the laborers their marginal product. As long as competition is free, unhampered by governmental restrictions, no universal cartel could either exploit labor or remain universal for any length of time.⁽³⁾ >Monopolies/Rothbard. 1. In the words of Professor Mises: „That the production of a commodity p is not larger than it really is, is due to the fact that the complementary factors of production required for an expansion were employed for the production of other commodities. . . . Neither did the producers of p intentionally restrict the production of p. Every entrepreneur’s capital is limited; he employs it for those projects which, he expects, will, by filling the most urgent demand of the public, yield the highest profit. An entrepreneur at whose disposal are 100 units of capital employs, for instance, 50 units for the production of p and 50 units for the production of q. If both lines are profitable, it is odd to blame him for not having employed more, e.g., 75 units, for the production of p. He could increase the production of p only by curtailing correspondingly the production of q. But with regard to q the same fault could be found by the grumblers. If one blames the entrepreneur for not having produced more p, one must blame him also for not having produced more q. This means: one blames the entrepreneur for the fact that there is a scarcity of the factors of production and that the earth is not a land of Cockaigne.“ (Mises, Planning for Freedom, pp. 115–16) 2. Ibid. p. 115. 3. Cf. Mises, Human Action New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998., p. 592.	Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Cassirer	Ricoeur	I 22 Cassirer, Ernst/Symbol/Ricoeur: in his philosophy of symbolic forms he was inspired by Kant's philosophy, his declared aim being to go beyond the all too narrow framework of the transcendental method, which is limited to the criticism of the principles of Newtonian philosophy, and to explore all synthetic activities and all the areas of objectification corresponding to them. RicoeurVsCassirer: but is it legitimate to call these different "forms" of synthesis, in which the object depends on the function, these " abilities" (Vermögen) each of which produces and sets a world, symbolic? Per Cassirer: he was the first to ask the question of the regression of the language. Symbolic Form/Cassirer/Ricoeur: the term delimits, even before it represents an answer, a question: that of the arrangement of all "mediating functions" into a single function, which Cassirer calls "the symbolic". Def The Symbolic/Cassirer/Ricoeur: the symbolic denotes the common denominator of all ways of objectifying reality, of giving it meaning. The symbolic seeks above all to express the non-immediateness of our knowledge of reality. I 23 RicoeurVsCassirer: the Kantian transcendentalism (...) harms the work of description and classification of symbolic forms. The problem is that of the unity of language and the interweaving of its multiple functions in a single realm of speech. >Symbol/Ricoeur, >Sense/Ricoeur, >Interpretation/Ricoeur. Ricoeur: this problem seems to me to be better characterized by the term sign (...). >Symbol/Cassirer, >Sign/Ricoeur. RicoeurVsCassirer: What (...) is at stake is the specificity of the hermeneutical problem. By uniting all the functions of mediation under the title "symbolic", Cassirer gives this concept as much scope as he does the concept of reality on the one hand and culture on the other. [The fundamental difference disappeares]: that between unambiguous expressions and ambiguous expressions. >Sense/Ricoeur.	Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976
Catharsis	Aristotle	Gadamer I 136 Catharsis/Tragedy/Aristotle/Gadamer: It seems clear to me that Aristotle is thinking of the tragic melancholy that overcomes the viewer in the face of tragedy. But melancholy is a kind of relief and solution in which pain and lust are strangely mixed. Why can Aristotle call this state a purification? What is the impure that is attached to the affects or that they are, and why is it erased in the tragic shock? The passing of the lament and the shudder is a painful split. >Fear/Aristotle, >Compassion/Aristotle. There is a disagreement with what is happening, a disbelief that rebels against the horrible events. But this is precisely the effect of the tragic catastrophe, that this disagreement with what "is", is dissolving. In this respect it brings about a universal liberation of the cramped chest. One is not only freed from the spell into which the lamentable and horrible nature of this one destiny had held one spellbound, but in one which with one is free from everything that holds one in relation with what disjoints one with what "is". The tragic melancholy thus reflects a kind of affirmation, a return to oneself, and if, as is not uncommon in modern tragedy, the hero is tinged with such tragic melancholy in his own consciousness, he has a little part in such affirmation himself by accepting his fate. >Affirmation/Gadamer.	Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Catharsis	Gadamer	I 136 Catharsis/Tragedy/Aristotle/Gadamer: It seems clear to me that Aristotle is thinking of the tragic melancholy that overcomes the viewer in the face of tragedy. But melancholy is a kind of relief and solution in which pain and lust are strangely mixed. Why can Aristotle call this state a purification? What is the impure that is attached to the affects or that they are, and why is it erased in the tragic shock? The passing of the lament and the shudder is a painful split. >Fear/Aristotle, >Compassion/Aristotle. There is a disagreement with what is happening, a disbelief that rebels against the horrible events. But this is precisely the effect of the tragic catastrophe, that this disagreement with what "is", is dissolving. In this respect it brings about a universal liberation of the cramped chest. One is not only freed from the spell into which the lamentable and horrible nature of this one destiny had held one spellbound, but in one which with one is free from everything that holds one in relation with what disjoints one with what "is". The tragic melancholy thus reflects a kind of affirmation, a return to oneself, and if, as is not uncommon in modern tragedy, the hero is tinged with such tragic melancholy in his own consciousness, he has a little part in such affirmation himself by accepting his fate. >Affirmation/Gadamer.	Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Causal Role	Armstrong	II (b) 40 Causal role/Armstrong: microstructure is semantically not singled out in sentences on arrangements themselves, but via the causal role: that is the solution for "counter-factual fact" if the case never occurs. >Counterfactual conditionals, Truthmakers, >Roles.	Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Causality	Attachment Theory	Corr I 237 Causality/attachment theory/Shaver/Mikulincer: In the earliest studies of infant attachment, Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters and Wall (1978) identified several maternal behaviours during home observations of mother-child interactions that were associated with an infant’s attachment security in the Strange Situation. These behaviours included, for example, being responsive to the infant’s crying, timing of feeding, sensitivity to the infant’s signals and needs, psychological accessibility when the infant was distressed or signalled a need or desire for support and comfort. In subsequent decades, dozens of studies followed up Ainsworth et al.’s (1978)⁽¹⁾ findings and further linked infant attachment security with sensitive maternal behaviour and the quality of paternal care-giving (see Atkinson, Niccols, Paglia et al. 2000⁽²⁾; De Wolff and van IJzendoorn 1997⁽³⁾, for reviews and meta-analyses). Based on this solid evidence, van IJzendoorn and Bakermans-Kranenburg (2004⁽⁴⁾, p. 248) concluded that ‘the causal role of maternal sensitivity in the formation of the infant-mother attachment relationship is a strongly corroborated finding. >About the Attachment theory, >M. Ainsworth. 1. Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E. and Wall, S. 1978. Patterns of attachment: assessed in the Strange Situation and at home. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 2. Atkinson, L., Niccols, A., Paglia, A., Coolbear, J., Parker, K. C. H., Poulton, L., Guger, S. and Sitarenios, G. 2000. A meta-analysis of time between maternal sensitivity and attachment assessments: implications for internal working models in infancy/toddlerhood, Journal of Social and Personal Relationships 17: 791–810 3. De Wolff, M. and van IJzendoorn, M. H. 1997. Sensitivity and attachment: a meta-analysis on parental antecedents of infant attachment, Child Development 68: 571–91 4. van IJzendoorn, M. H. and Bakermans-Kranenburg, M. J. 2004. Maternal sensitivity and infant temperament in the formation of attachment, in G. Bremner and A. Slater (eds.), Theories of infant development, pp. 233–57. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Ceteris paribus	Bigelow	I 222 Ceteris paribus/BigelowVsCeteris paribus/Qualification/Qualified Act/Exceptions/Bigelow/Pargetter: Variant: "if no other disturbances exist": 1. Problem: what threatens to turn a law into a tautology, which ultimately reads: "Things move so and so, unless they do not." >Tautologies. 2. Problem: The scope of a "qualified" law threatens to become so narrow that nothing more falls into that law. >Range. On the other hand, it will be said that a law has no positive authority at all if it is strictly understood. >Laws/Cartwright. Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: one can solve the riddle by understanding how laws contain modalities. >Modalities, >Laws/Bigelow.	Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Change	McTaggart	Geach I 304 Time/Change/McTaggart/Geach: Time is in any case untenable as a mere fourth dimension! For example, according to this view, the different temperatures of a fire-hook would be the same as different temperatures at different points of the time axis of the fire-hook. McTaggart: that would no longer be a change in temperature as it would be a variation of the temperature along the length of the fire hook itself. This also applies to other changes. E.g. this is also the case when you look at the acceleration curve of a car and find that there is a step when putting in the third gear. This problem is thus documented and traceable again. It is no longer anecdotal but can be analyzed. Geach: For example, the growth of a human being would be viewed as the running of a four-dimensional body along its time axis, but there cannot be a change stated here. Change/four-dimensional space-time/Geach: Change is ouright abolished here. The change is reduced to a mere variation of attributes between parts of a whole. Change/McTaggertVsFour-dimensional spacetime: no change means no time! >Fourdimensionalism. I 305 The speech of a time axis is inadequate under these assumptions. This view obliges us to say that time is an illusion. In the four-dimensional absolute reality, there is an arrangement of four-dimensional things that do not change. In our experience there are three-dimensional bodies that are subject to change. >Time.	Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972
Chaos Theorem	Social Choice Theory	Gaus I 243 Chaos Theorem/Social choice theory/D’Agostino: ((s) This is a special case of problems arising from the situation described by >Arrows Theorem): Arrow’s theorem/Example: e.g., Three Individuals (A, B, C) Gaus I 243 and three possible social arrangements (S1 , S2, S3), and (...) individuals' assessments of these arrangements. Given [a specific problematic] 'profile' of preferences (or deliberative judgements) [chosen for the sake of the argument], no merely 'mechanical' procedure of combination will produce a non-arbitrary (and hence legitimately collectively binding) ranking of the alternative social arrangements: Table I of preferences S1: A 1st – B 3rd – C 2nd S2: A 2nd – B 1st – C 3rd S 3: A 3rd – B 2nd - C 1st Procedures: S1/S2 then S3: Winner: S3 S1/S3 then S2: Winner: S2 S2/S3 then S 1: Winner S 1 Problem/D’Agostino: (...) it is clear that, on this profile of preferences, a collectively binding choice can be determined mechanically only on an ethico-politically arbitrary basis - e.g. by fixing the order in which alternatives are compared. Chaos theorem: (...) unless there are strong constraints on 'profiles', it is possible to establish a very general result, known in the literature of social choice as the chaos theorem, according to which, as Melvin Hinich and Michael Munger put it, 'it is possible to construct an agenda, or sequence of comparisons of pairs of alternatives, that leads to any alternative .. Choosing an agenda implies a choice of an outcome' (1997(1): 160—1). The situation is 'chaotic', in particular, because the procedure fails to provide any legitimate basis for distinguishing the alternatives among which individuals are imagined as choosing. Dynamic cycling: This situation is also, of course, chaotic dynamically, in the sense that any coalition to fix a particular procedure, and thus a particular outcome, can be destabilized. (This is called 'cycling' in the social choice literature.) Example: Consider Table I of preferences. Both B and C prefer S3 to Sl , and hence could form a coalition against A to fix the agenda (Sl/S2 then S3) that will deliver S3 as the overall result. But both A and B prefer S2 to S3 and, indeed, since B ranks S2 first, A could plausibly appeal to B to abandon her coalition with C and join him in a coalition against C; and so on ad nauseam (see Mueller, 1989(2): ch. 11.5). >Arrow’sTheorem/D’Agostino. 1. Hinich, Melvin and Michael Munger (1997) Analytical Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Mueller, Dennis (1989) Public Choice 11. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Cinema	Flusser	I 189 Film/Cinema/Flusser: Films are manipulation of stories. This manipulation takes place during production. I 190 Cinemas are reminiscent of theatres, although they have a completely different structure: in the theatre there is a channel, in the cinema one of them falls onto the screen under numerous broadcast rays. The aspects that make the film so different from photography are not as much about sending as they are about receiving. They are illusions provoked by the sender to the receiver. The gesture of filming is different from that of the photographer. >Photography/Flusser. The photographer is constantly changing his location, while the historical ideologist defends his point of view. The core of the codification of the film is the processing with scissors and adhesive. >Code/Flusser. Unlike the camera, the film apparatus is designed to eliminate decisions. He describes circles, zooms, is the indecisive doubt coagulated to material. The operator does not suffer from his doubts, his doubt is a method of making the tape manipulable. >Doubt. The tape consists of a series of dubious points of view and the operator treats it to make a film, a story out of it. Strictly speaking, the standpoint of cinema is a "transhistorical" standpoint. What the operator has in front of him when he cuts and sticks is the "historical time". The film tape is the "pretext" which is recoded in the apparatus operator system. I 193 The operator can intervene in the event in a way that the transcendent God of Jews and Christians is not entitled to: he can reorganize the events. Cf. >Omnipotence, >God. In Aristotle's case, the God is still the motionless mover, the apparatus in which the operator stands above the story is a motionless narrator (the God of Kafka). >History, >Historiography, >Aristotle. I 194 There are two types of action in the film. The one of the actor supplying the raw material and the one of the operator handling this action. For him, the "actors" are not only actors but also illuminators, scriptwriters, etc. The essential thing about film codes is that they push the linear principle to its limits in order to let it get out of whack and show that linear time is a trompe l' oeuil. From the point of view of the new level of consciousness, the transformation of the acting mankind into marionettes seems to reveal the fact that acting people ("the committed ones") can be nothing more than marionettes, because "freedom" does not consist in acting within time, but in the interpretation of this action. >Action, >Time, >Past, >Present, >Future, >Decision. I 205 Film/Flusser: the cinema has a striking resemblance to Plato's cave. One of the very few places where we are still allowed to concentrate. That, and not the content, is what makes cinema the predominant "art" today: you can concentrate on the film. >Plato. I 206 The cinema is architecturally based on the Roman basilica and not on the theatre. In the present it has two heirs (avatars): the supermarket (profan) and the cinema (sacral). I 207 In the cinema, one sits on geometrically arranged and arithmetically numbered chairs (so Cartesian chairs). >Cartesianism. You do not go to the cinema to dream, but you buy the illusion of seeing tech pictures as if they were traditional pictures or texts. The receiver's playing along is semi-conscious, only mala fide it is believed in them. >Pictures, >Texts.	Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996
Citizenship	Welfare Economics	Gaus I 216 Citizenship/Welfare economics/Moon: Because concepts of positive rights and equal opportunity are not well defined outside of specific social contexts, they are often combined with arguments appealing to ideals of citizenship and social solidarity. The basic argument is that the welfare state should guarantee the inclusion of all citizens as full members of a democratic society, which requires that an extensive range of social rights be provided. The reasoning is fairly straightforward: just as citizens must have civil and political rights, they must be guaranteed certain social rights if they are to be full members of a society, and specifically if they are to participate in democratic politics. The key premise in this argument is that citizenship must be universal. All who are capable of intentional or responsible action must be full citizens. The only legitimate basis for exclusion is incapacity for responsible action. T. H. Marshall: T. H. Marshall (1977)⁽¹⁾ offers a classical account of the welfare state as the necessary result of the universal extension of citizenship. He traces the emergence of universal citizenship by observing three successive phases, the first involving the general extension of civil rights, the second the universalization of the suffrage, and the third the growth of the welfare state and the creation of the 'social rights of citizenship'. * Individualism: There are a number of variants of this argument, but a common theme is a deep suspicion of the market and at least certain forms of individualism. Efficiency/solidarity: Whereas arguments from efficiency take the market as a baseline, and justify social policies on the ground that they can correct market failures, arguments from solidarity begin with something close to the opposite assumption - projecting an ideal in which all activities are organized through collective associations, in which individuals are oriented principally towards common needs and aspirations. Social order: Richard Titmuss (1972)⁽²⁾ extols the 'gift relationship', and David Harris (1987)⁽³⁾ speaks of the family as a model for social life. More concretely, Claus Offe (1984)⁽⁴⁾ and Gosta Esping-Andersen (1985)⁽⁵⁾ once expressed the hope that the growth of collective consumption and other forms of decommodification will eventually displace capitalism, leading to a socialist order of society. >Society/David Harris. * Like so much of social science, Marshall's account is blind to issues of gender, as he depicts these phases as a historical succession, the completion or virtual completion of one laying the basis for the realization of the next. His stages describe the gradual extension of the rights associated with citizenship for men, but they ignore the experience of women (and, I might add, other non-class-based exclusions), who often were able to claim various welfare rights (e.g. widows' pensions) before they were entitled to political or even full civil rights. 1. Marshall, T. H. (1977 119501) 'Citizenship and social class'. In his Class, Citizenship, and Social Development. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2. Titmuss, Richard (1972) The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy. New York: Random House. 3. Harris, David (1987) Justifying State Welfare. Oxford: Blackwell. 4. Offe, Claus (1984) Contradictions of the Welfare State. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 5. Esping-Andersen, Gosta (1985) Politics against Markets. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Civil Society	Giddens	Brocker I 872 Civil Society/Giddens: is to emerge from the renewal and society-wide dissemination of local, self-organised initiatives of citizens who, on their own initiative, come together to fulfil tasks in important areas of life in a self-determined manner that simultaneously serve the common good and benefit them themselves. >Society, >Community, >State. The range of fields of action for this civil society commitment is extremely broad and is highlighted in detail in a separate diagram: "Promotion of the non-profit sector" (e.g. in social assistance), "Protection of the local public" (in the ecological sense and with regard to public safety), "Revitalisation of community life" (as a prophylactic fight against crime) and "The democratic family".⁽¹⁾ >Family. Brocker I 873 From a decided opposition to the state, civil society tried there to seize some important functions for the citizens, for example in the areas of education and the public sphere. As a result, civil society can fulfil many of the public functions itself once it is mobilized. >Third Way/Giddens. 1.Anthony Giddens, Der dritte Weg. Die Erneuerung der sozialen Demokratie, Frankfurt/M. 1999, p. 96. Thomas Meyer, „Anthony Giddens, Der dritte Weg“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Classes	Frege	Simons I 102f Class/FregeVsSchröder: a) "Logical" classes: logical classes are value ranges. I 103 b) "Concrete" classes: a calculus of collective classes is just one calculus of a part and whole. VsFrege: >Russell’s paradox - is more vulnerable than Schröder’s "manifolds". >Calculus, >Parts/Wholes, >Value progression.	F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Classification	Mayr	I 133 Classification: Classification usually is done by logical division downwards: how many species are classified and what weight do the different characteristics have: "progressive" or "downwards classification". (Actually identification). >Identification, >Individuation, >Specification. Therefore later: "Upwards classification: hierarchical arrangement of ever-growing groups of related species into classes. >Species. Darwin's method confirmed the upward classification and thus triggered a scientific revolution. >Darwinism, >Evolution. I 134 Classification/20th Century (1950) two new schools: a) Numerical Phenetics b) Cladistics. Cladism: the cladist system is intended to reveal the history of the tribe only, while the evolutionary system strives to form taxa from the most similar and closely related species (useful for ecology and biology). >Ecology. Both species can continue to coexist, because they have very different objectives. I 173 Systematics: not only to describe but to contribute to understanding. I 175 Def Class/Biology/Mayr: Grouping of entities that are similar and related to each other. Classification: two important functions: a) recovery of information b) comparative research. Information storage. 1) Classes should be as homogeneous as possible 2) Attribution according to most common characteristics, 3) If the differences are too great, create a new class 4) The degree of difference between classes is ordered in a hierarchy. I 176 Taxonomy: two steps: 1) Differentiation of species (microtaxonomy). 2) Classification of species into related groups (macrotaxonomy). I 177 Microtaxonomy: The delineation of the species "Species Problem": Species usually means "organism type". Problem: Males and females are also different types of organisms, just like young and adult organisms. Def "Variety": (Linné, even Darwin): Deviations that are slightly smaller than those of a new species. ("typological" or "essential concept of species"). ("Common essence" ("Nature")). >Similarity. "Typological concept of species: four characteristics: 1) Common "nature". 2) Between the species sharp discontinuity 3) Each species is spatially and temporally constant. 4) Possible variation within the species is strictly limited. ("Natural kind"). >Species, >Natural kinds, >Essence, >Essentialism. I 178 MayrVsTypological Concept of Species: Darwin refutes the notion of the "constancy of species". Populations vary geographically, individuals vary within a population. In the animate nature there are no types or essences! Def twin species: (discovered only recently: spatially separated, but equally developed, discovered in almost all animal species), forces a new criterion for the delineatation of species: reproductive isolation of populations. I 178 Biological Concept of Species (VsTypological Concept of Species): derives from this criterion of the lack of reproduction among one another. I 183 Def Species Taxa: special populations or population groups that correspond to the species definition. They are entities ("individuals") and cannot be defined as such. Individuals cannot be defined, but are merely described and delineated. >Definitions, >Definability. I 185 Macrotaxonomy: The classification of species (in superordinate groups) Groups: Usually easily recognizable: birds, butterflies, beetles. Downward classification (actually identification). Dichotomy (Aristotelian), high time of medical botany. E.g. warm-blooded or not warm-blooded, with feathers or not. I 187 Upwards Classification/Mayr: Even Linné himself from 1770 onwards: better suited. Classes are distinguished and then grouped into superordinate groups. Unfortunately no strict methodology. There was no theoretical basis for the hierarchy. Functional Classification: Sub-form of the upwards classification. Only selected features. I 188 Two criteria: genealogy (common descent) and degree of similarity (extent of evolutionary change). Causal classification: E.g. diseases according to causes: pathogen, aging process, toxic substances, genes, malignant changes, harmful radiation, etc. >Causal explanation. Any classification that takes into account the causes is subject to severe restrictions and can never become a purely artificial system. I 189 "Taxon": Separate group of offspring. Each taxon consists of the descendants of the next common ancestor. "Monophyletic". Genealogy: Does not a classification make! Similarity cannot be neglected, because the diverging branches were subject to changes of varying extend. Result: Classification into families, genera, divisions, orders. >Systems, >Theories, >Explanation, >Causes, >Effects, >Single-case causation. Homology/Mayr: Relationship between species and higher taxa is shown by the occurrence of homologous features. I.e. a feature derived from the same feature of its next common ancestor. >Homology. I 373 You must always infer homology! There is a lot of evidence for homology, e.g. position of a structure in relation to other structures, also transitional forms with fossil ancestors. >Evidence.	Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998
Clauses	Lyons	I 180 Clause/Lyons: is a) arranged next to (coordinated) with "and" or "but" etc. its verb is not modified. b) subordinate (subordinated) "subordinate sentence" (by "if", "whether", etc.) here the sentence is modified. >sentences/Lyons. I 182 Clause/Distribution/Sentence/Lyons: For example, the section "if I were you" is not distributionally independent, so it is not a sentence. >distribution/Lyons.	Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995
Climate Change	Singer	I 217 Climate Change/Ethics/P. Singer: what we do to strangers in other communities far away today is much more serious than what we could have done to them if we had the habit of sending a group of fighters to their village. I 218 We can only combat climate change with global measures. What should the ethics on the basis of which we coordinate our actions look like? Natural Resources/Locke/P. Singer: from Locke's point of view, they can be exploited as long as there is enough and of the same quality for everyone. P. Singer: But we have now discovered that the absorption capacity of the atmosphere for greenhouse gases is limited. >J. Locke. I 220 Equal distribution: what can it look like? Principles/Nozick/P. Singer: Nozick makes a sensible distinction between "historical" and "time slices" principles.⁽¹⁾ : Def Historical principle/Nozick: to understand whether a given distribution of goods is fair or unfair, we have to ask how the distribution came about. We need to know its story. Are the parties entitled to ownership on the basis of originally justified acquisition? >Public Goods, >Property. Def two-sided principles/Nozick: consider only the current situations and do not ask about the realization. See also Responsibility/Singer. I 224 Equal burden sharing/pollution/Singer, P: at a UN conference in 2009, Rwandan President Paul Kagame argued for equal per capita burden sharing in the elimination of environmental damage, as all people use the atmosphere to the same extent. Everything else is counterproductive. Sri Lanka made a similar proposal. Singer: this is the application of a time slice principle: Rwanda and Sri Lanka - like other developing countries - do well with it, because they consume less. It is better for them to forego the right to compensation towards industrialised countries. I 231 Climate change/responsibility/individual/Singer, P.: what can I do as an individual? If I change my own behaviour, I can reduce the emission of greenhouse gases astonishingly far. However, this makes no measurable difference on a global scale. But if everyone did it, the effect would be measurable. Then it seems obvious that it is wrong for me personally not to abide by it. >Responsibility. I 232 Question: How about if I orientate my behaviour towards that of other individuals and behave badly, as long as not too many others behave badly as well? Consequentialism: on this question, there is a difference between consequentialists and non-consequentialists. >Consequentialism. Rule-Utilitarianism: would say: the best rule for the individual is not to commit any violation or to accept any damage to the community, even if it is not immediately measurable. Utilitarianism/David Lyons: (D. Lyons 1965.⁽³⁾): Thesis: In such cases, Rule-Utilitarianism coincides with Action-Utilitarianism. Both welcome and reject the same solutions. >Utilitarianism. R. M. Hare: claims the same with reference to Kant's appeal to the idea of a universal right (>Categorical imperative) and argues that this principle leads to Utilitarianism.⁽³⁾ I 233 Brad Hooker: (B. Hooker,2000⁽⁴⁾)): Hooker argues for a version of rule utilitarianism that prevents rules from becoming too complicated. He believes that we are acting wrongly when we break a rule that is part of a set of rules that, if internalised by an overwhelming majority of the population, would have the best consequences. If the rules became too complex, people would find it hard to internalize them. The cost of educating people would be too high. See also Responsibility/Parfit, Responsibility/Ethics//Glover, J., >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York, 1974 2. D. Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism, Oxford, 1965. 3. R. M. Hare,"Could Kant have been a Utilitarian?" Utilitas 5 (1993), pp. 1-16. 4. B. Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World. Oxford, 2000.	SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015
Climate Costs	United States	Norgaard I 178 Climate Costs/Losses/United States: The original United States Environmental Protection Administration (USEPA) studies of the damages from climate change were exclusively concerned with measuring effects in the United States (Smith and Tirpak 1989⁾⁽¹⁾. The analyses examined the consequences of the equilibrium climate that would be caused by doubling carbon dioxide (CO₂) concentrations in the earth (550 ppm). The USEPA studies did not address the dynamics of impacts over time. For example, the coastal, forestry, and ecosystem studies involve sectors that take decades if not centuries to adjust. The studies did not capture how these costs evolved over time. The USEPA studies revealed that a limited number of economic sectors were vulnerable to climate change: agriculture, coastal, energy, forestry, infrastructure, and water. In addition, several non‐market sectors were also vulnerable including recreation, ecosystems, endangered species, and health. Subsequent economic studies attempted to value the US economic damages associated with these impacts in terms of dollars (Nordhaus 1991⁽²⁾; Cline 1992⁽³⁾; Titus 1992⁽⁴⁾; Fankhauser 1995⁽⁵⁾; Tol 1995⁽⁶⁾). These economic results were summarized in the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Pearce et al. 1996)⁽⁷⁾. The aggregate damage estimates to the US for doubling greenhouse gases (550 ppm) range from 1.0 to 2.5 percent of GDP. The damage estimates varied widely across the different authors reviewed even though each author relied on the same original USEPA sectoral studies. Most of the other authors [excluding Cline and Frankhauser] assumed that ecosystem change would not necessarily be this harmful. Norgaard I 179 Climate Costs/Losses: Two studies went beyond the US and predicted impacts across the world (Fankhauser 1995⁽⁵⁾; Tol 1995⁽⁶⁾). Unfortunately, there was little evidence at the time to base this extrapolation upon other than population and income. They predicted global impacts from doubling CO would range from 1.4 to 1.9 percent of Gross World Product (GWP). They predicted that the bulk of these damages would fall on the OECD (60 to 67 percent) because they assumed that damages were proportional to income. Only 20 to 37 percent of the damages were predicted to fall on low latitude countries, although this would amount to a higher fraction of their GDP (over 6 percent). Africa, southern Asia, and southeast Asia (not including China) were predicted to be the most sensitive to warming with losses over 8 percent of GDP (Tol 1995)⁽⁶⁾. If temperatures could rise to 10 °C in future centuries, damages could rise to 6 percent of GWP (Cline 1992)⁽³⁾. Vs: (…) this is based largely on just extrapolating the results of the doubling experiment rather than upon additional research concerning higher temperatures. (…) the current present value of a ton of carbon would lead to damages on the order of $5 to $12 per ton (Pearce et al. 1996)⁽⁷⁾. This is equivalent to $1.4 to $3.3 per ton of carbon dioxide. This social cost of carbon should rise over time at approximately a 2 percent rate to account for the rising marginal damages associated with accumulating greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Such low prices will not stop greenhouse gases from accumulating over this century, they will simply slow them down (Nordhaus 1991)⁽²⁾. Climate Costs/Catastrophes: The IPCC report also considered catastrophe. If temperatures were 6°C warmer by 2090, ‘experts’ predicted an 18 percent chance that damages would be greater than 25 percent of GWP (Nordhaus 1994)⁽⁸⁾. In this case, experts included economists but also natural scientists unfamiliar with damage estimation. The three catastrophes identified in the IPCC report are a runaway greenhouse gas effect, disintegration of the West Antarctic ice sheet, and major changes in ocean currents (Pearce et al. 1996)⁽⁷⁾. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Smith, J., and Tirpak, D. 1989. Potential Effects of Global Climate Change on the United States. Washington, DC: US Environmental Protection Agency. 2. Nordhaus, W. 1991. To slow or not to slow: The economics of the greenhouse effect. Economic Journal 101: 920–37. 3. Cline, W. 1992. The Economics of Global Warming. Washington, DC: Institute of International Economics. 4. Titus, J. G. 1992. The cost of climate change to the United States. In S. Majumdar, L. Kalkstein, B. Yarnal, E. Miller, and L. Rosenfeld (eds.), Global Climate Change: Implications, Challenges, and Mitigation Measures. Easton, PA: Pennsylvania Academy of Sciences. 5. Fankhauser, S. 1995. Valuing Climate Change: The Economics of the Greenhouse. London: Earthscan. 6. Tol, R. 1995. The damage costs of climate change: Towards more comprehensive estimates. Environmental and Resource Economics 5: 353–74. 7. Pearce, D. et al. 1996. The social cost of climate change: Greenhouse damage and the benefits of control. Pp. 179–224 in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 8. Nordhaus, W. 1994. Managing the Global Commons. The Economics of Climate Change. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Mendelsohn, Robert: “Economic Estimates of the Damages Caused by Climate Change”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.	Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011
Climate Data	Climatology	Edwards I 406 Climate data/climatology/Edwards: The purposes, priorities, sources, and character of climate data contrast with those of weather data. The purpose of climate data is to characterize and compare patterns and trends. This requires statistics - averages, maxima, minima, etc. - rather than individual observations. And climate scientists care more about measurement quality, station stability, and the completeness and length of station records than they care about the speed of reporting. >Weather data/metereology, >Climate data/Edwars, >Models/climatology, >Weather forecasting/Edwards. Climatologists use many of the same data sources as forecasters, but they also use many others. Certain kinds of data, such as precipitation measurements or paleoclimatic proxies, are crucial to climatology yet have little relevance to forecasting. Conversely, some kinds of data useful in forecasting play little or no role in climatology. For example, Doppler radar revolutionized Edwards I 407 daily precipitation forecasting, but the data it produces are of little interest to climatologists.⁽¹⁾ When examining pre-twentieth century and paleoclimatic data, climatologists also use numerous “proxy” sources, including data on non-meteorological phenomena that depend strongly on climatic conditions. These data can provide indirect information about past weather conditions. Examples include ice cores, harvest records, tree rings, and species ranges.⁽²⁾ Edwards I 408 Data quality: To control data quality, climatologists may compare one data set with another for the same area, perhaps taken with different instruments (e.g. radiosonde vs. satellite). Metadata - information about station or instrument history, location, etc. - are crucial to this process. Edwards I 411 Temperature changes: In an influential article published in 1953, J. Murray Mitchell dissected the many causes of “long-period” temperature changes in station records, dividing them into two principal types. “Apparent” changes, such as changes in thermometer location or shelters, were purely artifactual, stemming from causes unrelated to the actual temperature of the atmosphere. “Real” changes represented genuine differences in atmospheric conditions. These could be either “directly” or “indirectly” climatic, for example resulting from shifts in the general circulation (direct) or variations in solar output (indirect). But not all “real” temperature changes reflected actual climatic shifts, since some were caused by essentially local conditions (such as urban heat islands, industrial smoke, and local foliage cover) that had nothing to do with the climates of the region or the globe.⁽³⁾ >Homogenization/climatology, >Reanalysis/climatology, >Model bias/climatology. Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Doppler radar can detect falling raindrops, hail, and snow, so it is commonly used for short-term precipitation forecasts. However, the amount of precipitation actually reaching the ground can differ from what radar detects in the atmosphere. For climatological purposes, actual ground-level precipitation is usually all that matters. 2. K. R. Briffa et al., “Tree-Ring Width and Density Data Around the Northern Hemisphere: Part 1, Local and Regional Climate Signals,” The Holocene 12, no. 6 (2002): 737; H. Grudd et al., “A 7400-Year Tree-Ring Chronology in Northern Swedish Lapland: Natural Climatic Variability Expressed on Annual to Millennial Timescales,” The Holocene 12, no. 6 (2002): 657; J. Esper et al., “Low-Frequency Signals in Long Tree-Ring Chronologies for Reconstructing Past Temperature Variability,” Science 295, no. 5563 (2002): 2250–; J. R. Petit et al., “Climate and Atmospheric History of the Past 420,000 Years from the Vostok Ice Core, Antarctica,” Nature 399 (1999): 429–; T. L. Root et al., “Fingerprints of Global Warming on Wild Animals and Plants,” Nature 421, no. 6918 (2003): 57–; T. L. Root and S. H. Schneider, “Ecology and Climate: Research Strategies and Implications,” Science 269, no. 5222 (1995): 334; I. Chuine et al., “Back to the Middle Ages? Grape Harvest Dates and Temperature Variations in France Since 1370,” Nature 432 (2004): 289–. 3. 13. J. M. Mitchell, “On the Causes of Instrumentally Observed Secular Temperature Trends,” Journal of the Atmospheric Sciences 10, no. 4 (1953): 244–.	Edwards I Paul N. Edwards A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming Cambridge 2013
Coase Theorem	Miceli	Parisi I 19 Coase theorem/Miceli: Coase’s original motivation in writing his seminal paper on externalities⁽¹⁾ was to offer a critique of the Pigovian view, which asserted that some form of government intervention (taxes, fines, or liability) was required to internalize external harm, such as that caused by straying cattle or railroad sparks. Causation/Pigou: Absent such intervention, the Pigovian view maintained, the “cause” of the harm (the rancher or the railroad) would over-engage in the harmful activity. CoaseVsPigou: Coase challenged this view by first noting that causation is reciprocal in the sense that both the injurer and victim must be present for an accident to occur. The designation of one party as the “injurer” is therefore arbitrary and in fact represents an implicit awarding of the right to be free from harm to the other party (the “victim”). Pigovian view: (...) the farmer has the right to be free from crop damage - whether from straying cattle or spewing sparks - and so the rancher or the railroad should be compelled to pay the farmer’s cost. Problem: (...) suppose the farmer-victim is in a better position to avoid the harm, say by moving his crops or not locating near the railroad or ranch in the first place. In that case, the designation of the rancher/railroad as the injurer may actually preclude the identification of more efficient ways of avoiding the harm. Coase’s point in raising the causation issue was to evaluate the conditions under which court-imposed liability is needed to internalize the external harm. Suppose, for example, that in the rancher–farmer dispute the court does not intervene to assign liability to the rancher. Does that necessarily mean that the rancher’s herd will expand inefficiently? Marginal benefit/marginal cost: The answer, of course, is no, provided that the parties can bargain, because if bargaining is possible, the farmer would be able to bribe the rancher to reduce the herd to the point where the marginal benefit from the last cow equals the marginal cost. In this case, property rights in straying cattle effectively belong to the rancher, and the farmer has to “purchase” them, which he will do up to the point where the two parties value the last cow equally. VsPigovian view: Note that this is the reverse of what happens under the Pigovian solution, where the farmer is (implicitly) awarded rights to the straying cattle and the rancher has to purchase them by paying the court-imposed damages. Efficiency: In both cases, however, the outcome will be efficient. Coase: This conclusion - that the initial assignment of property rights does not affect the final distribution of resources, which is efficient - is the Coase Theorem. External costs: [Key point]: When the conditions for the Coase Theorem are satisfied - that is, when bargaining is possible - the assignment of liability for external harms does not affect efficiency because the parties will rearrange any initial assignment of rights to the point where the gains from trade are exhausted. In this sense, the law does not matter for efficiency (though it does affect the distribution of wealth).* Law: When bargaining is not possible, in contrast, the law does matter because the parties will not be able to rearrange inefficient assignments of rights. As a result, the law must be designed with the explicit goal of efficiency in mind. In this way, the Coase Theorem defines the efficient scope for legal intervention (Demsetz, 1972)⁽²⁾. >Liability/Calabresi/Melamed. * The conclusion that the efficient allocation of resources will be achieved regardless of the initial assignment of legal rights mirrors the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics, which says that market exchange will be efficient regardless of how property rights are initially assigned. The >Coase Theorem thus shows that externalities need not preclude this outcome as long as bargaining costs are low. Cf. >Liability/Calabresi/Melamed. 1. Coase, Ronald (1960). “The Problem of Social Cost.” Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1–44. 2. Demsetz, Harold (1972). “When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?” Journal of Legal Studies 1: 13 - 28. Miceli, Thomas J. „Economic Models of Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press.	Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Code	Flusser	I 82 Codes/Flusser: The rules that arrange the symbols within a code form the network on which the info becomes information in the first place. >Information, >Meaning, >Symbol, >Sign, >Order. In English, this network is formed inter alia by the rule subject predicate. Therefore, all the information in this code becomes information about the relation subject predicate. >Grammar, >Syntax, >Predication, >Sentences, >Language, >Convention. Chinese or Eskimo languages are different "universes". >Translation, >Meaning. In an extreme example of "Fire!" they seem to be falling apart. The information "There's a fire!" is another, depending on whether it is called or transmitted by ringing bells. I 84 ff Codes/Flusser: a) Pre-alphabet b) Alphabet c) Post-alphabet Code functionality: a) Texts b) Images c) Technical pictures >Terminology/Flusser, >Techno-images/Flusser, >Images, >Texts. Pre-alphabet: Since every spoken language consists of far more tones than letters, the relationship between letters and tone is not unambiguous: a letter can mean more than one tone. >Phonemes, >Morphemes. For example, the "e" in "prayer" means two different sounds. On the other hand,"k" and "c" can be the same sound. I 85 The symbols § $ "2" are ideograms which have been transferred from other codes (arithmetic, legal, monetary) into the alphabet. For these and many other reasons, the alphabet must be considered an erroneous, hybrid code that is difficult to use for communication. >Communication. Letters: had formerly names: "Alpha": Aramaic,"ox" "Beta":"house". I 86 Such names indicate that the letters must have meant objects rather than sounds. I 105 Codes/Flusser: are dangerous: they program us without being seen through in their essence and threaten us as opaque walls instead of connecting us to reality as visible bridges.	Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996
Code	Lessig	I 81f Code/Lessig: The issue here is how the architecture of the Net—or ist “code”—itself becomes a regulator. In this context, the rule applied to an individual does not find its force from the threat of consequences enforced by the law—fines, jail, or even shame. I 82 A locked door is a physical constraint on the liberty of someone to enter some space. I 93 [This kind of code] is not just written rules; it is not just custom; it is not just the supply and demand of a knowing consuming public.What makes [e.g.] AOL is in large part the structure of the space.You enter AOL and you find it to be a certain universe. This space is constituted by its code. You can resist this code—you can resist how you find it, just as you can resist cold weather by putting on a sweater. But you are not going to change how it is. I 139 By “open code” I mean code (both software and hardware) whose functionality is transparent at least to one knowledgeable about the technology. By “closed code”, I mean code (both software and hardware) whose functionality is opaque. One can guess what closed code is doing; and with enough opportunity to test, one might well reverse engineer it. But from the technology itself, there is no reasonable way to discern what the functionality of the technology is. I personally have very strong views about how code should be created. But whatever side you are on in the “free vs. proprietary software” debate in general, in at least the contexts I will identify here, you should be able to agree with me first, that open code is a constraint on state power, and second, that in at least some cases, code must, in the relevant sense, be “open.” I 149 The code is regulable only because the code writers can be controlled. […]An unmovable, and unmoving, target of regulation, then, is a good start toward regulability. And this statement has an interesting corollary: Regulable code is closed code. I 150 To the extent that code is open code, the power of government is constrained.Government can demand,government can threaten, but when the target of its regulation is plastic, it cannot rely on its target remaining as it wants. […] Books are open code: They hide nothing; they reveal their source—they are their source! A user or adopter of a book always has the choice to read only the I 151 chapters she wants. Closed code functions differently. With closed code, users cannot easily modify the control that the code comes packaged with.Hackers and very sophisticated programmers may be able to do so, but most users would not know which parts were required and which parts were not. Or more precisely, users would not be able to see the parts required and the parts not required because the source code does not come bundled with closed code.Closed code is the propagandist’s best strategy—not a separate chapter that the user can ignore, but a persistent and unrecognized influence that tilts the story in the direction the propagandist wants. I 152 If the world becomes certificate-rich, regulability still increases. The same conclusion follows if more code were burned into hardware rather than left to exist as software. Then, even if the code were open, it would not be modifiable. (1) I 175 […]something fundamental has changed: the role that code plays in the protection of intellectual property. Code can, and increasingly will, displace law as the primary defense of intellectual property in cyberspace. Private fences, not public law. I 276 My vote in each context may seem to vary. With respect to intellectual property, I argue against code that tracks reading and in favor of code that guarantees a large space for an intellectual commons. In the context of privacy, I argue in favor of code that enables individual choice—both to encrypt and to express preferences about what personal data is collected by others. Code would enable that choice; law could inspire that code. In the context of free speech, however, I argue against code that would perfectly filter speech— it is too dangerous, I claim, to allow perfect choice there. Better choice, of course, is better, so code that would empower better systems of reputation is good, as is code that would widen the legitimate range of broadcasting. The aim in all three contexts is to work against centralized structures of choice. In the context of filtering, however, the aim is to work against structures that are too individualized as well. I 323 Jean CampVsLessig: Jean Camp, a Harvard computer scientist who taught in the Kennedy School of Government, said that I had missed the point. The problem, she said, is not that “code is law” or that “code regulates. LessigVsVs: Of course, for the computer scientist code is law. And if code is law, then obviously the question we should ask is:Who are the lawmakers? I 324 But to a lawyer, both Camp and I, throughout this book, have made a very basic mistake. Code is not law, any more than the design of an airplane is law. (See Internet Law/Lessig). I 328 Does this mean that we should push for open rather than closed code? Does it mean that we should ban closed code? The best code (from the perspective of constitutional values) is both modular and open. Modularity ensures that better components could be substituted for worse. And from a competitive perspective, modularity permits greater competition in the development of improvements in a particular coding project. I 329 The law prefers opaque to transparent code; it constructs incentives to hide code rather than to make its functionality obvious. […] Our law creates an incentive to enclose as much of an intellectual commons as possible. It works against publicity and transparency, and helps to produce, in effect, a massive secret government. […] But the inertia of existing law—which gives software manufacturers effectively unlimited terms of protection—works against change. The politics are just not there. 1. I am grateful to Hal Abelson for this point.	Lessig I Lawrence Lessig Code: Version 2.0 New York 2006ff
Coextensive	Carnap	VI 43/4 Def Coextensive/Carnap: coextensive properties belong to the same class - pre-range: class of possible antecedents. Def homogenous: is a relation, if pre- and post-range are isogenous. Def constitute: reduce a concept to another one (reduction) - Problem: transformation rule. >Element relation, >Comprehension, >Sets, >Set theory, >Subsets. --- VI 48 Def Logical Complex/Carnap: if an object can be reduced to another one, we call it a complex of the other objects. Classes and relations are complexes. They do not consist of their elements. >Complex/Carnap.	Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982
Cognition	Maturana	I 67 Def Cognitive Area/Maturana: entire interaction area of the body - can be extended indefinitely when new forms of interaction are created, it is enlarged with instruments. >Actions, >Domains/Maturana. I 78 Described things lie exclusively in the cognitive area - i.e. it is not part of the area that is to describe - (level) >Description levels. I 81 Cognition/Maturana: generation of a closed interaction area, not comprehension of an independent outside world. >Outer world, >Exterior/interior. Conclusion: Conclusions are necessary function results from the self-referential circular organization. - They are history-independent, because time itself is only part of the cognitive area of the ((s) second) observer. >Observation/Maturana, >Circularity, >Self-reference, >Time. I 146 Cognition/Maturana: Isolation of an area and call for appropriate behavior - only criterion: this appropriate behavior - it must be explained when cognition must be explained. >Explanation/Maturana. I 200 Cognition/Maturana: condition of realization (of the structural coupling) - not unveiling a reality, representation or description of "something". >Structural coupling, >Reality, >Representation. I 202 Cognitive Area/Maturana: with humans: language - humans exist in the range of objects that produce themselves through language actions - objects: do not exist outside language >Language, >Objects, >Domains/Maturana.	Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000
Cognition	Rorty	VI 46/47 Cognitive condition/Wright/RortyVsWright: for him, a speaker should function like a well-oiled machine. - This is traditional epistemology according to which prejudice and superstition are just sand in the works. >Epistemology, >Knowledge, >World/thinking, >Thinking. According to Wright we would have to recognize the right functions a priori. - Through knowledge of the content. PragmatismVsCognitivity: nothing more than contingent consensus. - For them, content is not important. >Content, cf. >Cognitive psychology, >Pragmatism. VI 51 Cognitition/cognitivity/cognitive/fact/Wright/Rorty: Wright’s cognitive commandment: Advantage: We do not need reified facts. - Instead: Reference on range of possible causes. ((s) Cognition makes facts superfluous.) Vs: Problem: that presupposes a concept of the mode of operation of a representation machine. VI 429f Cognitition/language/Rorty: cognition is not possible without language. - Therefore there is a gap between sensation and cognition. Certainly there is a causal continuity between experience and thought - but it also exists between nutrition and thinking. >World/thinking, >Representation.	Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Cognitive Psychology	Social Psychology	Haslam I 231 Cognitive Psychology/Social psychology: Studies of social influence, attitude change and group dynamics had dominated the field of social psychology for the 20 years before 1970. Even though social psychology had always studied mental life, and had avoided the behaviourist domination of experimental psychology that had seen the near banishment of the study of mental phenomena from the psychological laboratory, in the late 1960s and early 1970s a new approach that became known as ‘cognitive psychology’ was starting to dominate psychology. Many cognitive psychologists were armed with the metaphor of the person as a faulty information-processing device and this idea was imported into social psychology in the 1970s. This metaphor implied that as people processed information about the world around them, they made a series of errors (in particular, because they had limited processing capacity) and these had a range of unintended and unfortunate consequences. >Information processing/social psychology. Craig McGarty, „Stereotype Formation. Revisiting Hamilton and Gifford’s illusory correlation studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications	Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Coincidence	Lewis	V 111 Coincidence/Lewis: If coincidences did not supervene on facts (LewisVs), then no theories of coincidence - ((s)Vs: not if Definition coincidence/(s): not independence but range of possible reaction - Lewis: a different pattern would bring about an entirely different theory - then the theory of coincidence itself is not something that has a certain chance - Important argument: then several possible worlds are not something that has different story chance conditionals. Then the theory of coincidence would be necessary (for each possible world). Then it is just about historical information. >Possible world/Lewis, >Information/Lewis. Problem: if I know the pre-history, there is only one reasonable belief function. LewisVs: 1) so little room for maneuvre is not reasonable 2) it is unlikely that the properties of the world should not supervene on certain facts. V 175 Coincidence/Causing/Lewis: even random events are caused. >Event/Lewis, >Fact/Lewis, >Causation/Lewis.	Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Collective Action	Public Choice Theory	Parisi I 182 Collective action/Public choice theory/Farber: (…) public choice theory focuses on collective action problems where individual goals cannot be easily reconciled or coordinated. Collective action problems may be present because of the difficulty of mobilizing and coordinating individual actors, so that the necessary cooperative effort is not forthcoming. Groups: Once a group has formed, however, there are also inherent difficulties that attend translating the preferences of the group's members into a collective decision. VsPublic choice theory: early work on public choice tended to view the pitfalls of collective action as a justification for minimizing the role of government. But current public choice scholars tend to be more interested in how institutions evolve to cope with these pitfalls. Models: The new models are both more sophisticated and more complex. They Parisi I 183 include multiple strategic players, each of whom is attempting to influence final outcomes through a multi-stage policy process. In these newer models, outcomes are not simply a function of the inputs to political institutions—the preferences of voters, interest groups, and politicians. Instead, outcomes also depend critically on institutional structures. As Shepsle (2010)⁽¹⁾ puts it, institutions, not just individual preferences, matter for collective results" (p. 357). Institutions: But the effects of institutional structures are not always straightforward. For instance, an actor may sometimes be able to achieve better results when the actor's freedom of action is limited in some way than the actor could obtain with a fuller range of choices. This may seem paradoxical, but the paradox dissolves when we realize that other actors' behavior may change favorably for the actor because of the change.* Cooperation/problems: 1) The first difficulty that plagues collective action centers on failure to cooperate. The political sphere is rife with opportunities for free-riding. Everyone may benefit from a new statute. Yet, they can enjoy its benefits regardless of whether they contributed to its passage. Hence, there is an incentive to free-ride by letting others carry the burden of obtaining the new legislation. As a result, collective action may fail to take place at all. Or it may be warped because those individuals who do overcome the barriers to a collective action problem may have interests that differ from those of the non-participants. 2) Arrow’s theorem: The second fundamental difficulty in collective action is the inherent difficulty of aggregating individual preferences. Arrow's Theorem (Arrow, 1951)⁽³⁾ sparked a body of literature proving that any method of aggregating preferences is necessarily flawed. Ranking/Arrow: For instance, as Arrow proved, it is impossible to have a method for ranking outcomes from best to worst in which no individual is a dictator, outcomes are based purely on individuals' rankings of options, and a unanimous choice will always prevail against its alternative (Mueller, 2003⁽⁴⁾, pp. 5 82—590; Shepsle, 2010⁽¹⁾, pp. 67-76). >Arrow’s theorem/D’Agostino, >Governmental structures/Public choice theory. * For instance, the President may sometimes be able to achieve his policy goals more freely by agreeing to a restriction on his control over an agency, if doing so leads Congress to delegate more power to the agency (Gersen, 2010)⁽²⁾. 1. Shepsle, K. A. (2010). Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions. 2nd edition. New York: W.W. Norton & co. 2. Gersen, J. E. (2010). "Designing Agencies," in D. A. Farber and A. J. O'Connell, eds., Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law, 3 33—361. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 3. Arrow, K. J. (1951). social Choice and Individual values. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 4. Mueller, D. C. (2003). Public Choice 111. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Farber, Daniel A. “Public Choice Theory and Legal Institutions”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press	Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Colour	Wright	I 164 Color/Supervenience/Wright: Color supervenes other physical properties: E.g. there is a chaotic variety of physical conditions which is illustrated by scarlet things. >Supervenience. This conception is therefore weaker than that according to which color words have the semantics of concepts for natural kinds. >Stronger/weaker, >Natural kinds. It's the commitment to the idea that physically identical objects share their color, even if one of the objects offers the "best" conditions and the others don't. This supervenience is therefore, as it were, a force towards the uniqueness of color concepts. >Unabiguity, >Colour words. I 169 Color/Wright: However, I do not want to go so far as to assert that color predicates are semantically concepts for natural kinds. That would also be inconsistent with the thesis that the extension is partially determined by the best opinion. >Best explanation/Wright. Color/Wright: for our everyday understanding of color words there is no such risk (that there is nothing red): if it turned out that there are no interesting physical properties that red things have in common, then we learn by that that red things are, in fact, not a natural species, but that there are still indeed infinitely many red things. >Generality. This statement is, however, entirely consistent with the belief that red things do indeed have interesting physical properties in common! >Similarity, >Properties. The explanatory intuition does not have to be more than an epiphenomenon of the presumed accuracy of the conviction that something in which redness physically consists actually exists and that it is one of the reasons for the fact that there are best judgments about that which is red. >Euthyphro contrast/Wright, >Epiphenominology. --- II 247 Color Predicates/sorites/vagueness/Wright: a color word is not like "two meters long", but "less than two meters" (length ranges). Criterion: still measuring! But we can also say without measuring what the result would be. Solution/Wright: Actual distinction between cases where we can judge by eyesight, and cases where we cannot - then still observation predicates - which other base should this distinction provide? Crispin Wright: thesis: the methodological approach must be completely behavioristic and anti-reflexive. >Behaviorism, >Perception, >Sensory impressions, >Judgments.	WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Communication	Davidson	McDowell I 211 Communication/Language/Davidson: there is no "medium" here. Except in the sense of "smoke signals", sounds, etc. Language is at best a match of idiolects. All understanding is a special case of radical interpretation. >Radical interpretation/Davidson. "Common Language" is nothing more than the tool of cognitive activity, which could also do without it. Glüer II 58 Language/communication/meaning/Davidson/Glüer: there are two possible interpretations of the thesis of "communication without regularity": a strong one and a weak one. 1. strong demand: always use the word "capacity" in the way you want to be understood. Comprehensibility would be bound to following lexical norms. Davidson: is right: even if Mrs. X uses the word only once in the wrong way, we understand it perfectly. Comprehensibility may be difficult in practice, but theoretically it is not at risk. We cannot formulate a single lexical norm that the speaker must necessarily adhere to. 2. weak: as long as the radical interpretation should ensure the accessibility of the foreign idiolect, it must show a certain weak regularity internally. >Idiolect. DavidsonVs: the radical reading of "A nice derangement", however, denies this weak regularity. II 59 Problem: the theory of interpretation would lose its empirical character, the concept of statement intention would also remain puzzling. For it is still true that the interpreter has no other data for the determination of intentions than for meanings. They result from the same original interpretation process. "This characterization of linguistic competence is circular enough not to be wrong".(1986⁽¹⁾, p. 445). 1. Davidson, D. "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs" in: LePore, E. (ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, New York 1986.	Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993
Communitarianism	Lamont	Gaus I 233 Communitarianism/Lamont: Communitarians and feminists have (...) questioned the nature of persons and autonomy that is the celebrated core of liberalism. Communitarians see individuals as largely the products of culture, rather than as autonomous individuals who choose freely by exercising an objective capacity to reason (Mulhall and Swift, 1996⁽¹⁾; Taylor, 1985a⁽²⁾; 1985b⁽³⁾). >Subjects, >Free will, >Actions, >Individuals, >Individualism, >Liberalism. The dialogue growing out of the communitarian critique, along with the response of Rawls and other liberals, has coincided with political movements in Western democracies to respond to the myriad of issues raised by the realities of multiculturalism and feminism Lsee further Chapter 191. This body of literature discusses justice as much in terms of cultural recognition as in terms of resource distribution (Taylor, 1994⁽⁴⁾; Willet, 1998⁽⁵⁾). Method/content/principles: Communitarians oppose the methodology, but not necessarily the content, of liberalism. They represent a range of positions that specify a methodology, a style of justification, and a theory of the nature of persons. nature of persons. Relativism: Communitarians, along with Marxists, emphasize the relevance of the particular history, culture, class struggles, and community interests to the content and justification of distributive principles. Hence, they tend to be moral relativists. >Relativism, >Cultural relativism. Walzer: A communitarian liberal, then, such as Michael Walzer (1983)⁽⁶⁾, is someone who, for some particular society, will argue for liberal institutions on communitarian grounds. CommunitarianismVsLiberalism: One clear strand in the communitarian critique is the claim that whatever principles are proposed from a liberal-style methodology will be too vague and abstract to be of any practical use, and at the same time, that they will tend to be oppressive in so far as they ignore the ideals actually arising from real political and cul- tural histories (Fisk, 1989⁽⁷⁾; Walzer, 1983⁽⁶⁾; Willet, 1998⁽⁵⁾; Young, 2000⁽⁸⁾). Theorizing about distributive justice, for these thinkers, must be largely empirical and relativistic. 1. Mulhall, Stephen and Adam Swift, eds (1996) Liberals and Communitarians. Cambridge: Blackwell. 2. Taylor, Charles (1985a) Human Agency and Language. New York: Cambridge University Press. 3. Taylor, Charles (1985b) Philosophy and the Human Sciences. New York: Cambridge University Press. 4. Taylor, Charles (1994) Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Universtiy Press. 5. Willet, Cynthia, ed. (1998) Theorizing Multiculturalism. Oxford: Blackwell. 6. Walzer, Michael (1983) Spheres of Justice. Oxford: Martin Robertson. 7. Fisk, Milton (1989) The State and Justice: An Essay in Political Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 8. Young, Iris Marion (2000) Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lamont, Julian 2004. „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Community	Rawls	I 521 Social Community/Social Union/Rawls: Hegel's legal philosophy, §§ 182-187, discusses preforms. >Philosophy of law/Hegel, >G.W.F. Hegel. Rawls: the members of a private community, whether individuals or associations, have their own private goals that are either competing or independent of each other. Anyway, they do not complement each other. Institutions here do not assume that they have a value, their activities are not seen as good but at best as a burden. Each person therefore only joins the community in pursuit of his or her own goals. No one takes note of someone else's possessions or goods, but prefers the most efficient arrangement that gives them the greatest advantage. Public goods consist primarily of the framework conditions provided by the state. I 522 Community members are not driven by the need to behave fairly, so the system of functioning requires sanctions. Social nature/Rawls: the social nature of the human being is best seen as a counter-image to the private community outlined above: People do indeed share common goals and they value the shared institutions and public goods as something good in itself. We need each other as partners I 523 ...in many aspects of life and the successes and experiences of others are part of our own social life. See Aristotelian Principle, >Principles/Rawls, >Community/Humboldt. Rawls: We can follow Humboldt and say that the social community makes it possible for everyone to participate in the whole of the realized possibilities of the other members. I 527 Justice/Community/Rawls: in order to understand how the principles of justice are connected with human socialization, we can imagine a well-ordered society as a social community of social communities. Collective intentions then arise as a consequence of the fact that everyone expects everyone (including themselves) to behave according to the principles of justice. I 528 The individual lives of individuals are, so to speak, plans within an overall plan of the community, but this overall plan does not set a superordinate goal, as e.g. in the case of a religious association, let alone any national prestige. Rather, it is a matter of the constitutional order implementing the principles of justice. I 529 Division of labour: will of course not be abolished in a social community. After all, it's about the opportunity for each member to bring in his or her individual skills. However, it is never possible for everyone to realize their skilss to an unlimited extent. >Division of labour.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Compactness	Logic Texts	Read III 59 Compactness: the classic logical conclusion is compact. To understand this, we must acknowledge that the set of premises can be infinite. Classically, every logical truth (of which there are infinite numbers) is a conclusion from any statement. This can be multiplied, by double negation, the conjunction of itself with its double negation, and so on. III 60 The classical compactness does not mean that a conclusion cannot have an infinite number of premises, it can. But classically it is valid exactly when the conclusion follows from a finite subset of the premises. Compactness limits the expressiveness of a logic. Proof: is performed purely syntactically. In itself, the proof has no meaning. Its correctness is defined based on its form and structure. >Proof. III 61 The counterpart of proof is completeness: there should be a derivation. >Incompleteness/logic texts. III 61 The Omega rule (>Incompleteness/logic texts) is not accepted as a rule of orthodox, classical proof theory. How can I do this? According to classical representation, a rule is valid if the premises are true and the conclusion is false by no interpretation over any range of definition. How can the premises A₍₀₎,A₍₁₎ etc. was, but be false for each n,A_(n)? III 61/62 The explanation lies in the limitation of the expressiveness. In non-compact logic, there may be a categorical set of formulas for arithmetic, but the proof methods require compactness. For expressiveness: >Richness, >Meta language, >Object language. Difference compact/non compact: classical logic is a 1st order logic. A categorical set of axioms for arithmetic must be a second order logic. ((s) quantifiers also for properties). >Quantifier, cf. >Schematic letters. For example, Napoleon had all the properties of a great general: "for every quality f, if for every person x, if x was a great general, then x had f, then Napoleon had f". In reality it is a little more subtle. For syntactically one cannot distinguish whether a formula is like the 1st or 2nd level above. >2nd order logic.	Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Competition	Baumol	Sobel I 17 Competition/Baumol/Sobel/Clemens: Since the days of Adam Smith, the key concern in thinking about the differences among market types is the level of competition among firms, which is thought to be a force that disciplines the behaviour of businesses. Put simply, when firms are in greater competition With other firms they tend to provide better prices, quality, and customer service, and be more innovative and effcient. As is best summarized by noted economist William Baumol in his presidential address to the American Economic Association, „standard analysis leaves us With the impression that there is a rough continuum, in terms of desirability of industry performance, ranging from unregulated pure monopoly as the [worst] arrangement to perfect competition as the ideal, with [desirability] increasing as the number of firms expands. „(Baumol, 1982: 2)⁽¹⁾ Sobel/Clemens: At one extreme on this continuum of competition are markets or industries described as having "perfect competition" (lots of firms competing with identical products), while at the other are markets that are a monopoly (dominated by one firm). >Perfect competition. Generally, economists also consider two additional markets in the middle of the continuum often called "monopolistic competition" (lots offirms competing but with products or services that are differentiated from one another) and "oligopoly" (a few large rival firms). >Monopolistic competition. Each market has specific properties that identify and differentiate it. But, for simplicity's sake, as Baumol states, we can generally conclude simply that markets with more small firms are better (or more effcient) than those with fewer large firms. SchumpeterVsBaumol/SchumpeterVsTradition: Joseph Schumpeter was one of the first economists to question this standard description and indeed viewed this traditional framework as being somewhat misleading. >Competition/Schumpeter. 1. Baumol, William J. (1982). Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure. American Economic Review 72, 1: 1–15. , as of September 4, 2019.	EconBaum I William J. Baumol John C. Panzar Robert D. Willig, Contestable markets and the theory of industry structure New York 1982 EconBaum II William J. Baumol David F. Bradford Optimal departures from marginal cost pricing 1970 Sobel I Russell S. Sobel Jason Clemens The Essential Joseph Schumpeter Vancouver 2020
Complexes/Complexity	Geach	I 103 Compound Expressions/Complex Terms/Relative Clause/Geach: Problem: no merely simple predicate corresponds to the relative clause; - it is ambiguous to whom "someone", "he" or "anyone" refers. >Relative clause, >Clauses. Range: can be deceptive: E.g. A woman admired by all natives is beautiful/his wife. >Reference, >Identification/Geach, >Pronoun, >Anaphora, >Scope, Russell: a "denoting expression" must be radically paraphrased. - Geach ditto. >Denotation/Russell, >Denotation/Geach. I 106 Compound expressions/complex terms/relative clause/Geach: the relationship pronoun-antecedent is analogous to the relationship variable-operator - it is ambiguous. >Ambiguity, >Variables, >Operators. Solution: resolution by additional pronouns: "if", "and", etc. - ((s) It is not about unity, but about dissolving the unity.) Symbolic Language/Geach: (e.g. set theory): a symbolic language can dissolve unity by definition: E.g. "y belongs to the class of Ps": differs depending on whether with equal sign or epsilon: >"for a class x, y belongs to x, and if something belongs to x, it is P". E.g. wrong: "only a woman who has lost all sense of shame gets drunk". >Formal language, >Extensionality. Correct: a woman only gets ... when she..." otherwise it follows: "Men never get drunk."	Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972
Complexes/Complexity	Gould	III 140 Complex systems (e. g. sports teams) improve if their best performers play according to the same rules over a longer period of time. When a system improves, it reaches equilibrium and the range of variation decreases. III 183 Complexity/Gould: thesis: we will have to consider the complexity of the living and its historical development as a change in the entire system of variation. The apparent progress in the history of life comes about through falsification: presumably there is no average tendency to progress in the individual lines of descent at all. III 184 Development: in a system of straight-line movements limited on one side, random movement without favouring a direction inevitably causes the average position to move away from the point of origin on the wall. III 205 Complexity/Gould: thesis: the increase in complexity is not a real process. The findings as such cannot support such a theory, because in most habitats the simple forms are as prevalent today as they were in the past. (>Description levels). Complexity/GouldVsHuxley, Th. H.: the "achieved upper limit" is not a measure of a "higher degree of organization in general". III 245 Complexity/Gould: I would rather assume a slight natural overweight towards decreasing complexity in evolution. Arguments for higher complexity: there are alleged benefits in competition for resources (GouldVs). Why should it be more useful? Higher complexity can be combined with less flexibility. III 249 Definition complexity: complexity is the function of the number of its different parts and the irregularity of their arrangement, e.g. scrap yards, compost heaps. Opposite of complexity: opposite of complexity there is order, which is homogeneous and redundant, e. g. palisade fences. Complexity/evolution: e. g. there are different vertebrate sizes in vertebrates. There are two different trends: 1. the distance from the left edge (simpleness), or 2. the extension from the left edge, which is maintained. >Order.	Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989
Computers	Gershenfeld	Brockman I 166 Brain/computers/Gershenfeld: (…) both brains and computer chips are hard to understand by watching their inner workings; they’re easily interpreted only by observing their external interfaces. We come to trust (or not) brains and computer chips alike based on experience that tests them rather than on explanations for how they work. >Review, >Verification, >Function, >Functional explanation. Brockman I 167 What’s interesting about amino acids is that they’re not interesting. They have attributes that are typical but not unusual, such as attracting or repelling water. But just twenty types of them are enough to make you. In the same way, twenty or so types of digital-material part types - conducting, insulating, rigid, flexible, magnetic, etc. - are enough to assemble the range of functions that go into making modern technologies like robots and computers. >Robots, >Technology. Gershenfeld, Neil „Scaling”, in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press.	Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019
Computers	Zittrain	I 12 Computer/Zittrain: First, there was the First, there was the large-scale Hollerith model of mainframes managed by a single firm like IBM. These computers had general-purpose processors inside, capable of a range of tasks, and IBM’s programming team devised the software that the customer needed to fulfill its goals. The second type of computing devices was information appliances: devices hardwired for a particular purpose. […]Information appliances were substantially cheaper and easier to use than mainframes, thus requiring no ongoing rental and maintenance relationship with a vendor. However, they could do only the tasks their designers anticipated for them. I 13 PC makers were selling potential functionality as much as they were selling actual uses, and many makers considered themselves to be in the hardware business only. To them, the PCs were solutions waiting for problems. The essence—and genius—of separating software creation from hardware construction is that the decoupling enables a computer to be acquired for one purpose and then used to perform new and different tasks without requiring the equivalent of a visit to the mechanic’s shop.¹ >Software, >Hardware. 1. WINN L. ROSCH, THE WINN L. ROSCH HARDWARE BIBLE 35-38 (6th ed. 2003).	Zittrain I Jonathan Zittrain The Future of the Internet--And How to Stop It New Haven 2009
Concepts	Geach	I 26ff Concept/Frege/Geach: the meaning of "people" is not "many people", but the concept. I 220 Concept/GeachVsFrege: Frege: "The concept horse is not a concept" - i.e. it must be an object: this is a fallacy! - Not objects are realized, but concepts. - (The former is not falsehood, but nonsense). >Description level, >Level/Order, >Senseless, >Object. >Correct: E.g. "The concept human being is realized" is divided into "human being" and "the concept ... is realized" - the latter = "something is a...". What cannot be divided like this, is meaningless: E.g. "the concept human being is timeless". I 226 Concept/Frege/Geach: Frege has a purely extensional view - therefore he deals not with the "sense of the name", but the reference of the predicate. ((s) reference/(s): set of designated objects = extension.) >Extension. But: Extension/Frege/Geach: = object Concept/Frege: not an object! Reason: the concept is unsaturated, the object is saturated. >Saturated/unsaturated/Frege. "Red" does not stand for a concept, otherwise the concept would be a name. >Name/Frege. I 228f Concept/Geach: "The concept horse" is not a concept, because otherwise concepts would have names - (...+...) - Nor is a concept a logical unit. - No more than e.g. "Napoleon was a great general and the conqueror of Napoleon was a great general". - E.g. "A man is wise" is not an instance of "___ is wise" ("a man" is not a name), but of a derived predicate "a ... is wise". Sentence/Geach: sentences from which "the concept of human being" cannot be eliminated are pointless! - E.g. "The concept human being is an abstract entity". - Sentences about concepts need a quantifier. >Quantifier, >Quantification, >Sentence/Geach. I 230 Concept/Geach: a concept cannot have a proper name. - Instead, we refer the concept with the predicate. >Predicate/Geach, >Predicate/Frege. VsFrege: he uses pseudo-proper names for concepts: "The extension of the concept x cut the throat of x'." Pseudo-name: "the concept x cut x". >Names/Geach. Geach: correct: the name of the extension is "the range of x for x cut the throat of x'." I 234 Concept/Object/Quine: the distinction between concept and object is unnecessary! >Concept/Quine, >Object/Quine. GeachVsQuine: it is necessary! - Quine's disguised distinction between class and element corresponds to it. >Element relation/Quine, >Class/Quine.	Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972
Concepts	Strawson	I 163 Monad/Strawson: simplest form: the concept of an x, that... - but not determined by the relative clause, but the concept of these things. E.g. the concept of a person who has killed a man: Universal, but no monad. Because it is not a complete concept. >Universals, >Complete concept. Strawson: in the real world a complete description is completely meaningless. >Description, >Completeness, >Situation, >Fact. I 164 Complete Concept/Leibniz/Strawson: classes can be formed from complete descriptions if the descriptions given by the relative clause contain in both cases identical, but differently arranged elements. >Relative clause.	Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Conclusions	Logic Texts	I 165 Inference/Hoyningen-Huene: the mechanisms of the conclusion are warrranted not by repeatedly occurring terms, but by the words "all" and "some". >"All", >"Some", cf. >Distribution. Read III 66 Conclusion/Read: The logical conclusion is a matter of form. A statement is a logical conclusion from others if all statements of the same form are conclusions from other statements of the same form. And a formula is a conclusion from others if there is no range of definition and no interpretation of the schematic letters, which makes one false and the other true. III 67 Necessity: the classical criterion of logical deduction does not mention necessity! >Necessity, >Statement, >Formula, >Schematic letter.	Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Conditioning	Psychological Theories	Corr I 355 Conditioning/Psychological Theories: Even if we assume that Eysenck’s (1957)⁽¹⁾ theory were correct, classical conditioning cannot account for the known phenomena of neurosis. As discussed by Corr (2008a)⁽²⁾, the classical conditioning theory of neurosis assumes assumes that, as a result of the conditioned stimulus (CS) (e.g., hairy animal) and unconditioned stimulus (UCS) (e.g., pain of dog bite) getting paired, the CS comes to take on the eliciting properties of the UCS, such that, after conditioning and when presented alone, the CS produces a response (i.e., the conditioned response (CR), e.g., fear, and its associated behaviours) that resembles the unconditioned response (UCR) (e.g., pain, and its associated behaviours) elicited by the UCS. Problem: The CR (e.g., fear) does not substitute for the UCR (e.g., pain). In some crucial respects, the CR does not even resemble the UCR. For example, a pain UCS will elicit a wide variety of reactions (e.g., vocalization and behavioural excitement – recall the last time an object hit you hard!); but these reactions are quite different – in fact, opposite to – a CS signalling pain, which consists of a different range of behaviours (e.g., quietness and behavioural inhibition). >Conditioning/Eysenck, >Conditioning/Gray. 1. Eysenck, H. J. 1957. The dynamics of anxiety and hysteria. New York: Preger 2. Corr, P. J. 2008a. Reinforcement sensitivity theory (RST): Introduction, in P. J. Corr (ed). The reinforcement sensitivity theory of personality, pp. 1–43. Cambridge University Press Philip J. Corr, „ The Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory of Personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press Slater I 28 Conditioning/psychological theories: in the years since 1920 (Watson’s and Rayners Experiment “Little Albert”, Watson and Rayner 1920)⁽¹⁾ classical conditioning has been shown to be a complex operation that depends on many procedural nuances (Bouton, 2002⁽²⁾; Field, 2006a⁽³⁾) and subject characteristics that qualify its effects (Craske, 2003)⁽⁴⁾. >Experiment/Watson. Two of the more important procedural issues center around two characteristics thought to be associated with classical conditioning: namely, equipotentiality and extinction. Equipotentiality refers to the notion that any stimulus is able to become a conditioned stimulus, if it is associated with an unconditioned stimulus. This notion, of course, has not stood the test of time. For the criticisms of Watson’s and Rayner’s 1920 experiment. >VsWatson, >Conditioning/Watson, >Experiment/Watson, >Conditioning/Craske. Slater I 29 VsWatson: some early attempts to replicate conditioned emotional reactions in young children by other investigators were rather mixed, with some being successful (e.g., Jones, 1931)⁽⁵⁾ whereas others were not (e.g., Bregman, 1934⁽⁶⁾; Valentine, 1946⁽⁷⁾). Clearly, from a conceptual and theoretical standpoint, Watson and Rayner’s depiction of classical conditioning was simplistic and, assuming conditioning was produced, it may also have been fortuitous! 1. Watson, J. B., & Rayner, R. (1920). Conditioned emotional responses. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 3, 1–14. 2. Bouton, M. E., (2002). Context, ambiguity, and unlearning: Sources of relapse after behavioral extinction. Biological Psychiatry, 52, 976–986. 3. Field, A. P. (2006a). Is conditioning a useful framework for understanding the development and treatment of phobias? Clinical Psychology Review, 26, 857–875. 4. Craske, M. G. (2003). Origins of phobias and anxiety disorders. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science. 5. Jones, H. E. (1931). The conditioning of overt emotional responses. Journal of Educational Psychology, 22, 127–130. 6. Bregman, E. (1932). An attempt to modify the emotional attitudes of infants by the conditioned response technique. Journal of Genetic Psychology 45: 169-196 7. Valentine, C. W. (1946). The psychology of early childhood (3rd edn). London: Meuthen. Thomas H. Ollendick, Thomas M. Sherman, Peter Muris, and Neville J. King, “Conditioned Emotional Reactions. Beyond Watson and Rayner’s Little Albert”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Consciousness	Bieri	I 65ff Consciousness/Leibniz/Bieri: it is the factory as a whole which is responsible for consciousness. >Thought experiments. I 66/67 Consciousness/Bieri: not laws are the problem, certainly there are some. - Problem: why they exist, what in the brain makes it necessary that a person experiences anything? - Unlike gravity: consciousness is a system property. Cf. >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Knowing how/Chalmers, >Experience/Chalmers. I 61 Consciousness/Bieri: is no uniform phenomenon. Inner drive, inner control, awareness, sensitivity ability (in any case not the same as self-awareness). >Awareness, >Sensations, >Experience, cf. >Self-Consciousness. Discriminative behavior, appropriate to a situation, coherent over a period of time, "integrated". Some mental states are verbalizable, others are not. >Mental states. Consciousness in the cognitive sense, however, does not appear to be something intellectual that is impenetrable. >Cognition, >Thinking. I 64 Experience/Riddle: the experience is the mystery, not its representation. Consciousness/du Bois Reymond: "cannot be explained from its material conditions". >Representation. BieriVsdu Bois-Reymond: why should it be? - Thesis: it is also not explained by the material conditions, if we know (which we do not now) all the material conditions. >Emergence, >Explanation. Consciousness/Leibniz: it is the "factory as a whole" that is responsible for consciousness. I 74 Explanation/Bieri: it always means revealing a certain kind of relationship. Cf. >Causal explanation, >Causal relation, >Causality. Puzzle/consciousness/Bieri: we have no idea what would be a solution, an understanding. >Understanding But it would be very strange if there was a special relationship here, which does not exist anywhere else. (VsMcGinn). >Consciousness/McGinn. If there were a being that shows us this strange relationship, we would not understand it, we could not comprehend it.	Bieri I Peter Bieri Was macht Bewusstsein zu einem Rätsel? In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Bieri III P. Bieri Analytische Philosophie des Geistes Weinheim 2007
Consequence	Logic Texts	Read III 66 Conclusion/Read: The logical conclusion is a matter of form. A statement is a logical conclusion from others if all statements of the same form are conclusions from other statements of the same form. And a formula is a conclusion from others if there is no range of definition and no interpretation of the schematic letters, which makes one false and the other true. >Conditional, >Implication, >Schematic letter, >Formula.	Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Conservatism	Kekes	Gaus I 131 Conservatism/Kekes/Gaus: Conservatism (...), has different versions, partly because conservatives often disagree with each other about the particular political arrangements that ought to be conserved. There is no disagreement among them, however, that the reasons for or against those arrangements are to be found in the history of the society whose arrangements they are. ConservatismVsContractualism: This commits conservatives to denying that the reasons are to be derived from a hypothetical contract, or from an imagined ideal order, or from what is supposed to be beneficial for the whole of humanity. Questions for conservatism: - To what extent should political arrangements be based on history? - How does the diversity of values affect political arrangements? - What should be the relation between individual autonomy and social authority? - How should political arrangements respond to the prevalence of evil? >Absolutism/Kekes, >Values/Relativism. Gaus I 138 Conservatism on evil: Conservatism has been called the politics of imperfection (O'Sullivan, 1976⁽¹⁾: ch. 10; Quinton, 1978⁽²⁾). This is in some ways an apt characterization, but it is misleading in others. It rightly suggests that conservatives reject the idea of human perfectibility. (For the history of the idea, see Passmore, 1970⁽³⁾; Kekes, 1997⁽⁴⁾.) Yet it is too sanguine because it implies that, apart from some imperfections, the human condition is by and large all right. But it is worse than a bad joke to regard as mere imperfections war, genocide, tyranny, torture, terrorism, the drug trade, concentration camps, racism, the murder of religious and political opponents, easily avoidable epidemics and starvation, and other familiar and widespread evils. Conservatives are much more impressed by the prevalence of evil than this label implies. If evil is understood as serious unjustified harm caused by human beings, then the conservative view is that the prevalence of evil is a permanent condition that cannot be significantly altered. >Human Nature/Conservatism. 1. O'Sullivan, Noel (1976) Conservatism. New York: St Martin's. 2. Quinton, Anthony (1978) The Politics of Imperfection. London: Faber and Faber. 3. Passmore, John (1970) The Perfectibility of Man. London: Duckworth. 4. Kekes, John (1997) Against Liberalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Kekes, John 2004. „Conservtive Theories“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Consistency	Mischel	Corr I 46 Consistency/Situations/Personality/Mischel/Asendorpf: The first large study ((s) in order to test the consistency of behavior of persons in different situations) was conducted by Hartshorne and May (1928)⁽¹⁾ who designed eight tests and observational settings in order to observe inter-individual differences in honest behaviour among more than 800 school children. The cross-situational consistency between two such situations was only .19 which was much lower than the retest stability within situations. This problem was debated for some time but remained unresolved and nearly forgotten until Mischel (1968)(²⁾ revived this consistency debate by more empirical evidence, proposing a ‘magic limit’ of .30 for what he called the ‘cross-situational consistency of behaviour’. His conclusion was that traits exist only in the eye of the observers but have no reality, because behaviour is so much situation-dependent. >Personality Traits/Psychological Theories, >Situations/Psychological Theories. 1. Hartshorne, H. and May, M. A. 1928. Studies in the nature of character, vol. 1, Studies in deceit. New York: MacMillan 2. Mischel, W. 1968. Personality and assessment. New York: Wiley Jens B. Asendorpf, “Personality: Traits and situations”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. Corr II 106 Consistency/Mischel/Fleeson/Noftle/Eysenck, M.W.: Fleeson and Noftle (2008)⁽¹⁾ argued that we can potentially identify 36 concepts of consistency. For example, we can assess behavioural consistency across time, situation content, or behaviour content. Measures of consistency can involve correlating two single behaviours or aggregates of behaviour. In addition, we can distinguish between absolute consistency (i.e., the extent to which each individual’s behaviour is the same across situations) and relative consistency (i.e., the extent to which each individual’s behaviour relative to other individuals remains the same across situations). II 109 Mischel (1968)⁽²⁾ [argued that] individuals typically exhibit far less behavioural consistency across situations than would be predicted from the trait approach. II 110 VsMischel: (…) Mischel (1968)⁽²⁾ failed to consider consistency findings in the personality literature in the context of psychology generally. Meyer et al. (2001)⁽³⁾ considered numerous findings across many areas within psychology. The typical finding was that the modal effect size expressed as a correlation was between +.10 and +.40 for psychology as a whole. (…) Mischel (1968)⁽²⁾ [also] exaggerated the value of high consistency between, say, a measure of personality and some behavioural measure but minimized the nature of the behavioural outcome being predicted. In contrast, major personality traits have been shown to have a wide range of applicability to important real-world outcomes even though there was only moderate consistency or predictability. [Furthermore,] Mischel argued that individuals display very II 111 limited cross-situational consistency on the basis of studies that had mostly assessed consistency by correlating single behaviours in different situations. This approach has the disadvantage that there can be substantial errors of measurement when the focus is on single behaviours (Epstein, 1977)⁽⁴⁾. Finally, there are criticisms to be made of Mischel’s (1968) predominant emphasis on personality and situational factors as independent factors that influence behaviour. The four influences largely or totally ignored by Mischel are as follows: (1) influence of personal factors (e.g., personality) on the situation; (2) influence of behaviour on personal factors (e.g., personality; (3) influence of behaviour on the situation; and (4) influence of the situation on personal factors (e.g., personality). Of most relevance here is the notion that the situations individuals choose to be in are determined in part by their personality. In most research, the experimenter determines the situations in which participants find themselves and they are unable to change or control the situation. With such research, it is impossible to demonstrate the impact of personality on situational choice. 1. Fleeson, W., & Noftle, E. E. (2008). Where does personality have its influence? A supermatrix of consistency concepts. Journal of Personality, 76, 1355–1385. 2. Mischel, W. (1968). Personality and assessment. London: Wiley. 3. Meyer, G. J., Finn, S. E., Eyde, L. D., Kay, G. G., Moreland, K. L., Dies, R. R., et al. (2001). Psychological testing and psychological assessment. American Psychologist, 56, 128–165. 4. Epstein, S. (1977). Traits are alive and well. In D. Magnusson & N. S. Endler (Eds.), Personality at the crossroads: Current issues in interactional psychology. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Eysenck, Michael W.: “The Challenge to Trait Theory Revisiting Mischel (1968)”, In: Philip J. Corr (Ed.) 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, p.p 101-114.	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Constants	Genz	II 327 Units/unit/laws of nature/constants/natural constants/quantum mechanics/Relativity Theory/Genz: the basic units for length, mass and time appear in the natural laws of quantum mechanics and relativity theory only covertly as natural constants: c, gravitational constant G, Planck's constant h. >Natural constants. Together they can be converted into a length, a mass and a time and provide when not using numerical factors like 2 or 10²³ the Planck units above. Experiment/Genz: there are no experiments that come close to Planck's time or length, but close to Planck's mass, which is strangely large. It corresponds approximately to a dust particle. Question: why are the elementary particles so much smaller than the Planck mass? Solution: a solution is the "ongoing coupling" of quarks and gluons in the standard model. From the small value of the planck length, the coupling increases extremely slowly and only reaches the value of Planck's length that is greater with the factor 10²⁰ that allows the existence of a bound state of quarks and gluons - the proton. Proton/Genz: for the proton - and thus for all strong interactions - the relevant length scale is not the Planck scale, but the 10²⁰-times length scale of quantum electrochromodynamics (QCD). II 328 Planck mass/intuitive/Genz: its alleged giganticness damages the notion that all physical quantities should be discrete. Density/Genz: "worse still": if we want to place the Planck mass in a Planck length we get the 10⁹³-times density of water.	Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002
Constituents	Lyons	I 212 Constituent structure grammar/constituent structure/concatenation/linearity/layers/Lyons: so far we had regarded sentences as linear chains. >Sentences. New: the constituent structural grammar sees it arranged as constituents (not e.g. "subject"/"predicate" etc.), which leads to layers (reflected in the family tree, tree structure). >Constituent structure grammar. I 213 Immediate constituents/terminology/IC analysis/Lyons: (immediate constituents, IC): Example (poor John) (ran away). Tradition: there is obviously a parallelism here to the traditional conception of "poor John" as "subject" and "ran away" as "predicate". I 214 Layers: consist of direct constituents. Each constituent of a deeper layer is part of a higher one. Family Tree/Tree Structure/Structure Tree/Tree/Linguistics/Lyons: the layers of the constituents can also be specified by trees in addition to parentheses. Nodes: y and z indicate the layers. ((s) Layer x: consists of y and z, y: consists of poor and John etc. Constituent structural grammar/Lyons: there is no mention of "adjective", "predicate", etc. at all. >Phrase structure grammar/Lyons, >Adjectives, >Predicates.	Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995
Constitution	Marsilius of Padua	Höffe I 180 Constitution/Marsilius/Höffe: People/Citizenship/eligible voters: The entirety of the citizens, however, does not exercise legislative power directly, but representatively. It delegates its legislative power to the larger and more influential part (maior et valentior pars). Höffe: As already mentioned, the more detailed explanations of this idea are not clear-cut, for they range from the majority to that representative electoral elite, where one can think of the seven electors who were authorized to elect the emperor at that time. >Democracy/Marsilius. Höffe I 182 [Marsilius] distinguishes, (...) with reference to Aristotle, the classical state powers of legislation, government and the judiciary. However, he subordinates the judiciary to the exercising power, and the latter to the legislation. In accordance with the idea of the sovereignty of the people, as far as he represents it, Marsilius places the legislature at the head of the public powers. >State/Marsilius, >Governance/Marsilius, >Legislation/Marsilius.	Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016
Constitution	Rawls	I 197 Constitution/Rawls: we must distinguish between two problems: 1. establish a fair procedure that ensures the right outcome. This would be the case if the political process were governed by a constitution. The Constitution must guarantee equal rights for all citizens, such as freedom of thought, personal freedom and equal political rights. I 198 Nevertheless, each procedure can produce an unfair result - there is no system that excludes it. We must therefore identify the systems that are most likely to produce a fair result. Rawls: I assume that our two principles of justice provide an independent standard for judging: (See: I 61 Principles/Justice/Rawls: 1. every person must have the same right to the widest possible fundamental freedom, insofar as it is compatible with the same freedom for others. 2. social and economic inequalities shall be arranged in such a way that they (a) are reasonably expectable for everyone's benefit; and (b) are linked to positions and administrative procedures that can be held by anyone.) I 199 The primary standard for a fair constitution is then the first principle of equal freedom. The second principle is added in legislation. >Legislation/Rawls. In the course of the process, more and more contingent facts become known to the participants. I 221 Constitution/justice/Rawls: in connection with the political process, I call the principle of equal freedoms the principle of equal participation. It means that all citizens have an equal right to participate in the constitutional process and to have a say in its outcome.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Constitutional Structures	Public Choice Theory	Parisi I 189 Constitutional structure/Public choice theory/Farber: The choice between parliamentary and presidential government is one of the major dividing lines among democratic governments. Disappointingly, public choice does not provide clear insights into the relative merits of the two systems. Parliamentarism: Empirical studies are also inconclusive, although there is some evidence that parliamentary systems are more robust on average (Ginsburg, 2010⁽¹⁾, pp. 271-272). Federalism: There is a much richer body of literature about federalism.* The essential benefit of decentralizing governance is that it allows laws to be tailored more closely to public preferences. If there are no spillover effects between jurisdictions, then decentralization allows each locality to adopt policies catering to its own preferences rather than imposing a "one size fits all" national uniformity. The advantages are similar to allowing consumers to buy a variety of goods rather than limiting production only to a single model preferred by a majority. This argument provides a justification for local voice by showing how it might be useful to allow existing local populations to pick their own laws. That is an argument for local voice. But besides voting on local policies, individuals can also express their preferences by moving to jurisdictions with congenial policies. This power of exit can result in better alignment between preferences and laws (Cooter, 2002⁽²⁾, ch. 6). >Federalism/Public choice theory. Parisi I 192 Constitutional structure/Public choice theory/Farber: (…) majority voting by itself is not enough to produce coherent, stable outcomes except in some circumstances. In some parliamentary regimes, the solution is to delegate power to a Prime Minister or a cabinet, who can only be dislodged with difficulty before the end of her term. Governmental structures: One of the fundamental insights of public choice is that structures such as bicameralism and gatekeeper committees can limit cycling. (Cf. >Arrow’s Theorem). The reason is simply that adding veto points cuts the "win set" of proposals that can defeat any specific proposal. Essentially, giving multiple groups veto power blocks cycling except when (1) there is an identical cycle in the preferences of each of these groups, and (2) at least one proposal in the cycle is preferred to the status quo by each of these groups. In the extreme case of unanimous consent requirements, each legislator has a veto, making cycling impossible (though at the price of heavily privileging the status quo). ((s) Cf. >Veto player.) Procedural rules: Procedural rules may prevent observation of cycles in practice even in cases where the legislator's preferences do cycle. The agenda setter can potentially arrange a series of votes that will result in majority adoption of the agenda setter's preferred item in the cycle as the final outcome. Parisi I 193 Procedural rules may also limit the issue space—for instance, a committee may only have jurisdiction over a single-issue dimension, making it more likely that preferences will be single-peaked and therefore not open to cycling. The implication of these insights for statutory interpretation (Noll, McCubbins, and Weingast, 1994)⁽³⁾ are an open and highly contested question (Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett, 2006⁽⁴⁾, pp. 219-257). Some scholars argue that courts can identify the key decision-makers and their goals well enough in the legislative history to take these views into account in interpreting statutes. Others view the process as too opaque for judicial investigation and instead argue that judges should abandon the idea of legislative intent when interpreting statutes (Easterbrook, 1983)⁽⁵⁾. Preferences: (…) the existence of incoherent preferences does not necessarily translate into indeterminate meaning, quite apart from public choice theory. Given full information and zero drafting costs, we could infer that the actions of key agenda setters and veto gates must have combined to support the proposal over an alternative that was identical other than in its application to the circumstances in question. But even with those strong assumptions, there would be no need to reconstruct the preferences of those individuals in order to interpret the statute. * See Hills, R. M. (2010) "Federalism and Public Choice," in D. A. Farber and A. J. O'Connell, eds. Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law, 207-233. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 1. Ginsburg, T. (2010). "Public Choice and Constitutional Decision," in D. A. Farber and A. J. O'Connell, eds., Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law, 261-282. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 2. Cooter, R. D. (2002). The Strategic constitution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 3. Noll, R., M. McCubbins, and B. Weingast (writing as "McNollgast") (1994). "Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation." Law and Contemporary Problems 57(1):3-37. 4. Eskridge, W. N., P. P. Frickey, and E. Garrett (2006). Legislation and Statutory Interpretation. 2nd edition. St. Paul, MN: Foundation Press. 5. Easterbrook, F. H. (1983). "Statutes' Domains." University of Chicago Law Review 50(2): 53 3— 552. Farber, Daniel A. “Public Choice Theory and Legal Institutions”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press	Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Consumption Function	Keynesianism	Rothbard III 861 Consumption function/Keynesianism/Rothbard: The stability of the passive consumption function, as contrasted withthe volatility of active investment, is a keystone of the Keynesian system. This assumption is replete withso many grave errors that it is necessary to take them up one at a time. Consumption function/RothbardVsKeynesianism/VsConsumption function: (a) How do the Keynesians justify the assumption of a stable consumption function (…)? One route was through "budget studies" - cross-sectional studies of the relation between family income and expenditure by income groups in a given year. This is supposed to intimate that those doing the "dissaving," i.e., the dishoarding, are poor people below the subsistence level who incur deficits by borrowing. But how long is this supposed to go on? >Hoarding/Keynesianism. RothbardVsKeynesianism: How can there be a continuous deficit? Who would continue to lend these people the money? It is more reasonable to suppose that the dishoarders are decumulating their previously accumulated capital, i.e., that they are wealthy people whose businesses suffered losses during that year. (b) Aside from the fact that budget studies are misinterpreted, there are graver fallacies involved. For the curve given by the budget study has no relation whatever to the Keynesian consumption function! The former, at best, gives a cross section of the relation between classes of family expenditure and income for one year; the Keynesian consumption function attempts to establish a relation between total social income and total social consumption for any given year, holding true over a hypothetical range of social incomes. At best, one entire budget curve can be summed up to yield only one point on the Keynesian consumption function. Budget studies, therefore, can in no way confirm the Keynesian assumptions. Rothbard III 862 (c) Another very popular device to confirm the consumption function reached the peak of its popularity during World War II. This was historical-statistical correlation of national income and consumption for a definite period of time, usually the 1930's. This correlation equation was then assumed to be the "stable" consumption function. Errors in this procedure were numerous. RothbardVs: In the first place, even assuming such a stable relation, it would only be an historical conclusion, not a theoretical law. In physics, an experimentally determined law may be assumed to be constant for other identical situations; in human action, historical situations are never the same, and therefore there are no quantitative constants! Conditions and valuations could change at any time, and the "stable" relationship altered. There is here no proof of a stable consumption function. RothbardVs: Moreover, a stable relation was not even established. Income was correlated with consumption and with investment. Since consumption is a much larger magnitude than (net) investment, no wonder that its percentage deviations around the regression equation were smaller! >Consumption/Keynesianism, >Investment/Keynes, >Interest/Keynesianism. Time/ex ante/ex post/RothbardVsKeynesianism: Thirdly, the consumption function is necessarily an ex ante relation; it is supposed to tell how much consumers will decide to spend given a certain total income. Historical statistics, on the other hand, record only ex post data, which give a completely different story. For any given period of time, for example, hoarding and dishoarding cannot be recorded ex post. In fact, ex post, on double-entry accounting records, total social income is always equal to total social expenditures. Yet, in the dynamic, ex ante, sense, it is precisely the divergence between total social income and total social expenditures (hoarding or dishoarding) that Plays the crucial role in the Keynesian theory. (1) Rothbard III 863 (d) Actually, the whole idea of stable consumption functions has now been discredited, although many Keynesians do not fully realize this In fact, Keynesians themselves have admitted that, in the long run, the consumption function is not stable, since total consumption rises as income rises; and that in the short run it is not stable, since it is affected by all sorts of changing factors. RothbardVs: But if it is not stable in the short run and not stable in the long run, what kind of stability does it have? (e) it is instructive to turn now to the reasons that Keynes himself, in contrast to his followers, gave for assuming his stable consumption function. It is a confused exposition The "propensity to consume" out of given income, according to Keynes, is determined by two sets of factors, "objective" and "subjective." Rothbard: It seems clear, however, that these are purely subjective decisions, so that there can be no separate objective determinants. 1. See Lindahl, "On Keynes' Economic System - Part I," Economic Record (May 1954). p. 169 n. Lindahl shows the diffculties of mixing an ex post income line with ex ante consumption and spending, as the Keynesians do. Lindahl also shows that theexpenditure and income lines coincide ifthe divergence between expected and realized income affects income and not stocks. Yet it cannot affect stocks, for, contrary to Keynesian assertion, there is no such thing as hoarding or any other unexpected event leading to "unintended increase in inventories." An increase in inventories is never unintended, since the seller has the alternative of selling the good at the market price. The fact that his inventory increases means that he has voluntarily invested in larger inventory, hoping for a future price rise. 2. Summing up disillusionment withthe consumption function are two significant articles: Murray E. Polakoff, "Some Critical Observations on the Major Keynesian Building Blocks," Southern Economic Journal, October, 1954, pp. 141-51; and Leo Fishman, "Consumer Expectations and the Consumption Function," ibid., January, 1954, pp. 243-51.	Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Content	Boer	I XIII Definition Thought/Boer: can be common to different states of mind. Proposition/Boer: I do not call it thought content, because this expression brings too much ballast with it. --- Note I XVIII Intensional transitive verbs: have three conditions, each of which is sufficient for itself: (i) failure of the principle of the substitutability of identity (ii) quantification permits a specific "narrow range" (iii) there is no existential (ontological) commitment. --- I XIV Direct objects/direct object/propositional settings/Boer: it is controversial whether the relation to direct thought objects can be analyzed as propositional attitudes. E.g. "search": here it is certainly the case, e.g. "worship": seems to contradict this analysis. Fulfillment conditions/EB/proopositional attitudes/individuation/Boer: N.B.: The fulfillment conditions do not appear to be sufficient to individuate a propositional attitude. On the other hand: Thought content/GI: seems to be sufficient for the individuation of a propositional attitude. Truth conditions: (and hence also the fulfillment conditions) can be the same for two beliefs, while the subject is not sure whether it is the same object. E.g. woodchucks/groundhogs. Propositional attitudes/Individuation/Lewis: (1969)⁽¹⁾: the mere existence of a convention of this kind presupposes that speakers from a community have certain propositional attitudes with certain fulfillment conditions. Abstract objects/propositional attitudes/Boer: in order to believe that patience is a virtue, one must think of patience. Definition mental reference/Terminology/Boer: Thinking of: be a mental analogue to speaker reference. Speaker reference/some authors: thesis: never exists in isolation, but is only a partial aspect of a speech act (utterance). --- I XV Mental reference: should then only be a partial aspect of thinking-of-something. Probably, there is also predication. Definition mental reference/Boer: be in a state of thought with a content of thought which defines a fulfillment condition of which the object is a constituent. Problem: non-existent objects. --- I XV Thought content/GI/Boer: must be carefully distinguished from any objects that it might contain. Definition object of thought/object/GO/Boer: "object of the propositional attitudes ψ" is clearly only the item/s to which a subject by the power of having ψ refers to. (s) So not the propositional attitudes themselves. Individuation/identification/Boer: should be identified by a that-sentence (in a canonical attribution of ψ). That-sentence/Boer: is the content (thought content). Content/thought content/Boer: is the that-sentence. Thinking about/Boer: what you think of something is the object itself. 1. David Lewis 1969. Convention: A Philosophical Study, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.	Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986
Context/Context Dependence	Dworkin	Gaus I 15 Context dependence/political language/Walzer/Dworkin/Freeden: Some poststructuralists abandon the search for norms too readily. But even among the contrary camp of Anglo-American philosophers the certainty that is assumed to accompany objective and neutral understandings of concepts is being challenged. Thus Michael Walzer (1985)⁽¹⁾ has focused on the contextual and social meanings of social goods, while Ronald Dworkin has noted that most contemporary philosophers accept that conceptual definitions are substantive and normative. >M. Walzer, >Norms, >Definition, >Definability Taking democracy as an example, Dworkin contends against essentialist definitions that „we still need an account of what makes one feature of a social or political arrangement essential to its character as a democracy and another feature only contingent, and once we have rejected the idea that reflection on the meaning of ‘democracy’ will supply that distinction, nothing else will.“ (2001⁽²⁾: 11). >R. Dworkin, >Democracy. 1. Walzer, M. 1895. (1985) Spheres of Justice. Oxford: Blackwell. 2. Dworkin, R. 2001. ‘Political and legal Archimedeans’, draft paper. Freeden, M. 2004. „Ideology, Political Theory and Political Philosophy“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Dworkin I Ronald Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously Cambridge, MA 1978 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Context/Context Dependence	Walzer	Gaus I 15 Context dependence/political language/Walzer/Dworkin/Freeden: Some poststructuralists abandon the search for norms too readily. But even among the contrary camp of Anglo-American philosophers the certainty that is assumed to accompany objective and neutral understandings of concepts is being challenged. >Norms, >Society. Thus Michael Walzer (1985)⁽¹⁾ has focused on the contextual and social meanings of social goods, while Ronald Dworkin has noted that most contemporary philosophers accept that conceptual definitions are substantive and normative. Taking democracy as an example, Dworkin contends against essentialist definitions that „we still need an account of what makes one feature of a social or political arrangement essential to its character as a democracy and another feature only contingent, and once we have rejected the idea that reflection on the meaning of ‘democracy’ will supply that distinction, nothing else will.“ (2001⁽²⁾: 11). >Democracy, >Essentialism, >R. Dworkin. 1. Walzer, M. 1895. (1985) Spheres of Justice. Oxford: Blackwell. 2. Dworkin, R. 2001. ‘Political and legal Archimedeans’, draft paper. Freeden, M. 2004. „Ideology, Political Theory and Political Philosophy“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Contractualism	Gauthier	Gaus I 107 Contractualism/liberalism/Gauthier/Gaus: (...) the last 20 years has witnessed the induction of Hobbes as a core member of the liberal pantheon. In addition to his relentless individualist analysis on humans in society, the liberalization of Hobbes has been driven by his contractualism, and the way in which it lends itself to game-theoretic modelling, most importantly in the work of Jean Hampton (1986⁽¹⁾; for a discussion see Kraus, 1993⁽²⁾). At first blush one might think that Hobbes did not offer a moral contractualist theory at all: the laws of nature are pre-contractual moral norms, and the contract concerns the institution of a political sovereign, not agreement on moral norms. Gauthier: However, as David Gauthier (1995⁽³⁾) has stressed, the Hobbesian contract involves an authorization of the sovereign’s use of reason as right reason, including his reasoning about what morality requires; it is thus a political contract that subsumes morality. In any event, recent analyses inspired by Hobbes - most importantly Gauthier (1986)⁽⁴⁾ -have converted the Hobbesian approach into an account of justified morality which, in turn, endorses liberal arrangements (for doubts about the Hobbesian pedigree of Gauthier, see Lloyd, 1998⁽⁵⁾). >Hobbes/Economic theories. Gaus I 108 Gauthier argues that, in order to best pursue their goals, rational maximizers would agree to stop making maximizing choices. If individuals could adopt a disposition to obey the social contract the second problem, that of compliance, would be solved; once they have this disposition – this tendency to act – they no longer make choices by calculating what would best advance their goals, but on the basis of what would advance their goals in ways allowed for by the contract. If people adopted this disposition, then, somewhat paradoxically, they would do better at maximization, as they could honour the agreement that benefits all. Gauthier calls this ‘constrained maximization’ (1986⁽⁴⁾: 158). Problem: (...) the truly rational thing to do is to appear to turn yourself into a constrained maximizer while others really turn themselves into constrained maximizers. Gauthier has a two-part response. (1) Constrained maximizers do not adopt an unconditional disposition to constrain themselves no matter with whom they interact. They are only disposed to act in a constrained manner with those who are also constrained maximizers. (2) Gauthier insists that we are not totally opaque to each other; to some extent we can see into others and know their dispositions. As he puts it, we are ‘translucent’. Thus, concludes Gauthier, a rational agent would not seek to remain an unconstrained maximizer when others turn themselves into constrained maximizers. >Rational choice/Gauthier. 1. Hampton, Jean (1986) Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Kraus, Jody S. (1993) The Limits of Hobbesian Contractualism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Gauthier, David (1995) ‘Public reason’. Social Philosophy & Policy, 12 (Winter): 19–42. 4. Gauthier, David (1986) Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon. 5. Lloyd, S. A. (1998) ‘Contemporary uses of Hobbes’s political philosophy’. In Jules S. Coleman and Christopher Morris, eds, Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Corporations	Rothbard	Rothbard III 642 Corporations/Rothbard: What happens when a partnership or corporation is formed? Individuals agree to pool their assets into a central management, this central direction to set the policies for the owners and to allocate the monetary gains among them. In both cases, the pooling, lines of authority, and allocation of monetary gain take Place according to rules agreed upon by all from the beginning. There is therefore no essential difference between a cartel and an ordinary corporation or partnership. It might be objected that the ordinary corporation or partnership covers only one firm, while the cartel includes an entire "industry" (i.e., all firms producing a certain product). But such a distinction does not necessarily hold. Various firms may refuse to enter a cartel, while, on the other hand, a Single firm may well be a "monopolist" in the sale of its particular unique product, and therefore it may also encompass an entire "industry." The correspondence between a co-operative partnership or corporation - not generally considered reprehensible - and a cartel is further enhanced when we consider the case of a merger of various firms. Mergers have been denounced as "monopolistic," but not nearly as vehemently as have cartels. >Mergers/Rothbard, >Cartels/Rothbard, >Cartels/Mises, >Monopolies/Rothbard. Rothbard III 644 Merger/cartel/Rothbard: Yet an industry-wide merger is, in effect, a permanent cartel, a permanent combination and fusion. On the other hand, a cartel that maintains by voluntary agreement the separate identity of each firm is by nature a highly transitory and ephemeral arrangement and (…) generally tends to break up on the market. In fact, in many cases, a cartel can be considered as simply a tentative step in the direction of permanent merger. And a merger and the original formation of a corporation do not (…) essentially differ. The former is an adaptation of the size and number of firms in an industry to new conditions or is the correction of a previous error in forecasting. The latter is a de novo attempt to adapt to present and future market conditions.	Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Correctness	Rorty	VI 107f Correctness/presentation/representation/Rorty: Of course we can distinguish good and bad historians according to correct representation of the facts - on the other hand: philosophy: here it is not about correctness. - It’s about the question: can we can arrange pieces of the world and pieces of sentences so that we can specify how relations between the former correspond to relations between the latter? - >Presentation, >Representation, cf. also >Picture Theory, >Correspondence, >Correspondence theory.	Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Correctness	Tarski	Berka I 489 Correctness/domain/Tarski: according to the sentences 14-16 (or Lemma I) there is for each natural number k such a statement that is true in any area with k elements and in any area of the other thickness. In contrast: Every statementthat is true in an infinite range is also true in any other infinite domain. Properties/classes: so we conclude that the object language allows us to express such a property of classes of individuals, such as the existence of exactly k elements. There is no means for designating any specific type of infinity (e.g. countability) and we cannot distinguish by means of a single or a finite number of statements... I 490 ...two such properties of classes such as finiteness, infinity from each other. >Infinity. I 491 Truth (in the domain): depends on the scope in the finite case, not in the infinite. I 491 Correctness in the doamin/provability/Tarski: if we add the statement a (every nonempty class contains a singleton class as a part) to the axiom system correctness and provability will be coextensive terms. >Provability. N.B.: this does not work in the logical algebra, because here a is not satisfied in all interpretations. I 516 "In every correct domain"/Tarski: this term stands according to the extent in the middle between the provable sentence and the true statement, but is narrower than the class of all true statements generally. It does not contain statements whose validity depends on how big the total number of individuals is.⁽¹⁾ 1. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol 1, Lemberg 1935	Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983
Cost Structure	Economic Theories	Kiesling I 45 Cost Structure/Economic theories/Kiesling: Industries, like railways, electricity, and telecommunications, have characteristics that lead to difficult economic questions and challenging analyses. In such industries, production costs are skewed heavily toward capital, or fixed costs, with variable costs being a small share of total costs. Decreasing-cost: In these high fixed-cost industries, the average production cost per unit of output declines as a firm’s output increases, at least over the quantity or amount of product that consumers want to buy (“over the relevant range of demand”). That cost structure means that the marginal cost of a unit of that company’s product is lower than its average cost over this significant range of output. Companies structured this way are called “decreasing-cost.” Kiesling I 46 Competition: If firms in a decreasing-cost industry compete in a typical market process, their rivalry would drive the price of their product down to its marginal cost, because if the market price is the same as a firm’s marginal cost it can still pay its variable costs like wages. >Marginal costs. But if the price they receive is equal to marginal cost and this is a decreasing-cost industry, the market price will be lower than average cost, which will lead to losses. If marginal cost is not the right way to price goods in a decreasing-cost industry, how should prices be determined? >Price, >Markets, >Marginal costs, >Marginal cost controversy.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Costs	Clark	Rothbard III 729 Costs/competition/comparability/J.M. Clark/Rothbard: A (…) major line of attack [on monopolistic competition theory] has shown that the comparisons are much less important than they seem from conventional diagrams, because cost curves are empirically much flatter than they appear in the text- books. Long-run dmand curves: Clark has emphasized that firms deal in long-run considerations, and that long-run cost and demand curves are both more elastic than short-run; (…) >Elasticity. Clark and others have stressed the vital importance of potential competition to any would-be reaper of monopoly price, from firms both within and without the industry, and also the competition of substitutes between industries. A further argument has been that the cost curves, empirically, are flat within the relevant range, even aside from the long- vs. short-run problems.⁽¹⁾ >Monopolies, >Monopoly price, >Monopolistic competition. 1. See J.M. Clark, "Competition and the Objectives of Government Policy" in E.H. Chamberlin, ed., Monopoly and Competition and Their Regulation (London: Macmillan & Co., 1954), pp. 3 17-2 7; Clark, "Toward a Concept of Workable Competition" in Readings in the Social Control of Industry (Philadelphia: Blakiston, 1942), pp. 452-76; Clark, "Discussion"; Abbott, Quality and Competition, passim; Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper & Bros., 1942); Hayek, "Meaning of Competition"; Lachmann, "Some Notes on Economic Thought, 1933-53." Richard B. Heflebower, "Toward a Theory of Industrial Markets and Prices" in R.B. Heflebower and G.W. Stocking, eds., Readings on Industrial Organization and Public Policy (HomeWood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, 19 5 8), pp. 29 7-315. A more dubious argument - the flatness of the firm's demand curve in the relevant range - has been stressed by other economists, notably A.J. Nichol, "The Influence of Marginal Buyers on Monopolistic Competition," Quarterly Journal ofEconomics, November, 1934, pp. 121-34; Alfred Nicols, "The Rehabilitation of Pure Competition," Quarterly Journal of Economics, November, 1947 , pp. 31-63; and Nutter, "Plateau Demand Curve and Utility Theory."	Clark I John Bates Clark Essentials of Economic Theory by John Bates Clark: Foundational Concepts in Economics Made Accessible (English Edition) New Delhi 2029 Clark I John Maurice Clark Alternative to serfdom: Five lectures delivered ... at the University of Michigan, March 1947 New York 1948 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Costs	Rothbard	Rothbard III 588 Costs/production/business/Rothbard: Looked at from the point ofview of an individual entrepreneur, payments to factors are money costs. It is clear that we cannot simply rest on the old classical law that prices of products tend, in the long run, to be equal to their costs of production. Costs are not fixed by some Invisible Hand, but are determined precisely by the total force of entrepreneurial demand for factors of production. Basically, as Böhm-Bawerk and the Austrians pointed out, costs conform to prices, and not Vice versa. Confusion may arise because, looked at from the point of view of the individual firm rather than of the economist, it appears as if costs (at least in the sense of the prices of factors) are somehow given, and beyond one's control.⁽¹⁾ >Production factors/Rothbard, >Austrian School, >Böhm-Bawerk. If a firm can command a selling price that will more than cover its costs, it remains in business; ifnot, it will have to leave. The illusion of externally determined costs is prevalent because, (…) most factors can be employed in a wide variety of firms, if not industries. Rothbard III 589 If we take the broader view of the economist, however, the various "costs," i.e., prices of factors, determined by their various DMVPs (discounted marginal value products) in alternative uses, are ultimately determined solely by consumers' demand for all uses. It must not be forgotten, furthermore, that changes in demand and selling price will change the prices and incomes of specializedfactors in the same direction. The "cost curves" so fashionable in current economics assume fixed factor prices, thereby ignoring their variability, even for the single firm. >Factor market/Rothbard, >Discounting/Rothbard, >Marginal product/Rothbard, >Production costs/Rothbard, >Costs/Stigler. Rothbard III 490 Rothbard: The interesting phases, then, are the immediate run and the long run. Yet cost-curve analysis deals almost exclusively with a hybrid intermediate phase known as the "short run." In this short run, "costs" are sharply divided into two categories: fixed (which must be incurred regardless of the amount produced) and variable (which vary with output). This whole construction is a highly artificial one. RothbardVsFixed costs: There is no actual "fixity" of costs. Any alleged fixity depends purely on the length oftime involved. In fact, suppose that production is zero. Cost curve: The "cost-curve theorists" would have us believe that even at zero output there are fixed costs that must be incurred: rent of land, payment of management, etc. However, it is Clear that if data are frozen - as they should be in such an analysis - and the entrepreneurs expect a situation of zero output to continue indefinitely, these "fixed" costs would become "variable" and disappear very quickly. The rent contract for land would be terminated, and management fired, as the firm closed its doors. There are no "fixed" costs; rather there are different degrees of variability for different productive factors. >Production factors/Rothbard, >Production costs/Rothbard. Some factors are best used in a certain quantity over a certain range of output, while others yield best results over other ranges of output. The result is not a dichotomy into "fixed" and "variable" costs, but a condition of many degrees of variability for the various factors.⁽¹⁾ Rothbard III 591 There are two elements that determine the behavior of average costs, i.e., total costs per unit output. (a) There are "physical costs" - the amounts of factors that must be purchased in order to obtain a certain physical quantity of output. These are the obverse of "physical productivity" -the amounts of the physical product that can be produced with various amounts of factors. This is a technological problem. Here the question is not marginal productivity, where one factor is varied while others remain constant in quantity. Here we concentrate on the scale of output when all factors are permitted to vary. Where all factors and the product are completely divisible, a proportionate increase in the quantities of all the factors must lead to an equally proportionate increase in physical output.1341 This may be called the law of "constant returns to scale." >Return to scale/Rothbard. (b) The second determinant of average costs is factor prices. Rothbard III 599 Cost curve/Rothbard: (…) the marginal cost of further production (roughly the opportunity cost) becomes ever Iower as the product moves toward final output and sale. This is the simple meaning of the usual cost-curve morass. 1. Robbins points out that the length of a period of productive activity depends upon the expectations of entrepreneurs concerning the permanence of a change and the technical obstacles to a change. Robbins, “Remarks upon Certain Aspects of the Theory of Costs,” pp. 17–18.	Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Court Proceedings	Social Psychology	Parisi I 125 Court proceedings/juror decision-making/Social psychology/Nadler/Mueller: (...) each individual juror hears the evidence and arguments presented by lawyers, as well as the judge's instructions. Story model: According to the Story Model of Juror Decision-Making (Bennett, 1978⁽¹⁾; Pennington and Hastie, 1981⁽²⁾) jurors make sense of the evidence at trial by organizing it in a narrative fashion. Instead of passively absorbing verbatim the enormous amount of complex, Parisi I 126 ambiguous information given in a trial, jurors actively process the information using the framework of their existing knowledge to fill in gaps and construct stories from the evidence. Jurors create a story narrative that explains the different pieces of reliable evidence, and then reach a decision by matching the best-fitting story to the verdict categories. Criteria/eveluation: In order to evaluate competing stories, jurors use several criteria. The most preferred story will account for the greatest amount of evidence, will be internally consistent and leave no gaps in the causal chain of events, and will be plausible in light of what the juror believes about the world (Pennington and Hastie, 1981)⁽²⁾. „Thinking aloud“: This model has been supported by "think aloud" observations of mock jurors (Pennington and Hastie, 1986)⁽³⁾, as well as experiments examining judgments in mock criminal and civil trials (Huntley and Costanzo, 2003⁽⁴⁾; Pennington and Hastie, 1992⁽⁵⁾). Decision-making: More recent experimental research on coherence-based reasoning has stablished that the process of reaching a decision is often bi-directional (Holyoak and Simon, 1999)⁽⁶⁾. The decision task faced by jurors is cognitively complex because it requires consideration of information that is voluminous, contradictory, and ambiguous (D. Simon, 2004)⁽⁷⁾. Information processing: To process the large amount of complex information presented in a trial, jurors reconstruct the information into simpler mental representations, upon which their cognitive system imposes coherence (D. Simon, 2004)⁽⁷⁾. Schemas/beliefs: (...) jurors bring with them into the courtroom commonsense notions of legal categories like insanity, self-defense, and intent, and those existing schemas influence how jurors evaluate evidence and make legal judgments (Finkel, 2005⁽⁸⁾; Finkel and Groscup, 1997⁽⁹⁾; Robinson and Darley, 1995⁽¹⁰⁾). Even after receiving instructions about the definitions of crimes like burglary or robbery, jurors import their commonsense notions of these offenses into their decisions. Parisi I 127 Prediction: (...) (Kalven and Zeisel, 1966)⁽¹¹⁾ (...) found that a majority jury vote on the first ballot predicted the final verdict in over 90% of the cases, and they hypothesized that deliberation often focused on convincing the members of the minority to change their vote. Subsequent research set out to investigate more precisely the relationship between pre-deliberation preference and final verdict. In fact, immediate votes prior to deliberation seem to occur in only a small minority of cases (Devine et al., 2004⁽¹²⁾; Diamond and Casper, 1992⁽¹³⁾; Diamond et al., 2003⁽¹⁴⁾; Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington, 1983⁽¹⁵⁾; Sandys and Dillehay, 1995)⁽¹⁶⁾. When the first ballot does occur, if each juror expresses their preference verbally, the early preferences can influence those voting subsequently (J. H. Davis et al., 1988)⁽¹⁷⁾. Jurors' certainty and confidence in their views can be weak before deliberations begin, such that some do not begin leaning strongly toward one side until after substantial deliberations have taken place (Hannaford-Agor et al., 2002)⁽¹⁸⁾. To understand the influence of the jury deliberation process, it is therefore important to measure pre-deliberation preferences of individual jurors prior to deliberation. >Negotiation/Social psychology. 1. Bennett, W. L. (1978). "Storytelling in Criminal Trials: A Model of Social Judgment." Quarterly Journa1 ofSpeech 64(1): 1-22. doi:10.1080/0033563 7809383408. 2. Pennington, N. and R. Hastie (1981). "Juror Decision-making Models: The Generalization Gap." Psychological Bulletin doi: 10.103 7 3-2909.89.2.246. 3. Pennington, N. and R. Hastie (1986). "Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51 (2):242-258. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.51.2.242. 4. Huntley, J. E. and M. Costanzo (2003). "Sexual Harassment Stories: Testing a Story-me- diated Model of Juror Decision-making in Civil Litigation." Law and Human Behavior 27(1): 29-51. 5. Pennington, N. and R. Hastie (1992). "Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for Juror Decision Making." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 62(2): 189—206. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.62.2.189. 6. Holyoak, K. J. and D. Simon (1999). "Bidirectional Reasoning in Decision Making by Constraint Satisfaction." Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 128(1): 3-31. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.128.1.3. 7. Simon, D. (2004). "A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making." University of Chicago Law Review 71(2): 511-586. 8. Finkel, N. J. (2005). Commonsense Justice: Jurors' Notions of the Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 9. Finkel, N. J. and J. L. Groscup (1997). "Crime Prototypes, Objective versus Subjective Culpability, and a Commonsense Balance." Law and Human Behavior 21 (2):209-230. 10. Robinson, P. H. and J. M. Darley (199 5).Justice, Liability, and Blame: Community Views and the Criminal Law. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 11.Kalven, Harry, jr. And Hans Zeisel (1967). „The American Jury“. In: 24 Wash. & LeeL. Rev. 158 (1967),https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol24/iss1/18 12. Devine, D. J., K. M. Olafson, L. L. Jarvis, J. P. Bott, L. D. Clayton, and J. M. T. Wolfe (2004). "Explaining Jury Verdicts: Is Leniency Bias for Real?" Journal of Applied social Psychology 34(10): 2069-2098. 13. Diamond, S. S. andJ. D. Casper (1992). "Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury." Law and society Review 26(3): 513 - 563. doi:10.2307/3053737. 14. Diamond, S. S., N. Vidmar, M. Rose, and L. Ellis (2003). "Juror Discussions during Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona Innovation." Arizona Law Review 45: 1. 15. Hastie, R., S. Penrod, and N. Pennington (1983). Inside the Jury. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 16. Sandys, M. and C. Dillehay (1995). "First-ballot Votes, Predeliberation Dispositions, and Final Verdicts in Jury Trials." Law and Human Behavior 19(2): 175-195. doi:10.1007/ BF01499324. 17. Davis, J. H., M. F. Stasson, K. Ono, and S. Zimmerman (1988). "Effects of Straw Polls on Group Decision Making: Sequential Voting Pattern, Timing, and Local Majorities." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 5 5(6): 918—926. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.55.6.918. 18. Hannaford-Agor, P., V. Hans, N. Mott, and T. Munsterman (2002). "Are HungJuries a Problem National Center for State Courts, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdfilesl/ nij /grants/1993 72.pdf Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press Parisi I 131 Court Proceedings/racial bias/Social Psychology/Nadler/Mueller: (...) many attorneys try to (...) select jurors based on their assumptions that Black jurors are less likely to find defendants, especially Black defendants, guilty (Bonazzoli, 1998⁽¹⁾; Kerr et al., 1995⁽²⁾). In fact, behavioral and neuroimaging research provide some support for these intuitions, suggesting that we may be more able to empathize or take the perspective of individuals who are similar to ourselves (Cialdini et al., 1997⁽³⁾; M. H. Davis et al., 1996⁽⁴⁾; N. Eisenberg and Mussen, 1989⁽⁵⁾; J. P. Mitchell, Macrae, and Banaji, 2006⁽⁶⁾; but see Batson et al., 2005⁽⁷⁾ for an alternate behavioral mechanism). Black sheep effect: However, there is evidence that in some situations, people may want to distance themselves from ingroup members who have committed bad acts, that is, the "black sheep" effect (J. Marques et al., 1998⁽⁸⁾; J. M. Marques, Yzerbyt, and Leyens, 1988)⁽⁹⁾. >Capital Punishment/Social Psychology. 1. Bonazzoli, M. J. (1998). "Jury selection and Bias: Debunking Invidious Stereotypes through Science." Quinnapiac Law Review 18:247. 2. Kerr, N. L., R. W. Hymes, A. B. Anderson, and J. E. Weathers (1995). "Defendant-Juror Similarity and Mock Juror Judgments" Law and Human Behavior 19(6):545-567. doi:10.1007/BF01499374. 3. Cialdini, R. B., S. L. Brown, B. P. Lewis, C. Luce, and S. L. Neuberg (1997). "Reinterpreting the Empathy-Altruism Relationship: When One into One Equals Oneness." Journal of Personality and social Psychology 73(3): 481-494. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.73.3.481. 4. Davis, J. H. (1996). "Group Decision Making and Quantitative Judgments: A Consensus Model," in E. H. Witte andJ. H. Davis, eds., Understanding Group Behavior, Vol. 1: Consensual Action By Small Groups, 35—59. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 5. Eisenberg, N. and P. H. Mussen (1989). The Roots of Prosocial Behavior in Children. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6. Mitchell, J. P., C. N. Macrae, and M. R. Banaji (2006). "Dissociable Medial Prefrontal Contributions to Judgments of Similar and Dissimilar Others." Neuron 50(4): 655-663. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2006.03.040. 7. Batson, C. D., D. A. Lishner, J. Cook, and S. Sawyer (2005). "Similarity and Nurturance: Two Possible Sources of Empathy for Strangers." Basic and Applied social Psychology 2 15-25. 8. Marques, J., D. Abrams, D. Paez, and C. Martinez-Taboada (1998). " The Role of Categorization and In-group Norms in Judgments of Groups and their Members." Journal of Personality and social Psychology doi:10.1037/0022-3514.75.4.976. 9. Marques, J. M., V. Y. Yzerbyt, andJ.-P. Leyens (1988). "The 'Black Sheep Effect': Extremity of Judgments Towards Ingroup Members as a Function of Group Identification." European Journal of Social Psychology 18(1): 1—16. doi:10.1002/ejsp.2420180102. Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press	Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Credit Expansion	Austrian School	Coyne I 36 Credit expansion/Austrian School/Coyne/Boettke: In addition to discussing the policy response to a bust once it occurs, Austrian economists have (…) explored ways of avoiding the onset of a bust in the first Place. >Business cycle/Austrian School. These include designing and reforming monetary institutions to limit the possibility of credit expansions that lead to distortions in relative prices and the capital structure. Such proposals fall under the idea of a "monetary constitution," a set of rules and institutional arrangements to limit the ability of banks to create money. >Central banks, >Money supply. A monetary constitution can take a variety offorms in practice and might include such things as a rule limiting the amount of credit created within a particular time frame, the backing of credit by hard money to limit the ability of banks to print money, or monetary competition which would limit money creation by replacing a centralized monopoly supplier of money with competition among banks. >Money/Mises, >Money/Rothbard.	Coyne I Christopher J. Coyne Peter J. Boettke The Essential Austrian Economics Vancouver 2020
Credit Expansion	Rothbard	Rothbard III 991 Credit expansion/Rothbard: If inflation is any increase in the supply of money not matched by an increase in the gold or silver stock available, the method of inflation just depicted is called credit expansion - the creation of new money-substitutes, entering the economy on the credit market. As will be seen below, while credit expansion by a bank seems far more sober and respectable than outright spending of new money, it actually has far graver consequences for the economic system, consequences which most people would find especially undesirable. This inflationary credit is called circulating credit, as distinguished from the lending of saved funds - called commodity credit. Inflation/Rothbard: Credit expansion has, of course, the same effect as any sort of inflation: prices tend to rise as the money supply increases. Like any inflation, it is a process of redistribution, whereby the inflators, and the part of the economy selling to them, gain at the expense of those who come last in line in the spending process. Inflation: This is the charm of inflation - for the beneficiaries - and the reason why it has been so popular, particularly since modern banking processes have camouflaged its significance for those losers who are far removed from banking operations. The gains to the inflators are visible and dramatic; the losses to others hidden and unseen, (…). >Inflation/Rothbard. Rothbard III 992 Investment/consumption: Inflation also changes the market's consumption/investment ratio. Superficially, it seems that credit expansion greatly increases capital, for the new money enters the market as equivalent to new savings for lending. Since the new "bank money" is apparently added to the supply of savings on the credit market, businesses can now borrow at a Iower rate of interest; hence inflationary credit expansion seems to offer the ideal escape from time preference, as well as an inexhaustible fount of added capital. Actually, this effect is illusory. On the contrary, inflation reduces saving and investment, thus Iowering society's standard of living. It may even cause large-scale capital consumption. 1) In the first place, as we just have seen, existing creditors are injured. This will tend to discourage lending in the future and thereby discourage saving-investment. 2) Secondly (…) the inflationary process inherently yields a purchasing-power profit to the businessman, since he purchases factors and sells them at a later time when all prices are higher. Rothbard III 994 Market Interest rates: The credit expansion reduces the market rate of interest. This means that price differentials are Iowered, and, (…), Iower price differentials raise prices in the highest stages of production, shifting resources to these stages and also increasing the number of stages. >Production structure/Rothbard. As a result, the production structure is lengthened. The borrowing firms are led to believe that enough funds are available to permit them to embark on projects formerly unprofitable. Free market: On the free market, investment will always take place first in those projects that satisfy the most urgent wants of the consumers. Then the next most urgent wants are satisfied, etc. The interest rate regulates the temporal order of choice of projects in accordance with their urgency. A Iower rate of interest on the market is a signal that more projects can be undertaken profitably. Equilibrium: Increased saving on the free market leads to a stable equilibrium of production at a Iower rate of interest. Credit expansion: But not so with credit expansion: for the original factors now receive increased money income. In the free-market example, total money incomes remained the same. The increased expenditure on higher stages was offset by decreased expenditure in the Iower stages. The "increased length" o fthe production structure was compensated by the "reduced width." But credit expansion pumps new money into the production structure: aggregate money incomes increase instead of remaining the same. The production structure has lengthened, but it has also remained as wide, without contraction of consumption expenditure. Rothbard III 995 Production structure/inflation/Rothbard: The owners of the original factors, with their increased money income, naturally hasten to spend their new money. >Factors of production/Rothbard. They allocate this spending between consumption and investment in accordance with their time preferences. Let us assume that the time-preference schedules of the people remain unchanged. >Time preference/Rothbard. This is a proper assumption, since there is no reason to assume that they have changed because of the inflation. Production now no longer reflects voluntary time preferences. Business has been led by credit expansion to invest in higher stages, as ifmore savings were available. Since they are not, business has overinvested in the higher stages and underinvested in the Iower. Consumers act promptly to re-establish their time preferences – their preferred investment/consumption proportions and price differentials. The differentials will be re-established at the old, higher amount, i.e., the rate of interest will return to its free-market magnitude. As a result, the prices at the higher stages of production will fall drastically, the prices at the Iower stages will rise again, and the entire new investment at the higher stages will have to be abandoned or sacrificed. Rothbard III 997 Investments: (…) bank credit expansion cannot increase capital investment by one iota. Investment can still come only from savings. >Money supply/Rothbard, >Saving/Rothbard, >Interest rate/Rothbard. Rothbard III 998 Money supply: an increase in the supply of money does Iower the rate of interest when it enters the market as credit expansion, but only temporarily. In the long run (and this long run is not very "long"), the market re-establishes the free-market time-preference interest rate and eliminates the change. In the long run a change in the money stock affects only the value of the monetary unit. Business cycle/Rothbard: This process - by which the market reverts to its preferred interest rate and eliminates the distortion caused by credit expansion - is, moreover, the business cycle! Rothbard III 1010 Credit expansion/Rothbard: Limitations: How does the narrow range of a bank's clientele limit its potentiality for credit expansion? The newly issued money-substitutes are, of course, Ioaned to a bank's clients. The client then spends the new money on goods and services. The new money begins to be diffused throughout the society. Eventually - usually very quickly - it is spent on the goods or services of people who use a different bank. Example: Suppose that the Star Bank has expanded credit; the newly issued Star Bank's notes or deposits find their way into the hands of Mr. Jones, who uses the City Bank. Two alternatives may occur, either of which has the same economic effect: (a) Jones accepts the Star Bank's notes or deposits, and deposits them in the City Bank, which calls on the Star Bank for redemption; or (b) Jones refuses to accept the Star Bank's notes and insists that the Star client - say Mr. Smith - who bought something from Jones, redeem the note himself and pay Jones in acceptable standard money. Money-substitutes: Thus, while gold or silver is acceptable throughout the market, a bank's money-substitutes are acceptable only to its own clientele. Clearly, a single bank's credit expansion is limited, and this limitation is stronger (a) the narrower the range of its clientele, and (b) the greater its issue of money-substitutes in relation to that of competing banks. Rothbard III 1011 Bankruptcy: (…), the greater the degree of relative credit expansion by any one bank, the sooner will the day of redemption - and potential bankruptcy - be at hand and they are impelled to spend a great proportion of the new money. Some of this increased spending will be on one another's goods and services, but it is clear that the greater the credit expansion, the greater will be the tendency for their spending to "spill over" onto the goods and services of nonclients. This tendency to spill over, or "drain," is greatly enhanced when increased spending by clients on the goods and services of other clients raises their prices. In the meanwhile, the prices of the goods sold by non-clients remain the same. As a consequence, clients are impelled to buy more from nonclients and less from one another; while nonclients buy less from clients and more from one another. The result is an "unfavorable" balance of trade from clients to nonclients.⁽¹⁾ Bank reserve: The purpose of banks' keeping any specie reserves in their vaults (assuming no legal reserve requirements) now becomes manifest. It is not to meet bank runs - since no fractional-reserve bank can be equipped to withstand a run. It is to meet the demands for redemption which will inevitably come from nonclients. 1. In the consolidated balance ofpayments of the clients, money income from sales to nonclients (exports) will decline, and money expenditures on the goods and services of nonclients (imports) will increase. The excess cash balances of the clients are transferred to non-clients.	Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Criteria	Quine	II 224 Synonymy: is no criterion, only conjectures about linguistic behavior with "bachelor" and "unmarried man". >Synonymy. VII (f) 103 Entity/criterion/Quine: entity is not in the singular term but in quantification. Statements are made true by the things we say in the range of those entities to which we appeal with "an entity x". Entities are presumed by a theory when some of them are counted among the variables to make the statements true. We cannot tell which objects are presumed in a discourse if we do not have a translatable concept of "there are". But there is no difference of "there are" in terms of universalia, unicorns, etc. on one side and "there are entities" i.e."(Ey)" on the other side.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Cross World Identity	Stalnaker	I 12 Cross World Identity/Stalnaker: cross world identity does not need to be transitive, e.g. the Ship of Theseus, e.g. statue and clay: here it is controversial whether statements about the cross world identitiy are true. >Possible worlds, >Ship of Theseus. 1) conceptual framework. 2) As actualists we are not talking literally about sets of individuals in other possible world. >Actualism. Stalnaker: instead we speek about sets of representatives. We need to separate the individual from its way of being. >Proxy. I 123 Cross World Identity/Haecceitismus/StalnakerVsSalmon, Nathan: we do not need absolute identity to define our real world-relative identity. For actualism all statements are made from the perspective of a possible world - then there is no perspective beyond all possible worlds. >Perspective/Nagel, >Haecceitism. I 124 Def Identity/possible world-relative/Stalnaker: identity is always the binary relation whose extension in every possible world w is the set of pairs so that d is in the range of w. >Identity, >Extension. I 125 ((s) Cross world identity/(s): each is formulated in a possible worlds).	Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Crowd Psychology	Le Bon	Haslam I 12 Crowd psychology/Le Bon: Gustave Le Bon (1895/1960)⁽¹⁾ used careful observations of a range of large groups and collectives to develop an influential theoretical analysis of crowd behaviour that emphasized emotional, irrational and unconscious influences. Le Bon’s perspective on the potentially negative aspects of groups was highly influential, and can be seen as an intellectual precursor to modern research on deindividuation – the potential for an individual to lose his or her sense of self-awareness and accountability when submerged in a group (Zimbardo, 1969⁽²⁾. >Group behavior, >Coercion, >Persuasion, >Responsibility, >Behavior. 1. Le Bon, G. (1895/1960) The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind (translation of La Psychologie des foules). New York: Viking Press. 2. Zimbardo, P.G. (1969) ‘The human choice: Individuation, reason, and order versus deindividuation, impulse, and chaos’, Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 17: 237–307. Steven J. Karau and Kipling D. Williams, “Social Facilitation and Social Loafing. Revisiting Triplett’s competition studies”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Cultural Rights	Levy	Gaus I 253 Cultural Rights/Levy/Kukathas: [Will] Kymlicka's⁽¹⁾ defence of group-differentiated rights immediately raised a range of questions and problems, and the literature on multiculturalism over the past decade has tackled many of them. >Minority rights/Political Philosophy. The most helpful elucidation of the different kinds of rights claims made on behalf of cultural groups was offered by Jacob Levy (1997⁽²⁾: 24—5), who distinguished eight categories of rights. categories of rights. These include exemption rights (exempting groups from laws that burden their cultural practices), assistance rights (to do those things the majority can do unassisted), self-government rights, rights to impose external rules (say, restricting non-members' rights to buy property or restricting their right to use their own language), rights to enforce intemal rules (even if they violate other rights), rights of recognition of the group's legal code, rights of representation in government, and rights to symbolic claims to acknowledge the worth, status, or existence of the group (1997⁽²⁾: 25). >Culture/Kymlicka, >Minority rights/Kymlicka, >Minorities/Kymlicka. 1. Kymlicka, Will (1995a) Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Levy, Jacob (1997) 'Classifying cultural rights'. In Will Kymlicka and Ian Shapiro, eds, Ethnicity and Group Rights: NOMOS xxwx New York: New York University Press, 22—66. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Levy I I. Levy Gambling With Truth an Essay of Induction and the Aims of Science Cambridge 1974 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Culture	Kymlicka	Gaus I 252 Culture/multiculturalism/Kymlicka/Kukathas: National cultures are 'societal cultures', and the modern world is divided into such groupings. They provide their members with meaningful ways of life across the range of human activities - from the economic to the educational and religious. 'These cultures tend to be territorially concentrated, and based on a shared language' (1995a⁽¹⁾: 76). These are 'societal' cultures because they comprise not just shared memories or values but also common institutions and practices. A 'societal culture' is embodied in schools, in the media, in the economy, and in government. >Multiculturalism/Kymlicka, >Minority rights/Kymlicka, Cf. >Nationalism/Kymlicka. Minorities/groups: For Kymlicka, national minorities are, typically, groups with societal cultures — albeit cultures that have struggled against conquest, colonization, and forced assimilation. Immigrants, however, have no societal culture (though tthey may have left their own societal cultures). Societal cultures tend to be national cultures, and nations are almost invariably societal cultures (1995a⁽¹⁾: 80). Traditional culture/Kymlicka: In the modern world, cultures which are not societal cultures are not likely to prosper, given the pressures towards the creation of a single common culture in each country. His theory of group-differentiated rights accordingly focuses on enabling national minorities to sustain their societal cultures, while protecting immigrants with polyethnic rights that would 'help ethnic groups and religious minorities express their cultural particularity and pride without it hampering their success in the economic and political institu-tions of the dominant society' (1995a⁽¹⁾: 31). 1. Kymlicka, Will (1995a) Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Currency Crises	Fischer	Feldstein I 453 Currency crises/Stanley Fischer: The natural tendency to focus on crises that have happened may lead to certain biases. Almost by definition, these are outliers, outcomes that are worse Feldstein I 454 than anticipated. We should also think for a minute about crises that don’t happen. First, crises don’t happen in most countries, most of the time. Second, in some cases, they don’t happen because countries have taken action to avoid crises that were coming. Third, there are crises that are expected but don’t happen. In thinking about crises, we will need to figure out how and why the markets keep financing these countries, possibly long enough for them to avoid a crisis. >Exchange rates/Fischer, >Exchange rates, >Fixed exchange rates, >Floating exchange rates. Feldstein I 456 IMF/Fischer: Let me also discuss the proposal to amend the Articles of Agreement of the IMF to make liberalization of capital flows a purpose of the IMF. At present we have as one of our purposes the promotion of current account convertibility, but not capital account convertibility-though we are allowed to require countries to impose capital controls in certain circumstances. The proposal to amend the articles in this direction has aroused a great deal of concern in many developing countries, though not, I believe, warranted concern. Capital account liberalization is something that in the long run is going to happen to almost every country, as current account liberalization has happened to almost every country. And in the long run, as financial structures strengthen, it will be a good thing. Quotas/capital account/Fischer: We know that quotas are by and large worse than tariffs, despite the reverse occasionally being true in very specific circumstances. We know something about liberalizing by cutting tariffs proportionally, and so forth. We don’t have similar answers on the capital account-and we should try to develop them. ((s) Written in 1999). Feldstein I 457 Equilibrium/Fischer: (…) I have great difficulty knowing how we know whether the market is doing right, whether there isn’t another equilibrium, and what exactly is driving these situations. But if that’s what you start believing, then you have to ask whether in a crisis or otherwise, countries shouldn’t at least tentatively take a view on where the exchange rate should be. Of course, they can’t in these circumstances use reserves extensively to defend a particular rate, but they may try to use the interest rate to keep the rate from moving too far. Contagion: Contagion exists if, given the objective circumstances, a country is more likely to have a crisis if some other country is also having a crisis. The data show, for instance in a paper by Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996)⁽¹⁾, that contagion exists, a result that is easy to believe given the European crisis, the Latin American crisis, and the Southeast Asian crisis. Question: (…) should the IMF be lending in these circumstances and does that create too much moral hazard? Moral hazard/Fischer: Article I of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, which sets out the purposes of the Fund, includes the following: “To give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund temporarily available to them under appropriate safeguards, thus providing them with opportunity to correct maladjust Feldstein I 458 ments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity.” We were set up in part to lend to countries in crisis and are thus not going to tell a member that we cannot lend to it because of the moral hazard. There is moral hazard in every single insurance arrangement. We all know the analysis that seatbelts increase the speed at which people drive, and increase the intensity of accidents, and could even increase the number of accidents. That is also the case with the moral hazard of lending by the official sector in circumstances in which a country is in severe trouble, and there seems to be nothing else that will help it avoid taking measures destructive of national prosperity, which means having a very, very deep recession. 1. Eichengreen, Bany, Andrew Rose, and Charles Wyplosz. 1996. Contagious currency crises. NBER Working Paper no. 5681. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research. Stanley Fisher. „Crises that don’t happen.“ In: Martin Feldstein (ed). International Capital Flows. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999.	Fischer St I Stanley Fischer Imf Essays From a Time of Crisis Boston: MIT 2005 Feldstein I Martin Feldstein (ed.) International Capital Flows. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999. Chicago 1999
Currency Crises	Krugman	Feldstein I 421 Currency crises/Krugman: [a] sort of circular logic - in which investors flee a currency because they expect it to be devalued, and much (though usually not all) of the pressure on the currency comes precisely because of this investor lack of confidence - is the defining feature of a currency crisis. Feldstein I 422 Canonical crises model/Salant/Krugman: The canonical crisis model derives from work done in the mid-1970s by Stephen Salant⁽¹⁾, at that time at the Federal Reserve’s International Finance Section. His starting point was the proposition that speculators will hold an exhaustible resource if and only if they expect its price to rise rapidly enough to offer them a rate of return equivalent (after adjusting for risk) to that on other assets. This proposition is the basis of the famous Hotelling model of exhaustible resource pricing: the price of such a resource should rise over time at the rate of interest, with the level of the price path determined by the requirement that the resource just be exhausted by the time the price has risen to the “choke point” at which there is no more demand. >Hotelling Rule, >Exhaustible resources, >Currency crises/Salant. Feldstein I 423 Salant/Krugman: The canonical currency crisis model, as laid out initially by Krugman (1979)⁽²⁾ and refined by Flood and Garber (1984),(3) was designed to mimic the commodity board story. Canonical crises model/Salant/Krugman: The canonical currency crisis model, then, explains such crises as the result of a fundamental inconsistency between domestic policies - typically the per- Feldstein I 424 sistence of money-financed budget deficits - and the attempt to maintain a fixed exchange rate. This model has some important virtues. First of all, many currency crises clearly do reflect a basic inconsistency between domestic and exchange rate policy; (…). Second, the model demonstrates clearly that the abrupt, billions-lost-in-days character of runs on a currency need not reflect either investor irrationality or the schemes of market manipulators. It can be simply the result of the logic of the situation, in which holding a currency will become unattractive once its price is no longer stabilized, and the end of the price stabilization is itself triggered by the speculative flight of capital. These insights are important, especially as a corrective to the tendency of observers unfamiliar with the logic of currency crises to view them as somehow outside the normal universe of economic events-whether as a revelation that markets have been taken over by chaos theory, that “virtual money” has now overpowered the real economy (Drucker 1997)⁽⁴⁾, or as prima facie evidence of malevolent market manipulation. VsCanonical model/Krugman: Perhaps the best way to describe what is wrong with the canonical crisis model is to say that it represents government policy (though not the market response) in a very mechanical way. The government is assumed to blindly keep on printing money to cover a budget deficit, regardless of the external situation; the central bank is assumed to doggedly sell foreign exchange to peg the exchange rate until the last dollar of reserves is gone. In reality the range of possible policies is much wider. For more sophisticated models see >Currency crises/Obstfeld, >Currency crises/economic theories. Feldstein I 439 Preventions: [One] answer is simply not to offer speculators an easy target, by refusing to defend any particular exchange rate in the first place. Once a country Feldstein I 440 has a floating exchange rate, any speculative concerns about its future policies will already be reflected in the exchange rate. Thus anyone betting against the currency will face a real risk, rather than the one-way option in speculating against a fixed rate. Reasoning along these lines has convinced a number of economists working on currency crises that the ultimate lesson of the crisis-ridden 1990s is that countries should avoid halfway houses. They should either float their currencies or join currency unions. 1. Salant, Stephen. "Exhaustible Resources and Industrial Structure: A Nash-Cournot Approach to the World Oil Market," Journal of Political Economy, October 1976. 2. Krugman, P. 1979. A model of balance of payments crises. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 11:311-25. 3. Flood, R., and P. Garber. 1984. Collapsing exchange rate regimes: Some linear examples. Journal of International Economics 17: 1-13. 4. Drucker, P. 1997. The global economy and the nation-state. Foreign Affairs 76 (5): 159-71. Paul R. Krugman. „Currency Crises“. In: Martin Feldstein (ed). International Capital Flows. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999.	EconKrug I Paul Krugman Volkswirtschaftslehre Stuttgart 2017 EconKrug II Paul Krugman Robin Wells Microeconomics New York 2014 Feldstein I Martin Feldstein (ed.) International Capital Flows. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999. Chicago 1999
Dark Triad Traits	Paulhus	Corr II 246 Dark Triad Traits/Personality Traits/Paulhus/Williams/Zeigler-Hill/Marcus: Paulhus and Williams (2002)⁽¹⁾ examined the possibility that narcissism, psychopathy and Machiavellianism constituted a Dark Triad of personality traits. >Narcissism, >Psychopathy, >Machiavellianism, >Personality traits. The measures of narcissism, psychopathy and Machiavellianism had moderate correlations with each other in this sample showing that an individual who reported a high score for one of these traits was also likely to report relatively high scores for the other traits. (…) the Dark Triad personality traits had similar negative associations with the personality trait of agreeableness but often had divergent associations with the personality trait of neuroticism (…). >Neuroticism. The conclusion reached by Paulhus and Williams (2002)⁽¹⁾ was that the Dark Triad personality traits were distinct constructs that had important similarities to each other but were far from interchangeable. II 251 To develop a more complete understanding of the Dark Triad traits, it may be helpful to consider their potential evolutionary origins. The idea underlying (…) evolutionary perspectives is that the self-serving, manipulative and exploitative strategies that characterize the Dark Triad traits may be adaptive under certain conditions. >Evolutionary psychology. One of the earliest scholars to advocate for an evolutionary perspective for any of the Dark Triad traits was Mealey (1995)⁽²⁾, who suggested that psychopathy may be the expression of a frequency-dependent life strategy that is selected in response to varying environmental circumstances. Another approach to understanding the origins of the Dark Triad traits has been to consider their links with life II 252 history strategies which concern how individuals resolve the various trade-offs that must be made due to time and energy limitations (e.g., Kaplan & Gangestad, 2005)⁽³⁾. These trade-offs focus on: (1) somatic effort vs. reproductive effort; (2) parental effort vs. mating effort; (3) quality of offspring vs. quantity of offspring; and (4) future reproduction vs. present reproduction. This perspective argues that individuals differ along a continuum with regard to the reproductive strategies they employ to resolve these trade-offs (e.g., Buss, 2009)⁽⁴⁾. >D.M. Buss. II 253 [Various] results suggest the possibility that the Dark Triad traits may represent specialized adaptations that allow individuals to exploit particular niches within society such as those concerning opportunistic mating (e.g., Furnham et al., 2013)⁽⁵⁾. The Dark Triad traits tend to have similar — but not identical — associations with a range of aversive outcomes (…). Although many of the results concerning the Dark Triad provide an unpleasant view of these traits, other studies reveal that the Dark Triad traits may be beneficial or at least neutral in certain areas of life. For example, these traits may be helpful for individuals pursuing leader ship positions especially when they are combined with factors such as intelligence and physical attractiveness (Furnham, 2010)⁽⁶⁾ (…). II 255 VsDark Triad Traits: Other than perhaps following the ‘rule of three’ (Dundes, 1968)⁽⁷⁾, there is no intrinsic reason why the set of dark personality traits should be limited to a triad. In fact, Chabrol, Van Leeuwen, Rodgers and Séjourné (2009)⁽⁸⁾ have provided compelling evidence that sadism belongs with these other traits, creating a ‘Dark Tetrad’. We have argued that there are numerous additional dark traits that merit study and that could be included in the types of studies that have examined the Dark Triad (e.g., Marcus & Zeigler-Hill, 2015⁽⁹⁾; Zeigler-Hill & Marcus, 2016⁽¹⁰⁾). 1. Paulhus, D. L., & Williams, K. M. (2002). The Dark Triad of personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy. Journal of Research in Personality, 36, 556—563. 2. Mealey, L. (1995). The sociobiology of sociopathy: An integrated evolutionary model. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18, 5 23—599. 3. Kaplan, H. S., & Gangestad, S. W. (2005). Life history theory and evolutionary psychology. In D. M. Buss (Ed.), The handbook of evolutionary psychology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. 4. Buss, D. M. (2009). How can evolutionary psychology successfully explain personality and individual differences? Perspectives on Psychological Science, 4, 359—366. 5. Furnham, A., Richards, S. C., & Paulhus, D. L. (2013). The Dark Triad of personality: A 10 year review. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 7, 199—2 16. 6. Furnham, A. (2010). The elephant in the boardroom: The causes of leadership derailment. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 7. Dundes, A. (1968). The number three in American culture. In A. Dundes (Ed.), Every man his way: Readings in cultural anthropology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice—Hall. 8. Chabrol, H., Van Leeuwen, N., Rodgers, R., & Séjourné, N. (2009). Contributions of psychopathic, narcissistic, Machiavellian, and sadistic personality traits to juvenile delinquency. Personality and Individual Differences, 47, 734—73 9. 9. Marcus, D. K., & Zeigler-Hill, V. (2015). A big tent of dark personality traits. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 9,434—446. 10. Zeigler-Hill, V., & Marcus, D. K. (2016). A bright future for dark personality features? In V. Zeigler-Hill & D. K. Marcus (Eds.), The dark side of personality: Science and practice in social, personality, and clinical psychology. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Zeigler-Hill, Virgil; Marcus, David K.: “The Dark Side of Personality Revisiting Paulhus and Williams (2002)”, In: Philip J. Corr (Ed.) 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, pp. 245-262.	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Dark Triad Traits	Williams	Corr II 246 Dark Triad Traits/Personality Traits/Paulhus/Williams/Zeigler-Hill/Marcus: Paulhus and Williams (2002)⁽¹⁾ examined the possibility that narcissism, psychopathy and Machiavellianism constituted a Dark Triad of personality traits. >Narcissism, >Psychopathy, >Machiavellianism, >Personality traits. The measures of narcissism, psychopathy and Machiavellianism had moderate correlations with each other in this sample showing that an individual who reported a high score for one of these traits was also likely to report relatively high scores for the other traits. (…) the Dark Triad personality traits had similar negative associations with the personality trait of agreeableness but often had divergent associations with the personality trait of neuroticism (…). >Neuroticism. The conclusion reached by Paulhus and Williams (2002)⁽¹⁾ was that the Dark Triad personality traits were distinct constructs that had important similarities to each other but were far from interchangeable. II 251 To develop a more complete understanding of the Dark Triad traits, it may be helpful to consider their potential evolutionary origins. The idea underlying (…) evolutionary perspectives is that the self-serving, manipulative and exploitative strategies that characterize the Dark Triad traits may be adaptive under certain conditions. >Evolutionary psychology. One of the earliest scholars to advocate for an evolutionary perspective for any of the Dark Triad traits was Mealey (1995)⁽²⁾, who suggested that psychopathy may be the expression of a frequency-dependent life strategy that is selected in response to varying environmental circumstances. Another approach to understanding the origins of the Dark Triad traits has been to consider their links with life II 252 history strategies which concern how individuals resolve the various trade-offs that must be made due to time and energy limitations (e.g., Kaplan & Gangestad, 2005)⁽³⁾. These trade-offs focus on: (1) somatic effort vs. reproductive effort; (2) parental effort vs. mating effort; (3) quality of offspring vs. quantity of offspring; and (4) future reproduction vs. present reproduction. This perspective argues that individuals differ along a continuum with regard to the reproductive strategies they employ to resolve these trade-offs (e.g., Buss, 2009)⁽⁴⁾. >D.M. Buss. II 253 [Various] results suggest the possibility that the Dark Triad traits may represent specialized adaptations that allow individuals to exploit particular niches within society such as those concerning opportunistic mating (e.g., Furnham et al., 2013)⁽⁵⁾. The Dark Triad traits tend to have similar — but not identical — associations with a range of aversive outcomes (…). Although many of the results concerning the Dark Triad provide an unpleasant view of these traits, other studies reveal that the Dark Triad traits may be beneficial or at least neutral in certain areas of life. For example, these traits may be helpful for individuals pursuing leader ship positions especially when they are combined with factors such as intelligence and physical attractiveness (Furnham, 2010)⁽⁶⁾ (…). II 255 VsDark Triad Traits: Other than perhaps following the ‘rule of three’ (Dundes, 1968)⁽⁷⁾, there is no intrinsic reason why the set of dark personality traits should be limited to a triad. In fact, Chabrol, Van Leeuwen, Rodgers and Séjourné (2009)⁽⁸⁾ have provided compelling evidence that sadism belongs with these other traits, creating a ‘Dark Tetrad’. We have argued that there are numerous additional dark traits that merit study and that could be included in the types of studies that have examined the Dark Triad (e.g., Marcus & Zeigler-Hill, 2015⁽⁹⁾; Zeigler-Hill & Marcus, 2016⁽¹⁰⁾). >Personality/Traits. 1. Paulhus, D. L., & Williams, K. M. (2002). The Dark Triad of personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy. Journal of Research in Personality, 36, 556—563. 2. Mealey, L. (1995). The sociobiology of sociopathy: An integrated evolutionary model. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18, 5 23—599. 3. Kaplan, H. S., & Gangestad, S. W. (2005). Life history theory and evolutionary psychology. In D. M. Buss (Ed.), The handbook of evolutionary psychology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. 4. Buss, D. M. (2009). How can evolutionary psychology successfully explain personality and individual differences? Perspectives on Psychological Science, 4, 359—366. 5. Furnham, A., Richards, S. C., & Paulhus, D. L. (2013). The Dark Triad of personality: A 10 year review. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 7, 199—2 16. 6. Furnham, A. (2010). The elephant in the boardroom: The causes of leadership derailment. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 7. Dundes, A. (1968). The number three in American culture. In A. Dundes (Ed.), Every man his way: Readings in cultural anthropology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice—Hall. 8. Chabrol, H., Van Leeuwen, N., Rodgers, R., & Séjourné, N. (2009). Contributions of psychopathic, narcissistic, Machiavellian, and sadistic personality traits to juvenile delinquency. Personality and Individual Differences, 47, 734—73 9. 9. Marcus, D. K., & Zeigler-Hill, V. (2015). A big tent of dark personality traits. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 9,434—446. 10. Zeigler-Hill, V., & Marcus, D. K. (2016). A bright future for dark personality features? In V. Zeigler-Hill & D. K. Marcus (Eds.), The dark side of personality: Science and practice in social, personality, and clinical psychology. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Zeigler-Hill, Virgil; Marcus, David K.: “The Dark Side of Personality Revisiting Paulhus and Williams (2002)”, In: Philip J. Corr (Ed.) 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, pp. 245-262.	WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Darwinism	Vavilov	Gould II 132ff Darwinism/Variation/Evolution/Vavilov/Gould: Vavilov had collected barley, oats and millet from a wide variety of different breeds of wheat from various locations, and noted that within the different species of a genus, but also frequently within the species of related groups, remarkably similar series of varieties could be found. >Evolution. Law of Homologues series in Variation/Vavilov: Thesis: The new species arise by developing genetic differences that rule out crossbreeding with related species. But the new species is not all genetically different from its ancestors. Most of them remain untouched. The parallel variations thus represent the "play through" of the same genetic abilities, which are inherited as blocks of one species to another. Gould: Darwin does not disagree with such a thesis, since it gives the selection an important role. >Selection, >Inheritance. The variation is only the raw material. It arises in all directions and is at least not arranged in an adaptive way. The direction is slowly being determined by natural selection, as the more adapted generations proliferate. >Adaption. However, if the possibilities are very limited and one species shows all of its different varieties, then this choice cannot be explained by selection alone. That's how Vavilov sets himself apart from Darwin. >Darwinism, >Ch. Darwin. VavilovVsDarwin: Variation does not take place in all directions, but in classes that are analogous to those of chemistry and crystallography. GoudlVsVavilov: Vavilov underlined the creative role of the environment.	Vavilov I Nikolai I. Vavilov Origin and Geography of Cultivated Plants Cambridge 2009 Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989
de dicto	Logic Texts	Read III 127 Initial problem: Only real names allow the substitution, which is found in the indistinguishability of the identical. The principle says that Fa as well as a=b may infer Fb from a statement. Cicero accused Catilina, and Cicero was Tullius, so Tullius accused Catilina. >Substitution, >Insertion. Improper names: descriptions: Example: "the greatest Roman orator" and Example: "the number of planets". It's not in the form of Fa, but a much more complex one: " among the Roman orators, there's a greatest, and he accused Catilina." "Exactly one number counts the planets and it is greater than seven". Re III 128 Russell analysed (groundbreaking for analytic philosophy) that these propositions do not contain real names (except 9 and 7). Therefore, they cannot be a permise and conclusion of the principle of indistinguishability of the identical. >Leibniz principle, >Identity, >Indistinguishability, >Logical proper names, >Numbers, >Planets example. Re III 129 QuineVsRussell: with this we only got out of the rain and into the fire. Problem: Range. The analysis consists in replacing an apparent form A (d) in which a description d occurs in a statement A with a statement B that does not contain any component to which d corresponds. >Range, >Scope, >Narrow/wide. Solution: Quine is willing (until further analysis) to accept the modality de dicto, the attribution of modal properties to statements. But true ascriptions de re are quite different. They mean that objects themselves necessarily have properties. And that is essentialism. >Essentialism. Re III 130 Quine: Modality de dicto: Quote - "7" and "9" is now embedded - so that they are protected from the indiscernibiliy principle - statements of the form "necessary A’ be construed as if they were of the form Fa, where a is the statement A and F the predicate ’is necessarily true " - the scope is limited. >de re.	Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
de re	Quine	Brandom I 698 Quine: the central grammatical difference between these attribution types concerns the correctness of substitutions. Expressions in the de re part are "referential transparent" (co-referential expressions can be exchanged salva veritate but not in the de dicto part.) >Substitution/Quine. Quine II 144 f de re: it is out of range: x = planets, x = 9, 9 odd - the predicate applies to the value of a variable, not to the name! See > planets-example. de re: is the referring position! de dicto: the meant term stands in the sentence: "neccessary" planets odd: that is wrong! >de dicto/Quine. II 151 de re: Example "spy" should be an essential characteristic. This is wrong. This is not belief de re! (>Essential property).	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Decidability	Field	II 343 Decidability/finiteness/mathematics/Field: the operator F ("only a finite number") makes undecidable propositions in a finite range decidable. - Regardless of specific finiteness we have no specific term anamyore of e.g. a sentence of a given language, e.g. a theorem of a given system, e.g. a formula of a given language, e.g. the consistency of a system. Because since Frege all evidence must be formalized. >Gottlob Frege, >Formal language, >Formalization, >Proofs, >Provability.	Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Decision-making Processes	Experimental Psychology	Parisi I 119 Decision-making process/Experimental Psychology/Wilkinson-Ryan: Studies have shown that numeracy has important, serious effects on decision-making. Ellen Peters and co-authors (2006)⁽¹⁾ gave a pool of subjects a series of questions designed to test numeracy. The items ranged from very simple ("Which of the following represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? 1 10%, 5%?") to the moderately challenging ("The chance of getting a viral infection is .0005. Out of 10,000, about how many of them are expected to get infected?"). They then ran a series of common decision-making experiments, including framing effects, risk representation, and affective information. High-numeracy subjects made better decisions than low-numeracy subjects. Results: They were less likely to be swayed by framing effects (e.g. 75% of lives saved vs. 2 5% of lives lost), less likely to underestimate risks represented by percentages, and less likely to choose a low-probability reward that felt better. Legal decision-making: Rowell and Bregant (2014)⁽²⁾ applied this set of findings to legal decision-making. Using law students as subjects, they measured numeracy and asked subjects to make a series of legal judgments. They found some effects of numeracy on decision-making, notably in how the participants judged the defendant's precautions in a tort case, but more notably found population-wide effects of framing, suggesting widespread susceptibility to framings that implicate loss aversion. >Loss aversion. 1. Peters, Ellen, Daniel Västfjäll, Paul Slovic, C. K. Mertz, Ketti Mazzocco, and Stephan Dickert (2006). "Numeracy and Decision Making." Psychological Science 17: 407-413. 2. Rowell, Arden and Jessica Bregant (2014). "Numeracy and Legal Decision Making." Arizona State Law Journal 46: 13-29. Wilkinson-Ryan, Tess. „Experimental Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press	Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Definitions	Gadamer	Gadamer I 419 Definition/Gadamer: (...) what is a term? A word, the meaning of which is clearly delimited, provided that it means a defined term. A term is always something artificial, provided that either the word itself is artificially formed or - the more frequent case - a term already in use is cut out of the fullness and breadth of its meanings and fixed to a certain conceptual sense. >Words, >Word Meaning, >Definability, >Uniqueness. In contrast to the life of meaning of the words of spoken language, of which Wilhelm von Humboldt rightly showed⁽¹⁾ that a certain range of fluctuation is essential to it, the term is a frozen word and the terminological use of a word is an act of violence perpetrated on language. >Language use, >Language, >Meaning change, >Meaning. Ancient Philosophy/Terminology/Gadamer: Even as an interpreter of scientific texts, one will (...) always have to reckon with the coexistence of the terminological and the freer use of a word(2). Modern interpreters of ancient texts tend easily to underestimate this demand, because the term is more artificial and insofar more fixed in modern scientific use than in antiquity, which does not yet know any foreign and few artificial words. >Hermeneutics, >Hermeneutics/Gadamer. 1. W. v. Humboldt, Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaus, p. 9. 2. One should consider here, for example, the Aristotelian usage of phronesis, whose sub-minological occurrence endangers the certainty of developmental conclusions, as I once tried to show against W. Jaeger (Cf. Der aristotelische Protreptikos, Hermes 1928, p. 146ff.). (Cf. now in vol. 5 der Ges. Werke, p. 164—186.)	Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Definitions	Goodman	I 124 Definition/Goodman: a definition is not symmetrical: usually a definiens describes that to which it applies in more detail than the definiendum. It provides an analysis and introduces means for a systematic integration. >Asymmetries. --- III 61 Definition coextensive, but not identical/Goodman: coextensive but not identical are e.g. featherless bipeds and definitions. III 96 Definition/criterion/Goodman: the definition of hydrogen does not provide us with a test of how much of that is in this room. III 126f Definition/Goodman: even though a definition always unambiguously determines which objects it is in accordancce with, it rarely, in turn, is clearly justified by each of its individual cases. You can see, the table, to which I point, as a "steel table", "steel thing" then finally put it into a class with cars. In such a way that no label in this range applies to both. Such flexibility cannot be allowed in the case of scores. III 169f None of our common natural languages is a notation system. E.g. a wheelbarrow belongs to many performance classes of object-English: "wooden object", "means of transport with wheel", etc. In such a language, there is no such thing as the definition. In a system of notation, however, all scores for a given performance are coextensive, all have the same performances as a fulfillment object. III 191f Definition/Goodman: the difference between real and nominal defining still applies, as is already illustrated by the difference between writing a score for a pre-existing work and composing a new work. In the first case, a score is uniquely determined by a performance, in the second case a score determines a class of performances clearly.	G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997
Definitions	Saucier	Corr I 379 Definitions/science/Saucier: A source of difficulty is that scientists (a) define the concept in varying ways, and (b) are prone to define the concept more broadly than they operationalize it. Investigators tend to give personality a rather grand and inclusive definition (which serves to underscore its importance) while measuring it with instruments that capture only a segment of this grand, inclusive range. >Personality/Saucier, >Attributes/Saucier. Gerard Saucier, „Semantic and linguistic aspects of personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Deliberative Democracy	Social Choice Theory	Gaus I 146 Deliberative democracy/social choice theory/Dryzek: Deliberative democracy has three prominent sets of critics, who otherwise have absolutely nothing in common: social choice theorists, ifference democrats, and sceptical egalitarians. Cf. >Democracy/Riker, >Democracy/Social choice theory. Gaus I 147 Dryzek: [social chice theory] (...) provides a set of warnings about what democratic politics could be like if political actors behaved in Homo economicus fashion, and ifno mechanisms existed to curb these behavioural proclivities and their consequences. Deliberative democracy provides both a communicative paradigm of personhood and mechanisms to bring Homo economicus and his interactions under control (a non-deliberative alternative can be found in Shepsle's 1979⁽¹⁾ idea of structure-induced equilibrium). Now, social choice theorists can still try to pour cold water over deliberation because it is easy to demonstrate that the very conditions of free access, equality, and unrestricted communication conducive to authentic deliberation are exactly the conditions conducive to instability, arbitrariness, and so strategic manipulation (van Mill, 1996⁽²⁾; see also Grofman, 1993⁽³⁾: 1578; Knight and Johnson, 1994)⁽⁴⁾. VsVs: Deliberative democrats can reply that there are mechanisms intrinsic to deliberation that act to structure preferences in ways that solve social choice problems (Dryzek and List, 2003⁽⁵⁾). For example, deliberation can disaggregate a dimension on which preferences are non-single-peaked (one major cause of cycles across three or more alternatives that are at the root of the kind of instability Riker identifies) into several dimensions on each of which single-peakedness prevails (Miller, 1992)⁽⁶⁾. VsDemocracy: To the extent this deliberative reply succeeds, then the social choice critique undermines only an aggregative account of democracy in which all actors behave strategically, and can actually be deployed to show why deliberation is necessary. 1. Shepsle, Kenneth (1979) 'Institutional arrangements and equilibrium in multidimensional voting models'. American Journal of Political Science, 23:27—60. 2. Van Mill, David (1996) 'The possibility of rational outcomes from democratic discourse and procedures'. Journal of Politics, 58:734-52. 3. Grofman, Bernard (1993) 'Public choice, civic republicanism, and American politics: perspectives of a "reasonable choice" modeler'. Texas Law Review, 71: 1541-87. 4. Knight, Jack and James Johnson (1994) 'Aggregation and Deliberation: On the possibility of democratic legitimacy'. Political Theory, 22: 277-96. 5. Dryzek, John S. and Christian List (2003) 'Social choice theory and deliberative democracy: a reconciliation'. British Journal of Politica1 Science, 33: 1-28. 6. Miller, David (1992) 'Deliberative democracy and social choice'. Political Studies, 40 (special issue): 54—67. Dryzek, John S. 2004. „Democratic Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Dementia	Developmental Psychology	Upton I 142 Dementia/Developmental psychology/Upton: Def Dementia/Upton: a serious loss of cognitive ability in a previously unimpaired person, beyond what might be expected from normal ageing. It may be static, the result of a unique global brain injury, or progressive, resulting in long-term decline due to damage or disease in the body. Although dementia is far more common in the geriatric population, it may occur at any stage of adulthood. Developmental psychology: Normally, it is expected that high levels of loss of volume are linked to serious functional problems, such as those associated with dementia. Indeed, that is exactly the relationship seen in individuals of low to moderate socio-economic status. However, in individuals of higher socio-economic status, the same structural decline seems to be better tolerated – that is, it does not affect functioning. It has therefore been concluded that higher socio-economic status protects against cognitive decline. Individuals with dementia often lose the ability to look after themselves. They may also no longer recognize familiar places or people, including close family members such as their children or a spouse (Clark, 2006)⁽¹⁾. The most common form of dementia, accounting for between 50 and 70 per cent of all dementia, is Alzheimer’s disease. Alzheimer’s is progressive, meaning that it involves a gradual decline in skills. It is also irreversible. >Social status, >Alzheimer’s Disease. 1. Clark, R, Hyde, ¡S, Essex. MJ and Klein, MH (2006) Length of maternity leave and quality of mother- infant interactions. Child Development, 68,2: 364-83. Further reading: Kitchener, KS, Lynch, CL, Fischer, KW and Wood, PK (1993) Developmental range of reflective judgment: the effect of contextual support and practice on developmental stage. Developmental Psychology, 29:893-906. Available online at https :/ /gseweb.harvard.edu/ -ddl/articles Copy! Kitchener-etal 1993 DevRangeReflectjudgem.pdf.	Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011
Democracy	Furman	Krastev I 92 Democracy/Furman/Krastev: Writing in the context of a disintegrating country and a frightening power vacuum, Moscow political scientist Dmitry Furman was convinced that, while the only democracy Russians could expect in the short run was 'imitation democracy', in the long run, faking democracy would inculcate democratic habits regardless of the will of governing elites. As Perry Anderson observed, Furman 'viewed democracy simply as a normal attribute of a given age of humanity, as literacy, firearms or railways had been of other ages'. In his view, 'There was no way of knowing how Russians would dress, eat, live, work or fear in the future, but it could be predicted with some confidence that they would choose their rulers at the ballot box, take decisions by a majority and guarantee the rights of the minority.(1) - But while Furman was an optimist about the long run, he harboured deep-seated fears when it came to the immediate future of the democratic transition. Krastev I 93 At the end of the day, he believed, the democratic facade, because of the psychological expectations it creates, would foster the emergence and stabilization of electorally accountable government. In Furrnan' theory, therefore, the series of 'colour revolutions' (especially the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine)(2) that shattered post-Soviet space at the beginning of the twenty-first century were a logical sequel to imitation democracy. 1. Cited in Perry Anderson, 'Imitation Democracy', London Review of Books 37: 16 (27 August 2015). 2. Lincoln A. Mitchell, The Color Revolutions (University of Pennsylvania Press,2012).	Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019
Democracy	Johnson	Morozov I 107 Democracy/Politics/Steven Johnson/Morozov: Steven Johnson celebrates in his Future Perfect⁽¹⁾ the advantages of switching to what he calls "liquid democracy": In a traditional democracy, citizens elect representatives to legislate on their behalf; in a liquid democracy, citizens do not have to vote for representatives - they can simply transfer their votes to those who, in their opinion, know better about the issue. I 108 Morozov: the idea is not new. Lewis Carroll already suggested something similar.⁽²⁾ MorozovVsJohnson: this does not take into account the fact that the legislative process also includes discussion, negotiations, compromises and reflection. I 109 The model of Johnson and Miller ⁽³⁾ assumes that politics is only a kind of referendum. But such referendums only paralyze democracy ⁽⁴⁾. I 110 MorozovVsJohnson: he seems to think, just as we ask our friends where best to eat, we would do the same with political decisions. How strange! 1. St. Johnson, Future Perfect: The Case for Progress in a Networked Age (New York: Penguin, 2012), 170 2. Lewis Carroll, The Principles of Parliamentary Representation (London: Harrison and Sons, 1884). 3. James C. Miller, “A Program for Direct and Proxy Voting in the Legislative Process,” Public Choice 7, no. 1 (1969): 107– 113. 4. see Yannis Papadopoulos, “Analysis of Functions and Dysfunctions of Direct Democracy: Top-Down and Bottom-Up Perspectives,” Politics & Society 23 (December 1995): 421– 448.	JohnsonSt I Steven Johnson Future Perfect: The Case For Progress In A Networked Age New York 2012 Morozov I Evgeny Morozov To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism New York 2014
Democracy	Schumpeter	Brocker I 260 Democracy/Schumpeter: For Schumpeter, the defining feature of democracy consists in placing a "competition for political leadership" ⁽¹⁾ at the centre of attention. The core idea is: similar to the way companies compete for the favour of consumers, Brocker I 261 politicians and parties are in competition for the favour of voters ⁽²⁾ - with the important difference that people are usually well informed in economic matters, but usually rationally ignorant in political matters ⁽³⁾. What both systems have in common is the striving for one's own individual advantage. Thesis: Modern democracy is a product of the capitalist process ⁽⁴⁾; however, two important prerequisites for the functioning of democracy in contemporary capitalism are no longer fulfilled: a) the ideal of the economical state ⁽⁵⁾ b) the basic social consensus.⁽⁶⁾ Because of the expectation of large parts of the electorate to live at the expense of the state.⁽⁷⁾ >Free riders, >State, >Economy, >Society. 1. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York 1942. Dt.: Joseph A. Schumpeter, Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie, Tübingen/Basel 2005 (zuerst: Bern 1946), p. 427. 2. Ibid p. 427-433 3. Ibid p. 407 – 420. 4. Ibid p. 471. 5. Ibid p.. 471f. 6. Ibid p. 473. 7. Ibid p. 472. Ingo Pies, „Joseph A. Schumpeter, Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie (1942)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. Gaus I 148 Democracy/Schumpeter/Dryzek: The model of democracy most popular among comparative politics scholars, especially those in the burgeoning field of democratic transition and consolidation, expects far less from democracy than do the deliberative democrats. >Deliberative democracy This model is essentially that proposed long ago by Schumpeter (1942)⁽¹⁾: democracy is no more than competition among elites for popular approval that confers the right to rule. In the 1950s this idea became the foundation for 'empirical' theories of democracy happy with the generally apathetic role of the ignorant and potentially authoritarian masses (Berelson, 1952⁽²⁾; Sartori, 1962⁽³⁾). Competition models of democracy: Such competitive elitist models have Gaus I 149 long been discredited among democratic theorists - not least those such as Dahl (1989)⁽⁴⁾ who had earlier believed in them as both accurate descriptions of United States politics and desirable states of affairs. Yet they live on among transitologists and consolidologists, who see the hallmark of a consolidated democracy as a set of well-behaved parties representing material interests engaged in electoral competition regulated by constitutional rules (see, for example, Di Palma, 1990⁽⁵⁾; Huntington, 1991⁽⁶⁾; Mueller, 1996⁽⁷⁾; Schedler, 1998⁽⁸⁾). The deliberative democrat's concern with authenticity is nowhere to be seen. Active citizens play no role in such models. 1. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1942) Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper. 2. Berelson, Bernard (1952) 'Democratic theory and public opinion'. Public Opinion Quarterly, 16: 313—30. 3. Sartori, Giovanni (1962) Democratic Theory. Detroit: Wayne State Umversity Press. 4. Dahl, Robert A. (1989) Democracy and its Critics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 5. Di Palma, Giuseppe (1990) To Craft Democracies. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 6. Huntington, Samuel (1991) The Third Wave. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. 7. Mueller, John (1996) 'Democracy, capitalism and the end of transition'. In Michael Mandelbaum, ed. Postcommunism: Four Perspectives. New York: Council on Foreign Relations. 8. Schedler, A. (1998) 'What is democratic consolidation?' Journal of Democracy, 9: 91-107. Dryzek, John S. 2004. „Democratic Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications Sobel I 28 Democracy/Schumpeter/Sobel/Clemens: „Nothing is easier than to compile an impressive list offailures of the democratic method, especially if we include not only cases in which there was actual breakdown or national discomfiture but also those in which, though the nation led a healthy and prosperous life, the performance in the political sector was clearly substandard relative to the performance in others.“ Joseph A. Schumpeter (1942), Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy⁽¹⁾: 289. Sobel/Clemens: Joseph Schumpeter is largely known for his seminal contributions to our understanding of the role of entrepreneurs, innovation, and creative destruction in economic growth and development. >Business cycle/Schumpeter, >Innovation/Schumpeter, >Competition/Schumpeter, >Creative destruction/Schumpeter, >Entrepreneurship/Schumpeter. However, Schumpeter's economic insights extend far beyond just his most well-known work on innovation. Another area where Schumpeter was well ahead of the economics profession and provided real insights is the nature of politics and the democratic process of collective decision making. The economic analysis of the process of politics and collective decision making is the focus of a modern field of economics known as public choice. While Schumpeter wrote prior to the formal origins of this field in economics, early scholars such as Anthony Downs did cite and attribute some of his ideas to Schumpeter's writings in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (CSD)⁽¹⁾.* >Government policy/Schumpeter. Democracy: Schumpeter understood that democracy was merely an alternative process for producing social and economic outcomes, and "it would not necessarily follow that the political decisions produced by that process from the raw material of those individual volitions would represent anything that could in any convincing sense be called the will of the people" (CSD⁽¹⁾: 254). Regarding the idea that government pursues some common good, Schumpeter argues: „There is, first, no such thing as a uniquely determined common good that all People could agree on or be made to agree on by the force of rational argument. This is due not primarily to the fact that some people may want things other than the common good but to the much more fundamental fact that to different individuals and groups the common good is bound to mean different things ... as a consequence ... the particular concept of the will of the people ... vanishes into thin air.“ (CSD⁽¹⁾: 251-252) Sobel/Clemens: Schumpeter recognized that to understand democratic outcomes one must look to understand the motivations and different desires of the individuals involved in the process, be they the voters, elected politicians, or administrators and bureaucrats running government agencies. That is, to understand democratic outcomes one must understand the role of what he termed "Human Nature in Politics". Thus, Schumpeter shared a common insight with the founders of the field of public choice, such as Nobel Laureate James Buchanan, who recognized that just because individuals step into the public sphere, they do not suddenly start acting for the common good - instead they continue to be self-interested actors concerned with their own goals and desires. >James M. Buchanan. Democracy/Schumpeter: According to Schumpeter, democracy is best understood as follows: "it may be put into the nutshell of a definition ... the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for people's vote." (CSD⁽¹⁾: 269). According to Schumpeter, as far as there are genuine group-wise volitions ... we are now able to insert them in exactly the role they actually play…called to life by some political leader who turns them into political factors …by working them up and by including eventually appropriate items in his competitive offering ... The incessant competitive struggle to get into offce or to Stay in it imparts to every consideration of policies and measures the bias so admirably expressed by the phrase about "dealing in votes". (CSD⁽¹⁾: 270, 287). * In The Economic Theory of Democracy, Downs writes: "Schumpeter's profound analysis of democracy forms the inspiration and foundation for our whole thesis, and our debt and gratitude to him are great indeed" (1957⁽²⁾:29). 1. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy [CSD]. Harper & Brothers. 2. Downs, Anthony (1957). The Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper & Row.	EconSchum I Joseph A. Schumpeter The Theory of Economic Development An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Cambridge/MA 1934 German Edition: Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Leipzig 1912 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 Sobel I Russell S. Sobel Jason Clemens The Essential Joseph Schumpeter Vancouver 2020
Demonstration	Brandom	I 642 Demonstration/Ostension/Ostensive Definition/Brandom: direct line in the common space, extended until it crosses something opaque. >Pointing, >Ostension. I 643 Wittgenstein: that requires many social arrangements - Demonstration as such is unrepeatable. I 651 Referencing/Reference/Brandom: cannot be understood in terms of demonstration, rather the demonstration must be explained in terms of referencing. I 652 Anaphora: it is necessary in order to generate the repeatable from the unrepeatable where co-typicity does not even bear an annullable assumption of coreference and therefore not of (co)-recurrence. >Anahora.	Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Description Levels	Field	II 345 Indefiniteness 2nd order: it is unclear whether an undecidable sentence has a particular truth value. >Platonism. II 354 Logic/second order logic/Field/(s): excludes non-standard models better than theory 1st order. - 2nd order has no impredicative comprehension scheme. >Second order logic, >Comprehension, >Unintended models, >Models, >Model theory. --- III 33 Theory of the 1st order/Field: E.g. the theory of the space-time points. - (s) E.g.a theory which only uses functions but does not quantify over them. >Quantification. Theory 2nd order/Field: E.g. theory of real numbers, because it quantifies over functions. - Quantities of higher order: are used for the definition of continuity and differentiability. III 37 Theory of 1st order/2nd order/Hilbert/Field: Variables 1st order: for points, lines, surfaces. 2nd order: Quantities of ... Solution/Field: quantification 2nd order in Hilbert's geometry as quantification over regions. Only axiom 2nd order: Dedekind's continuity axiom. III 95 f Logic 2nd order/Field: E.g. Quantifiers like "there are only finitely many". - Also not: E.g. "There are less Fs than Gs". >Quantifiers. III 98 Extension of the logic: preserves us from a huge range of additionally assumed entities. - E.g., what obeys the theory of gravity. QuineVs: we should rather accept abstract entities than to expand the logic. (Quine in this case pro Platonism). III 96 Platonism 1st order/Field: accepts abstract entities, but no logic 2nd order. Problem: but it needs this (because of the power quantifiers).	Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Description Theory	Cresswell	II 47 Definition Description theory/Cresswell: (here): the description theory asserts that a name is synonymous with an equivalent specific description. This still allows for a wide range of interpretation. >Descriptions, >Names, >Synonymy. For example, "the planet called phosphorus" is such a description. - Vs: "Phosphorus" is the planet called Phosphorus" is not a necessary truth. ((s) de re). II 150 Discription Theory/Loar/Bach/Cresswell: Loar (1976⁽¹⁾, 370-373) and Bach (1981)⁽²⁾ defend the kind of description theory, which makes "Phosphorus" to something, which means something like "is called "Phosphorus". II 150 VsDescription theory/Cresswell: the description theory is circular, because the use of a name to refer to someone is involved. - (Also Kripke 1972⁽³⁾, 283, 286.) LoarVsVs: (1976⁽¹⁾ p.371): it is not at all that we are referring to something, by saying, "the referent of this expression "..." The reference is rather intrinsic. Cresswell ditto. >Reference, >Intrinsicness. II 153 Description theory/de re/Cresswell: Example (Partee) Loar believes that semantics is a branch of psychology, while Thomason believes that it is a branch of mathematics - that cannot be de re, because then both cannot be right. >de re, >de dicto. Solution: Description theory: Loar believes that the thing that is called "semantics" is a branch of psychology, while Thomason believes it is a branch of mathematics. - "It" then does not stand for a thing, but for the property of being called "semantics". >Semantics, >Properties. 1.Loar, B. The semantics of singular terms. Philos Stud 30, 353–377 (1976). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00372537 2.Bach, Emmon. 1981. On Time, Tense, and Aspects: An Essay in English Metaphysics. inPeter Cole (ed.), Radical Pragmatics , New York: Academic Press, 63-8 3. Saul A. Kripke (1972): Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann (eds.) (1972), 253-355	Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Description Theory	Russell	Hintikka I 165 Descriptions/Russell/Hintikka: Definition primary description: for them, the substitutability of identity (SI) applies. Definition secondary description: for them the substitutability of identity (SI) fails. I 166 E.g. Russell: two readings: (1) George IV did not know whether Scott was the author of Waverley. Description/Logical Form/Russell/Hintikka: "The Author of Waverley": (ix) A (x) Primary: the description has the following force: (2) (Ex)[A(x)&(y)A(y) > y = x) & George IV knew that (Scott = x). ((s) notation: the quantifier is here always a normal existence quantifier, mirrored E). That is, the quantifier has maximum range in the primary description. More likely, however, is the second reading: Secondary: (3) ~ George IV knew that (Ex)[A(x) & (y) > y = x & (Scott = x)]. ((s) narrow range) Range/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not know that there is a third possibility for the range of a quantifier ((s) "medium range"/Kripke). (4) ~ (Ex) [A(x) & (y)(A (y)> y = x) & George IV knew that (Scott = x)].	Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Descriptions	Cresswell	I 184 Description/Quantification/Cresswell: definite and indefinite descriptions are not quantifiers - the bond is in the depth structure. >Quantifiers, Deep structure, E.g. if you offer each boy a job, some boy will refuse it - "it" signals no variable bound by "a job", however quantification in depth. >Quantification. II 47f Theory of descriptions/Russell/Cresswell: according to Russell e.g. (24) BELIEVE (a, x) u x e . β . L) is possible, because "The planet which is called "Phosphorus"" can occur outside the range of the modal operator. >Scope, >Modal operator, >Names, >Morning star/Evening star, >Theory of descriptions/Russell. II 48 N.B: this allows us to talk about the thing that is actually called "Phosphorus" and ask what happens when it is not called like this. ((s) Out of reach of the modal operator: allows unambiguous reference to the thing). II 140 Theory of descriptions/Russell/Cresswell: Thesis: a particular description is in the same syntactic category as a quantifier, e.g. "Someone" problem: E.g. "Someone does not come" does not mean the same as "It is not the case that someone comes". >Someone/Geach. Solution/Russell: different ranges in modal and doxastic contexts - A) (narrow range) "the person next door lives next door" is logically equivalent with "exactly one person lives next door" and therefore it is in a sense necessarily true. B) (wide range) it is true that the person next door could also have lived somewhere else (so it is contingent). >Narrow/wide, >Exactly one, >Necessity, >Contingency. II 149 Theory of descriptions/Russell/Kripke/Cresswell: Kripke per Russell with regard to descriptions - not only with regard to names. >Descriptions/Kripke, >Names/Kripke.	Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Descriptions	Hintikka	II 172 Description/knowledge/Russell/Hintikka: knowledge by description: here, we know propositions about the "so-and-so" without knowing who or what the "so-and-so" is. >Propositional knowledge, >Knowlege how, >Knowledge. Ad (ii): e.g. description: instead of Bismarck: "the first chancellor of the German Reich". HintikkaVs (ii) this sweeps the problem under the carpet. Problem: the use of descriptions must ultimately lead to the fact that the descriptions are translated back into names, and this is not possible here! Also: Reduction/description/names/Hintikka: not all individuals with descriptions we talk about have identities that are known to everyone. The interpretation of Russell does not rule out the fact that many different entities act as legitimate values of the variables, which in principle can also be named with names. Ad (iii) Russell/Hintikka: that was Russell's implicit solution: he redefines the range of the individual variables so that they are restricted to individuals we know by acquaintance. Existential Generalization/EG/Russell/Hintikka: the existential generalization applies only to names of individuals with whom we are familiar. Concealed Description/Russell/Hintikka: the existential generalization fails for individuals whose names have to be conceived as covert descriptions ((s) because we know them only by description). Cf. >Acquaintance.	Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Descriptions	Logic Texts	Read III 127f Improper name/Quine: (= descriptions- only real names allow the substitution that can be found in the indistinguishability of identical. Improper names: lead to more complex form: E.g. "among the Roman orators there is a major one, and he denounced Catiline that". E.g. "Just one number counts the planets and it is more than seven"/Russell: here is only 7 a real name - hence these sentences may not be sentences in a conclusion of the principle of indistinguishability of the identical. >Leibniz principle, >Identity, >Indistinguishability, QuineVs:. problem : range: the marks must be eliminated, so that in the new wording no part corresponds with them. >Range, >Scope, >Narrow/wide. Strobach I 104 Indistinguishability/Strobach: requires Logic of the 2nd level: predicate logic 2nd level/PL2/Strobach: typical formula: Leibniz's Law: "x = y > (Fx ↔ Fy)". >Second order logic.	Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Stro I N. Strobach Einführung in die Logik Darmstadt 2005
Descriptions	Prior	I 124 Theory of Descriptions/unicorn/Russell/Prior: a) "the so-and-so φ-s" b) "X thinks that the so-and-so φ-s" in a) and b) the marking has the same meaning whether the object exists or does not exist - in b) the sentence even has the same truth value. >Truth value, >Non-existence, >Thinking, >Thoughts. I 148 Theory of Descriptions/Russell: singular names: "The only thing that φ-s". >Names, >Singular Terms. Geach: this analysis has two parts: a) explicitly predicative use: "x is the only thing that φ-s" b) use as apparent subject: can be explained as an explication of an implicit predicative use: "the only thing that φ-s, ψ-s." >Predication, >"Exactly one". a) as "something that .." b) "If something ..." Prior: thie is a solution for the non-existing. Problem: different scope: a) as part of a complex predicate: "Something is both the only-thing- that-φ-s and not ψ-s.". b) as part of a complex sentence: "It is not the case that ..". Markings: useful: "the φ-re does not exist" not with logically proper name "this". >Scope, >Narrow/wide scope. I 152 Champagne-Example/PriorVsRussell: has overlooked that markings can be used differently : "the man over there," does not speak of something that it is "man" or that it is "over there". - If it is true that he is clever, then even if it is a disguised woman - attribution does not require proper identification - it is only required that it is "the only ...". >Descriptions/Russell.	Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Determinates/ Determinables	Bigelow	I 51 Definition Determinable/Bigelow/Pargetter: what the objects have in common, but what is differently strong in them. For example, mass. Definition Determinate/Bigelow/Pargetter: is the special property that distinguishes the objects (simultaneously). For example a mass of 2.0 kg. Both together show what is common and what is different. >Problem of quantities, >Methexis/Plato, >Distinctions. Quantities/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: the approach is still incomplete: I 52 Either the relation between determinates and determinables is objective or it is not objective. A) objective: if it is objective, we need an explanation in which it exists. B) non-objective: then it is arbitrary to assert that objects that have different Determinates fall under that same Determinable. W.E. Johnson: our approach is based on one of Johnson's: in it, both are Determinables and also Determinate properties of individuals. Bigelow/Pargetter: Variant: we can start with a special property for each individual (Determinate, e.g. color shading). Then we define the common: color, this commonality is a property of 2nd level Definition 2nd degree property/Bigelow/Pargetter: E.g. the commonality of all shades of a color. I 53 Hierarchy: can then be continued upwards. E.g. to have a color at all is one level higher. Level/degree: E.g. pain: is having a 2nd level property. >Pain. Functional role/Bigelow/Pargetter: is a commonality, so there is a property 2nd level to have a certain functional role. >Functional role. Hierarchy: then consists of three sets of properties. 1. Property 1st level of individuals. All other properties supervene on them. 2. Properties of properties 1st level: = properties of 2nd degree (commonality of properties) 3. Properties 2nd level of individuals: = the property to have that or that property of the 1st level which has that or that property of the 2nd degree. >Properties. Problem of Quantities/Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: 1. Objects with different Determinates are different because each has a property of 1st level that another thing does not have. 2. they are the same because they have the same property of 2nd level. Determinables/Determinates/Johnson: are in close logical relations: to have a Determinate entails to have the corresponding Determinable. I 54 But not vice versa! Having a Determinable does not require possession of a particular Determinate! But it requires some Determinate from the range. BigelowVsJohnson: he could not explain the asymmetry. Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: properties of 2nd level. Problem: our theory is still incomplete! Problem: to explain why quantities are gradual. This does not mean that objects are the same and different at the same time. New: the problem that we can also say exactly how much they differ. Or, for example, two masses are more similar than two others. Plato: Plato solves this with the participation. >Methexis. Bigelow/Pargetter: we try a different solution see >Relational theories.	Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Determinism	Inwagen	Pauen I 273 Determinism/Peter van Inwagen/Pauen: determinism is not an implication of physicalism. The principle of causal closure refers to the fact that only physical explanations may be used. This does not mean that the cause/effect ratio must always be deterministic. The principle of physical determination does not make a statement about the necessity of certain causal chains but only requires that there is a physically describable change for every change that can be described in a higher level. van Inwagen: determinism thus stands for the thesis that the state of the world can be derived anytime later from a complete description and knowledge of the state of affair. >Initial conditions. Pauen: it is more than controversial that the determinism applies to our physical reality. --- Lewis V 296 Determinism/VsSoft determinism/VsCompatibilism/van InwagenVsLewis: (against the soft determinism which I pretend to represent): E.g. supposed to reductio that I could have lifted my hand, though determinism would be true. Then follows from four premises which I cannot deny that I could have produced a false conjunction HL from a proposition H over a time before my birth and a certain proposition about a law L. Premise 5: if so, then I could have falsified L. Premise 6: but I could not have falsified L (contradiction). LewisVsInwagen: 5 and 6 are not both true. Which one is true depends on what Inwagen means by "could have falsified". But not in the ordinary language but in Inwagen's artificial language. Even there it does not matter what Inwagen himself means! What is important is whether we can give a sense to this at all, which makes all premisses valid without circularity. Inwagen: (verbally) third meaning for "could have falsified": namely, and only if the acting person could have arranged things the way that his/her acting plus the whole truth about the prehistory together imply the nontruth of the proposition. Then, premise 6 says that I could not have arranged things the way that I was predestined not to arrange them like that. Lewis: but it is not at all instructive to see that soft determinism has to reject premise 6 that was interpreted in that way. V 297 Falsification/action/free will/Lewis: provisional definition: an event falsifies a proposition only if it is necessary that in the case that the event happens, then the proposition is false. But my act of throwing a rock would not itself falsify the proposition that the window in the course remains intact. Everything that is true, is that my act invokes another event that would falsify the proposition. The act itself does not falsify any law. It would falsify only a conjunction of prehistory and law. Everything that is true, is that my act precedes another act - the miracle - and this falsifies the law. Weak: let us state that I would be able to falsify a proposition in the weak sense if and only if I do something, the proposition would be falsified (but not necessarily by my act and not necessarily by any event evoked by my act). (Lewis pro "weak thesis" (soft determinism)). Strong: if the proposition is falsified either by my act itself or by an event which has been evoked by my act. Inwagen/Lewis: the first part of his thesis stands, no matter whether we represent the strong or weak thesis: If I could lift my hand although determinism is true and I have not lifted it then it is true in the weak and strong sense that I could have falsified the conjunction HL (propositions on the prehistory and the natural laws). But I could have falsified the proposition L in the weak sense although I could not have falsified it in the strong sense. Lewis: if we represent the weak sense, I deny premise 6. If we represent the strong sense, I deny premise 5. Inwagen: represents both premises by considering analogous cases. LewisVsInwagen: I believe that the cases are not analogous: they are cases in which the strong case and the weak case do not diverge at all: Premise 6/Inwagen: he asks us to reject the idea that a physicist could accelerate a particle faster than the light. LewisVsInwagen: but that does not help to support premise 6 in the weak sense,... V 298 ...because the rejected presumption is that the physicist could falsify a natural law in the strong sense. Premise 5/Inwagen: here we are to reject the assumption that a traveler might falsify a conjunction of propositions about the prehistory and one about his/her future journey differently than by falsifying the nonhistorical part. LewisVsInwagen: you can reject the assumption completely which does nothing to support premise 5 in the strong sense. What would follow if one could falsify the conjunction in the strong sense? That one could falsify the non-historical part in the strong sense? This is what premise 5 would support in the strong sense. Or would only follow (what I think) that the non-historical part could be rejected in the weak sense? The example of the traveler does not help here because a proposition about future journeys could be falsified in the weak as well as the strong sense! Cf. >Strength of theories.	Inwagen I Peter van Inwagen Metaphysics Fourth Edition Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Developing Countries	Rothbard	Rothbard III 969 Growth/Developing countries/Rothbard: Concomitantly with the hubbub about growth there has developed an enormous literature about the "economics of underdeveloped countries." We can here note only a few considerations. 1) First, contrary to a widespread impression, "neoclassical" economics applies just as fully to underdeveloped as to any other countries. In fact, as P. T. Bauer has often stressed, the economic discipline is in some ways sharper in less developed countries because of the extra option that many People have of reverting from a monetary to a barter economy. An underdeveloped country can grow only in the same ways as a more advanced country: largely via capital investment. The economic laws which we have adumbrated throughout this volume are independent of the specific content of any community's or nation's economy, and therefore independent of its level of development. >Neoclassical Economics. 2) Secondly, underdeveloped countries are especially prone to the wasteful, dramatic, prestigious government "investment" in such projects as Steel mills or dams, as contrasted with economic, but undramatic, private investment in improved agricultural tools.^(1),(2) 3) Thirdly, the term "underdeveloped" is definitely value-loaded to imply that certain countries are "too little" developed below some sort of imposed standard. As Wiggins and Schoeck point out, "undeveloped" would be a more objective term.⁽³) 1. The prolific writings of Professor Bauer are a particularly fruitful source of analysis of the problems of the underdeveloped countries. In addition to the references above, see especially Bauer's excellent United States Aid and Indian Economic Development (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Association, November, 1959); his West African Trade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954); "Lewis' Theory of Economic Growth," American Economic Review, September, 1956, pp. 632-41; "A Reply," Journal of Political Economy, October, 1956, pp. 435-41; and P.T. Bauer and B.S. Yamey, "The Economics of Marketing Reform," Journal of Political Economy, June, 19 54, pp. 210-34. The following quotation from Bauer's Study on India is instructive for its analysis of central planning as well as development: „As a corollary of reserving a large (and increasing) sector of the economy for the government, private enterprise and investment, both Indian and foreign, are banned from a wide range of industrial and commercial activity. These restrictions and barriers affect not only private Indian investment, but also the entry of foreign capital, enterprise and skill, which inevitably retards economic development. Such measures are thus paradoxical in View of the alleged emphasis on economic advance.“ (Bauer, United States Aid, p. 43) Bauer's chief defect is a tendency to underweigh the role of capital in economic development. 2.It is fascinating to discover, in 1925-26, before Soviet Russia became committed to full socialism and coerced industrialization, Soviet leaders and economists attacking central planning and forced industry and calling for economic reliance on private peasantry. After 1926, however, the Soviet planned economy deliberately planned uneconomically for forced heavy industry in order to establish an autarkic socialism. See Edward H. Carr, socialism In One Country, 1921-1926 (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1958), 1, 259 f., 316, 35 1, 503-13. On the Hungarian experience, see Ray, "Industrial Planning in Hungary," pp. 134 ff. 3. Wiggins and Schoeck, Scientism and Values, p. v. This symposium has many illuminating articles on the whole problem of underdevelopment. In addition to the Bauer article cited above, see especially the contributions of Rippy, Groseclose, Stokes, Schoeck, Haberler and Wiggins. Also see the critique of the concept of underdevelopment in Jacob Viner, International Trade and Economic Development (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1952), pp. 120 ff.	Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Dialogue	Schleiermacher	Gadamer I 183 Dialogue/Schleiermacher/Gadamer: SchleiermacherVsTradition: (...) precisely the extension of the hermeneutic task to the "meaningful conversation", which is particularly characteristic of Schleiermacher, shows how the meaning of strangeness, which hermeneutics is supposed to overcome, has fundamentally changed in comparison to the previous task of hermeneutics. In a new, universal sense strangeness is given indissolubly with the individuality of the "you". Gadamer: Nevertheless, one must not take the lively, even brilliant sense of human individuality that distinguishes Schleiermacher as an individual characteristic that influences theory here. Rather, it is the critical rejection of all that which in the Age of Enlightenment under the title "Reasonable Thoughts" was regarded as the common essence of humanity, which requires a fundamental redefinition of the relationship to tradition⁽¹⁾. Cf. >I-You-Relationship/Gadamer. 1. Chr. Wolff and his school included the "general art of interpretation" consequently to philosophy, since "finally everything aims at the fact that one may recognize and examine other truths, if one understands their speech" (J.Walch, Philosophisches Lexikon, (1726), p. 165). It is similar for Bentley when he demands of the philologist: "His only guides are reason, the light of the author's thoughts and their compelling force" (quoted from Wegner, Antiquity, p. 94).	Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Dispositions	Armstrong	II 1 f Disposition/Armstrong: Problem of unobservability. Place III 113 Verification/Place: Verification of dispositional properties: this is about what is likely to happen, not about what is observable. Armstrong II 4f Counterfactual Conditional/CoCo/Mellor: also categorical (not only dispositional) properties fulfil counterfactual conditionals. Armstrong: Dispositions are not made true by counterfactual conditionals. >Truthmaker/Armstrong. Martin: a counterfactual conditional can also be true, while a linked property is not realized - Dispositions cannot be reduced to the facts that are determined by the counterfactual conditionals which often contain them. II 5 Armstrong: Thesis: Dispositional = categorical properties = microstructure (therefore dispositions are no possibilia). - Other authors: categorical properties "realize" dispositional properties. >Microstructure/Armstrong. II 6 Dispositions/Martin: just as actual - it would be perverse to call them non-actual. Dispositions/Armstrong: dispositions are not in themselves causes - (others dito). - Dispositions are always actual, just not their manifestations. II 6 Example wire/Martin: Problem: a counterfactual conditional can be true without being true by virtue of the prescribed disposition: when the wire contacts, a current flows: can also be true if the wire is dead: e.g., "electro-finch": brings the wire to life the same moment: ((s) This would be a wrong cause). Place II 62 Dispositional Properties/PlaceVsArmstrong: Genes are not the propensity (tendency) to disease, the propensity is explained by the genes (categorical property), therefore they cannot be identical with the dispositional properties. II (c) 90 Dispositions/Armstrong/Place/Martin: Dispositions are "in" the objects. Martin: E.g. remote elementary particles which never interact with our elementary particles. - > This would require irreducible dispositions. ArmstrongVsMartin: there are no irreducible dispositions. Armstrong: why suppose that particles have properties in addition to have the manifested purely categorical property? II (c) 90/91 Martin-Example: Conclusion/Martin: Thesis: Natural laws/Armstrong. II 92 but the non-disp properties plus "strong" laws of nature which connect these non-disp properties are sufficient true makers - no unknown way of interaction is necessary. II 93 Armstrong: certain counterfactual conditionals apply, but their consequent must remain indeterminate, not only epistemically but also ontologically. >Counterfactual conditionals/Armstrong. II (c) 94 Intentionality/Armstrong: Vs Parallel to dispositions: in the mental, the pointing is intrinsic, in the case of dispositions it is only projected. Place III 108 Dispositions/Martin: Solution: we have to assume particles without structure. Place III 109 Martin-Example/Place: his example with distant particles which themselves have no microstructure allows him to investigate the subtleties of the relation of the properties of the whole and the properties of the parts, but forbids him to examine the relations between categorical and dispositional properties. Place III 119 Purely dispositional properties/PlaceVsMartin: have a structural basis in the carrier, the two are separate entities in a causal relation. Parts/wholesPlace: are separate entities, they are suitable as partners in a causal relation. - Dispositional properties of the whole are an effect of the dispositional properties of the parts and their arrangement. Martin III 163 Dispositions/Place: Dispositions are outside the entities, they are properties of interaction. (MartinVsPlace: This brings a confusion with manifestation. Armstrong: Should the dispositions be within? No. Rather in the connection. - Martin: they can be reciprocal reaction partners. Dispositions/Ryle: are not localized, but belong to the person or object. Martin III 165 Dispositions/MartinVsPlace: Place's introduction of "causal interaction" between the dispositions is a doubling of causality. Martin III 166 Dispositions/Martin: dispositions are always completely actual, even without manifestation. II 174 Armstrong: Dispositions are not in the eye of the beholder - unlike abilities.	Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Dispositions	Place	Armstrong II 1 f Disposition/Armstrong: Problem of unobservability. Place III 113 Verification/Place: Verification of dispositional properties: this is about what is likely to happen, not about what is observable. Armstrong II 4f Counterfactual Conditional/CoCo/Mellor: also categorical (not only dispositional) properties fulfil counterfactual conditionals. Armstrong: Dispositions are not made true by counterfactual conditionals. >Truthmaker/Armstrong. Martin: a counterfactual conditional can also be true, while a linked property is not realized - Dispositions cannot be reduced to the facts that are determined by the counterfactual conditionals which often contain them. Armstrong II 5 Armstrong: Thesis: Dispositional = categorical properties = microstructure (therefore dispositions are no possibilia). - Other authors: categorical properties "realize" dispositional properties. Armstrong II 6 Dispositions/Martin: just as actual - it would be perverse to call them non-actual. Dispositions/Armstrong: dispositions are not in themselves causes - (others dito). - Dispositions are always actual, just not their manifestations. Armstrong II 6 Example wire/Martin: Problem: a counterfactual conditional can be true without being true by virtue of the prescribed disposition: when the wire contacts, a current flows: can also be true if the wire is dead: e.g., "electro-finch": brings the wire to life the same moment: ((s) This would be a wrong cause). Place II 62 Dispositional Properties/PlaceVsArmstrong: Genes are not the propensity (tendency) to disease, the propensity is explained by the genes (categorical property), therefore they cannot be identical with the dispositional properties. Armstrong II (c) 90 Dispositions/Armstrong/Place/Martin: Dispositions are "in" the objects. Martin: E.g. remote elementary particles which never interact with our elementary particles. - > This would require irreducible dispositions. ArmstrongVsMartin: there are no irreducible dispositions. Armstrong: why suppose that particles have properties in addition to have the manifested purely categorical property? Armstrong II (c) 90/91 Martin-Example: Conclusion/Martin: Thesis: Natural laws/Armstrong. Armstrong II 92 the non-disp prop plus "strong" LoN which connect these non-disp prop are sufficient true makers - no unknown way of interaction necessary. Armstrong II 93 Armstrong: certain counterfactual conditionals apply, but their consequent must remain indeterminate, not only epistemically but also ontologically. >Counterfactual conditionals/Armstrong. Armstrong II (c) 94 Intentionality/Armstrong: Vs Parallel to dispositions: in the mental, the pointing is intrinsic, in the case of dispositions it is only projected. Place III 108 Dispositions/Martin: Solution: we have to assume particles without structure. Place III 109 Martin-Example/Place: his example with distant particles which themselves have no microstructure allows him to investigate the subtleties of the relation of the properties of the whole and the properties of the parts, but forbids him to examine the relations between categorical and dispositional properties. Place III 119 Purely dispositional properties/PlaceVsMartin: have a structural basis in the carrier, the two are separate entities in a causal relation. Parts/wholesPlace: are separate entities, they are suitable as partners in a causal relation. - Dispositional properties of the whole are an effect of the dispositional properties of the parts and their arrangement. Martin III 163 Dispositions/Place: Dispositions are outside the entities, they are properties of interaction. (MartinVsPlace: This brings a confusion with manifestation. Armstrong: Should the dispositions be within? No. Rather in the connection. - Martin: they can be reciprocal reaction partners. Dispositions/Ryle: are not localized, but belong to the person or object. Martin III 165 Dispositions/MartinVsPlace: Place's introduction of "causal interaction" between the dispositions is a doubling of causality. Martin III 166 Dispositions/Martin: dispositions are always completely actual, even without manifestation. II 174 Armstrong: Dispositions are not in the eye of the beholder - unlike abilities.	Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Distinctions	Lyons	I 69/70 Distinctions/sound/relativity/Lyons: the difference between[b] and[p] is not absolute but relative. I.e. we are dealing with sound ranges. >Phonemes. Lyons: the difference between[b] and[p] varies constantly (from the phonetic point of view.) Absolute/Lyons: the difference between the utterance elements /1/ and /2/ is absolute! That is, there is no word in the middle in terms of its grammatical function or meaning, and it is marked by a medium sound. >disjunctive/Goodman, analog/Goodman. Sound/conclusion: since the utterance units must not be confused, there must be a safety distance between the sound ranges they realize.	Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995
Distinctions	Millikan	I 272 Definition exclusivity class/Millikan/(s): ("contrary range", see above I 197) Class of properties that can have a substance or individual, as opposed to others. E.g. melting point, e.g. atomic weight etc. One thing cannot have several melting points or several atomic weights. Not every thing can have properties from any exclusivity class. E.g. humans have no atomic weight. Properties: their identity derives from the constellation of exclusivity classes. E.g. living beings: date of birth, age, weight, etc. but not electrical conductivity etc. (Individual/Object/Property/(s): thus, an object is defined by several dimensions: it cannot have a property from all exclusivity classes, but if it has a property from an exclusivity class, then it cannot have a second property from this exclusivity class.) Millikan: correspondingly: if a property of an exclusivity class is present, it is known that 1. all other properties from the same exclusivity class are out of question, 2. that some exclusivity classes are out of question because they cannot belong to the kind of object to which a property from the exclusivity class already established belongs to. E.g. Date of birth and melting point. >Identification, >Specification, >Individuation.	Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Distinctions	Rutter	Slater I 206 Distinctions/order/forms of thinking/Rutter: (Rutter 1987)⁽¹⁾: it is a critical question as to whether (…) factors represent something distinct from widely established (…) factors (…) or the positive pole of bi-polar dimensions. In other words, has something “new” been identified or are we rediscovering the full range of key variables that relate to adaptation along a continuum from negative to positive? In a well-known passage on the utility of naming the opposite poles of the same underlying dimension, Rutter discussed the value of ”up” and “down” the stairs as distinct in connotation from “up” and “not-up.” He argues that distinct words focus attention on where the action may be and may well carry different connotations. More importantly, he notes that the meaning is in the functional processes and not simply in designating the positive or negative pole of a bi-polar dimension. >Order, >Levels, >Classification. [E.g.,] Inoculations are described as protective because their purpose is directed at stimulating the immune system to make antibodies that will fend off more serious invasions by infectious agents. Compromised immune function (perhaps from malnutrition), on the other hand, would be described in terms of vulnerability because the functional significance is to exacerbate the risk for ill health or poor response to infection. 1. Rutter, M. (1987). Psychosocial resilience and protective mechanisms. American journal of Orthopsychiatry, 57, 316—331. Ann S. Masten, “Resilience in Children. Vintage Rutter and Beyond”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Diversity (Politics)	Liberalism	Gaus I 244 Diversity/Liberalism/D’Agostino: (...) if we tolerate 'too much' diversity in individuals' cognitive and evaluative attitudes, it cannot be ruled out that we will be unable to identify a collectively best system of social arrangements. Of course, neither pluralism nor representativeness requires the recognition of all empirically given diversity of attitudes (see, especially, Gaus, 1996⁽¹⁾). ((s) For problems in relation to diversity see >Arrow’s Theorem/D’Agostino.) Normalization: some attitudes can reasonably be 'filtered out' or normalized as part of any reasonable procedure for the identification of collectively binding social arrangements. If this can be done compatibly with specifically liberal principles, then liberalism can acknowledge diversity without abandoning a commitment to coherence in theory and in its institutional embodiments. (The idea of normalization is associated with Michel Foucault, 1977, (...). Nromalization/Rawls: John Rawls's original position (1973⁽²⁾: ch. Ill) represents the most influential attempt to identify a device of normalization that meets specifically liberal requirements. Bruce Ackerman's (1980)⁽³⁾ 'neutral dialogue' and Jürgen Habermas's (1990)⁽⁴⁾ >ideal speech situation are other examples (...). Normalization/Rawls: Rawls addresses this problem by considering how diversity of individuals' antecedent judgements might be reduced compatibly with specifically liberal ideals and principles. His task is twofold: 1) to find a basis for reduction, and 2) to find a specifically liberal rationale for reduction. Without (1), the coherence requirement cannot be satisfied; there is 'too much' antecedent diversity for a collectively best structure to be identified. Without (2), representativeness is not adequately acknowledged, for, absent a rationale, any reduction will be arbitrary from an ethical point of view - i.e. will arbitrarily fail adequately to represent decision-relevant diversity of assessments. Rawls's solution is embodied, specifically, in the veil of ignorance. >Veil of ignorance/Rawls, >Veil of ignorance/D’Agostino. Arrow’s Theorem/problems/solutions: a problem of coherence results, in fact, precisely in so far as we demand, of a solution to the problem of collective choice, that it identify a particular option as one which will be binding on all the individuals involved. >Arrow’s Theorem/D’Agostino. Three Individuals (A, B, C) and three possible social arrangements (S1, S2, S3); Table I of preferences S1: A 1st – B 3rd – C 2nd S2: A 2nd – B 1st – C 3rd S 3: A 3rd – B 2nd - C 1st There is, however, another possibility, and it has been widely exploited in specifically liberal institutions. It is, in effect, to see the profile of preferences represented in Table I as the end-point, not the starting-point, of a process of collective deliberation. Perhaps the individuals involved agree to devolve decision-making about these options to the individual level. In so far as they do agree to this, we have a collective solution to a problem of choice. Each of the individuals agrees, with all the others, not about what preference should collectively be honoured, but rather that that distribution of preferences over individuals is to be preferred to any other in which each individual has the preferences which he antecedently has (or which he would have, subject to specifically liberal normalization of his attitudes). 1. Gaus, Gerald (1996) Justificatory Liberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Rawls, John (1973) A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3. Ackerman, Bruce (1980) Social Justice in the Liberal State. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 4. Habermas, Jürgen (1990) Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christian Lenhart and Shierry Weber Nicholson. Cambridge: Polity. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Diversity (Politics)	Multiculturalism	Gaus I 251 Diversity/Multiculturalism/Kukathas: a) For some, multiculturalism requires moderate changes to social and political institutions to enable cultural minorities to preserve their languages and their distinctive customs or practices. b) For others, however, multiculturalism requires much greater social transformation to turn modern society into one in which racism has been eliminated and 'difference' is nurtured rather than repudiated, or simply tolerated. Unity/problems: But if multiculturalism is a way of embracing diversity, this still leaves open the question of how diversity is to be embraced. If a multicultural society is one in which different religions, cultures, languages, and peoples can coexist without some being subordinated to others, or to a single, dominant group, how can this be achieved, and what principles would describe such a society? This issue arises because even if there is diversity, there must surely be some kind of unity for a society to exist. The real question (...) is what does multiculturalism mean in practice? This question, however, was not addressed systematically until the 1990s when political theorists began to consider what might be the principled basis of a multicultural society. >Multiculturalism/Kymlicka, >Minority rights/Kymlicka, >Minority/Kymlicka, >Culture/Kymlicka. Gaus I 255 Diversity/Charles Taylor: Out of such desires, according to Taylor, grew a philosophical alternative to liberalism: the politics of difference. This view is sceptical about the pretensions of liberalism to offer neutral or difference-blind principles that are more than simply reflections of the standards of the dominant culture. >Multiculturalism/Taylor. Gaus I 256 A number of other theorists have developed arguments about how cultural diversity might be accommodated by giving greater recognition to 'difference' rather than extending the scope or range of liberal rights (Baumeister, 2000)⁽¹⁾. James Tully's Strange Multiplicity (1995)⁽²⁾, for example, offers a reconstruction of modern constitutionalism that is able to accommodate a greater variety of cultural traditions, and adapt elements from some of them to enhance the quality of liberal constitutional arrangements. In many of these cases, defenders of the politics of difference present an approach to cultural diversity which not only criticizes liberal individualism but also advocates a greater emphasis on the extension of democratic processes to give greater scope to the participation of cultural minori- ties in the shaping and governing of the polity (see Young, 1990⁽³⁾; 2000⁽⁴⁾; Phillips, 1995⁽⁵⁾; Devaux, 2000⁽⁶⁾; Williams, 1998⁽⁷⁾; Tully, 2003⁽⁸⁾). 1. Baumeister, Andrea T. (2000) Liberalism and the 'Politics of Difference Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 2. Tully, James (1995) Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Young, Iris Marion (1990) Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 4.Young, Iris Marion (2000) Democracy and Inclusion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Phillips, Anne (1995) The Politics of Presence. Oxford: Clarendon. 6. Devaux, Monique (2000) Cultural Pluralism and Dilemmas of Justice. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 7. Williams, Melissa (1998) Voice, Trust, and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 8. Tully, James (2003) 'Ethical pluralism and classical liberalism'. In Richard Madsen and Tracy B. Strong, eds, The Many and the One: Religious and Secular Perspectives on Ethical Pluralism in the Modern World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 78—85. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Diversity (Politics)	Rawls	Gaus I 240 Pluralism/diversity/Rawls/D’Agostino: [in relation to diversity] there are, (...) a variety of pluralisms, of stances towards and arguments about the purported political relevance of diversity. We might believe, for instance, that, 'in the limit' , diversity of evaluations would be eliminated by the progressive correction of epistemic and/or motivational deficiencies, much as monism presupposes. We might nevertheless also believe that, given human finitude (Chemiak, 1986)⁽¹⁾, such a 'limit' is unapproachable (to any very great degree) without forms of corrective action that would themselves be manifestly indefensible, ethico-politically, and, hence, that it cannot be demanded, as monism does demand, that we actually aim at the elimination of such diversity. Rawls: This seems to have been John Rawls's view in the book Political Liberalism and he grounds such weak pluralism, as I will call it, in his analysis of the so-called 'burdens of judgment' (1993⁽²⁾: ch. II, s. 2). These are, specifically, those 'hazards involved in the correct (and conscientious) Gaus I 241 exercise of our powers of reason and judgement in the ordinary course of political life' , which make it improbable that 'conscientious persons with full powers of reason, even after free discussion, will all arrive at the same conclusion' (1993⁽²⁾: 56, 58). Rawls himself characterizes this doctrine in terms of 'the practical impossibility of reaching reason- able and workable political agreement' (1993⁽²⁾: 63), and says that it expresses 'a political conception [that] tries to avoid, so far as possible, disputed philosophical theses and to give an account that rests on plain facts open to all' (1993⁽²⁾: 57, n. 10). >Pluralism/Political Philosophy. ((s) This is a weak version of pluralism; for the distinction of strong and weak pluralism. >Pluralism/D’Agostino.) 1) Rawls points out that '[e]ven where we fully agree about the kinds of considerations that are relevant [to assessment and choice], we may disagree about their weight, and so arrive at different Lover- allJ judgments' (1993⁽²⁾: 56). Rawls himself of course treats this phenomenon in purely 'practical' terms: reduction of such diversity would require the deployment of morally impermissible tactics. D’AgostinoVsRawls: Some observations of Thomas Kuhn (1977⁽³⁾: 330ff) provide the basis, however, for an argument in favour of precisely this kind of diversity. 2) Rawls points out that 'all our [choice-relevant] concepts are vague and subject to hard cases Land that this indeterminacy means that we must rely on judgement and interpretation... where reasonable persons may differ' (1993⁽²⁾: 56). Example: This might mean, schematically, that A considers X superior to Y whereas B does not because he, A, does judge that some choice-relevant concept (e.g. 'is just') applies to X whereas, because of indeterminacy or vagueness, she, B, does not. (A and B agree about 'core cases' for the application of the term but disagree about 'peripheral cases', which may, of course, still be important, ethico-politically.) Cf. >Diversity/Hart. Gaus I 242 3) Rawls notes, finally, that 'any system of social institutions is limited in the values it can admit so that some selection must be made from the full range of moral and political values that might be realized' (1993⁽²⁾: 57). Individuals/diversity/Ralws/D’Agostino: In Rawls's terminology, diversity in individuals' evaluations 'rests on plain facts open to all'. And, indeed, there may even, as Rawls himself believes, be versions of the diversity-endorsing doctrine of pluralism which manage to avoid 'disputed philosophical theses'. But there are also versions of pluralism which are more robust philosophically (than Rawls's weak pluralism), and which are argued for on quite different bases. >Pluralism/Berlin, >Diversity/Hart. 1. Cherniak, Christopher (1986): Minimal Rationality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2. Rawls, John (1993): Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 3. Kuhn, Thomas (1977): The Essential Tension. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Division of Labour	Say	Rothbard II 23 Division of labour/Say/Rothbard: Say follows Smith in his discussion of the division of labour, and in pointing out that the degree of that division is limited by the extent of the market. But Say's discussion is far sounder. He shows, first, that expanding the division of labour needs a great deal of capital, so that investment of capital becomes the crucial point rather than its division per se. SayVsSmith: He also points out that, in contrast to Smith, the crucial specialization of labour is not simply within a factory (as in Smith's famous pin factory) but ranges over the entire economy, and forms the basis for all exchange between producers. >Production/Say.	EconSay I Jean-Baptiste Say Traité d’ Economie Politique Paris 1803 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Domains	Kripke	III 372 Domain/range/Russell/Kripke: "iff" is extensional: it moves the domain inside. De dicto: de dicto always has the smallest domain: e.g. Jones believes there is ... . Dramatic difference to referential quantification: is referential quantification always the largest domain? E.g. there is something that Jones believes. >Referential quantification/Kripke, cf. >Substitutional quantification/Kripke, >de dicto, >de re. III 216f Domain/KripkeVsRussell: he wanted to explain the difference de re/de dicto by domains: smallest domain: the smalles domain is de dicto - the largest domain is de re. KripkeVs: there are three domains: narrowest MN(Ex) (there are exactly x planets and x is even), (de dicto); largest: (e.g.) (there are exactly x planets and MN(x is even)), (de re); medium domain: M(Ex) (there are exactly x planets and N(x is even)). ((s) It is possible that there are 8 planets and it is necessary that 8 is even (correct)). ((s) Short domain: both operators are at front. Widest domain: both are in the rear. Medium domain: has distributed operators. Medium domains are possible, when operators are repeated). >Planets example. III 217 Domain/Russell/Kripke: e.g. largest domain/de re: "there is a high official, so that Hoover believes that the Barrigans want to kidnap him". The smallest domain/de-dicto: "Hoover believes that the Barrigans ...". Medium domain: "Hoover believes that there is a high official, so ...". --- II 217ff Domain/Kripke: a domain is not suitable for illustrating the difference de re/de dicto because of the third domain. >Quantification.	Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984
Domains	Tarski	I Berka 463 Def range/Tarski: (of a relation) the class of the objects x, y which at least corresponds to an object such that xRy. Def counter range: the class of objects y, for which there is at least an object x, such that xRy.⁽¹⁾ >Relations. 1. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol 1, Lemberg 1935	Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983
Donkey Sentences		Donkey sentences, philosophy: term for logical problems, which preferably, but not essentially refer to donkeys. An early example is Buridan's donkey. A modern donkey sentence is "Geach's donkey": "Anyone who has a donkey beats it." Formal logic is here too rigid to map the possible limiting cases that are not problematic for the everyday language. See also existential quantification, universal quantification, range, scope, quantification, quantifiers, brackets, branched quantifiers.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Dualism	Chalmers	I 125 Dualism/Consciousness/Chalmers: we have seen that materialism failed because of the lack of logical supervenience of conscious experience on physical facts. >Supervenience, >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Consciousness, >Materialism. This is followed by a dualism, but not a Cartesian dualism, which assumes a "mind in the machine", which performs extra causal work. Instead, for us, a kind of property duelism follows. > Property dualism/Chalmers, cf. >R. Descartes. I 134 Dualism/Chalmers: you could avoid the dualism by referring to a zombie world that is physically identical to ours as being described as false. >Zombies/Chalmers. I 135 This world would at the same time be identical and different. We could make the physical properties rigid with the operator "dthat", e.g. dthat (plays the role of ...). >"dthat", >Rigidity, >Operators, >Properties. N.B.: then the zombie world would not have some features that our world has. N.B.: then consciousness could metaphysically supervene on other properties. That would be an interesting argument. >Metaphysical possibility, >Metaphysics. ChalmersVsVs: 1. this is speculative. 2. (more direct): it is based on an incorrect semantics of physical concepts. I 136 For example, an electron with unrecognized properties would still be called an electron, but not an electron with the properties of a proton. >Change in meaning, >Change in theory. Metaphysics/Chalmers: semantics is not so decisive here, but the metaphysical question remains. I 154 Dualism/Definition Proto-phanomenal property/Chalmers: involves as the only one not experiencing itself, but several simultaneously existing could have this. This is strange to us, but cannot be excluded a priori. This would suggest a causal role of the phenomenal. Cf. >Emergence, >Emergence/Chalmers, >Causality, >Phenomena, >Experience, >Knowing how. To represent such a theory would simply mean to accept another possible world where something else had the role of causation, but such a world would not be logically excluded. >Causation. I 155 Dualism/Chalmers: if we were to take such a position, we would represent an essential dualism. >Essentialism. ChalmersVsDualism: one can also understand this position non-dualist, albeit not as a materialistic monism. It then provides a network of intrinsic properties that "realizes" the extrinsic physical properties. >Monism, >Extrinsic, >Intrinsic, cf. >Exemplification. The laws are still the physical ones. In extreme form, when all intrinsic properties are phenomenal, we are dealing with a variant of idealism, but according to Berkeley's type. >G. Berkeley, >Idealism. It would most likely correspond to a version of Russel's neutral monism: I 155 Monism/Russell/Chalmers: neutral monism: the fundamental properties of the world are neither physical nor phenomenal, but the physical and the phenomenal are both built up from this fundamental. The phenomenal is formed from the intrinsic natures, the physical from the extrinsic. I 156 Dualism/Definition Interactionistic Dualism/Definition Interactionism/Chalmers: here, experience fills the causal gaps in the physical process. >Experience. ChalmersVs: that creates more problems than it solves. It does not solve the problems with epiphenomenalism. >Epiphenomenalism. Pro: the only argument for interactionist dualism are some properties of quantum mechanics that could be better explained. (> Eccles 1986)⁽¹⁾ I 157 ChalmersVsEccles: the effects would be much too small to cause any eventual behavioral changes. Other counter examples: VsInteractionistic Dualism/VsInteractionism/Chalmers: 1. it contradicts the quantum mechanical postulate that the microscopic "decisions" are random. 2. a behavior that was triggered by these microscopic influences would have to differ from behavior triggered differently. ChalmersVsEccles: such theories are also silent on what should happen in the brain if the wave function collapses. ChalmersVsInteractionistic Dualism: this makes the phenomenal irrelevant. I 158 ChalmersVsEccles: if there are psychons, then they can manage with purely causal interactions, without assumed phenomenal properties. VsChalmers: one might object that psychons (or ectoplasm, or whatever) are constituted by phenomenal properties. ChalmersVsVs: even then their phenomenal properties are irrelevant to the explanation of behavior: in the history of causation, it is only the relational properties that count. Thus this adheres to the causal unity of the physical. ChalmersVsInteractionism/ChalmersVsEccles: even if one were assuming psychones, one could tell a story about zombies, which involved psychones. One would then again have to assume additional phenomenal properties of psychones without being able to prove them. I 162 Definition Interactionist Dualism/Chalmers: Chalmers accepts that consciousness is non-physical (VsMaterialism) but he denies that the physical world is causally closed so that consciousness can play an autonomous causal role. >Causal role, >Causality, >Causation. I 162 Naturalistic dualism/Chalmers: so I characterize my own view: Thesis: Consciousness supervenes naturally on the physical, without supervening logically or "metaphysically". >Supervenience. I argue that materialism is wrong and that the realm of physical is causally completed. I 171 Naturalistic dualism/Chalmers: my position is already implicitly shared by many who still call themselves "materialists". All I have done is to make the ontological implications of the naturalistic view explicit - that consciousness "emerges" from the physical. We do not have to give up much, what is important for our scientific world. Cf. >Emergence, >Emergence/Chalmers. 1. Eccles, J.C. (1986) Do Mental Events Cause Neural Events Analogously to the Probability Fields of Quantum Mechanics? Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 227, 411-428. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.1986.0031	Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Each/All/Every	Quine	I 244 Each/all/every: have an ambiguous range and cannot be decided by compounding. An indefinite singular term is:.. A, any, each member - "not a"/"not every" - "I think one is such that ..."/"is a that I believe ... ". I 283 "No", "nobody", "nothing" is "any" plus negation. >Universal Quantification, >Existential quantification, >Domain, >Individuation, >Identification, >Reference.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Ecology	Naess	Singer I 251 Ecology/Naess, Arne/Singer, P.: (A. Naess (1973)⁽¹⁾: Def Shallow Ecology/Naess: is limited to the traditional framework of ethics: this is about not polluting water, for example, in order to have enough drinking water and to avoid pollution, so that one can continue to enjoy nature. On the other hand, Def Deep Ecology/Naess: wants to preserve the biosphere for its own sake, regardless of the potential benefit to mankind. Deep Ecology/Naess/Singer, P.: thus takes as its subject matter larger units than the individual: species, ecosystems and even the biosphere as a whole. Deep Ecology(2): (A. Naess and G. Sessions (1984)⁽²⁾ Principles: 1. The wellbeing and development of human and non-human life on earth have a value in itself (intrinsic, inherent value), regardless of the non-human world's use for human purposes. 2. Wealth and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and are values in themselves. 3. People do not have the right to diminish the wealth and diversity of the world, except when it comes to vital interests. Singer I 252 Biosphere/Naess/Sessions/Singer, P.: Sessions and Naess use the term "Biosphere" in a broad sense, so that rivers, landscapes and ecosystems are also included. P. SingerVsNaess: (see also SingerVsSessions): the ethics of deep ecology does not provide satisfactory answers to the value of the life of individuals. Maybe that is the wrong question. Ecology is more about systems than individual organisms. Therefore, ecological ethics should be related to species and ecosystems. Singer I 253 So there is a kind of Holism behind it. This is shown by Lawrence Johnson (L. Johnson, A Morally Deep World, Cambridge, 1993). Johnson's thesis: The interests of species are different from the sum of individual interests and exist simultaneously together with individual interests within our moral considerations. >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research 1. A. Naess (1973). „The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement“, Inquiry 16 , pp. 95-100 2. A. Naess and George Sessions (1984). „Basic Principles of Deep Ecology“, Ecophilosophy, 6	Naess I Arne Naess Can Knowledge Be Reached? Inquiry 1961, S. 219-227 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015
Economic Growth	Rothbard	Rothbard III 962 Economic Growth/Rothbard: The discussion is replete with comparisons of the higher rate of country X which "we" must hurriedly counter, etc. Amidst all the interest in growth, there are many grave problems (…) First and foremost is the simple query: "What is so good about growth?" Problem: The economists, discoursing scientifically about growth, have illegitimately smuggled an ethical judgment into their science - an ethical judgment that remains unanalyzed, as if it were self-evident. Ethics/justification/values: But why should growth be the highest value for which we can strive? What is the ethical justification? There is no doubt about the fact that growth, taken over as another dubious metaphor from biology, "sounds" good to most people, but this hardly constitutes an adequate ethical analysis. Free market/Rothbard: Many things are considered as good, but on the free market every man must choose between different quantities of them and the price for those forgone. Similarly, growth, (…) must be balanced and weighed against competing values. Given due consideration, growth would be considered by few people as the only absolute value. If it were, why stop at 5 percent or 8 percent growth per year? Why not 50 percent? Economics: It is completely illegitimate for the economist qua economist simply to endorse growth. What he can do is to contrast what growth means in various social conditions. In a free market, for example, every person chooses how much future growth he wants as compared to present consumption. Living standard: "Growth," i.e., a rise in future living standards, can be achieved (…) only in a few definable ways. Growth/Rothbard: Either more and better resources can be found, or more and better people can be born, or technology improved, or the capital goods structure must be lengthened and capital multiplied. Rothbard III 963 Saving/investment: In practice, since resources need capital to find and develop them, since technological improvement can be applied to production only via capital investment, since entrepreneurial skills act only through investments, and since an increased labor supply is relatively independent of short-run economic considerations and can backfire in Malthusian fashion by Iowering per capita output, the only viable way to growth is through increased saving and investment. Free market/decisions: On the free market, each individual decides how much he wants to save - to increase his future living standards - as against how much he wants to consume in the present. The net resultant of all these voluntary individual decisions is the nation's or world's rate of capital investment. The total is a reflection of the voluntary, free decisions of every consumer, of every person. Economics: The economist, therefore, has no business endorsing "growth" as an end; if he does so, he is injecting an unscientific, arbitrary value judgment, especially if he does not present an ethical theory in justification. Rothbard III 964 Coercion/saving: (…) in cases of coerced saving the saver reaps none of the benefit of his sacrifice, which is instead reaped by government offcials or other beneficiaries. Free market: This contrasts to the free market, where people save and invest precisely because they will reap some tangible and desired rewards. Free rider/coercion: In a regime of coerced growth, then, "society" cannot grow, and conditions are totally different from those of the free market. Indeed, what we have is a form of the "free rider" argument against the free market and for government; here the various "free riders" band together to force other People to be thrifty so that the former can benefit. >Free rider. Def Economic growth/Rothbard: Any proper definition must surely encompass an increase of economic means available for the satisfaction of people's ends - in short, increased satisfactions of people's wants, or as P.T. Bauer has put it, "an increase in the range of effective alternatives open to people." On such a definition, it is Clear that compulsory saving, with its imposed losses and restrictions on people's effective choices, cannot spur economic growth; and also that government "investment," With its neglect of voluntary private consumption as its goal, can hardly be said to add to people's alternatives. Quite the contrary.⁽¹⁾ Rothbard: Finally, the very term "growth" is an illegitimate import of a metaphor from biology into human action.⁽²) "Growth" and "rate of growth" connote some sort of automatic necessity or inevitability and have for many People a value-loaded connotation of something self-evidently desirable.⁽³⁾ 1. P.T. Bauer, Economic Analysis and Policy in Underdeveloped Countries (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1957), pp. 113 ff. On Soviet economic growth Bauer and Yamey make this salutary comment: „The meaning of national income, industrial output and capital formation is also debatable in an economy when so large a part of output is not governed by consumers' choices in the market; the diffculties of interpretation are particularly obvious in connection With the huge capital expenditure undertaken by government without reference to the valuation of output by consumers.“ (Bauer and Yamey, Economics of Under-Developed Countries, p. 162). Also see Friedman, "Foreign Economic Aid," p. 510. 2. For a critique of various metaphors illegitimately and misleadingly imported from the natural sciences into economics, see Rothbard, "The Mantle of Science." 3. The presumably excessive growth of cancerous cells, for example, is generally overlooked.	Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Economic Policies	Political Philosophy	Mause I 304 Economic Policy/Political Theories: Many politicians argue that money and the financial markets should be decoupled from the real economy. This thesis was widely discussed in political science in the 1980s and 1990s (including Strange 1988).⁽¹⁾ Vs: In recent years, the "counter-argument" that, conversely, financial markets of the real economy determine the heartbeat and thereby both systems show increasing similarities and interlocking possibilities (Overbeck and van Apeldoorn 2012)⁽²⁾. >Economy, >Financial markets. 1. Susan Strange, States and markets, 2. Aufl. London/ New York 1988. 2. Henk Overbeek & Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Hrsg. Neoliberalism in Crisis. International Political Economy Series. Houndmills/ Basingstoke/ Hampshire 2012.	Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Economic Rent	Ricardo	Kurz I 280 Economic Rent/Ricardo/classical economics/Kurz: In the Principles Ricardo defines rent rigorously in the following way: „Rent is that portion of the produce of the earth, which is paid to the landIord for the use of the original and indestructihle powers of the soil.“ (Ricardo 1951 : 67)⁽¹⁾. „It is often, however, confounded with the interest and profit of capital, and, in popular language, the term is applied to whatever is annually paid by a farmer to his landlord. If, of two adjoining farms of the same extent, Kurz I 281 and of the same natural fertility, one had all the conveniences of farming buildings, and, besides, were properly drained and manured, and advantageously divided by hedges, fences and walls, while the other had none of these advantages, more remuneration would naturally be paid for the use of one, than for the use of the other; yet in both cases this remuneration would be called rent. But it is evident, that a portion only of the oney annually to be paid for the improved farm, would be given for the original and indestructible powers of the soil; the other portion would be paid for the use of the capital which had been employed in ameliorating the quality of the land, and in erecting such buildings as were necessary to secure and preserve the produce.“ (Ricardo 1951: 67)⁽¹⁾ RicardoVsSmith, Adam: Adam Smith, Ricardo goes on to argue, did not stick to a rigorously defined concept when using the word rent. In Part II of Chapter XI of Book I of The Wealth of Nations ( WN)⁽²⁾, 'Of the Produce of Land which sometimes does, and sometimes does not, afford Rent', Smith gives an example of the timber business, timber clearly being a reproducible resource, in which he confounds the concepts of profits and rent (WN I.xi.c.5)⁽²⁾: „He [Smith] tells us, that the demand for timber, and its consequent high price, in the more southern countries of Europe, caused a rent to be paid for forests in Norway, which could before afford no rent. Is it not, however, evident, that the person who paid what he thus calls rent, paid it in consideration of the valuable commodity which was then standing on the land, and that he actually repaid himself with a profit, by the sale of the timber? If, indeed, after the timber was removed, any compensation were paid to the landlord for the use of the land, for the purpose of growing timber or any other produce, with a view to future demand, such compensation might justly be called rent, because it would be paid for productive powers of the land; but in the case stated by Adam Smith, the compensation was paidfor the liberty of removing and se/ling the timber, and not for the liberty of growing it.“ (Ricardo 1951⁽¹⁾: 68) Kurz I 282 Profit/rent/Ricardo: In Ricardo's view the distinction between profits and rent is crucial, because as capital accumulates and the population grows the two component parts of the social surplus are typically affected differently: „This is a distinction of great importance, in an enquiry concerning rent and profits; for it is found, that the laws which regulate the progress of rent, are widely different from those which regulate the progress of profits, and se/dom operate in the same direction. In all improved countries, that which is annually paid to the landlord, partaking of both characters, rent and profit, is sometimes kept stationary by the effects of opposing causes; at other times advances or recedes, as one or the other of these causes preponderates. In the future pages of this work, then, whenever I speak of the rent of land, I wish to be understood as speaking of that compensation, which is paid to the owner of land for the use of its original and indestructible powers.“ (Ricardo 1951:68-9⁽¹⁾) RicardoVsSmith, Adam: Hence what Smith called 'rent' of coal mines or stone quarries is to Ricardo profits and not rent. >Profit, >Economic Rent, >Royalties. 1. Ricardo, D. (1951 [1817]) On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, in P. Sraffa (ed.) with the collaboration Of M.H. Dobb, The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo, Vol. I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (P/b edn 2004, Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund.) 2. Smith, A. (1976 [1776]) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,in R.H. Campbell, AS Skinner and WB. Todd (eds), The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, Vol. I, Oxford University Press, Oxford. (In the text quoted as WN, book number, chapter number, section number, paragraph number.) Kurz, Heinz D. and Salvadori, Neri. „Ricardo on exhaustible resources, and the Hotelling Rule.“ In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. Rothbard II 83 Rent/land/Ricardo/Rothbard: Rent served as the linchpin of the Ricardian system. For, according to Ricardo's rather bizarre theory, only land differed in quality. Labour, as we have seen, was assumed to be uniform, and therefore wage rates are uniform, and, as we shall see, profits are also assumed to be uniform because of the crucial postulate of the economy's always being in long-run equilibrium. >Labour, >Ricardo, >Wages/Ricardo. Land is the only factor which miraculously is allowed to differ in quality. Next, Ricardo assumes away any discovery of new lands or improvements in agricultural productivity. His theory of history therefore concludes that people always begin by cultivating the most fertile lands, and, as population increases, the Malthusian pressure on the food supply forces the producers to use ever more inferior lands. In short, as population and food production rise, the cost of growing corn must inexorably rise over time. Rent, in Ricardo's phrase, is payment for the ‘use of the original and indestructible powers of the soil’. This hints at a productivity theory, and indeed Ricardo did see that more fertile and productive lands earned a higher rent. But unfortunately, as Schumpeter put it, Ricardo then ‘embarks upon his detour’. In the first place, Ricardo made the assumption that at any moment the poorest land in cultivation yields a zero rent. He concluded from that alleged fact that a given piece of land earns rent not because of its own productivity, but merely because its productivity is greater than the poorest, zero-rent, land under cultivation. Remember that, for Ricardo, labour is homogeneous and hence wages uniform and equal, and, as we shall see, profits are also uniform and equal. Land is unique in its permanent, long-run structure of differential fertility and productivity. Hence, to Ricardo, rent is purely a Rothbard II 84 differential, and Land A earns rent solely because of its differential productivity compared to Land B, the zero-rent land in cultivation. Rent/land/Ricardo: To Ricardo, several important points followed from these assumptions. First, as population inexorably increases, and poorer and poorer lands are used, all the differentials keep increasing. Thus, say that, at one point of time, corn lands (which sums up all land) range in productivity from the highest, Land A, through a spectrum down to Land J, which, being marginal, earns a zero rent. >Marginal costs/Ricardo. Rothbard II 95 RothbardVsRicardo/Problems: (…) in discussing the rise in cost of producing corn, Ricardo reverses cause and effect. Ricardo states that increasing population ‘obliges’ farmers to work land of inferior quality and then causes a rise in its price. But as any utility theory analyst would realize, the causal chain is precisely the reverse: when the demand for corn increases, its price would rise, and the higher price would lead farmers to grow corn on higher-cost land. But this realization, of course, eliminates the Ricardian theory of value and with it the entire Ricardian system. (…) as numerous critics have pointed out, it is certainly not true historically that people always start using the highest-quality land and then sink gradually and inevitably down to more and more inferior land. Rothbard II 91 VsRicardo/Rothbard: One of the greatest fallacies of the Ricardian theory of rent is that it ignores the fact that landlords do perform a vital economic function: they allocate land to its best and most productive use. Land does not allocate itself; it must be allocated, and only those who earn a return from such service have the incentive, or the ability, to allocate various parcels of land to their most profitable, and hence most productive and economic uses. >Allocation. Ricardo himself did not go all the way to government expropriation of land rent. His short-run solution was to call for lowering of the tariff on corn, or even repeal of the Corn Laws entirely. Rothbard II 108 VsRicardo: The Ricardian theory of rent was effectively demolished by Thomas Perronet Thompson (1783–1869) in his pamphlet, The True Theory of Rent (1826)⁽¹⁾. Thompson weighed in against this fallacious capstone to the Ricardian system: ‘The celebrated Theory of Rent’, Thompson charged, ‘is founded on a fallacy’, for demand is the key to the price of corn and to rent. The fallacy lies, in assuming to be the cause what in reality is only a consequence... [I]t is the rise in the price of produce... that enables and causes inferior land to be brought into cultivation; and not the cultivation of inferior land that causes the rise of rent. 1. Thomas Perronet Thompson. 1826. The True Theory of Rent, in Opposition to Mr. Ricardo and Others. Being an Exposition of Fallacies on Rent, Tithes, &C. In the Form of a Review of Mr. Mill's Elements of Political Economy. London.	EconRic I David Ricardo On the principles of political economy and taxation Indianapolis 2004 Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Economic Surplus	Sraffa	Kurz I 23 Economic surplus/Production theory/Sraffa/Kurz: Systems with a surplus are the object of what Sraffa called his ‘second equations’. More precisely, the latter deal with a system of production that produces a surplus over and above the necessary physical real costs, including the means of sustenance of workers, and in which the surplus is distributed according to a uniform rate of interest on the value of capital invested. Sraffa, thus, at first retained the earlier assumption of given real wages in commodity terms in each of the different industries. Therefore, both in his first and second equations Sraffa felt no need to invoke, and then define, the concept of ‘labour’: all that mattered were physical real costs, that is, amounts of commodities used up in the course of production. In his 1960 book Sraffa aptly spoke of ‘the methods of production and productive consumption’ (Sraffa, 1960, p. 3)⁽¹⁾. There is, however, a crucial difference between the no-surplus and the withsurplus case: ‘When we have got surplus, natural economy stops’ (D3/12/11: 42)(2) and social and institutional factors become important. Technically this is reflected in the fact that ‘the equations become contradictory’ (D3/12/6: 16)(2). Materially, ‘the “absolute values” have no more the appeal to commonsense of restoring the initial position – which is required if production has to go on’ (D3/12/6: 10). Indeed, in the with-surplus economy, a whole range of exchange ratios is, in principle, compatible with the condition of self- replacement (see D3/12/6: 9)(2). Sraffa stressed that ‘within those limits value will be indeterminate’. And: ‘It is therefore necessary to introduce some new assumption, which in substance will amount to determine … according to which criterion the surplus is distributed between the different industries’ (D3/12/6: 16)⁽²⁾. With free competition, and focusing attention on the case of only circulating capital, the surplus is distributed in terms of a uniform rate of interest on the value of the ‘capital’ advanced in the different industries. Obviously, with heterogeneous material inputs (means of production and means of subsistence) the value of capital cannot be ascertained independently of, but only simultaneously with, the prices oft he commodities. >Production theory, >Costs, >Prices. Kurz I 24 By mid 1928 Sraffa had managed, with the help of his colleague and friend Frank Ramsey, to establish that a solution existed and what it was (see Kurz and Salvadori, 2001, pp. 262–264)⁽³⁾. The system he and Ramsey discussed on 26 June 1928 was the following one: VaA = (vaa1 + vbb1 + c1)r VaB = (vaa2 + vab2 + c2)r VaA = (vaa3 + vbb3 + c3)r Here νi is the value (or price) of one unit of commodity i (i = a, b), with the third commodity serving as standard of value, and r is the interest factor (= 1 + interest rate); the meaning of the other magnitudes should be evident. Ramsey transformed the linear homogeneous system into its canonical form and set the determinant equal to zero in order to ascertain the non-trivial solutions. 1. Sraffa, P. (1960) Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 2. Taken from the work Sraffa carried out in the period 1927–1931 (unpublished papers). 3. Kurz, H.D. and Salvadori, N. (2001) Sraffa and the Mathematicians: Frank Ramsey and Alister Watson, in: T. Cozzi and R. Marchionatti (Eds) Piero Sraffa’s Political Economy. A Centenary Estimate, pp. 254–284 (London: Routledge). Heinz D. Kurz and Neri Salvadori 2015. „Input–output analysis from a wider perspective. A comparison of the early works of Leontief and Sraffa“. In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge.	Sraffa I Piero Sraffa Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Cambridge 1960 Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015
Economy	Anderson	I 14 Economy/Anderson: what economy does is to find suitable, easily understandable frameworks to describe real-world phenomena. I 15 Similarity: For example, with the publication of a successful book in 2004, a similar book from 1988 was again successful and even more so. A few readers had noticed similarities and mentioned them in public reviews. Sales of the second book resulted in considerable sales of the older book. Long-Tail-Economy/Anderson: Thesis: The economy of the 21st century will look different from that of the 20th century: if it used to be about hits, it will now be about niches. (See Terminology/Anderson). I 39 Hit economy: in the former economy, hits were used to cross-subsidize the many less successful titles - which in turn were used to incubate possible hits. (Ratio 80/20). I 41 Long-Tail-Economy/Anderson: there is a prehistory that had nothing to do with the internet: Order numbers, parcel delivery, credit cards, databases, even barcodes. These things have evolved over decades. The Internet has connected them to a network in no time at all. I 116 If shelving meters (= exhibition space) are no longer in short supply, the offer is no longer arranged in a ratio "good" to "bad", but there is a figure/background problem (noise). The solution to this problem are better search tools. I 117 Nevertheless, there are differences in the quality of the products on offer - these have become even greater. ((s) They just don't determine the order anymore). I 201 eBay is both: a long tail of products and a long tail of traders.	Ander I Chris Anderson The Long Tail: Why the Future of Business is Selling Less of More New York 2006
Efficiency	Rawls	I 67 Efficiency/efficiency principle/Rawls: this is about the fact that the distribution of goods cannot be changed at a certain point in time without making certain people worse off. An efficient configuration does not imply an absolute equal distribution. I 68 It does not already assume a concrete distribution, but rather an area of possible forms of distribution, which are all efficient in the sense that only a deviation from this is detrimental to some members of the community. >Pareto-Optimum. Within a range of optimal shapes, no shape is superior to the actual unequal distribution of another shape. The different characteristics are not comparable in this sense. I 69 Rawls: Within the concept of justice as fairness, fairness principles precede the principle of efficiency. I 70 An efficient situation is one in which no one wants to trade with someone else and no one has anything more to trade for others. However, this allows several forms of possible distributions. The efficiency principle can be applied to the basic structure (a community) if it is applied to the[assumed] expectations of representative members⁽¹⁾. Applied to the basic structure of rights and obligations, it can be said that a structure is efficient if a change would have a negative impact on the expectations of at least one person. Here again, various efficient arrangements are possible. These, in turn, are not all equally just. Therefore, the efficiency principle alone cannot ensure fairness. >Rights, >Duties. Markets/Rawls: income and wealth will be efficiently distributed within a standard competitive market. >Markets. 1. See J. M. Buchanan „The Relevance of Pareto Optimality“, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 6, 1962 – J. M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent, Ann Arbor, 1962.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Elasticity (Economics)	Rothbard	Rothbard III 127 Elasticity/demand/Rothbard: A striking feature of the total outlay curve ((s) of buyers and sellers) is that, in contrast to the other curves (such as the demand curve), it can slope in either direction as the price increases or decreases. The possibility of a slope in either direction stems from the operation of the two factors determining the position of the curve. Outlay = Price × Quantity Demanded (of purchase good). But we know that as the price decreases, the demand must either increase or remain the same. Therefore, a decrease in price tends to be counteracted by an increase in quantity, and, as a result, the total outlay of the sale good may either increase or decrease as the price changes. Def Elastic/: For any two prices, we may compare the total outlay of the sale good that will be expended by buyers. If the lower price yields a greater total outlay than the higher price, the total outlay curve is defined as being elastic over that range. Def Inelastic: If the lower price yields a lower total outlay than the higher price, then the curve is inelastic over that range. Rothbard III 129 Any two prices on the schedule may be compared. It is evident that an examination of the entire outlay curve demonstrates that the foregoing demand curve is basically elastic. It is elastic over most of its range, with the exception of a few small gaps. If we compare any two rather widely spaced prices, it is evident that the outlay is less at the higher price. If the price is high enough, the demand for any good will dwindle to zero, and therefore the outlay will dwindle to zero. Demand/supply: Contrary to what might be thought at first, the concept of “elasticity of supply” is not a meaningful one, as is “elasticity of demand.” Rothbard III 130 The reason is that its other determinant, quantity supplied, changes in the same direction as the price, not in the inverse direction as does quantity demanded. As a result, supply is always “elastic,” and the concept is an uninteresting one.⁽¹⁾ Rothbard III 406 Elasticity/service/factors of production/Rothbard: Labor services are also likely to be inelastic with respect to the interest discount, but probably less so than land, since labor has a reservation demand, a subjective use-value, even in the aggregate labor market. This special reservation demand stems from the value of leisure as a consumers’ good. Higher prices for labor services will induce more units of labor to enter the market, while lower prices will increase the relative advantages of leisure. Here again, however, the difference that will be made by relatively large changes in the interest rate will not be at all great, so that the aggregate supply-of-labor curve (or rather curves, one for each homogeneous labor factor) will tend to be inelastic with regard to the interest rate. >Factors of production/Rothbard, >Interest rates/Rothbard, >Production/Rothbard, >Production structure/Rothbard. Capitalism/Rothbard: It is true that capitalists, after investing in a stage of production, demand present goods in exchange for their product. This particular demand is inelastic in relation to interest changes since these capital goods also can have no subjective use-value for their producers. This demand, however, is strictly derivative and dependent. In the first place, the product for which the owner demands present goods is, of course, a future good, but it is also one stage less distantly future than the goods that the owner purchased in order to produce it. >Capitalism/Rothbard. 1. The attention of some writers to the elasticity of supply stems from an erroneous approach to the entire analysis of utility, supply, and demand. They assume that it is possible to treat human action in terms of "infinitely small" differences, and therefore to apply the mathematically elegant concepts of the calculus, etc., to economic problems. Such a treatment is fallacious and misleading, however, since human action must treat all matters only in terms of discrete steps. If, for example, the utility of x is so little smaller than the utility of Ythat it can be regarded as identical or negligibly different, then human action will treat them as such, i.e., as the same good. Because it is conceptually impossible to measure utility, even the drawing of continuous utility curves is pernicious. (…)	Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Element Relation	Quine	IX 23 Element relation/identity/classes/individuals: "ε" before individuals have the property of "=". IX 113 ff Definition element relation/ordinal: "E" stands for "{ : y ε z}". Ru: y is a number, but not z (z must be a quantity). Pair of number and quantity, also the number is part of the quantity. If this is true, it is an e-relation - E should arrange the ordinals. IX 119 NO: class of ordinal numbers (≠ ordinal numbers) Element relation/ordinals/Quine: here, "ε" means "smaller" and it is interchangeable with "contains" with respect to ordinals. Therefore x U {x} is the next ordinal after x if there are still ordinals behind x at all - it is not sufficient to meet the element conditions to belong to a class. The existence is necessary. Proof of "NO ε ϑ ((s) the class of ordinals does not exist"). It is now obvious: if NO existed, 23.9 and 24.3 (see above) would be a contradiction to 23.7 - >Paradoxon of Burali-Forti. IX 219 Element relation/Epsilon/induction/Quine: the primitive predicate "ε" divides the determination of classes (a) behind the Epsilon into the requirement of having elements and (b) in front of the epsilon into the requirement of being an element. Problem of Induction: always one with the existence of classes that have been used only for the requirement (a) - Induction: in order to derive it from the definition of n we need a class {x:Fx} or N n {x: Fx} or {x:x <= z u ~Fx} as a value of a variable of this definition and this is a variable that stands only on the right hand side of "ε". >Set theory, >Sets.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Elimination	Lewis	IV 33 Elimination/eliminate/Lewis: e.g. singular terms must be eliminated before translation into another theory - after that they can be introduced again - e.g. descriptions before they are eliminated, they must get a range - ((s) Whether rigid or non-rigid) - various ranges provide non-equivalent translations. Cf. >meaning change, >theory change.	Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Environment	AI Research	Norvig I 401 Environment/planning/real world/representation/artificial intelligence/Norvig/Russell: algorithms for planning (…) extend both the representation language and the way the planner interacts with the environment. >Planning/Norvig, >Agents/Norvig. New: [we now have] a) actions with duration and b) plans that are organized hierarchically. Hierarchy: Hierarchy also lends itself to efficient plan construction because the planner can solve a problem at an abstract level before delving into details 1st approach: “plan first, schedule later”: (…) we divide the overall problem into a planning phase in which actions are selected, with some ordering constraints, to meet the goals of the problem, and a later scheduling phase, in which temporal information is added to the plan to ensure that it meets resource and deadline constraints. Norvig I 404 Critical path: Mathematically speaking, critical-path problems are easy to solve because they are defined as a conjunction of linear inequalities on the start and end times. When we introduce resource constraints, the resulting constraints on start and end times become more complicated. Norvig I 405 Scheduling: The “cannot overlap” constraint is a disjunction of two linear inequalities, one for each possible ordering. The introduction of disjunctions turns out to make scheduling with resource constraints NP-hard. >NP-Problems. Non-overlapping: [when we assume non-overlapping] every scheduling problem can be solved by a non-overlapping sequence that avoids all resource conflicts, provided that each action is feasible by itself. If a scheduling problem is proving very difficult, however, it may not be a good idea to solve it this way - it may be better to reconsider the actions and constraints, in case that leads to a much easier scheduling problem. Thus, it makes sense to integrate planning and scheduling by taking into account durations and overlaps during the construction of a partial-order plan. Heuristics: partial-order planners can detect resource constraint violations in much the same way they detect conflicts with causal links. Heuristics can be devised to estimate the total completion time of a plan. This is currently an active area of research (see below). Norvig I 406 Real world planning: AI systems will probably have to do what humans appear to do: plan at higher levels of abstraction. A reasonable plan for the Hawaii vacation might be “Go to San Francisco airport (…)” ((s) which might be in a different direction). (…) planning can occur both before and during the execution of the plan (…). Solution: hierarchical decomposition: hierarchical task networks (HTN). Norvig I 407 a high-level plan achieves the goal from a given state if at least one of its implementations achieves the goal from that state. The “at least one” in this definition is crucial - not all implementations need to achieve the goal, because the agent gets Norvig I 408 to decide which implementation it will execute. Thus, the set of possible implementations in HTN planning - each of which may have a different outcome - is not the same as the set of possible outcomes in nondeterministic planning. It can be shown that the right collection of HLAs can result in the time complexity of blind search dropping from exponential in the solution depth to linear in the solution depth, although devising such a collection of HLAs may be a nontrivial task in itself. Norvig I 409 Plan library: The key to HTN planning, then, is the construction of a plan library containing known methods for implementing complex, high-level actions. One method of constructing the library is to learn the methods from problem-solving experience. (>Representation/AI research, >Learning/AI research). Learning/AI: In this way, the agent can become more and more competent over time as new methods are built on top of old methods. One important aspect of this learning process is the ability to generalize the methods that are constructed, eliminating detail that is specific to the problem instance (…). Norvig I 410 Nondeterministic action: problem: downward refinement is much too conservative for a real world environment. See >Terminology/Norvig for “demonic nondeterminism” and “angelic nondeterminism”. Norvig I 411 Reachable sets: The key idea is that the agent can choose which element of the reachable set it ends up in when it executes the HLA; thus, an HLA with multiple refinements is more “powerful” than the same HLA (hig level action) with fewer refinements. The notion of reachable sets yields a straightforward algorithm: search among highlevel plans, looking for one whose reachable set intersects the goal; once that happens, the algorithm can commit to that abstract plan, knowing that it works, and focus on refining the plan further. Norvig I 415 Unknown environment/planning/nondeterministic domains: [problems here are] sensorless planning (also known as conformant planning) for environments with no observations; contingency planning for partially observable and nondeterministic environments; and online planning and replanning for unknown environments. Norvig I 417 Sensorless planning: In classical planning, where the closed-world assumption is made, we would assume that any fluent not mentioned in a state is false, but in sensorless (and partially observable) planning we have to switch to an open-world assumption in which states contain both positive and negative fluents, and if a fluent does not appear, its value is unknown. Thus, the belief state corresponds exactly to the set of possible worlds that satisfy the formula. Norvig I 423 Online replanning: The online agent has a choice of how carefully to monitor the environment. We distinguish three levels: a) Action monitoring: before executing an action, the agent verifies that all the preconditions still hold, b) Plan monitoring: before executing an action, the agent verifies that the remaining plan will still succeed, c) Goal monitoring: before executing an action, the agent checks to see if there is a better set of goals it could be trying to achieve. Norvig I 425 Multi-agent planning: A multibody problem is still a “standard” single-agent problem as long as the relevant sensor information collected by each body can be pooled - either centrally or within each body - to form a common estimate of the world state that then informs the execution of the overall plan; in this case, the multiple bodies act as a single body. When communication constraints make this impossible, we have Norvig I 426 what is sometimes called a decentralized planning problem: (…) the subplan constructed for each body may need to include explicit communicative actions with other bodies. Norvig I 429 Convention: A convention is any constraint on the selection of joint plans. Communication: In the absence of a convention, agents can use communication to achieve common knowledge of a feasible joint plan. Plan recognition: works when a single action (or short sequence of actions) is enough to determine a joint plan unambiguously. Note that communication can work as well with competitive agents as with cooperative ones. Norvig I 430 The most difficult multi-agent problems involve both cooperation with members of one’s own team and competition against members of opposing teams, all without centralized control. Norvig I 431 Time constraints in plans: Planning with time constraints was first dealt with by DEVISER (Vere, 1983⁽¹⁾). The representation of time in plans was addressed by Allen (1984⁽²⁾) and by Dean et al. (1990)⁽³⁾ in the FORBIN system. NONLIN+ (Tate and Whiter, 1984)⁽⁴⁾ and SIPE (Wilkins, 1988(5), 1990⁽⁶⁾) could reason about the allocation of limited resources to various plan steps. Forward state-space search: The two planners SAPA (Do and Kambhampati, 2001)⁽⁷⁾ and T4 (Haslum and Geffner, 2001)⁽⁸⁾ both used forward state-space search with sophisticated heuristics to handle actions with durations and resources. Human heuristics: An alternative is to use very expressive action languages, but guide them by human-written domain-specific heuristics, as is done by ASPEN (Fukunaga et al., 1997)⁽⁹⁾, HSTS (Jonsson et al., 2000)⁽¹⁰⁾, and IxTeT (Ghallab and Laruelle, 1994)⁽¹¹⁾. Norvig I 432 Hybrid planning-and-scheduling systems: ISIS (Fox et al., 1982⁽¹²⁾; Fox, 1990⁽¹³⁾) has been used for job shop scheduling at Westinghouse, GARI (Descotte and Latombe, 1985)⁽¹⁴⁾ planned the machining and construction of mechanical parts, FORBIN was used for factory control, and NONLIN+ was used for naval logistics planning. We chose to present planning and scheduling as two separate problems; (Cushing et al., 2007)⁽¹⁵⁾ show that this can lead to incompleteness on certain problems. Scheduling: The literature on scheduling is presented in a classic survey article (Lawler et al., 1993)⁽¹⁶⁾, a recent book (Pinedo, 2008)⁽¹⁷⁾, and an edited handbook (Blazewicz et al., 2007)(18). Abstraction hierarchy: The ABSTRIPS system (Sacerdoti, 1974)⁽¹⁹⁾ introduced the idea of an abstraction hierarchy, whereby planning at higher levels was permitted to ignore lower-level preconditions of actions in order to derive the general structure of a working plan. Austin Tate’s Ph.D. thesis (1975b) and work by Earl Sacerdoti (1977)⁽²⁰⁾ developed the basic ideas of HTN planning in its modern form. Many practical planners, including O-PLAN and SIPE, are HTN planners. Yang (1990)⁽²¹⁾ discusses properties of actions that make HTN planning efficient. Erol, Hendler, and Nau (1994⁽²²⁾, 1996⁽²³⁾) present a complete hierarchical decomposition planner as well as a range of complexity results for pure HTN planners. Our presentation of HLAs and angelic semantics is due to Marthi et al. (2007⁽²⁴⁾, 2008⁽²⁵⁾). Kambhampati et al. (1998)⁽²⁶⁾ have proposed an approach in which decompositions are just another form of plan refinement, similar to the refinements for non-hierarchical partial-order planning. Explanation-based learning: The technique of explanation-based learning (…) has been applied in several systems as a means of generalizing previously computed plans, including SOAR (Laird et al., 1986)⁽²⁷⁾ and PRODIGY (Carbonell et al., 1989)⁽²⁸⁾. Case-based planning: An alternative approach is to store previously computed plans in their original form and then reuse them to solve new, similar problems by analogy to the original problem. This is the approach taken by the field called case-based planning (Carbonell, 1983⁽²⁹⁾; Alterman, 1988⁽³⁰⁾; Hammond, 1989⁽³¹⁾). Kambhampati (1994)⁽³²⁾ argues that case-based planning should be analyzed as a form of refinement planning and provides a formal foundation for case-based partial-order planning. Norvig I 433 Conformant planning: Goldman and Boddy (1996⁾⁽³³⁾ introduced the term conformant planning, noting that sensorless plans are often effective even if the agent has sensors. The first moderately efficient conformant planner was Smith and Weld’s (1998)⁽³⁴⁾ Conformant Graphplan or CGP. Ferraris and Giunchiglia (2000)⁽³⁵⁾ and Rintanen (1999)⁽³⁶⁾ independently developed SATPLAN-based conformant planners. Bonet and Geffner (2000)⁽³⁷⁾ describe a conformant planner based on heuristic search in the space of >belief states (…). Norvig I 434 Reactive planning: In the mid-1980s, pessimism about the slow run times of planning systems led to the proposal of reflex agents called reactive planning systems (Brooks, 1986⁽³⁸⁾; Agre and Chapman, 1987)⁽³⁹⁾. PENGI (Agre and Chapman, 1987)⁽³⁹⁾ could play a (fully observable) video game by using Boolean circuits combined with a “visual” representation of current goals and the agent’s internal state. Policies: “Universal plans” (Schoppers, 1987⁽⁴⁰⁾, 1989⁽⁴¹⁾) were developed as a lookup table method for reactive planning, but turned out to be a rediscovery of the idea of policies that had long been used in Markov decision processes (…). >Open Universe/AI research). 1. Vere, S. A. (1983). Planning in time: Windows and durations for activities and goals. PAMI, 5, 246-267. 2. Allen, J. F. (1984). Towards a general theory of action and time. AIJ, 23, 123-154. 3. Dean, T., Kanazawa, K., and Shewchuk, J. (1990). Prediction, observation and estimation in planning and control. In 5th IEEE International Symposium on Intelligent Control, Vol. 2, pp. 645-650. 4. Tate, A. and Whiter, A. M. (1984). Planning with multiple resource constraints and an application to a naval planning problem. In Proc. First Conference on AI Applications, pp. 410-416. 5. Wilkins, D. E. (1988). Practical Planning: Extending the AI Planning Paradigm. Morgan Kaufmann. 6. Wilkins, D. E. (1990). Can AI planners solve practical problems? Computational Intelligence, 6(4), 232-246. 7. Do, M. B. and Kambhampati, S. (2003). Planning as constraint satisfaction: solving the planning graph by compiling it into CSP. AIJ, 132(2), 151-182. 8. Haslum, P. and Geffner, H. (2001). Heuristic planning with time and resources. In Proc. IJCAI-01 Workshop on Planning with Resources. 9. Fukunaga, A. S., Rabideau, G., Chien, S., and Yan, D. (1997). ASPEN: A framework for automated planning and scheduling of spacecraft control and operations. In Proc. International Symposium on AI, Robotics and Automation in Space, pp. 181-187. 10. Jonsson, A., Morris, P., Muscettola, N., Rajan, K., and Smith, B. (2000). Planning in interplanetary space: Theory and practice. In AIPS-00, pp. 177-186. 11. Ghallab, M. and Laruelle, H. (1994). Representation and control in IxTeT, a temporal planner. In AIPS-94, pp. 61-67. 12. Fox, M. S., Allen, B., and Strohm, G. (1982). Job shop scheduling: An investigation in constraint directed reasoning. In AAAI-82, pp. 155-158. 13. Fox, M. S. (1990). Constraint-guided scheduling: A short history of research at CMU. Computers in Industry, 14(1–3), 79-88 14. Descotte, Y. and Latombe, J.-C. (1985). Making compromises among antagonist constraints in a planner. AIJ, 27, 183–217. 15. Cushing,W., Kambhampati, S.,Mausam, and Weld, D. S. (2007). When is temporal planning really temporal? In IJCAI-07. 16. Lawler, E. L., Lenstra, J. K., Kan, A., and Shmoys, D. B. (1993). Sequencing and scheduling: Algorithms and complexity. In Graves, S. C., Zipkin, P. H., and Kan, A. H. G. R. (Eds.), Logistics of Production and Inventory: Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Volume 4, pp. 445 - 522. North-Holland. 17. Pinedo, M. (2008). Scheduling: Theory, Algorithms, and Systems. Springer Verlag. 18. Blazewicz, J., Ecker, K., Pesch, E., Schmidt, G., and Weglarz, J. (2007). Handbook on Scheduling: Models and Methods for Advanced Planning (International Handbooks on Information Systems). Springer-Verlag New York, Inc. 19. Sacerdoti, E. D. (1974). Planning in a hierarchy of abstraction spaces. AIJ, 5(2), 115–135. 20. Sacerdoti, E. D. (1977). A Structure for Plans and Behavior. Elsevier/North-Holland 21. Yang, Q. (1990). Formalizing planning knowledge for hierarchical planning. Computational Intelligence, 6, 12–24. 22. Erol, K., Hendler, J., and Nau, D. S. (1994). HTN planning: Complexity and expressivity. In AAAI-94, pp. 1123–1128. 23. Erol, K., Hendler, J., and Nau, D. S. (1996). Complexity results for HTN planning. AIJ, 18(1), 69–93. 24. Marthi, B., Russell, S. J., and Wolfe, J. (2007). Angelic semantics for high-level actions. In ICAPS-07. 25. Marthi, B., Russell, S. J., and Wolfe, J. (2008). Angelic hierarchical planning: Optimal and online algorithms. In ICAPS-08. 26. Kambhampati, S., Mali, A. D., and Srivastava, B. (1998). Hybrid planning for partially hierarchical domains. In AAAI-98, pp. 882–888. 27. Laird, J., Rosenbloom, P. S., and Newell, A. (1986). Chunking in Soar: The anatomy of a general learning mechanism. Machine Learning, 1, 11–46. 28. Carbonell, J. G., Knoblock, C. A., and Minton, S. (1989). PRODIGY: An integrated architecture for planning and learning. Technical report CMU-CS- 89-189, Computer Science Department, Carnegie- Mellon University. 29. Carbonell, J. G. (1983). Derivational analogy and its role in problem solving. In AAAI-83, pp. 64–69. 30. Alterman, R. (1988). Adaptive planning. Cognitive Science, 12, 393–422. 31. Hammond, K. (1989). Case-Based Planning: Viewing Planning as a Memory Task. Academic Press. 32. Kambhampati, S. (1994). Exploiting causal structure to control retrieval and refitting during plan reuse. Computational Intelligence, 10, 213–244 33. Goldman, R. and Boddy, M. (1996). Expressive planning and explicit knowledge. In AIPS-96, pp. 110–117. 34. Goldman, R. and Boddy, M. (1996). Expressive planning and explicit knowledge. In AIPS-96, pp. 110–117. 35. Smith, D. E. and Weld, D. S. (1998). Conformant Graphplan. In AAAI-98, pp. 889–896. 36. Rintanen, J. (1999). Improvements to the evaluation of quantified Boolean formulae. In IJCAI-99, pp. 1192–1197. 37. Bonet, B. and Geffner, H. (2005). An algorithm better than AO∗? In AAAI-05. 38. Brooks, R. A. (1986). A robust layered control system for a mobile robot. IEEE Journal of Robotics and Automation, 2, 14–23. 39. Agre, P. E. and Chapman, D. (1987). Pengi: an implementation of a theory of activity. In IJCAI-87, pp. 268–272. 40. Schoppers, M. J. (1987). Universal plans for reactive robots in unpredictable environments. In IJCAI- 87, pp. 1039–1046. 41. Schoppers, M. J. (1989). In defense of reaction plans as caches. AIMag, 10(4), 51–60.	Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010
Environment	Developmental Psychology	Slater I 19 Environment/Developmental Psychology: new attention has been directed toward the substantial variability in how children respond to their environments. >Parent-Child Relationship/psychological theories, >Situation/Harlow, >Experiment/Harlow, >Situation/Ainsworth. Many children raised under adverse conditions, ranging from institutions to neglectful or abusive parenting, have shown remarkable recovery in later emotional and cognitive functioning. Child characteristics that contribute to “resilience” have been investigated in a wide range of human and animal studies (Sameroff, 2010)⁽¹⁾. These “child effects” have been conceptualized and measured at the genetic, physiological, and behavioral levels of analysis (Obradovic & Boyce, 2009)⁽²⁾. Molecular analyses have centered primarily on identifying genetic polymorphisms that increase or reduce the child’s vulnerability to adverse environments. Physiological measures have focused on autonomic or neuroendocrine measures of reactivity to stressful events, while behavioral measures have focused on individual differences in temperament conceived in terms of shy/inhibited or impulsive/aggressive dimensions (Suomi, 2006)⁽³⁾. Cf. >Environment/Molecular Genetics The ability to measure variability in both the caregiving environment and in children’s susceptibility to environmental exposures has fostered new research on the mechanisms through which early experience affects later adaptation (Meaney, 2010)⁽⁴⁾. This dynamic transaction between the child and the caregiving environment is evident in studies of gene/environment interactions associated with psychiatric disorders (Caspi & Moffitt, 2006)⁽⁵⁾. Work in rodents has identified how early experience can influence gene expression and produce stable epigenetic modifications that alter individual phenotypes across the lifespan (Roth & Sweatt, 2011⁽⁶⁾. 1. Sameroff, A. (2010). A unified theory of development: A dialectic integration of nature and nurture. Child Development, 81, 6–22 2. Obradovic, J., & Boyce, W. T. (2009). Individual differences in behavioral, physiological, and genetic sensitivities to contexts: implications for development and adaptation. Developmental Neuroscience, 31, 300–308. 3. Suomi, S. J. (2006). Risk, resilience, and gene x environment interactions in rhesus monkeys. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1094, 52–62 4. Meaney, M. (2010). Epigenetics and the biological definition of gene × environment interactions. Child Development, 81, 41–79. 5. Caspi, A., & Moffitt, T. (2006). Gene-environment interactions in psychiatry: joining forces with neuroscience. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 7, 583–590 6. Roth, T. L., & Sweatt, J. D. (2011). Annual Research Review: Epigenetic mechanisms and environmental shaping of the brain during sensitive periods of development. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 52, 398–408 Roger Kobak, “Attachment and Early Social deprivation. Revisiting Harlow’s Monkey Studies”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications Upton I 50 Environment/Developmental psychology/Upton: Current evidence (…) supports a greater role for the environment in the development of skills [like sitting up, crawling and walking]. Modern theories of motor skill development emphasise the interaction between nature and nurture. (>Nature and nurture). An important approach here is provided by the dynamic systems theory (Thelen, 1995)⁽¹⁾. >Dynamic systems theory/psychological theories. 1. Thelen, E. (1995) Motor development: a new synthesis. American Psychologist, 50: 79–95.	Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011
Environment	Gould	IV 43 Environment/adjustment/selection/Darwinism/Gould: according to the traditional point of view Darwinism is first and foremost a theory of natural selection. >Darwinism, >Selection. Gould: that is certainly true, but in reference to power and scope of selection we have become overzealous when we try to attribute every conceivable form and behaviour to their direct influence. Another often forgotten principle prevents any optimal adaptation: the strange and yet compelling paths of history! Organisms are subject to the constraints of inherited forms that slow down their evolution! They cannot be reshaped every time their environment changes. IV 44 History/Gould: a world that would be optimally adapted to its current environment would be a world without history, such a world could have been created as we find it now. >Evolution.	Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989
Environment	Norvig	Norvig I 401 Environment/planning/real world/representation/artificial intelligence/Norvig/Russell: algorithms for planning (…) extend both the representation language and the way the planner interacts with the environment. >Planning/Norvig, >Agents/Norvig. New: [we now have] a) actions with duration and b) plans that are organized hierarchically. Hierarchy: Hierarchy also lends itself to efficient plan construction because the planner can solve a problem at an abstract level before delving into details 1st approach: “plan first, schedule later”: (…) we divide the overall problem into a planning phase in which actions are selected, with some ordering constraints, to meet the goals of the problem, and a later scheduling phase, in which temporal information is added to the plan to ensure that it meets resource and deadline constraints. Norvig I 404 Critical path: Mathematically speaking, critical-path problems are easy to solve because they are defined as a conjunction of linear inequalities on the start and end times. When we introduce resource constraints, the resulting constraints on start and end times become more complicated. Norvig I 405 Scheduling: The “cannot overlap” constraint is a disjunction of two linear inequalities, one for each possible ordering. The introduction of disjunctions turns out to make scheduling with resource constraints NP-hard. >NP-Problems. Non-overlapping: [when we assume non-overlapping] every scheduling problem can be solved by a non-overlapping sequence that avoids all resource conflicts, provided that each action is feasible by itself. If a scheduling problem is proving very difficult, however, it may not be a good idea to solve it this way - it may be better to reconsider the actions and constraints, in case that leads to a much easier scheduling problem. Thus, it makes sense to integrate planning and scheduling by taking into account durations and overlaps during the construction of a partial-order plan. Heuristics: partial-order planners can detect resource constraint violations in much the same way they detect conflicts with causal links. Heuristics can be devised to estimate the total completion time of a plan. This is currently an active area of research (see below). Norvig I 406 Real world planning: AI systems will probably have to do what humans appear to do: plan at higher levels of abstraction. A reasonable plan for the Hawaii vacation might be “Go to San Francisco airport (…)” ((s) which might be in a different direction). (…) planning can occur both before and during the execution of the plan (…). Solution: hierarchical decomposition: hierarchical task networks (HTN). Norvig I 407 a high-level plan achieves the goal from a given state if at least one of its implementations achieves the goal from that state. The “at least one” in this definition is crucial - not all implementations need to achieve the goal, because the agent gets Norvig I 408 to decide which implementation it will execute. Thus, the set of possible implementations in HTN planning - each of which may have a different outcome - is not the same as the set of possible outcomes in nondeterministic planning. It can be shown that the right collection of HLAs can result in the time complexity of blind search dropping from exponential in the solution depth to linear in the solution depth, although devising such a collection of HLAs may be a nontrivial task in itself. Norvig I 409 Plan library: The key to HTN planning, then, is the construction of a plan library containing known methods for implementing complex, high-level actions. One method of constructing the library is to learn the methods from problem-solving experience. (>Representation/AI research, >Learning/AI research). Learning/AI: In this way, the agent can become more and more competent over time as new methods are built on top of old methods. One important aspect of this learning process is the ability to generalize the methods that are constructed, eliminating detail that is specific to the problem instance (…). Norvig I 410 Nondeterministic action: problem: downward refinement is much too conservative for a real world environment. See >Terminology/Norvig for “demonic nondeterminism” and “angelic nondeterminism”. Norvig I 411 Reachable sets: The key idea is that the agent can choose which element of the reachable set it ends up in when it executes the HLA; thus, an HLA with multiple refinements is more “powerful” than the same HLA (hig level action) with fewer refinements. The notion of reachable sets yields a straightforward algorithm: search among highlevel plans, looking for one whose reachable set intersects the goal; once that happens, the algorithm can commit to that abstract plan, knowing that it works, and focus on refining the plan further. Norvig I 415 Unknown environment/planning/nondeterministic domains: [problems here are] sensorless planning (also known as conformant planning) for environments with no observations; contingency planning for partially observable and nondeterministic environments; and online planning and replanning for unknown environments. Norvig I 417 Sensorless planning: In classical planning, where the closed-world assumption is made, we would assume that any fluent not mentioned in a state is false, but in sensorless (and partially observable) planning we have to switch to an open-world assumption in which states contain both positive and negative fluents, and if a fluent does not appear, its value is unknown. Thus, the belief state corresponds exactly to the set of possible worlds that satisfy the formula. Norvig I 423 Online replanning: The online agent has a choice of how carefully to monitor the environment. We distinguish three levels: a) Action monitoring: before executing an action, the agent verifies that all the preconditions still hold, b) Plan monitoring: before executing an action, the agent verifies that the remaining plan will still succeed, c) Goal monitoring: before executing an action, the agent checks to see if there is a better set of goals it could be trying to achieve. Norvig I 425 Multi-agent planning: A multibody problem is still a “standard” single-agent problem as long as the relevant sensor information collected by each body can be pooled - either centrally or within each body - to form a common estimate of the world state that then informs the execution of the overall plan; in this case, the multiple bodies act as a single body. When communication constraints make this impossible, we have Norvig I 426 what is sometimes called a decentralized planning problem: (…) the subplan constructed for each body may need to include explicit communicative actions with other bodies. Norvig I 429 Convention: A convention is any constraint on the selection of joint plans. Communication: In the absence of a convention, agents can use communication to achieve common knowledge of a feasible joint plan. Plan recognition: works when a single action (or short sequence of actions) is enough to determine a joint plan unambiguously. Note that communication can work as well with competitive agents as with cooperative ones. Norvig I 430 The most difficult multi-agent problems involve both cooperation with members of one’s own team and competition against members of opposing teams, all without centralized control. Norvig I 431 Time constraints in plans: Planning with time constraints was first dealt with by DEVISER (Vere, 1983⁽¹⁾). The representation of time in plans was addressed by Allen (1984⁽²⁾) and by Dean et al. (1990)⁽³⁾ in the FORBIN system. NONLIN+ (Tate and Whiter, 1984)⁽⁴⁾ and SIPE (Wilkins, 1988(5), 1990⁽⁶⁾) could reason about the allocation of limited resources to various plan steps. Forward state-space search: The two planners SAPA (Do and Kambhampati, 2001)⁽⁷⁾ and T4 (Haslum and Geffner, 2001)⁽⁸⁾ both used forward state-space search with sophisticated heuristics to handle actions with durations and resources. Human heuristics: An alternative is to use very expressive action languages, but guide them by human-written domain-specific heuristics, as is done by ASPEN (Fukunaga et al., 1997)⁽⁹⁾, HSTS (Jonsson et al., 2000)⁽¹⁰⁾, and IxTeT (Ghallab and Laruelle, 1994)⁽¹¹⁾. Norvig I 432 Hybrid planning-and-scheduling systems: ISIS (Fox et al., 1982⁽¹²⁾; Fox, 1990(13)) has been used for job shop scheduling at Westinghouse, GARI (Descotte and Latombe, 1985)⁽¹⁴⁾ planned the machining and construction of mechanical parts, FORBIN was used for factory control, and NONLIN+ was used for naval logistics planning. We chose to present planning and scheduling as two separate problems; (Cushing et al., 2007)⁽¹⁵⁾ show that this can lead to incompleteness on certain problems. Scheduling: The literature on scheduling is presented in a classic survey article (Lawler et al., 1993)⁽¹⁶⁾, a recent book (Pinedo, 2008)⁽¹⁷⁾, and an edited handbook (Blazewicz et al., 2007)(18). Abstraction hierarchy: The ABSTRIPS system (Sacerdoti, 1974)⁽¹⁹⁾ introduced the idea of an abstraction hierarchy, whereby planning at higher levels was permitted to ignore lower-level preconditions of actions in order to derive the general structure of a working plan. Austin Tate’s Ph.D. thesis (1975b) and work by Earl Sacerdoti (1977)⁽²⁰⁾ developed the basic ideas of HTN planning in its modern form. Many practical planners, including O-PLAN and SIPE, are HTN planners. Yang (1990)⁽²¹⁾ discusses properties of actions that make HTN planning efficient. Erol, Hendler, and Nau (1994⁽²²⁾, 1996⁽²³⁾) present a complete hierarchical decomposition planner as well as a range of complexity results for pure HTN planners. Our presentation of HLAs and angelic semantics is due to Marthi et al. (2007⁽²⁴⁾, 2008⁽²⁵⁾). Kambhampati et al. (1998)⁽²⁶⁾ have proposed an approach in which decompositions are just another form of plan refinement, similar to the refinements for non-hierarchical partial-order planning. Explanation-based learning: The technique of explanation-based learning (…) has been applied in several systems as a means of generalizing previously computed plans, including SOAR (Laird et al., 1986)⁽²⁷⁾ and PRODIGY (Carbonell et al., 1989)⁽²⁸⁾. Case-based planning: An alternative approach is to store previously computed plans in their original form and then reuse them to solve new, similar problems by analogy to the original problem. This is the approach taken by the field called case-based planning (Carbonell, 1983⁽²⁹⁾; Alterman, 1988⁽³⁰⁾; Hammond, 1989⁽³¹⁾). Kambhampati (1994)⁽³²⁾ argues that case-based planning should be analyzed as a form of refinement planning and provides a formal foundation for case-based partial-order planning. Norvig I 433 Conformant planning: Goldman and Boddy (1996⁾⁽³³⁾ introduced the term conformant planning, noting that sensorless plans are often effective even if the agent has sensors. The first moderately efficient conformant planner was Smith and Weld’s (1998)⁽³⁴⁾ Conformant Graphplan or CGP. Ferraris and Giunchiglia (2000)⁽³⁵⁾ and Rintanen (1999)⁽³⁶⁾ independently developed SATPLAN-based conformant planners. Bonet and Geffner (2000)⁽³⁷⁾ describe a conformant planner based on heuristic search in the space of >belief states (…). Norvig I 434 Reactive planning: In the mid-1980s, pessimism about the slow run times of planning systems led to the proposal of reflex agents called reactive planning systems (Brooks, 1986⁽³⁸⁾; Agre and Chapman, 1987)⁽³⁹⁾. PENGI (Agre and Chapman, 1987)⁽³⁹⁾ could play a (fully observable) video game by using Boolean circuits combined with a “visual” representation of current goals and the agent’s internal state. Policies: “Universal plans” (Schoppers, 1987⁽⁴⁰⁾, 1989⁽⁴¹⁾) were developed as a lookup table method for reactive planning, but turned out to be a rediscovery of the idea of policies that had long been used in Markov decision processes (…). >Open Universe/AI research). 1. Vere, S. A. (1983). Planning in time: Windows and durations for activities and goals. PAMI, 5, 246-267. 2. Allen, J. F. (1984). Towards a general theory of action and time. AIJ, 23, 123-154. 3. Dean, T., Kanazawa, K., and Shewchuk, J. (1990). Prediction, observation and estimation in planning and control. In 5th IEEE International Symposium on Intelligent Control, Vol. 2, pp. 645-650. 4. Tate, A. and Whiter, A. M. (1984). Planning with multiple resource constraints and an application to a naval planning problem. In Proc. First Conference on AI Applications, pp. 410-416. 5. Wilkins, D. E. (1988). Practical Planning: Extending the AI Planning Paradigm. Morgan Kaufmann. 6. Wilkins, D. E. (1990). Can AI planners solve practical problems? Computational Intelligence, 6(4), 232-246. 7. Do, M. B. and Kambhampati, S. (2003). Planning as constraint satisfaction: solving the planning graph by compiling it into CSP. AIJ, 132(2), 151-182. 8. Haslum, P. and Geffner, H. (2001). Heuristic planning with time and resources. In Proc. IJCAI-01 Workshop on Planning with Resources. 9. Fukunaga, A. S., Rabideau, G., Chien, S., and Yan, D. (1997). ASPEN: A framework for automated planning and scheduling of spacecraft control and operations. In Proc. International Symposium on AI, Robotics and Automation in Space, pp. 181-187. 10. Jonsson, A., Morris, P., Muscettola, N., Rajan, K., and Smith, B. (2000). Planning in interplanetary space: Theory and practice. In AIPS-00, pp. 177-186. 11. Ghallab, M. and Laruelle, H. (1994). Representation and control in IxTeT, a temporal planner. In AIPS-94, pp. 61-67. 12. Fox, M. S., Allen, B., and Strohm, G. (1982). Job shop scheduling: An investigation in constraint directed reasoning. In AAAI-82, pp. 155-158. 13. Fox, M. S. (1990). Constraint-guided scheduling: A short history of research at CMU. Computers in Industry, 14(1–3), 79-88 14. Descotte, Y. and Latombe, J.-C. (1985). Making compromises among antagonist constraints in a planner. AIJ, 27, 183–217. 15. Cushing,W., Kambhampati, S.,Mausam, and Weld, D. S. (2007). When is temporal planning really temporal? In IJCAI-07. 16. Lawler, E. L., Lenstra, J. K., Kan, A., and Shmoys, D. B. (1993). Sequencing and scheduling: Algorithms and complexity. In Graves, S. C., Zipkin, P. H., and Kan, A. H. G. R. (Eds.), Logistics of Production and Inventory: Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Volume 4, pp. 445 - 522. North-Holland. 17. Pinedo, M. (2008). Scheduling: Theory, Algorithms, and Systems. Springer Verlag. 18. Blazewicz, J., Ecker, K., Pesch, E., Schmidt, G., and Weglarz, J. (2007). Handbook on Scheduling: Models and Methods for Advanced Planning (International Handbooks on Information Systems). Springer-Verlag New York, Inc. 19. Sacerdoti, E. D. (1974). Planning in a hierarchy of abstraction spaces. AIJ, 5(2), 115–135. 20. Sacerdoti, E. D. (1977). A Structure for Plans and Behavior. Elsevier/North-Holland 21. Yang, Q. (1990). Formalizing planning knowledge for hierarchical planning. Computational Intelligence, 6, 12–24. 22. Erol, K., Hendler, J., and Nau, D. S. (1994). HTN planning: Complexity and expressivity. In AAAI-94, pp. 1123–1128. 23. Erol, K., Hendler, J., and Nau, D. S. (1996). Complexity results for HTN planning. AIJ, 18(1), 69–93. 24. Marthi, B., Russell, S. J., and Wolfe, J. (2007). Angelic semantics for high-level actions. In ICAPS-07. 25. Marthi, B., Russell, S. J., and Wolfe, J. (2008). Angelic hierarchical planning: Optimal and online algorithms. In ICAPS-08. 26. Kambhampati, S., Mali, A. D., and Srivastava, B. (1998). Hybrid planning for partially hierarchical domains. In AAAI-98, pp. 882–888. 27. Laird, J., Rosenbloom, P. S., and Newell, A. (1986). Chunking in Soar: The anatomy of a general learning mechanism. Machine Learning, 1, 11–46. 28. Carbonell, J. G., Knoblock, C. A., and Minton, S. (1989). PRODIGY: An integrated architecture for planning and learning. Technical report CMU-CS- 89-189, Computer Science Department, Carnegie- Mellon University. 29. Carbonell, J. G. (1983). Derivational analogy and its role in problem solving. In AAAI-83, pp. 64–69. 30. Alterman, R. (1988). Adaptive planning. Cognitive Science, 12, 393–422. 31. Hammond, K. (1989). Case-Based Planning: Viewing Planning as a Memory Task. Academic Press. 32. Kambhampati, S. (1994). Exploiting causal structure to control retrieval and refitting during plan reuse. Computational Intelligence, 10, 213–244 33. Goldman, R. and Boddy, M. (1996). Expressive planning and explicit knowledge. In AIPS-96, pp. 110–117. 34. Goldman, R. and Boddy, M. (1996). Expressive planning and explicit knowledge. In AIPS-96, pp. 110–117. 35. Smith, D. E. and Weld, D. S. (1998). Conformant Graphplan. In AAAI-98, pp. 889–896. 36. Rintanen, J. (1999). Improvements to the evaluation of quantified Boolean formulae. In IJCAI-99, pp. 1192–1197. 37. Bonet, B. and Geffner, H. (2005). An algorithm better than AO∗? In AAAI-05. 38. Brooks, R. A. (1986). A robust layered control system for a mobile robot. IEEE Journal of Robotics and Automation, 2, 14–23. 39. Agre, P. E. and Chapman, D. (1987). Pengi: an implementation of a theory of activity. In IJCAI-87, pp. 268–272. 40. Schoppers, M. J. (1987). Universal plans for reactive robots in unpredictable environments. In IJCAI- 87, pp. 1039–1046. 41. Schoppers, M. J. (1989). In defense of reaction plans as caches. AIMag, 10(4), 51–60.	Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010
Environment	Russell	Norvig I 401 Environment/planning/real world/representation/artificial intelligence/Norvig/Russell: algorithms for planning (…) extend both the representation language and the way the planner interacts with the environment. >Planning/Norvig, >Agents/Norvig. New: [we now have] a) actions with duration and b) plans that are organized hierarchically. Hierarchy: Hierarchy also lends itself to efficient plan construction because the planner can solve a problem at an abstract level before delving into details 1st approach: “plan first, schedule later”: (…) we divide the overall problem into a planning phase in which actions are selected, with some ordering constraints, to meet the goals of the problem, and a later scheduling phase, in which temporal information is added to the plan to ensure that it meets resource and deadline constraints. Norvig I 404 Critical path: Mathematically speaking, critical-path problems are easy to solve because they are defined as a conjunction of linear inequalities on the start and end times. When we introduce resource constraints, the resulting constraints on start and end times become more complicated. Norvig I 405 Scheduling: The “cannot overlap” constraint is a disjunction of two linear inequalities, one for each possible ordering. The introduction of disjunctions turns out to make scheduling with resource constraints NP-hard. >NP-Problems. Non-overlapping: [when we assume non-overlapping] every scheduling problem can be solved by a non-overlapping sequence that avoids all resource conflicts, provided that each action is feasible by itself. If a scheduling problem is proving very difficult, however, it may not be a good idea to solve it this way - it may be better to reconsider the actions and constraints, in case that leads to a much easier scheduling problem. Thus, it makes sense to integrate planning and scheduling by taking into account durations and overlaps during the construction of a partial-order plan. Heuristics: partial-order planners can detect resource constraint violations in much the same way they detect conflicts with causal links. Heuristics can be devised to estimate the total completion time of a plan. This is currently an active area of research (see below). Norvig I 406 Real world planning: AI systems will probably have to do what humans appear to do: plan at higher levels of abstraction. A reasonable plan for the Hawaii vacation might be “Go to San Francisco airport (…)” ((s) which might be in a different direction). (…) planning can occur both before and during the execution of the plan (…). Solution: hierarchical decomposition: hierarchical task networks (HTN). Norvig I 407 a high-level plan achieves the goal from a given state if at least one of its implementations achieves the goal from that state. The “at least one” in this definition is crucial - not all implementations need to achieve the goal, because the agent gets Norvig I 408 to decide which implementation it will execute. Thus, the set of possible implementations in HTN planning - each of which may have a different outcome - is not the same as the set of possible outcomes in nondeterministic planning. It can be shown that the right collection of HLAs can result in the time complexity of blind search dropping from exponential in the solution depth to linear in the solution depth, although devising such a collection of HLAs may be a nontrivial task in itself. Norvig I 409 Plan library: The key to HTN planning, then, is the construction of a plan library containing known methods for implementing complex, high-level actions. One method of constructing the library is to learn the methods from problem-solving experience. >Representation/AI research, >Learning/AI research. Learning/AI: In this way, the agent can become more and more competent over time as new methods are built on top of old methods. One important aspect of this learning process is the ability to generalize the methods that are constructed, eliminating detail that is specific to the problem instance (…). Norvig I 410 Nondeterministic action: problem: downward refinement is much too conservative for a real world environment. See >Terminology/Norvig for “demonic nondeterminism” and “angelic nondeterminism”. Norvig I 411 Reachable sets: The key idea is that the agent can choose which element of the reachable set it ends up in when it executes the HLA; thus, an HLA with multiple refinements is more “powerful” than the same HLA (hig level action) with fewer refinements. The notion of reachable sets yields a straightforward algorithm: search among highlevel plans, looking for one whose reachable set intersects the goal; once that happens, the algorithm can commit to that abstract plan, knowing that it works, and focus on refining the plan further. Norvig I 415 Unknown environment/planning/nondeterministic domains: [problems here are] sensorless planning (also known as conformant planning) for environments with no observations; contingency planning for partially observable and nondeterministic environments; and online planning and replanning for unknown environments. Norvig I 417 Sensorless planning: In classical planning, where the closed-world assumption is made, we would assume that any fluent not mentioned in a state is false, but in sensorless (and partially observable) planning we have to switch to an open-world assumption in which states contain both positive and negative fluents, and if a fluent does not appear, its value is unknown. Thus, the belief state corresponds exactly to the set of possible worlds that satisfy the formula. Norvig I 423 Online replanning: The online agent has a choice of how carefully to monitor the environment. We distinguish three levels: a) Action monitoring: before executing an action, the agent verifies that all the preconditions still hold, b) Plan monitoring: before executing an action, the agent verifies that the remaining plan will still succeed, c) Goal monitoring: before executing an action, the agent checks to see if there is a better set of goals it could be trying to achieve. Norvig I 425 Multi-agent planning: A multibody problem is still a “standard” single-agent problem as long as the relevant sensor information collected by each body can be pooled - either centrally or within each body - to form a common estimate of the world state that then informs the execution of the overall plan; in this case, the multiple bodies act as a single body. When communication constraints make this impossible, we have Norvig I 426 what is sometimes called a decentralized planning problem: (…) the subplan constructed for each body may need to include explicit communicative actions with other bodies. Norvig I 429 Convention: A convention is any constraint on the selection of joint plans. Communication: In the absence of a convention, agents can use communication to achieve common knowledge of a feasible joint plan. Plan recognition: works when a single action (or short sequence of actions) is enough to determine a joint plan unambiguously. Note that communication can work as well with competitive agents as with cooperative ones. Norvig I 430 The most difficult multi-agent problems involve both cooperation with members of one’s own team and competition against members of opposing teams, all without centralized control. Norvig I 431 Time constraints in plans: Planning with time constraints was first dealt with by DEVISER (Vere, 1983⁽¹⁾). The representation of time in plans was addressed by Allen (1984⁽²⁾) and by Dean et al. (1990)⁽³⁾ in the FORBIN system. NONLIN+ (Tate and Whiter, 1984)⁽⁴⁾ and SIPE (Wilkins, 1988(5), 1990⁽⁶⁾) could reason about the allocation of limited resources to various plan steps. Forward state-space search: The two planners SAPA (Do and Kambhampati, 2001)⁽⁷⁾ and T4 (Haslum and Geffner, 2001)⁽⁸⁾ both used forward state-space search with sophisticated heuristics to handle actions with durations and resources. Human heuristics: An alternative is to use very expressive action languages, but guide them by human-written domain-specific heuristics, as is done by ASPEN (Fukunaga et al., 1997)⁽⁹⁾, HSTS (Jonsson et al., 2000)⁽¹⁰⁾, and IxTeT (Ghallab and Laruelle, 1994)⁽¹¹⁾. Norvig I 432 Hybrid planning-and-scheduling systems: ISIS (Fox et al., 1982⁽¹²⁾; Fox, 1990(13)) has been used for job shop scheduling at Westinghouse, GARI (Descotte and Latombe, 1985)⁽¹⁴⁾ planned the machining and construction of mechanical parts, FORBIN was used for factory control, and NONLIN+ was used for naval logistics planning. We chose to present planning and scheduling as two separate problems; (Cushing et al., 2007)⁽¹⁵⁾ show that this can lead to incompleteness on certain problems. Scheduling: The literature on scheduling is presented in a classic survey article (Lawler et al., 1993)⁽¹⁶⁾, a recent book (Pinedo, 2008)⁽¹⁷⁾, and an edited handbook (Blazewicz et al., 2007)(18). Abstraction hierarchy: The ABSTRIPS system (Sacerdoti, 1974)⁽¹⁹⁾ introduced the idea of an abstraction hierarchy, whereby planning at higher levels was permitted to ignore lower-level preconditions of actions in order to derive the general structure of a working plan. Austin Tate’s Ph.D. thesis (1975b) and work by Earl Sacerdoti (1977)⁽²⁰⁾ developed the basic ideas of HTN planning in its modern form. Many practical planners, including O-PLAN and SIPE, are HTN planners. Yang (1990)⁽²¹⁾ discusses properties of actions that make HTN planning efficient. Erol, Hendler, and Nau (1994⁽²²⁾, 1996⁽²³⁾) present a complete hierarchical decomposition planner as well as a range of complexity results for pure HTN planners. Our presentation of HLAs and angelic semantics is due to Marthi et al. (2007⁽²⁴⁾, 2008⁽²⁵⁾). Kambhampati et al. (1998)⁽²⁶⁾ have proposed an approach in which decompositions are just another form of plan refinement, similar to the refinements for non-hierarchical partial-order planning. Explanation-based learning: The technique of explanation-based learning (…) has been applied in several systems as a means of generalizing previously computed plans, including SOAR (Laird et al., 1986)⁽²⁷⁾ and PRODIGY (Carbonell et al., 1989)⁽²⁸⁾. Case-based planning: An alternative approach is to store previously computed plans in their original form and then reuse them to solve new, similar problems by analogy to the original problem. This is the approach taken by the field called case-based planning (Carbonell, 1983⁽²⁹⁾; Alterman, 1988⁽³⁰⁾; Hammond, 1989⁽³¹⁾). Kambhampati (1994)⁽³²⁾ argues that case-based planning should be analyzed as a form of refinement planning and provides a formal foundation for case-based partial-order planning. Norvig I 433 Conformant planning: Goldman and Boddy (1996⁾⁽³³⁾ introduced the term conformant planning, noting that sensorless plans are often effective even if the agent has sensors. The first moderately efficient conformant planner was Smith and Weld’s (1998)⁽³⁴⁾ Conformant Graphplan or CGP. Ferraris and Giunchiglia (2000)⁽³⁵⁾ and Rintanen (1999)⁽³⁶⁾ independently developed SATPLAN-based conformant planners. Bonet and Geffner (2000)⁽³⁷⁾ describe a conformant planner based on heuristic search in the space of >belief states (…). Norvig I 434 Reactive planning: In the mid-1980s, pessimism about the slow run times of planning systems led to the proposal of reflex agents called reactive planning systems (Brooks, 1986⁽³⁸⁾; Agre and Chapman, 1987)⁽³⁹⁾. PENGI (Agre and Chapman, 1987)⁽³⁹⁾ could play a (fully observable) video game by using Boolean circuits combined with a “visual” representation of current goals and the agent’s internal state. Policies: “Universal plans” (Schoppers, 1987⁽⁴⁰⁾, 1989⁽⁴¹⁾) were developed as a lookup table method for reactive planning, but turned out to be a rediscovery of the idea of policies that had long been used in Markov decision processes (…). >Open Universe/AI research). 1. Vere, S. A. (1983). Planning in time: Windows and durations for activities and goals. PAMI, 5, 246-267. 2. Allen, J. F. (1984). Towards a general theory of action and time. AIJ, 23, 123-154. 3. Dean, T., Kanazawa, K., and Shewchuk, J. (1990). Prediction, observation and estimation in planning and control. In 5th IEEE International Symposium on Intelligent Control, Vol. 2, pp. 645-650. 4. Tate, A. and Whiter, A. M. (1984). Planning with multiple resource constraints and an application to a naval planning problem. In Proc. First Conference on AI Applications, pp. 410-416. 5. Wilkins, D. E. (1988). Practical Planning: Extending the AI Planning Paradigm. Morgan Kaufmann. 6. Wilkins, D. E. (1990). Can AI planners solve practical problems? Computational Intelligence, 6(4), 232-246. 7. Do, M. B. and Kambhampati, S. (2003). Planning as constraint satisfaction: solving the planning graph by compiling it into CSP. AIJ, 132(2), 151-182. 8. Haslum, P. and Geffner, H. (2001). Heuristic planning with time and resources. In Proc. IJCAI-01 Workshop on Planning with Resources. 9. Fukunaga, A. S., Rabideau, G., Chien, S., and Yan, D. (1997). ASPEN: A framework for automated planning and scheduling of spacecraft control and operations. In Proc. International Symposium on AI, Robotics and Automation in Space, pp. 181-187. 10. Jonsson, A., Morris, P., Muscettola, N., Rajan, K., and Smith, B. (2000). Planning in interplanetary space: Theory and practice. In AIPS-00, pp. 177-186. 11. Ghallab, M. and Laruelle, H. (1994). Representation and control in IxTeT, a temporal planner. In AIPS-94, pp. 61-67. 12. Fox, M. S., Allen, B., and Strohm, G. (1982). Job shop scheduling: An investigation in constraint directed reasoning. In AAAI-82, pp. 155-158. 13. Fox, M. S. (1990). Constraint-guided scheduling: A short history of research at CMU. Computers in Industry, 14(1–3), 79-88 14. Descotte, Y. and Latombe, J.-C. (1985). Making compromises among antagonist constraints in a planner. AIJ, 27, 183–217. 15. Cushing,W., Kambhampati, S.,Mausam, and Weld, D. S. (2007). When is temporal planning really temporal? In IJCAI-07. 16. Lawler, E. L., Lenstra, J. K., Kan, A., and Shmoys, D. B. (1993). Sequencing and scheduling: Algorithms and complexity. In Graves, S. C., Zipkin, P. H., and Kan, A. H. G. R. (Eds.), Logistics of Production and Inventory: Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Volume 4, pp. 445 - 522. North-Holland. 17. Pinedo, M. (2008). Scheduling: Theory, Algorithms, and Systems. Springer Verlag. 18. Blazewicz, J., Ecker, K., Pesch, E., Schmidt, G., and Weglarz, J. (2007). Handbook on Scheduling: Models and Methods for Advanced Planning (International Handbooks on Information Systems). Springer-Verlag New York, Inc. 19. Sacerdoti, E. D. (1974). Planning in a hierarchy of abstraction spaces. AIJ, 5(2), 115–135. 20. Sacerdoti, E. D. (1977). A Structure for Plans and Behavior. Elsevier/North-Holland 21. Yang, Q. (1990). Formalizing planning knowledge for hierarchical planning. Computational Intelligence, 6, 12–24. 22. Erol, K., Hendler, J., and Nau, D. S. (1994). HTN planning: Complexity and expressivity. In AAAI-94, pp. 1123–1128. 23. Erol, K., Hendler, J., and Nau, D. S. (1996). Complexity results for HTN planning. AIJ, 18(1), 69–93. 24. Marthi, B., Russell, S. J., and Wolfe, J. (2007). Angelic semantics for high-level actions. In ICAPS-07. 25. Marthi, B., Russell, S. J., and Wolfe, J. (2008). Angelic hierarchical planning: Optimal and online algorithms. In ICAPS-08. 26. Kambhampati, S., Mali, A. D., and Srivastava, B. (1998). Hybrid planning for partially hierarchical domains. In AAAI-98, pp. 882–888. 27. Laird, J., Rosenbloom, P. S., and Newell, A. (1986). Chunking in Soar: The anatomy of a general learning mechanism. Machine Learning, 1, 11–46. 28. Carbonell, J. G., Knoblock, C. A., and Minton, S. (1989). PRODIGY: An integrated architecture for planning and learning. Technical report CMU-CS- 89-189, Computer Science Department, Carnegie- Mellon University. 29. Carbonell, J. G. (1983). Derivational analogy and its role in problem solving. In AAAI-83, pp. 64–69. 30. Alterman, R. (1988). Adaptive planning. Cognitive Science, 12, 393–422. 31. Hammond, K. (1989). Case-Based Planning: Viewing Planning as a Memory Task. Academic Press. 32. Kambhampati, S. (1994). Exploiting causal structure to control retrieval and refitting during plan reuse. Computational Intelligence, 10, 213–244 33. Goldman, R. and Boddy, M. (1996). Expressive planning and explicit knowledge. In AIPS-96, pp. 110–117. 34. Goldman, R. and Boddy, M. (1996). Expressive planning and explicit knowledge. In AIPS-96, pp. 110–117. 35. Smith, D. E. and Weld, D. S. (1998). Conformant Graphplan. In AAAI-98, pp. 889–896. 36. Rintanen, J. (1999). Improvements to the evaluation of quantified Boolean formulae. In IJCAI-99, pp. 1192–1197. 37. Bonet, B. and Geffner, H. (2005). An algorithm better than AO∗? In AAAI-05. 38. Brooks, R. A. (1986). A robust layered control system for a mobile robot. IEEE Journal of Robotics and Automation, 2, 14–23. 39. Agre, P. E. and Chapman, D. (1987). Pengi: an implementation of a theory of activity. In IJCAI-87, pp. 268–272. 40. Schoppers, M. J. (1987). Universal plans for reactive robots in unpredictable environments. In IJCAI- 87, pp. 1039–1046. 41. Schoppers, M. J. (1989). In defense of reaction plans as caches. AIMag, 10(4), 51–60.	Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010
Epistemology	McGinn	I 11f McGinn thesis: confusion sets in not because philosophical questions refer to highly problematic, strange beings or facts, but because our cognitive faculties are subject to certain limits. Transcendental Naturalism/"principle of cognitive specificity"/McGinn: indispensable background principle: every knowing being of earthly nature (not of divine nature) shows strong and weak areas of cognitive faculties that depend in the end on their biological equipment. I 121f That means that there is probably no such thing as "general intelligence". >Intelligence. Accordingly, systematic failure in one field does not depend on the objects. Most things which we can understand have no semantic properties. The problem of knowledge is reminiscent of the problem of freedom of will, which also has a kind of stimulus independence. Decisions come about of their own accord, they are not mere effects. I 153 A priori knowledge/McGinn: is not derived from a causal input-output ratio and ignores the perception systems. And not because the stimuli are weak. >a priori/McGinn. At the same time, it is the realization of the solipsist, which is provided to each mind with sufficient inner strength. I 178 Freedom of will/knowledge/McGinn: related problems: cracks and discontinuities, fragmentary data build an extensive knowledge system, the input values do not determine in any case the final state. >Free will/McGinn. I 222 Knowledge pluralism: suggests that it is not true that human reason contained nothing that would be capable of solving philosophical problems. Secrets are secrets only for a particular ability. Maybe there are certain abilities that are philosophically more gifted than our conscious reason.	McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001
Equality	Sen	Gaus I 231 Equality/Sen/Lamont: in his influential lecture 'Equality of what?' (1980)⁽¹⁾, Amartya Sen addresses the question of what metric egalitarians should use to determine the degree to which a society realizes the ideal of equality. In his lecture, Sen was addressing a debate over two candidate metrics, welfare (or utility) on the one hand, and Rawlsian primary goods on the other. >J. Rawls. At issue between these were questions about the extent to which the welfare metric unfairly caters to morally wrongful preferences or expensive tastes. Between these extremes, Sen introduced 'capability equality' , where capabilities refer to what various goods do for people, apart from the welfare they achieve (Sen, 1985⁽²⁾; 1987⁽³⁾). Cf. >Equal Opportunities, >Welfare, >Distributive Justice. This introduced another variable into the 'equality of what' literature which had been dominated by arguments between equality of outcome and equality of opportunity advocates (for more recent contributions see Bowie, 1988⁽⁴⁾). A range of alternative variables for what should be equalized have since been introduced (Daniels, 1990⁽⁵⁾) and refined, including the resource egalitarians discussed above (Dworkin, 2000⁽⁶⁾), equal opportunity for welfare (Arneson, 1989⁽⁷⁾; 1990⁽⁸⁾; 1991⁽⁹⁾), equal access to advantage (Cohen, 1989)⁽¹⁰⁾, and equal political status (Anderson, 1999)⁽¹¹⁾. >Justification/Lamont. 1. Sen, Amartya (1980) 'Equality of what?' In Sterling M. McMurrin, ed., Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 195-220. 2. Sen, Amartya (1985) Commodities and Capabilities. Oxford: Elsevier Science. 3. Sen, Amartya (1987) On Ethics and Economics. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. 4. Bowie, Norman (1988) Equal Opportunity. Boulder, CO: Westview. 5. Daniels, Norman (1990) 'Equality of what: welfare, resources, or capabilities?' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50 (Fall): 273-96. 6. Dworkin, Ronald (2000) Soveæign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 7. Arneson, Richard (1989) 'Equality and equal opportunity for welfare, Philosophical Studies, 56: 77-93. 8. Arneson, Richard (1990) 'Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism and equal opportunity for welfare', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19: 159-94. 9. Arneson, Richard (1991) 'Lockean self-ownership: towards a demolition', Political Studies, 39 (l): 36-54. 10. Cohen, G. A. (1989) 'On the currency of egalitarian justice'. Ethics, 99 906_44. 11. Anderson, Elizabeth (1999) 'What is the point of equality?' Ethics, 109 (2): 287-337. Lamont, Julian 2004. „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	EconSen I Amartya Sen Collective Choice and Social Welfare: Expanded Edition London 2017 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Equality	Singer	I IX Equality/Animal/Human/Equal rights/Ethics/P. Singer: thesis: my book Practical Ethics⁽¹⁾ fights the attitude that all members of the human species would have higher-ranked rights solely because of their belonging to this species. >Animals, >Rights. P. SingerVs: it would be unphilosophical to forbid any comparisons beyond a species. This is about injustice that we inflict on animals and the damage we do to our environment. I 16 Equality/ethics/P. Singer: what does it actually mean when we say that all people are equal? Problem: the more we investigate individual cases, the more the belief in the universal validity of the principle of equality disappears. Example: Intelligence/Jensen/Eysenk/P. Singer: (Debate in the 1970s between Arthur Jensen, psychologist UC Berkeley and Hans Jürgen Eysenk, psychology at the University of London): I 17 Question: to what extent do variances of intelligence depend on genetic differences? This dispute was again taken up by Herrstein/Murray 1994⁽²⁾. >Intelligence, >A. Jensen, >H.J. Eysenck. Racism: the critics of these authors say their theses, if justified, would justify racial discrimination. Are they right? Similar problem: was Larry Summers a sexist when he - at that time president of the Harvard University - claimed biological factors in connection with difficulties to appoint more women to chairs in mathematics and sciences? Similar question: should disadvantaged groups receive special preferential treatment in access to jobs or to the university? P. Singer: Differences between genders and differences between giftedness exist in any case. Range property/John Rawls: (in Rawls, Theory of Justice)⁽³⁾ if one belongs to a domain, one simply has the property to belong to this domain and all within the domain have this property alike. I 18 Equality/Rawls/P. Singer: Rawl's thesis: a moral attitude is the basis for equality. >Morals, >Ethics. VsRawls: 1. One might object that this is a gradual matter. 2. Small children are not capable of having a moral personality. Solution/Rawls: small children are potentially moral personalities. I 19 VsRawls: Rawls does not provide a solution for people with irreparable impairments.⁽³⁾ I 20 Suffering/interest/Third person/P. Singer: Problem: we have to explain whether the pain of a certain person is less undesirable than that of another person. >Suffering, >Pain. I 20 Interest/P. Singer: Principle: When it comes to equality, we should weigh interests as interests and not as interests of persons, as mine or someone else's interests. If then X loses more by an action than Y wins, the action should not be executed. >Interest. I 21 Then the race plays no role anymore in the weighing of interests. This is the reason why the Nazis were wrong: their policy was based only on the interests of the Aryan race. >Racism, >Fascism. 1. Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 3rd ed. Cambridge University Press (2011). 2. Herrnstein, R. J., & Murray, C. The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life. New York, NJ: Free Press (1994). 3. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Original Edition. Belknap Press (1971).	SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015
Equality	Tawney	Gaus I 420 Equality/Tawney/Weinstein: Tawney's 'higher' socialism both mimics Hobson's 'liberal socialism' and anticipates contemporary egalitarian liberalisms like Dworkin's. >Equality/Dworkin. Although his theorizing lacks Dworkin's rigour, it likewise begins with our common dignity and regards liberty and equality as compatible (Tawney, 1964⁽¹⁾: 46—7). Liberty/Tawney: Liberty and equality are fully commensurate, especially where greater economic equality protects all citizens from undue economic coercion. Greater economic equality is 'essential' to greater liberty (1964(1): 168). Tawney thus follows new liberals m insisting that extreme economic inequalities are no less constraining than physical threats. In the 1952 edition of Equality, Tawney clarifies why liberty and equality are compatible. He insists that political liberties are more 'fundamental' than 'secondary' economic liberties. Hence, while redis- tributive justice plainly compromises the freedom to acquire and exchange property (a 'secondary' liberty), it enhances political liberties by making them more than merely nominal for the poor. In short, greater economic equality frees us by opening our political 'range of alternatives' and fortifies our 'capacity' to choose between them. Liberty and equality 'can live as friends' (1964⁽¹⁾: 227—9). 1. Tawney, R. H. (1964 119521) Equality. London: Unwin. Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Equilibrium	Gould	II 256ff Equilibrium/evolution/Eldredge/Gould: I am one of the evolutionists who believe in leaps in evolution. Together with Niles Eldredge: Thesis: theory of uninterrupted equilibrium: leaps do not have to express gaps in fossil finds, but can confirm the predictions of the theory of evolution.⁽¹⁾ II 258 These tendencies cannot be attributed to the gradual change within the sexes, but must arise from the different success of certain types of species. They are rather stairs than a sloping plane. Transitional forms are generally absent at the level of species, but are abundant between larger groups. IV 186 Equilibrium/theory of the interrupted equilibrium (selective equilibrium)/Gould: thesis: the theory of the interrupted equilibrium is an unorthodox theory to explain the absence of expected patterns and laws (together with Niles Eldredge). Thesis: in normal times there is no continuous adaptive perfection within the groups of descent. Rather, the species are formed quite quickly on a scale of geological periods (i. e. in a few thousand years) and then remain extremely stable in the following millions of years. IV 187 Evolution/Gould: therefore, it must have an effect on the species level and not in Darwin's sense as a fight of the individuals: > punctuated equilibrium. >Evolution. Mass extinction: what was accumulated in normal times collapses, is dismantled and rearranged or newly started and spread. If the theory of the interrupted equilibrium is correct, then mass extinctions are even more catastrophic than previously assumed! If they can destroy up to 90% of all species, then by an unfortunate coincidence we lose some groups forever, while others in another world are better equipped. 1. N. Eldredge, S. J. Gould: Punctuated equilibria: an alternative to phyletic gradualism. In: T. Schopf (Ed), Models in Paleobiology, 82-115, San Francisco, (1972).	Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989
Equivalence	Quine	VI 76 Cognitive Equivalence: is the replacement of a sentence by another. One should not interfere with the empirical content. QuineVs: this is not sure because a representative function is possible - instead: synonymy of stimuly - (but this is only for occasion sentences). Afterwards cognitive synonymy is possible also for terms but not for timeless sentences. X 21ff Sentence Equivalence/QuineVs: in everyday language there is no basic order (like pixels in a photo) - you cannot assign the sensual proof clearly to individual sentences ((s) formulations) - Quine: Because of the network of theories - (>underdetermination of empiricism). II 66 Sentence Equivalence: when are two sentences considered equivalent? Frequent answer: if their use is the same! Or, if the stimuli are the same. Obviously it does not work that way! The two sentences cannot be uttered at the same time. The utterance of one must exclude that of the other! Moreover, at every opportunity when one of the two possible sentences has been uttered, there must be a reason, however trivial, for the utterance of one instead of the other! We are obviously asking too much when we are asking for all the irritations in question to be identical. In any case, one criterion would be illusory in practice if it demanded that the stimulus conditions are actually being compared. All in all, statements are practically unpredictable. The motives for the utterance of a sentence can vary inscrutably. Solution/Quine: >Cognitive Equivalence: II 67 Cognitive Equivalence: here we are spared speculations about motives and circumstances. Instead, we can arrange circumstances and say sentences ourselves. If you make a mistake with your verdicts, it does not matter, you will make a mistake with both sentences. II 68 Def Cognitive Equivalence: two occasional sentences are cognitively equivalent if they cause consent or rejection on every occasion. >Cognition/Quine. II 45ff Empirical equivalence of theories: is discovered when one discovers the possibility of reinterpretation. Both theories are true, but may be logically incompatible.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Ethics	Mackie	Stegmüller IV 169 Ethics/moral/Mackie: (similar to Field): our everyday understanding calls for a realm of moral characteristics, which should be as autonomous as material objects, but which do not exist. Moral error theory: (Field, Mackie): our search for a true-making realm of facts is caused by a semantic error. >Truth makers. The correct explanation of the truth conditions of moral judgments deprives those judgments of the valuation by everyday reasoning. (Due to the metaphysical hair-raising properties). >Truth condition, >Metaphysics. Ethics/Mackie: Thesis: there are no objective values (ontologically). >Ontology. Stegmüller IV 173 Objectivistic ethics/MackieVsObjectivism/Stegmüller: leads to strange entities like "Shall Be Done". MacKieVsintuitionism/VsEmotivism: Riddle of income: what is the link between the natural fact that murder is cruel and the moral fact that it is wrong? IV 179 Metaethical fallacy: - Conclusion of beliefs on their accuracy. >Belief, >Correctness, cf. >Naturalistic fallacy. IV 280 Morality/ethics/wisdom/generalizability/generalization/universalization/Mackie/Stegmüller: everyone wants to live according to his conscience - that tends to raise the tension between morality and self-interest . Under these circumstances, however, what is wise, does not coincide with, what would be wise if we do not have a moral sense. >Generalization. Stegmüller IV 263 Morality/Ethics/Mill: Mill believed in gradual change of human nature toward a "general love of man". StephenVsMill: "impartial charity" could also lead to Stalinism. Mackie ditto - MackieVsMill. IV 269 Freedom/Mill/Stegmüller: Thesis: The only justification for interfering with the freedom of others is to prevent harm to others. MackieVsMIll: This is too weak. Freedom of thought cannot be justified with this. Instead: "Principle of legitimate intervention. >Freedom.	Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Events	Einstein	Kanitscheider I 164 Event/General Theory of Relativity/Kanitscheider: every event is a point in four-dimensional space-time that can be described independently of all conceptual constructions such as vector bases and coordinate systems. Space-time/Einstein: somewhere between 10^-15 and 10^-33 cm the smooth manifold image of space-time breaks down. >Spacetime/Einstein, >Gravitation/Einstein, >Covariance/Einstein. Kanitscheider I 166/167 Def light cone/Kanitscheider: shows the character of Einstein's gravitational theory well: if we pick out a point e in space-time, it represents a physical event. The cone of light from e is then the story of a spherical flash of light that converges inward towards e and then diverges outward again from e. The cone of light reflects the local causal structure of the Relativity Theory. All allowed processes are represented by world lines lying inside or at most (in the case of photons and neutrinos) on the mantle of the cone. All events in the past cone can affect e and all in the future cone can be affected by e. The gravitation-free space-time of the Secial Relativity (matter-free universe) can be distinguished from the generally relativistic space-times filled with gravitational fields by the local light cone structure. In the SR (without matter) the cones are all arranged the same. In the General Relativity (with matter) they are inclined according to the strength of acting gravitational fields. (Effect on the causal structure and time by the gravitation of matter). >Special Relativity.	Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Events	Simons	I 129 Event/occurrents/Simons: events or processes are like continuants in time, but with temporal parts. No identity conditions can be specified. Continuants cannot be eliminated. Brutus-events cannot be seperated into individual events without reference to Brutus. I 131 Event/part/mereology/Simons: spatially and temporally extended events may have parts that are neither purely temporal nor purely spatial, e.g. the part of the football match which is attributable to a single player. Range/span/spn(e): a range or span is a spatiotemporal localization. "Being in": means within larger regions. "Covering": means covering exactly the part. Def spread/spr[e]: a spread is an exact space. Def spell/sp[e]: spell refers to an exact time. Atomic: if pan and spread = 0. Connected: two events are connected, if their span (consisting of span and spell) are topologically connected. Def temporal part: the temporal part contains all simultaneously occurring parts of the event (analog spatial part). Def phase: a phase has temporally related part. Def disc: a disc is a phase with duration 0. Def segment: a segment is a spatially related spatial part. Def section: a section is a segment with expansion 0. I 134 Sum/event/mereology/Simon: for sums of events, it is different than for sums of objects: if events are causally isolated, they cannot form a sum. However, they can be part of a wider whole (they may have an upper limit). Events do not satisfy the full mereology, but the weaker axioms. I 182 Product/events/Simons: problem: the products can exist interrupted. E.g. two objects could alternate between overlapping and separateness, e.g. light spots on a screen, e.g. two bodies share at a time certain members, at others times not. Problem: in the latter case the same product may arise again, but with other elements. >Interrupted Existence. I 183 The change of products requires topological terms. I 182 Coincidence/events: the lack of extensionality allows only one proof of coincidence instead of uniqueness. I 281 Event/reduction/reductionism/Forbes/Simons: events are open to a reduction in such a way as continuants are not, therefore, it is questionable whether there are irreducible truths de re about events ((s) that cannot be traced back to anything else). Essentialism: but as events are also real objects, there should also be essential truth about them. Problem: they are specified by descriptions. Simons: thesis: pro essentialism for events: e.g. the assassination of Franz Ferdinand by principle contains both essentially. E.g. bomb instead of firearm: is a different murder but not with swapped bullets. I 282 It is essential for an event that it is exactly part of those events, of which it is part at this point of time. Different: four-dimensionalism: it does not obey the essentialism. I 305 Event/continuants/Simons: event a: here a formula like "a < b" is complete. Continuants: here we need additionally a time index (with quantification): "ž(Et)[a Continuants.	Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Evolution	Darwin	Gould II 329 Darwin: 2 stages of evolution 1) Random range of variation (production of raw material) 2) Selection as a conventional force. Gould II 331 The official definition of evolution/Gould: Def Evolution: "Change of gene frequencies in populations". (The process of random increase or decrease in the gene frequency is called Def "genetic drift".) The new theory of neutralism suggests that many, if not most, of the genes in individual populations owe their frequency primarily to chance. --- Mayr I 235 Darwin (early): change by adaption. - Vs: adaption can never explain the enormous diversity of organic life, because there is no increase in the number of species. Mayr I 236 Darwin/Mayr: The Origin of Species: 5 Main Theories 1) Organisms are constantly evolving over time (evolution as such). 2) Different types of organisms are derived from a common ancestor. 3) Species multiply over time (speciation) 4) Evolution takes place in the form of gradual change. (GradualismVsSaltationism). 5) The evolutionary mechanism consists in the competition of subordinate unique individuals for limited resources that lead to differences in survival and reproduction (natural selection). >Selection. --- Gould IV 357 Evolution/Darwin: Thesis: no inner dynamics drives life forward! If the environment really did not change, it would not be impossible for evolution to come to a standstill crunchingly! Actually, the species lead their lives independently of each other! Their most important battles take place against climate, geological and geographical conditions. (>Species).	Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998
Evolution	Mayr	I 43 Evolution/Mayr: Unit of evolution is the population (or species) and not the gene or the individual. (MayrVsDawkins). >Species, >Genes, >R. Dawkins, >Genes/Dawkins, >Evolution/Dawkins. Def Integron/Mayr: An integron is a system created by integration of subordinate units on a higher level. Integrons evolve by natural selection. They are adapted systems at each level because they contribute to the fitness (suitability) of an individual. >Selection. I 183 Evolution/Mayr: Species is the decisive entity of evolution. I 230 Evolution/Progress/Mayr: Cohesion: an expression of the fact that the system of development has become very narrow. Evolution: proceeds very slowly in large, member-rich species, and very quickly in small peripheral isolated groups. >Speciation, >punctuated equilibrium/Eldredge/Gould. A start-up population with few individuals and therefore little hidden genetic variation can more easily assume a different genotype. Macroevolution: is most strongly determined by the geographical factor (isolation). I 234 Evolution/Mayr: the concepts: 1) Rapid evolution: (transmutationism): type jump. Even after Darwin some researchers (including his friend Huxley) could not accept the concept of natural selection and developed saltationist theories. 2) Transformational evolution (transformationism) gradual change of the ice to the organism. Ignored by Darwin. I 235 3) Variation Evolution (Darwin) I 235 Darwin (early): adaptation modification. Vs: can never explain the enormous variety of organic life, because it does not allow for an increase in the number of species. I 236 Darwin/Mayr: The Origin of Species: 5 Main Theories 1) Organisms are constantly evolving over time (evolution as such). 2) Different species of organisms are derived from a common ancestor. 3) Species multiply over time (speciation) 4) Evolution takes the form of gradual change. (GradualismVsSaltationism). >Gradualism, >Saltationism. 5) The evolutionary mechanism consists in the competition among numerous unique individuals for limited resources that leads to differences in survival and reproduction (natural selection). I 234 Evolution/Mayr: the concepts: 1) Rapid evolution: (transmutationism): type jump. Even after Darwin some researchers (including his friend Huxley) could not accept the concept of natural selection and developed saltationist theories. 2) Transformational evolution (transformationism) gradual change of the ice to the organism. Ignored by Darwin. I 235 3) Variation Evolution (Darwin) I 235 Darwin (early): adaptation modification. Vs: can never explain the enormous variety of organic life, because it does not allow for an increase in the number of species. I 236 Darwin/Mayr: The Origin of Species: 5 Main Theories 1) Organisms are constantly evolving over time (evolution as such). 2) Different species of organisms are derived from a common ancestor. 3) Species multiply over time (speciation) 4) Evolution takes the form of gradual change. (GradualismVsSaltationism). 5) The evolutionary mechanism consists in the competition among numerous unique individuals for limited resources that leads to differences in survival and reproduction (natural selection). >Selection. I 377 Evolution of life: a chemical process involving autocatalysis and a directing factor. Prebiotic selection. Cf. >St. Kauffman. I 237 Pasteur: proofed the impossibility of life in oxygen-rich atmosphere! In 1953, Stanley Miller grew amino acids, urea and other organic molecules in a glass flask by discharging electricity into a mixture of methane, ammonium, hydrogen, and water vapor. I 238 Proteins, nucleic acids: the organisms must form these larger molecules themselves. Amino acids, pyrimidines, puridine do not need to formed by the organisms themselves. I 239 Molecular biology: discovered that the genetic code is the same for bacteria, which do not have nuclei, as in protists, fungi, animals and plants. I 240 Missing link: Archaeopteryx: half bird half reptile. Not necessarily direct ancestor. Speciation: a) dichopatric: a previously connected area is divided by a new barrier: mountain range, inlets, interruption of vegetation. b) peripatrically: new start-up population emerges outside of the original distribution area. c) sympatric speciation: new species due to ecological specialization within the area of distribution. Darwin's theory of gradualism. >Gradualism. I 243 VsGardualism: cannot explain the emergence of completely new organs. Problem: How can a rudimentary wing be enlarged by natural selection before it is suitable for flying? I 244 Darwin: two possible solutions: a) Intensification of the function: E.g. eyes, e.g. the development of the anterior limbs of moles, whales, bats. b) Functional change: E.g. Antennae of daphia (water flea): additional function of the swimming paddle, which is enlarged and modified under selection pressure. E.g. Gould: Feathers probably first for temperature control before any animal could fly. Function/Biology: Functional differences are also related to behavioral patterns, e.g. feather cleaning. Competing theories on evolutionary change I 247 Salationism: Huxley later Bateson, de Vries, (Mendelists). The saltationist emergence of new species only occurs poyploidy and some other forms of chromosomal restructuring (very rare) during sexual reproduction. Teleological theories: assume that nature has a principle: Osbron's arsitogenesis, Chardin's omega principle. Should lead to perfection. >Teilhard de Chardin. Lamarck's Theories: Changes go back to use and non-use, environmental conditions. Until the 1930s! I 248 Def "soft inheritance" (acquired characteristics). Was refuted by genetics. Def "hard inheritance" (so-called "central dogma"): the information contained in the proteins (the phenotype) cannot be passed on to the nucleic acids (the genotype)! (Insight of molecular biology). I 256 Macroevolution: after saltationism, soft heredity and autogenesis, had been refuted with evolution, macroevolution had to be explained more and more as a phenomenon on the level of the population, i.e. as a phenomenon directly attributable to events and processes during microevolution. (Speciation: faster in isolation). (>Gould, Eldredge, 1971⁽¹⁾: "punctuated equilibrium", punctualism.) I 281 New: we know today that the cycles of herbivores elicit those of the predators and not vice versa! Coevolution: E.g. the Yucca moth destroys the plant's ovules by its larvae, but pollens the flowers. 1. N. Eldredge, S. J. Gould: Punctuated equilibria: an alternative to phyletic gradualism. In: T. Schopf (Ed), Models in Paleobiology, 82-115, San Francisco, (1972).	Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998
Evolution	Minsky	I 145 Evolution/Minsky: Evolution illustrates how processes can become enslaved by the investment principle. >Terminology/Minsky. Why do so many animals contain their brains inside their heads — as with fish, amphibians, reptiles, birds, and bats? This arrangement was inherited long before our earliest aquatic ancestor first crawled upon the land three hundred million years ago. For many of those animals — woodpeckers, for example — another arrangement might serve at least as well. But once the pattern of centralizing so many functions in the head was established, it carried with it great networks of dependencies involving many aspects of anatomy. Because of this, any mutation that changed any part of that arrangement would disrupt many other parts and lead to dreadful handicaps, at least in the short run of evolution. And because evolution is so inherently short-sighted, it would not help if, over longer spans of time, such changes could lead to advantages. >Obsolescence/Minsky.	Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003
Existence	Leibniz	Holz I 48/49 Existence/world/outside/reason/Leibniz: a sufficient reason for existence cannot be found in the series of facts, but also not in the whole set-up. Because also the composition, like the series needs a reason. Leibniz calls the existence reason "extramundan" because it cannot be found within the series (series reum). >Inside/outside/Leibniz, >World/Leibniz. Holz: that does not mean "outside the world"! Literally it means: Leibniz: "apart from the world, there is a dominating one." Not just like the soul in me but more like myself in my body, but of much higher reason. Existence reason/outside/outer/Leibniz: The reason for unity is the form determinateness of its all-round connection, not the linearity of a sequence or series. To this extent the existence reason of the world (as the totality of the connections) is not in the world, but it conditions it as a world. This "ultima ratio rerum" establishes the world and makes it". It is the connecting principle. >Totality/Leibniz. Holz I 70 Existence/Leibniz: of it we can have no idea, except through the perception of beings. Therefore, perception is the formal unity and universality of all the contents that enter into it. Holz I 71 "We have no other idea of existence than that we perceive that the things are perceived". Perception/Leibniz: provides now, as self-perception, the idea of the continuity and contiguity of existence as such (which is evident to us in the existence of our own self). >Perception/Leibniz, >Experience/Leibniz. Existence/Experience/Leibniz: Existence cannot be thought, it has to be experienced, because the sentence "non-being is" is contradictory. (However, only in relation to the whole). Existence/Being/Leibniz: the falsification of the universal negation allows the tautology "the being is"! In contrast to any particular tautological statement like e.g. "The House is the House", which is only a concept or essence definition and does not include existence. Only the universal proposition of being transcends from a logical definition into an ontological axiom. Since it is related to the whole, there can be only one case of necessity of existence, namely that of the whole. In the bodies themselves, there is no basis of existence, only in the total context, which ultimately includes the entire chain (all relationships in the universe). In the individual bodies you will never find the reason why they are like that and not different. Existence/Being/Leibniz: the falsification of the universal negation allows the tautology "the being is"! In contrast to any particular tautological statement like e.g. "The House is the House", which is only a concept or essence definition and does not include existence. Only the universal proposition of being transcends from a logical definition into an ontological axiom. Since it is related to the whole, there can only be one case of necessity of existence, namely that of the whole. >Necessity/Leibniz. In the bodies themselves, there is no reason of existence, only in the total context, which ultimately includes the entire chain (all relationships in the universe). In the individual bodies you will never find the reason why they are like that and not different. Holz I 72 Existence/Necessity/Identity/Being/Leibniz: the sentences "The being is" and "Only one being is necessary" are in a very specific follow-up ratio: The proposition "the being is" is an identical proposition, i.e. its opposite is contradictory. Thus existential and copulative (copula) use of "is" coincide here. One could also say "being is being" in order to make clear that the predicate is necessary for the subject. But: For example, "the stone is a being stone": this sentence is not identical, the being does not necessarily belong to the stone! The stone could only be thought of. Therefore, we need the perception to be convinced of existence. But this is not only true of bodies, but also of general, e.g. the genus human, it does not exist neccessarily. Holz I 73 The necessity of existence is valid only by the world as a whole. Holz I 75 Unity/Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: the ultimate ratio is necessarily only one reason, not a multiplicity, because it is the structure of the whole. Leibniz, therefore, does not need to sacrifice the multiplicity of things in order to reach the one and only world. The substance of Spinoza is replaced by him with the "harmonie universelle". Existence/Leibniz: Question: "Why is there anything at all and not rather nothing?". This question also remains in existence when we have secured the unity of the multiplicity. There could still be nothing! Holz I 76 Assuming that things must exist, one must also be able to specify the reason why they must exist in this way and not otherwise. Holz I 91 Existence/Leibniz: "Why is there something and not rather nothing?" 1. The reason why something exists is in nature: the consequence of the supreme principle that nothing happens without reason. 2. The reason must lie in a real being or in a cause. 3. This being must be necessary, otherwise a further cause would have to be sought. 4. So there is a cause! Holz I 92 5. This first cause also has the effect that everything possible has a striving for existence, since no universal reason for the restriction to only certain possible can be found. 6. Therefore it can be said that everything possible is intended for its future existence. (Because possibility is striving). 7. It does not follow from this that everything that is possible also exists. This would only follow if everything together were possible. 8. However, some possibilities are incompatible with others. 9. Thus arises the series of things that exists through the greatest range of all possibilities. 10. As fluids assume spherical form (largest content), there is in the nature of the universe a series with the greatest content. 11. Thus the most perfect exists, for perfection is nothing but the quantity of materiality. (Best of all worlds, >best world). 12. Perfection, however, is not to be found solely in matter, but in form or variety. Holz I 93 13. It follows from this that matter is not everywhere alike, but is made by the forms itself to be unequal. (There are further 12 theses on the level of consciousness theory). Holz I 120 World/Existenz/Leibniz: is as a whole contingent. There is no reason to see why this world must be. But we can see that it is a totality of all that is real and possible. That is, the principle of deduction fails at the first substance, which can no longer be made intelligible, or is no longer derivable by itself. Holz I 12 Question: Why is anything at all and not nothing? Although we cannot see why this world is, we can still see that this world is possible! And many other possible beside it as well. Then we can reformulate the question: Why does this world exist and not another? >Possible world/Leibniz, >Possibility/Leibniz.	Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994
Existence	Lewis	Schwarz I 30 Existence Definition/Lewis : is simply to be one of the things that are there. >"there are"/existence. Lewis IV 24 Actual/actuality/ontology/existence/"there is"//Lewis: Thesis: There are many things that are not actual - e.g. overcountable many people, spread over many possible worlds. - LewisVsCommon sense: not everything is actual. - >Difference between "exist"/"there is". >Actuality/Lewis. IV 40 Existence/Ontology/Possible Worlds/Lewis: let's say an individual exists from the point of view of a world when, and only when, it is the least restricted area normally capable of determining the WW in the world. (This is not about modal metaphysics). Cf. >Modal realism, >Metaphysical possibility/Lewis. This area will include all individuals in the world, not others. And some, but not all, sets (e.g. numbers). Schwarz I 20 Quantification/range/Schwarz: Unlimited quantifiers are rare and belong to metaphysics. Example "There is no God" refers to the whole universe. Example "There is no beer": refers to the refrigerator. Existence/Lewis/Schwarz: then there are different "modes of existence". Numbers exist in a different way than tables. Existence/Presentism: his statements about what exists are absolutely unlimited. Four-dimensionalism/existence: statements about what exists ignore past and future from his point of view. Cf. >Four dimensionalism. Schwarz I 30 Existence/Van Inwagen: (1990b⁽¹⁾. Chapter 19) Thesis: Some things are borderline cases of existence. LewisVsvan Inwagen: (1991⁽²⁾,80f,1986e⁽³⁾,212f): if you have already said "there is", then the game is already lost: if you say "something exists to a lesser degree". Def Existence/Lewis: simply means to be one of the things that exist. Schwarz I 42 Def Coexistence/Lewis: two things are in the same world, iff there is a space-time path from one to the other. Consequence: Possible worlds/Lewis: are space-time isolated! So there is also no causality between them. >counterparts , >counterpart relation, >counterpart theory. Schwarz I 232 Object/existence/ontology/Lewis/Schwarz: the question whether a thing exists in a world is itself completely determined by the distribution of qualitative properties and relations. Then the condition "what things exist there" is superfluous. With this we are with Lewis' "a priori reductionism of everything". (1994b⁽⁴⁾,291). Truthmaker/Lewis: Pattern of the instantiation of fundamental properties and relations. >Truth maker/Lewis. 1. P. van Inwagen [1990b]: Material Beings. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press 2. D. Lewis [1991]: Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell 3. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 4. D. Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (Hg.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431.	Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Existentialism	Camus	Brocker I 323 Existentialism/Camus: Camus never belonged to the Existentialists, but was mistakenly counted among them by the reception because he was friends with Sartre and Beauvoir. However, with L'étranger (1942) and La peste (1947) in literature and Le mythe de Sisyphe (1942) he acted similarly in concert in a philosophical way. With Les justes (1949) at the latest, however, Camus began a withdrawal movement from the hopes of a socialist revolution spreading among the group around Sartre. Hans-Martin Schönherr-Mann, „Albert Camus, Der Mensch in der Revolte (1951)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018.	Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Experience	Dilthey	Gadamer I 67 Experience/Dilthey/Gadamer: Something becomes an experience, as long as it was not only experienced, but its being experienced had a special emphasis, which gives it lasting meaning. What is in this way one, completely wins a new state of being in the expression of art. Dilthey's famous book title "Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung" (English: "The Experience and Poetry") brings this connection to a catchy formula. Indeed, it was Dilthey who first assigned a conceptual function to the word, which soon became a popular buzzword and was soon to rise to a term of such a plausible concept of value that many European languages have adopted it as a foreign word. Gadamer I 68 Dilthey's Goethe essay allows us (...) to look back (...) into the unconscious prehistory of the word, because this essay is available in the version of 1877⁽¹⁾ and in the later adaptation of "Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung" (1905). In this essay Dilthey compares Goethe with Rousseau, and in order to describe Rousseau's novel poetry from the world of his inner experiences, he uses the expression "the experience". In the paraphrase of a Rousseau text, the phrase "the experiences of earlier days"⁽²⁾ can be found. DiltheyVsRationalism: The coinage of the word obviously evokes the criticism of the rationalism of the Enlightenment, which in Rousseau's late times emphasized the concept of life. It is probably Rousseau's influence on German Classicism that set the standard for "being experienced" ("Erlebtsein") and thus enabled the formation of the word experience ("Erlebnis").⁽³⁾ Life/Idealism/Gadamer: The concept of life forms Gadamer I 69 also the metaphysical background that carries the speculative thinking of German idealism, and plays a fundamental role in both Fichte and Hegel, but also in Schleiermacher. In contrast to the abstraction of understanding as well as to the particularity of feeling or imagination, this concept implies the connection to totality, to infinity. Gadamer: This can be clearly heard in the tone that the word experience has had up to the present day. >Experience/Historical Development/Gadamer, >Given/Dilthey. Gadamer I 71 Dilthey/Gadamer: The entities of meaning we encounter in the humanities may be very strange and incomprehensible to us - they can be traced back to the last units of what is given in consciousness, which themselves no longer contain anything foreign, representational or in need of interpretation. They are the units of experience, which are themselves units of sense. Sensation/DiltheyVsMach/DiltheyVsCarnap/Gadamer: [It was of decisive importance (...) for Dilthey's] thinking (...) that as the last unit of consciousness not sensation or feeling is mentioned, as was taken for granted in Kantianism and still in the positivist epistemology of the 19th century up to Ernst Mach, but what Dilthey says for it. He thus limits the constructive ideal of a construction of knowledge from sensation atoms and opposes it with a sharper version of the concept of the given. >Life/Dilthey. Gadamer I 226 Experience/Dilthey/Gadamer: The question is (...) how the experience of the individual and his or her insight can be elevated to historical experience. History is no longer about interrelations that are experienced as such by the individual or are relived as such by others. Dilthey develops how the individual acquires a life context and from there seeks to gain the constitutive terms that are also important for the historical context and his recognition. In contrast to the categories of the knowledge of nature, these concepts are concepts of life. For the last prerequisite for the knowledge of the historical world, in which the identity of consciousness and object, Gadamer I 227 this speculative postulate of idealism, is still a demonstrable reality and is according to Dilthey the experience. Here is immediate certainty. For what is experience is no longer differentiated into an act, such as becoming one, and a content, that which one is becoming⁽³⁾. It is rather an inner being that cannot be further dissolved. Context/Dilthey: Already in his ideas "on descriptive and dissecting psychology" Dilthey had distinguished the task of deriving "the acquired context of the soul life" from the explanatory forms of the knowledge of nature(4). He had used the term structure in order to distinguish the experience of soul connections from the causal connections of the natural event. The logical characteristic of "structure" was, that here a whole of a relationship is meant, which is not based on the temporal sequence of being achieved, but on inner relationships. >Subject/Dilthey, >Interrelation/Dilthey. 1. Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie, Bd. X; cf. die Anmerkung Diltheys zu »Goethe und die dichterische Phantasie« (Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung, p. 468 ff.). 2. Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung, 6. Aufl., p. 219; cf. Rousseau, Les Confessions, Partie Il, Livre 9. The exact correspondence cannot be proven. Obviously it is not a translation, but a paraphrase of the description to be read in Rousseau's work. 3. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften Vll, 27f.; 230. 4. VII, 13a.	Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Experience	Hegel	Gadamer I 359 Experience/Dialectic Experience/Hegel/Aristoteles: [In Hegel] the moment of historicity wins its right. He thinks of experience as the accomplishing skepticism. We saw (>Experience/Gadamer) that the experience that one makes changes his whole knowledge. Strictly speaking, one cannot have the same experience twice. Gadamer I 360 [Hegel] has shown in his "Phenomenology of the Spirit" how the consciousness, which wants to become certain of itself, makes its experiences. The object of consciousness is the "in itself", but what is "in itself" can only be known in the way it presents itself to the experiencing consciousness. Thus, the experiencing consciousness experiences this very thing: the appearance of the object is "for us" itself⁽¹⁾. Hegel: "The dialectical movement which consciousness exercises on itself, both on its knowledge and on its object, in so far as the new true object springs from it, is actually that which is called experience. Gadamer: We recall the above and ask ourselves what Hegel, who obviously wants to say something here about the general nature of experience, means. HeideggerVsHegel: It seems to me that Heidegger was right to point out that Hegel here does not interpret experience dialectically, but conversely, what is dialectical, thinks from the essence of experience.⁽²⁾ Hegel/Gadamer: According to Hegel, experience has the structure of a reversal of consciousness and therefore it is a dialectical movement. >Dialectic/Hegel, >Dialectic, >Consciousness. Hegel pretends that what would otherwise be understood by experience is something else, provided that we generally "make the experience of the untruth of this first concept on another object" (and not so that the object itself changes). But it's only apparently different. In truth, the philosophical consciousness sees through what the experiencing consciousness actually does when it goes from one to the other: it reverses itself. So Hegel claims that the true essence of experience itself is to reverse itself in this way. Hegel/Gadamer: (...) Experience [is] first always the experience of nothingness. Faced with the experience of another object, both our knowledge and its object change. One now knows it differently and better, and i.e. the object itself "does not endure". The new object contains the truth about the old one. Consciousness/Hegel: What Hegel describes as experience in this way is the experience that the consciousness makes with itself. "The principle of experience contains the infinitely important provision that for accepting and keeping for oneself a content, the person him- or herself must be present, more specifically, that he or she must find such content united with the certainty of him- or herself⁽³⁾. Gadamer I 361 Reversal/Hegel/Gadamer: The concept of experience means just this, that such unity with oneself is only established. This is the reversal that happens to the consciousness of recognizing oneself in the stranger, the other person. >Subject-object problem, >Subject/Hegel, >Intersubjectivity. Absolute Knowledge/Hegel: According to Hegel, it is of course necessary that the path of experience of consciousness leads to a knowledge of oneself that no longer has any other, foreign, apart from oneself. For him, the completion of experience is the "science", the certainty of him- or herself in knowledge. The standard by which the person thinks experience is thus that of knowing oneself. Therefore, the dialectic of experience must end with the overcoming of all experience, which is achieved in absolute knowledge, that is, in the complete identity of consciousness and object. 1. Hegel, Phänomenologie, Einleitung (ed. Hoffmeister p. 73) 2. Heidegger, Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung (Holzwege p. 169). 3. Hegel, Enzyklopädie, § 7. Brandom I 156 Representation/Kant: involved in inferential relations between sentences - Hegel turns the order: resulting from experience as inferential activity.	Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Experience	Maturana	I 216 Experience / Maturana: all dimensions in the range of experiences exist in the language, i.e. as coordination of actions between observers. >Observation/Maturana, >Language, >Language and thought, >Thinking without language, >Thinking/Maturana. I 228 Experience / Maturana: primarily compared to explanation - all experience comes from nowhere - e.g. a car that passed us - Understanding: always happens in practice. >Understanding. I 311 Life practice and experience just happen. Explanations are superfluous. >Explanation/Maturana. I 352 Experience/Maturana: is content-free. In our experience, we encounter not things, not objects nor nature. We live in the experience of life practice as something that we produce ourselves at any moment. Cf. >language/Maturana, >Content.	Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000
Experimental Economics	Economic Theories	Parisi I 78 Experimental economics/Economic theories/Sullivan/Holt: [there is an] increasingly frequent interaction between two literatures: experimental economics and law and economics. In many ways, these literatures developed as siblings during the heady period of economic research spanning the 1960s and early 1970s. At about the same time that Ronald Coase (1960)⁽¹⁾, Guido Calabresi (1961)⁽²⁾, and Gary Becker (1968)⁽³⁾ were authoring seminal papers in the modern law-and-economics movement, acceleration of the experimental economics literature was under way with Vernon Smith’s (1962)⁽¹³⁾ experimental challenge to the established notion that theories of efficient, perfect competition were only relevant in idealized settings with large numbers of well-informed traders. Vernon Smith: Smith’s approach to studying market equilibrium was to create a market for an artificial commodity. Adaptations of the experimental approach to other settings quickly followed, eventually bleeding into the also-expanding literature of law and economics. >Experimental economics/Vernon Smith, >Law and Economics/Sullivan/Holt. Parisi I 79 Methodology: (... )the design and implementation of controlled experiments is about as fundamental to scientific inquiry as anything could be. Parisi I 80 Another intuitive use of experiments is as part of a more open-ended search for practical solutions to a novel problem. This is often the case in experiments designed for engineering applications. Economists use experiments in much the same ways as physicists or engineers. Preconditions/hypotheses: Economic theories are typically based on strong assumptions about rationality and foresight, and evaluated on the basis of elegance, sharpness of prediction, and consistency with basic intuition. Idealization/context: features of context, interpersonal frictions, and institutional detail are frequently omitted to achieve greater tractability and generality. Experiments: The resulting theories cry out for experimental tests, where differences in individual personality traits and propensities, limitations in attention and foresight, and other details too intricate to measure or model formally can be accounted for using random assignment and other experimental controls. Example: consider the question whether a cap on damages reduces the frequency of tort suits.* Randomization: randomization or careful selection algorithms could be used to partition the members of society into two identical (or at least nearly identical) groups: one group would remain under the status quo liability rules, while the other would be subject to a cap on damages. With absolutely nothing else changed, the researcher Parisi I 81 could collect data for a few months, and then compare the rates of tort suits in the two groups to see what causal effect the cap on damages had on the outcome of interest. Comparison/control: the researcher exploits control over the experimental environment to apply some treatment to only one of two otherwise identical groups of subjects. Subjects in the experiment then interact according to their normal self-interests, but those in the treatment group act under a slightly different set of rules than those in the control group. The experimenter measures observed behavior in both the treatment and control groups, and any difference in behavior reflects the causal treatment effect of interest. Experiments without control group: (...) economic experiments are sometimes designed simply to measure and document how subjects behave in a given market structure or incentive environment without reference to any control group. Examples include experiments that test the efficiency of an auction structure, such as an innovative proposal to allow bidding for combinations of spectrum licenses in a way that protects firms from overpaying for pieces of a fragmented network.* Variations: (...) economic experiments can also be structured to consider a range of treatment effects. An example is an experimental study of equilibrium price formation in a homogenous-good oligopoly as the number of producers drops from five, to four, to three, to two (e.g. Huck, Normann, and Oechssler, 2004⁽¹¹⁾; Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000⁽¹²⁾). In every case, the conceptual framework of the economics experiment is the same as that of experiments in any other field of science. Induced value theory: >Induced value theory/Economic theories. Experiments/methods: See >Experiments/Experimental economics, >Settlement Bargaining/Experimental conomics. * For economic experiments on the effect of damages caps on the rate of settlement, see Babcock and Pogarsky (1999)⁽⁴⁾ and Pogarsky and Babcock (2001)⁽⁵⁾. For broad surveys of various experimental designs in economics, see Davis and Holt (1993)⁽⁶⁾, Kagel and Roth (1995)⁽⁷⁾, and Holt (2007)⁽⁷⁾. For a practical approach to experimental design for economists, see Friedman and Sunder (1994)⁽⁸⁾. * See Goeree and Holt (2010)⁽¹⁰⁾ for a set of experiments used by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission to design and implement a major auction for spectrum licenses for the provision of wireless communications services in a geographic network. Even this paper, however, had a control treatment without package bidding opportunities, which showed problems that could arise if bidders were not permitted to submit "all or nothing" bids for combinations of licenses. 1. Coase, R. H. (1960). “The Problem of Social Cost.” Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1–44. 2. Calabresi, G. (1961). “Some Thoughts on Risk Distributions and the Law of Torts.” Yale Law Journal 70(4): 499–553. 3. Becker, G. S. (1968). “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.” Journal of Political Economy 76(2): 169–217. 4. Babcock, L. and G. Pogarsky (1999). “Damage Caps and Settlement: a Behavioral Approach.” Journal of Legal Studies 28(2): 341–370. 5. Pogarsky, G. and L. Babcock (2001). “Damage Caps, Motivated Anchoring, and Bargaining Impasse.” Journal of Legal Studies 30(1): 143–159. 6. Davis, D. D. and C. A. Holt (1993). Experimental Economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 7. Kagel, J. H. and A. E. Roth, eds. (1995). Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 8. Holt, C. A. (2007). Markets, Games, & Strategic Behavior. Boston, MA: Pearson Education, Inc. 9. Friedman, D. and S. Sunder (1994). Experimental Methods: A Primer for Economists. New York: Cambridge University Press. 10. Goeree, J. K. and C. A. Holt (2010). “Hierarchical Package Bidding: A Paper & Pencil Combinatorial Auction.” Games and Economic Behavior 70: 146–169. 11. Huck, S., H.-T. Normann, and J. Oechssler (2004). “Two Are Few and Four Are Many: Number Effects in Experimental Oligopolies.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 53(4): 435–446. 12.Dufwenberg, M. and U. Gneezy (2000). “Price Competition and Market Concentration: An Experimental Study.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 18: 7–22. 13. Smith, V. L. (1962). “An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior.” Journal of Political Economy 70(2): 111–137. Sullivan, Sean P. and Charles A. Holt. „Experimental Economics and the Law“ In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press.	Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Experiments	Gifford	Haslam I 233 Experiment/Gifford/Hamilton: Hamilton and Gifford (1976)⁽¹⁾ reported two experiments that used a common method. In the first of these, participants were presented with 39 statements that described either positive or negative behaviors undertaken by a member of one of two (unnamed) groups: Group A or Group B. These statements were of the form: ‘John, a member of Group A, is not always honest about small sums of money.’ See also McConnell et al. 1994⁽²⁾. Haslam I 234 The experiment’s cover story informed participants that ‘in the real world population, Group B is smaller than Group A. Consequently statements about Group B occur less frequently’. In line with this, of the 39 statements, 26 were about Group A and 13 were about Group B. Similarly, 27 statements described behaviours that had previously been judged to be positive and 12 described behaviours that had previously been judged to be negative. Positive and negative behaviours were ascribed to members of both the large group (A) and the small group (B). Results: The important feature of this set of stimulus statements is that the ratio of positive to negative statements is the same for both groups (i.e., 9:4). Because the groups are unnamed (and there are therefore no cues about the groups they might correspond to in society) there is no reason for the participants to have expectations about one group or the other. The key empirical question, then, was whether participants would see the two groups to be equally good, or whether they would judge one more positively than the other. Measuring: 1) Assignment measure: examined participant’s recognition of the statements. participants were presented with the 39 behaviours and asked to remember the group membership of the person who had exhibited each of the behaviours. Here, if the doubly distinctive behaviours (negative behaviours performed by Group B) were overrepresented in memory then one would expect negative behaviours attributed to the small group to be less likely to be forgotten and hence to be overestimated. 2) Frequency estimation: participants were asked to indicate the number of negative behaviours performed by members of the two groups. Again one would expect that if doubly distinctive behaviours are more likely to attract attention and be stored in memory, then participants would tend to overestimate the negative behaviours performed by the minority group. Haslam I 235 Results: Participants overestimated the number of undesirable behaviours performed by members of the minority group (B). Problems: Paired distinctiveness implies improved memory rather than the creation of false or distorted memories, and we would therefore expect that any effect on measures of memory would be rather muted. Solution/Gifford/Hamilton: introduction of a third measure: 3) Trait ratings: this was introduced instead of a memory task: it involved rating the two groups on a range of evaluative dimensions (e.g., indicating how popular, sociable, industrious and intelligent they were). This measure involves responses that are close to the everyday conception of stereotypes. It could show that paired distinctiveness impacts on actual judgments of groups – and indeed this is precisely what happened, with participants here rating Group A much more positively than Group B. A second study in which the majority of behaviours were negative rather than positive. This second study was important because it appears to rule out the possibility that the effect could be caused by a bias against small groups or something as simple as a preference for the label ‘Group A’ vs. ‘Group B’. Haslam I 236 For comments on the studies of Gifford and Hamilton see Richard Eiser’s Cognitive Social Psychology⁽³⁾, the 3rd edition of Eliot Smith and Diane Mackie’s Social Psychology (2007)⁽⁴⁾, Smith, 1991⁽⁵⁾; Spears et al., 1985⁽⁶⁾, 1986⁽⁷⁾. 1. Hamilton, D.L. and Gifford, R.K. (1976) ‘Illusory correlation in intergroup perception: A cognitive basis of stereotypic judgments’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 12: 392–407. 2. McConnell, A.R., Sherman, S.J. and Hamilton, D.L. (1994) ‘Illusory correlation in the perception of groups: An extension of the distinctiveness-based account’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67: 414–29. 3. Eiser, J.R. (1980) Cognitive Social Psychology. London: McGraw-Hill. 4. Smith, E.R. and Mackie, D. (2007) Social Psychology, 3rd edn. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press. 5. Smith, E.R. (1991) ‘Illusory correlation in a simulated exemplar-based memory’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 27: 107–23. 6. Spears, R., van der Pligt, J. and Eiser, J.R. (1985) ‘Illusory correlation in the perception of group attitudes’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48: 863–75. 7. Spears, R., van der Pligt, J. and Eiser, J.R. (1986) ‘Generalizing the illusory correlation effect’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51: 1127–34. Craig McGarty, „Stereotype Formation. Revisiting Hamilton and Gifford’s illusory correlation studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications	Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Experiments	Hamilton	Haslam I 233 Experiment/Gifford/Hamilton: Hamilton and Gifford (1976)⁽¹⁾ reported two experiments that used a common method. In the first of these, participants were presented with 39 statements that described either positive or negative behaviors undertaken by a member of one of two (unnamed) groups: Group A or Group B. These statements were of the form: ‘John, a member of Group A, is not always honest about small sums of money.’ See also McConnell et al. 1994⁽²⁾. Haslam I 234 The experiment’s cover story informed participants that ‘in the real world population, Group B is smaller than Group A. Consequently statements about Group B occur less frequently’. In line with this, of the 39 statements, 26 were about Group A and 13 were about Group B. Similarly, 27 statements described behaviours that had previously been judged to be positive and 12 described behaviours that had previously been judged to be negative. Positive and negative behaviours were ascribed to members of both the large group (A) and the small group (B). Results: The important feature of this set of stimulus statements is that the ratio of positive to negative statements is the same for both groups (i.e., 9:4). Because the groups are unnamed (and there are therefore no cues about the groups they might correspond to in society) there is no reason for the participants to have expectations about one group or the other. The key empirical question, then, was whether participants would see the two groups to be equally good, or whether they would judge one more positively than the other. Measuring: 1) Assignment measure: examined participant’s recognition of the statements. participants were presented with the 39 behaviours and asked to remember the group membership of the person who had exhibited each of the behaviours. Here, if the doubly distinctive behaviours (negative behaviours performed by Group B) were overrepresented in memory then one would expect negative behaviours attributed to the small group to be less likely to be forgotten and hence to be overestimated. 2) Frequency estimation: participants were asked to indicate the number of negative behaviours performed by members of the two groups. Again one would expect that if doubly distinctive behaviours are more likely to attract attention and be stored in memory, then participants would tend to overestimate the negative behaviours performed by the minority group. Haslam I 235 Results: Participants overestimated the number of undesirable behaviours performed by members of the minority group (B). Problems: Paired distinctiveness implies improved memory rather than the creation of false or distorted memories, and we would therefore expect that any effect on measures of memory would be rather muted. Solution/Gifford/Hamilton: introduction of a third measure: 3) Trait ratings: this was introduced instead of a memory task: it involved rating the two groups on a range of evaluative dimensions (e.g., indicating how popular, sociable, industrious and intelligent they were). This measure involves responses that are close to the everyday conception of stereotypes. It could show that paired distinctiveness impacts on actual judgments of groups – and indeed this is precisely what happened, with participants here rating Group A much more positively than Group B. A second study in which the majority of behaviours were negative rather than positive. This second study was important because it appears to rule out the possibility that the effect could be caused by a bias against small groups or something as simple as a preference for the label ‘Group A’ vs. ‘Group B’. Haslam I 236 For comments on the studies of Gifford and Hamilton see Richard Eiser’s Cognitive Social Psychology⁽³⁾, the 3rd edition of Eliot Smith and Diane Mackie’s Social Psychology (2007)⁽⁴⁾, Smith, 1991⁽⁵⁾; Spears et al., 1985⁽⁶⁾, 1986⁽⁷⁾. >Simplification/Psychological theories, >Stereotypes/Social psychology, >Illusory correlation/Gifford/Hamilton. 1. Hamilton, D.L. and Gifford, R.K. (1976) ‘Illusory correlation in intergroup perception: A cognitive basis of stereotypic judgments’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 12: 392–407. 2. McConnell, A.R., Sherman, S.J. and Hamilton, D.L. (1994) ‘Illusory correlation in the perception of groups: An extension of the distinctiveness-based account’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67: 414–29. 3. Eiser, J.R. (1980) Cognitive Social Psychology. London: McGraw-Hill. 4. Smith, E.R. and Mackie, D. (2007) Social Psychology, 3rd edn. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press. 5. Smith, E.R. (1991) ‘Illusory correlation in a simulated exemplar-based memory’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 27: 107–23. 6. Spears, R., van der Pligt, J. and Eiser, J.R. (1985) ‘Illusory correlation in the perception of group attitudes’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48: 863–75. 7. Spears, R., van der Pligt, J. and Eiser, J.R. (1986) ‘Generalizing the illusory correlation effect’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51: 1127–34. Craig McGarty, „Stereotype Formation. Revisiting Hamilton and Gifford’s illusory correlation studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications	Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Explanation	Mayr	I 99 Biology: Questions: e.g. unique events: "Why are there no hummingbirds in the old world"? E.g. "Where did Homo sapiens begin?" This leads to historical representation as the only possible form. This approach is fundamentally different from the explanation by means of causal laws. One can never categorically prove that a historical representation is "true". >Single-case causation, >Causality, >Causal explanation, >History, >Historiography. I 100 Reproducibility/Science: the uniqueness is not reserved for the living nature! E.g. each of the nine planets is unique. Every mountain range and stream has unique features on the earth. Hume/Science: cannot say anything satisfying about the cause of any unique phenomenon. >Causes, >Effect, >Causality/Hume. MayrVsHume: the historical representation can often explain unique events satisfactorily and sometimes even make verifiable predictions. >History/Mayr). I 101 History/Causation/Mayr: earlier events usually contribute causally to later ones. "Particularistic causality". I 103 Biology/explanation/Mayr: here we often find more than a causal explanation. Perhaps one has to explain most of the phenomena of biology even with several theories! A theory of science that cannot cope with pluralism is unsuitable for biology. >Theories. I 166 Explanation/biology: by direct causes: molecular biology, functional morphology, developmental biology, physiological genetics Indirect: evolutionary biology, classical genetics, ethology, systematics, comparative morphology, ecology. Problem: separation of morphology and genetics. Overlaps.	Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998
Explanation	Minsky	Minsky I 50 Explanation/parts/Minsky: The idea of a single, central Self doesn't explain anything. >Self, >I, Ego, Self, >Subject, >Person. This is because a thing with no parts provides nothing that we can use as pieces of explanation! Then why do we so often embrace the strange idea that what we do is done by Someone Else — that is, our Self? Because so much of what our minds do is hidden from the [other] parts of us that are involved with consciousness. >Consciousness, >Unconscious, >Actions, >Complexity, >Simplicity.	Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003
Explanation	Peacocke	I 71 Explanation/behavior/Peacocke: assuming, the spatial relations of a subject determine its settings. Problem: then we could explain the behavior solely from the accepted beliefs of the subject without mentioning the spatial relations. >Belief attitudes, >Spatial localization, >Behavior, >Behavioral explanation. I 81 Narrow explanation/Peacocke: E.g. someone has only the terms "there is an F", "there are two Fs", "There are three Fs" and "the Fs are numerically equivalent to the Gs". Then operations with higher numbers are explainable with these few terms. >Numerical equality. E.g. He actually arranges 20 pebbles and pieces of gold one to one. Then there is no difference in his intentional actions without one which is formulated with its few terms. >Intentions. Problem: such an unstructured ability would then be necessary and a priori. "Numerically equivalent"/numerical equality: can be treated as an unstructured operator of 2nd order. >Operators, >Description levels, >Levels/order, >Second Order Logic. I 133ff Explanation/Peacocke/Nozick: must rely on the nature of the object, not on the manner of givenness. - ((s) intension: is virtually equated with appearance- "nature" with "real object".) >Way of givenness, >Intensions. I 185 Action explanation/Peacocke: by properties of objects - explanation of thoughts: by specific markings - better: by the object itself. --- I 192 Action explanation/Peacocke: in the case of properties no specific object is meant: E.g. "red lamp", not "John's favorite color" - demonstrative: specific object, descriptively: can also be another object.	Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Extensions	Geach	I 231f Extension/Geach: E.g. to accept sense data as a more fundamental class of objects: If we know what sense data are, we can consider the extension of a predicate that is true only of sense data as identical to a particular physical object. >Sense data. But this does not reduce the object itself to a logical construction. - ... + ... If there is an object like the range of z for which F(z), then x belongs to this range only if F(x). I 235 Extension/Geach: it is a serious mistake to assume the objects formed the extension, they are only indirectly assigned to it as falling under the concept. I 243 Theory/extensional/Geach: no theory, no matter how rich, may contain all classes which are the extensions of their own sentences. >Semantic paradoxes. Cf. >Extensionality.	Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972
Exterior/interior	Maturana	I 98 Recursion/within/without/Maturana: through recursive distinctions the observer can operate as if he moves outside his circumstances. (Self-reference, application of operations an operations). >Recursion, >Self-reference. I 113f Unity/closed system/Maturana: within/without is only for the observer not by Input/Output describable, otherwise open system. >Systems, >Input/Output. I 121 Distinction from hallucination for nervous system not possible, part of the cognitive domain of the observer. >Observation/Maturana, >Nervous system. I 183 Definition Life/Maturana: in ontogenetic drift push through a range of interference, while a constantly changing niche is realized. >Life, >Niche. Living System/: operates only in the present. - It is open for the passage of molecules (parts of autopoietic systems). Purpose: is part of the observer. >Purposes. Living systems have no within/without - they are in the process of autopoiesis or disintegrated. >Autopoiesis. Environment: is not "used" by the system. - Instead living systems they bring their own niche out. I 194 Life is knowledge - living systems are cognitive systems. >Knowledge, >Cognition.	Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000
Exterior/interior	Reichenbach	Carnap VI 19 Knowledge/outside/Reichenbach: it is a strange fact that we carry out an assignment of two sets in the knowledge, one of which is defined in its elements only by the assignment.⁽¹⁾ >Circular reasoning, >Sets, >Definition, >Cognition, >Method. 1. H. Reichenbach, Relativitätstheorie und Erkenntnis, Berlin 1920, p. 38	Reich I H. Reichenbach The Philosophy of Space and Time (Dover Books on Physics) 1st English Ed. 1957 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982
External Economies	Rothbard	Rothbard III 1038 External Economies/Rothbard: An important case of external benefits is "external economies," which could be reaped by investment in certain industries, but which would not accrue as profit to the entrepreneurs. >External benefit/Rothbard. There is no need to dwell on the lengthy discussion in the literature on the actual range of such external economies, although they are apparently negligible. Protective tariff/Pigou: The suggestion has been persistently advanced that the government subsidize these investments so that "society" can reap the external economies. Such is the Pigou argument for subsidizing external economies, as well as the old and still dominant "infant industries" argument for a protective tariff. Free market/RothbardVsPigou: The call for state subsidization of external economy investments amounts to a third line of attack on the free market, i.e., that B, the potential beneficiaries, beforced to subsidize the benefactors A, so that the latter will produce theformer's benefits. For the first and second attac see Free market/economic theories. This (…) line is the favorite argument of economists for such proposals as government-aided dams or reclamations (recipients taxed to pay for their benefits) or compulsory schooling (the taxpayers will eventually benefit from others' education), etc. The recipients are again bearing the onus of the policy; but here they are not criticized for free riding. They are now being "saved" from a situation in which they would not have obtained certain benefits. RothbardVs: Since they would not have paid for them, it is diffcult to understand exactly what they are being saved from. Costs: The third line of attack therefore agrees with the first that the free market does not, because of human selfishness, produce enough external-economy actions; but it joins the second line of attack in placing the cost of remedying the situation on the strangely unwilling recipients. Coercion: If this subsidy takes place, it is obvious that the recipients are no longer free riders: indeed, they are simply being coerced into buying benefits for which, acting by free choice, they would not have paid. Rothbard III 1039 RothbardVs: The absurdity of the third approach may be revealed by pondering the question: Who benefits from the suggested policy? The benefactor A receives a subsidy, it is true. But it is often doubtful if he benefits, since he would otherwise have acted and invested profitably in some other direction. The state has simply compensated him for losses which he would have received and has adjusted the proceeds so that he receives the equivalent of an opportunity forgone. Therefore A, if a business firm, does not benefit. As for the recipients, they are being forced by the state to pay for benefits that they otherwise would not have purchased. How can we say that they "benefit"? A standard reply is that the recipients "could not" have obtained the benefit even if they had wanted to buy it voluntarily. Secondly, there is no reason Why the prospective recipients could not have bought the benefit. In all cases a benefit produced can be sold on the market and earn its value product to consumers.	Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Externalities	Buchanan	Boudreaux I 45 Externalities/Buchanan/Boudreaux/Holcombe: An externality exists when the actions of some people impose costs or convey benefits to others not involved in those actions. One common example is smoke from a factory that pollutes the air that nearby individuals breathe. The typical remedy suggested by economists is to tax the externality-generating activity, or if that is not feasible, to impose a regulation that reduces the external cost - the cost that’s imposed on third parties. Buchanan’s views on the existence of externalities conform to those of mainstream economists, but he departed from those scholars on the desirable remedies for externalities. He maintained that when externalities cause resources to be used inefficiently, individuals have an incentive to find ways to remedy these inefficiencies on their own. If some people impose external costs on others, both parties have an incentive to negotiate to remedy those inefficiencies on their own. Boudreaux I 46 Clubs/Buchanan: There is a parallel between Buchanan’s views on externalities and his theory of clubs - the latter being, (…) an explanation of how people voluntarily form clubs to produce collectively consumed goods. >Clubs/Buchanan. In both cases there is the prospect that resources can be allocated more efficiently, with all parties able to adjust their actions to create mutual gains. Because externalities are rarely global in nature, Buchanan’s discussion of federalism reveals that it is possible for people to have the option of moving out of jurisdictions where external costs are high and into jurisdictions where these costs are lower. Taxation: Also important to keep in mind is that using taxes or regulation to mitigate externalities brings its own problems. Buchanan noted that the theoretical remedies recommended by economists would work only if industries are what economists call “perfectly competitive.” >Taxation/Buchanan, >Perfect competition/Buchanan. Externalities might result in inefficiencies, but there is no guarantee that matters would be improved by a government-directed remedy. (…) this fact did not lead Buchanan to advocate against all government responses to pollution and other externalities, but it did prompt him to advise politicians and the public to temper their enthusiasm about governments’ abilities to improve matters with interventions. Costs: Of course, the problem with externalities, as the name suggests, is that resources are used in ways that some affected persons don’t bargain for - as happens, for example, when a factory emits pollutants into the air that is breathed by all the town’s residents and, thus, harms these residents. Boudreaux I 47 If (say) the town council had a clear property right in the town’s airspace, the factory could negotiate with the council and offer to pay to it a sum to compensate the town for whatever amount of pollution the factory emits. Such a bargain would benefit both the town and factory. Property: But if there is no clear definition of property rights in the air, then the factory will be reluctant to negotiate with the town council. It will likely simply continue to pollute without the town being compensated to bear the cost of the pollution. Clearly defined property rights thus promote bargaining to mutual advantage -that is, toward greater efficiency of resource use - while the absence of such rights stymies such bargaining. Buchanan/Tullock: In The Calculus of Consent, Buchanan and Tullock say „If property rights are carefully defined, should not the pure laissez-faire organization bring about the elimination of all significant externalities? … After human and property right are initially defined, will externalities that are serious enough to warrant removing really be present? Or will voluntary co-operative arrangements among individuals emerge to insure the elimination of all relevant external effects?“ (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962/1999⁽¹⁾: 44) Boudreaux I 48 Politics: A central reason for Buchanan’s caution in recommending government intervention to remedy externalities was his recognition that democratic politics carries with it a built-in externality. If one thinks of an externality as a third-party effect - that is, some people impose costs unilaterally on others - one should then see that when collective decisions are made by majority rule, the majority imposes external costs on the minority. The majority gets what it wants, forcing the minority to accept what it, the minority, does not want. This reality further reinforced Buchanan’s reluctance to recommend government remedies for externalities. Government action would replace one externality with another. This point warrants emphasis: politics contains a built-in externality. Government policies apply to everyone, whether or not they agree, unlike market exchange which only takes place if and when all parties to the exchanges agree. The nature of government means that whatever it does, it unilaterally imposes costs on some people. As Buchanan explains, „The minimum-size effective or dominating coalition of individuals, as determined by the voting rule, will be able to secure net gains at the expense of other members of the political group.… In the simple majority-rule model, this involves, in the limit, fifty plus percent of the total membership in the dominating coalition and fifty minus percent, of the total membership in the losing or minority coalition.“ (Buchanan, 1999⁽²⁾: 64-65) Buchanan’s point is partly theoretical. This outcome could happen. But his point is also partly practical. If democratic political institutions could be used in this way, individuals then in fact have incentives to use them this way because they can. It is naïve to think that some people can possess the power to manipulate the political process for their own gain without understanding that some people actually will exercise this power in that way. Boudreaux I 49 Government action/Buchanan: This reasoning points directly to Buchanan’s overall approach to analyzing political action. Economists, even in the twenty-first century, tend to evaluate government action as if government officials apolitically implement optimal public policies. Economists derive the theoretical optimal allocation of resources and then assume that government will act to achieve this optimal allocation. BuchananVsTradition: Buchanan’s fundamental contribution was to note that just as resources are not typically allocated in markets with perfect efficiency, neither are they typically allocated by government with perfect efficiency. >Government policy/Buchanan. Boudreaux I 51 In drawing a parallel between market failure and government failure, Buchanan’s insight is that democratic political systems create their own inevitable externalities. Some people can use the system to impose costs on others. >Government failure/Buchanan. 1. Buchanan, James M., and Gordon Tullock (1962/1999). The Calculus of Consent. Liberty Fund. 2. Buchanan, James M. (1999). The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty. Liberty Fund.	EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Boudreaux I Donald J. Boudreaux Randall G. Holcombe The Essential James Buchanan Vancouver: The Fraser Institute 2021
Extraversion	Eysenck	Corr I 97 Extraversion/Eysenck/Deary: Eysenck’s (1957)⁽¹⁾ general ideas about Extraversion’s basis in individual differences in cortical arousability were already stated ten years before, and had an acknowledged basis in McDougall’s (1929)⁽²⁾ ideas that were contemporaneous with Allport’s own earliest writings⁽³⁾⁽⁴⁾. >G. Allport. McDougall and Eysenck mght not have been right (there is hardly a single replicable discovery discovery concerning the biological basis of personality that has arisen from these pioneering ideas), but their scientific instincts were correct: that traits were unsatisfying fare unless one attacked the problem from both the outside and the inside at the same time. >Method, >Personality traits. 1. Eysenck, H. J. 1957. The dynamics of anxiety and hysteria. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 2. McDougall, W. 1929. The chemical theory of temperament applied to Introversion and Extroversion, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 24: 293–309 3. Allport, G. W. 1927. Concepts of trait and personality, Psychological Bulletin 24: 284–93 4. Allport, G. W. 1931. What is a trait of personality?, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 25: 368–72 Ian J. Deary, “The trait approach to personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press Corr I 353 Extraversion/Eysenck: Eysenck’s (1967)⁽¹⁾ personality theory states that individuals differ with respect to the sensitivity of their ARAS (Ascending Reticular Activating System), which serves to dampen or amplify incoming sensory stimulation. Those of us with an active ARAS easily generate cortical arousal, whereas those of us with a less active ARAS generate cortical arousal much more slowly. Those of us with an underactive ARAS are, generally, less cortically aroused and are not close to this optimal point of arousal; therefore, we seek out more stimulation, and we benefit from stimulation that we encounter: we are extraverts. Most people are in the middle range of these extreme values (i.e., ambiverts). >Conditioning/Eysenck, >Conditioning/Gray. 1. Eysenck, H. J. 1957. The dynamics of anxiety and hysteria. New York: Preger Philip J. Corr, „ The Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory of Personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Fairness	Rawls	I 108 Fairness/Principles/Rawls: our principles of justice concerned institutions and the basic structure of a society. When it comes to individuals, the principle of fairness is relevant. I 110 Individuals/Principles: this is, among other things, about what obligations we have. However, a certain basic structure of a company to be established is assumed from the outset. Rawls: here it can be interpreted without major distortions in such a way that the duties and tasks presuppose a moral conception of institutions, and that the content of equitable institutions must therefore be determined before demands can be made on individuals. I 111 Right/legality/conformity/Rawls: intuitively, we can say that the notion of being right is synonymous with one's being consistent with those principles which, in a society's initial state, would be recognised as being applied to the relevant problems. If we accept that, we can equate fairness with rightness. Individuals/fairness: first of all, we must distinguish between obligations and natural duties. >Duties, >Natural duties. Principle of fairness: requires a person to fulfil his obligations as established by an institution, under two conditions: 1) The institution is fair, i. e. the institution fulfils the two principles of justice >Principles/Rawls. I 112 2) The arrangement has been voluntarily approved. This means that those who have agreed have a right to expect this from others who benefit from this arrangement⁽¹⁾. >Reciprocity. It is wrong to assume that justice as fairness or contract theories would generally follow that people have an obligation to unjust regimes. >Justice. VsLocke/Rawls: Locke in particular was wrongly criticized for this: the necessity of further background assumptions was overlooked⁽²⁾. >J. Locke, >Contract Theory, >Contracts. 1. See H.L.A. Hart „Are There Any Natural Rights?“, Philosophical Review, Vol. 64, (1955) p. 185f. 2. See Locke's thesis that conquest does not create justice: Locke, Second treatise of Government, pars. 176, 20.)	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Fear	Developmental Psychology	Corr I 181 Fear/developmental psychology/psychological theories/Rothbart: When infants are four months of age, their distress and body movement to laboratory-presented stimulation predict later fear and behavioural inhibition. Positive affect and body movement, on the other hand, predict later surgency. Developmental research to date indicates that the reactive systems of emotion and orienting are in place before the development of executive effortful attention (Posner and Rothbart 2007⁽¹⁾; Rothbart and Bates 2006⁽²⁾). >Stages of development, >Stimuli, >Reaction range. The onset of fear or behavioural inhibition in the last quarter of the first year of life appears to work in opposition to the infant’s approach tendencies, in that some infants who formerly rapidly approached novel objects are now slowed in their response to novel stimuli, and may not approach at all. They may also show distress to threatening objects (Rothbart 1988)⁽³⁾. As with approach tendencies, individual differences in fearful behavioural inhibition show considerable stability across childhood and even into adolescence (Kagan 1998)⁽⁴⁾. Longitudinal research has reported stability of fearful inhibition from two to eight years and from the pre-school period to age eighteen. It has also been related to later development of internalizing disorders such as anxiety (Fox 2004⁽⁵⁾; Kagan, Snidman, Zentner and Peterson 1999⁽⁶⁾). Corr I 182 Fear-related control of behaviour can be seen in the early development of conscience (Kochanska 1997⁽⁷⁾; Kochanska, Aksan and Joy 2007⁽⁸⁾), with fearful children more likely to show early development of conscience. In addition, fearful children whose mothers use gentle discipline, presumably capitalizing on the child’s tendency to experience anxious states, are especially likely to develop internalized conscience. Corr I 185 Fear is also associated with elevations in cortisol when the child is in less optimal care, but no such association is found when the child’s care-giver is sensitive and responsive (Gunnar and Donzella 2002⁽⁹⁾). 1. Posner, M. I. and Rothbart, M. K. 2007. Educating the human brain. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association 2. Rothbart, M. K. and Bates, J. E. 1998. Temperament, in W. Damon (Series ed.) and N. Eisenberg (Vol. ed.), Handbook of child psychology, Vol. III, Social, emotional, and personality development, 5th edn, pp. 105–76. New York: Wiley 3. Rothbart, M. K. 1988. Temperament and the development of inhibited approach, Child Development 59: 1241–50 4. Kagan, J. 1998. Biology and the child, in W. Damon (Series ed.) and N. Eisenberg (Vol. ed.), Handbook of child psychology, vol. III, Social, emotional and personality development, 5th edn, pp. 177–235. New York: Wiley 5. Fox, N. A. 2004. Temperament and early experience form social behaviour, in S. G. Kaler and O. M. Rennert (eds.), Understanding and optimizing human development: from cells to patients to populations, 1st edn, pp. 171–8. New York: New York Academy of Sciences 6. Kagan, J., Snidman, N., Zentner, M. and Peterson, E. 1999. Infant temperament and anxious symptoms in school age children, Development and Psychopathology 11: 209–24 7. Kochanska, G. 1997. Multiple pathways to conscience for children with different temperaments: from toddlerhood to age 5, Developmental Psychology 33: 228–40 8. Kochanska, G., Aksan, N. and Joy M. E. 2007. Children’s fearfulness as a moderator of parenting in early socialization: two longitudinal studies, Developmental Psychology 43: 222–37 9. Gunnar, M. R. and Donzella, B. 2002. Social regulation of the cortisol levels in early human development, Psychoneuroendocrinology 27: 199–220 Mary K. Rothbart, Brad E. Sheese and Elisabeth D. Conradt, “Childhood temperament” in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Features	Mayr	I 186 Def Feature/Biology/Mayr: a feature is a distinguishing property or attribute. Is arbitrarily chosen by the taxonomists. It often led to very strange "unnatural" groups. At the end of the 18th century, attempts were made to replace the Linné system with a more natural one. Cf. >Properties, >Attributes.	Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998
Fictions	Gadamer	I 138 Literature/Fiction/Gadamer: For the poet, free invention is always only one side of a mediocrity bound by given validity. He does not freely invent his fable, no matter how much he imagines it. Rather, to this day something remains of the old foundation of the mimesis theory. >Mimesis. The free invention of the poet is the representation of a common truth which also binds the poet. Other forms of art are not different, especially the fine arts. The aesthetic myth of the freelance imagination, which transforms experience into poetry, and the cult of the genius that belongs to it, only attest that in the 19th century the mythical-historical traditional good is no longer a self-evident possession. But even then the aesthetic myth of imagination and ingenious invention represents an exaggeration that cannot withstand what is real. Still, the choice of material and the design of the chosen material does not originate from a free will of the artist and is not merely an expression of his inwardness. Rather, the artist appeals to prepared minds and chooses for it what promises him effect. He himself is in the same tradition as the audience he means and collects. In this sense, it is true that he is not an individual, a thinking consciousness that needs to know explicitly what he is doing and what his work says. It is never just a strange world of magic, intoxication, dream, to which the player, creator or spectator is enraptured, but it is still his own world, to which he is actually transferred by recognizing himself deeper within it. There remains a continuity of meaning that unites the work of art with the world of existence and from which even the alienated consciousness of an educational society never completely detaches itself. >Literature, >Education, >Second Nature, >Cultural Tradition, >Cultural Values, >Culture, >Society.	Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Finitism	Kanitscheider	I 154ff Einstein universe/Kanitscheider: The Einstein universe is static, cylindrical, all clocks can be synchronized. Worldwide simultaneity can be defined here. First relativistic model, but could not do justice to the red shift discovered a short time later! The Einstein universe led to a revival of finitism. Here the Riemannian idea of the compatibility of finiteness and unboundedness is realized. Finite space content, but no outer limits, medieval idea. Every point can be regarded as a center. ((s) Three-dimensional space is curved like the two-dimensional surface of a cylinder). Gravitation: conceived as a metric field, is determined by its properties in the infinitely small. However, the Riemannian idea of infinitesimal geometry, largely realized in RT, entails the uncertainty according to which guiding principles the extension to a universal metric and topology should proceed. The Minkowski space (Minkowski world) is pseudo-Euclidean in the small and medium size range. >Minkowski space. I 157 It is the consequence of the geometrization of the dynamics, the absorption of all inertial forces into the metric guiding field, that the physical geometry gets purely local character. Proximity character of geometry: Consequence: multiplicity of the topological coherence forms with which the local metric is compatible! If one identifies every point of the spherical space with the diametral point, one arrives at the elliptic space. (In three-dimensional space even infinitely many closed and finite elliptic space forms). Two-dimensionally, the spherical can be thought of as a one-sided surface on which a cog maintains its sense of rotation. On the elliptic surface it has the sense of rotation reversed! From this follows that the center of the wheel has already covered a closed path after passing through a semicircle.	Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Firms	Coase	Kiesling I 9 Firms/Coase/Kiesling: (…) why do firms exist? Coase observed the contrast between markets, where individual actions and decisions are coordinated by the decentralized price system, and firms, where actions and decisions are coordinated by internal hierarchy and central planning. If spot markets using the price system to coordinate production can maximize economic welfare, why is not all production done through spot market transactions? Kiesling I 10 These two options present alternative institutional structures for the organization of production. >Firms/Neoclassical economics. Firms/Coase: (…) [Firms] exist in order to address - specifically, to keep to a minimum - transaction costs. Coase’s answer unleashed a stream of influential research that is still generating new ideas today (although he did not use that phrase in his 1937 article, calling them “marketing costs” instead). Coase defined transaction costs as “the cost of using the price system” (1937⁽¹⁾: 390). A more general definition is the cost of establishing and maintaining property rights (Allen 1999⁽²⁾: 898). As examples of transaction costs, Coase included the task of discovering what market prices are and the cost of negotiating a separate contract for each transaction. Institutions emerge to reduce those costs, but they can never be eliminated entirely. Firms still use contracts, but they are of longer duration and of a different nature: Kiesling I 11 „It is true that contracts are not eliminated when there is a firm but they are greatly reduced. A factor of production (or the owner thereof) does not have to make a series of contracts with the factors with whom he is co-operating within the firm, as would be necessary, of course, if this co-operation were as a direct result of the working of the price mechanism. For this series of contracts is substituted one.“ (1937⁽¹⁾: 391) Organizing and using managerial hierarchy within the firm has costs, so the decision of what transactions to perform internally involves weighing the tradeoff between transaction costs and organization costs. That was Coase’s fundamental insight. >Transaction costs/Coase. Contracts/employment/time: Consider how costly it would be to have to settle on a new contract each day for each worker who comes to the shop, and for that contract to specify the tasks to be performed. Longer-term employment contracts that make the employee part of the firm typically economize on transaction costs, enabling the shop owners to schedule and plan production and the workers to schedule tasks based on more stable expectations and routines. Longer-term employment contracts also encourage firms to invest in worker training, making them more productive. But shop owners may decide not to bring all of the relevant transactions into the firm. Kiesling I 12 The firm, simply responding to profit incentives, tends to discover and implement the lowest transaction costs solution, (…). The firms contract with others for functions that are cheaper to accomplish through markets than by organizing internally. This paradigm may seem basic, but it has sparked a wide range of research and created new fields of inquiry in economics, management, and political science. If a firm is successful and faces sufficient demand to expand, it can expand by increasing the amount of its production, by expanding into related product lines (product differentiation), or by merging with a competitor (horizontal integration). It can also integrate backward by producing its own inputs, or forward into more finished goods and marketing (vertical integration). Coase argued that the comparison between transaction costs and organization costs determine the size and boundaries of the firm as well as the extent of vertical integration. „[A] firm will tend to expand until the costs of organising an extra transaction within the firm become equal to the costs of carrying out the same transaction by means of an exchange on the open market or the costs of organising in another firm.“ (1937⁽¹⁾: 395) >Specialization/Adam Smith. 1. Coase, Ronald H. (1937). The Nature of the Firm. Economica 4, 16. 386-405. 2. Allen, Douglas W. (1999). Transaction Costs. Encyclopedia of Law and Economics.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Forces	Attachment Theory	Corr I 248 Forces/attachment theory/Bowlby/Shaver/Mikulincer: According to Bowlby (1973)⁽¹⁾, the development of adult attachment patterns is constrained by two forces: (a) ‘homeothetic forces’ (Waddington 1957)⁽²⁾ that buffer changes in attachment patterns from infancy to adulthood, making it less likely that they will deviate from early working models, and (b) ‘destabilizing forces’ that encourage deviation from early working models given powerful experiences that demand revision and updating of attachment representations. Corr I 247 Bowlby borrowed these concepts from Waddington’s (1957)⁽²⁾ epigenetic landscape model. Attachment theory/Shaver/Mikulincer: Attachment research has provided evidence for both homeothetic and destabilizing forces. With regard to homeothetic forces, several studies have examined the stability of attachment patterns in infancy (as assessed in the Strange Situation (>Situation/Ainsworth); Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters and Wall 1978)⁽³⁾ over periods ranging from one month to twenty years. Fraley (2002)⁽⁴⁾ meta-analysed these studies and found moderate levels of stability in attachment classification: a mean correlation of .35 for studies that examined attachment patterns at one and four years and a slightly lower correlation for studies comparing attachment in adolescence with attachment in the Strange Situation years earlier. >About the Attachment theory. 1. Bowlby, J. 1973. Attachment and loss, vol. II, Separation: anxiety and anger. New York: Basic Books 2. Waddington, C. H. 1957. The strategy of the genes. London: Allen and Unwin 3. Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E. and Wall, S. 1978. Patterns of attachment: assessed in the Strange Situation and at home. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 4. Fraley, R. C. 2002. Attachment stability from infancy to adulthood: meta-analysis and dynamic modeling of developmental mechanisms, Personality and Social Psychology Review 6: 123–51 Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Developmental, psychodynamic and optimal-functioning aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Forgeries	Goodman	III 43 Even with trompe l'oeuil the probability rarely rises above zero, because to see a picture as a picture, excludes, to mistake it for something else. >Deceptions, >Seeing, >Art. III 103 No one can determine by mere looking at the pictures that no one has ever been able or will be able to tell them apart by mere looking at them. III 103 If you set the difference beyond the what is perceptible by mere looking at them, one admits that anything beyond this range constitutes a difference. III 105 And the fact, that I might be able in the future to perceive a difference which I do not perceive now, constitutes now for me a significant aesthetic difference between the two! This may contribute to the development of my ability. >Perception, >Distinctions. III 108/09 When in fact, no difference can be perceived, then the existence of a difference is based alone on something that can be proved (or not) by other means than looking at it. III 120 Def forgery: Goodman: the forgery of a work of art is an object that wrongly pretends to have a history, which is essential for the original.	G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997
Formalism	Thiel	I 20 Formalism/Thiel: Carries out, so to speak, the "linguistic turn" in mathematics. It is now asked what the object of the mathematician's work is. Rules for actions. Symbols are replaced by others. The formalist does not ask for the "meaning". Mathematics: Theory of formalisms or formal systems. >Formalism. In addition to this "calculus-theoretical variant" of formalism, there is the "structure-theoretical variant". (>Hilbert). Different formal systems can be interpreted as valid from exactly the same mathematical object domains. We can call this their "description" by the formal systems. >Mathematical entities. I 279 Formalism/Geometry/Hilbert/Thiel: In 1899 Hilbert had used terms such as point, straight line, plane, "between", etc. in his foundations of geometry, but had understood their meaning in a previously unfamiliar way. It should not only enable the derivation of the usual sentences, but in its entirety should also determine the meaning of the terms used in them. I 280 Later this was called "definition by postulates", "implicit definition". >Definitions, >Definability, The terms point, straight line, etc. should at most be a convenient aid for mathematical understanding. FregeVsHilbert: clarifies in his correspondence that his axioms are not statements but forms of statements. >Statement form. He contested the fact that their combination gave meaning to the terms appearing in them. Rather a (in Frege's terminology) "second level term" is defined, today one would also say a "structure". HilbertVsFrege: N.B.: Hilbert's approach is precisely that the meaning of "point", "straight line" etc. is left open. Frege and Hilbert could have agreed on it, but did not. Axioms/Frege/Thiel: an axiom should be a simple statement at the beginning of a system. Axioms/Hilbert: forms of statement that together define a discipline. This has developed into the "sloppy" way of speaking, e.g. "straight line" in sphere geometry is a great circle. Thiel I 342 Intuitionism and formalism are often presented as alternatives to logicism. The three differ so strongly that a comparison is even difficult. I 343 Formalism/Thiel: 1. "older" formalism: second half 19th century creators Hankel, Heine, Thomae, Stolz. "formal arithmetic," "formal algebra". "The subject of arithmetic are the signs on the paper itself, so that the existence of these numbers is not in question" (naively). Def "principle of permanence": it had become customary to introduce new signs for additional numbers and then to postulate that the rules valid for the numbers of the initial range should also be valid for the extended range. Vs: this should be considered illegitimate as long as the consistency is not shown. Otherwise a new figure could be introduced, and one could simply postulate e.g. § + 1 = 2 and § + 2 = 1. This contradiction would show that the "new numbers" do not really exist. This explains Heine's formulation that the "existence is not at all in question". I 343/'344 Thomae treated the problem as "rules of the game" in a more differentiated way. FregeVsThomae: he did not even specify the basic rules of his game, namely the correspondences to the rules, figures, and positions. This criticism of Frege was already a forerunner of Hilbert's theory of proof, in which mere series of signs are also considered with disregard for their possible content on their creation and transformation according to given rules. I 345 HilbertVsVs: Critics of Hilbert often overlook the fact that, at least for Hilbert himself, the "finite core" should remain interpreted in terms of content and only the "ideal" parts that cannot be interpreted in a finite way have no content that can be directly displayed. This note is methodical, not philosophical. For Hilbert's program, "formalism" is also the most frequently used term. Beyond that, the concept of formalism has a third sense: namely, the concept of mathematics and logic as a system of schemes of action for dealing with figures free of any content. HilbertVsFrege and Dedekind: the objects of number theory are the signs themselves. Motto: "In the beginning was the sign." I 346 The term formalism did not originate from Hilbert or his school. Brouwer had stylized the contrasts between his intuitionism and the formalism of the Hilbert School into a fundamental decision. Brouwer: his revision of the classical set and function concept brings another "Species of Mathematics". Instead of the function as assignment of function values to arguments of the function, sequences of election actions of a fictitious "ideal mathematician" who chooses a natural number at every point of the infinitely conceived process take place, whereby this number may be limited by the most different determinations for the election action, although in the individual case the election action is not predictable.	T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995
Forms	Gould	I 44 Form/nature/physics/Gould: D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson (1942) prophetically argued that organisms are directly formed by physical forces. ⁽¹⁾ I 260 Form/life/organism/evolution/physics/Gould: stability is created by the fact that a living being is large enough to penetrate into an area where gravity surpasses the forces that take place on the surface. As the ratio of surface to volume decreases with growth, an increasing size is the safest way into this area. The Earth's physical environment contains numerous habitats, which are only available to organisms that are larger than single-celled organisms. The multicellularity probably originated in several places independently of each other. It has the two main features of analogue similarity: 1. It is relatively easy to reach and both highly adaptable and flexible as well as 2. the only possible route to the benefits it brings. With the exception of ostrich eggs, individual cells cannot grow very large. I 261 The multicellularity has probably arisen even within the individual kingdoms several times. Most biologists believe that it occurs in plants and fungi through amalgamation. These organisms are the descendants of protist colonies. (Protists: unicellular organisms, see Terminology/Gould). For example, some Volvox colonies with a fixed number of cells are regularly arranged. The cells may differ in size and the reproductive function may be limited to those of them located at a pole. I 264 Larger animals have such a low ratio of outer surface to volume that they need to form internal organs to increase the available surface area. I 288 Ratio of surface to volume: the ratio of surface to volume is very high in small organisms. Heat is generated by the volume of the body and radiated at its surface. Therefore warm-blooded animals have a particularly high energy requirement. Field mice, for example, must eat all the time. The ratio was so low for the large dinosaurs that they could get by without an insulation layer. I 311 Form/life/physics/size/Gould: the character of Morgan in E. L. Doctorow's "Ragtime" was wrong when he thought that large mammals were geometric copies of their smaller relatives. Elephants have relatively larger brains and thicker legs than mice. He is right in that larger animals are often similar to smaller relatives in the same group. Galileo already gave a classic example: the strength of a leg is a function of the cross-section. The weight that the legs have to carry varies with their volume. In order for the bodily functions to remain the same, animals must change their form when they become larger: this is the "scaling theory". E. g. from crab spider to tarantula, the scale of relatives reaches up to a thousand times the body weight of the smallest specimen. Here too, the scale runs regularly: the duration of the heartbeat increases only 4/10 times as fast as in relation to the body weight. I 312 Small animals move through life much faster than large ones, their heart beats faster, they breathe more frequently, their pulse is faster, their "fire of life "burns" faster: in mammals, the metabolic rate increases by only three quarters as fast as the body weight. Smaller ones tend to live shorter than large ones. I 313 However, the homo sapiens lives much longer than a comparable mammal of the same size: See Neoteny/Gould. The importance of the astronomical time is by no means to be denied; animals must measure it in order to survive. I 315 Breathing time and heartbeat increase about 0.28 times faster than body weight; the body weight can be reduced, leaving mammals of any size to breathe once at about 4 beats. For all mammals, regardless of their size, they also breathe about 200 million times during their lifetime, the heart beats about 800 million times. I 318 ff There are magnetotactic bacteria that orient themselves according to the fields and move accordingly. They thus resist the mechanism of Brownian movement. It was discovered that the magnets are distributed in the body of the bacteria in the form of about 20 small particles. Question: why is there this distribution of magnetism on particles, and why are these particles about 500 Angstrom large (1 Angstrom = 1 ten millionth of a millimetre). They form a chain in the body of the elongated bacteria. I 320 If these particles were a little smaller (about one-fifth smaller) then they would be "superparamagnetic", i. e. a magnetic reorientation of the particles could be effected at room temperature. If, on the other hand, they were twice as large, for example, the particles would form their own magnetic range within the particles, pointing in different directions. What can such a small creature do with a magnetic field? The room for movement during the few minutes of their existence is probably only a few centimetres. It does not really matter which way it goes. It can now be decisive for a bacterium to move downwards. Now gravity can be felt at least as well without a magnetic field. However, this only applies to large organisms. I 322 Insects and birds live in a world dominated by forces that affect the surface. Some of them can run on water or hang down from the ceiling because the surface tension is so strong and the gravitation is relatively weak. Gravity is hardly a problem for insects and not at all for bacteria. IV 17 Forms/biology/Gould: Darwin: thesis: form follows function. IV 19 It is the question of how a form develops continuously. IV 27 Adaptation: we should not conclude that Darwin's assumed adaptability to a local environment has unrestricted power to generate theoretically optimal designs for all situations. The natural selection can only use existing material. This is the classic dilemma of evolutionary theory. IV 151 Forms/evolution/Gould: perhaps the most difficult problem of evolution is: how can new complex forms (not just single adaptive advantageous features) be created when every single form requires thousands of individual changes and when intermediate stages do not produce viable specimens? Solution: new forms do not need to be created piece by piece, but a development program is started in a coordinated manner by activating a "main switch". IV 337 Form/organisms/evolution/Gould: surfaces grow with the square of length, volumes with the third power of length and thus much faster. Therefore, compared to their volume, small animals have a large surface area (and must eat more). 1. D' Arcy Wentworth Thompson, Onb Groth and Form, 1917, Cambridge University Press, https://openlibrary.org/books/OL6604798M/On_growth_and_form. (access date 12.01. 2018)	Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989
Forms	Luhmann	Baraldi I 59 Form/medium/Luhmann: medium is characterized through loose coupling of its elements - e.g. sand. Form: tight coupling of the elements - E.g. footprint in the sand. Cf. >Media/Talcott Parsons, >Media/Habermas. --- AU Cass 10 Medium/form/Luhmann: viable systems must be loosely coupled. Sentences: are forms in the medium of language (= vocabulary). >Sentence. Words: form in the medium of sound or visual designs. >Words. Medium/Luhmann: 1. A medium can only be reproduced through morphogenesis - (if you never form sentences, you would forget the words). 2. The medium is more stable than the morphogenesis. Objects can disappear. In the medium we always see something new. - E.g. power as a medium is used to arrange something specific (form). >Power/Talcott Parsons, >System/Luhmann, >Systems theory.	AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Baraldi I C. Baraldi, G.Corsi. E. Esposito GLU: Glossar zu Luhmanns Theorie sozialer Systeme Frankfurt 1997
Foundation	Chalmers	I 297 Foundation/Chalmers: It would be strange for a fundamental property (here consciousness) to be realized for the first time at a late time in the development of the universe. Most basic properties are realized in simple systems and thus distributed very widely in the universe. > Panpsychism/Chalmers, >Consciousness/Chalmers, cf. >Emergence.	Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Four-Dimensionalism	Field	III 36 Space/quantification/four-dimensionalism/time slices/Field: we can quantify over points or regions, without obligation to absolute rest: Solution: We consider a statement about the space as an abbreviation for a statement about each time slice. Time slice/Field: is generated by the relation of simultaneity. - Example: the sentence that the space is Euclidean, is a sentence about the fact that each time slice of space-time is Euclidean. Punch line: then the objects in the range of quantifiers are really space-time points and no longer mere space points. >Scope, >Domains, >Spacetime, >Spacetime points, >Quantifiers, >Quantification, >Ontology, >Mathematical entities.	Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Four-Dimensionalism	Lewis	Schwarz I 25 Four-dimensionalism/Lewis: The time operator shifts the range: E.g., „In 1642 there were no cuckoo clocks“ is like e.g., „there are no cuckoo clocks in Australia“. The sentence about 1642 is true if there are no cuckoo clocks in this area (part of reality). Intrinsic change/time/four-dimensionalism: Problem: e.g., I make the sentence true: "Last night there was someone in my bed" but I am sitting here at the table. Cf. >Truth maker/Lewis. Schwarz I 26 Intuitive Answer: (some representatives): Having slept last night is not at all incompatible with being awake now. The things seem to instantiate only incompatible properties, these are in reality merely time-relative. Objects about which we quantify with "last night" are in themselves neither sleeping nor sitting nor anything else. They also have neither shape nor color. Correct: you are "awake at t" etc. Properties: According to this view, simple properties are actually relations between strangely featureless things and times. Cf. >Properties/Lewis. Time-relative properties/LewisVs: This is unacceptable. Form/Lewis: A form is a property and not a relation! Properties, intrinsic/SchwarzVsLewis: Lewis misstated the problem; it is not about intrinsic properties, but about single-digit properties. Properties/Relation: Question: Whether form predicates express disguised relations similar to e.g. "famous" and "far". It is meaningless to say someone is famous without reference to anything. Lewis: But I guess it makes sense without reference to anything else to say something is red or round. Intrinsic change/Lewis: Lösung: Solution: According to the analogy of time and space: e.g., a long wall is high and red in some places, low and gray in others. As a whole, it is neither high nor low, neither red nor gray. Solution: It is simply composed of different parts. Schwarz I 27 Change/Lewis: Ordinary things have different properties at different times by being composed of parts with those properties. >Change/Lewis. Identity/time/temporal identity/Lewis/Schwarz: Problem: Then past things are not strictly identical with present things. The thing that used to be asleep and the thing that is sitting here now are not strictly identical. The different temporal parts are different things after all.(1976b⁽¹⁾ >Temporal Identity. MellorVsLewis:That is absurd. When we talk about someone, we are not talking about his parts. LewisVsVs: E.g., surely the whole man was Hillary on Mt. Everest. Solution: Hillary has a past temporal part that is on a past part of Everest. Edmund Hillary as a whole meets this condition. Problem: E.g., Then I am strictly speaking as a whole neither waking nor sitting. But as a whole I am not formless because of that. Lewis/Solution: I have a complex four-dimensional form. There are always temporal parts which are ignored. I/Four-dimensionalism/Lewis: "I" often refers only to a single temporal part of me. Ted Sider: (1996⁽³⁾, 2001a⁽⁴⁾, 188-208): Ted Sider elaborated: Names always refer to temporal parts. I tonight was a temporal counterpart of me now. 1. David Lewis [1976b]: “The Paradoxes of Time Travel”. American Philosophical Quarterly, 13: 145–152. In [Lewis 1986f]. 2. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell. 3. Theodore Sider [1996]: “All the World’s a Stage”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 433–453. 4. Theodore Sider [2001a]: Four-Dimensionalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.	Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Four-Dimensionalism	McTaggart	Geach I 304 Time/Change/McTaggart/Geach: Time is in any case untenable as a mere fourth dimension! For example, according to this view, the different temperatures of a fire-hook would be the same as different temperatures at different points of the time axis of the fire-hook. McTaggart: that would no longer be a change in temperature as it would be a variation of the temperature along the length of the fire hook itself. This also applies to other changes. E.g. This is also the case when you look at the acceleration curve of a car and find that there is a step when putting in the third gear. This problem is thus documented and traceable again. It is no longer anecdotal but can be analyzed. Geach: For example, the growth of a human being would be viewed as the running of a four-dimensional body along its time axis, but there cannot be change stated here. Change/four-dimensional space-time/Geach: Change is outright abolished here. The change is reduced to a mere variation of attributes between parts of a whole. Change/McTaggertVsFour-dimensional spacetime: no change means no time! I 305 The speech of a time axis is inadequate under these assumptions. This view obliges us to say that time is an illusion. In the four-dimensional absolute reality, there is an arrangement of four-dimensional things that do not change. In our experience there are three-dimensional bodies that are subject to change. >Time, >Present, >Past, >Future.	Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972
Freedom	Pinker	Brockman I 105 Freedom/society/progress/Pinker: (…) I lose no sleep over technological advances in the Internet, video, or artificial intelligence. The reason is that almost all the variation across time and space in freedom of thought is driven by differences in norms and institutions and almost none of it by differences in technology. >Technology, >Progress, >Society, >Artificial Intelligence. Brockman I 106 (…)the biggest threats lie in the networks of ideas, norms, and institutions that allow information to feed back (or not) on collective decisions and understanding. >Networks, >Institutions. As opposed to the chimerical technological threats, one real threat today is oppressive political correctness, which has choked the range of publicly expressible hypotheses, terrified many intelligent people against entering the intellectual arena, and triggered a reactionary backlash. Pinker, S. “Tech Prophecy and the Underappreciated Causal Power of Ideas” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press.	Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019
Freedom	Rothbard	Rothbard III 652 Freedom/consumers/market/Rothbard: There are (…) arguments that opponents of cartels use in decrying cartel action. One thesis asserts that there is something wicked about formerly competing firms now uniting, e.g., "restricting competition" or "restraining trade." >Cartels/Rothbard, >Competition/Rothbard, >Monopolies/Rothbard. Consumption/choice: Such restriction is supposed to injure the consumers' freedom of choice. As Hutt phrased it (…) "Consumers are free ... and consumers' sovereignty is realizable, only to the extent to which the power of substitution exists."⁽¹⁾ >Consumer’s sovereignty/Hutt. RothbardVsHutt: But surely this is a complete misconception of the meaning of freedom. Crusoe and Friday bargaining on a desert island have very little range or power of choice; their power of substitution is limited. Yet if neither man interferes with the other's person or property, each one is bsolutely free. To argue otherwise is to adopt the fallacy of confusing freedom with abundance or range of choice. No individual producer is or can be responsiblefor other people's power to substitute. No coffee grower or steel producer, whether acting singly or jointly, is responsible to anyone because he chose not to produce more. Rothbard III 653 If consumer demand had really justified more competitors or more of the product or a greater variety of products, then entrepreneurs would have seized the opportunity to profit by satisfying this demand. The fact that this is not being done in any given case demonstrates that no such unsatisfied consumer demand exists. But if this is true, then it follows that no man-made actions can improve the satisfaction of consumer demand more than is being done on the unhampered market. The false confusion of freedom with abundance rests on a failure to distinguish between the conditions given by nature and man-made actions to transform nature. In a state of raw nature, there is no abundance; in fact, there are few, if any, goods at all. >Free market/Rothbard. Rothbard III 654 Market entry: Some critics charge that there is no "real" free entry or free competition in a free market. For how can anyone compete or enter a field when an enormous amount of money is needed to invest in effcient plants and firms? It is easy to "enter" the pushcart peddling "industry" because so little capital is required, but it is almost impossible to establish a new automobile firm, with its heavy requirements of capital. This argument is but another variant of the prevailing confusion between freedom and abundance. In this case, the abundance refers to the money capital which a man has been able to amass. Every man is perfectly free to become a baseball player; but this freedom does not imply that he will be as good a baseball player as the next man. Therefore, the fact that everyone is free to enter an industry does not mean that everyone is able, either in terms of personal qualities or monetary capital, to do so. 1. W.H. Hutt, “The Concept of Consumers’ Sovereignty,” Economic Journal, March, 1940, pp. 66–77. Hutt originated the term in an article in 1934. For an interesting use of a similar concept, cf. Charles Coquelin, “Political Economy” in Lalor’s Cyclopedia, III, 222-23.	Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Function	Minsky	I 123 Function/structure/description/context/uniframes/Minsky: [a chair can be described in different ways}: a) A chair is a thing with legs and a back and seat. b) A chair is something you can sit upon. To catch the proper meaning, we need connections between parts of the chair structure and the requirements of the human body that those parts are supposed to serve. >Functional explanation, >Functional analysis, >Analysis, >Explanation, >Function, >Description. Solution/Minsky: I 121 Uniframe/terminology/Minsky: a description constructed to apply to several different things at once. ((s) E.g. building blocks may be arranged in different ways and create tools for different functions). I 123 Uniframes that include structures like this can be powerful. For example, such knowledge about relations between structure, comfort, and posture could be used to understand when a box could serve as a chair… >Frames, >Frame Theories, >Terminology/Minsky.	Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003
Functionalism	Danto	I 269 Functionalism: is the assumption that certain aspects of the mind can be discussed without any knowledge of the brain. Thesis: the same mental operations can be performed quite well by material systems. Cf. >Materialism, >Thinking, >Brain, >Brain states, >Mental states, >World/thinking. I 269f FunctionalismVsMaterialism: functionalism has strangely enough caused serious problems for certain materialistic theories of mind. It cannot be said that the mind is nothing other than the brain, therefore nothing other than this material system, if the mind itself can be functionally defined and something is given that supports all its functions, but otherwise is different from the brain. Cf. >Identity theory. How can the mind be equated with the brain and just as well with the computer when on the other hand the computer and the brain cannot be equated with each other? Identity is transitive. That would not be fulfilled here. >Computer model, >Computation, >Cognition.	Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Functions	Armstrong	Place III 119 Function/Place/(s): There is no double function: a thing cannot at the same have the categorical property (as a function) of sharpness and the dispositional property (as a function) of the ability to cut. - ((s) At least no "double explanation" no "double yield"?). Example: if the arrangement of the molecules of opium contitutes the categorical aspect of the binding of these atoms, it can not simultaneously have the categorical aspect of the soporific effect. - There does not seem to enough categorical to supply all reactants with their dispositional property. >Dispositions/Place.	Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004
Functions	Frege	II 83 f Function: a function has generality; it is a law. Any number of an x-range is assigned to a number of the y-range. A function is not a variable (also: an elliptic function is not an elliptic variable). Function: a function is unsaturated. >Generality, >unsaturated, >Generalization. II 87 Functional characters: functional characters are unsaturated. However, in connection with numerals they are saturated. Argument: every time a number > value of the function Caution: it has become common to read the equation "y = f (x)": "y is a function of x". This contains two errors: 1) If the equal sign is translated by the copula. 2) The function with its value is mistaken for an argument. These errors gave rise to the opinion that the function was a number. >Equations, >Numbers. Husted V 93 Functions of numbers are fundamentally different (because they are unsaturated). Logic/Grammar: E.g. "Peter plays with Agnes": in the logic both Peter and Agnes can be declared subjects. >Subject, >Predicate. V 93 Argument/function: E.g. "(3) to the power of 2". The argument expression is: "3". The function expression is: "(...) to the power of 2". E.g. "3 + 2". The argument expressions is: "2" and "3". The function expression is: "+". E.g. "Peter is asleep". The argument expression is: "Peter". The function expression is: "is asleep". E.g. "Everybody loves Agnes". The argument expression is: "loves Agnes". The function expression is: "everybody". Function expressions: "+", (...) to the power of"! The verb (sometimes also the argument expression) is a second order function expression: "everybody", "nobody". Function expressions: 1st order E.g. "is asleep" 2nd order E.g. "everybody", "nobody".	F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993
Functions	Sen	Brocker I 890 Functions/Sen: The term 'functions' [...] reflects the various things a person likes to do or likes to be. The desirable functions may range from elementary conditions such as adequate nutrition or freedom from avoidable diseases to very complex activities or personal states such as being able to participate in community life and having self-respect. A person's 'chances of realization' refer to the possible connections of the functions he or she is able to perform. >Capabilitites/Sen. Claus Dierksmeier, „Amartya Sen, Ökonomie für den Menschen (1999)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	EconSen I Amartya Sen Collective Choice and Social Welfare: Expanded Edition London 2017 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Game-theoretical Semantics	Kamp	Cresswell I 179 Game-theoretical semantics/CresswellVsHintikka: Hintikka and Kulas (1985)⁽¹⁾ have not made any discoveries that would not have been made by Kamp (1983)⁽²⁾ and Heim (1983)⁽³⁾ as well. I 180 Example: (1) Everyone loves someone. This is about two different ranges. Λ-categorial language: (2) >, someone>>>. ((s) Everyone is so that someone is so that the former likes the latter, without quantification. > Lambda notation/Cresswell). and (3) <<λy, < everyone, <λx, >>>, someone>. 1. Hintikka J. & Kulas J. (1985): Definite Descriptions. In: Anaphora and Definite Descriptions. Synthese Language Library (Texts and Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy), Vol. 26. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-5410-6_2. 2. Kamp, H. & Rohrer, C. (1983): Tense in texts. Meaning, use and interpretation of language 250, 269. 3. Heim, I. (1983): Formal Semantics - the Essential Readings. In: P. Portner & B. H. Partee (eds.), Blackwell. pp. 249-260.	Kamp I Kamp From Discourse to Logic: Introduction to Modeltheoretic Semantics of Natural Language, Formal Logic and Discourse Representation Theory (Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy) Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Gavagai	Quine	I 59ff Gavagai: the totality of the sentences can be permuted so that verbal behavior remains, but correlation disappears - translation manuals can be internally consistent and mutually incompatible. I 67 Gavagai: this is about stimuli, not rabbits. - (> forgery). - A verification shall be carried out by the community. V 119 Reference/Gavagai/Quine: problem: we do not know whether the child who agrees to "red" also referred to red - Red: can be a general term for set of red surfaces - or a general term for any visible color spot - but not for parts of color spots - this does not allow abstraction - no problem: to realize that the reference is made to the mere presence of red - different translation manuals lead to different translations. >General Terms/Quine, >Translation/Quine. VI 73 Gavagai/Quine: the translation vagueness in particular should not be shown with that, because the translation with "Look, a rabbit" is well secured - the point was that the reference is not determined by the translation. Because "Gavagai" is a whole sentence, there was no compensation possibility - Reference/explanation: reference is explained by quote eradication "rabbit" refers to rabbit. --- XII 18 Gavagai/Quine: must neglect differences such as "There is a rabbit" and "Look, a rabbit" - no single term can be attributed, but only an entire sentence in which "rabbit" appears - do not assume objectification - even if the presence of rabbits is an expression condition, they might still be temporal stages or rabbit parts - not sufficient: to ask whether "an X is present" - solution: "the same x" - expression conditions are not sufficient to know whether the stranger refers to an object - Solution: A-u-B is at least acknowledgment for whole sentences. XII 47 Gavagai/Quine: Problem: a whole rabbit is given iff a non-severed part or a temporal stage is given. XII 48 Gavagai/color/color word/generic term/mass term/Quine: the big difference between "Rabbit" and "Sepia" is that "Sepia" is a mass term like "water" - "Rabbit" on the other hand, is a term of crushed reference. Therefore it cannot be dominated without the individuation principle. One must know where one rabbit ends and another one begins - that does not work by pointing (ostension) - where does a Gavagai end and where does another one begin? - inextricably - ((s) Because Gavagai is not a mass term, that is important.) - Important argument: if you take the part of the universe, which consists of rabbits, it is identical to the part, which consists of un-severed rabbit parts and with the one that consists of temporal stages of rabbits - only difference: how to split it - ostension cannot teach that - pointing to a whole is always also pointing to its parts and vice versa. XII 50 Translation Manual: offers no solution: Problem: stage/part/rabbit: perhaps we always ask in a foreign language "Do they belong together?" instead of "Is it the same?" without knowing it. XII 51 Gavagai/Quine: behaviorist criterion: a stable, relatively homogeneous object against a background will probably be denoted by a relatively short term - but merely imposed on the foreign language - (yet reasonable hypothesis). XII 52 Gavagai/native tongue/part/whole/time stage/Quine: within our own language, we can distinguish between whole rabbits, rabbit parts and rabbit stages, because the apparatus of individuation (plural, pronoun, identity, quantification, etc.) is determined - when translating from another language, this itself is subject to indeterminacy. XII 53ff Gavagai/Japanese/classifier/Quine: 1) numeral "5" 2) animal classifier 3) "Ox" - Explanation A: declined numeral of the genus "animal" (ox: individuative term, here for all cattle) - B: 3rd word here is a mass term "lifestock" (e.g. here only cattle) - Japanese: in both cases it is "five cattle" - German: both are equally good translations - both fit into language behavior - reference (extension): is different. >Translation/Quine, >Indeterminacy/Quine.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Generalization	Bigelow	I 62 Generalization/Bigelow/Pargetter: one advantage of our relational theory (of the 3 levels) is that it allows generalizations and variations. >Relation theory/Bigelow. I 63 Vector: especially an easy explanation of vectors, with which other theories struggle. See Relation-Theory/Bigelow, here in the lexicon. >Vectors. I 218 Generalization/Bigelow/Pargetter: logical form, if without exception: (x) (Fx > Gx) if it has modal status natN (x)(Fx > Gx) But sometimes it is good enough to say Most F's are G's. Even such statements can have modal character, but beware: probably not of the form NatN (most F's are G's) But of the form Most F's are necessarily G's. Necessity: then only refers to consequence. For example, although not all living creatures necessarily have a mother, so surely our cat. >Range, >Operators. Modal Operator/Range/Bigelow/Bigelow/Pargetter: even if it only refers to the consequence, it can be important, e.g. for justifying the explanation domain. >Modal operators. Logical form/Bigelow/Pargetter: one could think it should look like this: (most x)(Fx > natN Gx) I 219 But that does not cover the whole meaning. This would be equivalent to (most x)(~Fx v natNGx) and that is true when most things are not F. And that is not what is meant here! Wrong solution/Generalization/Bigelow/Pargetter: a counterfactual conditional would not help here: (most x)(Fx would be > would be natN Gx) >Counterfactual conditional. Problem: this could be true for the wrong reasons, for example Counterfactual conditional/Lewis: is trivially true if the antecedent Fx is not true in any possible world. >Possible worlds. Logical form/Generalization/Regularity/Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: of "most F's are necessarily G's" must allow the predicate F limits the range over which the quantifier "most" goes. i.e. it must be something like: ((Fx)(most x) natNGx. Language/Level/Bigelow/Pargetter: this is not possible with the languages we discussed in chapter 3. (Quantification 2. Level, higher level, logic 2. level). >Levels/order, >Description levels, >Second order logic. Generalisation/Regularity/Law/Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: we avoid formalisation and deal with the problem intuitively. Generalization/Bigelow/Pargetter: often we find such generalization in our daily life: they are not strictly true. Laws/Bigelow/Pargetter: 1. The characteristic feature is that they involve generalizations. 2. And that they often attribute a kind of necessity to generalization. I 220 That is, not every correlation should be considered a law. Necessity: For example, if it is a law that all things fall to the center of the earth, a) it must not be true that things move like this, but b) it must be true that they have to move in this way. >Necessity. Generalizations/Bigelow/Pargetter: a) some are only true because each of their instances is true. ((s) without necessity). Such generalizations without necessity are not laws. b) for other generalizations, the direction of explanation is reversed: the generalization is not true because their instances are true, but the instances are true because they are instances of generalization. Those are laws. >Laws. The law explains the instances. Instances explain a (non-necessary) generalization. >Explanation.	Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Generalization	Freeden	Gaus I 5 Generalization/individuals/generality/political theory/Freeden: (... ) the increasing democratization of politics has shifted the emphasis of scholarship from ‘great men and women’ philosophers to the moral claims any individual and all individuals may direct at their societies and the benefits they ought to derive from social life. Just as historians now seldom tell the story of kings and queens but have developed a keen interest in popular history, so political theorists have refocused around individual selfdevelopment, participation, citizenship, and civic virtue (Young, 1986⁽¹⁾: 479, 484–5), notions close to the concerns of contemporary liberal theory (...). One manifestation of this has been the recent fascination of philosophers with questions of justice. >Self-realization, >Participation. Although justice is a systemic property of a wellorganized society, it has been reformulated, primarily by John Rawls (1971)⁽²⁾, as establishing the correct manner of attaining fairness for individuals, through devices that ensure that ordinary persons themselves decide reasonably on the rules of justice that ought to apply to them. >Justice, >Justice/Rawls, >J. Rawls. Deontology/method: Consequently, the deontology of rights and duties has been predominantly assigned to individuals, and Anglo-American political philosophy has been resistant to the impingement of groups and communities on its fundamental epistemology – an inclination towards atomism that is itself ideological as well as methodological. >Deontology. Universality/generality: Moreover, that approach is predicated on the assumption that the rationally exercised faculties of individuals will in crucial instances converge on common ground rather than diverge in a range of acceptable, rational and good solutions radiating out from a common core, as John Stuart Mill had indicated. >Generality. 1.Young, Robert (1986) Personal Autonomy: Beyond Negative and Positive Freedom. London: Croom-Helm. 2. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press Freeden, M. 2004. „Ideology, Political Theory and Political Philosophy“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Generational Justice	Kant	Rawls I 291 Generational justice/Kant: he saw it as strange that earlier generations would bear their burden only for the benefit of later generations and that they would be the only ones who would be lucky enough to be allowed to live in a finished building.⁽¹⁾ RawlsVsKant: these feelings are out of place: the relation is asymmetric, but this has to be corrected. First of all, the question of justice does not arise because of the extension of time in only one direction. What can be fair or unfair is the way in which institutions deal with this situation and with historical possibilities. If all generations, with the exception of the first, now benefit and everyone inherits from their ancestors, all they have to do is choose a fair saving principle that ensures that future generations will also benefit from their services. The only reciprocity between generations is virtual. However, each generation can regulate the details for itself. >Reciprocity, >Justice, >Asymmetry. 1. I. Kant „Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose“, quoted from Hans Reiss (ed.) Kant, Political Writings, Cambridge, 1970, p. 44.	I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Generational Justice	Rawls	I 128 Generational Justice/Rawls: it is a question of whether the persons in an assumed initial state of a society to be established have duties and obligations towards third parties, in particular their direct descendants. >Fairness/Rawls, >Society/Rawls, >Fairness/Rawls. However, the principle of justice as fairness does not want to derive its principles from such considerations. Nevertheless, I assume that although the individuals do not consider their own life span in continuity, their goodwill will extend over at least two generations. I 208 Generational Justice/Rawls: since the members of society have an interest in securing equal rights of freedom for their descendants, there is no conflict over the choice of the principle of equal freedoms. For example, a son could not argue that the father neglected his interests if he accepted the principle of equal freedoms. The father would have to argue to the detriment of others if they departed from it that these other benefits would arise when they grow up. I 284 Generational Justice/Rawls: this question challenges every ethical theory. It depends on how the minimum social standards are defined. I 286 Social minimum standards/Rawls: there are two problems here: a) there is not enough to save or b) taxation gets too strong when the minimum is raised. Then the situation of the worst-off starts to deteriorate. The question of the savings rate has often been discussed^{(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)}. I 287 Generational Justice/Rawls: The conclusion is that the greater benefits of future generations will be sufficiently great to compensate for the present victims. This can be true simply because future generations have better technology at their disposal. RawlsVsUtilitarianism: this forces us to impose greater sacrifices on the poorer people for the later ones, who may be better off as a result of other circumstances. However, this counting up between generations does not make as much sense as between contemporaries. >Utilitarianism, >VsUtilitarianism. Contract theory/contract doctrine/Rawls: it considers the problem from the perspective of the initial situation of a society to be established. Here, the participants do not know to which generation they belong if they are to decide on the form of the company and its structure. Now they should ask themselves how much they are prepared to save if everyone else does the same. In doing so, they should establish a principle of fair saving that applies to all. >Contract Theory. I 288 Only the relatives of the very first generation do not benefit from this, but no one knows to which generation they belong. I 289 However, the principle of fair saving does not force us to continue saving forever. Details have to be clarified at a later point of time. Each generation has its own appropriate goals. Generations are no more subject to each other than individuals. No generation has special demands. I 290 Savings/Savings Rate/Prosperity/Rawls: the last stage does not have to be one of abundance. The principle of justice does not require previous generations to save money so that later generations will have more. Rather, saving is about enabling a fair society and equal freedoms to become more effective. If more is saved, it is for other purposes. It would be a misunderstanding to think that the realisation of a good and fair society must wait until a high standard of living has been achieved. I 291 Generational Justice/Alexander Herzen/Rawls: Herzen thesis: human development is a kind of chronological unfairness, because the later ones benefit from the work of the former without paying the same price⁽⁶⁾. >A. Herzen. Generational fairness/Kant: he saw it as strange that earlier generations would bear their burden only for the benefit of later generations and that they would be the only ones who would be lucky enough to be allowed to live in a finished building⁽⁷⁾. >Generational Justice/Kant. 1. See A. K. Sen „On Optimizing the Rate of Saving“, Economic Journal, Vol. 71, 1961. 2. J. Tobin, National Economic Policiy, New Haven, 1966, ch. IX. 3. R.M. Solow, Growth Theory, New York, 1970, ch. V. 4. Frank P. Ramsey, „A Mathematical Theory of Saving“, Economic Journal, Vol. 38, 1928, reprinted in Arrow and Scitovsky, Readings in Welfare Economics. 5. T.C. Koomans, „On the Concept of Optimal Economic Growth“ (1965), In: Scientific Papers of T. C. Kopmans, Berlin, 1970. 6. Quote from Isaiah Berlin’s Einführung zu Franco Venturi, Roots of Revolution, New York, 1960 p. xx. 7. Kant: „Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose“, quoted from Hans Reiss (ed.) Kant, Political Writings, Cambridge, 1970, p. 44.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Genetic Variation	Social Psychology	Haslam I 245 Genetic Variation/racial gaps/Social psychology: One issue that stimulated a great deal of discussion in the 1990s was racial gaps in academic achievement and test scores that persisted despite legal and social efforts to dismantle institutionalized barriers to educational advancement (Kao and Thompson, 2003)⁽¹⁾. In popular media and academic circles, explanations ranged from stark differences in educational quality in what were (and still are) racially segregated schools (Kozol, 2012)⁽²⁾ to controversial claims of inherent genetic differences in intelligence based on race (Herrnstein and Murray, 1994⁽³⁾). It was in the context of this broader national debate about the racial gap in performance that Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson introduced a ground-breaking set of studies that have become a modern classic in the field (Devine and Brodish, 2003⁽⁴⁾; Fiske 2003⁽⁵⁾). >Stereotype threat/Aronson/Steele. 1. Kao, G. and Thompson,J.S. (2003) ‘Racial and ethnic stratification in educational achievement and attainment’, Annual Review of Sociology, 29:417-42. 2. Kozol, J. (2012) Savage Inequalities: Children in America’s Schools. New York: Broadway Books. 3. Herrnstein, R. and Murray, C. (1994) The Bell Curve. New York: Free Press. 4. Devine, P.G. and Brodish, A.B. (2003) 1Modern classics in social psychology’, Psychological Inquiry, 14:196—202. 5. Fiske, S.T. (2003) ‘The discomfort index: How to spot a really good idea whose time has come’, Psychological Inquiry, 14:203—8. Toni Schmader and Chad Forbes, “Stereotypes and Performance. Revisiting Steele and Aronson’s stereotypes threat experiments”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Geographical Factors	Economic Theories	Rothbard III 819 Geographic factors/Economic theories/Rothbard: Rothbard: The purchasing power of money will (…) tend to remain equal in all places where the money is used, whether or not national boundaries happen to intervene. >Geographical factors/Rothbard. Economic theoriesVsRothbard: Some people contend that, on the contrary, there do exist permanent differences in the purchasing power of money from place to place. For example, they point to the fact that prices for food in restaurants are higher in New York City than in Peoria. Quality of life: For most people, however, New York has certain definite advantages over Peoria. It has a vastly wider range of goods and services available to the consumer, including theaters, concerts, colleges, high-quality jewelry and clothing, and stockbrokerage houses. There is a great difference between the commodity "restaurant service in New York" and the commodity "restaurant service in Peoria." The former allows the purchaser to remain in New York and to enjoy its various advantages. Thus, the two are distinct goods, and the fact that the price of restaurant service is greater in New York signifies that the preponderance of individuals on the market value the former more highly and consider it a commodity of higher quality.⁽¹⁾ Transport/RothbardVs: Costs of transport, however, do introduce a qualification into this analysis. Suppose that the PPM in Detroit is slightly higher than in Rochester. We would expect gold to flow from Rochester to Detroit, spending relatively more on goods in the latter place, until the PPM's (purchasing power of the monetary unit) are equalized. If, however, the PPM in Detroit is higher by an amount smaller than the transport cost of shipping the gold from Rochester, then relative PPM's have a leeway to differ within the zone of shipping costs of gold. It would then be too expensive to ship gold to Detroit to take advantage of the higher PPM. The interspatial PPM's may vary in either direction within this cost-of-transport margin.⁽²⁾ PPM: Many critics allege that the PPM cannot be uniform throughout the world because some goods are not transferable from one locale to another. Times Square or Niagara Falls, for example, cannot be transferred from one region to another; they are specific to their locale. Therefore, it is alleged, the equalization process can take place only for those goods which "enter into interregional trade"; it does not apply to the general PPM. Rothbard III 820 RothbardVs: Plausible as it seems, this objection is completely fallacious. a) In the firstpPlace, disparate goods like Times Square and other main streets are different goods, so that there is no reason to expect them to have the same price. b) Secondly, so long as one commodity can be traded, the PPM can be equalized. The composition of the PPM may well be changed, but this does not refute the fact of equalization. The process of equalization can be deduced from the fact of human action, even though (…) the PPM cannot be measured, since its composition does not remain the same. Stores/real estates/locations: Finally, since any good can be traded, what is there to prevent, for example, Oshkosh capital from buying a building on Times Square? The Oshkosh capitalists need not literally transport a good back to Oshkosh in order to buy it and make money from their investment. Rothbard: Every good, then, "enters into interregional trade"; no distinction between "domestic" and "interregional" (or "international") goods can be made. Putrchasing power: Thus, suppose the PPM is higher in Oshkosh than in New York. New Yorkers tend to buy more in Oshkosh, and Oshkoshians will buy less in New York. This does not only mean that New York will buy more Oshkosh wheat, or that Oshkosh will buy less New York clothing. It also means that New Yorkers will invest in real estate or theaters in Oshkosh, while Oshkoshians will sell some of their New York holdings. >Clearing/Rothbard. 1. For an appreciation of Mises’ achievement in clarifying this problem, see Wu, An Outline of International Price Theories, pp. 127, 232-34. 2. (…) interlocal clearing can greatly narrow these limits.	Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Geometry	Bigelow	I 360 Golden Section/Bigelow/Pargetter: this relation is all too real. Nevertheless, it is not a ratio in our sense. >Ontology, >Existence, >Relations. For example, if we create lines by stringing DF together we will never get a matching point with multiples of DC. Logical form/General/Incommensurability/Bigelow/Pargetter: n times DF will never be = m times DC. This also applies to the solution of Wiener (see above). Proportion: here is 2: (1 + √5), therefore it cannot be represented as ratio a:b for integers a and b. Incommensurability/proof: can be proven by raa: assuming DF and DC would be commensurable, i.e. there is a distance d that divides both DF and DC. Let's take a look at the rectangle (in the graphic above) FDC, d divides DF and DF equals EC. This divides both DC and EC. Therefore, it must also divide DE. Then the same size must divide both the larger and the smaller rectangle, which is not possible. d would then also have to divide the sides of the third rectangle in the drawing etc. ad infinitum. Therefore, no finite length can divide both sides of a golden rectangle. I 360 VsBigelow: incommensurability seems to be against our theory. >Irrational numbers. BigelowVsVs: Solution: we redefine "ratio" a little bit: we need a third relation: Definition Incommensurability/logical form/Bigelow/Pargetter: if two relations R and S are income-survable, then whenever x Rn y, follows that not: x Sm y, for whichever values of n and m are used. Repetition of n applications of R will never result in a match with m applications of S. N.B.: nevertheless, we can determine that the results of repeated applications of R and S are in a certain relation to each other. They are arranged in a linear order "<" ("smaller"). I.e. it can be, for an n and an m If x Rn y and x Sm z, then y < z. Golden Section/Bigelow/Pargetter: is clearly defined by the list of numbers n and m for which the above scheme applies. I 362 General: each proportion between two relations R and S can be unambiguously characterized by a list of natural numbers n and m for which the scheme applies. >Proportions. Proportion/Bigelow/Pargetter: this theory of proportions is based on Eudoxo's contribution to Euclid's Elements (Book 5 Def 5). Real Numbers/Bigelow/Pargetter: this theory of proportions as a theory of real numbers was developed by Dedekind and others at the end of the 19th century. >Real numbers. I 364 Geometry/Bigelow/Pargetter: geometry has to do with spatially instantiated universals. Therefore, it is vulnerable through empirical discoveries about space. It could be that we discover that space does not instantiate the geometric shapes that we had previously assumed to be instantiated like this. >Discoveries, >Space. Aristotle/Bigelow/Pargetter: according to him the forms would then be discarded. Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: he allows first the acceptance of a non-Euclidean space. ((s) But if it is not directly perceptible to us and if it is instantiated in the universe, for example, it is not a problem for Aristotle either.) I 365 Universals/Platonism/Bigelow/Pargetter: actually he doesn't believe in uninstantiated universals either, but he will find them or invent them. Above all, he will say that pure mathematics is autonomous. >Ideas/Plato.	Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Given	Dilthey	Gadamer I 70 Given/Humanities/Science/Dilthey/Gadamer: Since [Dilthey] is concerned with epistemological justification of the work of the humanities, the motif of the truly given dominates him everywhere. So it is an epistemological motif or better the motif of epistemology itself that motivates its conceptualization and that corresponds to the linguistic process (...) (>Experience/Dilthey). ((s)VsDilthey: see Wilfrid Sellars' criticism of the concept of the given: >Given/Sellars). Humanities/Gadamer: This is precisely what characterizes the development of the humanities in the 19th century, that they not only outwardly described the natural sciences as a role model but that they, coming from the same reason for which modern science lives, develop the same pathos of experience and research as they do. ((s) Cf. >Sensations/Carnap). Gadamer I 71 Dilthey/Gadamer: The conditions in the humanities are in fact of a special kind, and Dilthey wants to formulate this through the concept of "experience". In connection with Descartes' distinction of res cogitans he defines the concept of experience by reflexivity, by being within. He also wants to justify the knowledge of the historical world epistemologically from this special way of giving facts. The primary conditions on which the interpretation of historical objects are based are not data of experiment and measurement, but units of meaning. This is what the concept of experience wants to say: Given/Dilthey: The sense entities we encounter in the humanities no matter how strange and incomprehensible they may be to us - can be traced back to the last units of what is given in consciousness, which themselves no longer contain anything foreign, representational or in need of interpretation. They are the units of experience, which are themselves units of sense. Gadamer I 231 Given/Humanities/Dilthey/Gadamer: The concept of the given is [in the humanities] of a fundamentally different structure [than in the natural sciences]. It distinguishes the conditions of the humanities from those of the natural sciences, "that everything solid, everything alien, as is inherent in the images of the physical world, is given, must be thought away from the notion of what is given in this field"⁽¹⁾. All that is given is brought forth here. Dilthey: According to Dilthey, the old preference that Vico already attributed to historical objects is the basis of the universality with which understanding takes possession of the historical world. Gadamer: The question is, however, whether on this basis the transition from the psychological to the hermeneutical point of view is really successful or whether Dilthey gets entangled in problem contexts that bring him into an unwanted and unacknowledged proximity to speculative idealism. Not only Fichte, but also Hegel is visible right down to the words at the quoted passage. His criticism of "positivity"⁽²⁾ the concept of self-alienation, the definition of the spirit as self-knowledge in otherness can easily be derived from Dilthey's sentence, and one wonders where actually the difference remains that emphasized the historical view of the world compared with idealism and that Dilthey undertook to legitimize epistemologically. This question is reinforced when one considers the central turn with which Dilthey characterizes life, this basic fact of history. >Lebensphilosophie/Dilthey. 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften VIl, 148. 2. Hegels theologische Jugendschriften, ed. Nohl, S. 139f.	Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Given	Humanities	Gadamer I 70 Given/Humanities/Science/Dilthey/Gadamer: Since [Dilthey] is concerned with epistemological justification of the work of the humanities, the motif of the truly given dominates him everywhere. So it is an epistemological motif or better the motif of epistemology itself that motivates its conceptualization and that corresponds to the linguistic process (...) (>Experience/Dilthey). ((s)VsDilthey: see Wilfrid Sellars' criticism of the concept of the given: >Given/Sellars). Humanities/Gadamer: This is precisely what characterizes the development of the humanities in the 19th century, that they not only outwardly described the natural sciences as a role model but that they, coming from the same reason for which modern science lives, develop the same pathos of experience and research as they do. ((s) Cf. >Sensations/Carnap). Gadamer I 71 Dilthey/Gadamer: The conditions in the humanities are in fact of a special kind, and Dilthey wants to formulate this through the concept of "experience". In connection with Descartes' distinction of res cogitans he defines the concept of experience by reflexivity, by being within. He also wants to justify the knowledge of the historical world epistemologically from this special way of giving facts. The primary conditions on which the interpretation of historical objects are based are not data of experiment and measurement, but units of meaning. This is what the concept of experience wants to say: Given/Dilthey: The sense entities we encounter in the humanities no matter how strange and incomprehensible they may be to us - can be traced back to the last units of what is given in consciousness, which themselves no longer contain anything foreign, representational or in need of interpretation. They are the units of experience, which are themselves units of sense. Gadamer I 231 Given/Humanities/Dilthey/Gadamer: The concept of the given is [in the humanities] of a fundamentally different structure [than in the natural sciences]. It distinguishes the conditions of the humanities from those of the natural sciences, "that everything solid, everything alien, as is inherent in the images of the physical world, is given, must be thought away from the notion of what is given in this field"⁽¹⁾. All that is given is brought forth here. Dilthey: According to Dilthey, the old preference that Vico already attributed to historical objects is the basis of the universality with which understanding takes possession of the historical world. Gadamer: The question is, however, whether on this basis the transition from the psychological to the hermeneutical point of view is really successful or whether Dilthey gets entangled in problem contexts that bring him into an unwanted and unacknowledged proximity to speculative idealism. Not only Fichte, but also Hegel is visible right down to the words at the quoted passage. His criticism of "positivity"(2) the concept of self-alienation, the definition of the spirit as self-knowledge in otherness can easily be derived from Dilthey's sentence, and one wonders where actually the difference remains that emphasized the historical view of the world compared with idealism and that Dilthey undertook to legitimize epistemologically. This question is reinforced when one considers the central turn with which Dilthey characterizes life, this basic fact of history. >Lebensphilosophie/Dilthey. 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften VIl, 148. 2. Hegels theologische Jugendschriften, ed. Nohl, S. 139f.	Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Goals	AI Research	Bostrom I 126 Goals/superintelligence/AI Research/Bostrom: Is it possible to say anything about what a superintelligence with a decisive I 127 strategic advantage would want? I 129 Motivation/intelligence/superintelligent will/orthogonality/Bostrom: Intelligent search for instrumentally optimal plans and policies can be performed in the service of any goal. Intelligence and motivation are in a sense orthogonal: we can think of them as two axes spanning a graph in which each point represents a logically possible artificial agent. Some qualifications could be added to this picture. For instance, it might be impossible for a very unintelligent system to have very complex motivations. I 130 Def Orthogonality thesis/Bostrom: Intelligence and final goals are orthogonal: more or less any level of intelligence could in principle be combined with more or less any final goal. According to the orthogonality thesis, artificial agents can have utterly non-anthropomorphic goals. -Predictability through design: I 131 (…) even before an agent has been created we might be able to predict something about its behavior, if we know something about who will build it and what goals they will want it to have. -Predictability through inheritance. If a digital intelligence is created directly from a human template (as would be the case in a high-fidelity whole brain emulation), then the digital intelligence might inherit the motivations of the human template. -Predictability through convergent instrumental reasons: (…) we may be able to infer something about its more immediate objectives by considering the instrumental reasons that would arise for any of a wide range of possible final goals in a wide range of situations. I 132 Def Instrumental convergence thesis/Bostrom: Several instrumental values can be identified which are convergent in the sense that their attainment would increase the chances of the agent’s goal being realized for a wide range of final goals and a wide range of situations, implying that these instrumental values are likely to be pursued by a broad spectrum of situated intelligent agents. >Goals/Omohundro. Where there are convergent instrumental values, we may be able to predict some aspects of a superintelligence’s behavior: -Self-preservation: Most humans seem to place some final value on their own survival. This is not a necessary feature of artificial agents: some may be designed to place no final value whatever on their own survival. -Goal-content integrity: If an agent retains its present goals into the future, then its present goals will be more likely to be achieved by its future self. This gives the agent a present instrumental reason to I 133 prevent alterations of its final goals. For software agents, which can easily switch bodies or create exact duplicates of themselves, preservation of self as a particular implementation or a particular physical object need not be an important instrumental value. Advanced software agents might also be able to swap memories, download skills, and radically modify their cognitive architecture and personalities. I 141 Orthogonality thesis/Bostrom: (see above) the orthogonality thesis suggests that we cannot blithely assume that a superintelligence will necessarily share any of the final values stereotypically associated with wisdom and intellectual development in humans (…). I 270 Goals/ethics/morality/superintelligence/Bostrom: Consider, for example, the following “reasons-based” goal: Do whatever we would have had most reason to ask the AI to do. ((s)VsBostrom: Here it is assumed that the AI has no reason to falsify our intentions. I 272 Bostrom: components for choices of behavior: -Goal content: What objective should the AI pursue? How should a description of this objective be interpreted? -Decision theory: Should the AI use causal decision theory, evidential decision theory, updateless decision theory, or something else? -Epistemology: What should the AI’s prior probability function be (…).What theory of anthropics should it use? -Ratification: Should the AI’s plans be subjected to human review before being put into effect? If so, what is the protocol for that review process? >Ethics/superintelligence/Bostrom, >Ethics/superintelligence/Yudkowsky, >Norms/Bostrom.	Bostrom I Nick Bostrom Superintelligence. Paths, Dangers, Strategies Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017
Goals	Bostrom	I 126 Goals/superintelligence/AI Research/Bostrom: Is it possible to say anything about what a superintelligence with a decisive I 127 strategic advantage would want? I 129 Motivation/intelligence/superintelligent will/orthogonality/Bostrom: Intelligent search for instrumentally optimal plans and policies can be performed in the service of any goal. Intelligence and motivation are in a sense orthogonal: we can think of them as two axes spanning a graph in which each point represents a logically possible artificial agent. Some qualifications could be added to this picture. For instance, it might be impossible for a very unintelligent system to have very complex motivations. I 130 Def Orthogonality thesis/Bostrom: Intelligence and final goals are orthogonal: more or less any level of intelligence could in principle be combined with more or less any final goal. According to the orthogonality thesis, artificial agents can have utterly non-anthropomorphic goals. -Predictability through design: I 131 (…) even before an agent has been created we might be able to predict something about its behavior, if we know something about who will build it and what goals they will want it to have. -Predictability through inheritance. If a digital intelligence is created directly from a human template (as would be the case in a high-fidelity whole brain emulation), then the digital intelligence might inherit the motivations of the human template. -Predictability through convergent instrumental reasons: (…) we may be able to infer something about its more immediate objectives by considering the instrumental reasons that would arise for any of a wide range of possible final goals in a wide range of situations. I 132 Def Instrumental convergence thesis/Bostrom: Several instrumental values can be identified which are convergent in the sense that their attainment would increase the chances of the agent’s goal being realized for a wide range of final goals and a wide range of situations, implying that these instrumental values are likely to be pursued by a broad spectrum of situated intelligent agents. >Goals/Omohundro. Where there are convergent instrumental values, we may be able to predict some aspects of a superintelligence’s behavior: -Self-preservation: Most humans seem to place some final value on their own survival. This is not a necessary feature of artificial agents: some may be designed to place no final value whatever on their own survival. -Goal-content integrity: If an agent retains its present goals into the future, then its present goals will be more likely to be achieved by its future self. This gives the agent a present instrumental reason to I 133 prevent alterations of its final goals. For software agents, which can easily switch bodies or create exact duplicates of themselves, preservation of self as a particular implementation or a particular physical object need not be an important instrumental value. Advanced software agents might also be able to swap memories, download skills, and radically modify their cognitive architecture and personalities. I 141 Orthogonality thesis/Bostrom: (see above) the orthogonality thesis suggests that we cannot blithely assume that a superintelligence will necessarily share any of the final values stereotypically associated with wisdom and intellectual development in humans (…). I 270 Goals/ethics/morality/superintelligence/Bostrom: Consider, for example, the following “reasons-based” goal: Do whatever we would have had most reason to ask the AI to do. ((s)VsBostrom: Here it is assumed that the AI has no reason to falsify our intentions. I 272 Bostrom: components for choices of behavior: -Goal content: What objective should the AI pursue? How should a description of this objective be interpreted? -Decision theory: Should the AI use causal decision theory, evidential decision theory, updateless decision theory, or something else? -Epistemology: What should the AI’s prior probability function be (…).What theory of anthropics should it use? -Ratification: Should the AI’s plans be subjected to human review before being put into effect? If so, what is the protocol for that review process? >Ethics/superintelligence/Bostrom, >Ethics/superintelligence/Yudkowsky, >Norms/Bostrom.	Bostrom I Nick Bostrom Superintelligence. Paths, Dangers, Strategies Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017
Goedel	Dennett	I 602 Mind/Goedel/Dennett: Goedel himself seemed to deem the "sky hook" necessary as an explanation for the human mind. Goedel: certain truths can be "seen" but never proved. (> Proof). I 605 Goedel Figure: it is possible to arrange all sorts of axiomatic systems in alphabetical order. DennettVsGoedel: Problem: how can you find out whether a mathematician proved a sentence or has only made a sound like a parrot? (Behavior). J.R.Lucas, 1961⁽¹⁾: the crucial property should be "to represent a sentence as true". DennettVsLucas: but this faces insurmountable problems of interpretation. Goedel/Toshiba Library/Dennett: "there is no single algorithm that can prove all the truths of arithmetics". Dennett: Goedel says nothing about all the other algorithms in the library. 1. J.R.Lucas, Minds, Machines, and Gödel. Etica E Politica 5 (1):1 (1961)	Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Governance	Smith	Otteson I 35 Governance/Adam Smith/Otteson: [in his] Theory of Moral Sentiments, in a discussion of the proper role of the statesman, Smith describes a certain type of political leader, whom Smith calls the "man of system," Who "is apt to be very wise in his own conceit; and is often so enamoured with the supposed beauty of his own ideal plan of government, that he cannot suffer the smallest deviation from any part of it" (TMS⁽¹⁾: 233-4). Smith continues that such a person "seems to imagine that he can arrange the different members of a great society with as much ease as the hand arranges the different pieces upon a chess-board. He does not consider that the pieces upon the chess-board have no other principle of motion besides that which the hand impresses upon them; but that, in the great chess-board of human society, every single piece has a principle of motion of its own, altogether different from that which the legislature might chuse to impress upon it" (TMS(1): 234). >Knowledge/Adam Smith, >Decisions/Adam Smith. 1. Smith, Adam (1982) [1759]. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie, eds. Liberty Fund.	EconSmith I Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010 EconSmithV I Vernon L. Smith Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009 Otteson I James R. Otteson The Essential Adam Smith Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2018
Government	Smith	Otteson I 48 Government/Adam Smith/Otteson: Smith writes in the first chapter of WN⁽¹⁾: "It is the great multiplication of the productions of all the different arts, in consequence of the division of labor, which occasions, in a well- governed society, that universal opulence which extends itself to the Iowest ranks of the people" (WN⁽¹⁾: 22). Well-governed: (…) what Smith means here by "well-governed" is articulated in his discussion of "justice" in TMS⁽²⁾ - which, as we just mentioned, comprises the protections of person, property, and promise (TMS⁽²⁾ 84). We can conclude from these two passages that Smith believes that the primary duty of government is the protection of (his conception of) justice. Moreover, (…) this conception of justice is a "negative" one, requiring only that we refrain from injuring others. Justice: A government reflecting this conception of justice would be summoned into action only upon the infringement of someone's person, property, or promise. We might consider Smith's conception of justice, then, a "negative, defensive only“ [NDO] conception of justice, or "NDO" conception, one whose core purpose is provide us defensive protection against infringements. Individualism: Finally, (…) all of the various positive duties of beneficence that we have are not, according to Smith, duties of government, but, rather, duties of us as individuals (and as voluntary and private groups). >Community/Adam Smith, >Political economy/Adam Smith, >Governance/Adam Smith, >Natural Law/Adam Smith. Liberalism: Smith actually spends far more time in WN⁽¹⁾ describing the ways that government makes mistakes, overreaches, and engages in counterproductive activities, sometimes through corruption and sometimes through incompetence, sometimes with malice and sometimes unintentionally. Anarchism/libertarianism: But Smith is not an anarchist; he is not even a principled modern-day libertarian. Instead, he articulates a positive and robust role for government, though he limits its powers and authorities to a small range of specific duties. Here is one key passage [from WN⁽¹⁾]: „All systems either of preference or of restraint, therefore, being thus completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord. Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those of any other man, or order of men. The sovereign is completely discharged from a duty, in the attempting to perform which he must always be exposed to innumerable delusions, and for the proper performance of which no human wisdom or knowledge could ever be suficient; the duty of superintending the industry of private people, and of directing it towards the employments most suitable to the interest of the society. According to the system of natural liberty, the sovereign has only three duties to attend to; three duties ofgreat importance, indeed, but plain and intelligible to common understandings: first, the duty of protecting the societyfrom the violence and invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; and, thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public institutions, which it can never befor the interest ofany individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain; because the profit could never repay the expence to any individual or small number of individuals, though it may frequently do much more than repay it to agreat society.“ (WN⁽¹⁾: 687-8) Otteson I 52 Government/Adam Smith: the Smithian government is quite small by contemporary standards. 1. Smith, Adam. (1776) The Wealth of Nations. London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell. 2. Smith, Adam (1982) [1759]. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie, eds. Liberty Fund.	EconSmith I Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010 EconSmithV I Vernon L. Smith Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009 Otteson I James R. Otteson The Essential Adam Smith Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2018
Government Policy	Schumpeter	Sobel I 28 Government policy/Schumpeter/Sobel/Clemens: Schumpeter's ideas about the functioning of government were likely informed by his first-hand experience as the minister of finance of Austria. At the time, and even today, much of the economic analysis of government intervention relied on a set ofimplicit (sometimes explicit) assumptions about the actors in the political sphere - that they are selfless, benevolent, leaders and bureaucrats worried only about the public interest, untouched by influence from interest groups. Indeed, much of the interventionist approach to macroeconomic policy championed by John Maynard Keynes implicitly relies on the wise actions of benevolent government actors who selflessly worry about the common good. SchumpeterVsKeynes: Schumpeter knew from his own experience that these assumptions were incorrect. >John Maynard Keynes, >Keynesianism. Democracy: Schumpeter understood that democracy was merely an alternative process for producing social and economic outcomes, and "it would not necessarily follow that the political decisions produced by that process from the raw material of those individual volitions would represent anything that could in any convincing sense be called the will of the people" (CSD⁽¹⁾: 254). Regarding the idea that government pursues some common good, Schumpeter argues: „There is, first, no such thing as a uniquely determined common good that all People could agree on or be made to agree on by the force of rational argument. This is due not primarily to the fact that some people may want things other than the common good but to the much more fundamental fact that to different individuals and groups the common good is bound to mean different things ... as a consequence ... the particular concept of the will of the people ... vanishes into thin air.“ (CSD⁽¹⁾: 251-252) Sobel/Clemens: Schumpeter recognized that to understand democratic outcomes one must look to understand the motivations and different desires of the individuals involved in the process, be they the voters, elected politicians, or administrators and bureaucrats running government agencies. That is, to understand democratic outcomes one must understand the role of what he termed "Human Nature in Politics". Thus, Schumpeter shared a common insight With the founders of the field of public choice, such as Nobel Laureate James Buchanan, who recognized that just because individuals step into the public sphere, they do not suddenly start acting for the common good - instead they continue to be self-interested actors concerned With their own goals and desires. >James M. Buchanan, >Public Choice Theory, >Public Choice. Democracy/Schumpeter: According to Schumpeter, democracy is best understood as follows: "it may be put into the nutshell of a definition ... the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for people's vote" (CSD⁽¹⁾: 269). According to Schumpeter, as far as there are genuine group-wise volitions ... we are now able to insert them in exactly the role they actually play … called to life by some political leader who turns them into political factors ... by working them up and by including eventually appropriate items in his competitive offering ... The incessant competitive struggle to get into offce or to Stay in it imparts to every consideration of policies and measures the bias so admirably expressed by the phrase about "dealing in votes". (CSD⁽¹⁾: 270, 287).	EconSchum I Joseph A. Schumpeter The Theory of Economic Development An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Cambridge/MA 1934 German Edition: Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Leipzig 1912 Sobel I Russell S. Sobel Jason Clemens The Essential Joseph Schumpeter Vancouver 2020
Grammar	Wittgenstein	II 35 Application/use/grammar/convention/Wittgenstein: grammar does not say anything about application - as well as convention - presupposes applications. - E.g. That red differs from blue in a different way than red and chalk, because not formal, is not verified experimentally. >Conventions, >Properties, >Use. II 38 Grammar/Wittgenstein: in it there are no gaps - it is always complete - in it no discoveries are made - E.g. Sheffer stroke: was not a discovery, but a new space was found. >Sheffer stroke II 115 Grammar/Wittgenstein: we cannot describe it - because for this we would have to use the language again - grammar cannot cause that we say something that is not true - it is not determined by facts. >Facts. II 229 Grammar/Wittgenstein: of a grammatical rule, we cannot say that it corresponds to a fact or that contradicts it - the rules of grammar are independent of the facts. II 230 Example of the term "The primary color No. 7" has no meaning - wrong: to believe that this would correspond to a fact of nature - the term has no parallels to E.g. "There is no two-meter man that would fit the standard sizes" - N.B.: on contrast, we could well ask why we do not have a 7th primary color if the grammar of "color" is arbitrary - that 7 colors cannot be arranged in a polyhedron, is not a natural fact. >Colour. II 436 Mathematics/grammar/Wittgenstein/(s): important for him is always the method or process.	W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Gravitation	Kanitscheider	Gravity/Newton: Law of action at a distance: K = γ m₁ m₂/r². This can be written in the form of an equation for the potential φ: Δφ = 4πγρ. Potential φ: Feldstärke der Gravitation. Differenzen des Potentials leisten Arbeit! The potential at a point is determined to an integral for 0 - infinity. This degenerates at r > infinity to an indefinite expression. But since we observe clear differences of the potential (field strength of gravity), the universe must have a different structure. This leads to the "gravitation paradox" of classical cosmology. Solution: Assumption of the cosmological constant λ. Then the Poisson-equation is transformed into Δφ = 4πγρ+λφ. Problem: local untestability: because the recoil force caused by it would be measurable only in very distant areas. Gravity/space/equilibrium/cosmology/kanitscheider: only in a universe without center and edge the gravitational effects of all bodies can compensate each other! With an island distribution an agglomeration of matter would have to occur soon, whereby the potential gravitational energy is converted into radiation. To avoid this, one would have to grant the bodies or the galaxy gas stronger own velocity. Problem: by the so strong movement the islands would dissolve soon. It would lead to the evaporation and desolation of the universe. I 143 Gravitational Paradox/Olbers Paradox/Charlier: ingenious solution: hierarchical arrangement of stepwise concentric aggregates of celestial bodies, where the lower order systems always make up the elements of the higher ones. This eliminates the need for an unstable balance of forces. The density ρ becomes lower and lower. 1st Vs: as a result of inhomogeneity, no sampled volume is large enough to be typical. The cosmological principle that a finite part of the infinite universe is representative in terms of large-scale structures is not applicable. 2nd Vs: the hierarchical conception requires an asymptotically flat space structure, which violates the idea of dependence of the spacetime metric on matter content. Unsatisfactory for relativistic conceptions. 3rd Vs: in conflict with observed background radiation. >Olbers paradox. I 174 Gravity/Canite separator: The local simulatability of gravity by acceleration is a significant difference to electromagnetism. Masses are neutral, charges are accelerated by an external according to their charge (positive/negative). Gravitation/Einstein/Kanitscheider: Einstein's theory does not fulfill the superposition principle, according to which the gravitational effect of two bodies can be put together additively. The metric field with its curvature possesses also mass energy! This provides for a self-interaction of the gravitation! That means that the graviton is "charged", while the carrier of the electromagnetic interaction, the photon, is electrically neutral. Space curvature/wave/channel separator: also a gravitational wave has, if it has separated from its source, energy and momentum, acts accordingly as source and delivers a contribution to the space curvature. I 182 Gravitation/Cosmology/Kanitscheider: Gravitation is not shieldable in contrast to electromagnetism. Therefore it is the only interaction which is used to explain the universe. >Space Curvature/Kanitscheider.	Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Grice	Avramides	I 26 Grice/Avramidis: Grice view should be understood as a conceptual analysis, not as reductionism. - Not as physicalism. - Grice wants a reconciliation with Frege and Davidson. >Philosophy of mind, >Gottlob Frege, >Donald Davidson, >Paul Grice. I 42f Grice/Avramides: Thesis: the problem of sentence meaning (meaning of the whole utterance) takes precedence over the meaning of partial statements. >Sentence meaning, >Word meaning, >Clauses, >Compositionality, >Frege-Principle, >Subsententials. Statement/Grice: is understood broadly, also signals etc. Important argument: thus, the analysis ranges in a situation meaning before the timeless meaning (the standard meaning). >Situation, >Situation/Psychology, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. Only so can he equate"x means something" with "S means something (in a situation) with x". 1st Version; ... A response from the listener is induced ... 2nd Version: ... in addition: the listener must recognize the intention of the speaker. I 44 3rd Version: in addition: the recognition of the speaker's intention must act as a reason for the belief of the listener. Vs: there are still many counterexamples. I 45 GriceVsGrice: counter-E.g. it is a difference whether I spontaneously frown in a situation or in order to express my displeasure to a person. Important argument: exactly the same information is transmitted, no matter if the speaker has the intention to communicate or not. Then there is no reason to distinguish between natural and non-natural meaning. >Natural meaning/non-natural meaning. The difference has to do with what the frowning person can expect the listener to believe - but without intention no meaning - non-natural meaning (without intention) never sufficient for response. I 46 E.g. thumbscrews mean nothing. I 67 Grice/Avramides: so far, the analysis is not sufficient for timeless (linguistic meaning. - Only for speaker-meaning. Meaning/Grice: meaning is to be found both outside language and within. I 68 Timeless meaning/Grice: disjunction of findings and about what people want to achieve with x. - This is also an effect etc. but not a practice. It is not sufficient (because it may have a second meaning), and not necessary (it may have alternatives). - But it is a "procedure in the repertoire". >Practise, >Language behavior, >Language community, >Convention. I 111 Reductionist Gricean/Loar: This position risks to accept thinking without language. >Thinking without language.	Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989
Group Cohesion	Psychological Theories	Haslam I 192 Group cohesion/psychological theories: [in] an old experiment by Back (1951)⁽¹⁾ in which high (vs. low) levels of cohesion were manipulated in a variety of ways. In particular, researchers generated high cohesion by leading pairs of participants meeting for the first time to expect that they were similar and would like one another. Participants in this condition exhibited the strongest evidence for groupthink symptoms. A subsequent meta-analysis of similar lab studies further indicated that manipulations of cohesion based on personal attractiveness (but not cohesion based on task commitment or group pride) were associated with worse group decisions (Mullen et al., 1994)⁽²⁾. >Group think/psychological theories, >Group behavior/psychological theories, >Social groups/psychological theories. Both the social identity maintenance (Turner and Pratkanis, 1998a;⁽³⁾ >Group think/Pratkanis) and the social discomfort approach (McCauley, 1998⁽⁴⁾) include cohesion as a primary antecedent to groupthink.[anyway they differ in relation] to the nature of that cohesion. a) Turner and Pratkanis (1998a)⁽³⁾ adopt a social identity approach and define cohesion in terms of members’ identification/self-categorization with a group b) McCauley (1998)⁽⁴⁾, on the other hand, posits that a sense of commitment or group pride is less important than cohesion grounded in agreeable personal relations among members. Comparison of effects: Michael Hogg and Sarah Hains (1998)⁽⁵⁾ manipulated types of cohesion in laboratory groups, varying whether it was based on personal attractiveness (i.e., prior friendship) or social attractiveness (i.e., grounded in a shared group identity). They also measured friendship and group identification. VsMcCauley: Their findings were mixed, but the overall pattern suggested – contrary to McCauley (1998)⁽⁴⁾; Cf. >Group think/McCauley) – that cohesion grounded in personal relations was associated with fewer/weaker groupthink-like symptoms, whereas cohesion grounded in collective identity was associated with more/stronger symptoms (see also Haslam et al., 2006)⁽⁶⁾. Difference between the studies of McCauley and Hogg/Hains: McCauley focused on people meeting for the first time while Hogg and Hains examined groups of existing friends. Friendship: Once friendly relations exist and can, at least to some extent, be taken for granted, disagreement and divergence may become more permissible (see also McKelvey and Kerr, 1988)⁽⁷⁾. >Friendship. 1. Back, K. (1951) ‘Influence through social communications’, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 46: 9–23. 2. Mullen, B., Anthony, T., Salas, E. and Driskell, J.E. (1994) ‘Group cohesiveness and quality of decision making: An integration of tests of the groupthink hypothesis’, Small Group Research, 25: 189–204. 3. Turner, M.E. and Pratkanis, A.R. (1998a) ‘A social identity maintenance model of groupthink’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 210–35. 4. McCauley, C. (1998) ‘Group dynamics in Janis’ theory of groupthink: Backward and forward’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 146–62. 5. Hogg, M.A. and Hains, S.C. (1998) ‘Friendship and group identification: A new look at the role of cohesiveness in groupthink’, European Journal of Social Psychology, 28: 323–41. 6. Haslam, S.A., Ryan, M.K., Postmes, T., Spears, R., Jetten, J. and Webley, P. (2006) ‘Sticking to our guns: Social identity as a basis for the maintenance of commitment to faltering organizational projects’, Journal of Organizational Behavior, 27: 607–28. 7. McKelvey, M. and Kerr, N.H. (1988) ‘Differences in conformity among friends and strangers’, Psychological Reports, 62: 759–62. Dominic J. Packer and Nick D. Ungson, „Group Decision-Making. Revisiting Janis’ groupthink studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications	Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Group Rights	Kukathas	Gaus I 256 Toleration/society/group rights/Kukathas: Kukathas (1997⁽¹⁾; 2001⁽²⁾; 2003b⁽³⁾), in particular, has argued vigorously that toleration is so important a liberal virtue that a liberal order will tolerate a diversity of cultures even if some of them are highly illiberal. What a good society protects is freedom of association, not autonomy. And for as long as individuals are free to exit the arrangements or communities or groups within which they find themselves, that order is legitimate - even if it might be one in which many groups or communities are highly illiberal in as much as they are themselves intolerant of diversity. Group rights/KukathasVsKymlicka: This view, however, gives no particular rights to groups as such, and denies them the external protections advocated by Kymlicka and others; though it also denies outside authorities any right to intervene to lift internal restrictions imposed by such communities upon their members. >Diversity/Multiculturalism, >Group rights/Political philosophy, >Minority rights/Political philosophy, >Minorities/Multiculturalism, >Multiculturalism. 1. Kukathas, Chandran (1997) 'Cultural toleration'. In Will Kymlicka and Ian Shapiro, eds, Ethnicity and Group Rights: NOMOS XXXIX New York: New York University Press, 69—104. 2. Kukathas, Chandran (2001) 'Is Feminism Bad for Multiculturalism?' Public Affairs Quarterly, 15 (2): 83-98. 3. Kukathas, Chandran (2003b) The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Groupthink	Psychological Theories	Haslam I 182 Groupthink/psychological theories: Example: after the failure of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion which had been planned by a group of highly intelligent people the question came up how this failure had been possible. >Group think/Janis. Psychological tradition: Beginning of the 1970s theory and research on group and organizational decision-making were dominated by individualistic subjective utility theory (Kramer, 1998)⁽¹⁾, according to which a single person’s subjective evaluations of risk and reward affect their decision-making processes. >Decision-making processes. JanisVsTradition: stressed the group dynamics underlying these decisions. In particular, he theorized Haslam I 183 that the cohesiveness of groups could motivate their members to prioritize group harmony and unanimity over careful deliberation when making decisions. >Group cohesion. Haslam I 187 Criticisms VsJanis: Philip Tetlock (1979)⁽²⁾: Consistent with the groupthink model, public statements in groupthink cases were more simplistic and tended to make more ingroup-favouring references than public statements in non-groupthink cases. However, inconsistent with the model, public statements in groupthink cases were no more likely to make negative references to outgroups. Clark McCauley (1989)⁽³⁾: three of [Janis’] cases (i.e., North Korea, Pearl Harbor, Watergate) indeed appeared to involve group members internalizing collective beliefs (i.e., privately agreeing with group decisions). However, he concluded that the Bay of Pigs invasion and Vietnam War escalation were better characterized as involving compliance – that is, members publicly expressed agreement with group positions without privately accepting them, presumably due to social pressures to conform. TetlockVsJanis: (Tetlock et al 1992)⁽⁴⁾: The authors found some evidence consistent with the groupthink model: structural and procedural faults (e.g., directive leadership, decision-making procedures) predicted groupthink symptoms. However, in contrast to Janis’ original formulation, group cohesiveness and high stress conditions did not emerge as key antecedents to groupthink symptoms. Haslam I 188 PetersonVsJanis: (Peterson et al. 1998)⁽⁵⁾ found support for the idea that decision-making styles and procedures have important implications for the success and failures of real corporations. However, there were some caveats: (…) ’unsuccessful groups’ identified by Peterson and colleagues did not resemble the sorts of groups likely to be plagued by groupthink as characterized by Janis; rather, they tended to have weaker leaders and less cohesion. In contrast, ‘successful groups’ were characterized by stronger leaders, greater willingness to take risks, and more optimism. Laboratory studies: have generally focused on manipulating groupthink antecedents (e.g., cohesion, decision-making procedures) to examine their effects on groupthink symptoms and decision quality. Cohesion has been manipulated in a variety of ways: giving false feedback regarding the compatibility of group members’ attitudes, offering rewards to Haslam I 189 successful groups, forming groups from friends vs. strangers, or highlighting shared group membership among individuals (for a review, see Esser, 1998⁽⁶⁾: 127–133). Results: these laboratory studies have not found a consistent causal relationship between group cohesion and groupthink symptoms. However,(…) the inconsistency of these results may have much to do with inconsistency in the way cohesion has been defined and operationalized. VsJanis: although there are empirical observations that some of Janis’ (1972⁽⁷⁾, 1982⁽⁸⁾) antecedents may produce certain groupthink symptoms, it seems fair to say that there is little or no evidence from either case or lab studies for a strict model in which all of Janis’ (1972⁽⁷⁾, 1982⁽⁸⁾) antecedents must be present to elicit the symptoms of groupthink, or in which all groupthink symptoms necessarily co-occur. There is also little evidence for an additive model in which the accumulation of antecedents produces more or stronger symptoms (see Turner and Pratkanis, 1998b). Haslam I 193 Group dynamics: Robert S. Baron: Baron (2005)⁽⁹⁾ argued that groupthink-like dynamics, including conformity, suppression of dissent, polarization, self-censorship, illusions of consensus and intergroup bias are actually commonplace – meaning that they are ubiquitous to pretty much any meaningful group. Baron (2005)⁽⁹⁾ further argued that failures to find strong or consistent evidence for the antecedent conditions of groupthink may actually reflect the fact that it is so common. In other words, there is little variation to detect because most groups exhibit groupthink-like symptoms and defective decision-making processes. >Groupthink/Packer. 1. Kramer, R.M. (1998) ‘Revisiting the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam decisions 25 years later: How well has the groupthink hypothesis stood the test of time?’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 236–71. 2. Tetlock, P.E. (1979) ‘Identifying victims of groupthink’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37: 1314–24. 3. McCauley, C. (1989) ‘The nature of social influence in groupthink: Compliance and internalization’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57: 250–60. 4. Tetlock, P.E., Peterson, R.S., McGuire, C., Chang, S. and Feld, P. (1992) ‘Assessing political group dynamics: A test of the groupthink model’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63: 403–25. 5. Peterson, R.S., Owens, P.D., Tetlock, P.E., Fan, E.T. and Martorana, P. (1998) ‘Group dynamics in top management teams: Groupthink, vigilance, and alternative models of organizational failure and success’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 272–305. 6. Esser, J.K. (1998) ‘Alive and well after 25 years: A review of groupthink research’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 116–41. 7. Janis, I.L. (1972) Victims of Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 8. Janis, I.L. (1982) Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 9. Baron, R.S. (2005) ‘So right it’s wrong: Groupthink and the ubiquitous nature of polarized group decision-making’, Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 37: 219–253. Dominic J. Packer and Nick D. Ungson, „Group Decision-Making. Revisiting Janis’ groupthink studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications	Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Hedonism	Rawls	I 554 Def Hedonism/Rawls: in tradition, hedonism is interpreted in two ways: a) as the view that the only intrinsic good is the feeling of something pleasant, or b) as the psychological thesis that enjoyment is the only thing that individuals aspire to. I 557 Rawls: I see hedonism as an attempt to impose the concept of the ultimate goal, i.e. to show that a rational decision is always possible, at least in principle. Although this attempt fails, it is worthwhile to show the difference between utilitarianism and contract theory in his example. >Rationality, >Utilitarianism, >Contract Theory. Hedonism/Rawls: therefore assumes that there must be an ultimate goal, because there is no rational way of weighing equal goals against each other. For him, enjoyment is simply a pleasant feeling and thus the only candidate for a superordinate goal, by eliminating competing goals, not by a principle. If there are rational choices, there must be a supreme goal and happiness or another objective goal cannot be it because that would be circular⁽¹⁾. >Goals, >Purposes. I 556 Hedonism/Sidgwick/Rawls: even if too little information is available, maximum pleasure conveys an idea of good. For Sidgwick, this is sufficient to ensure that pleasure as a rational goal is an orientation of thought⁽²⁾. RawlsVsHedonism: he fails to define a reasonable superordinate goal, because once the pleasure is described in sufficient detail,... I 557 ...so that it can be included in the rational considerations of the actor, it is no longer plausible that it should be the sole rational objective⁽³⁾. ((s) Explanation: For example, when it comes to experiencing the birth of a grandchild, there must be a superordinate goal, namely to live for so long. If the acting person is asked what is more important to him, his own life or the life of the grandchild, he will probably give up his hedonism.) Pleasure/Sidgwick/RawlsVsSidgwick/Rawls: it is difficult for him to weigh up and evaluate different forms of pleasure against each other⁽⁴⁾. >H. Sidgwick. Pleasure/Aristotle/Rawls: Aristotle says that a good person gives up his life for a friend if necessary, on the grounds that he prefers a short period of intense pleasure to a long, dull life⁽⁵⁾. Santayana/Rawls: means that we have to weigh up the relative value of pleasure and pain against each other. >The Good/Aristotle. Petrarca/Santayana/Rawls: when Petrarca says that a thousand pleasures cannot outweigh a single pain, he adopts a yardstick that goes back beyond both possibilities. The acting person must involve his whole life in the weighing process. So the problem of multiplicity of purposes comes back⁽⁶⁾. I 558 Economic theory/demand theory/Rawls: It is a misunderstanding that in modern economic theory, e. g. demand theory, the problem of hedonism would be solved. Here, needs are arranged convexly and completely as a set of alternatives. Then there is a utility function that selects the best alternative for an individual. RawlsVs: however, this can only be taken as a guideline if an individual wishes to adhere to it. But then we have returned to the issue of rational choice^(7)(8)(9). >Rational Choice. 1. See C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory (London, 1930). 2. See H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (London, 1907), pp. 405-407. 3. Cf. Broad, p. 187. 4. Sidgwick, p. 127. 5. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1169a17-26. 6. G. Santayana, The Life of Reason in Common Sense (New York, 1905) pp. 237f. 7. See L. Walras, Elements of Pure Economics, Homewood, Ill, 1954, p. 256. 8. P. A. Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis (Cambridge, 1947), pp. 90-92. 9. R.D. Luce and H. Raiffa, Games and Decisions (New York, 1957), pp. 16, 21-24, 38.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Heritability	Molecular Genetics	Slater I 127 Heritability/molecular genetics: Genome-wide association studies of cognitive ability test scores have yielded many alleles of extremely small effects that tend not to replicate from sample to sample and account at best for only tiny proportions of trait variance. At present we have not yet identified a single gene locus robustly associated with normal range cognitive ability test scores (Davis, Butcher, Docherty, Meaburn, & Curtis, 2010(1); Deary, Penke, & Johnson, 2010)(2). The general failure to identify clear associations between particular gene loci and highly heritable, well-measured common traits has been termed the “missing heritability problem” (Maher, 2008)(3). [There are] more complex genetic mechanisms (see Johnson, Penke, & Spinath, 2011(4), for more detailed information). 1. Davis, O. S., Butcher, L. M., Docherty, S. J., Meaburn, E. L., & Curtis, C. J. (2010). A three-stage genome-wide association study of general cognitive ability: Hunting the small effects. Behavior Genetics, 40, 759–767. 2. Deary, I. J., Penke, L., & Johnson, W. (2010). The neuroscience of human intelligence differences. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 11, 201–211. 3 .Maher, B. (2008). The case of the missing heritaiblity. Nature, 456, 18–21. 4. Johnson, W., Penke, L., & Spinath, F. M. (2011). Heritability in the era of molecular genetics. European Journal of Personality, 25, 254–266. Wendy Johnson: „How Much Can We Boost IQ? Updated Look at Jensen’s (1969) Question and Answer“, in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Hermeneutics	Schleiermacher	Gadamer I 171 Hermeneutics/Schleiermacher/Gadamer: In the beginning, Schleiermacher as well as Hegel are aware of loss and alienation from tradition, which challenges their hermeneutical reflection. Yet they determine the task of hermeneutics in very different ways. Schleiermacher (...) is entirely focused on restoring the original purpose of a work in understanding. For art and literature handed down to us from the past have been wrenched from their original world. Thus Schleiermacher writes that it is no longer the natural and original, "when works of art come into circulation. Namely, each has a part of its comprehensibility from its original purpose". "Hence the work of art, torn out of its original context if it is not preserved historically, loses its significance. "He almost says, "So a work of art is therefore actually rooted in its ground, in its environment. It already loses its meaning when it is torn out of this environment and goes into circulation, it is like something that has been rescued from the fire and now bears scorch marks"⁽¹⁾. Gadamer I 172 Gadamer: According to Schleiermacher, historical knowledge opens the way to replace what has been lost and restoring tradition, provided it brings back the occidental and original. In this way, the hermeneutic endeavor seeks to regain the "point of contact" in the spirit of the artist, who should first make the meaning of a work of art fully understandable, just as it is usually done with texts by striving to reproduce the author's original production. ((s) Cf. the discussion of various philosophical theories on >Meaning Change). GadamerVsSchleiermacher: (...) the question is whether what is gained here is really what we seek as the meaning of the work of art, and whether understanding is correctly determined when we see in it a Second Creation, the reproduction of the original production. In the end, such a determination of hermeneutics is no less absurd than all restitution and restoration of past life. Restoration of original conditions, like all restoration, is a powerless beginning in view of the historicity of our being. Hegel/Gadamer: Hegel takes a different path than Schleiermacher: >Hermeneutics/Hegel. Gadamer I 182 SchleiermacherVsDilthey/SchleiermacherVsTradition/Gadamer: Schleiermacher (...) seeks the unity of hermeneutics no longer in the content-related unity of the tradition to which understanding is to be applied, but detached from all content-related particularity in the unity of a procedure that is not differentiated even by the way the thoughts are transmitted, whether in writing or orally, in a foreign or in one's own simultaneous language. (Cf. >Hermeneutics/Dilthey). Schleiermacher's idea of a universal hermeneutics is determined from Gadamer I 183 there. It arose from the idea that the experience of strangeness and the possibility of misunderstanding is a universal one. SchleiermacherVsTradition: (...) precisely the extension of the hermeneutic task to the "meaningful conversation", which is particularly characteristic of Schleiermacher, shows how the meaning of the strangeness that hermeneutics is supposed to overcome has fundamentally changed in comparison to the previous task of hermeneutics. Strangeness is indissolubly given in a new, universal sense with the individuality of the "you". Gadamer: Nevertheless, one must not take the lively, even brilliant sense of human individuality that distinguishes Schleiermacher as an individual characteristic that influences theory here. Rather, it is the critical rejection of all that which in the Age of Enlightenment under the title "Reasonable Thoughts" was regarded as the common essence of humanity, which requires a fundamental redefinition of the relationship with tradition⁽²⁾. Gadamer I 188 Understanding/SchleiermacherVsTradtion: (...) instead of an "aggregate of observations" [it is necessary] to develop a real art of understanding. This means something fundamentally new. For now, the difficulty of understanding and misunderstanding is no longer reckoned with as occasional moments, but as integrating moments, the prior elimination of which is at stake. This is how Schleiermacher virtually defines: "Hermeneutics is the art of avoiding misunderstanding". It rises above the pedagogical occasionality of the interpretative Gadamer I 189 practice for the autonomy of a method, provided that "misunderstanding is self-evident and understanding at every point must be wanted and sought"⁽³⁾. Gadamer I 191 Hermeneutics includes a grammatical and psychological "art of interpretation". Schleiermacher's own speciality, however, is psychological interpretation. It is ultimately a divinatory behaviour, a putting oneself in the writer's entire condition, a view of the "inner course of production" of the creation of a work⁽⁴⁾. Understanding, then, is a reproduction related to an original production, a recognition of what has been recognized (Boeckh)⁽⁵⁾, a reconstruction that starts from the living moment of conception, the "sprouting decision" as the organizing point of the composition⁽⁶⁾. Gadamer: But such an isolating description of understanding means that the thought construct that we want to understand as speech or text is not understood in terms of its factual content, but as an aesthetic construct, as a work of art or as "artistic thinking". >Genius/Schleiermacher, >Understanding/Schleiermacher. Understanding/Schleiermacher: Schleiermacher [comes] to the conclusion that it is necessary to understand a writer better than he or she has understood him- or herself - a formula that has been repeated ever since and in whose changing interpretation the entire history of modern hermeneutics becomes apparent. 1. Schleiermacher, Ästhetik, ed. R. Odebrecht, S. 84 ff. 2. Chr. Wolff and his school included the "general art of interpretation" in philosophy, since "finally everything aims at the fact that one may recognize and examine other truths, if one understands their speech" (J. Walch, Philosophisches Lexikon, (1726), p. 165). It is similar for Bentley when he demands of the philologist: "His only guides are reason, the light of the author's thoughts and their compelling force" (quoted from Wegner, Altertumskunde, p. 94). 3. Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik § 15 und 16, Werke I, 7, S. 29f. 4. Schleiermacher Werke I, 7, S. 83. 5. Schleiermacher Werke III, 3, S. 355, 358, 364. 6. Boeckh, Enzyklopädie und Methodologie der philologischen Wissenschaft, ed. Bratuschek, 2.Autfl. 1886, S. 10.	Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Hierarchies	Evolutionary Psychology	Corr I 362 Hierarchy/Evolutionary Psychology: One major alteration in revised RST (>Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory) is the inclusion of a hierarchical arrangement of distributed brain systems that mediate specific defensive behaviours associated with level of threat experienced, ranging from the prefrontal prefrontal cortex, at the highest level, to the periaqueductal grey, at the lowest level. To each structure is assigned a specific class of mental disorder (McNaughton and Corr 2008a)⁽¹⁾. According to this perspective, separate emotions (e.g., fear, panic, etc.) may be seen as reflecting the evolution of specific neural modules to deal with specific environmental demands (e.g., flee in the face of a predator) and, as these separate systems evolved and started to work together, some form of regulatory process (e.g., when one module is active, others are inactivated) evolved. >Anxiety. The resulting hierarchical nature of this defence system reflects the fact that simpler systems must have evolved before more complex ones, which provides a solution to the problem of conflicting action systems: the later systems evolved to have inhibitory control on lower-level systems. The result of this process of evolution is the existence of hierarchically ordered series of defensive reactions, each appropriate for a given defensive distance (i.e., level of threat perceived). This hierarchical arrangement (…) can be conveniently summarized in terms of a two-dimensional scheme, consisting of ‘defensive distance’ and ‘defensive direction’. >Terminology/Corr, >Order, >Classification. 1. McNaughton, N. & Corr, P. J. 2008a. The neuropsychology of fear and anxiety: a foundation for reinforcement sensitivity theory, in P. J. Corr (ed). The reinforcement sensitivity theory of personality, pp. 44–94. Cambridge University Press Philip J. Corr, „ The Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory of Personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Hierarchies	Psychological Theories	Corr I 136 Hierarchies/psychological theories/traits/Five-Factor Model/De Raad: Throughout the history of developing personality trait structures, hierarchy has played an inherent role. Possibly the most well-known hierarchy of traits is the strict hierarchy hypothesized by Eysenck (1970)⁽¹⁾. Leves are: type level (e.g. extraversion), trait level (e.g. sociability), habitual response level (e.g. entertaining strangers) and specific response level (e.g. telling jokes). Corr I 138 An interesting way of looking at hierarchy, which has been applied increasingly over the last decade (e.g., De Raad and Szirmák 1994⁽²⁾; Saucier, Georgiades, Tsaousis and Goldberg 2005⁽³⁾), is by giving the correlations between factors from different levels of extraction. E.g. First level: 1 factor (virtue) Second level: two factors (virtue and dynamism) Third level: three factors (virtue, anxiety and dynamism) Fourth level: four factors (virtue, anxiety, pleasure, and competence) ⁽⁴⁾ >J. Eysenck, >Personality traits/Eysenck. Corr I 139 Tests/hierarchies/traits/De Raad: Hierarchy is not only brought about psychometrically, through factoring variables or through factoring factors. Hampson, John and Goldberg (1986)⁽⁵⁾ explicitly searched for indexes of hierarchy according to principles of Category Breadth and Concept Asymmetry, to enable an empirical test of hierarchy. Hampson, John and Goldberg (1986)⁽⁵⁾ provided supportive empirical evidence for expected two-tiered (e.g., talkative is a way of being social) and three-tiered (e.g., musical is a way of being artistic, and artistic is a way of being talented) hierarchies for different types of descriptors (adjectives, verbs, nouns). Hampson et al. suggested that well-differentiated hierarchies are found in certain domains of the Big Five and not in others. >Big Five, >Five-factor model. For example, when overt occurrence of behaviour is signalled by a trait (e.g., Emotional Instability), differentiated hierarchies are more frequent than when non-occurrence (e.g., being passive, silent, reserved) of behaviour is signalled by a trait (e.g., Introversion). >Extraversion, >Introversion, >Behavior. 1. Eysenck, H. J. 1970. The structure of human personality, 3rd edn. London: Methuen 2. De Raad, B. and Szirmák, Z. 1994. The search for the ‘Big Five’ in a non-Indo-European language: the Hungarian trait structure and its relationship to the EPQ and the PTS, European Review of Applied Psychology 44: 17–24 3. Saucier, G. and Goldberg, L. R. 1996. Evidence for the Big Five in analyses of familiar English personality adjectives, European Journal of Personality 10: 61-77 4. De Raad, B. and Barelds, D. P. H. 2008. A new taxonomy of Dutch personality traits based on a comprehensive and unrestricted list of descriptors. descriptors. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 94: 347–64 5. Hampson, S. E., John, O. P. and Goldberg, L. R. (1986). Category breadth and hierarchical structure in personality: studies of asymmetries in judgments of trait implications, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51: 37–54 Boele De Raad, “Structural models of personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Historical Consciousness	Dilthey	Gadamer I 233 Historical Consciousness/Dilthey/Gadamer: Is there also an absolute spirit for Dilthey? (...) [i.e.] a complete self-transparency, complete erasure of all strangeness (...)? For Dilthey it is not a question that there is and that it is historical consciousness that corresponds to this ideal, and not speculative philosophy. It sees all the phenomena of the human-historical world only as objects by which the mind recognizes itself more deeply. Insofar as it understands them as objectivations of the spirit, it translates them back "into the spiritual vitality from which they emerged"⁽¹⁾. The formations of the objective mind are thus objects of self-knowledge of that spirit for the historical consciousness. Historical consciousness extends itself into the universal, provided that it understands all the circumstances of history as an expression of the life from which they originate; "life grasps life here"(2). In this respect, the entire tradition becomes a self-encounter of the human spirit for the historical consciousness. It thus draws to itself what seemed to be reserved for the special creations of art, religion and philosophy. Not in the speculative knowledge of the concept, but in the historical consciousness; the knowledge of the spirit of itself is completed Gadamer I 234 by itself. It preserves historical spirit in everyting. Even philosophy is only an expression of life. As long as it is aware of this, it thereby gives up its old claim to be knowledge through concepts. It becomes philosophy of philosophy, a philosophical justification of the fact that there is philosophy in life - besides science. Dilthey has in his latest works drafted such a philosophy of philosophy, in which he attributed the types of worldview to the multi-sidedness of life that is interpreted in them(3). Dilthey himself has pointed out that we only recognize historically because we ourselves are historical. That should be an epistemological relief. Gadamer I 235 GadamerVsDilthey: But can it be? Is Vico's often mentioned formula correct at all? Doesn't it transfer an experience of the human artistic spirit to the historical world, in which one cannot speak of "doing", i.e. planning and executing in the face of the course of events? Where is the epistemological relief to come from here? Isn't it in fact a complication? Must not the historical conditionality of consciousness represent an insurmountable barrier for its completion in historical knowledge? Hegel/Gadamer: Hegel might have thought that by abolishing history in absolute knowledge this barrier had been overcome. But if life is the inexhaustible-creative reality as which Dilthey thinks it is, must not the constant change of the context of meaning of history exclude a knowledge that reaches objectivity? So is historical consciousness in the end a utopian ideal and contains a contradiction in itself? >Understanding/Dilthey, >Consciousness/Dilthey. Gadamer I 238 What is the distinction of the historical consciousness (...) that its own conditionality cannot abolish the fundamental claim to objective recognition? Knowledge/Absolute Knowledge: His distinction cannot be that it is really in the sense of Hegel's "absolute knowledge", that is, that it unites in a present self-consciousness the whole of the becoming of the spirit. Truth: The claim of the philosophical consciousness to contain in itself the whole truth of the history of the spirit is just denied by the historical world view. That is rather the reason why historical experience requires that human consciousness is not an infinite intellect for whom everything is simultaneously and equally present. Absolute identity of consciousness and object is in principle unattainable to finite-historical consciousness. Gadamer I 239 Dilthey/Gadamer: [one can summarize his view like this]: Historical consciousness is not so much self-extinction ((s) as in Hegel) as an increased possession of itself, which distinguishes it from all other forms of the spirit. It no longer simply applies the measures of its own understanding of life to the tradition in which it stands and thus further forms in naive appropriation of the tradition ("tradition" as in handing down sth) the tradition ("tradition" as in heritage). It knows itself rather to itself and to the tradition in which it stands, in a reflected relationship. It understands itself from its history. Historical consciousness is a way of self-knowledge. >Life/Dilthey. 1. Ges. Schr. Vll V, 265 2. Ges. Schr. Vll VII, 136 3. Ges. Schriften V, 339ff u. Vlll.	Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
History	Gould	IV 43 History/selection/Darwinism/Gould: according to the traditional point of view Darwinism is first and foremost a theory of natural selection. Gould: that is certainly true, but the reference to power and scope of selection has become overzealous when we try to attribute every conceivable form and behaviour to their direct influence. Another often forgotten principle prevents any optimal adaptation: the strange and yet compelling paths of history! Organisms are subject to the constraints of inherited forms that slow down their evolution! They cannot be reshaped every time their environment changes. IV 44 History/Gould: a world that would be optimally adapted to its current environment would be a world without history, such a world could have been created as we find it now. >Selection, >Evolution.	Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989
Hobbes	Gaus	Gaus I 109 Hobbes/justice/liberalism/Gaus: the line between a Hobbesian justification of liberal principles and what I shall call a ‘liberal theory of justice’ is fuzzy and open to challenge. The rationale for the distinction is this: utilitarian, Hobbesian and value subjectivist moralities may be employed to justify liberal arrangements, but depending on the details and assumptions, they can also justify distinctively illiberal policies. They thus require additional premises (say, the theory of the market) to ground liberal political principles. GausVsHobbes: After all, Hobbes’s own theory was distinctively illiberal. Liberalism: In contrast, what I shall call ‘liberal theories of justice’ tie the very idea of justice and moral reasoning to basic liberal principles. >Rights/Liberalism, >Rights/Mill. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Holism	Esfeld	I 16 ~ Holism/Esfeld: e.g. social community: a social community is more than the dependence of the thinking of others. Social: the social is not rigidly dependent: members die, new members come. A social role as a business man only is a part of the community. Generic: any other, but not a certain thing must exist. Not holistic: purely functional characterized systems are not holistic: e.g. traffic lights exist and function also without traffic and vice versa. I 29 Holism/characteristics/Esfeld: holism is not "this individual", not a disjoint (e.g. "round or angular"). It could be intrinsic or relational (more than causal). It is not correct to say: "the property to be a system (holistic system)". An Arrangement (that is causal itself) is not enough, but an interaction. Relational: there must be at least one thing with which it has no common parts. Also, to be alone is a relational property/Lewis: holistic properties form family. They do not have to be the same for every part of the system: e.g. heart/kidney. Holistic properties are relational (the arrangement is already assumed). They do not have to be intrinsic (e.g. natural numbers). I 28 Causation: causation is not enough, even properties which are the cause of things, can be intrinsic. They are ontological and not description dependent. Parts: e.g. bones are not holistic, but humans for social system are. Bones do not make up a part for a community. The holistic part is not transitive - the part is more narrow than in mereology. >Mereology, >Part-of-relation, >Parts. I 36 Arrangement property: an arrangement property is not enough: to be a heart is an arrangement property, e.g. a heart which the butcher sells, otherwise it is no heart anymore. Therefore the functional definition is not a holistic criterion. A holistic property cannot be detected in a description which can have the parts in isolation. I 42 Type A bottom-up: every constituent must have a few holistic properties: every belief is, as far as it has conceptual content dependent on other beliefs (e.g. social holism). Type B: holistic properties primarily belong to the system as a whole: e.g. conceptual content, confirmation, justification (e.g. quantum holism). Semantic holism: A or B is possible. I 50 Confirmation holism leads to semantic holism. Two dogmas: two dogmas represent both. >Two Dogmas, >Confirmation. I 366ff Holism/Esfeld: can we merge holism of physics and holism of philosophy of the mind? No, we can only follow them in one area and exclude the other. Belief-holism: can only take into account the conceptual area (quasi everyday language), not the quantum mechanical. Quantum holism is fixed on epistemic self-sufficiency and representationalism. >Quantum mechanics. Epistemic self-sufficiency equals internalism: belief states are independent of physical nature (intentional states can be the same in other environments) I 383 Holism/tradition: in the tradition of holism stand Parmenides, Spinoza and Bradley. >B. Spinoza, >Parmenides, >F.H. Bradley. Esfeld: Esfeld retains a revised Cartesianism. >Cartesianism, >R. Descartes.	Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Holism	Quine	VI 22 Holism/Quine: holism simply combats the idea that a sentence has its own separate empirical content. ((s) This is moderate). VI 22 Theory/GrünbaumVsHolism: one can always save a hypothesis by revising one's theoretical reserves of accepted sentences so that these, together with the threatened hypothesis, imply the absence of the prognosis. Holism/QuineVsGrünbaum: such an assumption does not even occur in my work. It is all about mitigating the wrong implication. Holism merely fights the naive idea that each sentence has its own separate empirical content. Empirical Content/Quine: is rather something that sentences have in common and in which even mathematical sentences indirectly participate. >Empirical Content/Quine. VI 79 Quine: HolismVsAnalyticity. XII 95 Translation/Theory/Holism/Quine: "strange translation": of whole theories, but not of the parts - because the assignment of subordinate clauses cannot be justified - several translations of subordinate clauses can produce the same empirical implications. > Translation, > Indeterminacy.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Honesty	Cultural Psychology	Slater I 169 Honesty/cultural psychology: the cultural specificity of children’s reasoning about lying and truth telling, with a focus on differences between Western and East Asian cultures has been in focus of recent research. This contrast is of particular interest in light of arguments by cultural theorists that there are important qualitative differences between Western and East Asian cultures, with individualism versus collectivism being the most widely studied dimension (see Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002⁽¹⁾ for a meta-analysis). Individualism involves a focus on individual rights and interests, with personal identity being based upon individual accomplishments. Collectivism focuses on the interests of a collective, with personal identity being based upon harmony within the group and participation in community-oriented activities. These differences point to different goals for interpersonal communication, with Western cultures placing greater emphasis on freedom of choice, self-esteem, and well-being, and East Asian cultures placing greater emphasis on collective goals and group cohesiveness. These differences call into question whether a model such as Kohlberg’s (>Morality/Kohlberg, >Honesty/Kohlberg) can be generalized across cultures, and raise the possibility of substantial cross-cultural differences in beliefs about what it means to be moral. Although lying in politeness situations tends to be evaluated similarly by children in East Asia and in the West (Xu, Bao, Fu, Taiwar, & Lee, 2010)⁽²⁾, there are cross-cultural differences in how the lies are justified. In Western cultures, the focus is on the recipient’s emotional wellbeing, whereas in East Asian cultures the focus is on the social implications for the recipient (i.e., his or her “face” or public persona; Bond & Hwang, 1986)⁽³⁾, which is consistent with evidence that individuals in East Asian cultures tend to place a high value on the ability to adapt one’s behavior across a range of social situations (Gao, 1998⁽⁴⁾; Heine, 2001⁽⁵⁾; Markus & Kitayama, 1991)⁽⁶⁾. Slater I 170 Heyman, Itakura, and Lee (2011)(7) found that Japanese children aged 7 to 11 judged the truthful acknowledgment of a good deed more negatively when it was made to an audience of classmates rather than in private. In contrast, there were no such effects of setting within a comparison group of children from the US. 1. Oyserman, D., Coon, H., & Kemmelmeier, M. (2002). Rethinking individualism and collectivism: Evaluation of theoretical assumptions and meta-analyses. Psychological Bulletin, 128, 3—73. 2. Xu, F., Bao, X., Fu, G., Taiwar, V, & Lee, K. (2010). Lying and truth-telling in children: From concept to action. Child Development, 81, 581—596. 3. Bond, M. H., & Hwang, K. K. (1986). The social psychology of Chinese people. In M. H. Bond (Ed.), The psychology of the Chinese people (pp. 213—266). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 4. Gao, G. (1998). “Don’t take my word for it.” — understanding Chinese speaking practices. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 22, 163—186. 5. Heine, S. J. (2001). Self as cultural product: An examination of East Asian and North American selves. Journal of Personality, 69, 881—906. 6. Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. Psychological Review, 98, 224—253. 7. Heyman, G. D., Itakura, S., & Lee, K. (201 1). Japanese and American chi1drens reasoning about accepting credit for prosocial behavior. Social Development, 20, 171—184. Gail D. Heyman and Kang Lee, “Moral Development. Revisiting Kohlberg’s Stages“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Human Nature	Conservatism	Gaus I 134 Human Nature/Conservatism/Kekes: [Pluralism] regards some political arrangements as necessary for good lives, but it allows for a generous plurality of possible political arrangements beyond the necessary minimum. The standard operates in the realm of moral necessity, and it leaves open what happens in the realm of moral possibility. The standard thus accommodates part of the universal values of absolutism and part of the context-dependent values of relativism. >Values/Relativism. Absolutism prevails in the realm of moral necessity; relativism in the realm of moral possibility. >Absolutism/Kekes. Human Nature: The source of this standard is human nature. (For a general account of the political significance of human nature for politics, see Berry, 1986⁽¹⁾. For the specific connection between human nature and conservatism, see Berry, 1983⁽²⁾.) To understand human nature sufficiently for the purposes of this standard does not require plumbing the depths of the soul, unravelling the obscure springs of human motivation, or conducting scientific research. It does not call for any metaphysical commitment and it can be Gaus I 135 held without subscribing to the existence of a natural law. It is enoug tor it to concentrate on n people in a commonsensical way. It will then become obvious that good lives depend on the satis- faction of basic physiological, psychological, and social needs: for nutrition, shelter, and rest; for companionship, self-respect, and the hope for a good or better life; for the division of labour, justice, and predictability in human affairs; and so forth. Absolutism: Society: Absolutists go beyond the minimum and think that their universal and objective standard applies all the way up to the achievement of good lives. Relativism: Relativists deny that there is such a standard. Values/Relativism. Pluralism: In this respect, pluralists side with relativists and oppose absolutists. Pluralists think that beyond the minimum level there is a plurality of values, of ways of ranking them, and of good lives that embody these values and rankings. According to pluralists, then, the political arrangements of a society ought to protect the minimum requirements of good lives and ought to foster a plurality of good lives beyond the minimum. >Values/Pluralism, >Conserevatism/Kekes. 1. Berry, Christopher J. (1986) Human Nature. London: Macmillan. 2. Berry, Christopher J. (1983) 'Conservatism and human nature'. In Ian Forbes and Steve Smith, eds, Politics and Human Nature. London: Pinter. Kekes, John 2004. „Conservtive Theories“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Human Rights	International Political Theory	Gaus I 293 Human rights/International political theory/Brown: (...) an account of universal principles based on the rights of individuals rather than on the rights of collectivities was instituted by the UN Charter of 1945, and, more specifically, by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948. There is, as might be expected, a very large literature on the international human rights regime; (...) (Dunne and Wheeler, 1999)⁽¹⁾. (...) one important feature of the human rights regime[:] although it purports to impose universal standards upon states, it has been, until very recently, itself statist in origin and modes of operation. It comprises declarations made by states, covenants signed and ratified by them, and institutions subordinated to them. Only in one case, that of the European Convention on Human Rights, can it be said that effective mechanisms exist for ensuring that states live up to their treaty obligations. Interventions/Problems: In the last decade or so practices have emerged that have challenged this situation. 1) In the first place, groups of states have, on occasion, taken it upon themselves to intervene forcibly in the internal affairs of another state, in the interests of its inhabitants; 2) second, more radically, developments in international law have begun to undermine the prin- ciple of sovereign immunity. As to the first of these changes - humanitarian intervention - the record of the 1990s has been mixed (Mayall, 1996⁽²⁾; Moore, 1998⁽³⁾). (...) although there have been developments of international law in this area, it may be premature to talk of an emerging norm of humanitarian intervention, as Nicholas Wheeler does (2000)⁽⁴⁾ in the best book on the subject. >Inequalities/International political theory. Gaus I 295 Economic rights/social rights: Economic and social rights are often described as 'second generation', political rights being 'first'. 'Third-generation' rights are the rights of peoples, which include such general notions as a right to self-determination, but also more specific sets of rights such as those of indigenous peoples (Crawford, 1988)⁽⁵⁾. Problems: There is a conceptual problem here; the notion of human rights is associated with the promotion of universal standards and equality of treatment, but the rights of peoples can only be meaningful if they endorse a right to be different. Indigenous peoples, for example, demand the right to be governed in terms of their own customs and mores, which may well not sit easily with universal norms; this is a well-recognized issue in the politics of multiculturalism (Kymlicka, 1995⁽⁶⁾; Parekh, 2000)⁽⁷⁾ (...). However, in international Gaus I 296 relations, the most striking manifestation of this problem arises in the context ofa wider challenge to the notion of human rights: the argument that the international human rights regime is based on specifically Western values, an argument most clearly articulated by a number of East Asian states, hence often referred to as the 'Asian values' debate (Bauer and Bell, 1999⁽⁸⁾; Bell, 2000⁽⁹⁾). Religion/family: The core argument is that the human rights identified in the 1948 Declaration and subsequently are related to a specifically Western conception of the individual and the public sphere; Asian values, it is argued, are oriented towards the family and the collectivity, stress duties and responsibilities rather than rights, and place a greater emphasis on religion. 1. Dunne, T. and N. Wheeler, eds (1999) Human Rights in Global Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Mayall, J., ed. (1996) The New Interventionism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Moore, J., ed. (1998) Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 4. Wheeler, N. J. (2000) Saving Strangers. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Crawford, J. , ed. (1988) The Rights of Peoples. Oxford: Clarendon. 6. Kymlicka, W. , ed. (1995) The Rights of Minority Cultures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 7. Parekh, B. (2000) Rethinking Multiculturalism. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 8. Bauer, J. and D. A. Bell, eds (1999) The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 9. Bell, D. (2000) East Meets West: Human Rights and Democracy in East Asia. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Brown, Chris 2004. „Political Theory and International Relations“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Humans	Bostrom	I 110 Humans/intelligence/biology/capacities/Bostrom: The principal reason for humanity’s dominant position on Earth is that our brains have a slightly expanded set of faculties compared with other animals. I 346 In what sense is humanity a dominant species on Earth? Ecologically speaking, humans are the most common large (~50 kg) animal, but the total human dry biomass (~100 billion kg) is not so impressive compared with that of ants, the family Formicidae (300 billion–3,000 billion kg). Humans and human utility organisms form a very small part (<0.001) of total global biomass. However, croplands and pastures are now among the largest ecosystems on the planet, covering about 35% of the ice-free land surface (Foley et al. 2007)⁽¹⁾. And we appropriate nearly a quarter of net primary productivity according to a typical assessment (Haberl et al. 2007)⁽²⁾, though estimates range from 3 to over 50% depending mainly on varying definitions of the relevant terms (Haberl et al. 2013)⁽³⁾. Humans also have the largest geographic coverage of any animal species and top the largest number of different food chains. >Superintelligence/Bostrom. 1. Foley, J. A., Monfreda, C., Ramankutty, N., and Zaks, D. 2007. “Our Share of the Planetary Pie.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 104 (31): 12585–6. 2. Haberl, H., Erb, K. H., Krausmann, F., Gaube, V., Bondeau, A., Plutzar, C., Gingrich, S., Lucht, W., and Fischer-Kowalski, M. 2007. “Quantifying and Mapping the Human Appropriation of Net Primary Production in Earth’s Terrestrial Ecosystems.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 104 (31): 12942–7. 3. Haberl, Helmut, Erb, Karl-Heinz, and Krausmann, Fridolin. 2013. “Global Human Appropriation of Net Primary Production (HANPP).” Encyclopedia of Earth, September 3.	Bostrom I Nick Bostrom Superintelligence. Paths, Dangers, Strategies Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017
Humboldt, Wilhelm von	Gadamer	I 347 Humboldt/Historism/Gadamer: In the final analysis, it is Hegel's position that [19th-century historism] finds its legitimation, even if the historians who inspired the pathos of experience preferred to refer to Schleiermacher and Wilhelm von Humboldt instead. >Historism, >G.W.F. Hegel. GadamerVsSchleiermacher/GadamerVsHumboldt: Neither Schleiermacher nor Humboldt really thought their position through to the end. They may emphasize individuality, the barrier of strangeness that our understanding has to overcome, but in the end, understanding is only completed in an infinite consciousness and the idea of individuality finds its justification. Hegel/Gadamer: It is the pantheistic enclosure of all individuality into the Absolute that makes the miracle of understanding possible. So here, too, being and knowledge permeate each other in I 348 the Absolute. Neither Schleiermacher's nor Humboldt's Kantianism is thus an independent systematic affirmation of the speculative completion of idealism in Hegel's absolute dialectic. >Humboldt as an author, >Absoluteness/Hegel, >Pantheism. 1. The expression philosophy of reflection has been coined by Hegel against Jacobi, Kant and Fichte. Already in the title of "Glaube und Wissen" but as a "philosophy of reflection of subjectivity". Hegel himself counters it with the reflection of reason.	Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Humean World	Esfeld	I 297f Humean supervenience/Lewis: the world is a mosaic of local states of particulars (single facts). It is a simple system of external relations of space-time intervals. There is no difference without a distinction in the arrangement of properties - all supervenes on everything - point properties are always intrinsic. >Supervenience, cf. >"Mosaic", >Intrinsic, >Causality, >Causality/Hume, >Causality/Lewis, >Explanation, >Reality, >World/Thinking.	Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Humean World	Lewis	V IX Humean supervenience/HS/Lewis: Thesis: everything in the world is a large mosaic of local facts - there is a geometry: a system of external relations of spatiotemporal distances between points - at the points we have local qualities, perfectly natural intrinsic properties - everything is an arrangement of qualities (AoQ). Everything supervenes on it. Important argument: there is no distinction without difference. - That does not mean that two possible worlds could not be different without having a difference in the AoQ. Cf. >Causality/Hume. Example 1) possible worlds with Humean supervenience, 2) possible worlds without! - ((s) i.e. Humean supervenience is contingent). Lewis: for our inner sphere of possibilities there is no such distinction. V VII Arrow of time: only in one direction - the Humean supervenience has to consider this asymmetry. - Humean supervenience/(s): does not mean here that causality is denied. --- V X Materialism/Humean supervenience/Lewis: materialism is a metaphysics that is to confirm the truth of known physics. Humean supervenience: it may be that the Humean supervenience is true and all our physics wrong. V 111 Humean supervenience/Coincidence/Lewis: If the Humean supervenience is wrong, there is a fatal counter e.g., which is made by coincidences - then coincidences and coincidence theories do not supervene on facts. Problem: a theory of coincidence is not something that itself may only have a certain chance - (which also says the Principal Principle PP) - an equally likely deviant pattern would lead to an entirely different coincidence theory. Right: chances are contingent because they depend on contingent facts, but not because they depended on a theory of coincidence - then the Humean supervenience is maintained. --- Schwarz I 112 Humean supervenience/Lewis/Schwarz: From description which property exists at point X and which at point y we learn which properties these are, thus in which the laws of nature apply.	Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
I, Ego, Self	Castaneda	Frank I 159 ff I/Castaneda: "volatile egos": like "here", "now", irreducible. - They are entirely epistemological, only for re-presentation, not empirical. Limited identity: only consubstantiation (sameness between coexisting sets of characteristics): not diachronic (transsubstatiation), therefore not all properties are identical, no substitutability, no strict identity with person. "I" is criteria-less, content-neutral. - "I" can only be represented by the impersonal and situation independent quasi-indicator "he". I-design/Castaneda: Vs "I" as "Something". >Guise theory, >Quasi-Indicator. I 167ff *I/Castaneda: "I myself"** in an episode of self-awareness one refers to oneself - (corresponding for he). I 186 "I"* is no demonstrative. >Demonstratives. I 170 Transcendent I/Castaneda: we experience ourselves as a not completely identical with the content of our experiencen and therefore associated to the world beyond experience. I 171 I/Self/Consciousness/Self-Awareness/SA/Logical Form/Hintikka/Castaneda: E.g. "The man who is actually a, knows that he is a". Wrong: "Ka (a = a). - Right: (Ex) (Ka (x = a)) -the individual variables occurring in "Ka (...)" are conceived as relating to a range of objects that a knows - "there is a person whom a knows, so that a knows that this person is a" - CastanedaVs: does not work with contingent assertions: "there is an object, so that a does not know it exists" - E.g. "the editor does not know that he is the editor" - (Ex) (Ka(x = a) & ~Ka(x = a))) was be a formal contradiction - better: (Exa)(Ka (x = a) & Ka (x = himself) (not expressible in Hintikka). I 226f I/Castaneda: no specific feature - different contrasts: opposites: this/that, I/she - I/he - I (meaning/acting person) - I/you - I/we -> Buber: I/it - I/you -> Saussure: network of contrasts (plural). Hector-Neri Castaneda(1966b): "He": A Study on the Logic of Self-consciousness, in : Ratio 8 (Oxford 1966), 130-157 Frank I 378 I/hall of mirrors/Castaneda: seems to need two selves: one he speaks to, one he speaks about - but simple self as different from I and body not sufficient. I 430f I/Extra sense/Castaneda: psychological role that one associates with "I" - which explains mental states that do not explain proper names or descriptions: "I'm called for on the phone": spec. mental states - PerryVsCastaneda: not sufficient, you also need to know that it is the own It! - A proposition with "he" itself says nothing about the meaning of this expression, therefore no identification - E.g. "heaviest man in Europe" could know this without a scale if "he" could act independently without antecedent. Solution: intermediary extra sense for Sheila's beliefs about Ivan's extra-sense-i. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 I 470 I/Castaneda: Variable, not singular term, not singular reference: instead: i is the same as j and Stan believes of j... >Singular Terms, >Variables.	Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Ideas	Bateson	I 57 Ideas/Bateson: abstraction does not create equality: the idea of two oranges is completely different from the idea of two miles. >Abstraction, >Generalization, >Equality, cf. >Semantic Ascent.	Bt I G. Bateson Steps to an Ecology of Mind, Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, and Epistemology, San Francisco 1972 German Edition: Ökologie des Geistes. Anthropologische, psychologische, biologische und epistemologische Perspektiven Frankfurt 1985
Ideas	Foucault	II, 193ff History of ideas/Foucault: It is now possible to reverse the procedure (after examining the discourse). >Discourse/Foucault. One can walk downhill. The general theory is sketched, now we can reach the possible fields of application. It is about separating oneself from it. Instead: archeology. FoucaultVsHistory of ideas: indefinite object, ill-drawn boundaries, history of secondary positions. Rather, the history of alchemy than of chemistry. Analysis of the opinions more than knowledge, the errors more than the truth, not the thought forms, but the mentality types. Also analysis of the silent origin, the distant correspondences, the permanences. Archeology/Foucault: the attempt to write a completely different history: four differences: 1. With regard to the determination of novelty 2. Analysis of contradictions 3. The comparative descriptions 4. Finding the Transformations. Archeology: 1. Does not try to define thoughts, ideas, images, themes that are hidden or manifest in discourses. But those discourses themselves. Discourse not as a sign for something else but as a monument. No interpretative discipline, it does not seek a "different discourse." It is not "allegorical". 2. Archeology does not seek to find a continuous transition. 3. It is not ordered according to the sovereign form of the work. The authority of the creative subject as a principle of its unity is alien to it. 4. It is not looking for the restoration of what people have thought, wanted, felt, desired. It does not seek that volatile core. Archeology: creates the tribe of a discourse. E.g. the natural history: 1. As leading statements, it will set the statements concerning the definition of the observable structures and the field of possible objects. 2. Those who prescribe the forms of the description. 3. Those who make the most general characterization possibilities appear, and thus open up a whole range of terms. 4. Those who, by making a strategic choice, leave room for a very large number of later options. This is not a deduction from axioms. Nor is it a general idea or a philosophical core.	Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981
Identification	Geach	I 139f Identification/Reference object/Intentionality/Geach: Problem: E.g.: "Someone made a derogatory remark about an unnamed person. Mrs. Supanich claims to be that person." E.g. "Ralph is the person x so that it was the will of the testator that x should inherit his business." Def Shakespearian context/Geach: is given if any name can be used ("A rose, whatever its name may be, would smell lovely.") Def non-Shakespearian context/Geach: is given if not every name can be used because of opacity. E.g. inheritance example: Shakespearian. E.g. "Ralph was (one person that) expressly from the testator..." - (here any name can be used). - Even non-extensional contexts can be Shakespearian: E.g. "It is logically and chronologically possible that Caesar was the father of Brutus." (But not when instead of "Caesar" a description is used). We also do not want quantification on "possible names". >Someone, >Reference, >Identification, >Name, >Description, >Context, >Quantification. I 145ff Intentionality/Identification/Intensional object/Geach: E.g. a fraudster buys a car under a wrong name: Problem: The correct name cannot be assigned. Solution: identification over time - then ad hoc name possible: "A" (Existential generalization, "Existence interoduction"). >Existential generalization, >Temporal identity. E.g., "Hutchinson" is not the same person as __ and the plaintiff believed that __ wanted to buy her car. - N.B.: wrong: "Hutchinson is the Person x and the plaintiff believed of x that he wanted to buy her car" (then the plaintiff would have lost). ((s) Identification not with "the buyer", then the purchase would have been achieved - but in case of misidentification: then there was no purchase.) I 148f Identity/Intentionality/Intensional objects/Geach: Problem: de re "in relation to someone .." - "... >de re. Hob and Nob believe that she is a witch". This presupposes that one and the same person is meant. - This is the same problem as "There is a horse that he owes me" (which horse?). >Intensional objects. The Cob-Hob-Nob case. To refer to indeterminate things often means to refer in an undefined way to something specific. - Problem: Quantification does not help: "Hob thinks a witch has blinded Bob's mare and Nob wonders if she (same witch) killed Cob's sow." The range of the quantified sentence part seems to be fully within the earlier dependent context, on the other hand it covers something of the later context. - This cannot be represented in a logical schema at all. Problem: Anaphora: "she" or "the same witch" is tied to an antecedent: "the only one ..." Best solution: Hob thinks that the (one and only) witch which is F, blinded Bob's mare, and Nob wonders if the witch who is F has killed Cob's sow. ((s) additional property F). N.B.: the sentence is true if a suitable interpretation of the property F is true. ((s) Otherwise the sentence is false because of the non-existence of witches.) >Non-existence, >Predication, >Attribution. cf. the logical definition of >"Exactly one".	Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972
Identity Conditions	Hintikka	II 143 Uniqueness Condition/W-questions/answer/Hintikka: the condition that something is a complete and unambiguous answer to a who-question (ambiguous) is, first, that (8) must imply (7). (6) Who is the man over there? (7) I know who the man over there is. E.g. It is Sir Norman Brook. (8) I know the man there is Sir Norman Brook. Problem: the step from (8) to (7) is that of an existential generalization (EG). >Existential generalization. II 144 Problem: for that we need an additional premise. E.g. (13) (Ex) Ki (Sir Norman Brook = x). (Non-mirrored quantifier, perceptually) "I know who Norman Brook is." II 145 HintikkaVsQuine: Quine does not recognize the role that my uniqueness conditions play. Quine: Quine says that these conditions can also be transferred to belief, knowledge, etc. Quine: Hintikka wants the subject to know who or what the person or thing is. Whom or what the term designates. HintikkaVsQuine: he thinks I would only use one kind of uniqueness condition. Solution: the semantic situation shows the difference: the relation between the conditions for different propositional attitudes (belief, seeing, knowledge) is one of analogy, not of identity. Solution: the sets of compatible worlds are respectively different ones in the case of knowledge, seeing, memory, belief! II 146 Identification/belief/Quine/QuineVsHintikka: every world of belief will contain innumerable bodies and objects that are not recognizable at all, simply because the believer believes that his world contains a countless number of such objects. Identity: questions about the identity of these objects are meaningless. Problem: if you quantify in belief contexts, how should one exclude them? >Quantification. Solution: one would have to limit the range of the variables to such objects, over which the subject has a sufficiently clear idea. Problem: how should one determine how clear these ideas must be? HintikkaVsQuine: the solution is quite simple when we quantify over individuals in doxastic worlds: E.g. operator: "in a world w1, compatible with everything, Jack believes": Solution/Hintikka: we can quantify over inhabitants of such worlds by simply using a quantifier within the operator. ((s) i.e. that Jack, but not we differentiate?) Problem: it could be that we want to consider the inhabitants as our neighbors from the actual world w0 ("qua neighbors"). Hintikka: but that is a problem for itself and has nothing to do with uniqueness conditions. Problem: it rather lies in the notation of the conventional modal logic, which runs from the outside to the inside and which does not allow the evaluation process, to ever turn around so that it runs from the inside outwards. Solution/Saarinen: the solution is "retrospective" operators. Solution/Hintikka: it may be that we can trace back an individual from w1 to w0, even if it does not fulfill the uniqueness conditions. (These require that an individual is identifiable in all worlds.) HintikkaVsQuine: the latter is mistaken that the question of identity is meaningless if the uniqueness conditions are not all fulfilled. On the contrary: it has to be meaningful so that we are able to see that the conditions are not fulfilled! Uniqueness Condition/Hintikka: if the uniqueness condition is not fulfilled, it means only that we cannot find an individual in every world. II 150 Truth Conditions/uniqueness conditions/Hintikka: the truth conditions of the uniqueness conditions are very different from the truth conditions for other types of the most simple sentences. World Lines/Hintikka: world lines can therefore be drawn in different ways, without tipping over the remaining semantic situation. >Truth conditions, >Possible world semantics, cf. >Situation-semantics.	Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Ideology	Freeden	Gaus I 6 Ideology/Freeden: [for Marx and Engels⁽¹⁾](...) abstract philosophy was nothing more than ideology, because both were the inverted mental reflection of a distorted and alienated reality. Today: differently. Ideologies are usefully comprehended not as defective philosophies, but rather as ubiquitous and patterned forms of thinking about politics. They are clusters of ideas, beliefs, opinions, values, and attitudes usually held by identifiable groups, that provide directives, even plans, of action for public policy-making in an endeavour to uphold, justify, change or criticize the social and political arrangements of a state or other political community. This tells us something about their functions and about the necessary services they perform for such a community. To begin with, it is unimaginable to conceive of a society that does not engage in such patterned thought, that does not have distinguishable and recurrent ways of thinking, say, about who should be rewarded in that society and for what, about the limits to the exercise of political power, about the value of national symbols, or about its expectations of government. Freeden: Ideologies, let it be emphasized, are evident in the entire field of thinking about political ends and principles, and virtually all members of a society have political views and values they promote and defend. Analytical philosophy: By contrast, analytical political philosophy sites itself at a particular end of each of these spectrums. Language: ideologies (...) compete deliberately or unintentionally over the control of political language, by means of which they attempt to wield the political power necessary to realizing their functions. Ultimately, they aim to give precise definition to the essentially contested meanings of the major political concepts. So whereas a political philosopher such as Rawls contends that many hard decisions may seem to have no clear answer (1993: 57)⁽²⁾, the morphology Gaus I 7 of concepts suggests that, to the contrary, they may have many clear answers. Social groups/ideological families: (...) provide their followers with a social and political identity and operate as one of the major factors in the realization of political goals. 1) (...) there is no necessary configuration of ideologies in these forms; they may well be the product of contingent historical forces that appear and vanish over time. On the other hand, some of the ideological families may reflect fundamental human understandings of the social order and its relation to human drives and hopes. 2) (...) any one of these ideologies is host to loose and fluid positions. There is no obvious thing called socialism, but there certainly are socialisms: Marxist, evolutionary, or guild socialisms are examples. 3) (...) ideologies are not mutually exclusive. 4) (...) a fragmentation of ideologies has accompanied the great families and has become more marked in recent decades. Alongside the full ideologies, with their total if not totalitarian solutions to social issues, there exist thin ideologies that address areas of ideological contestation, but otherwise rely on other ideologies to fill the gaps with which they do not primarily concern themselves. Nationalism is one such instance, containing no substantive theory of distributive justice (...). Gaus I 8 Political theory: the painstaking and critical investigation of ideologies is the only area of analysis in which political ideas can receive appropriate consideration as a direct branch of the study of politics, rather than of philosophy or history. Only then can questions such as the following be addressed: what are the social and political functions of political ideas; (...). Method: All these can only be undertaken if we also consider immorality, inconsistency and bad arguments as suitable subject-matter for analysis within the sphere of political practice. >Power/Freeden. Gaus I 10 Language: The comparative study of ideologies has to address [the] problems of translation, when differences are often masked by ostensible similarities of language, while similarities are disguised by disparate ways of expression. Gaus I 11 (...) ideologies are not merely directed at groups, they always are group products. As in Karl Mannheim’s famous (1936)⁽³⁾ account,ideologies are Weltanschauungen or world views of people who share common understandings of the world, perhaps because of joint socio-economic roots, or because they have assimilated a particular set of cultural values. 1. Marx, K. and F. Engels 1974. The German Ideology, ed. C. J. Arthur. London: Lawrence and Wishart. p.47 2. Rawls, J. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 57 3. Mannheim, K. 1936. Ideology and Utopia. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Freeden, M. 2004. „Ideology, Political Theory and Political Philosophy“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Imagination	Flusser	I 114 Image/Imagination/Flusser: Reduction of dimension is motivated by the will to change the world and consequently by the tendency to beauty. >Beauty, >Reduction. Such a description, however, requires a new definition of "imagination": inference from two to four dimensions. Pictogram, for example. Stick figures in the frame: suggests a four-dimensional scene. >Images/Flusser. I 115 On the other hand: Ideogram: H - O - H (representation of the molecular composition instead of the symbol H₂O. Definition Imagination: is then not only the ability to create similarities, but also the ability to imagine the relationships between objects of the world as relations of symbols on the surface. >Symbols. Def Imagination: proposing and accepting an agreement. One does not take pictures to imitate a known situation, but to make an unknown one imaginable. >Understanding, >Conceivability. I 116 The agreement is: "Reality" is designed to become flat when you abstract the depth, and stands still when you abstract time from it. I 117 Imagination is not a solitary activity because of the agreement. >Convention, >Intersubjectivity. Imagination/Flusser: we are not aware that the imaginary relationships "above" and "right" which arrange the symbols in the picture are as conventional as the relationships in the morse alphabet. We are programmed to "believe" in images, i. e. not to see them as mediations, but as images. I 123 Imagination II: Images are designed to recognize the world that has become unrecognizable: maps. >Map-example. Then the world begins to be experienced as an image, i.e. to mirror the categories of the image. In it life becomes horrible, from now on the images must serve a strategy of escaping the horrible and function as magical tools. >Magical thinking. Only when the images begin to lose their "magical dimension" as a mediation between the world and humans and become opaque will the age of imagination be over. The pictures form a wall that closes people off from the world of experiences. >Opacity. The world becomes "phantom-like", "fantastic". This development from the imaginary to the fantastic can be seen in the Aztecs or, individually, in paranoiacs. The emergence of the linear text must have been perceived as a relief here. >Texts/Flusser. I 161 Concept/perception/Flusser: We are constantly trying to imagine terms, to comprehend this idea, and then to make this concept conceivable again. >Concepts/Flusser. This overbidding of imagination through conception and vice versa, in which images become conceptual (concept art) and texts "imaginary" (science fiction) is an important aspect of today's "crisis of art". >Art, >Fictions, >Literature.	Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996
Imitation	Plato	Gaus I 311 Imitation/Plato/Keyt/Miller: ...the only true constitution is the one ruled by such a person. Since such persons are exceedingly rare (Plt. 292el-293a4, 297b7-c2), a central question is how a polis bereft of a true statesman can share in reason. The answer of the Eleatic Stranger is that it can share through law, law being an imitation of the truth apprehended by the true statesman (Plt. 300c5-7, 300el 1-301a4). >Philosopher king/Plato, >Laws/Plato, >Constitution/Plato. Forms of imitation: Since the true statesman rules without law, there is a better and a worse way of imitating him. The rulers of a polis can imitate reason's rule by ruling according to reason's reflection in law, or they can imitate reason's lawlessness by ruling contrary to law (Plt. 300e7-301 c5). Given that the rulers are one, few, or many, there are three good and three bad imitations of the one true constitution. Since the fewer the rulers the stronger the rule, the six imitations form a hierarchy, fewer rulers being better when rule is according to law but worse when it is contrary (Plt. 302b5- 303b5). The rulers under these imitative constitutions, we learn are not statesmen at all but factionists (stasiastikoi); concord (homonoia) and friendship (philia), each an antithesis of faction, are within the purview only of the ruler of the one true constitution (Plt. 303c2, 311 b9). One matter of controversy is the extent to which this latter ruler is a reprise of the philosopher-king of the Republic. >Philosopher king/Plato, >Governance&/Plato. Literature: (After long neglect the Statesman has recently come into the spotlight. Lane, 1998, is a study of its political philosophy; and Rowe, 1995, is an extensive collection of papers on all aspects of the dialogue.) 1. Lane, M. S. (1998) Method and Politics in Plato's Statesman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Rowe, C. J. (1995) Reading the Statesman: Proceedings of the 111 Symposium Platonicum. Sankt Augustin: Academia. Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Implication Paradox	Wessel	I 129 C.I.Lewis VsParadoxes of the implication: "strict implication": modal: instead of "from contradiction any statement": "from impossible ..." >Implication, strict, >Modalities, >Modal logic. WesselVsLewis, C.I.: circular: modal terms only from logical entailment relationship - 2.Vs: strict Implication cannot occur in provable formulas of propositional calculus as an operator. >Consequence, >Operators. I 140ff Paradoxes of implication: strategy: avoid contradiction as antecedent and tautology as consequent. >Tautologies, >Antecedent, >Consequent. I 215 Paradoxes of implication/quantifier logic: Additional paradoxes: for individual variables x and y may no longer be used as any singular terms - otherwise from "all Earth's moons move around the earth" follows "Russell moves around the earth". Solution: Limiting the range: all individuals of the same area, for each subject must be clear: P (x) v ~ P (x) - that is, each predicate can be meant as a propositional function - Wessel: but that is all illogical. >Logic, >Domain.	Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999
Impossible World	Logic Texts	Read III 113 Impossible world/contradictory conditional sentences/Stalnaker/Read: (not counterfactual, here the front link is impossibly true). Solution: Impossible world, where every statement is true. ((s) Then A and not-A ist true at the same time.) Then the contradictory conditional sentences are also all true. Lewis: they are true in an empty way. Read: Worlds (or theories) are concluded with logical consequence. - Then there is only one impossible world. Problem/Read: if we reject EFQ, we need a range of worlds that are both possible and impossible. >EFQ/ex falso quodlibet, >Possible world.	Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Income	Rothbard	Rothbard III 208 Income/trade/exchange/Rothbard: (…) the consumer must have money in his cash balance in order to spend it on consumers’ goods, and, likewise, the producer must have the original money to invest in factors. Where does the consumer get the money? (…) in the last analysis he must have obtained it from the sale of some productive service. (…) laborers and landowners use the money thus obtained to buy the final products of the production system. The capitalist-producers also receive income at each stage of the production process. (…) the net incomes accruing to the owners of capital goods are not simply the result of the contribution to production by the capital goods, since these capital goods are in turn the products of other factors. Producers: Where, then, do the producers acquire their money for investment? Clearly, from the same sources only. From the income acquired in production, individuals can, in addition to buying consumers’ goods, purchase factors of production and engage in the productive process as producers of a good that is not simply their own labour service. Rothbard III 209 Investments: In order to obtain the money for investment, then, an individual must save money by restricting his possible consumption expenditures. >Loans/Rothbard, >Production/Rothbard, >Investments, >Factors of production/Rothbard, >Consumption. Rothbard III 300 Income/Rothbard: Everyone attempts to maximize the [psychic income], which includes on its value scale a vast range of all consumers’ goods, both exchangeable and nonexchangeable. Exchangeable goods: exchangeable goods are generally in the monetary nexus, and therefore can be purchased for money, whereas nonexchangeable goods are not. We have indicated some of the consequences of the fact that it is psychic and not monetary income that is being maximized, and how this introduces qualifications into the expenditure of effort or labor and in the investment in producers’ goods. >Action/Rothbard, >Allocation/Rothbard, >Exchange/Rothbard. Subjectivity: It is also true that psychic income, being purely subjective, cannot be measured. Utility/praxeology: Further, from the standpoint of praxeology, we cannot even ordinally compare the psychic income or utility of one person with that of another. We cannot say that A’s income or “utility” is greater than B’s. We can - at least, theoretically - measure monetary incomes by adding the amount of money income each person obtains, but this is by no means a measure of psychic income. Furthermore, it does not, as we perhaps might think, give any exact indication of the amount of services that each individual obtains purely from exchangeable consumers’ goods. An income of 50 ounces of gold in one year may not, and most likely will not, mean the same to him in terms of services from exchangeable goods as an income of 50 ounces in some other year. The purchasing power of money in terms of all other commodities is continually changing, and there is no way to measure such changes. Rothbard III 301 Purchasing power: Even if we confine ourselves to the same period, monetary incomes are not an infallible guide. There are, for example, many consumers’ goods that are obtainable both through monetary exchange and outside the money nexus. Psychic income: Neither can we measure psychic incomes if we confine ourselves to goods in the monetary nexus. Utility/marginal utility: It follows that the law of the diminishing marginal utility of money applies only to the valuations of each individual person. There can be no comparison of such utility between persons. Thus, we cannot, as some writers have done, assert that an extra dollar is enjoyed less by a Rockefeller than by a poor man. If Rockefeller were suddenly to become poor, each dollar would be worth more to him than it is now; similarly, if the poor man were to become rich, his value scales remaining the same, each dollar would be worth less than it is now. >Marginal utility of money/Rothbard, >Marginal utility/Rothbard. Rothbard III 533 Income/business/profit/Rothbard: Are “capital gains” - increases in capital value - income? If we fully realize that profits and capital gains, and losses and capital losses, are identical, the solution becomes clear. No one would exclude business profits from money income. The same should be true of capital gains. >Business/Rothbard, >Economy/Rothbard, >Production/Rothbard, >Production structure/Rothbard, >Profit/Rothbard, >Rate of profit/Rothbard, >Gain and Loss/Rothbard.	Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Income Tax	Sanchirico	Parisi I 326 Income tax/Labour Earnings Tax/Sanchirico: (…) critics have argued labor earnings taxation is itself subject to great policy uncertainty, and that no coherent argument has been, or perhaps could be, made that the problem is less severe for labor earnings taxation than for other distributional instruments (Sanchirico, 2011b, pp. 10–37)⁽¹⁾. The pure theory of optimal labor earnings taxation offers only the barest minimum by way of prescription (Mirrlees, 1976(2); Stiglitz, 1982⁽³⁾, pp. 239–240; Slemrod, 1987⁽⁴⁾). Its sharpest useful prescription, arguably, is that the tax rate should lie somewhere between 0% and 100%. And even this relies on untenable assumptions regarding how individuals differ (Mirrlees, 1976⁽²⁾, pp. 333, 341–344; Choné and Laroque, 2010⁽⁵⁾, pp. 2532–2533; Judd and Su, 2006⁽⁶⁾; Boadway et al., 2002⁽⁷⁾; Bošković, 2008⁽⁸⁾, pp. 13–14). Moreover, it applies only when - in somewhat conclusory fashion - the only taxes considered in the optimization problem are those on labor earnings (Mirrlees, 1976⁽²⁾, pp. 333–340, 344–352; Nava, Schroyen, and Marchand, 1996)⁽⁹⁾. Further, computer simulations of optimal tax models - which input empirically determined parameters into the theoretical model in an attempt to narrow down its outputted prescriptions - have not in fact been able to tighten the range of possibilities for optimal policy (Diamond, 1998⁽¹⁰⁾, p. 84; Kanbur and Tuomala, 1994⁽¹¹⁾, p. 281; Myles, 2000⁽¹²⁾, p. 114). This appears to have two causes. The first is the extreme dependence of such simulations on portions of the hypothesized theoretical model (such as the curvature of utility functions) that do not submit to empirically grounded parameterization. The second is the substantial width of the range of plausible values for parameters that do submit to empirical investigation. Regarding the latter, a case in point is the surprisingly wide spread of estimates for the after-tax price elasticity of work hours - the percentage change in work hours per percentage change in take-home hourly wage, an elemental parameter in optimal labor earnings tax design (Joint Comm. on Tax’n, 2003⁽¹³⁾, pp. 15–16; Tuomala, 1990⁽¹⁴⁾, p. 14; Ashenfelter, Doran, and Schaller, 2010⁽¹⁵⁾, pp. 1–2; Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999(16), pp. 1684–1685; Evers, de Mooij, and van Vuuren, 2008⁽¹⁷⁾, p. 26; Pencavel, 2002⁽¹⁸⁾, p. 252). 1. Sanchirico, Chris William (2011b). “Optimal Tax Policy and the Symmetries of Ignorance.” Tax Law Review 66: 1–62. Web appendix available at . 2. Mirrlees, James A. (1976). “Optimal Tax Theory: A Synthesis.” Journal of Public Economics 6: 327–358. 3. Stiglitz, Joseph (1982). “Self-Selection and Pareto Efficient Taxation.” Journal of Public Economics 17: 213–240. 4. Slemrod, Joel (1990). “Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 4(1): 157–178. 5. Choné, Philippe and Guy Laroque (2010). “Negative Marginal Tax Rates and Heterogeneity.” American Economic Review 100: 2532–2547. 6. Judd, Kenneth L. and Che-Lin Su (2006). “Optimal Income Taxation with Multidimensional Taxpayer Types.” Working Paper No. 471. Society for Computational Economics, available available at . 7. Boadway, Robin, Maurice Marchand, Pierre Pestieau, and Maria del Mar Racionero (2002). “Optimal Redistribution with Heterogeneous Preferences for Leisure.” Journal of Public Economic Theory 4: 475–498. 8. Bošković, Branko (2008). “Optimal Income Taxation with Heterogeneous Preferences.” (September 2, 2008). Manuscript, University of Toronto Department of Economics. 9. Nava, Mario, Fred Schroyen, and Maurice Marchand (1996). “Optimal Fiscal and Public Expenditure Policy in a Two-Class Economy.” Journal of Public Economics 61: 119–137. 10. Diamond, Peter A. (1998). “Optimal Income Taxation: An Example with a U-Shaped Pattern of Optimal Marginal Tax Rates.” American Economic Review 88: 83–95. 11. Kanbur, Ravi and Matti Tuomala (1994). “Inherent Inequality and the Optimal Graduation of Marginal Tax Rates.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 96: 275–282. 12. Myles, Gareth D. (2000). “On the Optimal Marginal Rate of Income Tax.” Economics Letters 66: 113–119. 13. Joint Committee on Taxation (2003). 108th Cong., Overview of Work of the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation to Model the Macroeconomic Effects of Proposed Tax Legislation to Comply with House Rule XIII.3.(h)(2) (Comm. Print). 14. Tuomala, Matti (1990). Optimal Income Tax and Redistribution. New York: Oxford University Press. 15. Ashenfelter, Orley, Kirk Doran, and Bruce Schaller (2010). “A Shred of Credible Evidence on the Long-Run Elasticity of Labour Supply.” Economica 77: 637–650. 16. Blundell, Richard and Thomas MaCurdy (1999). “Labor Supply: A Review of Alternative Approaches,” in O. C. Ashenfelter and D. Card, eds., Handbook of Labor Economics 3A. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 1559–1695. 17. Evers, Michiel, Ruud de Mooij, and Daniel van Vuuren (2008). “The Wage Elasticity of Labour Supply: A Synthesis of Empirical Estimates.” De Economist 156: 24–43. 18. Pencavel, John (2002). “A Cohort Analysis of the Association Between Work Hours and Wages Among Men.” Journal of Human Resources 37: 251–274. Chris William Sanchirico. “Optimal Redistributional Instruments in Law and Economics”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. >Taxation, >Tax Avoidance, >Tax Competition, >Tax Compliance, >Tax Evasion, >Tax Havens, >Tax Incidence, >Tax Loopholes, >Tax System.	Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Incompleteness	Logic Texts	Read III 61 Incompleteness Theorem/Gödel/Read: the compact inference produces too little: there are intuitively valid inferences that mark it as invalid. For example, the most famous example is the Omega theory: assuming a formula is true for any natural number. Then "for every n, A(n) is true". This is not a classical logical conclusion from them, because it does not follow from any finite subset of any set. The Omega rule would allow us to deduce from the premises A(0),A(1)... etc. "for every n A(n)." But this is a rule that could never be applied, it would require that a proof be an infinite object. Def Omega model: the natural numbers, as well as the zero, with the operations of the successor, addition, multiplication and exponentiation. The Omega rule is not accepted as a rule of orthodox classical proof theory. How can I do this? According to classical representation, a rule is valid if it is not possible to make the premises true and the conclusion false by any interpretation over any range of definition. How can the premises A(0),A(1) etc. was, but be false for each n,A(n)? III 61/62 The explanation lies in the limitation of the expressiveness. >Compactness/Logic texts, >2nd order logic. III 64 The Omega rule requires an extra premise: "and these are all numbers". This extra premise is arithmetically true, but the non-standard models show that, as far as logic is concerned, it has to be formulated explicitly (in 1st level terms, i.e. logical terms). III 65 Two ways to see that this answer is not appropriate as a defense of classical logic and its compactness. >Compactness/Logic texts. 1. the extra provision "and these are all numbers " cannot be expressed in terms of 1st level terms. 2. a proposal by Wittgenstein: a long conjunction for "each F is G": "this is G and that is G and that other is G... RussellVs: these two statements are not equivalent, because the long conjunction needs a final clause "and these are all F's". ReadVsRussell: Error: if a conjunction is exhaustive, then the two statements are equivalent. If not, the extra clause has no effect, because it is wrong. It does not do extra work. >Second order logic.	Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Indeterminacy	Davidson	I (b) 35/6 See here: Proposition: This "relativism" contains nothing that could show that the measured properties are not "real". I (b) 36 Strangely, however, these conclusions have been drawn by some: e.g. John Searle: it would be incomprehensible that two different interpretations could each serve to correctly interpret the same thoughts or utterances of one person. I (b) 36 Just as numbers can capture all empirically significant relationships between weights or temperatures in an infinite number of different ways, a person's utterance can capture all the significant characteristics of the thoughts of another person in different ways. Jerry Fodor also argues that the holism or the indeterminacy of translation is a threat to realism regarding the propositinal attitudes. >Holism. Glüer II 49 DavidsonVsFodor: the same mistake: indeterminacy of the translation does not mean that the thoughts themselves are somehow vague or unreal. The indeterminacy of the translation also applies when all data are available. (Quine). There is in principle more than one translation manual. >Translation manual. Indeterminacy of Interpretation/Davidson: There are no empirical criteria to decide between empirically equivalent theories. Davidson: Solution: we must cease to regard an utterance as belonging to a particular language and no other. Rather, we should identify languages with truth theories. The indeterminacy loses its scariness. Davidson I 57 Relativity/Davidson: is not an indeterminateness at all. Glüer II 46 Translating Indeterminacy/Quine/Davidson/Glüer: also exists when all data are available - there is in principle more than one translation manual. Glüer II 47 Indeterminacy of interpretation/Davidson: there are no empirical criteria to decide between empirically equivalent theories. Glüer II 47 Indeterminacy/Davidson/Glüer: there are 3 types: 1. The logical form: empirically equivalent theories (e.eq.th.) can identify predicates, singular terms etc. differently. 2. The reference: empirically equivalent theories can be assigned to different referents. 3. The truth: the same sentence can have different truth values for empirically equivalent theories. Glüer II 49 Problem: how can both sentences be appropriate? Solution: we must not regard an utterance as belonging to only one language. Instead: identify languages with truth theories.	Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993
Indeterminacy	McGinn	I 178 Underdetermination/McGinn: E.g. meaning: the only possible reasons for the relation of reference are considered inadequate for the determination of a unique reference order. >Reference. E.g. knowledge: our knowledge claims are compatible with a wide range of knowledge alternatives. >Knowledge.	McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001
Indeterminacy	Rawls	I 201 Indeterminacy/form of society/political process/Rawls: in the initial state of a society to be established, it is not necessarily clear which constitutional form is to be preferred. >Constitution. Then justice itself is, in a way, indeterminate. Institutions within a certain range of possibilities are equally fair, including laws and policies. This indeterminacy is not a deficiency. We should be expecting it. Solution: the theory of justice as fairness/Rawls. >Fairness/Rawls, >Justice/Rawls, >Society/Rawls, >Institutions.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Individuals	Schleiermacher	Gadamer I 193 Individuals/Authorship/Understanding/Hermeneutics/Schleiermacher/Gadamer: [It is] Schleiermachers premise that each individuality is a manifestation of the all-life (German: "Alleben") and therefore "each carries a minimum of each within him- or herself, and divination is thus excited by comparison with oneself". So he can say that the individuality of the author is to be understood directly, "by transforming oneself, as it were, into the other". By intensifying the understanding of the problem of individuality as such, the task of hermeneutics presents itself to Schleiermacher as a universal one. For the two extremes of strangeness and familiarity are given with the relative difference of all individuality. The "method" of understanding will be as much concerned with what is common through comparison as with what is peculiar through guessing, that is, it will be both comparative and divinatory. But it will remain "art" in both respects, because it cannot be mechanized as an application of rules. The divinatory remains indispensable⁽¹⁾. >Genius/Schleiermacher, >Hermeneutics/Schleiermacher. 1. Schleiermacher, Werke I, 7, 146f.	Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Inequalities	Rawls	I 100 Inequality/Rawls: there is a principle of remedy for individuals who are disadvantaged because of their natural endowment, at least for the first few years of school. I 101 To my knowledge, however, this principle has never been more than a prima facie principle⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾. Rawls: However, the principle of remedy must always be taken into account, no matter what other principles we follow. Difference principle/Rawls: secures resources, e. g. for the promotion of disadvantaged people. >Difference Principle/Rawls. It has the same intention as the principle of remedy. I 102 The basic structure (of a society to be built) can be arranged in such a way that natural inequalities, which cannot be changed, have an effect for the benefit of the most disadvantaged. Nature/natural distribution/Rawls: is neither fair nor unfair. What is fair or unfair are the institutions that deal with this distribution. In justice as fairness ((s) Rawl's approach), members agree to participate in the fate of others. I 103 VsRawls: now one could argue that the preferred ones expect a bigger gain for themselves if they agree to the arrangement. RawlsVsVs: however, this requires a cooperation scheme. I 104 It is nobody's merit to be able to take a certain position in a community through natural talent or disadvantage. Since no right to a certain cooperation scheme with advantages for the better follows from this, it is the difference principle that can be accepted by all. The concept of merit simply cannot be used here. >Income. I 171 Inequality/Economy/Economics/Mathematics/Rawls: we must not underestimate the continuing effect of our individual initial conditions, talents and our original place in society and trust that mathematically appealing solutions would at some point provide a balance. Resolution/Rawls: our principles of justice must remedy the situation. >Principles/Rawls. I 226 Inequality/politics/economy/Rawls: thesis: the effects of injustice in the political system are much more serious and long-lasting than market irregularities. Political power expands rapidly and becomes uneven. Those who take advantage of this can easily move into positions of power by taking advantage of the apparatus of state institutions and law. Equal suffrage is not a secure means of combating this⁽³⁾. >Markets. 1. See H. Spiegelberg, "A Defense of Human Equality" Philosophical Review, vol 53,1944, pp. 101,113-123. 2. D. D. Raphael, "Justice and Liberty", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 51,1950-1951, pp. 187f. 3. See F. H. Knight, The Ethics of Competition and Other Essays, (New York, 1935) pp. 293-305.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Infinitesimal Calculus	Thiel	I 171 Infinitesimal Calculation/Prehistory/Thiel: Cavallieri (died 1647, pupil of Galilei) Teaching of the Def "Indivisibles"/Cavalieri: Such "indivisibles" are the points for distances, the intersection lines for surfaces and the intersection planes for bodies, which must not be regarded as parts of the same, since they each have one dimension less, they cannot be their building blocks! The missing dimension is only added by the direction of the movement. By their movement one can imagine the corresponding shapes (e.g. section plane body) created. The "Indivisibiles" are the precursors of the "infinitely small sizes" which Leibniz, Newton and L'Hopital each introduced in different ways. I 174 Infinitesimal Calculus: for the infinitesimal view, the difference disappears when the base becomes "infinitely small" too dx. No doubt, this is a cheating. A strict justification of such area observations by correct infinitesimal observations does not assume fictitious infinitely small bases dx, but rather a division of the entire area base into very small but finite distances Dx. I 175/176 Leibniz: a route is not extended by adding dx. He saw through this as fiction, but justified it by analogies rather than eliminating it. Cantor took credit for having finally refuted the idea of "infinitely small sizes". Of course, his considerations do not quite show what they should show. Def "infinitely small": means that the product of a quantity a with this property and a basic number n, however large, cannot become larger than any given number x. In fact, this only shows that a range in which infinitely small quantities of this kind occur cannot be a "continuous" range, but not that such ranges (today referred to as "non-Archimedean") would be contradictory. I 176/177 According to some contemporary authors, such "non-Archimedean" areas have led to the subsequent justification of the "infinitely small quantities". At the end of the 19th century, it had been regarded as progress that the "arithmetization of analysis" outlined above made it possible to understand statements about "infinitely small quantities" as statements that remain valid no matter how small one chooses their size, without being forced to assume entities that were infinitely small but nevertheless were quantities, or that become infinitely small.	T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995
Infinity	Quine	V 165 Infinity/material/Quine: if you need an infinite number of characters (e.g. for natural numbers) you cannot say, a sign is a physical object, because then you will soon come to an end. Also forms are not used as classes of inscriptions. These are again physical realizations of forms. IX 64 Infinity/Quine: is only necessary for induction - x = {y}, y = {z}, z = {w} ... ad infinitum - this is the case if {,,,x}. XIII 96 Infinite Numbers/Quine: For example, suppose we randomly assign items to any class, the only limitation is that no object can belong to more than one class. Problem: then there will not be enough items for all classes! A class for which there is no correlate will be the class of all objects that do not belong to their correlated classes. Because its correlate should belong to it, iff it does not belong to it. Cantor: proved in 1890 that the classes of items of any kind exceed the number of items. XIII 97 The reason for this has to do with the paradoxes, if the relation, which is mentioned there, is specified correctly. It turns out that there are infinitely many different infinities. For example, there are more classes of integers than there are integers. But since there are infinitely many integers, the infinity of infinitely many classes of integers must be of a higher kind. For example, there are also more classes of classes of integers than there are classes of integers. This is an even higher infinity. This can be continued infinitely many times. The argument here depended on the class of non-elements of their own correlated classes (nonmembers of own correlated classes). Russell's Antinomy/Quine: depended on the class of nonelements of selves. Cantor's Paradox/Quine: if one takes the correlation as self-correlation, Cantor's paradox amounts to Russell's Paradox. That is how Russell came up with it. Cantor/Theorem/Quine: his theorem itself is not a paradox. Russell's Antinomy/Solution/Quine: is prevented by excluding a special case from Cantor's theorem that leads to it. (See Paradoxes) Cantor Theorem/Corollar/unspecifiable classes/Quine: the existence of unspecifiable classes follows as a corollar from Cantor's theorem. I.e. classes for which we cannot specify the containment condition. There is no other identifying move either. For example, the infinite totality of grammatically constructible expressions in a language. According to Cantor's theorem, the class of such expressions already exceeds the expressions themselves. Classes/larger/smaller/criterion/Quine: our criterion for larger and smaller classes here was correlation. Def greater/classes/quantities/Quine: one class is larger than another if not each of its elements can be paired with an element of the other class. XIII 98 Problem: according to this criterion, no class can be larger than one of its real subclasses (subsets). For example, the class of positive integers is not larger than the class of even numbers. Because we can always form pairs between their elements. This simply shows that infinite sets behave unusually. Infinite/larger/smaller/class/quantities/Quine: should we change our criterion because of this? We have the choice: a) We can say that an infinite class need not be larger than its real subclasses, or b) change the criterion and say that a class is always larger than its real parts, only that they can sometimes be exhausted by correlation with elements of a smaller class. Pro a): is simpler and standard. This was also Dedekind's definition of infinity. Infinite/false: a student once wrote that an infinite class would be "one that is a real part of itself". This is not true, but it is a class that is not larger than a (some) real part of itself. For example the positive integers are not more numerous than the even numbers. E.g. also not more numerous than the multiples of 3 (after the same consideration). And they are also not less numerous than the rational numbers! Solution: any fraction (ratio) can be expressed by x/y, where x and y are positive integers, and this pair can be uniquely represented by a positive integer 2x times 3y. Conversely, we get the fraction by seeing how often this integer is divisible by 2 or by 3. Infinite/Quine: before we learned from Cantor that there are different infinities, we would not have been surprised that there are not more fractions than integers. XIII 99 But now we are surprised! Unspecifiable: since there are more real numbers than there are expressions (names), there are unspecifiable real numbers. Names/Expressions/Quine: there are no more names (expressions) than there are positive integers. Solution: simply arrange the names (expressions alphabetically within each length). Then you can number them with positive integers. Real Numbers/Cantor/Quine: Cantor showed that there are as many real numbers as there are classes of positive integers. We have seen above (see decimals and dimidials above) that the real numbers between 0 and 1 are in correlation with the infinite class of positive integers. >Numbers/Quine.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Infinity	Thiel	I 59 Infinity/Thiel: to the "potentiality" of the election one does not have to march up all basic numbers in their "actuality". Even if finiteness occurs in a certain sense in infinity, not every sentence about finiteness is normally a special case of sentences about infinity. I 60 For example, study whether there might be a series of properties of the basic numbers, similar to the series of basic numbers themselves. To do this, we have to distinguish between properties and forms of expression through which we represent them. Here is a one-digit form of statement: For example, the property of being an even number. By means of a tally list I 60 ...+ Question: whether in any arithmetically suitable language the forms of statements representing a property of basic numbers can be arranged in a series: Cantor Diagonal Procedure/Thiel: There will be infinitely many such forms of statements. We would have the infinite series Aq(m), A2(m), A3(m), ... I 62 ... the statement form "~An(n)" represents a well-defined property of basic numbers, as long as we only have a series like the one above. In this series, however, no logically equivalent statement form to the newly constructed statement form can occur, and in particular no statement form itself! Thiel I 157 Infinite/Thiel: Example "There are infinitely many prime numbers". To capture this sentence it is of course not sufficient to formulate "There is one more prime number for each prime number". For this would also apply if 2 and 3 were the only prime numbers! What is meant, however, is that there is always at least one different to them to any number of primes. I 158 In another way, it is much easier to indicate this, namely by means of an order relation. (m)(En) (m I 159 This expresses that there are infinitely many basic numbers. Although there are infinitely many prime numbers, we cannot simply arrive at a clothing of the Euclidean theorem in a way parallel to the one we have just chosen, by using p and q for m and n. Because a comparable calculation is not yet known for prime numbers. The "in the broader sense calculatory" procedure, however, to calculate a further one for each finite number of primes, is itself the proof of the Euclidean theorem. ..+...I 160 Justification of the Euclidean theorem. I 161 Infinite: For example, even numbers form only "half" of the range of basic numbers, yet there are infinitely many even numbers, and as many as one experiences by pairwise assignment: 1 2 3 4 5 ... 2 4 6 8 10... Galilei also applied this to square numbers, explaining that we erroneously "attribute properties to the infinite that we know of in the finite". But the attributes "great" and "small" do not apply to the infinite. Long after Galileo's "Discorsi", mathematics found ways to speak of "greater" and "smaller", although not in the sense of removing a sub-area, so that the objects of the sub-area or the remaining ones could be assigned to each other unambiguously. I 162 What was new was that the ranges of e.g. prime numbers, even lines, odd lines, wholes etc. all seemed to contain "the same number" of items. I 163 This is shown by reversibly unambiguous assignment of number pairs. >F. Waismann. I 164 These discussions show the conflict between two views of infinity: Property or process. >Infinite/Cantor.	T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995
Information	Chalmers	I 277 Information/Chalmers: (I draw upon Shannon 1948)⁽¹⁾. I 278 Information in this sense is not always about something. It is rather the choice of possibilities. >"Aboutness", >Probability. Choosing a point from a 3-dimensional space carries more information than a point from a 2-dimensional one. >Complexity). I 279 Information state: an information state can be viewed as a waveform, or another function with a continuous range of functions and values. Information space: the information space has two types of structure: each complex state will have an internal structure (the combinatorial structure) and each element in this state will belong to a subspace with its own topological structure (the relational structure). I 280 Information space/Chalmers: informartion space (different from Dretske 1981 ⁽²⁾ and Barwise/Perry 1983 ⁽³⁾) is independent of further considerations with regard to semantic content. >Content/Chalmers, >Semantic Content, >F. Dretske, >J. Barwise, >J. Perry. Information: we can find information in the physical as well as the phenomenal world. >Phenomena, >Qualia. I 281 The structure of the information space will correspond to a structure of the effect space. I 282 Transferability principle: Physically realized information is only information, if it can be processed (see Mackay 1969 ⁽⁴⁾). This corresponds to the transferability in Shannon. I 283 Message/Shannon: Information sets must be separated to count as individual messages. When two physical states of a system are transformed into the same signal, they count as the same message. I 284 Phenomenal Information/Chalmers: there are natural patterns of differences between phenomenal states. These provide the difference structure for an information space. Therefore, we can assume that phenomenal states realize information states. Since every experience has natural similarity and distinction relations, we will always find suitable information spaces. >Experience, >Experience/Chalmers. 1. C. E. Shannon,A mathematical theory of communication. Bell Systems Technical Journal 27, 1948: pp. 379-423 2. F. Dretske, Knowledge and the flow of information, Cambridge 1981. 3. J. Barwise and J. Perry, Situations and Attitudes, Cambridge 1983 4. D. M. Mackay Information, Mechanism, and Meaning, Cambridge 1969	Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Information	Coase	Kiesling I 24 Information/court proceddings/Coase/Kiesling: Courts have an information problem, though: they may not possess all of the knowledge they need to be able to identify which party can avoid the harm at least cost, which is one reason why transaction costs influence outcomes. >Transaction costs/Coase, >Social cost/Coase, >Law/Coase. Low transaction costs: In a low transaction cost setting, parties can bargain to exchange rights to rearrange them if the court’s assignment doesn’t reflect the best feasible assignment of rights and liabilities (“contracting around the law” in Coase’s words). High transaction cost: When courts assign rights and liabilities in the presence of positive (and high enough) transaction costs, though, that assignment could prevent parties from reaching the efficient outcome because transaction costs prevent the parties from bargaining to exchange those rights and liabilities (Pennington, 2015⁽¹⁾: 97). In the farmer-railroad scenario, if the court assigned the right to emit sparks to the railroad and the cost of sparks to farmers was higher than their benefit to the railroad, then the efficient outcome would be for the farmers to pay the railroad to reduce their sparks. But the high transaction costs of organizing farmers to discover how high their cost is and to bargain with the railroad could prevent the transfer of rights to resolve the conflict. Cf. >Externalities/Pigou, >Coase Theorem/Stigler, >Law and economics. 1. Pennington, Mark (2015). Coase on Property Rights and the Political Economy of Environmental Protection. In Cento G. Veljanovski (ed.), Forever Contemporary: The Economics of Ronald Coase. Institute of Economic Affairs.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Information	Luhmann	Reese-Schäfer II 31 Definition information/Luhmann/Reese-Schäfer: nothing but an event that causes a combination of differences. Reese-Schäfer II 38 Def Information/Luhmann/Reese-Schäfer: event, that selects system states. Information reserves its meaning in the repetition, but loses the information value. - The event disappears. >Event/Luhmann, >Communication. --- AU Cass 6 Information/Luhmann: there is no "genetical" information, because the genes only contain structures, not events. Information/Luhmann: is selection of alternatives. - This presupposes that one defines a possibility range against others. Information is only within systems - also the possibilities only exist in the system. - Not in the environment. >System/Luhmann, >Environment/Talcott Parsons. Time/information: time plays a role because the information disappears whith acquaintance. - Information is not transmitted. - ((s) because it is an event.) --- AU Cass 13 Definition information/Maturana/Luhmann: Vs genetic information: Information is always a moment of communication, only within a system. It works as an information when it comes to finding the next operation - ((s) not circular: - "A works as A, when ...".) Information: is not "data"; that would be "transmission theory". Two aspects: 1st from which is selected 2nd this and nothing else is selected. Only within a system information is possible. - The system determines what information is: e.g. Socialist system, planned economy: only performance is an information. Capitalist system: in capitalist systems unemployment numbers are no information. Communication/Luhmann: no information without communication. - But communication may repeat itself, information does not. Understanding: does not exist outside communication. >Communication/Luhmann, >System/Luhmann, >Operation/Luhmann.	AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001
Information Processing	Social Psychology	Haslam I 231 Information processing/Social psychology: in the late 1960s and early 1970s a new approach that became known as ‘cognitive psychology’ was starting to dominate psychology. Many cognitive psychologists were armed with the metaphor of the person as a faulty information-processing device and this idea was imported into social psychology in the 1970s. This metaphor implied that as people processed information about the world around them, they made a series of errors (in particular, because they had limited processing capacity) and these had a range of unintended and unfortunate consequences. As it became permissible to explain mental life in terms of events within the mind it also seemed possible to explain many of the outcomes of mental life, including social relations and social structure, in terms of these mental phenomena. It was compelling to ask whether it is possible to explain the relationships between people in terms of the mental states that these people experience. If we could explain social structure by reducing it to the aggregate effect of the ways that individuals think, then we might be able to explain important social phenomena – such as stereotyping and prejudice – without the need to consider competing and complicating explanations provided by other accounts. Stereotypes/Social psychology: e.g., Hamilton and Gifford explained the phenomenon of false stereotypes in terms of an illusory correlation. >illusory correlation. Craig McGarty, „Stereotype Formation. Revisiting Hamilton and Gifford’s illusory correlation studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications	Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Infrastructure	Edwards	I 40 Infrastructure/Star/Ruhleder/Edwards: Infrastructure thus exhibits the following features, (…) summarized by Susan Leigh Star and Karen Ruhleder: -Embeddedness. Infrastructure is sunk into, inside of, other structures, social arrangements, and technologies. -Transparency. Infrastructure does not have to be reinvented each time or assembled for each task, but invisibly supports those tasks. -Reach or scope beyond a single event or a local practice. -Learned as part of membership. The taken-for-grantedness of artifacts and organizational arrangements is a sine qua non of membership in a community of practice. Strangers and outsiders encounter infrastructure as a target object to be learned about. New participants acquire a naturalized familiarity with its objects as they become members. I 41 - Links with conventions of practice. Infrastructure both shapes and is shaped by the conventions of a community of practice. - Embodiment of standards. Infrastructure takes on transparency by plugging into other infrastructures and tools in a standardized fashion. - Built on an installed base. Infrastructure wrestles with the inertia of the installed base and inherits strengths and limitations from that base. - Becomes visible upon breakdown. The normally invisible quality of working infrastructure becomes visible when it breaks: the server is down, the bridge washes out, there is a power blackout. -Is fixed in modular increments, not all at once or globally. Because infrastructure is big, layered, and complex, and because it means different things locally, it is never changed from above. Changes require time, negotiation, and adjustment with other aspects of the systems involved. Adapted from S. L. Star and K. Ruhleder, “Steps Toward an Ecology of Infrastructure: Design and Access for Large Information Spaces,” Information Systems Research 7, no. 1 (1996): 111–.	Edwards I Paul N. Edwards A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming Cambridge 2013
Inner World	Piaget	Habermas III 106/107 Inner world/Piaget/Habermas: the formal concepts of the world (inner world/external world/lifeworld) have the function of preventing the inventory of commonalities from dissolving in the flight of iteratively mirrored subjectivities. They make it possible to jointly adopt the perspective of a third party or uninvolved parties. The concepts of the three worlds serve as the co-ordination system, in which the situation contexts can be arranged in such a way that agreement is reached on the fact that the participants can treat them as face or valid norm or subjective experience. >Outer world >Life world >Intersubjectivity >Communication >Subjectivity >Objectivity >Experience	Piag I J. Piaget The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Institutional and Organizational Economics (IOE)	Economic Theories	Kiesling I 13 Institutional and organizational economics (IOE)/economic theories/Kiesling: [Ronald] Coase’s introduction of transaction costs and organization to the theory of the firm initiated new work in industrial organization, leading to new fields of transaction cost economics (TCE), organizational economics, and new institutional economics, now broadly called institutional and organizational economics (IOE). IOE focuses on governance institutions and their diversity in organizing production relationships, enabling organizations to adapt to unknown and changing conditions, to protect their investments in assets specific to that relationship, and to harmonize the interests of the parties in the relationship. >Firms/Coase, >Transaction costs/Coase. IOE research building on Coase (1937)⁽¹⁾ has expanded the analysis of hybrid methods of organization beyond long-term contracts to include relational contracts that are informal relationships held together by the expectation of future value, as well as other forms of hybrid ownership and control. Kiesling I 14 Since the 1970s, TCE/IOE research on governance institutions in a variety of settings has grown. One fundamental research topic in this area is the “make or buy” decision. Should a firm make its own inputs, or buy them from a specialized external supplier? This question is relevant in a wide range of industries and applications, from truck manufacturing to information technology to winemaking (and even ice cream shops). The make-or-buy decision is a decision about the degree of vertical integration in a firm’s structure. Why do some firms vertically integrate while others do not, even in the same industry? Building on Coase (1937)⁽¹⁾, the tradeoff between transaction costs and organization costs is the starting point for such investigations. Vertical integration provides a means of coordinating production, but substitute institutional choices exist, such as long-term contracts or other hybrid forms of organization. This literature has delved deeply into those alternatives (Klein, 2005)⁽²⁾. >Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). 1. Coase, Ronald H. (1937). The Nature of the Firm. Economica 4, 16: 386-405. 2. Klein, Peter G. (2005). The Make-or-Buy Decision: Lessons from Empirical Studies. In Claude Ménard and Mary Shirley (eds.), Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Springer: 435-464.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Institutional Utilitarianism	Gaus	Gaus I 224 Institutional Utilitarianism/Gaus/Lamont: The move to indirect and institutional utilitarian- ism has breathed new life into utilitarian theory, but at a high price. Under institutional utilitarianism, the theoretical criterion for accepting an institution or policy is straightforward: does it maximize the aggregate utility of the population? The problem arises at the practical level, where the information requirements needed to determine which institutions or policies maximize aggregate utility are almost always too great (Gaus, 1998⁽¹⁾). For example, consider the question of whether institutional utilitarianism would recommend welfare payments to the poor unemployed. This question would be more easily answered if all people obtained the same amount of welfare from all the goods and services available, and if the amount of welfare obtained from a good declined as more of the good is received (that is, if all people had identical diminishing marginal utility functions). Under these conditions we would have some reason to believe that taking goods from the rich and giving them to the poor would increase overall utility. However, every individual has a different utility function and, of course, nobody knows what these functions are. The informational requirements for determining whether utilitarianism recommends welfare payments seem impossible to meet. Unfortunately, the same situation arises for the full range of policies. This problem is compounded by analogues to the common sense morality objections that plagued earlier versions of utilitarianism. Cf. >Utilitarianism. 1. Gaus, Gerald (1998) 'Why all welfare states (including laissez-fai,æ ones) are unreasonable'. Social Philosophy and Policy 15 (2): 1-33. Lamont, Julian, „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Institutions	Coase	Kiesling I 5 Institutions/Coase/Kiesling: In all of his work Coase emphasized the importance of incorporating institutions into economic theory and empirical economic research. Institutions are the arrangements, the “rules of the game,” that structure social interactions. They vary from informal social norms about acceptable conduct to formal law enshrined in precedent or legislation. Institutions structure social interactions in the sense that they shape the incentives that individuals face as they make decisions, decisions that can affect their own outcomes and the outcomes for other people. >Property rights/Coase. Kiesling I 7 Institutions/Coase/Kiesling: [The] institutional framework is a combination of legal institutions, a property rights framework, and market institutions, within a context of informal social norms and conventions. A society’s institutional framework determines the transaction costs that citizens confront. These costs, in turn, are an important part of the incentives that individuals confront when engaging in economic activities. Whether as a producer or consumer, we can think about those outcomes as net value realized from a transaction. In this sense, institutions matter for shaping the transaction costs and incentives that lead to specific outcomes. >Transaction cost/Coase. Kiesling I 8 Institutional frameworks don’t always generate beneficial outcomes; often people can attempt to improve on realized outcomes by experimenting with different actions or rules. Over time there are feedback effects from the profits and losses realized. If an institutional arrangement embeds high transaction costs that thwart potential gains, people may use that feedback to change the institutional arrangement to be more conducive to welfare creation. In many cases that reform does not happen, and those cases are important to study and understand. >Firms/Coase.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Institutions	Smith	Parisi I 269 Institutions/Adam Smith: For Smith, individuals have a natural propensity to “truck, barter and exchange” (Smith, 1981/1776⁽¹⁾, p. 15). The growth in opportunities for exchange is the growth of markets. So, in pursuing exchange, individuals are unintentionally providing greater scope for the division of labor and more general specialization both within and across firms (Smith, 1981/1776⁽¹⁾, p. 31). However, none of this would be possible without the extension and formalization of property and contract law. >Property, >Contract law, >Exchange, >Division of Labour. In dealing with strangers in perhaps far-flung areas, rules may need to become more detailed and more definite. This extension of trade itself creates incentives to modify and adapt existing rules into new legal forms. Merchants will make rule-like agreements to facilitate their trading activity (Benson, 1989)⁽²⁾. Therefore, the individual Parisi I 270 individual desire to gain from exchange can be seen as the impetus for the development of property and contract law. Law, then, is the spontaneous or unintended consequence of exchange. >A. Smith. 1. Smith, A. (1981/1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Vols. I–V. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. 2. Benson, B. (1989). “The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law.” Southern Economic Journal 55: 644–661. Rajagopalan, Shruti and Mario J. Rizzo “Austrian Perspectives on Law and Economics.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University.	EconSmith I Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010 EconSmithV I Vernon L. Smith Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Insurances	Barr	Gaus I 212 Insurance/welfare state/adverse selection/moral hazard/Barr/Moon: [in a welfare state] voluntary welfare provision may (...) be unable to cover everyone in a society. Many people in the heyday of mutual aid societies were not members, and non-members were often among the least advantaged, those without steady jobs and a secure place within the community. Adverse selection: organizations offering protection recognize that those most likely to need protection have Gaus I 213 the greatest incentive to seek it, and so to join a mutual aid society or to purchase insurance, while those facing the lowest risks have an incentive to stay out. As a result of this process of 'adverse selection' , risks tend to be spread over a smaller and smaller part of the population, and premiums must rise accordingly. This process of adverse selection can continue to the point where most of those in need of protection are unable to afford it, because premiums have to rise so high that all but the most vulnerable drop out. The welfare state can combat the problem of adverse selection by making membership compulsory: 'because low risks cannot opt out, it makes possible a pooling solution' (Barr, 1992⁽¹⁾: 755). >Adverse Selection. Moral hazard: adverse selection is reinforced by a second process or condition, called 'moral hazard'. People who are insured against a certain risk may be more willing to take chances than they would be in the absence of insurance. Knowing that if I get sick or injured, my medical bills will be covered, may make me more willing to engage in risky behaviour, such as downhill skiing. To the extent that this occurs, organizations may face higher claims, thereby forcing them to raise their charges, and discouraging others from purchasing protection. More obviously, unemployment insurance schemes are subject to moral hazard, for knowing that I will be covered in the event that I am unemployed, I have an incentive to quit (or arrange to be fired) and/or not to seek or accept employment. Of course, state schemes are subject to moral hazard as well, but the key point is that if the genuine risk of losing one's job is to be covered at all, it must be covered through a public programme (see Barr, 1998⁽²⁾: 190—2). >Moral hazard, >Free riders. For all of these reasons organizations offering protection will try to limit use, to prevent too many high risk people from joining, and to charge them more in order to hang on to their other members. In the case of voluntary groups, such as neighbourhood-, work- or craft-based mutual aid societies, informal patterns of social surveillance and affinity may function to exclude outsiders and others who are thought to be especially likely to need benefits. Similarly, private firms may use various underwrit- ing mechanisms to screen out high risk individuals or groups. The overall result may well be that certain groups may receive no or inadequate coverage, and the cost of services may be much greater than they would be if they were provided through a compulsory plan that spread risks more widely and rationed services to avoid overuse.* * An example of how a system dominated by private provision both is more expensive, and provides protection to a smaller proportion of the population, may be medical care in the US. The US spends a far higher proportion of its GDP (12.9 percent in 1998 compared with Germany's 10.3 or the UK's 6.8) on medical care than other rich countries, but fails to provide coverage for over 20 percent of its population. Ironically, public provision of medical care in the US is larger than that of the UK (5.8 versus 5.7 percent of GDP), not even counting the implicit subsidy represented by the favourable tax treatment of employer-provided health insurance (OECD health statistics). 1. Barr, Nicholas (1992) 'Economic theory and the welfare state'. Journal of Economic Literature, 30 (2): 741-803. 2. Barr, Nicholas (1998) The Economics of the Welfare State, 3rd edn. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Intelligence	Molecular Genetics	Slater I 126 Intelligence/molecular genetics: Though there is still [2012] considerable debate about the magnitude of the heritability, the presence of substantial genetic influence is now well established, through the accumulation of evidence from many studies in many different samples (see Deary, Johnson, & Houlihan, 2009⁽¹⁾, for a recent review, and Neisser et al., 1996⁽²⁾, for the consensus statement of an American Psychological Association Task Force). In contrast to the view prevailing at the time Jensen wrote (see Jensen 1969⁽²⁾, >Intelligence/Jensen, >Intelligence tests/Jensen, >Heritability/Jensen, >Intelligence tests/psychological theories), the existence of genetic influences on behavioural traits of all kinds is now generally accepted (Turkheimer, 2000)⁽³⁾, which means that it would be considered exceptional if intelligence and achievement test scores were not genetically influenced. Slater I 127 Genome-wide association studies of cognitive ability test scores have yielded many alleles of extremely small effects that tend not to replicate from sample to sample and account at best for only tiny proportions of trait variance. At present we have not yet identified a single gene locus robustly associated with normal range cognitive ability test scores (Davis, Butcher, Docherty, Meaburn, & Curtis, 2010⁽⁴⁾; Deary, Penke, & Johnson, 2010)⁽⁵⁾. The general failure to identify clear associations between particular gene loci and highly heritable, well-measured common traits has been termed the “missing heritability problem” (Maher, 2008)⁽⁶⁾. [There are] more complex genetic mechanisms (see Johnson, Penke, & Spinath, 2011⁽⁷⁾, for more detailed information). 1. Deary, I. J., Johnson, W., & Houlihan, L. (2009). Genetic foundations of human intelligence. Human Genetics, 126, 613–624. 2. Neisser, U., Boodoo, G., Bouchard, T. J., Boykin, A. W., Brody, N., Ceci, S. J., Halpern, D. F., Loehlin, J. C., Perloff, R., Sternberg, R. J., & Urbina, S. (1996). Intelligence: Knowns and unknowns. American Psychologist, 51, 77–101. 3. Turkheimer, E. (2000). Three laws of behavior genetics and what they mean. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 9, 160–164. 4. Davis, O. S., Butcher, L. M., Docherty, S. J., Meaburn, E. L., & Curtis, C. J. (2010). A three-stage genome-wide association study of general cognitive ability: Hunting the small effects. Behavior Genetics, 40, 759–767. 5. Deary, I. J., Penke, L., & Johnson, W. (2010). The neuroscience of human intelligence differences. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 11, 201–211. 6. Maher, B. (2008). The case of the missing heritaiblity. Nature, 456, 18–21. 7. Johnson, W., Penke, L., & Spinath, F. M. (2011). Heritability in the era of molecular genetics. European Journal of Personality, 25, 254–266. Wendy Johnson: „How Much Can We Boost IQ? Updated Look at Jensen’s (1969) Question and Answer“, in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Intelligence	Psychological Theories	Corr I 163 Intelligence/psychological theories/Ackerman: Modern intellectual ability theories (see e.g., Carroll 1993(1)) represent intelligence in a hierarchical fashion, with a general intellectual ability (the most general construct) at the top of the hierarchy (Strata III), and somewhat narrower ability content as one moves down the hierarchy ((s) here from left to right). E.g. Crystalized intelligence - (e.g. verbal comprehension, lexical knowledge) Fluid intelligence - (e.g. sequential reasoning) Visual perception - (e.g. spatial relations) Learning and memory - (e.g. memory spun, associative memory) Speed - (e.g. perceptual speed, reaction speed) Auditory perception - (e.g. hearing and speech, music perception) (For the complete Table cf. ⁽¹⁾) For the relation between intelligence and personality traits see >Personality traits/Ackerman. Corr I 167 Def TIE/Ackerman: a measure of typical intellectual engagement: TIE is defined as the individual’s preference toward or away from intellectual activities.(Goff and Ackerman 1992)⁽²⁾. The authors of the TIE hypothesized that scores on the measure would correlate mainly with measures of accumulated knowledge (an ability called ‘crystallized intelligence’) and less so with measures of fluid intellectual abilities (e.g., deductive reasoning and quantitative reasoning). Corr I 168 Overlap of intelligence with personality factors: The associations between personality trait measures that are narrower in scope than the broad five factors of Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Conscientiousness and Agreeableness typically show modest correlations with measures of intellectual abilities, whether at the general or specific level. Need for Achievement (nAch) probably shows the most robust positive correlations among this group of personality traits, with correlations in the range of r = .07 to .24. Traits like Alienation, Aggression, Harm-Avoidance and Traditionalism all show small negative correlations with intellectual ability measures, ranging from negligible magnitude to about r = −.15. >Personality traits/Ackerman. 1. Carroll, J. B. 1993. Human cognitive abilities: a survey of factor-analytic studies. New York: Cambridge University Press 2. Goff, M. and Ackerman, P. L. 1992. Personality-intelligence relations: assessing typical intellectual engagement, Journal of Educational Psychology 84: 537–52 Phillip L. Ackerman, “Personality and intelligence”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press Slater I 127 Intelligence/psychological theories: Many who have recently addressed the subject have taken the same kind of debating perspective Jensen (1969⁽¹⁾ did, but from the opposite side. >Intelligence/Jensen, >Intelligence test/Jensen, >Intelligence test/psychological theories. That is, they selectively present evidence just as indirect as Jensen’s but opposing his position, and prematurely conclude that he was wrong (see, e.g., Nisbett, 2009⁽²⁾; Shenk, 2010⁽³⁾). Though the question of the source of the racial gap in test scores is certainly scientifically legitimate, it must be pursued responsibly from all perspectives (Hunt & Carlson, 2007)⁽⁴⁾. Slater I 128 Jensen: Perhaps the greatest irony surrounding Jensen’s (1969)⁽¹⁾ article is that he was very creatively doing just that when he was sidetracked into arguing that socially dis-advantaged children were inherently less educable. 1. Jensen, A. R. (1969). How much can we boost IQ and scholastic achievement? Harvard Educational Review, 3, 1–123. 2. Nisbett, R. E. (2009). Intelligence and how to get it: Why schools and cultures count. New York: Norton. 3. Shenk, D. (2010). The genius in all of us: Why everything you’ve been told about genetics, talent, and IQ is wrong. New York: Doubleday. 4. Hunt, E., & Carlson, J. (2007). Considerations relating to the study of group differences in intelligence. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2, 194–213. Wendy Johnson: „How Much Can We Boost IQ? Updated Look at Jensen’s (1969) Question and Answer“, in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Intelligence Tests	Jensen	Slater I 120 Intelligence tests/Jensen: In the mid-1960s, Jensen’s lab was conducting experiments with paired-associate and serial learning in children from various racial and SES backgrounds. In these tasks, participants are presented with randomly grouped stimuli, often words, and asked later to recall both the stimuli and the ways in which they were grouped. Jensen was comparing performance on these tasks in children with different IQs. Jensen was acutely aware that most intelligence tests include items intended to assess how much the individual had learned in the predominant cultural environment, thus potentially putting minority and low-SES (socioeconomic status) backgrounds at substantial disadvantage (Jensen, 1966⁽¹⁾, 1967⁽²⁾, 1968a⁽³⁾, 1969⁽⁴⁾). Solution/Jensen: basic, novel, laboratory learning tasks might be more direct and “culture-free” indexes of intelligence. Jensen and his staff noted that African-American, Mexican-American, and low-SES European-American children with low IQs in the 70–90 range tended to perform much better on these learning tasks than did middle- and upper-SES European-American children with similar IQs. In fact, the minority and low-IQ children performed very similarly on these tasks compared to middle- and upper-SES European-American children with normal and even above-normal IQs (Jensen, 1968b⁽⁵⁾). „Culture-free“ IQ test: Raven’s Progressive Matrices: Raven’s is a well-known nonverbal reasoning test that was then generally assumed, and still is by many, to be “culture-free” because of its nonverbal character and the absence of any performance reliance on knowledge of specific information. Problem: it was exactly this test that produced the greatest difference in correlations. Jensen: this suggested, that the source of the performance contrast was not cultural bias in the tests but some difference inherent between the children in the two kinds of groups. >Heritability/Jensen, >Intelligence/Jensen, >Racism/Jensen, >Science/Jensen, >Genetic variation/Jensen. Slater I 122 JohnsonVsJensen: Jensen did not present the evidence contradicting his case, nor did he present alternative interpretations of the evidence he presented. Slater I 128 Perhaps the greatest irony surrounding Jensen’s (1969)⁽¹⁾ article is that he was very creatively doing just that when he was sidetracked into arguing that socially dis-advantaged children were inherently less educable. 1. Jensen, A. R. (1966). Verbal mediation and educational potential. Psychology in the Schools, 3, 99–109. 2. Jensen, A. R. (1967). The culturally disadvantaged: Psychological and educational aspects. Educational Research, 10, 4–20. 3. Jensen, A. R. (1968a). Social class, race, and genetic – Implications for education. American Educational Research Journal, 5, 1–42. 4. Jensen, A. R. (1969). How much can we boost IQ and scholastic achievement? Harvard Educational Review, 3, 1–123. 5. Jensen, A. R. (1968b). Patterns of mental ability and socioeconomic status. Proceedings of the National Academy of the United States of America, 60, 1330–1337. Wendy Johnson: „How Much Can We Boost IQ? Updated Look at Jensen’s (1969) Question and Answer“, in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Intensional Logic	Hintikka	II 11 Intensional Logic/non-standard/Hintikka: intensional logic uses non-standard semantics (i.e. the individual domain is not fixed). Therefore, it is not necessary to limit the domain of possible worlds of their framework. It would also be inappropriate for other reasons: In the epistemic logic the restriction would mean that everyone knows the identity of all individuals in the possible world. This would lead to omniscience. Also: Problem: this would make the situation even stranger: there must then often be epistemic alternatives to the world w₀, which are not alethic (logical) alternatives! This contradicts the natural assumption that logical possibility forms the broadest class of possibilities. >Epistemic logic, >Modal logic, >Domains, >Possible worlds.	Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Intentions	Psychological Theories	Haslam I 32 Intentions/Psychological theories: in relation to the problem of divergence between attitude and behavior researchers argued that there was no simple attitude–behaviour relationship and that in order to predict behaviour accurately it is necessary to take other variables into account. >Attitudes and behavior, >Attitudes. The most dominant of these ‘other variables’ approaches are the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975⁽¹⁾) and the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991)⁽²⁾. According to both these theories, the most immediate determinant of behaviour is a person’s intention to engage in that behaviour. >Behavior, >Decision-making processes. Intention, in turn, is determined by attitudes (i.e., the person’s evaluation of the target behaviour), subjective norms (i.e., the person’s perception that others would approve of the behaviour), and, in the theory of planned behaviour, Haslam I 32 perceived behavioural control (i.e., the person’s perception that the behaviour is under his or her control). >Social behavior, >Group behavior, >Norms. See meta-analyses by Albarracin et al., 2001⁽³⁾; Armitage and Conner, 2001⁽⁴⁾; Hagger et al., 2002⁽⁵⁾). Attitudes correlate well with intentions (the average correlation, r, ranges between .45 and .60). The same is true for correlations between subjective norms and intentions (.34 < r < .42), and between perceived behavioural control and intentions (.35 < r < .46). Indeed, overall, in combination, attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control turn out to be very good predictors of intentions (.63 < r < .71). Furthermore, Sheeran (2002)⁽⁶⁾ observes that intentions are themselves good predictors of behaviour (average r = .53). Scheme: Attitude/Subjective norm/Perceived behavioral control > Intention > Behavior (With an additional direct influence of perceived behavioral control on behavior). 1. Fishbein, M. and Ajzen, I. (1975) Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behaviour: An Introduction to Theory and Research. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 2. Ajzen, I. (1991) ‘The theory of planned behaviour’, Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes, 50: 179–211. 3. Albarracin, D., Johnson, B.T., Fishbein, M. and Muellerleile, P.A. (2001) ‘Theories of reasoned action and planned behaviour as models of condom use: A meta-analysis’, Psychological Bulletin, 127: 142–61. 4. Armitage, C.J. and Conner, M. (2001) ‘Efficacy of the theory of planned behaviour: A meta-analytic review’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 40: 471–99. 5. Hagger, M.S., Chatzisarantis, N.L.D. and Biddle, S.J.H. (2002) ‘A meta-analytic review of the theories of reasoned action and planned behaviour in physical activity: Predictive validity and the contribution of additional variables’, Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 24: 3–32. 6. Sheeran, P. (2002) ‘Intention–behaviour relations: A conceptual and empirical review’, European Review of Social Psychology, 12: 1–36. Joanne R. Smith and Deborah J. Terry, “Attitudes and Behavior. Revisiting LaPiere’s hospitality study”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Internal Realism	Putnam	VI 389 Internal Realism/Putnam: internal realism is an empirical theory - collective spokesperson-behavior. In contrast, metaphysical realism is not empirical, but a model (like billiard balls). VI 400 Internal Realism/Putnam: how a theory "is understood" cannot be discussed within the theory itself. Whether the theory has a clearly intended interpretation, has no absolute sense. Metaphysical Realism: metaphysical realism asks for a theory-independent fact in regards to what a term refers to within a theory. Internal Realism: our use of "cow" assumes that "cow" is understood. This works but only with a verificationist approach of understanding - not with a truth-conditional. Hence, the use is already explained. >Truthconditional semantics, >Verificationism, >Use. --- I (a) 18 Internal Realism/Putnam: (truth relative to a theory): here use and reference are linked. I (e) 151 Internal Realism/PutnamVsDummett: internal realism is related to its anti-realism, but truth is not identified with justification but with an idealization of justification. >Anti-realism, >Justification, >Idealization. Quine: the justification conditions change with our corpus of knowledge. I (f) 156ff Internal Realism/Putnam: the ontology is theory-dependent. Truth: truth has rationalized acceptability. Brains in a vat are not a possible world, because they are only assessable from God's perspective. >Brains in a vat. Observation through a "different world" is excluded by definition. The internal realism recognizes an "internal conceptual scheme", within which objects exist. Internalism: "rabbit" refers just to rabbit. >Conceptual scheme, >Gavagai. I (f) 159 ExternalismVs: externalism does not tell us what reference is. Internalism: tautologies are sufficient for reference (> Meaning Postulates). Causality is irrelevant for reference. "Alien" refers to aliens. ExternalismVs: the meaning arises for us by association with "not from this earth" and that is ultimately causally mediated. E.g. natural type: the natural type is the basic concept for future horses. I (f) 160 InternalismVs"of the same kind": "of the same kind" does not make sense outside of a category system. Everything is kind of the same kind. There are no extra facts that make true that horses are horses, there are just horses. >Natural kinds. VsInternalism: but in this way self-identifying objects are accepted (and the world arranges itself). Putnam: ultimately, there are self-identifying objects, but not in the externalist sense. Solution: objects are made and discovered. Then they have intrinsic labels (but they are not mind-independent).	Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Internal/external	Carnap	II 207 Internal/External/Carnap: internal: within a frame: E.g. a unicorn is a mythical creature - external: E.g. existence of numbers or physical things. Stroud I 183 External/Internal/Carnap/Quine/Stroud: Quine: distinction between "Categories Questions" and "Subset Questions": external: only one type variable for all things - then the question "is there such and such?" covers the whole range (category). - Internal: a variable for any kind of thing: Subset question, we come to generality by letting a kind of variable go over all things. Stroud: nevertheless same syntax. - Carnap: therefore different languages. >Syntax, >Language. I 184 Thing language/("Dingsprache"): here questions of existence are possible. >Existence statements. I 185 Practical Question/Carnap: here the solution consists in an action. ((s)> Manifestation/Dummett). Important argument: Carnap: existential questions must be treated as practical matters - choice of question is a practical question (of convention). - Problem: CarnapVsMoore: The kind of choice cannot be answered internally - Thing language: is efficient, but does not show a reality in the world.	Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Internet	Benkler	Benkler I 131 Internet/World Wide Web/Websites/Benkler: The basic intuition and popular belief that the Internet will bring greater freedom and global equity has been around since the early 1990s. It has been the technophile’s basic belief, just as the horrors of cyberporn, cybercrime, or cyberterrorism have been the standard gut-wrenching fears of the technophobe. The technophilic response is reminiscent of claims made in the past for electricity, for radio, or for telegraph, expressing what James Carey described as “the mythos of the electrical sublime.” I 216 The World Wide Web is [one] major platform for tools that individuals use to communicate in the networked public sphere. It enables a wide range of applications, from basic static Web pages, to, more recently, blogs and various social-software–mediated platforms for large-scale conversations of the type (...) like Slashdot. Static Web pages are the individual’s basic broadcast” medium. They allow any individual or organization to present basic texts, sounds, and images pertaining to their position. They allow small NGOs to have a worldwide presence and visibility. They allow individuals to offer thoughts and commentaries. They allow the creation of a vast, searchable database of information, observations, and opinions, available at low cost for anyone, both to read and write into. >Public Sphere/Benkler, >Internet/Lessig, >Internet/Mozorov, >Internet/Zittrain. Benkler I 370 Internet/Communication/Benkler: As a technical and organizational matter, the Internet allows for a radically more diverse suite of communications models than any of the twentieth century systems permitted. It allows for textual, aural, and visual communications. It permits spatial and temporal asynchronicity, as in the case of email or Web pages, but also enables temporal synchronicity—as in the case of IM, online game environments, or Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP). It can even be used for subchannel communications within a spatially synchronous context, such as in a meeting where people pass electronic notes to each other by e-mail or IM. Because it is still highly textual, it requires more direct attention than radio, but like print, it is highly multiplexable—both between uses of the Internet and other media, and among Internet uses themselves.	Benkler I Yochai Benkler The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom New Haven 2007
Internet Culture	Benkler	Benkler I 233 Internet Critique/internet culture/internet criticism/internet critics/World Wide Web/Benkler: 1. A basic problem created when everyone can speak is that there will be too many statements, or too much information. Too I 234 many observations and too many points of view make the problem of sifting through them extremely difficult, leading to an unmanageable din. This overall concern, a variant of the Babel objection, underlies three more specific arguments: that money will end up dominating anyway, that there will be fragmentation of discourse, and that fragmentation of discourse will lead to its polarization. I 235 2. A second-generation criticism of the democratizing effects of the Internet is that it turns out, in fact, not to be as egalitarian or distributed as the 1990s conception had suggested. First, there is concentration in the pipelines and basic tools of communications. Second, and more intractable to policy, even in an open network, a high degree of attention is concentrated on a few top sites—a tiny number of sites are read by the vast majority of readers, while many sites are never visited by anyone. In this context, the Internet is replicating the mass media model, perhaps adding a few channels, but not genuinely changing anything structural. I 236 3. [Another concern] in the context of the Internet, (…) most clearly articulated by Neil Netanel, has been that in the modern complex societies in which we live, commercial mass media are critical for preserving the watchdog function of the media. Big, sophisticated, well-funded government and corporate market actors have enormous resources at their disposal to act as they please and to avoid scrutiny and democratic control. 4. A distinct set of claims and their critiques have to do with the effects of the Internet on authoritarian countries. The critique is leveled at a basic belief supposedly, and perhaps actually, held by some cyber libertarians, that with enough access to Internet tools freedom will burst out everywhere. The argument is that China, more than any other country, shows that it is possible to allow a population access to the Internet— it is now home to the second-largest national population of Internet users—and still control that use quite substantially. 5. While the Internet may increase the circle of participants in the public sphere, access to its tools is skewed in favor of those who already are well-off in society—in terms of wealth, race, and skills. >Internet/Benkler, >Internet/Zittrain. I 241 Ad. 1. Rather than succumb to the “information overload” problem, users are solving it by congregating in a small number of sites. This conclusion is based on a new but growing literature on the likelihood that a Web page will be linked to by others. The distribution of that probability turns out to be highly skew. That is, there is a tiny probability that any given Web site will be linked to by a huge number of people, and a very large probability that for a given Web site only one other site, or even no site, will link to it. I 242 Ad. 2. While the Internet, the Web, and the blogosphere are indeed exhibiting much greater order than the freewheeling, “everyone a pamphleteer” image would suggest, this structure does not replicate a mass-media model. We are seeing a newly shaped information environment, where indeed few are read by many, but clusters of moderately read sites provide platforms for vastly greater numbers of speakers than were heard in the mass-media environment. Filtering, accreditation, synthesis, and salience are created through a system of peer review by information affinity groups, topical or interest based. These groups filter the observations and opinions of an enormous range of people, and transmit those that pass local peer review to broader groups and ultimately to the polity more broadly, without recourse to market-based points of control over the information flow. Intense interest and engagement by small groups that share common concerns, rather than lowest-common denominator interest in wide groups that are largely alienated from each other, is what draws attention to statements and makes them more visible. This makes the emerging networked public sphere more responsive to intensely held concerns of a much wider swath of the population than the mass media were capable of seeing, and creates a communications process that is more resistant to corruption by money. I 264 Ad. 3. Just as the World Wide Web can offer a platform for the emergence of an enormous and effective almanac, just as free software can produce excellent software and peer production can produce a good encyclopedia, so too can peer production produce the public watchdog function. I 265 (…) network-based peer production also avoids the inherent conflicts between investigative reporting and the bottom line—its cost, its risk of litigation, its risk of withdrawal of advertising from alienated corporate subjects, and its risk of alienating readers. Building on the wide variation and diversity of knowledge, time, availability, insight, and experience, as well as the vast communications and information resources on hand for almost anyone in advanced economies, we are seeing that the watchdog function too is being peer produced in the networked information economy. I 270 Ad. 4. (…) in authoritarian countries, the introduction of Internet communications makes it harder and more costly for governments to control the public sphere. If these governments are willing to forgo the benefits of Internet connectivity, they can avoid this problem. If they are not, they find themselves with less control over the public sphere. There are, obviously, other means of more direct repression. Benkler I 359 Social Ties/Internet culture/studies/Benkler/Turkle/Kraut: Rather than a solution to the problems that industrial society creates for family and society, the Internet was seen as increasing alienation by absorbing its users. It made them unavailable to spend time with their families. It immersed them in diversions from the real world with its real relationships. In a social-relations version of the Babel objection, it was seen as narrowing the set of shared cultural experiences to such an extent that people, for lack of a common sitcom or news show to talk about, become increasingly alienated from each other. One strand of this type of criticism questioned the value of online relationships themselves as plausible replacements for real-world human connection. Sherry Turkle, the most important early explorer of virtual identity, characterized this concern as: “is it really sensible to suggest that the way to revitalize community is to sit alone in our rooms, typing at our networked computers and filling our lives with virtual friends?”⁽¹⁾ Benkler I 360 Another strand of criticism focused less on the thinness, not to say vacuity, of online relations, and more on sheer time. According to this argument, the time and effort spent on the Net came at the expense of time spent with family and friends. Prominent and oft cited in this vein were two early studies. The first, entitled Internet Paradox, was led by Robert Kraut⁽²⁾. It was the first longitudinal study of a substantial number of users—169 users in the first year or two of their Internet use. Kraut and his collaborators found a slight, but statistically significant, correlation between increases in Internet use and (a) decreases in family communication, (b) decreases in the size of social circle, both near and far, and (c) an increase in depression and loneliness. The researchers hypothesized that use of the Internet replaces strong ties with weak ties. A second, more sensationalist release of a study followed two years later. In 2000, the Stanford Institute for the Quantitative Study of Society’s “preliminary report” on Internet and society, more of a press release than a report, emphasized the finding that “the more hours people use the Internet, the less time they spend with real human beings.”⁽³⁾ The actual results were somewhat less stark than the widely reported press release. As among all Internet users, only slightly more than 8 percent reported spending less time with family; 6 percent reported spending more time with family, and 86 percent spent about the same amount of time. I 361 Vs: The strongest result supporting the “isolation” thesis in that study was that 27 percent of respondents who were heavy Internet users reported spending less time on the phone with friends and family. The study did not ask whether they used email instead of the phone to keep in touch with these family and friends, and whether they thought they had more or less of a connection with these friends and family as a result. I 362 Unless Internet connections actually displace direct, unmediated, human contact, there is no basis to think that using the Internet will lead to a decline in those nourishing connections we need psychologically, or in the useful connections we make socially, that are based on direct human contact with friends, family, and neighbors. I 363 Relations with one’s local geographic community and with one’s intimate friends and family do not seem to be substantially affected by Internet use. To the extent that these relationships are affected, the effect is positive. Kraut and his collaborators continued their study, for example, and followed up with their study subjects for an additional three years. They found that the negative effects they had reported in the first year or two dissipated over the total period of observation.⁽⁴⁾ Their basic hypothesis that the Internet probably strengthened weak ties, however, is consistent with other research and theoretical work. I 364 Human beings, whether connected to the Internet or not, continue to communicate preferentially with people who are geographically proximate than with those who are distant⁽⁵⁾. Nevertheless, people who are connected to the Internet communicate more with people who are geographically distant without decreasing the number of local connections. 1. Sherry Turkle, “Virtuality and Its Discontents, Searching for Community in Cyberspace,” The American Prospect 7, no. 24 (1996); Sherry Turkle, Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995). 2. Robert Kraut et al., “Internet Paradox, A Social Technology that Reduces Social Involvement and Psychological Well Being,” American Psychologist 53 (1998): 1017–1031. 3. Norman H. Nie and Lutz Ebring, “Internet and Society, A Preliminary Report,” Stanford Institute for the Quantitative Study of Society, February 17, 2000, 15 (Press Release), http://www.pkp.ubc.ca/bctf/Stanford_Report.pdf. [Website not available as of 08/08/19] 4. Robert Kraut et al., “Internet Paradox Revisited,” Journal of Social Issues 58, no. 1 (2002): 49. 5. Barry Wellman, “Computer Networks as Social Networks,” Science 293, issue 5537 (September 2001): 2031.	Benkler I Yochai Benkler The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom New Haven 2007
Interpretation	Pocock	Gaus I 410 Interpretation/Pocock/Weinstein: By the 1970s, the Cambridge school of political thought, led by Quentin Skinner, J. G. A. Pocock, John Dunn and Richard Tuck, began challenging such interpretive strategies, countering that the meanings of past political philosophical texts could only be recovered with difficulty by historically contextualizing them (...). Skinner: According to Skinner, we should first ascertain the range of possible meanings available to an author Gaus I 411 when writing a piece of text, and next deploy 'this wider linguistic context as a means of decoding the actual intention of the given writer' (1969⁽¹⁾: 49). Pocock: For his part, Pocock (1985)⁽²⁾ insists that proper interpretation depends more on discovering the discourse paradigms that inform political philosophical texts than on trying to discover their authors' intentions. In his view, discourse paradigms function hegemonically, structurally infusing texts with often-contested yet related core meanings. Hence, we must first sensitize ourselves to the debates and secondary literature contextualizing any text and then map these core meanings back into them. Moreover, discourse paradigms are dynamic, evolving with each new 'spin' that canonical works impart to their inheritance. And subsequent readings of these texts spin them again, making each reader, in part, a new author. Interpretation is inherently open-ended and unstable. >Meaning change, >Theory change. Language: Language paradigms 'impose upon actors in subsequent contexts the constraints to which innovation and modification are the necessary but unpredictable responses' (1985⁽²⁾: 7). 1. Skinner, Quentin (1969) 'Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas'. History and Theory, V Il: 3-53. 2. Pocock, J. G. A. (1985) Virtue, Commerce, and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Interpretation	Schiffer	I 115 Interpretative meaning theory/interpreted/Davidson: 1. You must know what is determined and relativized to expressions by an extensional finite Tarskian truth theory 2. Conscience empirical conditions are satisfied (usually principle of charity) 3. We would know that 1. and 2. exist. ((s) This is Davidson's solution for the problem, that the equivalence "Snow is white" is true iff grass is green, holds.) >Homophony, >Truth definition, >Principle of charity. This works only for a counterfactual conditional: "what would be the case ...". Otherwise it is not realistic for any actual speaker. >Counterfactual conditional. Problem: there is no Tarskian theory for natural languages. >Truth definition/Tarski. Strange feature/Schiffer: that there then has to be a content-determining property, which is not known by any speaker. Solution: it is in the non-propositional or subdoxastic knowledge. It is in any case "represented internally". Subdoxastic knowledge: >Beliefs/Schiffer. Schiffer: this is not a mistake of Davidson.	Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Interpretation	Skinner	Gaus I 410 Interpretation/Quentin Skinner/Weinstein: By the 1970s, the Cambridge school of political thought, led by Quentin Skinner, J. G. A. Pocock, John Dunn and Richard Tuck, began challenging such interpretive strategies, countering that the meanings of past political philosophical texts could only be recovered with difficulty by historically contextualizing them (...). >J.G.A. Pocock. Skinner: According to Skinner, we should first ascertain the range of possible meanings available to an author Gaus I 411 when writing a piece of text, and next deploy 'this wider linguistic context as a means of decoding the actual intention of the given writer' (1969⁽¹⁾: 49). >Meaning/Intending, >Intention/Quentin Skinner, >Theory change, >Meaning change. Pocock: For his part, Pocock (1985)⁽²⁾ insists that proper interpretation depends more on discovering the discourse paradigms that inform political philosophical texts than on trying to discover their authors' intentions. >Interpretation/Pocock. 1. Skinner, Quentin (1969) 'Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas'. History and Theory, V Il: 3-53. 2. Pocock, J. G. A. (1985) Virtue, Commerce, and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	SkinnerBF I B. F. Skinner Science And Human Behavior 1965 SkinnerQ I Qu. Skinner The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences Cambridge 2008 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Interventionism	Mises	Rothbard IV 30 Socialism/Interventionism/Mises/Rothbard: Austrian economics had always implicitly favored a free-market policy, but in the quiet and relatively free world of the late nineteenth century, the Austrians had never bothered to develop an explicit analysis of freedom or of government intervention. In an environment of accelerating statism and socialism, Ludwig von Mises, while continuing to develop his business cycle theory, turned his powerful attention to analyzing the economics of government intervention and planning. His journal article of 1920, “Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth,”⁽¹⁾ was a blockbuster: demonstrating for the first time that socialism was an unviable system for an industrial economy; … MisesVsSocialism: …for Mises showed that a socialist economy, being deprived of a free-market price system, could not rationally calculate costs or allocate factors of production efficiently to their most needed tasks. Mises incorporated his insights into a comprehensive critique of socialism, Socialism (1922)⁽²⁾. Interventions/Mises: If socialism cannot work, then neither can the specific acts of government intervention into the market which Mises dubbed “interventionism.” In a series of articles during the 1920s, Mises criticized and disposed of a host of statist economic measures, articles which were collected into Kritik des Interventionismus (1929)(3). If neither socialism nor interventionism were viable, then we are left with “laissez-faire” liberalism, or the free-market economy, and Mises expanded on his analysis of the merits of classical liberalism in his notable Liberalismus(4) (1927). In Liberalismus, Mises showed the close interconnection between international peace, civil liberties, and the free-market economy. >Laisser-faire, >Liberalism. 1. “Die Wirtschaftsrechnung im sozialistischen Gemeinwesen,” in Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften 47 (1920): 86–121. Translated into English by S. Adler and inluded in F.A. Hayek, ed., Collectivist Economic Planning: Critical Studies of the Possibilities of Socialism (London: G. Routledge & Sons, 1935). 2. Ludwig von Mises, Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis (Indianapolis: Liberty Press/Liberty Classics, 1981). German editions, 1922, 1932. English translation by J. Kahane, 1936; enlarged with an Epilogue, Planned Chaos, 1951; Jonathan Cape, 1969. 3. Ludwig von Mises, A Critique of Interventionism, trans. by Hans F. Sennholz (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1977); reprinted 1996 by the Ludwig von Mises Institute. Original German edition in 1976 by Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft (Darmstadt, Germany), with a Foreword by F.A. Hayek. 4. Liberalism: A Socio-Economic Exposition, trans. Ralph Raico, Arthur Goddard, Ludwig von Mises, ed. (Kansas City: Sheed Andrews and McMeel, 1978); 1962 edition, The Free and Prosperous Commonwealth (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand). Coyne I 29 Interventionism/Mises/Coyne/Boettke: (…) Interventionism (…) requires employing the discretionary power of the administrative state to replace the preferences of private economic actors with those of policymakers. (…) government interference in a market generates a range of interrelated effects on economic activity. In addition, subsequent attempts by policymakers to counteract the emergence of unintended consequences and to make the initial intervention yield the desired results leads to increasingly extensive controls over economic activity, which threatens the dynamism of the market process. Cf. >Spontaneous order, >Markets. Interventionism is a form of non-comprehensive planning. It does not abolish ownership over the means of production or attempt to plan all economic activity, as under socialism. But it does involve piecemeal economic planning. Under Piece-meal planning, policymakers replace what emerged through the market process with their own judgments of what they believe should exist. >Planning, >Planned economy. The underlying implicit assumption of interventionism, therefore, is that policymakers have access to the economic knowledge necessary to engage in piecemeal planning to achieve their ends. More specifically, there are three types of economic knowledge that policymakers are assumed to possess. 1) First, since government interventions into the market are justified as a means of improving social welfare, the policymakers are assumed to possess knowledge of ways of allocating scarce resources that are superior to the market alternative. 2) Second, intervenors are assumed to possess knowledge of how to adjust interventions in the face of constant change. As broader economic conditions change, so too will the effcacy of even well-intentioned interventions. Given the goal of improving social welfare, past intervention will need to be continually revised, and perhaps removed or replaced, in the face of changing circumstances. This requires that policymakers possess knowledge of the new conditions as well as the knowledge of how best to revise existing regulations or introduce new regulations that improve social welfare in the face of circumstances different from those in the past. 3) Third, the policymakers are assumed to possess knowledge of what would have emerged absent the intervention. Claiming an intervention is necessary to achieve an outcome implies that the same outcome, or an even better outcome, would not have emerged in future periods absent the intervention. Knowledge/Mises/Hayek: The main constraint on policymakers in obtaining each of these categories of economic knowledge is the knowledge problem that Mises and Hayek highlighted during the socialist calculation debate. Absent the ability to rely on market-determined prices and profit and loss, there is no way for policymakers to know the highest-valued uses of scarce resources. >Ignorance/Kirzner. VsInterventionism/Problems: This ignorance poses issues for the initial design of interventions because there is no way for policymakers to acquire the tacit and context-specific knowledge of dispersed actors throughout society. As a result, they cannot have superior knowledge, relative to market participants, about the allocation of resources. This same issue also plagues attempts by policymakers to revise interventions as conditions change. Since they are unable to acquire the economic knowledge of time and place necessary to determine the best allocation of scarce resources, there is no way to ensure that interventions will be revised and adjusted to improve social welfare. Finally, since the market is an open-ended process of competition, discovery, and change, there is no way for policy-makers to know what would have emerged through voluntary interaction and exchange absent the intervention. This makes it impossible for policymakers to determine if an intervention has produced an outcome that is superior to the counterfactual - namely, the spontaneous order that would have emerged if economic actors were left to engage without intervention in discovery and exchange. >Interventions/Austrian School.	EconMises I Ludwig von Mises Die Gemeinwirtschaft Jena 1922 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 Coyne I Christopher J. Coyne Peter J. Boettke The Essential Austrian Economics Vancouver 2020
Introversion	Eysenck	Corr I 353 Introversion/Eysenck: Eysenck’s (1967)⁽¹⁾ personality theory states that individuals differ with respect to the sensitivity of their ARAS (Ascending Reticular Activating System), which serves to dampen or amplify incoming sensory stimulation. Those of us with an active ARAS easily generate cortical arousal, whereas those of us with a less active ARAS generate cortical arousal much more slowly. According to this view, those of us with an overactive ARAS are, generally, more cortically aroused and closer to our optimal point of arousal; therefore, we do not seek out more stimulation, and we shy away from stimulation that we encounter: we are introverts. Most people are in the middle range of these extreme values (i.e., ambiverts). >Personality traits/Eysenck, >Personality/Eysenck, >Extraversion/Eysenck, >VsEysenck. 1. Eysenck, H. J. 1967. The biological basis of personality. Springfield, IL: Thomas Philip J. Corr, „ The Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory of Personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Intuitionism	Rawls	I 31 Intuitionism/Rawls: we should see it as a kind of pluralism. In doing so, we have to weigh up principles intuitively. Intuitionists are concerned with different dimensions, be it taxes, wages, penalties. Cf. >Pluralism. I 32 These different dimensions give rise to different socio-political objectives, which must be weighed up against each other, for example with regard to an effective tax system, full employment, gross domestic product, and so on. Intuitionism creates a basis for deciding to what extent the commandments of one group must be adapted to those of another group. There are two principles: 1. principle of benefit: we should produce as much as possible. 2. principle of justice: Accumulate wealth and balance inequalities. This concept is intuitive in that it is now a matter of weighing these principles against each other. >Benefit, >Justice. I 34 Justice: Intuitionism claims that the emphasis is not based on an explicit ethical conception. There would be no moral criteria here. In the end, we have a number of first principles about which we can only say that it seems to us to be more correct to balance them in this way than in another. >Principles/Rawls. RawlsVsIntuitionism: if we want to refute it, we must identify constructive ethical criteria for these weightings, which supposedly do not exist. I 35 Intuitionism/Rawls: there are teleological (Moore⁽¹⁾ >perfectionism) and deontological variants⁽²⁾ of intuitionism. >Deontology. I 39 Intuitionism is not intrinsically irrational when it says that there is a plurality of first principles at the end. He insists, however, that an attempt to get behind these principles either reduces them to the triviality, that everyone is provided with duties or to an incorrect simplification if everything is traced back to a benefit. I 41 Intuitionism/justice/Rawls: undoubtedly, any conception of justice will have to rely to some extent on intuition. In order to allow a rational discussion of principles, however, we must reduce this intuition to a minimum. I 42 Principles/Intuition/Rawls: A. In the initial position for the establishment of a society, the weighting of principles must be discussed between the individual members. These will aim for a different weighting of their own accord. B. Another possibility is the lexical order for the execution of principles in an order to be chosen. I 43 The sequence itself is simply serial and avoids having to weigh the principles against each other from the very beginning. >Principles/Rawls. Problem: in a lexical order. I 44 Dependence on intuition can be minimized by dealing with rational questions rather than moral ones. For example, it can be too abstract to weigh total benefit against total equality. >Benefit, >Equality. Justice as Fairness/Rawls: this is where intuition comes into play in two ways: 1. we choose a social position to deal with, 2. we ask from the point of view of a person who is supposed to hold that position, whether it is rational to prefer this arrangement. >Justice/Rawls, >Fairness/Rawls. 1. Principia Ethica, pp. 27-31 2. Ross, The Right and the Good, pp. 21-27.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Inverted Spectra	Chalmers	I 99 Inverted Spectra/Consciousness/Chalmers: in order to demonstrate the lack of explainability of our consciousness, it suffices to show the logical possibility of a physical world with our identical world where facts about our conscious experience differ from those in our world. This is about positive facts, not about a lack of facts. >Facts/Chalmers, >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Qualia, >Possible worlds. I 100 Someone who lives in my world might experience something as blue that I perceive as red. Of course, he would call it "red" just like me. The rest of its color perception would be arranged so that no differences could be noticed. Explanation: The simplest explanation would be that two of the axes of our three-dimensional color space are interchanged, the red-green axis and the yellow-blue axis. (An enlightening discussion of the human color space can be found in Hardin, 1988⁽¹⁾). This is not only conceptually consistent and it does not appear to be excluded from neurophysiology either. HarrisonVsInverted spectra/HardinVsInverted Spectra/Chalmers: (Harrison 1973⁽²⁾, Hardin 1987⁽³⁾): Thesis: The human color space is asymmetric so that such a reversal is not possible. For example, warm/cold colors associated with different functional roles ("positive", "negative"). ChalmersVsVs: 1. Nevertheless, nothing is conceptually contradictory in inverted spectra. 2. Instead of an inversion of red and blue, one could assume an inversion of only slightly different color hues (Levine 1991)⁽⁴⁾. I 101 There is also no reason why an inversion of the spectrum needs to use only natural colors. 3. (Shoemaker, 1982)⁽⁵⁾: Even though our color space is asymmetric, there is no reason to believe that there might be creatures with a symmetric color space that are physically identical to us. Conceivability/Reductive explanation/Chalmers: if such assumptions are conceivable, this has an impact on the question of the possibility of reductive explanations. >Conceivability/Chalmers, >Explanation, >Reduction/Chalmers. Consciousness: both the conceivability of zombies as well as the one of inverted spectra show that consciousness does not logically supervene on physical facts. At most the existence of conscious experience could be explained reductively, but not the specific character of our experience. >Experience. I 263 Inverted Spectra/Chalmers: we must exclude the possibility of inverted spectra for functionally isomorphically structured systems. Inverted Qualia come first in John Locke. I 264 VsChalmers: even materialists argue that the nature of experiences is based on the physiological nature, that is to say, in the case of differently constructed systems (for example, machines). >Materialism. Inverted Spectra/Schlick (1932)⁽⁶⁾: they cannot be ascertained verificationistically. Therefore, there can be no real difference. ChalmersVsSchlick: this is not sufficient to draw the conclusion that there is no fact here in regard to conscious experiences, namely, because the nature of Qualia is conceptually not linked to behavior. ((s) > nonfactualism). I 265 Invariance Principle/Chalmers: the principle is not shaken by the natural (not only logical) possibility of inverted spectra. It is also not shaken by examples of reorganization, rewiring, etc. (Gert, 1965⁽⁷⁾, Lycan 1973⁽⁸⁾, Wittgenstein, 1968⁽⁹⁾). It is also not shaken by kidnapping to a twin earth with a yellow sky. (Block 1990)⁽¹⁰⁾. Here the representations after an acclimatization period will be about yellow. The invariance principle (the preservation of conscious experiences with a changed physical structure of a functionally consistent system) remains. >Invariance principle. 1. C. L. Hardin, Color for Philosophers: Unweaving the Rainbow, Indianapolis 1988. 2. B. Harrison, Form and Content, Oxford, 1973 3. C. L. Hardin, Qualia and materialism: Closing the explanatory gap. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48, 1987: pp. 281-98 4. J. Levine, Cool red. Philosophical Psychology 4, 1991: pp. 27-40 5. S. Shoemaker, The inverted spectrum. Journal of Philosophy 79, 1982: pp. 357-81 6. M. Schlick, Positivism and Realism, Erkenntnis 3, 1932 7. B. Gert, Imagination and verifiability. Philosophical Studies 16, 1965: pp. 44-47 8. W. G. Lycan, Inverted spectrum. Ratio 15, 1973: pp. 315-19 9. L. Wittgenstein, Notes for lectures on "private experience" and "sense data". Philosophical Review 77, 1968 10. N. Block, Invereted earth, Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79 (1990)	Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Inverted Spectra	Pauen	Pauen I 143 Inverted spectra/DennettVs inverted spectra/Pauen: behavior and phenomenal experience cannot be separated because they are interwoven on the neural level. - With that consciousness and behavior are inseparable. >Consciousness, >Behavior, >Phenomena, >Experience, >Qualia. I 184 Inverted spectra/missing Qualia/Pauen: common thesis of both arguments: it is impossible to establish a connection between phenomenal and physiological knowledge - so neurobiological theories would be fundamentally unsuited for knowledge of phenomenal processes. Cf. >Qualia/Chalmers. Nevertheless, causal effectiveness of mental properties possible. - No epiphenomenalism. >Epiphenomenalism, >Mental states. I 186 Phenomenal states/Vs Inverted spectra/Pauen: the specific quality of a phenomenal state is rarely determined only by its location within a frame of reference. >Sensory impressions, >Perception, >Subjectivity, >Colors, >Color words. So there is probably no sensation of red itself. - One cannot talk reasonable of differences of the spectrum between people. Maximum change in a person. >Other minds. I 187 Inverted spectra/Vs inverted spectra/Pauen: the spectrum is not symmetric. - This is noticeable in our discernment. Primary colors and mixed colors would be displayed on each other in different numbers. - Orange and Red are turning both into Brown, if they are darkened. Solution: this could be corrected, if one sets exactly the mirror axis through the axis of orange/brown. Problem: that would display secondary colors on primary colors. Pauen: therefore the thought experiment fails because of the imaginability. >Conceivability.	Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Investments	Rothbard	Rothbard III 62 Investments/Rothbard: Thus, the investment decision will be determined by which is greater: the present value of the future good or the present value of present goods forgone. The present value of the future good, in turn, is determined by the value that the future good would have if immediately present (say, the “expected future value of the future good”); and by the rate of time preference. >Production/Rothbard, >Capital goods/Rothbard, >Factors of production/Rothbard. Rothbard III 63 The greater the former, the greater will be the present value of the future good; the greater the latter (the rate of discount of future compared to present goods), the lower the present value. At any point in time, an actor has a range of investment decisions open to him of varying potential utilities for the products that will be provided. As he makes one investment decision after another, he will choose to allocate his resources first to investments of highest present value, then to those of next highest, etc. As he continues investing (at any given time), the present value of the future utilities will decline. On the other hand, since he is giving up a larger and larger supply of consumers’ goods in the present, the utility of the consumers’ goods that he forgoes (leisure and others) will increase - on the basis of the law of marginal utility. >Consumer goods/Rothbard, >Marginal Utility. Rothbard III 316 Investments/Rothbard: Not only do the renting and selling of consumers’ goods rest on appraisement and on hope of monetary profits, but so does the activity of all the investing producers, the keystone of the entire productive system. (…) that the term “capital value” applies, not only to durable consumers’ goods, but to all nonhuman factors of production as well—i.e., land and capital goods, singly and in various aggregates. The use and purchase of these factors rest on appraisement by entrepreneurs of their eventual yield in terms of monetary income on the market, and it will be seen that their capital value on the market will also tend to be equal to the discounted sum of their future yields of money income.⁽¹⁾ >Capital value/Rothbard. Rothbard III 537 Investments/production structure/Rothbard: (…) there is only one way by which man can rise from the ultraprimitive level [of production]: through investment in capital. But this cannot be accomplished through short processes, since the short processes for producing the most valuable goods will be the ones first adopted. >Production structure/Rothbard. Any increase in capital goods can serve only to lengthen the structure, i.e., to enable the adoption of longer and longer productive processes. Men will invest in longer processes more productive than the ones previously adopted. They will be more productive in two ways: (1) by producing more of a previously produced good, and/or (2) by producing a new good that could not have been produced at all by the shorter processes. Within this framework these longer processes are the most direct that must be used to attain the goal (…). >Production/Rothbard. Rothbard III 538 Time preference/production: (…) if there were no time preference, the most productive methods would be invested in first, regardless of time, and an increase in capital would not cause more productive methods to be used. The existence of time preference acts as a brake on the use of the more productive but longer processes. Any state of equilibrium will be based on the time-preference, or pure interest, rate, and this rate will determine the amount of savings and capital invested. It determines capital by imposing a limit on the length of the production processes and therefore on the maximum amount produced. A lowering of time preference, therefore, and a consequent lowering of the pure rate of interest signify that people are now more willing to wait for any given amount of future output, i.e., to invest more proportionately and in longer processes than heretofore. A rise in time preference and in the pure interest rate means that people are less willing to wait and will spend proportionately more on consumers’ goods and less on the longer production processes, so that investments in the longest processes will have to be abandoned.⁽²⁾ Rothbard III 540 (…) the limits at any time on investment and productivity are a scarcity of saved capital, not the state of technological knowledge. In other words, there is always an unused shelf of technological projects available and idle. This is demonstrable by the fact that a new invention is not immediately and instantaneously adopted by all firms in the society. >Technology/Rothbard. Rothbard III 547 Labour/investments/Rothbard: The benefits to land factors, (…) accrue only to particular lands. Other lands may lose in value, although there is an aggregate gain. This is so because usually lands are relatively specific factors. >Production factors/Rothbard. For the nonspecific factor par excellence, namely, labor, there is, on the contrary, a very general rise in real wages. These laborers are “external beneficiaries” of increased investment, i.e., they are beneficiaries of the actions of others without paying for these benefits. Rothbard III 547 Investments/entrepreneurs/Rothbard: What benefits do the investors themselves acquire? In the long run, they are not great. In fact, their rate of interest return is reduced. This is not a loss, however, since it is the outcome of their changed time preferences. Their real interest return may well be increased, in fact, since the fall in the interest rate may be offset by the rise in the purchasing power of the monetary unit in an expanding economy. >Economy/Rothbard, >Interest rates/Rothbard, >Purchasing power/Rothbard. The main benefits gained by the investors, therefore, are short-run entrepreneurial profits. These are earned by investors who see a profit to be gained by investing in a certain area. But the short-run benefits earned by the workers and landowners are more certain. >Profit/Rothbard, >Rate of profit/Rothbard. 1. On appraisement and valuation, cf. Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. pp. 328–30. 2. It should be clear that, as Mises lucidly put it, „Originary [pure] interest is not a price determined on the market by the interplay of the demand for and the supply of capital or capital goods. Its height does not depend on the extent of this demand and supply. It is rather the rate of originary interest that determines both the demand for and the supply of capital and capital goods. It determines how much of the available supply of goods is to be devoted to consumption in the immediate future and how much to provision for remoter periods of the future.“ (Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. pp. 523 - 24)	Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Jensen	Psychological Theories	Slater I 123 Jensen/intelligence/genetic variation/cultural differences/psychological theories: Jensen’s (1969)⁽¹⁾ article unleashed a storm of controversy. The article itself was published with commentary by nine well-known psychologists and geneticists. All rejected Jensen’s conclusion that the score differences could be considered genetically determined, generally pointing out the limitations in his arguments, alternative explanations for the facts he presented, and data he had overlooked. >Jensen, Arthur R, >Intelligence, >Intelligence tests. His critics were not able empirically to refute the case that Jensen had made, and often resorted to rather emotional attacks, particularly in the mainstream press. The response was so extreme and vitriolic that some felt that it ran contrary to the spirit of scientific debate and acted to restrict intellectual freedom of inquiry. Johnson: regardless of whether Jensen’s (1969)⁽¹⁾ article was the impetus, it is striking that, to this day, the American Psychological Association publishes a wide range of journals addressing many aspects of psychological function, including very specific aspects of cognition, but research involving general intelligence has no clear representation in any of these journals. >Cognition, >Cognitive psychology. 1. Jensen, A. R. (1969). How much can we boost IQ and scholastic achievement? Harvard Educational Review, 3, 1–123. Wendy Johnson: „How Much Can We Boost IQ? Updated Look at Jensen’s (1969) Question and Answer“, in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Jigsaw Method	Psychological Theories	Haslam I 221 Jigsaw method/psychological theories: in the years since Aronson’s experiments (>Jigsaw method/Aronson; Aronson et al. ⁽¹⁾) research on the jigsaw classroom has continued to yield positive results in terms of enhanced academic performance and esteem, particularly among students from economically or educationally disadvantaged backgrounds, as well as improved intergroup relations within the classroom and the school (Johnson et al., 2000⁽²⁾; Tomcho and Foels, 2012⁽³⁾). >E. Aronson, >Learning, >Learning theory, >Socialization, >Group behavior. It has been applied successfully to diverse topical Haslam I 222 areas such as English as a second language (ESL; Ghaith and El-Malak, 2004⁽⁴⁾) and physics classes (Hänze and Berger, 2007)⁽⁵⁾, and positive results have been replicated internationally (Walker and Crogan, 1998)⁽⁶⁾. Robert Cialdini initiated an influential set of studies on social influence that drew on observations of strategies used by individuals, such as salespeople, in applied settings, identified underlying psychological principles, and tested these ideas in field settings (Cialdini, 2009)(7). Also, basic research on attitudes and behaviour, such as the work of Ajzen and Fishbein’s (1980)⁽⁸⁾ theory of reasoned action (…), significantly guided the development of effective interventions to change sexual practices and promote medical adherence to help curb the emerging international AIDS epidemic (Albarracin et al., 2001)⁽⁹⁾. Ingroup relations: research on this topic was also inspired by the jigsaw classroom research; see Paluck and Green (2009)⁽¹⁰⁾. Haslam I 223 Publications: Indeed, the earliest publications publications on the jigsaw classroom – also known as cooperative learning – were published in education journals rather than social psychological journals. Limitations of the method:/VsAronson: Aronson’s work spawned a new generation of cooperative learning interventions that were constructed to be effective in a wider range of classroom situations, not just under the specific circumstances associated with recently desegregated schools. These newer cooperation-based interventions were more generally effective educationally. So it was that when David Johnson and colleagues (2000)⁽²⁾ ranked eight commonly used cooperation-based teaching methods in terms of their effectiveness the jigsaw classroom was only ranked sixth in terms of impact on educational achievement. By the early 1990s, 79% of US elementary schools used cooperative learning methods (Puma et al., 1993)⁽¹¹⁾ attests to the influence of the jigsaw classroom on policy implementation. >Jigsaw method/Social psychology. 1. Aronson, E., Stephan, C., Sikes, J., Blaney, N. and Snapp, M. (1978) The Jigsaw Classroom. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 2. Johnson, D., Johnson, R.T. and Stanne, M.B. (2000) ‘Cooperative learning methods: A meta-analysis’, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/David_Johnson50/publication/220040324_Cooperative_learning_methods_A_meta-analysis/links/00b4952b39d258145c000000.pdf (04.05. 2019)). 3. Tomcho, T.J. and Foels, R. (2012) ‘Meta-analysis of group learning activities: Empirically-based teaching recommendations’, Teaching of Psychology, 39: 159–69. 4. Ghaith, G. and El-Malak, M.A. (2004) ‘Effect of Jigsaw II on literal and higher-order EFL reading comprehension’, Educational Research and Evaluation, 10: 105–55. 5. Hänze, M. and Berger, R. (2007) ‘Cooperative learning, motivational effects, and student characteristics: An experimental study comparing cooperative learning and direct instruction in 12th grade physics classes“, Learning and instruction, 17: 29-41. 6. Walker, I. and Crogan, M. (1998) ‘Academic performance, prejudice, and the jigsaw classroom: New pieces to the puzzle’, Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 8: 381–93. 7. Cialdini, R.B. (2009) Influence: Science and Practice (5th edn). New York: Pearson. 8. Ajzen, I. and Fishbein, M. (1980) Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Social Behavior: Attitudes, Intentions, and Perceived Behavioral Control. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 9. Albarracin, D., Johnson, B.T., Fishbein, M. and Muellerleile, P.A. (2001) ‘Theories of reasoned action and planned behavior as models of condom use: A meta-analysis’. Psychological Bulletin, 127: 142–61. 10. Paluck, E.L. and Green, D.P. (2009), ‘Prejudice reduction: What works? A review and assessment of research and practice’, Annual Review of Psychology, 60: 339-67. 11. Puma M.J., Jones C.C., Rock D. and Fernandez, R. (1993) ‘Prospects: The congressionally mandated study of educational growth and opportunity’, Interim Report. Bethesda, MD: Abt Associates. John F. Dovidio, „ Promoting Positive Intergroup Relations. Revisiting Aronson et al.’s jigsaw classroom“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications	Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Jigsaw Method	Social Psychology	Haslam I 223 Jigsaw method/Social Psychology: Within social psychology, the theoretical contribution of the jigsaw strategy (Aronson et al. 1978⁽¹⁾; >Jigsaw method/Aronson; >Jigsaw method/psychological theories) was limited because of difficulty in clarifying the underlying mechanisms that accounted for the effects obtained. Indeed, moving into the contemporary era, this focus on outcomes rather than process limited the kind of theory development that was becoming critically important for publication within social psychology. (…) the phrase ‘jigsaw classroom’ has not appeared in the title of an article published in a leading social psychology journal (…). Preliminary work: Contact hypothesis: Beginning with research in the 1930s but catalysed by Allport’s (1954)⁽²⁾ classic book The Nature of Prejudice, the contact hypothesis had represented the state-of-the art intervention for improving intergroup relations (see Dovidio et al., 2003)⁽³⁾. Aronson’s work drew heavily on Sherif et al.’s (1961)⁽⁴⁾ concept of superordinate goals in the Robbers Cave study, helped to revitalize interest in the way intergroup contact can improve intergroup relations. And although it may seem that the jigsaw classroom was somewhat neglected by social psychologists, this is certainly not the case today. (Paluck and Green(2009)⁽⁵⁾. Explanations: It was the development of two other contemporaneous frameworks – social cognition and social identity – that ultimately provided the essential insights into the underlying processes (e.g., after Fiske and Taylor, 1984⁽⁶⁾; Tajfel and Turner, 1979⁽⁷⁾). Categorization/social cognition: intergroup biases are conceptualized as outcomes of normal cognitive processes associated with simplifying and storing the overwhelming quantity and complexity of information that people encounter daily. One fundamental aspect of this process is the tendency to categorize individuals as members of social groups based on distinguishing characteristics, Haslam I 224 often socially constructed as essential qualities. >Categorization/Dovidio. Haslam I 225 Social identity theory: According to social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979⁽⁷⁾; see also Abrams and Hogg, 2010)⁽⁸⁾, the other important development around the time of Aronson and colleagues’ (1978)⁽¹⁾ original work on the jigsaw strategy, a person’s experience of identity varies along a continuum that ranges at one extreme from the self as a separate individual with personal motives, goals, and achievements, to another extreme in which the self is the embodiment of a social collective or group. Individual level: here, one’s personal welfare and goals are most salient and important. Group level: here, the goals and achievements of the group are merged with one’s own, and the group’s welfare is paramount. Intergroup relations: begin when people think about themselves as group members rather than solely as distinct individuals. (See Sherif (1961⁽⁴⁾ and Tajfel and Turner (1979⁽⁷⁾). 1. Aronson, E., Stephan, C., Sikes, J., Blaney, N. and Snapp, M. (1978) The Jigsaw Classroom. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 2. Allport, G.W. (1954) The Nature of Prejudice. New York: Addison-Wesley. 3. Dovidio, J.F., Gaertner, S.L. and Kawakami, K. (2003) ‘The Contact Hypothesis: The past, present, and the future’, Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 6: 5–21. 4. Sherif, M., Harvey, O.J., White, B.J., Hood, W.R. and Sherif, C.W. (1961) Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Book Exchange. 5. Paluck, E.L. and Green, D.P. (2009), ‘Prejudice reduction: What works? A review and assessment of research and practice’, Annual Review of Psychology, 60: 339-67. 6. Fiske, S.T. and Taylor, S.E. (1984) Social Cognition. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley. 7. Tajfel, H. and Turner, J.C. (1979) ‘An integrative theory of intergroup conflict’, in W.G. Austin and S. Worchel (eds), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. pp. 33–48. John F. Dovidio, „ Promoting Positive Intergroup Relations. Revisiting Aronson et al.’s jigsaw classroom“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications	Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Justice	International Political Theory	Gaus I 294 Justice/International political theory/Brown: The reinvigoration of theories of justice begun by John Rawls's A Theory of Justice⁽¹⁾ (...) here, the technicalities of Rawls's scheme will be taken for granted, and the focus will be on their international implications (Brown, 1997⁽²⁾; 2002a⁽³⁾; 2002b)⁽⁴⁾. International justice/Brown: of the 'difference principle'. International society is not a 'co-operative venture for mutual advantage'; individual societies are assumed to be bounded and self-sufficient, and so there is nothing that could provide the basic materials for redistribution required by the notion of international distributive justice. VsRawls: For a theory of social justice to have nothing to say about the extraordinary inequalities that exist between societies appears perverse. International Justice/BarryVsRawls: Brian Barry this is symptomatic of wider problems with Rawls's project. International justice poses problems that are structurally similar to those posed by, for example, intergenerational justice and environmental justice; in each case the central notion of a contract based, at least in part, on the search for mutual advantage by the contractors, cannot easily respond to the interests of those who cannot be present as contractors, which category includes foreigners. Moreover, the requirement that arrangements be, in some sense, based on reciprocity is equally if not more limiting (Barry, 1989)⁽⁵⁾. >Justice/Barry, >Jutice/Beitz, >International relations/Pogge. Gaus I 295 Borders/boundaries/refugees: Since existing boundaries are clearly not the result of any kind of contract - nor are they 'natural' - what, if any, justification can be given for the norm which assigns to state authorities the right to control such borders, and thus creates categories such as 'political refugee' and 'economic migrant'? Pogge⁽⁵⁾ suggests none, and the majority of cosmopolitan liberals agree (Barry and Goodin, 1992(6); O'Neill, 1994⁽⁷⁾). However, as most cosmopolitans also agree, there are obviously practical problems with such a position, and liberal nationalists such as Michael Walzer and David Miller argue that Rawls was essentially correct to assume that distributive justice can only be a feature of bounded communities (Miller and Walzer, 1995⁽⁸⁾). A socially just society will involve redistribution of resources, and the willingness of citizens to redistribute depends crucially on the existence of a sense of community (Miller, 1995)⁽⁹⁾. Equality/inequality/justice/Brown: problem: a world of socially just communities might still be a radically unequal world. Can such a state of affairs truly be just? Liberalism/Brown: There is an impasse here which is symptomatic of a wider set of problems for contemporary cosmopolitan liberalism (Brown, 2000a)⁽³⁾. The distinction between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' is difficult to justify rationally, but a politics without this distinction, a politics without borders, is, in the world as it is, unattainable and undesirable, unless a libertarian conception of liberalism be taken to its limits, as Hillel Steiner (1992)⁽¹⁰⁾ advocates. >Hillel Steiner. 1. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2. Brown, C. (1997) 'Review essay: theories of international justice'. British Journal of Political Science, 27:273—9. 3. Brown, C. (2000a) 'On the borders of (international) political theory'. In N. O'Sullivan, ed., Political Theory in Transition. London: Routledge. 4. Brown, C. (2000b) 'Cultural diversity and international political theory'. Review of International Studies, 26: 199-213. 5. Pogge, T. (1989) Realizing Rawls. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 6. Barry, B. and R. E. Goodin, eds (1992) Free Movement. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 7. O'Neill, O. (1994) 'Justice and boundaries'. In C. Brown, ed., Political Restructuring in Europe. London: Routledge, 69-88. 8. Miller, D. and M. Walzer, eds (1995) Pluralism, Justice and Equality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 9. Miller, D. (1995) On Nationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 486—93. 10. Steiner, H. (1992) 'Libertarianism and the transnational migration of people'. In B. Barry and R. E. Goodin, eds, Free Movement. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Brown, Chris 2004. „Political Theory and International Relations“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Justice	Liberalism	Gaus I 96 Justice/Liberalism/Waldron: we should not understand the strategy of the political liberal as a strategy of attempting to suppress all basis for disagreement about justice. Political liberals should think about justice as a topic that naturally evokes disagreement even when the influence of rival comprehensive conceptions is left out of account. ((s) For the distinction between political and comprehensive liberalism see >Liberalism/Waldron.) Rights/law/society/Waldron: The fact that one major source of dissensus is removed should not lead us to assume - what many political theorists mistakenly assume about rights - that what is just and unjust can be determined in some realm of principle that is beyond politics, some arena of philosophical argument where political procedures like voting will not be necessary. Like individual rights, justice remains an intensely contested issue, and though the contestation may be diminished it is not eliminated by the strategies that the political liberal proposes. Overlapping consensus/WaldronVsRawls: Social justice, after all, raises concerns that can hardly be dealt with by the strategy of vagueness or evasion associated with overlapping consensus – putting about a set of anodyne formulas that can mean all things to all people. >Overlapping consensus/Rawls, >Overlapping consensus/Waldron. Gaus I 97 Justice/Waldron: A theory of justice (...) is not just some set of esoteric formulas; it is supposed to be something public, something shared among the citizens as a common point of reference for their debates about the allocation of rights and responsibilities. responsibilities. So political liberalism also has implications for what this sharing a conception of justice amounts to. Example: (...) e.g., a left liberal like me ((s) Jeremy Waldron) may not say, for example, to a Social Darwinian that even the feeblest person is entitled to our compassion because he is created in the image of God. I must find some way of putting my point about equality that can be affirmed even by people who do not share my religious convictions. Equally a Christian conservative may not justify laws restricting abortion on the grounds that foetuses have souls, since this too is rooted in a comprehensive conception he cannot expect others to share. Gaus I 98 (...) the dative element (...) - that political justification be understood as justification to each and every individual -can be understood in more than one way. a) It may be understood as a requirement that the justificatation of political arrangements should be directed to the good or interests of each and every one who is subject to those arrangements. I shall call this the ‘interestregarding’ interpretation. b) Or it may be understood as a requirement that the justification of a political decision be plausibly reckoned likely to persuade everyone who is subject to the arrangements. I shall call this the ‘premise-regarding’ interpretation, because it understands ‘justification to X’ as justification that seeks to hook up with premises to which X is already committed. Rawls/Waldron: Clearly Rawls’s political liberalism assumes what I have called the ‘premise-regarding’ interpretation of the requirement that political justification must be justification to each and every individual. >Justice/Rawls. Waldron: However it is also important to see that interestregarding interpretation of justifiability to all can be maintained even if the premise-regarding interpretation is given up. >Liberalism/Waldron. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Justification	Lamont	Gaus I 230 Theories/principles/justification/Lamont: (...) theories [on distributive justice] have been characterized mainly according to the content of their approach to the moral demands of welfare (or luck) and responsibility. It is important to note here some of the complications of these characterizations and Gaus I 231 also other ways of conceptualizing the distributive justice literature. Most theorists are accurately described by a number of non-equivalent labels. The classifications used here are widespread in the contemporary literature, but there are nevertheless subtle differences in the ways different authors use these labels. Content/principle/justification: one important distinction is between the content of a distributive principle, and its justification. Content: 'Content' refers to the distribution ideally recommended by a principle, whereas 'justification' refers to the reasons given in support of the principle. Theorists can be distinguished and labelled according to the content of their theory or according to the justification they give. Problems: 1) (...) the common labels used here refer sometimes to the content and other times to the justifications for various positions. 2) (...) most groups of theories have justifications from a number of different sources and single writers even will sometimes use more than one source of justification for their theory. Most combinations of content and justification, in fact, have been tried. For instance, different libertarians use natural rights, desert, utilitarianism or contractarianism in the justification of their theories; different desert theorists use natural rights, contractarianism and even utilitarianism (Mill 1877⁽¹⁾; Sidgwick, 1890⁽²⁾). Partly this comes about because there are different versions of justifications which nevertheless, due to some similarity, share the same broad label. Contract theory: For instance, contractarianism features in the justifications of many theories, and covers both Hobbesian and Kantian contractarians, after Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant (Hampton, 1991⁽³⁾). A) Hobbesian contractarians, such as David Gauthier, attempt to justify morality in terms of the self-interested reasons individuals have for agreeing to certain terms of social co-operation. B) Kantian contractarians, such as John Rawls, appeal to moral reasons to justify the terms of social cooperation that would be worthy of consent, usually arguing for distributions on the egalitarian end of the spectrum. A Hobbesian contractarian, as you might suspect, is more likely to argue for libertarian oriented systems (Buchanan, 1982⁽⁴⁾; Gauthier, 1987⁽⁵⁾; Levin, 1982⁽⁶⁾). However, there are also followers of Hobbes who insist his contractarianism is better read to justify some important aspects of the welfare state, rather than a merely minimalist government (Kavka, 1986⁽⁷⁾; Morris, 1998⁽⁸⁾: ch. 9; Vallentyne, 1991⁽⁹⁾). So theorists who share the 'contractarian' label may also be characterized by a libertarian rejection of redistribution or an egalitarian insistence on widespread distribution (...). Equality/egalitarianism: the most common alternatives to characterizing distributive justice theories along the dimensions of welfare and responsibility have been to characterize them either along the related dimension of equality, or according to the degree of egalitarianism the theories prescribe. So each of the theories already surveyed here could alternatively be categorized according to its treatment, or approach, to equality (Joseph and Sumption, 1979⁽¹⁰⁾; Rakowski, 1991)⁽¹¹⁾. >Equality/Sen. Sen: in his influential lecture 'Equality of what?' (1980)⁽¹²⁾, Amartya Sen addresses the question of what metric egalitarians should use to determine the degree to which a society realizes the ideal of equality. A range of alternative variables for what should be equalized have since been introduced (Daniels, 1990⁽¹³⁾) and refined, including the resource egalitarians discussed above (Dworkin, 2000)⁽¹⁴⁾, equal opportunity for welfare (Arneson, 1989⁽¹⁵⁾; 1990⁽¹⁶⁾; 1991⁽¹⁷⁾), equal access to advantage (Cohen, 1989)⁽¹⁸⁾, and equal political status (Anderson, 1999)⁽¹⁹⁾. Gaus I 232 Concepts/content/theories: Another complication (...) comes from differences in how the very topic of distributive justice itself is conceived, with some theorists emphasizing process rather than content or justification. Principles: [many theories] address the question of distributive justice by recommending principles intended as normative ideals for institutions, which themselves will significantly determine the distribution of resources. These theories reflect progress and a growing consensus throughout most of the twentieth century about what is not acceptable. For example, all of the theories on offer reject the inequalities characteristic in feudal, aristocratic, and slave societies, as well as the inequalities inherent in systems that restrict access to goods, services, jobs or positions on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity or religion. Deciding processes: On the other hand, some theorists believe that the ongoing existence of reasonable disagreement reflects importantly on the very nature of distributive justice. They argue that, within the area of reasonable disagreement about what are the best distributive ideals, the additional questions to examine are whether the processes for deciding distributive questions are just. So, some argue that certain distributive justice issues should be dealt with at the constitutional level, variously described, while other issues are properly decided at the legislative level. Just processes; a subgroup of these theorists also take the view that some decisions about distributive justice issues can be partly or fully justified because they are the result of a just process (Christiano, 1996⁽²⁰⁾; Gaus, 1996⁽²¹⁾). Rational argument alone may be able to exclude some systems as unjust, but others will be justified not simply on the grounds of their content, but also by the process by which they were reached. >Liberalism/Lamont. 1. Mill, John S. (1877) Utilitarianism, 6th edn. London: Longmans, Green. 2. Sidgwick, Henry (1890) The Methods of Ethics, 4th edn. London: Macmillan. 3. Hampton, Jean (1991) 'Two faces of contractarian thought'. In Peter Vallentyne, ed., Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier 's Morals by Agreement. New York: Oxford University Press, 31—55. 4. Buchanan, Allen (1982) 'A critical introduction to Rawls' theory of justice'. In H. Gene Blocker and Elizabeth H. Smith, eds, John Rawls' Theory of Social Justice: An Introduction. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press. 5. Gauthier, David Peter (1987) Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon. 6. Levin, Michael (1982) 'A Hobbesian minimal state'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1 1 (4): 338-53. 7. Kavka, Gregory S. (1986) Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 8. Morris, Christopher (1998) An Essay on the Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 9. Vallentyne, Peter (1991) Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement. New York: Cambridge University Press. 10. Joseph, Keith and Jonathan Sumption (1979) Equality. London: Murray. 11. Rakowskl, Eric (1991) Equal Justice. Oxford: Clarendon. 12. Sen, Amartya (1980) 'Equality of what?' In Sterling M. McMurrin, ed., Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 195-220. 13. Daniels, Norman (1990) 'Equality of what: welfare, resources, or capabilities?' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50 (Fall): 273-96. 14. Dworkin, Ronald (2000) Soveæign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 15. Arneson, Richard (1989) 'Equality and equal opportunity for welfare, Philosophical Studies, 56: 77-93. 16. Arneson, Richard (1990) 'Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism and equal opportunity for welfare', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19: 159-94. 17. Arneson, Richard (1991) 'Lockean self-ownership: towards a demolition', Political Studies, 39 (l): 36-54. 18. Cohen, G. A. (1989) 'On the currency of egalitarian justice'. Ethics, 99 906_44. 19. Anderson, Elizabeth (1999) 'What is the point of equality?' Ethics, 109 (2): 287-337. 20. Christiano, Thomas (1996) The Rule of the Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory. Boulder, CO: Westview. 21. Gaus, Gerald (1996) Justificatory Liberalism. New York: Oxford University Press. Lamont, Julian 2004. „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Kant	Sandel	Gaus I 111 Kant/Sandel/Gaus: Benn and Gewirth both seek a direct route from agency to liberal rights: if we understand the type of agents we are, we see that we must claim certain liberal rights and grant them to others. >Person/Benn, >Rights/Gewirth. KantVsGewirth/KantVs/Benn: in contrast, what is often called ‘Kantian liberalism’ seeks to establish liberal rights via a hypothetical contract, which then generates basic rights. SandelVsKant: In the words of Sandel, its most famous critic, according to ‘deontological’ or ‘Kantian liberalism’, ‘society, being composed of a plurality of persons, each with his own aims, interests, and conceptions of the good, is best arranged when it is governed by principles that do not themselves presuppose any particular conception of the good’ (1982(1): 1–7). Respect/recognition: Because, on this view, each is a chooser of her own ends in life, respect for the person of others demands that we refrain from imposing our view of the good life on her. Only principles that can be justified to all respect the personhood of each. Respect, then, requires a certain mode of justification, according to which moral principles are acceptable to all free moral persons in a fair choice situation. Liberal principles are then generated via this mode of justification. Cf. >Reason/Scanlon. 1. Sandel, Michael (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. Brocker I 670 Kant/SandelVsRawls/SandelVsKant/SandelVsLiberalism/Sandel: Kant has perhaps most consistently decoupled ethics and law from the vanishing point of good living and instead fully relied on a theory of right, understood in the sense of the reasonable generalizability of maxims of action. Rawls builds on this with his theory of justice (1975). See Principles/Rawls. SandelVsRawls, SandelVsKant: propagates the priority of an idea of good and successful life (Aristotle's eudaimonia) as a starting point. See Liberalism/Sandel, Law/Kant, SandelVsRawls. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Sand I Michael Sandel The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Knowledge	McGinn	I 52ff How it is/know how to/scope/McGinn: what logical scope have questions like E.g. How is it to be a bat? >"What is it like to be a bat?" "How-be": We are not quantified here about a single thing, but a type. Bat: range of all bats. The "how" of being for the bat is identical with the How-be of the world for the bat. How does it happen that we know anything at all? >Knowing how. I 177 Knowledge/Transcendental Naturalism/TN/McGinn: the transcendental naturalism claims that the gaps are ultimately gaps in our understanding ability. Their origin is of epistemological, not ontological kind. >Terminology/McGinn. I 230 Knowledge/representation/consciousness/McGinn: "be in the know" does neither require consciousness nor belief, but only an effective representation. >Representation, >Consciousness, >Belief. --- II 35 Bat/Nagel/mind/brain/McGinn:* the sonar perception in humans has no counterpart. But this lack of understanding is not a lack of understanding about the bat brain. We might even know everything about the brain of the bat, without knowing how it feels to be a bat. II 49 E.g. assuming, we can easily imagine a universe in which the vast majority of stars emit no light. In this universe there is much less knowledge. We would have no knowledge of any distances. So the world must be so that the mind can include its properties in itself. And there is never a guarantee that the right knowledge mediating relationship really exists. Knowledge is not a matter of course. I 180 Irreducibility/I/McGinn: irreducibility of knowledge: there is only one neurosis of the skeptic. The word "know" has an established use, which meets the conditions of justified assertibility. I simply know that I have two hands. (> Moore's hands). And that is good. (> DIME - domesticated irreducible mystic elimination: see Terminology/McGinn).	McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001
Knowledge	Plato	Bubner I 35 Knowledge/Cave-Parable/Plato/Bubner: the knowledge acquired by the few should not lead to theoretical self-sufficiency. The rare insight into the nature of the good is to be implemented politically. It is not a question of the value neutrality of a supreme object. The philosophers must descend again to share life with fellow prisoners. They are committed to do this because of the peculiarities of what they have seen! (Good). Only the one who has a goal in life can act rationally (reason). Summary: the idea of the good must be understood literally. The parable-like dress does not point to an ontological secret doctrine. The philosopher who, with this question of the meaning and purpose of the theory, relativizes the possibilities of the theory itself, becomes a dialectician. (Dialectic). >Good/Plato, >Dialectic/Plato. I 119 Knowledge/Menon/Plato: Aporia: either you cannot learn anything, or only what you already know. Plato responds to this with the myth of Anamnesis. (Remembrance of the past life of the soul). Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato (Menon): no knowledge arises from nothing. In the case of syllogism and epagogé (nowadays controversial, whether to be seen as an induction) there is prior knowledge. >Knowledge/Aristotle, cf. >Knowledge paradox. Gaus I 311 Knowledge/governance/Plato/Keyt/Miller: in the Statesman [Politikos] the Eleatic Stranger pursues the idea of the rule of reason to its logical terminus and draws a conclusion that in the Republic remains tacit - that knowledge by itself provides sufficient warrant for the application of force, even deadly force, when persuasion fails (for the antithesis see Plt. 296bl, 304d4). It is within the bounds of justice, according to the Eleatic Stranger, for the true statesman, the man who possesses the political art and is 'truly and not merely apparently a knower' , to purge his polis, with or without law, with or without the consent of his subjects, by killing or banishing some of its members (Plt. 293a2-e2). The only true constitution is the one ruled by such a person. Since such persons are exceedingly rare (Plt. 292el-293a4, 297b7-c2), a central question is how a polis bereft of a true statesman can share in reason. The answer of the Eleatic Stranger is that it can share through law, law being an imitation of the truth apprehended by the true statesman (Plt. 300c5-7, 300el 1-301a4). Imitation: Since the true statesman rules without law, there is a better and a worse way of imitating him. The rulers of a polis can imitate reason's rule by ruling according to reason's reflection in law, or they can imitate reason's lawlessness by ruling contrary to law (Plt. 300e7-301 c5). Given that the rulers are one, few, or many, there are three good and three bad imitations of the one true constitution. Since the fewer the rulers the stronger the rule, the six imitations form a hierarchy, fewer rulers being better when rule is according to law but worse when it is contrary (Plt. 302b5- 303b5). >Governance/Plato. Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Kohlberg	Psychological Theories	Slater I 167 Kohlberg/Morality/psychological theories: [An] important critique was offered by Shweder (1991)⁽¹⁾ who criticized the model for focusing too narrowly on questions of justice and failing to capture a range of moral concerns, such as divinity and community, that are highly salient in non-Western cultures. (ShwederVsKohlberg). >Morals/Kohlberg. See also GilliganVsKohlberg: >Morality/Gilligan. Kohlberg’s approach has been further criticized for its reliance on hypothetical situations. As Krebs and Denton (2005)⁽²⁾ noted, real-life moral dilemmas tend to differ from Kohlberg’s dilemmas in a number of ways that can have implications for moral reasoning. (KrebsVsKohlberg, DentonVsKohlberg) For example, when individuals are considering hypothetical dilemmas they are unlikely to consider the possibility of interacting with the targets of their judgments in the future. However, empirical evidence does not seem to support this criticism. For example, work by Walker and colleagues (Walker, 1989⁽³⁾; Walker, de Vries, & Trevethan, 1987)⁽⁴⁾ showed that hypothetical and self-generated moral dilemmas result in similar moral stage classifications for both children and adults. (WalkerVsKohlberg). Slater I 168 ShwederVsKohlber/DentonVsKohlberg: Kohlberg’s model (…) emphasizes moral reasoning to the exclusion of moral behavior. Krebs and Denton (2005⁽²⁾, p. 645) argued, “What people do is more practically important than what they say, and the study of what people do is better equipped to elucidate morality than the study of what they say.” They asserted that moral reasoning accounts for only a small proportion of the variance in moral behavior, and noted that correlations between moral behavior and performance on Kohlberg’s reasoning tasks tend to be around .3, and even lower after controlling for factors such as socio-economic status (see also Blasi, 1980⁽⁵⁾) and Gibbs, 2006⁽⁶⁾, for a counter-argument). Slater I 171 Xu et al. (2010)⁽⁷⁾ found that (…) children who falsely claimed to like [a] gift were more likely to express a favorable view of lie telling in politeness situations. A study by Fu, Evans, Wang, and Lee (2008)⁽⁸⁾ examined the relation between children’s reasoning about lying and their actual lie-telling behavior. The results of these studies indicate that children’s moral reasoning can have significant implications for their moral behavior when the reasoning and behavioral contexts are constructed in a highly parallel manner. The findings suggest that Kohlberg’s moral dilemmas may be indeed too abstract to offer useful insights into children’s moral understanding, moral behavior, and the linkage between the two (Krebs & Denton, 2005)⁽²⁾. 1. Shweder, R. (1991). Thinking through cultures: Expeditions in cultural psychology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2 Krebs, D. L. & Denton, K. (2005). Toward a more pragmatic approach to morality: A critical evaluation of Kohlberg’s modeL Psychological Review, 112,629—649. 3. Walker, L. J. (1989). A longitudinal study of moral reasoning. Child Development, 60, 157—166. 4. Walker, L. J., de Vries, B., & Trevethan, S. D. (1987). Moral stages and moral orientations in real-life and hypothetical dilemmas. Child Development, 58, 842—858. 5. Blasi, A. (1980). Bridging moral cognition and moral action: A critical review of the literature. Psychological Bulletin, 88, 1-45. 6. Gibbs, J. C. (2006). Should Kohlberg’s cognitive developmental approach be replaced with a more pragmatic approach? Comment on Krebs and Denton. Psychological Review, 113, 666—671. 7. Xu, F., Bao, X., Fu, G., Taiwar, V, & Lee, K. (2010). Lying and truth-telling in children: From concept to action. Child Development, 81, 581—596. 8. Fu, G., Evans, A. D., Wang, L., & Lee, K. (2008). Lying in the name of the collective good: A developmental study. Developmental Science, 11, 495—503. Gail D. Heyman and Kang Lee, “Moral Development. Revisiting Kohlberg’s Stages“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Kripke Semantics	Hintikka	II XIII Kripke Semantics/HintikkaVsKripke: Kripke semantics is not a viable model for the theory of logical modalities (logical necessity and logical possibility). Problem: the right logic cannot be axiomatized. Solution: to interpret Kripke semantics as a non-standard semantics,... II XIV ...in the sense of Henkin's non-standard interpretation of the logic of higher levels, while the correct semantics for logical modalities would be analogous to a standard interpretation. >Logical possibility, >Logical necessity, >Modal logic, >Modalities. --- II 1 Kripke Semantics/Hintikka: Kripke semantics is a modern model-theoretic approach that is misleadingly called Kripke semantics. E.g.: F: is a framework consisting of SF: a set of models or possible worlds and R: a two-digit relation, a kind of alternative relation. Possible Worlds: w1 is supposed to be an alternative, which could legitimately be realized instead of w0 (the actual world). R: the only limitation we impose on it is reflexivity. Truth Conditions/modal logic/Kripke semantics/Hintikka: the truth conditions for modal sentences are then: II 2 (TN) Given a frame F, Np is true in w₀ ε SF iff. P is true in every alternative w_i ∈ SF to w₀. (T.M) Given a frame F, Mp is true in w₀ ε SF iff. P is true in at least one alternative w_i ∈ SF to w₀. Model Theory/modal logic/Hintikka: Kanger, Guillaume and later Kripke have seen that when we add reflexivity, transitivity, and symmetry, we get a model theory for axiom systems of the Lewis type for modal propositional logic. Kripke Semantics/modal logic/logical possibility/logical necessity/HintikkaVsKripke/HintikkaVsKripke semantics: problem: if we interpret the operators N, P as expressing logical modalities, they are inadequate: we need more than one arbitrary selection for logical possibility and necessity of possible worlds. We need truth in every logically possible world. But in the Kripke semantics it is not necessary that all such logically possible worlds are contained in the set of alternatives ((s) that is, there may be logically possible worlds that are not considered). (See below the logical possibility forms the largest class of possibilities). Problem: Kripke semantics is therefore inadequate for logical modalities. II 12 Kripke/Hintikka: Kripke has avoided epistemic logic and the logic of propositional attitudes, concentrating on pure modalities. >Epistemic logic. Therefore, it is strange that he uses non-standard logic. But somehow it seems clear to him that this is not possible for logical modalities. Metaphysical Possibility/Kripke/HintikkaVsKripke: Kripke has never explained what these mystical possibilities actually are. II 13 Worse: Kripke has not even shown that they are so restrictive that he can use his extremely liberal non-standard semantics.	Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Land (Economics)	Ricardo	Rothbard II 83 Rent/land/Ricardo/Rothbard: Rent served as the linchpin of the Ricardian system. For, according to Ricardo's rather bizarre theory, only land differed in quality. Labour, as we have seen, was assumed to be uniform, and therefore wage rates are uniform, and, as we shall see, profits are also assumed to be uniform because of the crucial postulate of the economy's always being in long-run equilibrium. >Labour, >Ricardo, >Wages/Ricardo. Land is the only factor which miraculously is allowed to differ in quality. Next, Ricardo assumes away any discovery of new lands or improvements in agricultural productivity. His theory of history therefore concludes that people always begin by cultivating the most fertile lands, and, as population increases, the Malthusian pressure on the food supply forces the producers to use ever more inferior lands. In short, as population and food production rise, the cost of growing corn must inexorably rise over time. Rent, in Ricardo's phrase, is payment for the ‘use of the original and indestructible powers of the soil’. This hints at a productivity theory, and indeed Ricardo did see that more fertile and productive lands earned a higher rent. But unfortunately, as Schumpeter put it, Ricardo then ‘embarks upon his detour’. In the first place, Ricardo made the assumption that at any moment the poorest land in cultivation yields a zero rent. He concluded from that alleged fact that a given piece of land earns rent not because of its own productivity, but merely because its productivity is greater than the poorest, zero-rent, land under cultivation. Remember that, for Ricardo, labour is homogeneous and hence wages uniform and equal, and, as we shall see, profits are also uniform and equal. Land is unique in its permanent, long-run structure of differential fertility and productivity. Hence, to Ricardo, rent is purely a Rothbard II 84 differential, and Land A earns rent solely because of its differential productivity compared to Land B, the zero-rent land in cultivation. Rent/land/Ricardo: To Ricardo, several important points followed from these assumptions. First, as population inexorably increases, and poorer and poorer lands are used, all the differentials keep increasing. Thus, say that, at one point of time, corn lands (which sums up all land) range in productivity from the highest, Land A, through a spectrum down to Land J, which, being marginal, earns a zero rent. >Marginal costs/Ricardo. Rothbard II 95 RothbardVsRicardo/Problems: (…) in discussing the rise in cost of producing corn, Ricardo reverses cause and effect. Ricardo states that increasing population ‘obliges’ farmers to work land of inferior quality and then causes a rise in its price. But as any utility theory analyst would realize, the causal chain is precisely the reverse: when the demand for corn increases, its price would rise, and the higher price would lead farmers to grow corn on higher-cost land. But this realization, of course, eliminates the Ricardian theory of value and with it the entire Ricardian system. (…) as numerous critics have pointed out, it is certainly not true historically that people always start using the highest-quality land and then sink gradually and inevitably down to more and more inferior land. Rothbard II 91 VsRicardo/Rothbard: One of the greatest fallacies of the Ricardian theory of rent is that it ignores the fact that landlords do perform a vital economic function: they allocate land to its best and most productive use. Land does not allocate itself; it must be allocated, and only those who earn a return from such service have the incentive, or the ability, to allocate various parcels of land to their most profitable, and hence most productive and economic uses. >Allocation. Ricardo himself did not go all the way to government expropriation of land rent. His short-run solution was to call for lowering of the tariff on corn, or even repeal of the Corn Laws entirely. Rothbard II 108 VsRicardo: The Ricardian theory of rent was effectively demolished by Thomas Perronet Thompson (1783–1869) in his pamphlet, The True Theory of Rent (1826)⁽¹⁾. Thompson weighed in against this fallacious capstone to the Ricardian system: ‘The celebrated Theory of Rent’, Thompson charged, ‘is founded on a fallacy’, for demand is the key to the price of corn and to rent. The fallacy lies, in assuming to be the cause what in reality is only a consequence... [I]t is the rise in the price of produce... that enables and causes inferior land to be brought into cultivation; and not the cultivation of inferior land that causes the rise of rent. 1. Thomas Perronet Thompson. 1826. The True Theory of Rent, in Opposition to Mr. Ricardo and Others. Being an Exposition of Fallacies on Rent, Tithes, &C. In the Form of a Review of Mr. Mill's Elements of Political Economy. London. Rothbard III 560 Land/Ricardo/Rothbard: What if the supply of capital remained the same, while the supply of labor or land factors changed? Thus, suppose that, with the same capital structure, population increases, thus expanding the total supply of labor factors. The result will be a general fall in the MVP of labor and a rise in the MVP of land factors. This rise will cause formerly submarginal, no-rent lands to earn rent and to enter into cultivation by the new labor supply. Land/Ricardo: This is the process particularly emphasized by Ricardo: population pressing on the land supply. The tendency for the MVP (marginal value product) of labor to drop, however, may well be offset by a rise in the MPP (marginal physical product) schedules of labor, since a rise in population will permit a greater utilization of the advantages of specialization and the division of labor. The constant supply of capital would have to be reoriented to the changed conditions, but the constant amount of money capital will then be more physically productive. Hence, there will be an offsetting tendency for the MVPs of labor to rise. >Factor market/Rothbard, >Production factors/Rothbard, >Land/Rothbard, >Labour/Rothbard, >Marginal product/Rothbard.	EconRic I David Ricardo On the principles of political economy and taxation Indianapolis 2004 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Language	Davidson	I (e) 113 Language/Davidson: Conventions and rules do not explain language, language explains them. >Rules, >Conventions, >Explanation. Glüer II 54 Thesis: the term of language is superfluous. There is no such thing as a language, at least not in the sense that many philosophers and linguists claim. Rorty II 21 Davidson/Rorty: "How language works" has little to do with the question "how knowledge works." DavidsonVsTradition/Rorty: Language is no instrumental character system, neither of expression nor representation. Davidson: There is no such thing as a language, there is nothing you can learn or master. (These are rather provisional theories). There are no conventions how we communicate! Davidson: we should come to worship no one at all, everything, our language, consciousness, community, are products of time and chance. Brandom I 922 Language/Davidson: is merely practical, hypothetical necessity, convenient for the community to have it - decisive: how someone would like to be understood - not to make up content before mutual interpretations. >Content, >Propositional content, >Interpretation, >Radical interpretation. Brandom I 518 Language Davidson: interprets linguistic expressions as an aspect of the intentional interpretation of actions - pro top down - Tarski: whether top-down or bottom-up. Glüer II 51 Language/Davidson: each is accessible through the causal relationships - this ultimately irrelevant for the truth-theory, which is the actual spoken language. >Truth theory. Brandom I 454 Language/Davidson/Rorty: is not a conceptual schema, but causal interaction with the environment - described by the radical interpretation. Then one can no longer ask whether the language "fits" into the world. >Conceptual scheme. Rorty III 33 Language/DavidsonVsTradition/Rorty: Language is not medium, neither of expression nor of representation. - Wrong questions: e.g. "What place have values?" - E.g. "Are colors more conscious dependent than weights?" - Correct: "Does our use of these words stand in the way of our use of other words?" >Use. Rorty VI 133 Language/Davidson/Rorty: There is no such thing as a language. (> Davidson, "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs")⁽¹⁾: there is no set of conventions that one would have to learn when one learns to speak. No abstract structure that must be internalized. Seel III 28 Language/Davidson: Thesis: Language is not a medium - but mind without world and world without mind are empty concepts. Language does not stand between us and the world - seeing: we do not see through the eyes but with them. VsMentalese/language of thought: does not exist. - Language is a part of us. - It is an organ of us. - It is the way we have the world. >Mentalese. Medium/Davidson/Seel: here use is very narrow. Medium/Gadamer: is not an instrument, but an indispensable element of thought. 1. Davidson, D. "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs" in: LePore, E. (ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, New York 1986.	Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Seel I M. Seel Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997 Seel II M. Seel Ästhetik des Erscheinens München 2000 Seel III M. Seel Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001
Language	Logic Texts	Read III 212f Wittgenstein/early: claimed that there are no vague expressions. What we think needs to be sharp. Where Frege and Russell were searching for an ideal language, Wittgenstein argued that our language had to be already perfect. His argument: "it would be strange if human society would have spoken so far, without forming a correct sentence." >Ideal language, >Meaning, >Reference, >Ambiguity, >Correctness, >Everyday language, >Language and thought, >World/Thinking.	Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Language	Pinker	I 94 Language/thinking/Pinker: we do not think in our mother tongue. Language of thought/mentalese. I 451 PinkerVsWhorf: the English have no word for gloating, but they know exactly what is meant. - All the strange feeling words can be acquired. >Sapir-Whorf thesis, >Vocbulary, >Language and thought, >World/thinking. Margeret Mead: thesis: the people of Samoa are dispassionate. PinkerVsMead: unbelievable - Derek FreemanVsMead: debunked this as misrepresentation. >Margaret Mead.	Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998
Language	Renaissance	Gadamer I 440 Language/Renaissance/Gadamer: (...) [it] retains (...) something artificial and adverse to the essence of language, if the contingency of natural concept formation is measured against the true order of essence and understood as merely accidental.(Cf. >Language/Ancient Philosophy). Such contingency is in fact brought about by the necessary and legitimate range of variation in which the human mind is able to articulate the essential order of things. That the Latin Middle Ages, despite the biblical significance of the human confusion of language on this side, did not really pursue the problem of language may be explained above all by the self-evident dominance of scholarly Latin, as well as by the continued influence of the Greek Logos doctrine. It was not until the Renaissance, when the layman became important and the national languages penetrated into scholarly education, that fruitful thought was given to their relationship to the inner word or "natural" vocabulary. Gadamer: One must be careful, however, not to immediately assume the question of modern philosophy of language and its instrumental concept of language. Cf. >Word of God/Nicholas of Cusa, >Language/Medieval Philosophy, >Language/Nominalism,.	Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Language	Stoicism	Gadamer I 436 Language/Stoa/Gadamer: The struggle of philosophy and rhetoric for Greek youth education, which was decided with the victory of Attic philosophy, also has this side, that thinking about language becomes a matter of a grammar and rhetoric which have always recognized the ideal of scientific concept formation. Thus the sphere of linguistic meaning begins to detach itself from the things encountered in linguistic formation. The Gadamer I 437 stoic logic speaks first of those incorporeal meanings by which the speaking of things takes place (to lekton). Topos: It is highly significant that these meanings are put on the same level as topos, i.e. space: see⁽¹⁾. Just as empty space only now, in thinking away the things that arrange themselves to each other in it, comes to the condition for thinking⁽²⁾, so also the "meanings" as such are only now thought for themselves and a term is coined for them by thinking away the things mentioned by means of the meaning of the words. The meanings are also like a space in which things are ordered to each other. Such thoughts apparently only become possible when the natural relationship, i.e. the intimate unity of speaking and thinking, is disturbed. Cf. >Language and Thought/Ancient Philosophy, >Language and Thought/Gadamer. One may mention here, as Lohmann⁽³⁾ has shown, the correspondence of stoic thinking and the grammatical-syntactic formation of the Latin language. That the incipient bilingualism of the Hellenistic Oikumene has played a promoting role in thinking about language is probably undeniable. But perhaps the origins of this development lie much earlier, and it is the emergence of science in general that triggers this process. Then the beginnings of the same will go back to the early days of Greek science. Gadamer: The fact that this is the case speaks for the scientific concept formation in the field of music, metaphysics and physics, because a field of rational representations is measured there, the constructive creation of which brings into being corresponding relationships that can no longer actually be called words. Signs/Word/Antiquity/Gadamer: Wherever the word takes on a mere sign function, the original connection between speaking and thinking, at which our interest is directed, is transformed into an instrumental relationship. This transformed relationship between word and sign underlies the conceptualization of science as a whole and has become so self-evident to us that it requires its own artistic remembrance that, in addition to the scientific ideal of unambiguous designation, the life of language itself continues unchanged. 1. Stoic. vet. fragm. Arnim Il, S. 87. 2. Cf. the theory of the diaphragm still rejected by Aristotle (Phys. A 4, 211 b 14ff.) 3. J. Lohmann has recently made interesting observations, according to which the discovery of the world of sounds, figures and numbers has led to a unique way of forming words and thus to a first increase in language awareness. Cf. J. Lohmann's works: Arch. f. Musikwiss. XIV, 1957, pp. 147-155, XVI, 1959, pp. 148- 173, 261-291, Lexis IV, 2 and last: Über den paradigmatischen Charakter der griechischen Kultur (Festschrift for Gadamer 1960). (In the meantime, reference should be made to the volume "Musike und Logos" Stuttgart 1970 (...)	Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Language Acquisition	Wittgenstein	Hintikka I 264 Language Learning/Language Acquisition/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: when we teach a child a word, we teach a new behavior - e.g. new pain behavior: to make use of the word "pain". The word replaces the crying and does not describe it. The use is not based on criteria, nor on crying. >Learning, >Use, >Criteria. II 159 Language Learning/Language Acquisition/Colour/Rules/Game/Wittgenstein: if the child confuses the colour words, it has not understood the game, it has broken the rules. If it does not guess the weather correctly, it has made a mistake. These two cases behave to each other like playing chess without observing the rules on the one hand, and playing chess and losing on the other. >Chess. II 204 Language/Learning/Language Learning/Language Acquisition/Augustinus: said he learned Latin by learning the names of things. >Names, >Words. Wittgenstein: let's assume someone learned the language that way. That would be a complete language. Because when we look at it we cannot see that something is missing. VI 143 Training/Language Learning/Wittgenstein/Schulte: when a technique is strange to us, we cannot even ask the right questions. Once the use is established it can no longer be questioned. Training: we do not learn any number of basic colors. Non-linguistic is a prerequisite for the understanding of the linguistic. >Colour. VI 159 Characters are not interpreted, but known - practical ability. >Knowledge.	W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Language Development	Bruner	Upton I 3 Language development/BrunerVsChomsky/Bruner: theorists such as Jerome Bruner (1983⁽¹⁾) agree with Chomsky’s notion of an LAD. However, Bruner asserts that Chomsky gives too big a role to this aspect of language acquisition, noting that social context, and the behaviour of parents in particular, have a significant impact on language development. This aspect of the environment he calls the language acquisition support system (LASS). According to Bruner, the LAD cannot function alone and every LAD therefore needs a LASS. Def Language acquisition support system (LASS)/Bruner: Bruner’s term to describe the range of interactive precursors, such as joint picture book reading, that help support language development in children. These social interactions provide a scaffolding environment to structure the child’s early language utterances. Upton I 62 Language development/Bruner/Upton: Joint attention and sharing interactions are key features of early relationships and, according to Bruner (1985)⁽²⁾, these play a key role in the development of language. To begin with, such interactions might only involve the carer and child, for example playing a game of Peek-a-boo. >Interaction/Bruner, >Motherese/Developmental psychology. In joint-action formats the mother creates simple, structured activities with objects such as toys so as to teach her infant what the objects are for and how to use them – for example, building blocks into a tower, or using a spoon for feeding. Upton I 62 These shared sequences are also talked about by the mother, which encourages the infant to acquire language (Bruner, 1975⁽³⁾, 1985(2), 1993⁽⁴⁾). The joint-action formats provide a mapping activity during which the child learns to link words and phrases with the correct objects and events. Pointing has an important role to play in ensuring joint attention during joint-action formats – for example, when reading picture books with their carers, infants show joint attention to objects shown in the book through pointing, which is usually accompanied by labelling of the object. Cf. >Triangulation. Adults’ role: the adult response to pointing by an infant is usually to label the object pointed at (Hannan, 1992)⁽⁵⁾. Blindness: Research has also shown that blind children are able to label significantly fewer objects than sighted infants (Norgate, 1997)⁽⁶⁾, which lends further support to the importance of pointing for acquiring object names. Spcial context/Bruner: Bruner argues that, in this way, the mother (or other carer) provides a social context in which the meaning of language can be learned. This idea that the social context supports language acquisition is supported by evidence that the first words to be understood by an infant are typically the child’s own name, the names of other family members and the names of familiar objects such as clock, drink and teddy (Harris et al., 1995a)⁽⁷⁾. >Language acquisition, >Stages of Development. 1. Bruner, J. S. (1983) Child’s talk: Learning to use language. New York: Norton. 2. Bruner, J.S. (1985) Actual Minds, Possible Worlds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 3. Bruner, J.S. (1975) The ontogenesis of speech acts.Journal of Child Language, 2: 1—19. 4. Bruner, J.S. (1993) Explaining and interpreting: two ways of using mind, in Harman, G (ed.) Conceptions of the Human Mind: Essays in honor of George A Miller. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 5. Hannan, T.E. (1992) An examination of spontaneous pointing in 20- to 50-month-old chil then. Perceptual andMotor Skills, 74: 65 1—8. 6. Norgate, S.H. (1997) Research methods for studying the language of blind children, in Horn berger, N.H. and Corson, D. (eds) The Encyclopedia of Languczge and Education, Vol. 8:Research methods in language and education. The Netherlands: Kiuwer Academic Publishers. 7. Harris, M., Barlow-Brown, F. and Chasin, J. (1995a) The emergence of referential understanding: pointing and the comprehension of object names. First Language, 15: 19–34.	Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011
Language Models	Norvig	Norvig I 860 Language models/Norvig/Russell: language models [are] models that predict the probability distribution of language expressions. Norvig I 861 Ultimately, a written text is composed of characters - letters, digits, punctuation, and spaces in English (and more exotic characters in some other languages). Thus, one of the simplest language models is a probability distribution over sequences of characters. N-gram character models: A sequence of written symbols of length n is called an n-gram (from the Greek root for writing or letters), with special case “unigram” for 1-gram, “bigram” for 2-gram, and “trigram” for 3-gram. A model of the probability distribution of n-letter sequences is thus called an n-gram model. (But be careful: we can have n-gram models over sequences of words, syllables, or other units; not just over characters.) An n-gram model is defined as a Markov chain of order n − 1. (…)in a Markov chain the probability of character ci depends only on the immediately preceding characters, not on any other characters. Norvig I 863 We can evaluate a model with cross-validation. Split the corpus into a training corpus and a validation corpus. Determine the parameters of the model from the training data. Then evaluate the model on the validation corpus. The evaluation can be a task-specific metric, such as measuring accuracy on language identification. Alternatively we can have a task-independent model of language quality: calculate the probability assigned to the validation corpus by the model; the higher the probability the better. Norvig I 864 N-gram models over words: The main difference is that the vocabulary - the set of symbols that make up the corpus and the model—is larger. There are only about 100 characters in most languages, and sometimes we build character models that are even more restrictive, for example by treating “A” and “a” as the same symbol or by treating all punctuation as the same symbol. But with word models we have at least tens of thousands of symbols, and sometimes millions. The wide range is because it is not clear what constitutes a word. In English a sequence of letters surrounded by spaces is a word, but in some languages, like Chinese, words are not separated by spaces, (…).Word n-gram models need to deal with out of vocabulary words. With character models, we didn’t have to worry about someone inventing a new letter of the alphabet. But with word models there is always the chance of a new word that was not seen in the training corpus, so we need to model that explicitly in our language model. ((s) Cf. >Vocabulary/philosophical theories.) >Data compression. Norvig I 883 History: N-gram letter models for language modeling were proposed by Markov (1913)⁽¹⁾. Claude Shannon (Shannon and Weaver, 1949)⁽²⁾ was the first to generate n-gram word models of English. Chomsky (1956⁽³⁾, 1957⁽⁴⁾) pointed out the limitations of finite-state models compared with context-free models, concluding, “Probabilistic models give no particular insight into some of the basic problems of syntactic structure.” This is true, but probabilistic models do provide insight into some other basic problems—problems that context-free models ignore. Chomsky’s remarks had the unfortunate effect of scaring many people away from statistical models for two decades, until these models reemerged for use in speech recognition (Jelinek, 1976)⁽⁵⁾. Kessler et al. (1997)⁽⁶⁾ show how to apply character n-gram models to genre classification, and Klein et al. (2003)⁽⁷⁾ describe named-entity recognition with character models. Franz and Brants (2006)⁽⁸⁾ describe the Google n-gram corpus of 13 million unique words from a trillion words of Web text; it is now publicly available. The bag of words model gets its name from a passage from linguist Zellig Harris (1954)⁽⁹⁾, “language is not merely a bag of words but a tool with particular properties.” Norvig (2009)⁽¹⁰⁾ gives some examples of tasks that can be accomplished with n-gram models. Simple n-gram letter and word models are not the only possible probabilistic models. Blei et al. (2001)⁽¹¹⁾ describe a probabilistic text model called latent Dirichlet allocation that views a document as a mixture of topics, each with its own distribution of words. This model can be seen as an extension and rationalization of the latent semantic indexing model of (Deerwester et al., 1990)⁽¹²⁾ (see also Papadimitriou et al. (1998)⁽¹³⁾) and is also related to the multiple-cause mixture model of (Sahami et al., 1996)⁽¹⁴⁾. 1. Markov, A. A. (1913). An example of statistical investigation in the text of “Eugene Onegin” illustrating coupling of “tests” in chains. Proc. Academy of Sciences of St. Petersburg, 7. 2. Shannon, C. E. and Weaver, W. (1949). The Mathematical Theory of Communication. University of Illinois Press. 3. Chomsky, N. (1956). Three models for the description of language. IRE Transactions on Information Theory, 2(3), 113–124. 4. Chomsky, N. (1957). Syntactic Structures. Mouton. 5. Jelinek, F. (1976). Continuous speech recognition by statistical methods. Proc. IEEE, 64(4), 532–556. 6. Kessler, B., Nunberg, G., and Schütze, H. (1997). Automatic detection of text genre. CoRR, cmplg/ 9707002. 7. Klein, D., Smarr, J., Nguyen, H., and Manning, C. (2003). Named entity recognition with character level models. In Conference on Natural Language Learning (CoNLL). 8. Franz, A. and Brants, T. (2006). All our n-gram are belong to you. Blog posting. 9. Harris, Z. (1954). Distributional structure. Word, 10(2/3). 10. Norvig, P. (2009). Natural language corpus data. In Segaran, T. and Hammerbacher, J. (Eds.), Beautiful Data. O’Reilly. 11. Blei, D. M., Ng, A. Y., and Jordan, M. I. (2001). Latent Dirichlet Allocation. In Neural Information Processing Systems, Vol. 14. 12. Deerwester, S. C., Dumais, S. T., Landauer, T. K., Furnas, G. W., and Harshman, R. A. (1990). Indexing by latent semantic analysis. J. American Society for Information Science, 41(6), 391–407. 13. Papadimitriou, C. H., Tamaki, H., Raghavan, P., and Vempala, S. (1998). Latent semantic indexing: A probabilistic analysis. In PODS-98, pp. 159–168. 14. Sahami, M., Hearst, M. A., and Saund, E. (1996). Applying the multiple cause mixture model to text categorization. In ICML-96, pp. 435–443.	Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010
Laws	Armstrong	I 117 Laws of Nature/LoN/sings/Armstrong: there is no sign for the law of gravity! Phenomena are only clues! Sign/Ex Black Clouds: there must be a true inductive generalization, probability. Designated thing: is like the sign always a particulate fact. There is no sign for the general! (i.e. neither is there for the validity of the laws of nature! III 26f Local Laws (below cosmic range): local laws force all theories to distinguish exactly between laws (laws of nature) and law statements: II 28 There may then be local laws that can never be determined as a full law statement. III 112 Uninstantiated Laws/UIL/Armstrong: I'll allow them, but as second-class cases of laws. - But there are no uninstantiated universals. III 121 Uninstantiated Laws/Armstrong: disguised counterfactual conditionals, truth depends entirely on the actual (higher-level laws) - probability does not require the law of the excluded third, the non-true is not a fact - (VsWessel: Wessel has an operator for "unfact": >Operators/Wessel). Probability laws are only instantiated if probability is realized. III 140 Laws with universal scope: "Everything is F" - is that at all possible? - How can a U to make itself necessary? III 141 Law/Form/Armstrong: every law must have a dyadic structure, because otherwise it could not be used for inferences - universal law: Rel between "being something in the universe" and "being F". Universe/Armstrong:The universe is really big garden! - (>Smith's garden is idiosyncratic) - Law in Smith's Garden: relation between quasi-Universals: "fruit in Smith's Garden" and genuine universal: "being an apple". III 147f Def Iron Laws/Armstrong: tell us that under certain conditions a state is necessary (or has a certain probability). - No matter what further conditions prevail - they apply, apply no matter what happens (but within certain conditions must be given for the particular). III 148 Def Oaken Laws/Armstrong: are under certain conditions invalid - but only real universals can be involved.	Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Laws	Goodman	I 39 ~ Law/invent/discover/Goodman: to the discovery of laws, belongs to design them. >Discoveries. --- II 37 E.g. ... because he describes a random fact and there is no law. And apparently also no purely syntactic criterion can be useful, because the most specific description of individual facts can be brought into a form that has any desired degree of syntactic generality. II 38 I just want to emphasize the thought by Hume that a sentence is not used for predictions because it is a law, but that it is called a law, because it is used for predictions. And that the law is not used for predictions, because it describes a causal connection, but that the meaning of the causal connection is to explain by the help of laws for predictions. >Predictions. II 40f Definition Act (wrong): a law is a sentence that is lawlike and true - but a sentence can be true but not lawlike, or lawlike and not true. For this definition lawlikeness would be a short-lived and random affair. Only sentences that you actually use for predictions, would be lawlike. And a true sentence which has been used for predictions, would be no law anymore if it had once been fully examined. II 41 Lawlike/Goodman: a sentence is lawlike if its recognition does not depend on the decision of any given application case alone. II 41 Sensible is that there schould be no application case on which test the recognition depends on. This criterion does not allow statements like "This book is black and oranges are round" to be lawlike because their recognition is subject to the knowledge, if this book is black. II 109 Lawlike or resumable hypotheses are not to be characterized in a purely syntactic way. >Hypotheses. II 114 If all application cases are examined, there is no hypothesis or law anymore. II 114 The hypothesis neither needs to be true nor false, nor lawlike or even just reasonable, because we do not speak of what should be continued, but what is actually continued. Wrong hypotheses can be supported.	G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997
Laws	Ramsey	Lewis V 122 Law/laws of nature/Ramsey: (Foundations)⁽¹⁾: "... those consequences of sentences which we took as axioms if we knew everything and would bring them into the simplest possible deductive system. >Natural laws. Lewis: strange here is the unnecessary mention of knowledge. - This suggests that an ideal system would imply all truths. - Which may not have been Ramsey’s intention, because he has not made such a stupid mistake: that would mean all regularities emerge as laws. >Regularity. Regularity/Lewis: is not a law by itself but qua axiom or theorem of a system. >Laws, >Axioms, >Systems. 1. Frank Plumpton Ramsey (1931). The foundations of mathematics and other logical essays. Ed. R. B. Braithwaite. New York: Harcourt, Brace and company.	Ramsey I F. P. Ramsey The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013 Ramsey II Frank P. Ramsey A contribution to the theory of taxation 1927 Ramsey III Frank P. Ramsey "The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Legislation	Marsilius of Padua	Höffe I 179 Legislation/Marsilius/Höffe: In the course of the analysis of legislator, law and government and their mutual relations Marsilius brings in a later famous definition of the legislator. In it he argues for the origin of state power with the people concerned, the citizens, but not so clearly that one can see in him a clear representative of modern popular sovereignty. The definition reads: Def Lawmaker/Marsilius: (...) "is the people (populus) or the totality of citizens (civium universitas) or their valencior pars"⁽¹⁾, ... Höffe: ...which can be understood as a more weighty, but also a more powerful part. Höffe I 180 People/citizenship/eligible voters: The entirety of citizens, however, does not exercise legislative power directly, but representatively. They delegate their legislative power to the larger and more influential part (maior et valentior pars). Höffe: As already mentioned, the more detailed explanations of this idea are not clear-cut, for they range from the majority to that representative electoral elite, where one can think of the seven electors who were authorized to elect the emperor at that time. >Democracy/Marsilius. Höffe I 182 [Marsilius] distinguishes, (...) with reference to Aristotle, the classical state powers of legislation, government and the judiciary. However, he subordinates the judiciary to the exercising power, and the latter to the legislation. In accordance with the idea of the sovereignty of the people, as far as he represents it (>Democracy/Marsilius), Marsilius places the legislature at the head of the public powers. >Law/Marsilius. 1. Marsilius, Defensor pacis, I, 12, § 3	Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016
Levels (Order)	Minsky	I 86 Levels/goals/tools/K-lines/Minsky: we learn by attaching agents to K-lines, but we don't attach them all with equal firmness. Instead, we make strong connections at a certain level of detail, but we make weaker connections at higher and lower levels. >K-Line/Minsky (>Memory/Minsky). I 87 Memory/levels: [levels, rsp. level-bands] provide a way for a memory to encompass some range or level of detail of descriptions (…).The problems we have to solve change with time, so we must adapt our old memories to our present goals. I 88 Fringes/Minsky: It's hard to recognize a thing when you're presented with too much detail. Solution: levels of detail: Lower Band: Beyond a certain level of detail, increasingly complete memories of previous situations are increasingly difficult to match to new situations. Upper Band: Memories that arouse agents at too high a level would tend to provide us with goals that are not appropriate to the present situation. Hierarchies of memory: this hierarchical type of memory (…) will be based more on stereotypes and default assumptions than on actual perceptions. Specifically, you will tend to remember only what you recognized at the time. So something is lost — but there's a gain in exchange. Memory-tree/Minsky: These K-line memory-trees lose certain kinds of details, but they retain more traces of the origins of our ideas.	Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003
Lexicon	Lyons	I 161 Lexicon/Lyons: each grammar requires an encyclopaedia in which the words are arranged according to the distribution classes to which the grammatical rules refer. Grammar/Lexicon: both can be considered from two points of view: a) Analysis: a corpus of utterances b) Synthesis of grammatical sentences. >Analysis/Lyons, >Distribution/Lyons, >Grammar, >Generative Grammar, >Universal Grammar, >Categorial Grammar, >Transformational Grammar.	Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995
Liability	Calabresi	Parisi I 19 Liability rules/property rules/Calabresi/Melamid/Miceli: The classic paper by Calabresi and Melamed (1972)⁽¹⁾ addresses the manner in which rights or entitlements, once assigned, are legally protected and transferred. Parisi I 20 They distinguished between ... Property rules: ... under which an entitlement can only be transferred if the holder of the entitlement consents; and ... Liability rules: ..., under which a party seeking to acquire an entitlement can do so without the holder’s consent provided that he or she is willing to pay compensation for the holder’s loss.* Property rules: Property rules therefore form the basis for market (voluntary) exchange, while... Liability rules: ... liability rules form the basis for legal (forced) exchange. Markets: Because market exchange is consensual, it ensures a mutual benefit, or the realization of gains from trade. Law/property rules: : The role of the law in such transactions is limited to the enforcement of property rights and contractual exchange of entitlements. In other words, law is complementary to markets in promoting the efficient allocation of resources. Law/liability rules: In the case of liability rules, on the other hand, the law takes the primary role of forcing an exchange of the entitlement on terms dictated by the court. Here, the law is a substitute for market exchange in organizing the transfer of entitlements because bargaining costs preclude voluntary transfers. Externalities/liability: The choice between market and legal exchange depends on the trade-off between the transaction costs associated with bargaining over the price, and errors by the court in setting the price. >Coase Theorem/Miceli. Property rule/Miceli: (...) suppose that farmers situated along a railroad track have the legal right to be free from crop damages caused by sparks, and that right is protected by a property rule. The railroad would then have to secure the agreement of all farmers in order to run trains along a given route, a prospect that would likely prevent any trains from ever running due to high bargaining costs. Liability rule: If the farmers’ rights were instead protected by a liability rule that only required the railroad to compensate farmers for any damages but did not allow the farmers to prevent trains from running, the railroad would internalize the harm through the assessment of liability for damages, and it would run the efficient number of trains. Legal problem: This arrangement, however, places a heavy burden on the court to measure the damages suffered by victims accurately. If it underestimates the damages, the railroad will run too many trains, and if it overestimates damages, the railroad will run too few. * Calabresi and Melamed also discuss a third rule, called an inalienability rule, which prohibits the exchange of an entitlement under any circumstances, including consensual exchange. Examples include constitutional protections of certain fundamental rights, like speech and religion, as well as laws prohibiting the sale of organs, children, and cultural artifacts. 1. Calabresi, Guido and A. Douglas Melamed (1972). “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral.” Harvard Law Review 85: 1089–1128. Miceli, Thomas J. „Economic Models of Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press.	Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Liability	Melamed	Parisi I 19 Liability rules/property rules/Calabresi/Melamid/Miceli: The classic paper by Calabresi and Melamed (1972)⁽¹⁾ addresses the manner in which rights or entitlements, once assigned, are legally protected and transferred. Parisi I 20 They distinguished between ... Property rules: ... under which an entitlement can only be transferred if the holder of the entitlement consents; and ... Liability rules: ..., under which a party seeking to acquire an entitlement can do so without the holder’s consent provided that he or she is willing to pay compensation for the holder’s loss.* Property rules: Property rules therefore form the basis for market (voluntary) exchange, while... Liability rules: ... liability rules form the basis for legal (forced) exchange. Markets: Because market exchange is consensual, it ensures a mutual benefit, or the realization of gains from trade. Law/property rules: : The role of the law in such transactions is limited to the enforcement of property rights and contractual exchange of entitlements. In other words, law is complementary to markets in promoting the efficient allocation of resources. Law/liability rules: In the case of liability rules, on the other hand, the law takes the primary role of forcing an exchange of the entitlement on terms dictated by the court. Here, the law is a substitute for market exchange in organizing the transfer of entitlements because bargaining costs preclude voluntary transfers. Externalities/liability: The choice between market and legal exchange depends on the trade-off between the transaction costs associated with bargaining over the price, and errors by the court in setting the price. >Coase Theorem/Miceli. Property rule/Miceli: (...) suppose that farmers situated along a railroad track have the legal right to be free from crop damages caused by sparks, and that right is protected by a property rule. The railroad would then have to secure the agreement of all farmers in order to run trains along a given route, a prospect that would likely prevent any trains from ever running due to high bargaining costs. Liability rule: If the farmers’ rights were instead protected by a liability rule that only required the railroad to compensate farmers for any damages but did not allow the farmers to prevent trains from running, the railroad would internalize the harm through the assessment of liability for damages, and it would run the efficient number of trains. Legal problem: This arrangement, however, places a heavy burden on the court to measure the damages suffered by victims accurately. If it underestimates the damages, the railroad will run too many trains, and if it overestimates damages, the railroad will run too few. * Calabresi and Melamed also discuss a third rule, called an inalienability rule, which prohibits the exchange of an entitlement under any circumstances, including consensual exchange. Examples include constitutional protections of certain fundamental rights, like speech and religion, as well as laws prohibiting the sale of organs, children, and cultural artifacts. 1. Calabresi, Guido and A. Douglas Melamed (1972). “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral.” Harvard Law Review 85: 1089–1128. Miceli, Thomas J. „Economic Models of Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press.	Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Liberalism	Dietz	Gaus I 283 Liberalism/Dietz/Mottier: Like Pateman, Young and Benhabib, Dietz (1992)⁽¹⁾ also founds her critique of the gendered nature of citizenship on a critical reading of liberal theories, based especially on the American political context. >Deliberative democracy/Benhabib, >Public Sphere/Pateman, >Democracy/Young. Dietz: She is, however, more hostile towards liberal perspectives. Whereas Pateman reproaches liberal theories for their relative indifference towards social inequalities, including those between men and women, Dietz's critique is more radical: DietzVsLiberalism: [Dietz] argues that liberalism and gendered concepts of citizenship are fundamentally incompatible. She thus joins other feminist critics for whom the central themes of liberalism - the citizen who has rights and pursues his own interests in a capitalist and competitive society - do not allow for the adequate conceptualization of interrelations or relations of dependency between individuals, either in the political or in the family spheres. Public Sphere/privacy/Dietz: Dietz shares the views of Pateman and Walby concerning the necessity of reconceptualizing the links between the public and the private, and of rethinking the distinction between the spheres. Citizenship: She also emphasizes the importance of citizenship as 'a continuous activity and a good in itself, not as a momentary engagement (or a socialist revolution) with an eye to a final goal or a societal arrangement', calling for a 'feminist revitalization' of citizenship (1992⁽¹⁾: 392). 1. Dietz, Mary (1992) 'Context is all: feminism and theories of citizenship'. In Chantal Mouffe, ed., Dimensions of Radical Democracy. London: Verso, 63—85. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Liberalism	MacIntyre	Brocker I 661 Liberalism/MacIntyreVsLiberalism/Modernism/MacIntyre: For MacIntyre, the liberalism of modern societies is little more than "a collection of strangers, each chasing its own interests under minimal restrictions. ⁽¹⁾ Modern nation: be only a traditionally forgotten collection of "citizens of nowhere".⁽²⁾ >Nation. Rationality/MacIntyre: In a "world of profane rationality", "any public, common logical basis or justification"⁽³⁾ for our moral orientations is missing. Rationality. We are victims of a pluralism that threatens to overrun us.⁽⁴⁾. See Modernism/MacIntyre. Brocker I 664 University/MacIntyreVsLiberalism: MacIntyre advocates an idea of the university that sees it as its stage on which divergent points of view are presented in order to be able to view the central conflicts. Instead, he diagnoses a real university conflict avoidance strategy disguised as liberality.⁽⁵⁾ 1. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, Notre Dame, Ind. 1981. Dt: Alasdair MacIntyre, Der Verlust der Tugend. Zur moralischen Krise der Gegenwart. Erweiterte Neuausgabe, Frankfurt/M. 2006 (zuerst 1987), p. 334 2. Ibid. p. 210 3. Ibid. p. 74 4. Ibid. p.. 301. 5. Alasdair MacIntyre , Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry. Encyclopedia, Genealogy and Tradition (Gifford Lectures 1988) Notre Dame, Ind. 1990 p. 231. Jürgen Goldstein, „Alasdair MacIntyre, Der Verlust der Tugend“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Liberty	Buchanan	Boudreaux I 55 Def Natural Liberty/Adam Smith/Buchanan/Boudreaux/Holcombe: „According to the system of natural liberty, the sovereign has only three duties to attend to; three duties of great importance, indeed, but plain and intelligible to common understandings: first, the duty of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; and thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public institutions, which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain…“ (Smith, 1776/1937⁽¹⁾: 651) Boudreaux I 56 Buchanan: One can see, in Smith’s vision of natural liberty, the foundation for several of Buchanan’s ideas. First, Buchanan’s functional division of government into the protective state and the productive state (…) echoes Smith, who limited the duties of the sovereign to protecting the society from outside invasion and from internal oppression - the protective state - and producing public works - the productive state. Smith saw the protective and productive state as being essential to a system of natural liberty. Buchanan: That points to the second commonality between Smith and Buchanan: the advocacy for a system of natural liberty. Smith: To quote Smith again, in this system of natural liberty, “Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest in his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those of any other man, or order of men” (Smith, 1776/1937⁽¹⁾: 651). Smith’s system of natural liberty clearly encompasses free markets, and prohibits some from coercing peaceful others. Buchanan: In an article titled “The Justice of Natural Liberty,” Buchanan quotes this passage from Smith: „To hurt in any degree the interest of any one order of citizens for no other purpose but to promote that of some other, is evidently contrary to that justice and equality of treatment which the sovereign owes to all different orders of his subjects.“ (1976⁽²⁾: 6) Buchanan makes use of Smith’s idea in two ways. 1) The first is the clear notion that there is no such thing as social welfare beyond the welfare of the individuals who compose society. It is unjust to impose costs on some for the benefit of others. 2) Second, Buchanan emphasizes, drawing on Smith, that markets and market exchange have an ethical justification that supersedes any efficiency justification. Markets are grounded ethically in the fundamental principle of justice that declares that people should deal with each other through cooperative action rather than by force. >Utility/Buchanan, >Social welfare/Buchanan, >Economic ethics/Buchanan, >Liberalism/Buchanan. Boudreaux I 78 Liberty/Buchanan/Boudreaux/Holcombe: The title of Buchanan’s book, The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan⁽³⁾, summarizes the issue that most concerned him throughout his career. His normative goal was to preserve liberty, and he saw threats to liberty coming from two opposite directions. On one side, if government’s power is too constrained, anarchy will arise and create a society that is a war of all against all, where no one’s liberty is protected. On the other side, if government’s power is insufficiently constrained, it will grow into a Leviathan that itself violates the liberty of its citizens. The challenge, one that Buchanan explicitly took from the American founding father James Madison, is to design a government that is sufficiently powerful to protect individual rights and to produce collective goods, but one that also is sufficiently constrained that it does not violate the individual rights that it is created to protect. The limits of liberty lie between anarchy and Leviathan. >Thomas Hobbes. Buchanan felt strongly that individuals should not be compelled to live under rules that are imposed on them unilaterally by others. To be legitimate, government must enjoy the consent of everyone under its power. The requirement of this consent lies at the foundation of the idea of politics as exchange. The practical problem, of course, is that government would get nothing done if it had to get unanimous consent for every policy change. The costs of arriving at collective decisions would prevent bargains from taking place if everyone were required to agree. Boudreaux I 79 Thus, Buchanan was interested in exploring institutional arrangements to which everyone would agree if decision-making costs did not stand in the way. That is the reason he suggested the types of arrangements people would agree to in a hypothetical renegotiation of the social contract from a state of anarchy. >Agreement/Buchanan, cf. >Coercion. 1. Adam Smith. (1776). The Wealth of Nations. London: Strahan and Cadell. 2. James M. Buchanan. (1976). “The Justice of Natural Liberty,” Journal of Legal Studies 5 (January). 3. Buchanan, James M. (1975). The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. University of Chicago Press.	EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Boudreaux I Donald J. Boudreaux Randall G. Holcombe The Essential James Buchanan Vancouver: The Fraser Institute 2021
Liberty	Rawls	I 72 Natural freedom/Rawls: Natural freedom (in contrast to liberal equality) implies a strong influence of social contingencies (randomities) on the distribution of goods. I 73 Liberal equality/Rawls: The liberal interpretation then requires that the institutions of the free market be integrated into a framework of social and legal institutions. Cf. >Liberalism. I 195 Freedom/Society/order/Rawls: in this context, three kinds of questions must be answered: 1. the question of justice of legislation and social policy I 196 2. a citizen must decide which constitutional arrangements are appropriate to settle legal disputes 3. even if the citizen accepts a particular constitution, there are still disputes. It is then a question of whether you want to follow the majority or oppose the majority. 4. Stage: The initial situation of a society to be established must be reconsidered in this light. >Society/Rawls, >Veil of Ignorance. Constitution/C. J. Arrow/Rawls: the idea of a four-step process is laid out in the Constitution of the United States and its history⁽¹⁾. I 202 Rawls: I suppose freedom can always be explained by three kinds of problems: 1. the doers, 2. the limits from which they are free, 3. what they are allowed to do or not allowed to do⁽²⁾. I 203 Fundamental freedoms: must be considered as a whole, as a system. Here it is the case that greater freedom is basically desirable, which is not the case in the case of specific freedoms. I 204 Some authors claim that the economic restrictions that make it impossible to make use of certain freedoms are among the restrictions on freedom. I do not do that. I do not think they diminish the value of freedom. However, the value is not the same for all people. I 213 Freedom of consciousness/freedom of thought/Rawls: Freedom of consciousness does not require a metaphysical doctrine or theory of knowledge: it is based on criteria that can be accepted by everyone. Also no special philosophical theory is implied. 1. See K. J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd. Ed. New York, 1963, pp. 89-91. 2. See G.G: McCallum, „Negative and Positive Freedom“, Philosophical Review, Vol. 76, 1967.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Liberty	Tocqueville	Gaus I 388 Liberty/society/Tocqueville/Plant: It is in the writings of Tocqueville^(1,2) that we encounter a more developed set of ideas about the values that underpin liberty. Tocqueville's position falls somewhere between Constant's highly practical account of freedom and a more metaphysically based one, or in modern parlance one based upon a comprehensive doctrine. Cf. >Society/Constant. Religion/Tocqueville: Tocqueville had a strong commitment to the necessary link as he saw it between religion and the maintenance of liberty, and within religion he approved of the idea of natural justice. >Religion, >Natural justice, >Freedom, >Society. It is certainly true, as we have already seen, that Tocqueville approves of the role of intermediate institutions in society as a guarantee of liberty, since they stand between the individual and a state whose power grows in a democratic era, and to that extent community life and what falls under what he calls mores or customs are part of what sustains liberty. Religion, however, comes into this because he wants to distinguish between arbitrary mores, conventions and the institutions on which they depend, and those that grow up from religiously and natural law sanctioned habits and forms of character. >Institutions. For Tocqueville, these include the innate idea of freedom and its importance in human life, the recognition of the soul and that the human person is more than a body and mind, and sentiments of honesty and common sense. When these things pervade character they can sustain the 'habits of the heart' that are essential to freedom and a free society. Constitution/society/Tocqueville: Constitutional arrangements and legislation have to be sustained by these mores for, as he argues in his Conversations with Nassau Senior: 'Liberty depends on the manners and beliefs of the people who are to enjoy it.' These manners and beliefs are more sustaining to liberty if they are held to be true and not just arbitrary or convenient inventions or historical accretions. So what Tocqueville argues for is a regulated liberty held in check by religion, custom and law. He is however certain that constitutions and legislation have to be rooted in ideas of this sort that are pervasive in the population and cannot be brought into being by legislation. >Legislation. 1. Tocqueville, A. de (1945) Democracy in America. New York: Knopf. 2. Tocqueville, A. de (1955) The Old Regime and the French Revolution. Garden City, NY: Anchor. Plant, Raymond 2004. „European Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Life	Dilthey	Gadamer I 71 Life/Dilthey/Gadamer: The meanings that we encounter in the humanities - as strange and incomprehensible to us as they may be - can be traced back to the last units of what is given in consciousness, which themselves no longer contain anything foreign, objective or in need of interpretation. They are the units of experience, which are themselves units of meaning. Gadamer: This is how a concept of life emerges in the epistemology of the humanities, which restricts the mechanistic model. This concept of life is conceived teleological: Dilthey: for him, life is productivity par excellence. As life objectifies itself in sense formations, all understanding of sense is "a retranslation of the objectivations of life into the spiritual vitality from which they have emerged". Thus the concept of experience forms the epistemological basis for all knowledge of the objective. >Experience/Dilthey, >Experience/Gadamer, >Experience/Husserl. Gadamer I 232 Life/Dilthey/Gadamer: As is well known, [Dilthey] speaks of the "thought-forming work of life"⁽¹⁾. What distinguishes this phrase from Hegel is not easy to say. Life, however much it may show an "unfathomable face"⁽²⁾, Dilthey may mock the all too friendly view of life, which sees in it only progress of culture - as long as it is understood in terms of the thoughts it forms, it is subjected to a teleological interpretation scheme and is conceived as a spirit. Spirit/Hegel/Dilthey: It is true that Dilthey in his later years leaned more and more about Hegel and talked about spirit where he used to say "life". He is just repeating a conceptual development that Hegel himself had also taken. In the light of this fact that we owe Dilthey the knowledge of the so-called "theological" youth writings of Hegel seems remarkable. In these materials on the history of the development of Hegelian thought, it becomes quite clear that the Hegelian concept of the spirit is based on a pneumatic concept of life.⁽³⁾ Dilthey himself has tried to account for what connects him to Hegel and what separates him from Hegel⁽⁴⁾. But what does his criticism of Hegel's belief in reason say, of his speculative construction of world history, of his aprioristic derivation of all concepts from the dialectical self-development of the absolute, when he too gives the concept of the "objective mind" such a central position? DiltheyVsHegel: (...) Dilthey turns against the ideal construction of this Hegelian term. "Today we must start from the reality of life". He writes: "We seek to understand it and to present it in adequate terms. By thus separating the objective spirit from the one-sided reasoning in the general reason that expresses the essence of the world spirit, and also from the idealistic construction, a new concept of the same becomes possible. There are several things included in it: language, custom, every kind of way of life, every style of life, as well as family, civil society, state and Gadamer I 233 right. And now also that which Hegel distinguished as the absolute spirit from the objective one - art and religion and philosophy - falls under this term.⁽⁵⁾ >Spirit/Dilthey, >Comparison/Dilthey. Gadamer I 239 Understanding/Historical Consciousness/Dilthey/Gadamer: Dilthey starts from life. Life itself is designed for contemplation. [Dilthey's life philosophical tendency] (...) is based on that very thing, that in life itself there is knowledge. >Lebensphilosophie/Dilthey. Already the inner being, which characterizes the experience, contains a kind of turning back of life to itself. "Knowledge is there, it is connected with experience without reflection" (V Il, 18). But the same immanent reflexivity of life also determines the way in which, according to Dilthey, meaning is absorbed in the context of life. For meaning is only experienced by stepping out of the "hunt for goals". >Meaning/Dilthey. It is a distance, a distance from the context of our own actions that makes such reflection possible. Gadamer I 240 In both directions, contemplation and practical contemplation, the same tendency of life, a striving for firmness(6), shows itself according to Dilthey. From there it is understood that he could consider the objectivity of scientific knowledge and philosophical self-reflection as the completion of the natural tendency of life. 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften Vll, 136. 2. Ges. Schriften Vlll, 224. 3. Dilthey's fundamental treatise: "Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels", first published in 1906 and multiplied in the 4th volume of the Collected Writings (1921) by estate manuscripts, opened a new epoch of Hegel studies, less by its results than by its task. It was soon (1911) accompanied by the publication of the "Theologische Jugendschriften" by Hermann Nohl, which were opened up by the vivid commentary of Theodor Haering (Hegel 1928). Cf. from the author: "Hegel und der geschichtliche Geist" and Hegels Dialektik IGes. Werke Bd. 31 and Herbert Marcuse, Hegels Ontologie und die Grundlegung einer Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit, 1932, who proved the model-forming function of the concept of life for the "Phenomenology of the Spirit". 4. in detail in the records of the bequests on the "youth history of Hegel" (IV, 217-258), more deeply in the 3rd chapter of the "Aufbau" (146ff.). 5. Dilthey, Ges. Schr. Vll, 150. 6. Ges. Schriften Vll, 347.	Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Life	Gould	I 227 ff Beginning/life/Gould: e.g. at the end of 1977, fossil prokaryotes were discovered in South Africa, which were about 3.4 billion years old. This is a much earlier beginning of life than previously assumed. Definition prokaryotes: prokaryotes are e.g. bacteria and blue-green algae, among others and they form the kingdom of the Definition Monera: Monera have no organelles, no nuclei, no mitochondria. A short time later it was announced that these methane bacteria are not closely related to other Monera at all. Common ancestors had to be much older! The oldest dated rocks in West Greenland are 3.8 billion years old. So there is very little time from the creation of decent living conditions to the creation of life itself. Perhaps the emergence of life (primitive life) is as inevitable as that of feldspar or quartz. If methanogens are listed separately, they form a sixth kingdom. Biologists today distinguish between Eukaryotes and prokaryotes rather than between plants and animals. Because of a common RNA sequence, the prokaryotes must have had a common precursor at some point in time. I 234 The assumption of a steady evolutionary speed is probably impossible to maintain. The early methanogens may have developed much faster. I 260 Form/life/organism/evolution/physics/Gould: stability is created by the fact that a living being is large enough to penetrate into an area where gravity surpasses the forces that take place on the surface. As the ratio of surface to volume decreases with growth, an increasing size is the safest way into this area. The Earth's physical environment contains numerous habitats, which are only available to organisms that are larger than single-celled organisms. The multicellularity probably originated in several places independently of each other. It has the two main features of analogue similarity: 1. it is relatively easy to reach and both highly adaptable and flexible and 2. it is the only possible route to the benefits it brings. With the exception of ostrich eggs, individual cells cannot grow very large. I 261 The multicellularity has probably arisen even within the individual kingdoms several times. Most biologists believe that it occurs in plants and fungi through amalgamation. These organisms are the descendants of protist colonies. (Protists: protists are unicellular organisms, see Terminology/Gould) For example, some Volvox colonies with a fixed number of cells are regularly arranged. The cells may differ in size and the reproductive function may be limited to those of them located at a pole. I 264 Larger animals have such a low ratio of outer surface to volume that they need to form internal organs to increase the available surface area. I 288 Ratio of surface to volume: the ratio of surface to volume is very high in small organisms. Heat is generated by the volume of the body and radiated at its surface. Therefore warm-blooded animals have a particularly high energy requirement. Field mice must eat all the time. The ratio was so low for the large dinosaurs that they could get by without an insulation layer. I 311 Shape/life/physics/size/Gould: the character of Morgan in E. L. Doctorow's "Ragtime" was wrong when he thought that large mammals were geometric copies of their smaller relatives. Elephants have relatively larger brains and thicker legs than mice. He is right in that larger animals are often similar to smaller relatives in the same group. Galileo already gave a classic example: the strength of a leg is a function of the cross-section. The weight that the legs have to carry varies with their volume. In order for the bodily functions to remain the same, animals must change their form when they become larger: "scaling theory". E. g. from crab spider to tarantula, the scale of relatives reaches up to a thousand times the body weight of the smallest specimen. Here too, the scale runs regularly: the duration of the heartbeat increases only 4/10 times as fast as the body weight. I 312 Small animals move through life much faster than large ones, their heart beats faster, they breathe more frequently, their pulse is faster, their "fire of life "burns" faster: in mammals, the metabolic rate increases by only three quarters as fast as the body weight. Smaller ones tend to live shorter than large ones. I 313 However, the homo sapiens lives much longer than a comparable mammal of the same size: See Neoteny/Gould. The importance of the astronomical time is by no means to be denied; animals must measure it in order to survive. I 315 Breathing time and heartbeat increase about 0.28 times faster than body weight; the body weight can be reduced, leaving mammals of any size to breathe once at about 4 beats. For all mammals, regardless of their size, they also breathe about 200 million times during their lifetime, the heart beats about 800 million times. I 318 ff There are magnetotactic bacteria that orient themselves according to the fields and move accordingly. They thus resist the mechanism of Brownian movement. It was discovered that the magnets are distributed in the body of the bacteria in the form of about 20 small particles. Question: why is there this distribution of magnetism on particles, and why are these particles about 500 Angstrom large (1 Angstrom = 1 ten millionth of a millimetre). They form a chain in the body of the elongated bacteria. I 320 If these particles were a little smaller (about one-fifth smaller) then they would be "superparamagnetic", i. e. a magnetic reorientation of the particles could be effected at room temperature. If, on the other hand, they were twice as large, for example, the particles would form their own magnetic range within the particles, pointing in different directions. What can such a small creature do with a magnetic field? The room for movement during the few minutes of their existence is probably only a few centimetres. It does not really matter which way it goes. It can now be decisive for a bacterium to move downwards. Now gravity can be felt at least as well without a magnetic field. However, this only applies to large organisms. I 322 Insects and birds live in a world dominated by forces that affect the surface. Some of them can run on water or hang down from the ceiling because the surface tension is so strong and the gravitation is relatively weak. Gravity is hardly a problem for insects and for bacteria not at all. II 325 Life/sense/Gould: thesis: the history of life has some weak empirical tendencies, but in essence it is nowhere to be found. IV 196 Life/multicellular organisms: life only existed for 600 million years. This time is divided into three major parts: Palaeozoic (old earth age), Mesozoic (earth middle age) and Cenozoic (modern earth age). All problematic cases take place in the Palaeozoic. Surprisingly, there is a superordinate pattern: although the number of problematica (organisms that had no future in evolution and therefore, due to their rarity and isolation are difficult to allocate) is declining towards the modern age, it is amazing how they almost completely disappear towards the end of the Palaeozoic. In the early history of multicellular organisms, the problematica must have flourished. IV 303 Life/Gould: life as a result of structural and functional complexity cannot be broken down into its chemical components and cannot be explained in its entirety by laws. Function: e.g. the cell membrane controls many processes in the cell. How can we interpret the functions of cells by breaking them down into molecular components? III 207 Life/development/complexity: Gould: 7 arguments 1. Life must begin on the left wall (minimum complexity). 2. There must be temporal stability of the original bacterial form. The prokaryotes (organisms without nucleus, chromosomes, mitochondria and choroplasts) consist of breathtakingly diverse groups, which are collectively called "bacteria" and the "blue-green algae", also called bacteria (cyanobacteria), which make use of the photosynthesis. More than half the history of life is the history of prokaryotes. 3. In order for life to spread, a more and more right-wing distribution had to develop. 4. Characterizing a total distribution by an extreme value in a tail is short-sighted. More than 80% of all species are arthropods, and as a rule all members of this tribe are considered primitive. Moreover, the forms that occupied the right tail over time do not form an uninterrupted evolutionary sequence. It is a colorful row that is not connected. Time Sequence: bacteria, eukaryotic cell, marine algae, jellyfish, trilobite, nautilus, shellfish, dinosaurs, sabre-toothed tigers, homo sapiens. 5. Causality lies on the ((s) left) wall (lowest complexity) and in the extension of the range of variations. The right tail is not cause, but effect. III 212 6. The only way to reintroduce progress is logically possible, but empirically most likely wrong. The first living creature stands on the left wall but the first mammal, the first flowering plant or the first clam starts from the middle and the offspring can move in both directions. But there are good reasons to assume a preference for the direction to the left, because parasitism is a very common evolutionary strategy, and parasites are anatomically usually built simpler than their independent ancestors (Vs progress!). So the whole system could contain subordinate counterlines. Empirically, the finds show no preference to the right! 7. Even a narrow-minded limitation to the right tail (>complexity) does not lead to the desired conclusion, namely a predictable, meaningful evolution to the supremacy of a conscious being. The right tail must exist statistically, but what kind of living things exist cannot be predicted at all. It is by no means determined by the mechanisms of evolution! If evolution were to repeat itself, the development to human-like beings would be virtually impossible, because of the extreme improbability.	Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989
Life	Kanitscheider	I 285 Life/Universe/Possible worlds/Kanitscheider: (Investigation of Ellis and Brundrit)⁽¹⁾ if one makes the plausible assumption that there is a finite probability for life in galaxies of our type, then there is certainly in one of the other life-bearing systems an individual with identical genetic construction as a special living being on earth. But if there is also only one individual of a certain type, it follows immediately from the presupposed finite, non-vanishing probability that there are infinitely many genetically identical living beings in the universe at any time! Not only copies, but also their history several times existing! However, this is valid only if one refrains from the fact that the space-time allows infinitely many different localizations of the events because of its continuity. One must put a kind of finite grid over the space-time so that the finite events also occur infinitely often. I 287 The striking thing about this argument is that, in addition to cosmological data, it relies only on a relatively weak assumption that there are not an infinite number of different life forms. Physically, this is credible because there are only finitely many elements and the maximum size of stable molecules is certainly finite. So the kinds of life we know are certainly a true fraction of all possible life forms Kanitscheider: moreover, practically only carbon can be considered as a basis, silicon life is inferior to carbon life in the competition. Ellis/Brundrit⁽¹⁾, however, consider even more exotic objections: if a now-unknown long-range force played a role in the origin of life, so that the probability of life in larger systems would decrease, the result would still remain intact, since particle horizons exist in almost all FRW worlds, limiting the interactions. the present probabilities for life on separate Earth-like planets are independent of each other. At any point in time, there are infinitely many causally decoupled regions in a low total energy universe. I 288 Now in each of them only a finite number of viable structures can exist, the infinite multiplicity of these organisms is inevitable! If one does not want to share these assumptions, nevertheless the ways out are not less strange, under retention of the homogeneity one would have to already 1. deny that the origin of life can be estimated at all with a probability measure, or that this is vanishingly small. Or: 2. a) (with homogeneity): the space-like hypersurfaces would have to be compact (K = +1). That would be a universe with negative total energy (high density). This is not supported empirically at present. b) Way out: force solution: one would have to provide the space sections with local hyperbolic or Euclidean geometry via identification topologies with a compact connection form. Ex (k = 0): then the local geometry of spacetime can be described in the line element ds² = dt² + R²(t)[dx² + dy² + dz²] Notation: L: coordinate length. (see below identification topology, determines the galaxy number). If one chooses in this space a cube of the coordinate length L, x, y, z respectively between 0 and L, and identifies opposite sides, then this does not change the local spatial structure, but the spatial coordinates become cyclic in the sense that (t, x, y, z) and (t, x +L, y + L, z + L) represent the same event. By the new coherence form, the spatial sections have now become 3-toroi of finite volume V =R³L³. In such a finite Euclidean space, of course, there are only finitely many galaxies, just as in a space with positive curvature. so the multiplicity of things would be avoided. >Coordinate system/Kanitscheider. I 289 In exchange, however, a new parameter emerges which is not at all determined by local physics, namely the length scale of the identification topology L. The quantity L which determines the galaxy number could be determined in any number of different ways without being supported by local empirical information. However, if one sticks to the principle of choosing more exotic topologies only when prompted by empirical evidence, it follows that each of us has infinite doubles, most of them behind a particle horizon. Steady-State Theory SST would have the same consequence in temporal terms. At infinity, any particle combination for which there is even a tiny finite probability simply occurs infinitely often. Copernican Principle/Ellis: his main point was to point out that the Copernican Principle has no empirical support, on the other hand it leads to such strange consequences. I 290 Ellis: to make this clearer, he designed a Bsp alternative model universe, locally isotropic, but without Copernican principle, which nevertheless covers all empirical findings. SSS: Spherically symmetric static universe, two centers, near one we live, the other is a naked singularity. Redshift here is interpreted not as result of space expansion, but as gravitational redshift, background not as relic radiation, but as result of hot fireball sphere permanently surrounding second singularity. Cold center C, hot center S. At a point p near the cold center, the background radiation is taken as an indication that the past light cone refocuses from p toward the hot singularity. The world is spherically symmetric about S and C. If one goes from C in the direction of S, it becomes hotter and hotter. Near the singularity, all the things happen that happen in a FRW world in the deep past. Symmetrically around S, there is an area of decoupling, and even closer, an area of nucleosynthesis. Circulation, light elements drift from S to C, there heavy elements are formed, which migrate back. I 291 Such a world is dominated by the singularity as the "soul of the universe". It also provides the dominant arrow of time. Methodologically, it is now important whether one can make the correspondence between a Steady State (SSS) and a Friedman world perfect. The temporal range of circumstances favorable to life in the Friedman world is matched in the SSS by a small spatial range around C. This is a real alternative to the Copernican principle for some authors. (I.e. it looks completely different somewhere else, conclusions from our environment on distant sections of the universe are not allowed). With alternative theories one decides mostly after simplicity and uniformity points of view. Kanitscheider: The absurd consequence of the infinitely many doubles does not seem to be a sufficient argument for leaving the homogeneity assumption. >Universe/Kanitscheider. 1. Ellis, G. F. R. & Brundrit, G. B. Life in the infinite universe. Royal Astronomical Society, Quarterly Journal, vol. 20, Mar. 1979, p. 37-41.	Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Literature	Gadamer	I 138 Literature/Fiction/Gadamer: For the poet, free invention is always only one side of a mediocrity bound by given validity. He does not freely invent his fable, no matter how much he imagines it. Rather, to this day something remains of the old foundation of the mimesis theory. The free invention of the poet is the representation of a common truth which also binds the poet. Other forms of art are not different, especially the fine arts. The aesthetic myth of the freelance imagination, which transforms experience into poetry, and the cult of the genius that belongs to it only attest to the fact that in the 19th century the mythical-historical traditional good is no longer a self-evident possession. >Fiction/Gadamer, >Mimesis. But even then the aesthetic myth of imagination and ingenious invention represents an exaggeration that cannot withstand what is real. Still, the choice of material and the design of the chosen material does not originate from a free will of the artist and is not merely an expression of his inwardness. Rather, the artist appeals to prepared minds and chooses for it what promises him effect. He himself is in the same tradition as the audience he means and collects. In this sense, it is true that he is not an individual, a thinking consciousness that needs to know explicitly what he is doing and what his work says. It is never just a strange world of magic, intoxication, dream, to which the player, creator or viewer is enraptured, but it is still his own world, to which he is actually transferred by recognizing himself deeper within it. There remains a continuity of meaning that unites the work of art with the world of existence and from which even the alienated consciousness of an educational society never completely detaches itself. I 165 Literature/Gadamer: The specific presence of the work of art is a "coming-to-representation" of being. >Artworks/Gadamer. [In literature] there seems to be no representation at all that could claim an own existence-valence. Understanding: (...) all understanding reading always seems to be a kind of reproduction and interpretation. Emphasis, rhythmic structure and the like also belong I 166 to the quietest reading. The meaningful and its understanding is apparently so closely connected with the linguistically corporeal that understanding always contains an inner speech. Certainly, literature and its reception in reading shows a maximum of detachment and mobility⁽¹⁾. The fact that one does not need to read a book in one go already testifies to this, so that staying with it is a separate task of resumption, which has no analogy in listening or looking at it. But it is precisely this what makes it clear that "reading" corresponds to the unity of the text. Reception: The concept of literature is not without reference to the recipient. Rather, literature is a function of intellectual preservation and transmission and therefore brings its hidden history into every present. I 167 History: Only the development of historical consciousness transforms this living unity of world literature from the immediacy of its normative claim to unity into the historical question of literary history of literature. >History, >Historiography. Tradition: (...) the concept of literature [is] to be conceived much broader than the concept of literary works of art. All linguistic tradition has a part in the mode of being of literature, not only the religious, legal, economic, public and private texts of all kinds, but also the writings in which such traditional texts are scientifically processed and interpreted, that is, the whole of the humanities. Yes, the form of literature belongs to all scientific research in general, as long as it is essentially connected with linguistics. I 168 Literary work of art: the essential difference [between literary and, for example, scientific language] lies in the difference in the claim to truth. >Reading. 1.Excellent analyses of the linguistic stratification of the literary work of art and the mobility of vivid fulfilment that the literary word has, can be found in: R. Ingarden, Das literarische Kunstwerk, 1931.	Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Literature	Ricoeur	II 27 Literature/Ricoeur: [When] is human thought directly brought to writing without the intermediary'stage of spoken language[,] [t]hen writing takes the place of speaking. A kind of short-cut occurs between the meaning of discourse and the material medium. II 29 The best way to measure the extent of this substitution is to look at the range of changes which occur among the other components of the communication process. >Media/Ricoeur, >Writing/Ricoeur. II 31 Message/Hearer: At the opposite end of the communication chain the relation of the textual message to the reader is no less complex than is the relation to the author. [The] universaliziaton of the audience is one of the more striking effects of writing and may be expressed in terms of a paradox. Because discourse is now linked to a material support, it becomes more spiritual in the sense that it is liberated from the narrowness of the face-to-face situation. A work also creates its public. In this way it enlarges the circle of communication and properly initates new modes of communication. To that extent, the recognition of the work by the audience created by the work is an unpredictable event. times projected into a cloudy future. It is part of the meaning of a text to be open to an indefinite number of readers and, II 32 therefore, of interpretations. This opportunity for multiple readings is the dialectical counterpart of the semantic autonomy of the text. It follows that the problem of the appropria tion of the mean- ing of the text becomes as paradoxical as that of the authorship. The right of the reader and the right of the text converge in an important struggle that generates the whole dynamic of interpretation. Hermeneutics begins where dialogue ends. >Hermeneutics/Ricoeur, >Code/Literature/Ricoeur.	Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976
Local/global		Local, global: this distinction refers to the range of influences in a system and its effects on the conceptualization and structuring of theories that describe this system.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Loewenheim	Hilbert	Berka I 340 Loewenheim/Hilbert/Ackermann: Loewenheim has shown that every expression that is universal for the countable domain has the same property for every other domain. In Loewenheim, however, the sentence appears in the dual version: Every formula of the function calculus is either contradictory or can be satisfied within a countable infinite range of thought. >Satisfaction, >Satisfiability, >Models, >Model theory, >Functional calculus, >Countability. General Validity/Hilbert/Ackermann: examples of formulas which are valid in each domain are all formulas that can be proved from axioms of a system. >Validity, >Universal validity. Loewenheim/Hilbert/Ackermann: Loewenheim has made another remarkable proposition: in the treatment of the logical formulas one can restrict oneself to those in which only function symbols with a maximum of two vacancies occur⁽¹⁾. This corresponds to: Schroeder: the general relative calculus can be traced back to the binary calculus⁽²⁾. >Logical formulas. 1. L. Löwenheim: Über Möglichkeiten im Relativkalkül, Math. Annalen 76 (1915), pp. 447-470, p. 459. 2. D. Hilbert & W. Ackermann: Grundzüge der Theoretischen Logik, Berlin, 6. Aufl. Berlin/Göttingen/Heidelberg 1972, § 12.	Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983
Loewenheim	Putnam	V 54 ff Loewenheim/reference/PutnamVsTradition: Loewenheim tries to fix the intension und extension of single expressions via the determination of the truth values for whole sentences. V 56f PutnamVsOperationalism: e.g. (1) "E and a cat is on the mat." If we re-interpret this with cherries and trees, all truth values remain unchanged. Cat* to mat: a) some cats on some mats and some cherries on some trees, b) ditto, but no cherry on a tree, c) none of these cases. Definition cat: x is a cat* iff. a) and x = cherry, or b) and x = cat or c) and x = cherry. Definition mat: x = mat iff. a) and x = tree or b) and x = mat or c) and x = quark. Ad c) Here all respective sentences become false ((s) "cat* to mat" is the more comprehensive (disjunctive) statement and therefore true in all worlds a) or b)). Putnam: cat will be enhanced to cat by reinterpretation. Then there might be infinitely many reinterpretations of predicates that will always attribute the right truth value. Then we might even hold "impression" constant as the only expression. The reference will be undetermined because of the truth conditions for whole sentences (>Gavagai). V 58 We can even reinterpret "sees" (as sees) so that the sentence "Otto sees a cat" and "Otto sees a cat" have the same truth values in every world. V 61 Which properties are intrinsic or extrinsic is relative to the decision, which predicates we use as basic concepts, cat or cat. Properties are not in themselves extrinsic/intrinsic. V 286ff Loewenheim/Putnam:* theorem: S be a language with predicates F1, F2, ...Fk. I be an interpretation in the sense that each predicate S gets an intension. Then, there will be a second interpretation J that is not concordant with I but will make the same sentences true in every possible world that are made true by I. Proof: W1, W2, ... all be possible worlds in a well-ordering, Ui be the set of possible individuals existing in world Wi. Ri be the set, forming the extension of the predicate Fi in the possible world Wj. The structure [Uj;Rij(i=1,2...k)] is the "intended Model" of S in world Wj relative to I (i.e. Uj is the domain of S in world Wj, and Rij is (with i = 1, 2, ...k) the extension of the predicate Fi in Wj). J be the interpretation of S which attributes to predicate Fi (i=1, 2, ...k) the following intension: the function fi(W), which has the value Pj(Rij) in every possible world Wj. In other words: the extension of Fi in every world Wj under interpretation J is defined as such, that it is Pj(Rij). Because [Uj;Pj(Rij)(i=1,2...k)] is a model for the same set of sentences as [Uj;Rij(i=1,2...k)] (because of the isomorphism), in every possible world the same sentences are true under J as under I. J is distinguished from I in every world, in which at least one predicate has got a non-trivial extension. V 66 Loewenheim/intention/meaning/Putnam: this is no solution, because to have intentions presupposes the ability to refer to things. Intention/mind State: is ambiguous: "pure": is e.g. pain, "impure": means e.g. whether I know that snow is white does not depend on me like pain (> twin earth). Non-bracketed belief presupposes that there really is water (twin earth). Intentions are no mental events that evoke the reference. V 70 Reference/Loewenheim/PutnamVsField: a rule like "x prefers to y iff. x is in relation R to y" does not help: even when we know that it is true, could relation R be any kind of a relation (while Field assumes that it is physical). --- I (d) 102ff E.g. the sentence: (1) ~(ER)(R is 1:1. The domain is R < N. The range of R is S). Problem: when we replace S by the set of real numbers (in our favourite set theory), then (1) will be a theorem. In the following our set theory will say that a certain set ("S") is not countable. Then S must in all models of our set theory (e.g. Zermelo-Fraenkel, ZF) be non-countable. Loewenheim: his sentence now tells us, that there is no theory with only uncountable models. This is a contradiction. But this is not the real antinomy. Solution: (1) "tells us" that S is non-countable only, if the quantifier (ER) is interpreted in such a way that is goes over all relations of N x S. I (d) 103 But if we choose a countable model for the language of our set theory, then "(ER)" will not go over all relations but only over the relations in the model. Then (1) tells us only, that S is uncountable in a relative sense of uncountable. "Finite"/"Infinite" are then relative within an axiomatic set theory. Problem: "unintended" models, that should be uncountable will "in reality" be countable. Skolem shows, that the whole use of our language (i.e. theoretical and operational conditions) will not determine the "uniquely intended interpretation". Solution: platonism: postulates "magical reference". Realism: offers no solution. I (d) 105 In the end the sentences of set theory have no fixed truth value. I (d) 116 Solution: thesis: we have to define interpretation in another way than by models.	Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Loewenheim	Quine	X 79 Validity/Sentence/Quantity/Schema/Quine: if quantities and sentences fall apart in this way, there should be a difference between these two definitions of validity (via schema with sentences) or models (with quantities). But it follows from the Loewenheim theorem that the two definitions of validity (via sentences or quantities) do not fall apart as long as the object language is not too weakly (poorly) expressive. Condition: the object language must be able to express (include) the elementary number theory. Object Language: in such a language, a scheme that remains true for all sentence implementations is also fulfilled by all models and vice versa. The demand of elementary number theory is quite weak. Def Elementary Number Theory/eZT/Quine: is about positive integers using addition, multiplication, identity, truth functions and quantification. >Number Theory/Quine. Standard Grammar/Quine: the standard grammar would express the addition, multiplication and identity functions by appropriate predicates. That is how we get the two sentences: (I) If a scheme remains true for all implentations of sentences of the elementary number theory sets, then it is fulfilled by all models. X 80 (II) If a scheme is fulfilled by each model, then e is true for all settings of sets. Quine: Sentence (I) goes back to Loewenheim 1915: Sentence of Loewenheim/Quine: every scheme that is ever fulfilled by a model is fulfilled by a model 'U,‹U,β,α...', where U contains only the positive integers. Loewenheim/Hilbert/Bernays: intensification: the quantities α, β,γ,...etc. may each be determined by a sentence of the elementary number theory: So: (A) If a scheme is fulfilled by a model at all, it is true when using sentences of the elementary number theory instead of its simple schemes. Prerequisite for the implentations: the quantifiable variables must have the positive integers in their value range. However, they may also have other values. (I) follows from (A) that: (A) is equivalent to its contraposition: if a schema is wrong in all the implementations of s of sentences of the elementary number theory, it is not fulfilled by any model. If we speak here about its negation instead of the schema, then "false₂" becomes "true" and "from no model" becomes "from every model". This gives us (I). The sentence (II) is based on the theorem of the deductive completeness of the quantifier logic. II 29 Classes: one could reinterpret all classes in its complement, "not an element of ..." - you would never notice anything! Bottom layer: each relative clause, each general term determines a class. >Classes/Quine. V 160 Loewenheim/Quine: there is no reinterpretation of characters - but rather a change of terms and domains - the meanings of the characters for truth functions and for quantifiers remain constant. The difference is not that big and can only play a role with the help of a new term: "ε" or "countable". For quantifiers and truth functions only the difference finite/infinte plays a role. Uncountable is not a matter of opinion. Solution: it is all about which term is fundamental: countable or uncountable.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Logic	Cognitive Psychology	Upton I 137 Adulthood/logic/Cognitive psychology/Upton: (…) we now recognize that cognitive development goes beyond [the years of childhood (>Cognitive development/Piaget)] and a fourth stage of cognitive development has been suggested by a number of theorists (e.g. Commons et al. 1984⁽¹⁾; Sinnott, 1994⁽²⁾; Yan and Arlin, 1995)⁽³⁾. Called ‘post-formal thought’, this stage has been suggested to be typified by relativistic thinking, whereby adults recognize that knowledge depends on the subjective perspective of each individual and that there is, therefore, no absolute truth (…). Perry (1970)⁽⁴⁾ studied cognitive growth in college students and found that there was a shift from the initial assumption when entering college that there was an absolute truth to be found, to a gradual recognition that questions might have many answers. (…) we move from absolutist to relativist thinking and, according to some theorists, this results in the use of a greater variety of thinking styles (Zhang, 2002)⁽⁵⁾. Furthermore, it is suggested that advanced thinkers relish the challenge of finding the paradoxes and inconsistencies in ideas so as to attempt to reconcile them (Basseches, 1984)⁽⁶⁾. >Stages of development. 1. Commons. ML, Richards, FA and Armon, C (1 984) Beyond Formal Operations: Late adolescent and adult cognitive development. New York: Praeger. 2. Sinnott J.D. (2002) Postformal Thought and Adult Development. In: Demick J., Andreoletti C. (eds) Handbook of Adult Development. The Springer Series in Adult Development and Aging. Springer, Boston, MA 3. Yan. B and Arlin PK (1995) Nonabsolute/relativistic thinking: a common factor underlying models of postformal reasoning? Journal of Adult Development, 2: 223-40. 4. Perry, WG (1970) Forms of Intellectual and Ethical Development in the College Years. New York: Holt, Rhinehart. 5. Zhang, LF (2002) Thinking styles and cognitive development. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 163: 179-95. 6. Basseches, M (1984) Dialectical Thinking and Adult Development. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Further reading: Kitchener, KS, Lynch, CL, Fischer, KW and Wood, PK (1993) Developmental range of reflective judgment: the effect of contextual support and practice on developmental stage. Developmental Psychology, 29:893—906. Available online at https ://gseweb.harvard.edu/ —ddl/articles Copy! Kitchener-etal 1993 DevRangeReflectjudgem.pdf.	Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011
Logic	Logic Texts	Hoyningen-Huene II 148f Relation of logic to reality: A: No one can read this book in three days. B: A hard-working student can read this book in three days. Whether there are hard-working students is something that cannot be captured with the statement logic. The inconsistency of the example can only be detected with the predicate logic. Other inconsistencies cannot be captured by the means of logic at all: A: Hans is a giant. - B: Hans is a dwarf. --- Read III 62f Difference compact/non-compact: classical logic is a logic of the 1st level. A categorical set of axioms for arithmetic must be a second-level logic. (Quantifiers also for properties). >Second order logic. Logic first order/second order are not to be distinguished syntactically, but semantically! E.g. Napoleon has all properties of an emperor: are not syntactically to be distinguished, whether logic 1st or 2nd level. III 70ff VsClassical Logic: This reduction, of course, fails. For "nothing is round and square" is necessarily true, but its non-logical components cannot be interpreted in any way that makes this statement false. Allowing variable areas of definition for classical representation was a catastrophe. The modality has returned. We can make a substitution, but we cannot really change the range. >Range, >Modality. If an object is round, it follows that it is not square. But this conclusion is not valid thanks to the form, but thanks to the content. III 79 It was a mistake to express the truth-preservation criterion as "it is impossible that the premisses are true and the conclusion false". Because it is not so obvious that there is a need to conclude from A to B. Provided he is cowardly, it follows that he is either cowardly or - what one wants. But simply from the fact that he is cowardly does not follow that if he is not cowardly - what one wants. >EFQ/ex falso quodlibet. III 151 Logic 1st order: individuals, 2nd order: variables for predicates, distribution of the predicates by quantifiers. 1st level allows restricted vocabulary of the 2nd level: existence and universal quantifier! >Existential quantification, >Universal quantification, >Existence predicate, >Existence. III 161 Free logic: no existence assumptions - no conclusion from the absence of the truth value to falsehood - global evaluation. >Truth value, >Truth value gaps, >Truth value agglomeration, >Valuation. --- Menne I 26 Justification of Logic/Menne: the so-called logical principles of identity, of consistency, and the excluded middle are not sufficient to derive the logic. In addition, ten theorems and rules of the propositional logic are needed, just to derive the syllogistic exactly. These axioms do not represent obvious ontological principles. Kant: transcendental justification of logic. It must be valid a priori. >Logic/Kant. Menne I 28 The justification from the language: oversees that there is no explicit logic at all if the language itself already contained logic. Precisely because language does not always proceed logically, the logic is needed for the standardization of language. Menne: there must be a recursive procedure for justification. >Justification, >Recursion.	Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Me I A. Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1997
Logical Form	Leibniz	Holz I 135 World/Mirror/Leibniz/Holz: Leibniz uses for this relationship the metaphor of the mirror. Each monad is a living mirror and endowed with inner action that represents the universe according to its perspective. Mirror/Holz: its essence is to be the appearance of a mirrored in-itself. But it is also true that the mirrored outside of the mirror exists only "extensively" or as an aggregate of scattered parts. The unit is made by the mirror! But that is a definite and figurative unity. In-itself and appearance always exist in the identity of the different, because in the mirror we see the thing itself,... I 136 ...unlike in a painting or a photograph. Holz: this results in a strange reciprocal relationship between the logical and the ontological overlap of the links on their respective counterparts. Representation/Holz: logical: the representation is logically the genre of itself and the depicted. (See "The Overarching General"). Ontological: the reverse is the represented genre of itself and representation. Entanglement of world and substance in Leibniz. >World/Leibniz, >Substance/Leibniz, cf. >Representation.	Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994
Logical Truth	Logic Texts	Read III 67 Logical truth-form: can one really reject a whole range of valid inferences, namely those which, although valid, are not valid because of their form? Yes: The logical truths. For example, "nothing is round and square at the same time". Neither "round" nor "square" are logical expressions, so the form of the statement "nothing is both F and G", which can obviously be made wrong by an appropriate interpretation of F and F. But something must have been overlooked here, because "nothing is both round and square" cannot be wrong! It is a necessary truth! Necessity: the classical criterion of logical deduction does not mention necessity! >Necessity, >Deduction, cf. >Round square.	Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Luxury Consumption	Hayek	Rothbard III 986 Luxury consumption/Hayek/Rothbard: (…) consumption [is ] the very goal of the entire economic system; let us note two stimulating contributions in recent years on hidden but important functions of luxury consumption, particularly by the "rich." Hayek: F.A. Hayek has pointed out the important function of the luxury consumption of the rich, at any given time, in pioneering new ways of consumption, and thereby paving the way for later diffusion of such "consumption innovations" to the mass of the consumers.⁽¹⁾ de Jouvenel: And Bertrand de Jouvenel, stressing the fact that refined esthetic and cultural tastes are concentrated precisely in the more affluent members of society, also points out that these citizens are the ones Who could freely and voluntarily give many gratuitous services to others, services which, because they are free, are not counted in the national income statistics.⁽²⁾ >Affluent society/Galbraith. 1. Hayek, Constitution of Liberty, pp. 42 ff. As Hayek puts it: A large part of the expenditure of the rich, though not intended for that end, thus serves to defray the cost of the experimentation With the new things that, as a result, can later be made available to the poor. The important point is not merely that we gradually learn to make cheaply on a large scale what we already know how to make expensively in small quantities but that only from an advanced position does the next range of desires and possibilities become visible, so that the selection of new goals and the effort toward their achievement will begin long before the majority can strive for them. (Ibid., pp. 43-44) Also see the similar point made by Mises 30 years before. Ludwig von Mises, "The Nationalization of Credit" in Sommer, Essays in European Economic Thought, pp. 111 f. And see Bertrand de Jouvenel, The Ethics of Redistribution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), pp. 38 f. 2. De Jouvenel, Ethics of Redistribution, especially pp. 6 7 ff. If all housewives suddenly stopped doing their own housework and, instead, hired themselves out to their next-door neighbors, the supposed increase in national product, as measured by statistics, would be very great, even though the actual increase would be nil. For more on this point, see de Jouvenel, "The Political Economy of Gratuity," The Virginia Quarterly Review, Autumn, 1959, pp. 515 ff.	Hayek I Friedrich A. Hayek The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents--The Definitive Edition (The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, Volume 2) Chicago 2007 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Magical Thinking	Flusser	I 121 Magic/Flusser: for people who are not aware of conventionality, the world is not structured as if it could be depicted in pictures, but is actually depictable in pictures. It is scenic. There is no difference between "real " and "imaginary" world. As soon as imagination or myth is spoken of, they are at risk. We should not forget that our own imagination is on a different level than that of children and primitives. >Imagination, >Thinking, >Images, >Myth. I 121 Whoever connects to the world through images, whoever experiences them as a scene, whoever lives imaginatively, for them the world is at the same time right and horrible. It is "holy." >World/thinking. There is nothing primitive about the worldview that regards Gods as "valuable", it is only historically behind the profane worldview of the explanatory texts, but not figuratively. I 122 If one believes that "earlier" is less good than "later" and "older" is less true than "younger", then one has read the relations of the information that the linear codes arrange incorrectly - i. e. figuratively. >Time, >Linear order, >Past, >Present, >Future, To say that every tree contains a God or every spring is a mermaid is basically nothing more than to say that every thing is "invisible" connected to all others. >Cf. >Pathetic fallacy, >Animism. And in such a way that these relations produce a picture. God, soul, mermaid are names for relationships between things within an absolute, timeless immortal because the orbiting time contains the whole. That is why gods, mermaids, etc. are immortal. The elements of the image may shift, but the ratios are constant. Living in such a world means constantly breaking the rules, because living means moving and moving means leaving one's right place in the picture. Life in magic is "horrible". >Imagination II. I 123 Imagination II/Flusser: Images are designed to recognize the world that has become unrecognizable: maps. >Images, >Map example. Then the world begins to be experienced as an image, i.e. to mirror the categories of the image. In it life becomes horrible, from now on the images must serve a strategy of escaping the horrible and function as magical tools. >Consciousness, >Thinking, >Reality, >Imagination, >Images, >Relations, >Association, >Myth, >Experience, >Life, >Causes, >Effect.	Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996
Marginal costs	Ricardo	Rothbard II 84 Marginal costs/Ricardo: (…) as population inexorably increases, and poorer and poorer lands are used, all the differentials keep increasing. Thus, say that, at one point of time, corn lands (which sums up all land) range in productivity from the highest, Land A, through a spectrum down to Land J, which, being marginal, earns a zero rent. But now population increases and farmers have to cultivate more and poorer lands, say K, L, and M. M now becomes the zero-rent land, and Land J now earns a positive rent, equal to the differential between its productivity and that of M. And all the previous infra-marginal lands have their differential rents raised as well. It becomes ineluctably true, therefore, that over time, as population increases, rents, and the proportion of income going to rent, increase as well. Yet, though rent keeps increasing, at the margin it always remains zero, and, as Ricardo put it in a crucial part of his theory, being zero rent does not enter into cost. Put another way: quantity of labour cost, being allegedly homogeneous, is uniform for each product, and profits, being uniform and fairly small throughout the economy, form a part of cost that can be basically neglected. Since the price of every product is uniform, this means that the quantity of labour cost on the highest-cost, or zero-rent, land, uniquely determines the price of corn and of every other agricultural product. Rent, being infra-marginal in Ricardo's assumptions, cannot enter into cost. >Economic rent/Ricardo, >Wages/Ricardo, >Economy/Ricardo. And, paradoxically, while rent keeps rising over time, it remains zero at the margin, and therefore without any impact on costs. RothbardVsRicardo: There are many flaws in this doctrine. 1) (…) even the poorest land in cultivation never earns a zero rent, just as the least productive piece of machinery or worker never earns a zero price or wage. It does not benefit any resource owner to keep his resource or factor in production unless it earns a positive rent. The marginal land, or other resource, will indeed earn less of a rent than more productive factors, but even the marginal land will always earn some positive rent, however small. 2) Second, apart from the zero-rent problem, it is simply wrong to think that rent, or any other factor return, is caused by differentials. Each piece of land, or unit of any factor, earns whatever it produces; differentials are simple arithmetic subtractions between two lands, or other factors, each of which Rothbard II 85 earns a positive rent of its own. The assumption of zero rent at the margin allows Ricardo to obscure the fact that every piece of land earns a productive rent, and allows him to slip into the differential as cause. >Causality/Philosophical theories. 3) (…) in discussing the rise in cost of producing corn, Ricardo reverses cause and effect. Ricardo states that increasing population ‘obliges’ farmers to work land of inferior quality and then causes a rise in its price. But as any utility theory analyst would realize, the causal chain is precisely the reverse: when the demand for corn increases, its price would rise, and the higher price would lead farmers to grow corn on higher-cost land. But this realization, of course, eliminates the Ricardian theory of value and with it the entire Ricardian system. 4) (…) as numerous critics have pointed out, it is certainly not true historically that people always start using the highest-quality land and then sink gradually and inevitably down to more and more inferior land. >Ricardo/Neoclassical Economics.	EconRic I David Ricardo On the principles of political economy and taxation Indianapolis 2004 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Market Anarchism	Liberalism	Gaus I 118 Market Anarchism/tratidional liberalism/Gauss/Mack: The liberty tradition’s doctrinal commitments easily endorse Market Anarchism (Friedman, 1973)⁽¹⁾. Liberty requires private property and a market order (>Order/liberalism, >Property7LIberalism). Gaus I 119 Individualism: desirable order emerges out of individual choices (>Individuals/Liberalism), the market uses the dispersed information of individuals, Coercion: the tradition is deeply sceptical of all coercion to the extent that most coercion is illegitimate, and, crucially, because the liberty tradition rejects an important distinction between public and private morality, the grounds for justified coercion must lie in the rights of private individuals. >Institutions/Liberalism. LockeVsAnarchy: Solution: each would agree to a political society, ‘all private judgement of every particular Member being excluded, the Community comes to be Umpire, by settled standing Rules, indifferent and the same to all Parties’ and where only some have the authority to interpret and enforce these rules (1960⁽²⁾: 342). Marchet AnarchismVsLocke: Market Anarchists, however, do not concede the need for political authority to solve such disagreement. Order: Against Locke, the market anarchist argues that a market regime of multiple, competing, protective agencies will not produce disorder and strife – so long as there is a strong demand for the orderly, peaceful, and just resolution of disputes. If we suppose that people desire the orderly, peaceful, and just resolution of disputes strongly enough that the powers of a >minimal state would be confined to the provision of such resolutions, this very demand for orderly, peaceful, and just resolution of disputes would be strong enough to call forth their market provision. >Society/Market Anarchism. Market Anarchism/traditional liberalism/Gaus/Mack: LiberalismVsAnarchism: A member of the liberty tradition defending some form of government might reply to this anarchist case in two ways. 1) VsAnarchism: (...) the enterprise of producing and delivering the protection of rightful claims is especially subject to natural monopolies or cartelization. Gaus I 120 Monopoly problem: (...) judging and protection are characterized by increasing returns. If it is the case that over the full range of possible outputs, the (n + 1)th unit costs less to produce than did the nth unit, then the larger a provider already is, the less its marginal and average costs. This may well be the case with protection services. If increasing returns hold, a monopolistic provider is apt to arise in a free market. In two ways this takes the sting out of the anarchist’s condemnation of the government’s monopoly (Nozick, 1974⁽³⁾: 52). >Society/Market Anarchism. Cartelization problem: A protective agency will be able to compete effectively in the provision of desired protective services only if it can offer to its clients the enforcement of the rights articulations, rules, procedures, and appeal mechanisms that emerge from agreements among the competing protective agencies. 2) VsAnarchism: a protective agency or confederation of such agencies that aspires to the status of minimal state can more readily permissibly suppress the putatively rights-protecting activities of its competitors than may at first seem to be the case (Nozick, 1974)⁽³⁾. For such an agency or confederation may permissibly suppress activities that pose even a moderate risk of violating rights (at least if it will not be feasible for the boundary crossers to compensate the victims of their violations). >Minimal state/Gauss. 1. Friedman, David (1973) The Machinery of Freedom. New York: Harper and Row. 2. Locke, John (1960) Second Treatise of Government. In Peter Laslett, ed., Two Treatises of Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York: Basic. 4. Cowen, Tyler (1992) 'Law as a public good: the economics of anarchy'. Economics and Philosophy, 8:249—67. Mack, Eric and Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Market Interest Rate	Rothbard	Rothbard III 550 Market Interest Rate /Rothbard: The pure rate, (…) abstracts from any entrepreneurial uncertainty. It gauges the premium of present over future goods on the assumption that the future goods are known as certain to be forthcoming. In the real world, of course, nothing is absolutely certain, and therefore the pure rate of interest (the result of time preference) can never appear alone. >Time preference. Risk: (…) the riskier a given venture appears ex ante, the higher will be the expected interest return that capitalists will require before they make the investment. >Investment/Rothbard. Rothbard III 551 On the market, then, a whole structure of interest rates will be superimposed on the pure rate, varying positively in accordance with the expected risks of each venture. The counterpart of this structure will be a similar variety of interest rates on the loan market, which, as usual, is derivative from the goods market.⁽¹⁾ >Goods/Rothbard, >Market/Rothbard, >Economy/Rothbard. 1. The loan market will diverge from the “natural” market to the extent that conditions for repayment of loans, etc., establish such differences. The two would be the same if the loans were clearly recognized as entrepreneurial, so that in cases where there was no deliberate fraud, the borrower would not be considered criminal if he did not repay the loan. However, if, as discussed in chapter 2 above, there are no bankruptcy laws and defaulting borrowers are considered criminal, then obviously the “safety” of all loans would increase in relation to “natural” investments, and the interest rates on loans would decline accordingly. In the free society, however, there would be nothing to prevent borrowers and lenders from agreeing, at the time the contract is made, that borrowers would not be held criminally responsible and that the loan would really be an entrepreneurial one. Or they could make any sort of arrangement in dividing gains or losses that they might choose.	Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Marketing Research	Rothbard	Rothbard III 979 Marketing research/Rothbard: Advertising/Galbraith: Thesis: (…) wants, (…) are not real or genuine ones; they have been "created" in the populace by advertisers, and their wicked clients, the producing businessmen. The very fact of production, through such advertising, "creates" the supposed wants that it supplies. Rothbard: Galbraith's entire theory of excess affluence rests on this flimsy assertion that consumer wants are artificially created by business itself. >Advertising/Galbraith. Marketing research/RothbardVsGalbraith: Indeed, our view is the only one that makes sense of the increasingly large quantities of money spent by business on marketing research. Why bother investigating in detail what consumers really want, if all one need do is to create the wants for them by advertising? If, in fact, production really created its own demand through advertising, as Galbraith maintains, business would never again have to worry about losses or bankruptcy or a failure to sell automatically any good that it may arbitrarily choose to produce. Certainly there would be no need for marketing research or for any wondering about what consumers will buy. This image of the world is precisely the reverse of what is occurring. Indeed, precisely because people's standards of living are moving ever farther past the subsistence line, businessmen are worrying ever more intensely about what consumers want and what they will buy. It is because the range of goods available to the consumers is expanding so much beyond simple staples needed for subsistence, in quantity, quality, and breadth of product substitutes, that businessmen must compete as never before in paying court to the consumer, in trying to obtain his attention: in Short, in advertising. Increasing advertising is a function of the increasingly effective range of competition for the consumer's favor.^(1),(2) 1. Recent writings by marketing experts on "the marketing revolution" now under way stress precisely this increasing competition for, and courting of, the favor and custom of the consumer. Thus, see Robert J. Keith, "The Marketing Revolution," Journal of Marketing, January, 1960, pp. 35-38; Goldman, "Product Differentiation and Advertising: Some Lessons From Soviet Experience," and Goldman, "Marketing—a Lesson for Marx," Harvard Business Review, January-February, 1960, pp. 79-86. 2. On the alleged powers of business advertising, it is well to note these pungent comments of Ludwig von Mises: „It is a widespread fallacy that skillful advertising can talk the consumers into buying everything that the advertiser wants them to buy.... However, nobody believes that any kind of advertising would have succeeded in making the candlemakers hold the field against the electric bulb, the horse-drivers against the motorcars, the goose quill against the steel pen and later against the fountain pen.“ (Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. p. 317)	Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Markets	Hayek	Gaus I 246 Markets/Hayek/D’Agostino: ‚[T]he cosmos of the market neither is nor could be governed by such a single scale of ends; it serves the multiplicity of separate and incommensurable ends of all its sep- arate members' (1976⁽¹⁾: 108).) D’Agostino: We see it, rather, as a question which is devolved to individuals and mediated by the price mechanism. The answer to the question 'What should be produced and how should it be distributed?' is, then, simply the result, via market mechanisms, of individuals' answers to the question 'What do I want and how willing am I to pay for it?' That (social) option is best, in effect, in which each individual holds as her share of the commodities produced in her society those that she is willing and able to pay for. Other options, in which all individuals, regardless of their own assessments, hold the some 'normal' share of basic commodities or in which individuals' holdings differ but are not 'aligned' to individuals' own payments, are ranked below this particular option by the system which is defined by the principles of liberty of exchange. Cf. >Diversity/Liberalism. (This is the rationale, relative to the ideology of the market, for the principle of 'user pays' which has recently been much applied in commodities, including services, which have traditionally been produced by public sector organizations.) Diversity/D’Agostino: on the account developed here, the market is a (specifically liberal) device for achieving coherence without sacrificing diversity. As Hayek said, 'it is the great advantage of the market that makes agreement on ends unnecessary [representativeness] and a reconciliation of divergent purposes possible [coherence]‘ (1976⁽¹⁾: 112). VsHayek: to be sure, some theorists, across a range of theoretical perspectives, suspect and argue that the sort of 'reconciliation of divergent purposes' which specifically market mechanisms of devolution facilitate in fact works via a covert (and illegitimate) normalization of subjects, and hence does depend, contrary to Hayekian ideology, on a (manipulated) 'agreement on ends'. 1. Hayek, Friedrich (1976) Law, Legislation and Liberty. Vol. 2, The Mirage of Social Justice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications Mause I 71 Market/Hayek: The most important social institutions (such as the market) are not the product of conscious planning, but of unconscious social evolution. And this social evolution must not be hindered, but must be kept open for the development of institutional innovations.	Hayek I Friedrich A. Hayek The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents--The Definitive Edition (The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, Volume 2) Chicago 2007 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Markets	Minimal State	Gaus I 122 Markets/Minimal state/Gaus/Mack: Liberal tradition thesis: Government is justified largely on the grounds of market failure: although the market generally provides for both a free and a prosperous society, it is not perfect (Buchanan, 197⁵⁽¹⁾: ch. 3). Thus the classical liberal political economists of the nineteenth century (...) insisted that the market depended on a political framework that it could not itself provide; the market could not itself provide a coercive public apparatus for the enforcement of property rights and contracts (Robbins, 1961⁽²⁾; Gaus, 1983(3)). Minimal stateVsLiberalism/market anarchismVsLiberalism: Market anarchists and minimal statists may challenge these widely held views. They may argue, 1) first, that coercive state provision of public goods tends to oversupply them, so that it has its own offsetting inefficiencies (Buchanan and Tullock, 1965⁽⁴⁾). And, 2) they may insist, market and contractual arrangements can be envisioned that will yield funding for public goods - especially rights-protective public goods - that is not significantly suboptimal (Buchanan, 1975⁽¹⁾; Narveson, 1988⁽⁵⁾: 238). >Social goods/Minimal state. Minimal stateVsMarket anarchism/Gaus: Advocates of the minimal state that depict it as a natural monopoly seem better positioned to make this argument than are market anarchists. Such a minimal state will, to a considerable degree, be able to tie its clients’ purchase of non-public aspects of rights protection to their also paying for public aspects of rights protection. >Society/Minimal state, >Individuals/Minimal state, >Minimal state/Gaus. 1. Buchanan, James M. (1975) The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2. Robbins, Lord (1961) The Theory of Economic Policy in Classical English Political Economy. London: Macmillan. 3. Gaus, Gerald F. (1983b) ‘Public and private interests in liberal political economy, old and new’. In S. I. Benn and G. F. Gaus, eds, Public and Private in Social Life. New York: St Martins, 183–222. 4. Buchanan, James M. and Gordon Tullock (1965) The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 5. Narveson, Jan (1988) The Libertarian Idea. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Mack, Eric and Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Marx	Höffe	Höffe I 369 Marx/Höffe: Alienation:HöffeVsMarx: It is (...) not wrong to intertwine two concepts of alienation: the socio-psychological alienation, that "someone or something becomes a stranger to you", and the economic-legal alienation, that "someone sells property". But Marx argues the more far-reaching thesis that both alienations are two sides of one and the same process. Because this thesis is neither substantiated nor plausible, the socio-political goal cannot convince that a change in the economic form, the abolition of private property, the socio-psychological change, will bring about the person who is no longer alienated. >Alienation. Changes/HöffeVsMarx: (...) a change in economic form [comes about] only through a change in people. In Hegel's terms, "objective morality", the world of institutions, is only a counterpart to "subjective morality", human responsibility, not a substitute for it. Höffe I 370 In Hegelian terms, [Marx] generally overestimates the weight of the economy over that of law and state within the framework of objective morality. >Customs/Hegel. Theory/HöffeVsMarx: Even a theory that is compelling in argumentative terms cannot produce the corresponding practice itself. For this it needs an essentially practical moment: the approval of the allegedly compelling theory, its recognition. >Practise.	Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016
Maximin Rule	Rawls	I 152 Def Maximin Rule/Rawls: this rule allows us to classify alternatives according to the worst possible result.⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾ I 153 The better possible results are then determined. The starting position of a society to be established: here, however, the participants do not assume that their future place will be determined by a malevolent opponent. The lack of information (by the lurker of ignorance) is not misinformation. >Veil of ignorance, >Society/Rawls. Maximin rule/Rawls: is not generally recommended for decisions under uncertainty, but rather when certain characteristics of a situation are given. In our case, this is the case when it comes to assessing the two principles of justice: I 61 Principles/Rawls: 1. every person must have the same right to the widest possible fundamental freedom, insofar as it is compatible with the same freedom for others. 2. social and economic inequalities shall be arranged in such a way that they (a) are reasonably expectable for everyone's benefit; and (b) are linked to positions and administrative procedures that can be held by anyone. I 156 If freedom (liberty) has priority, this implies that people in the initial situation have no desire for greater income at the expense of freedom. They will not jeopardize the minimum guaranteed by the two principles in lexical order ((s), i. e. that the first principle is ranked before the second principle in time). >Counterarguments. For a counterposition to Rawls see >Utilitarianism - Conterarguments: >VsUtilitarianism. 1. See W. J. Baumol, Economic Theory and Operations Analysis, 2nd. Ed. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1965, ch. 24. 2. R. D. Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decision New York, 1957.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Maximum	Leibniz	Holz I 86 World/totality/Leibniz: the construction of the totality corresponds to the calculus. Maximum: is the infinite set of different substanceialities. (World) Minimum: is the representation of the whole in the individual. (Representation). >Totality/Leibniz, >World/Leibniz, >Infinity/Leibniz, >Representation/Leibniz. I 87 LeibnizVsLocke: the connection of the infinite set of predicates and the idea of infinity as unity: that is the exact opposite of the mere addition of manifold. This excludes the idea of infinity from the range of quantity! There is no "infinite number". Also no infinite line. >Unity/Leibniz.	Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994
Meaning	Ancient Philosophy	Gadamer I 436 Meaning/Ancient Philosophy/Gadamer: The struggle of philosophy and rhetoric for Greek youth education, which was decided with the victory of Attic philosophy, also has this side, that thinking about language becomes a matter of grammar and rhetoric, which have always recognized the ideal of scientific concept formation. Thus the sphere of linguistic meaning begins to detach itself from the things encountered in linguistic formation. The Gadamer I 437 stoic logic speaks first of those incorporeal meanings by which the speaking of things takes place (to lekton). >Language and thought/Ancient philosophy. Topos: It is highly significant that these meanings are put on the same level as topos, i.e. space:⁽¹⁾. Just as empty space only now, in thinking away the things that arrange themselves to each other in it, comes to the condition for thinking⁽²⁾, so also the "meanings" as such are only now thought for themselves and a term is coined for them by thinking away the things mentioned by means of the meaning of the words. The meanings are also like a space in which things are ordered to each other. Such thoughts apparently only become possible when the natural relationship, i.e. the intimate unity of speaking and thinking, is disturbed. Cf. >Language and Thought/Ancient Philosophy, >Language and Thought/Gadamer. 1. Stoic. vet. fragm. Arnim Il, S. 87. 2. Cf. the theory of the diaphragm still rejected by Aristotle (Phys. A 4, 211 b 14ff.)	Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Meaning	Benkler	Benkler I 289 Meaning/cultural meaning/internet culture/advertisement/advertising/Benkler: Culture, symbolism, and meaning, as they are tied with market based goods, become a major focus of advertising and of demand management. No one who has been exposed to the advertising campaigns of Coca-Cola, Nike, or Apple Computers, as well as practically to any one of a broad range of advertising campaigns over the past few decades, can fail to see that these are not primarily a communication about the material characteristics or qualities of the products or services sold by the advertisers. I 290 They are about meaning. These campaigns try to invest the act of buying their products or services with a cultural meaning that they cultivate, manipulate, and try to generalize in the practices of the society in which they are advertising, precisely in order to shape taste. If there is business reason to do anything about culture, it is to try to shape the cultural meaning of an object or practice, in order to shape the demand for it, while keeping the role of culture hidden and assuring control over the careful cultural choreography of the symbols attached to the company. While there is some constitutional free-speech protection for criticism, there is also a basic change in the understanding of trademark law— from a consumer protection law intended to assure that consumers can rely on the consistency of goods marked in a certain way, to a property right in controlling the meaning of symbols a company has successfully cultivated so that they are, in fact, famous. This legal change marks a major shift in the understanding of the role of law in assigning control for cultural meaning generated by market actors. >Cultural Freedom/Benkler, >Cross-cultural communication/Benkler.	Benkler I Yochai Benkler The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom New Haven 2007
Meaning Change	Foucault	II 183 Meaning Change/Concept Change/Discourse/Foucault: e.g. Buffon and Linné speak of "the same thing" by placing themselves at the "same level" or "at this distance", by developing "the same conceptual world" and meeting one another on "the same battlefield". On the other hand: e.g. Darwin and Diderot do not speak of the same thing! The analysis and the positivity of the discourse helps to distinguish this. Positivity of the discourse: the tenacity and backwardness of topics and re-discovered meanings. Thus positivity plays the role of a historical a priori. Not a validity condition for judgments, but reality condition for statements. No formal a priori. >Discourse/Foucault. Def Archive/Foucault: instead of seeing how, in the great mythical book of history, words are juxtaposed with each other, transforming ideas that have been formed before and elsewhere, we have systems in the density of discursive practices that introduce the statements as events and things. All these statements (events and things) are the archive. The archive is at first the law of what can be said. It also means that all these things that have been said do not accumulate infinitely, and do not form a seamless linearity, nor disappear even in accidental external circumstances. Instead that they arrange themselves into distinct figures and connect with one another on the basis of manifold relationships. This causes them not to go back the same step with time, but like stars, can shine most brightly when the furthest away. Archive: defines the system of expressability, the system of functioning. This cannot be described in its totality. Human: our diagnosis establishes that we are differences, that our reason is the difference of discourses, our history is the difference of times, our ego is the difference of masks. Scattering, not origin! Def Archeology: describes the discourses as specified practices in the element of the archive. It is necessary, because the right of the words does not coincide with that of the philologists. But it's not about the search for any beginning. >Archeology/Foucault, >Theory change.	Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981
Meaning Change	Kanitscheider	I 145 Change of meaning/conceptual change/Newton/Einstein/Kanitscheider: the semantic differences are serious: with Newton gravity is active force in passive space with Einstein gravity is the activity of space-time. With Newton the cosmic forces of distant matter are indeterminate or extinguish each other or are in equilibrium, in relativity each point is specific and has specific dynamic properties. Now a subrange can be distinguished where the velocities are small and the gravitational fields are weak, where the two theories give comparable statements. Thus the theories are not separated by an insurmountable semantic gap. >Theory change, >Fragments.	Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Meaning Theory	Foster	I 4 Meaning Theory/m.th./Foster: the meaning theory does not say what is "meaning" but it reveals what conditions it must meet. - Analog: Science theory does not explain what is the concept of a natural law, but it covers the canon of scientific methods. I 6 Meaning Theory/Foster: the extension of "means that p" is not determined by the truth value or the extensional structure of the sentence , which is used for "p". - It is an error to presuppose an intensional idiom for "that means" (presupposes what we are looking for). - Solution: Extension instead of intension. I 7 Meaning Theory/ Foster: examined language L: is about (contingent) facts - metalanguage: uses essentially methodological vocabulary (not contingent) to establish the theorems. I 11 Meaning Theory/truth theory/FosterVsDavidson: the truth condition is determined to set out the specific truth value in all circumstances. - Problem : Tarski: the scheme would correspond to a counterfactual condition "would be true if ... " - but the schema is indicative. I 17 Meaning Theory/Foster: Problem: all T-sentences of the Tarski schema ("Snow is white" is true iff snwo is white) remain true if one uses just something that preserves the truth values and the right side is a translation of the left. - It provides no meaning, only a truth-definition. A meaning Theory can arise when one knows that the conditions are met - i.e. that the truth th. is a meaning theory. I 19 But only if the theory is formulated in the same language as the object language - Because the theory is not really interpreting. Solution/Foster: We need the facts and the knowledge that the facts are truth-theoretical. I 20 Then the meaning theory is a single sentence: q : " a truth theory T in L represents that ... " - I 21 ... if we are aware, we can find out what determines each selected sentence. - This implies the ability to interpret each sentence due to its structure , because it implies to perceive what each element contributes. ( >Compositionality) Per: that is interpretive. Vs: Problem: "notes that" is still intensional! I 22 E.g.* someone who does not know what U denotes, could know the facts that U says . - Problem: if the meaning theory is purely extensional, then it is no longer interpreting. Summary: Meaning theory/Foster: is a meaning theory for an object language L0 in the design of an appropriate range of possible worlds if it exhausts all possible facts that allows our philosophical standpoint. This together with a finite set of axioms true, which provides for each L₀ - sentence S the relevant canonical reformulation of the T-conditional. This would consist of the scheme "(w) (x is true-of-w, if w, then it would be the case that p)" by inserting the structural description (sound, character) of S for "p." Instead of "part-of" relation "material-part-of" is between x and y: if y is a world and x is an ordered pair whose first element is the class of all material things, and whose second element is the class of all ordered pairs of all the tangible things that are in the part-whole relation.	Foster I John A. Foster "Meaning and Truth Theory" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Measurements	Kanitscheider	I 220 Def Measure/Def Define/Kanitscheider: measuring is an empirical process supported by theories, while defining is a conceptual activity carried out within the framework of a theory. The meaning of a theoretical term can only be elucidated by semantic investigation. Measurement assigns numerical values to already metrized quantities with factual reference represented by a particular function. >Operationalism/Kanitscheider. I 229 Measurement/Kanitscheider: Problem: all astronomical distance determinations have always only certain range. So one must work with overlapping measuring chains. "Homogeneity extrapolation: e.g. period luminosity relation of Cepheids, diameter luminosity relation of H II regions and constancy of luminosity of Sc I galaxies. Bsp These models carry into the determination of H0 (age of the universe) a hypothetical element, which one can justify if not empirically, nevertheless rationally. Similarly: Ex Determination of today's acceleration parameter q0 (or brake parameter): is mostly tried to be determined from the dependence between the apparent brightness and the redshift of the galaxies. Problem: to find an object of known standard magnitude at a sufficient distance. Method: to pick the brightest galaxy in a known regular cluster of elliptical galaxies as a "standard candle". But again, the assumption is that the galaxies retain their luminosity over a long time.	Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Media	Ricoeur	II 26 Media/writing/text/Ricoeur: The most obvious change from speaking to writing concerns the relation between the message and its medium or channel. At first glance, it concerns only this relation, but upon closer examination, the first alteration irradiates in every direction, affecting in a decisive manner all the factors and functions. It is because discourse only exists in a temporal and present instance of discourse that it may flee as speech or be fixed as writing. Because the event appears and disappears, there is a problem of fixation, of inscription. What we want to fix is discourse, not language as II 27 langue. > href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=2602993&a=$a&first_name=Paul&author=Ricoeur&concept=Discourse">Discourse/Ricoeur, >Langue/Ricoeur, >Dialogque/Ricoeur. Fixation: It is only by extension that we fix by inscription the alphabet, the lexicon, and the grammar, all of which serve that which alone is to be fixed: discourse. The atemporal system of language neither appears or disappears, it simply does not happen. Only discourse is to be fixed, because discourse as event disappears. Inscription: What we write, what we inscribe is the noema of the act of speaking, the meaning of the speech event, not the event as event. >Writing/Ricoeur. Literature: [When] is human thought directly brought to writing without the intermediary'stage of spoken language[,] [t]hen writing takes the place of speaking. A kind of short-cut occurs between the meaning of discourse and the material medium. II 29 The best way to measure the extent of this substitution is to look at the range of changes which occur among the other components of the communication process. >Literature/Ricoeur.	Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976
Memory	Minsky	Münch III 113 Memory/Minsky: memory is not separated from thinking; it uses the same strategies. Effective searching (and finding) can therefore not be innate! It must depend on one's own knowledge. Problem: Only a little can be retrieved, which is not already embedded in a framework. Marvin Minsky, “A framework for representing knowledge” in: John Haugeland (Ed) Mind, design, Montgomery 1981, pp. 95-128 Minsky I 35 Memory/software agents/Minsky: People often think of memory in terms of keeping records of the past, for recollecting things that happened in earlier times. But agencies also need other kinds of memory as well. See, for example, requires some sort of temporary memory in order to keep track of what next to do, when it starts one job before its previous job is done. If each of “See's” [a software agent for vision tasks] agents could do only one thing at a time, it would soon run out of resources and be unable to solve complicated problems. But if we have enough memory, we can arrange our agents into circular loops and thus use the same agents over and over again to do parts of several different jobs at the same time. >Hierarchies/Minsky, >Conflicts/Minsky, >Learning/Minsky. Minsky I 62 Memory/Minsky: Our memories are only indirectly linked to physical time. We have no absolute sense of when a memorable event actually happened. At best, we can only know some temporal relations between it and certain other events. You might be able to recall that X and Y occurred on different days but be unable to determine which of those days came earlier. And many memories seem not to be linked to intervals of time at all — like knowing that four comes after three, or that I am myself. >Now/Minsky, >Experience/Minsky. I 82 Memory/Terminology/Minsky: Whenever you get a good idea, solve a problem, or have a memorable experience, you activate a K-line to represent it. Def K-Line/Minsky: A K-line is a wirelike structure that attaches itself to whichever mental agents are active when you solve a problem or have a good idea. When you activate that K-line later, the agents attached to it are aroused, putting you into a mental state much like the one you were in when you solved that problem or got that idea. (…) we memorize what we're thinking about by making a list of the agents involved in that activity. Example/Kenneth Haase: You want to repair a bicycle. Before you start, smear your hands with red paint. Then every tool you need to use will end up with red marks on it. When you're done, just remember that red means ‘good for fixing bicycles.’ Next time you fix a bicycle, you can save time by taking out all the red-marked tools in advance. If you use different colors for different jobs, some tools will end up marked with several colors. Problem: suppose you had tried to use a certain wrench, and it didn't fit. It wouldn't be so good to paint that tool red. To make our K-lines work efficiently, we'd need more clever policies. I 83 P-agents: were used before in solving a problem. Q-agents: are agents of your recent thoughts. Problem: (…) we wouldn't want our memories to re-arouse old states of mind so strongly that they overwhelm our present thoughts — for then we might lose track of what we're thinking now and wipe out all the work we've done. We only want some hints, suggestions, and ideas. >Levels/Minsky. I 154 Memory/Minsky: It's hard to distinguish memories from memories of memories. Indeed, there's little evidence that any of our adult memories really go way back to infancy; what seem like early memories may be nothing more than reconstructions of our older thoughts. Then what do we mean by memory? Our brains use many different ways to store the traces of our pasts. No single word can describe so much, unless it is used only in a general, informal sense. Artificial intelligence/memory/Minsky: Memories are processes that make some of our agents act in much the same ways they did at various times in the past. I 155 We like to think of memories as though they could restore to us things we've known in the past. But memories can't really bring things back; they only reproduce some fragments of our former states of mind, when various sights, sounds, touches, smells, and tastes affected us. The Immanence Illusion: Whenever you can answer a question without a noticeable delay, it seems as though that answer were already active in your mind. >Present/Minsky. I 156 Kinds of Memory: A brain has no single, common memory system. Instead, each part of the brain has several types of memory-agencies that work in somewhat different ways, to suit particular purposes. I 157 Representation/Minsky: rearrangements of memory: E.g. what would we need to imagine moving things around a room? First we'd need some way to represent how objects are arranged in space. (…) we could use the following simple four-step script: 1. Store the state of A in M-1. 2. Store the state of B in M-2. 3. Use M-2 to determine the state of A. 4. Use M-1 to determine the state of B. A memory-control script like this can work only if we have memory-units that are small enough to pick out couch-sized portions of the larger scene. M-1 and M-2 would not do the job if they could store only descriptions of entire rooms. In other words, we have to be able to connect our short-term memories only to appropriate aspects of our current problems. Learning such abilities is not simple, and perhaps it is a skill some people never really master. Our pair-exchanging script needs more machinery. Because each memory-unit must wait until the previous step is finished, the timing of each script step may have to depend on various condition sensors. >Representation/Minsky. I 158 Organization of memory/Minsky: We'll assume that every substantial agency has several micromemory-units, each of which is a sort of temporary K-line (>Terminology/Minsky) that can quickly store or restore the state of many of the agents in that agency. There is good evidence that, in human brains, the processes that transfer information into long-term memory are very slow, requiring time intervals that range from minutes to hours. Accordingly, most temporary memories are permanently lost. >Artificial Consciousness/Minsky.	Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992
Mental States	Davidson	I (b) 30 Twin Earth/Davidson: Subjective states do not arise as a consequence of the state of the brain or the nervous system. I (b) 35 False theory: the objects would be the meanings of sentences (Vs), that is, the >propositions. DavidsonVs: with this, it would be so arranged that, e.g. if a Frenchman attributed the same state of consciousness to Paul as I do, the same subject would be named by us both, whereas this would not be the case in the theory under consideration, for the sentence in question of the Frenchman would not be the same as mine (falsely). It should not concern us that the Frenchman and I use different words, it is similar to ounces and carats. (> Measuring). My monism is ontological: it asserts that mental events and objects can also be described as physical. >">Anomalous Monism. I (e) 99 Mind/Davidson: if we consider the subjective or mental exclusively as a consequence of the physical characteristics of a person, meanings cannot be something purely subjective or mental. (Putnam: Meanings are not in the head). Frank I 626 Mind/Davidson: does not work without language, both equal. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica 38 (1984), 101-111 - - - Frank I 657ff Mental states/external attribution/Davidson: "narrow" state/twin earth: "inner", is solipsistic, as in Descartes. The narrow states are the same for the twin earth. BurgeVsPutnam: they do not exist. SearleVsPutnam: narrow states are unnecessary, ordinary propositional attitudes suffice. DavidsonVsSearle/VsBurge: ordinary mental states are narrow (internal) and at the same time "non-individualistic", i.e. externally identifiable. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58	Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Mergers	Rothbard	Rothbard III 643 Mergers/Rothbard: Mergers have been denounced as "monopolistic," but not nearly as vehemently as have cartels. ers have been denounced as "monopolistic," but not nearly as vehemently as have cartels. Merging firms pool their capital assets, and the owners of the individual firms now become part owners of the Single merged firm. They will agree on rules for the exchange ratios of the shares of the different companies. If the merging firms encompass the entire industry, then a merger is simply a permanent form of cartel. >Cartels/Rothbard, >Monopolies. Yet clearly the only difference between a merger and the original forming of a single corporation is that the merger pools existing capital goods assets, while the original birth of a corporation pools money assets. It is clear that, economically, there is little difference between the two. A merger is the action of individuals with a certain quantity of already produced capital goods, adjusting themselves to their present and expected future conditions by cooperative pooling of assets. The formation of a new company is an adjustment to expected future conditions (before any specific investment has been made in capital goods) by cooperative pooling of assets. The essential similarity lies in the voluntary pooling of assets in a more centralized organization for the purpose of increasing monetary income. The theorists who attack cartels and monopolies do not recognize the identity of the two actions. >Corporations/Rothbard. Rothbard III 644 Merger/cartel/Rothbard: Yet an industry-wide merger is, in effect, a permanent cartel, a permanent combination and fusion. On the other hand, a cartel that maintains by voluntary agreement the separate identity of each firm is by nature a highly transitory and ephemeral arrangement and (…) generally tends to break up on the market. In fact, in many cases, a cartel can be considered as simply a tentative step in the direction of permanent merger. And a merger and the original formation of a corporation do not (…) essentially differ. The former is an adaptation of the size and number of firms in an industry to new conditions or is the correction of a previous error in forecasting. The latter is a de novo attempt to adapt to present and future market conditions.	Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Metalanguage	Genz	II 210 Meta language/addition/algorithm/sum/Gauss/Genz: the sum of the numbers from 1 to 100 is 5050 = 101 x 50: Example 1 to 10: 1+2+3+4+5+6+7+8+9+10 = (1+10)+(2+9)+(3+8)+(4+7)+(5+6) = 11+11+11+11+11 = 5 x 11 = 55 The sum can be rearranged in such a way that the result of the addition is independent of the sequence of the numbers due to the algorithm. N.B.: this is a statement about the results of additions, in meta-language. >Object language. II 211 Meta language/blackening/characters/formalisms/Hofstadter/Genz: Example for a purely typographical derivation: if 0+0=0, 1+0= 1 etc. as well as 1 = 1 is specified, you can add 1 + x = 1 + x for any x. Derivation/Formalism/Genz: that negative numbers must be excluded here has no significance for formalism and cannot be used to justify derivations within it. >Derivation, >Derivability. >Formalization. Hofstadter/Genz: Hofstadter uses the successor relation SS0 instead of 2, so no meanings crept in. Evidence/Hofstadter: evidence is something informal. The result of reflection. Formalisation/Hofstadter: formalisation serves to logically defend intuitions. Derivation/Hofstadter: derivation artificially produced an equivalent of the evidence... II 212 ...that makes the logical structure explicit. Simplicity/derivation/Hofstadter: it may be that myriads of steps are necessary, but the logical structure turns out to be quite simple. >Simplicity. Meaning/Genz: the infinite sequence of the above statements is summed up in the sentence that all numbers, if multiplied by 0, remain unchanged. N.B.: however, this is not based on the meaning of the symbols, but only on the typographic derivation rules of the object language. Meta language/Genz: it is an insight into formalism that guarantees that all tokens are true. Object language: be so that the above generalization ("all numbers, multiplied by 0, remain unchanged") can be formulated in it, but cannot be derived. 1st meta-language: here it can be derived. It contains complete induction. 2nd meta-language: here it cannot be derived, but its negation! (see below) Both meta languages contain the object language. Therefore, the consequences can be derived from them. II 213 Object language: not all true sentences can be derived in the object language. Solution: we add the sentence to the language ourselves, then it is true as well as (trivially) derivable. N.B.: in the second meta-language, which is incompatible with the first, its negation can be added instead of the sentence without creating a contradiction. 2nd meta-language: the 2nd meta-language forces the occurrence of "unnatural" numbers, which cannot be represented as successors of 0.⁽¹⁾ 1. Douglas Hofstadter (2008). Gödel, Escher, Bach. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. p. 240.	Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002
Metaphors	Gärdenfors	I 34 Metaphor/Gärdenfors: by distinguishing between dimensional and meronomic (part-whole-) relations, we can explain the difference between metaphors and metonymies. --- I 39 Metaphor/domains/terminology domain/Gärdenfors: it is natural to assume that a metaphor expresses an identity of the structure between two domains. Here, a word representing a particular pattern in one domain is used in another domain to represent the same pattern. See Invariance Principle/Lakoff: (Lakoff 1993, p. 215).⁽¹⁾ --- I 40 What is transmitted is rather the pattern than the domain-specific information. N.B.: thus the metaphor can be used to identify a structure in a domain that would otherwise not have been discovered. Thus, metaphors convey new knowledge. --- I 247 Metaphors/Gärdenfors: a metaphor does not come alone: it compares not only two terms, but also the structure of two complete (conceptual) spaces. Once the connection is established, it can serve as the source of new metaphors. (See also Lakoff & Johnson (1980)⁽²⁾, Tourangeau & Sternberg (1982)⁽³⁾, Gärdenfors (2000, sec. 5.4)).⁽⁴⁾ Metaphorical illustrations involve complete conceptual spaces. Properties/Metaphor/Fernandez: Thesis: the interpretation of metaphors emphasizes some properties and suppresses less important properties. (Fernández, 2007, p. 334).⁽⁵⁾ 1. Lakoff, G. (1993). The contemporary theory of metaphor. In A. Ortony (Ed.), Metaphor and thought (2nd ed., pp. 202–251). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 3. Tourangeau, R., & Sternberg, R. J. (1982). Understanding and appreciating metaphors. Cognition, 11, 203–244. 4. Gärdenfors, P. (2000). Conceptual spaces: The geometry of thought. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 5. Fernández, P. R. (2007). Suppression in metaphor interpretation: Differences between meaning selection and meaning construction. Journal of Semantics, 24, 345–371.	Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014
Metaphysical Possibility	Stalnaker	I 64 Metaphysically necessary/metaphysical possibility/Lewis/Stalnaker: that means: if you have a range of all possibilities, you can quantify with them. The modal operators are then the quantifiers. >Quantifiers, >Domains, >Quantification. Error: one can also be mistaken, but only about how one should understand a sentence - not about how a possible situation would have to be. >Understanding, >Conditions, >Verificationism. I 102 Def metaphysically possible world/metaphysically possible/Stalnaker: metaphysically possible are all possible worlds. ((s) They are not a particular subset of all possible worlds, metaphysical is not something "special".) Stalnaker: If a world is not metaphysically possible, it is impossible. If there are metaphysical laws, then they are contingent. >Impossible world, >Contingency. I 102 Metaphysically possible/metaphysical possibility/epistemic/Kripke/Stalnaker: Kripke: there are epistemic possibilities that are metaphysically impossible, e.g. that water is not H₂O, e.g. that Charles is not the son of Elizabeth II. Kripke: but these are metaphysical possibilities in other descriptions. I 167 Metaphysically possible/Kripke/Stalnaker: e.g. Shakespeare did not have to write any of his works - but he could not have been anything other than a human being. He could not have had other parents than the ones he had (essentialism). >Essentialism. I 168 Some VsKripke: Shakespeare could have had some properties counterfactually, but not all. >Properties, >Counterfactuals.	Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Method	Gadamer	I 295 Method/Gadamer: Understanding itself is not so much to be thought of as an act of subjectivity, but rather as an engagement with an event of tradition in which past and present are constantly communicated. This is what has to come into play in hermeneutic theory, which is far too much dominated by the idea of a procedure, i.e. a method. >Cultural Transmission, >Interpretation/Gadamer. I 300 Method/Hermeneutics/Gadamer: [A Tension] plays between the strangeness and familiarity that tradition has for us, between the historically meant, distant representationalism and belonging to a tradition. In this in-between is the true place of hermeneutics. From the intermediate position in which hermeneutics has to take its stand, it follows that its task is not at all to develop a procedure of understanding, but to clarify the conditions under which understanding occurs. >Hermeneutics/Gadamer. However, these conditions are by no means all of the kind of "procedure" or method, so that one as the one who understands them is able to apply them of his own accord - they must I 301 rather be given. The prejudices that occupy the interpreter's consciousness are not as such at his or her free disposal. He or she is not able to separate in advance of his or her own accord the productive prejudices that make understanding possible from those prejudices that prevent understanding and lead to misunderstandings. >Prejudice, >Understanding. I 304 Method/Gadamer: GadamerVsHistorism: The naivety of so-called historism consists in the fact that it evades (...) reflection ((s) on its own preconditions) and, trusting in the methodology of its procedure, forgets its own historicity. ((s) Since methods must be capable of generalization, they cannot be designed for changeability from the outset). >Historism. Graeser I 85 Gadamer / Graeser: Truth and Method (1965) - Vs contrast between systematics and history - undermines the distinction between creation and context of justification. - Sellars ditto: has no secured bank. - Truth: is then not the ultimate, but what you do with it. -> Pragmatism.	Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002
Method	Hobbes	Adorno XIII 241 Method/Deduction/Hobbes/Adorno: the method of Hobbes itself - which is strange in such a consistent nominalist - was Cartesian deductive. It was less a purely inductive method, as one would have expected it in a thinker who, as the true being, could only accept the individual and the concept of self-withdrawal. > Materialism/Adorno, System/Adorno, Principles.	Hobbes I Thomas Hobbes Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Method	Luhmann	AU Cas 11 Observation/system/separation/method/Luhmann: an observer can observe operations and define it as a unit, which run psychologically and socially at the same time. However, it is methodologically strange: he can identify how it appears to him naturally. - It would simply be unnatural to separate the systems. Which seems to be a contradiction to the entire system theory. >System/Luhmann, >System theory, >Observation/operation/Luhmann. Solution/Luhmann: clarify what is actually an observer. Solution: there is someone who chooses theories. With that the observer occurs in his own theory again. - This is a cycle or somersault. Cf. >Circular reasoning. Question: Is it the everyday world or the science which determines the theory choice? Durkheim: Social Emergence: you can explain social facts only by social facts.	AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997
Method	Moscovici	Haslam I 95 Method/Moscovici: In their afterimage studies Moscovici and Personnaz (1980)⁽¹⁾ had the novel idea of setting out to show that, in contrast to a majority, a numerical minority could change the way people see the world (in this case colours) even though they would be unaware of this change. Haslam I 94 (Moscovici et al. 1969⁽²⁾): In these ‘blue-green’ experiments, groups of up to six naïve participants sat in front of a screen and viewed a series of blue slides that varied in their light intensity. After each slide, each participant was asked, in turn, to name aloud the colour of that slide. When all the participants had named the colour of the slide, the next slide was presented. Under these conditions, virtually everybody called the slides ‘blue’, showing that they were perceived as being unambiguously blue. However, in some experimental conditions, a numerical minority within the group (two of the six group members) were confederates of the experimenter and gave pre-agreed responses. In this case they replied ‘green’ to the slides – a response that was clearly different from that of the naïve participants. Through the use of a clever methodological technique, the afterimage studies were able to examine people’s perceptions of colours beyond what they publicly said but at a more latent and unconscious level. Haslam I 96 Problem: these studies were unable to examine the impact of the minority on a more latent/private level of influence. This is because only one type of response was measured, namely the slide colour (manifest influence), and no measure of latent influence was taken. Critically, then, such studies cannot tell us whether participants’ private judgments were also affected by the minority. Haslam I 97 Afterimage/experiment/Moscovici: (Moscovici and Personnaz (1980⁾⁽¹⁾) The afterimage judgment was obtained by participants viewing a white screen, after looking at the blue slide, on which an afterimage briefly developed. Afterimage responses were recorded on a nine-point scale (1 = yellow, 2 = yellow/orange, 3 = orange, 4 = orange/red, 5 = red, 6 = red/pink, 7 = pink, 8 = pink/purple, 9 = purple). In fact, the same slide, which was unambiguously blue, was used throughout the experiment. The experiment had four phases, with each phase consisting of a number of trials or presentations of a slide. Gender/Moscovici: Moscovici argued that he preferred to use women as confederates and participants in his blue-green studies ‘because of their greater involvement in evaluating the colour of an object’ (Moscovici et al., 1969⁽²⁾: 368). Haslam I 102 VsMoscovici: no evidence has been found for influence at the manifest or public level. Haslam I 103 Most studies (> href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=2162428&a=$a&first_name=&author=Psychological%20Theories&concept=Moscovici">Moscovici/Psychological theories) report that on only very few occasions do participants agree with the confederate that the slide is green. However, it should be noted that the paradigm was primarily designed to examine latent/private influence, and there is robust support from other research that majorities have a greater impact on the manifest/public level (Martin and Hewstone, 2008)⁽³⁾. 1. Moscovici, S. and Personnaz, B. (1980) ‘Studies in social influence: V. Minority influence and conversion behavior in a perceptual task’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 16: 270–82. 2. Moscovici, S., Lage, E. and Naffrechoux, M. (1969) ‘Influence of a consistent minority on the response of a majority in a color perception task’, Sociometry, 32: 365–80. 3. Martin, R. and Hewstone, M. (2008) ‘Majority versus minority influence, message processing and attitude change: The Source-Context-Elaboration Model’, in M. Zanna (ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 40: 237–326. Robin Martin and Miles Hewstone, “Minority Influence. Revisiting Moscovici’s blue-green afterimage studies”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Method	Neo-Keynesianism	Harcourt I 176 Method/Neo-Keynesianism/Harcourt: (…) Bhaduri [1969]⁽¹⁾: Suppose that r and w are given from outside as r and vv, i.e. are constants. This is what the chain index method of measuring capital provides, for it gives a 'quantity' of capital from which the effects of changes in the values of w and r have been removed. >Method/Champernowne. Bhaduri: Then totally differentiating q = rk + w gives dq = rdk so that r = dq/dk. In a general equilibrium model with fixed, i.e. equilibrium prices, the marginal product of aggregate capital is equal to the rate of interest (determined in conjunction with either the consumers' or the government's rate of time preference) but this relates only to one point: see, for example, Swan [1956⁽²⁾]. That is to say, this is true of any point, i.e. stationary state, but, as Swan also argues, no one point may be compared with another because a different equilibrium dollar's work of capital is implied at each: see Swan [1956]⁽²⁾ (…). Laing: (Laing [1969b]⁽³⁾ demonstrates this proposition in terms of an intertemporal production function.) As we have seen, it is the assumption (or the deduction) of the fixity of relative prices which is one key - and which is challenged most keenly by Pasinetti, Garegnani - and Joan Robinson. >L.L. Pasinetti, >P.Garegnani, >Joan Robinson. 1. Bhaduri, A. [1969] 'On the Significance of Recent Controversies on Capital Theory: A Marxian View', Economic Journal, LXXIX, pp. 532-9. 2. Swan, T. W. [1956] 'Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation', Economic Record, xxxn, pp. 334-61. 3. Laing, N. F. [1969b] 'Trade, Growth and Distribution. A Study in the Theory of the Long Run', Adelaide: unpublished monograph, 2nd edition.	Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972
Mind	Chalmers	I 11 Mind/Chalmers: conscious experience is not all there is to the mind. Cognitive sciences has had almost nothing to say about consciousness, but about mind in general as the internal basis of behaviour. >Cognitive psychology, >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Behavior. Mind/Chalmers: a) phenomenal concept of mind: the conscious experience of mental states. That is what I will concentrate on. >Spirit, >Mental states, >Experience. b) The psychological concept as a causal or explanatory basis of behaviour. ChalmersVsDescartes: Descartes may have been partly responsible for a conflation of the two concepts. >R. Descartes, >Causal Explanation. I 14 Mind/Psychology/Ryle/Chalmers: in philosophy, the shift in emphasis form the phenomenal to the psychological was codified by Gilbert Ryle (1949) ⁽¹⁾ who argued that all our mental concepts can be analysed in terms of certain kinds of associated behaviour, or in terms of dispositions to behave in certain ways (E. g. Lycan 1987 ⁽²⁾). >G. Ryle, >Dispositions. ChalmersVsRyle: Ryle intended all mental concepts to fall within the grasp of his analysis. It seems to me that this view is a nonstarter as an analysis of our phenomenal concepts such as sensation and consciousness itself. >Sensation. But Ryle’s analysis provided a suggestive approach to many other mental notions, such as believing, enjoying, wanting, pretending and remembering. >Memory, >Thinking, >Desires, >Beliefs. ChalmersVsRyle: technical problems: 1. It is natural to suppose that mental states cause behaviour, but if mental states are themselves behavioural then it is hard to see how they could do the job. >Weakness of will. 2. it was argued (Chisholm, 1957 ⁽³⁾, Geach, 1957 ⁽⁴⁾) that no mental state could be defined by a single range of behavioural dispositions, independent of any other mental states. E.g. if one believes that it is raining, one’s behavioural dispositions will vary depending on whether one has the desire to get wet. It is therefore necessary to invoke other mental states in characterizing the behavioural dispositions. (GeachVsRyle, ChisholmVsRyle). >P. Geach, >R. Chisholm. 1. G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, Oondon 1949 2. W. G. Lycan, Consciousness, Cambridge 1987 3. R. Chisholm, Perceiving Ithaca, NY, 1957 4. P. Geach, Mental Acts, London 1957	Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Mind	Minsky	Minsky I 42 Mind/artificial intelligence/AI/Minsky: How do we control our minds? Ideally, we first choose what we want to do, then make ourselves do it. But that's harder than it sounds: we spend our lives in search of schemes for self-control. We celebrate when we succeed, and when we fail, we're angry with ourselves for not behaving as we wanted to — and then we try to scold or shame or bribe ourselves to change our ways. But wait! How could a self be angry with itself? Who would be mad at whom? >Self/Minsky, >Soul/Minsky. What makes us use such roundabout techniques to influence ourselves? Why be so indirect, inventing misrepresentations, fantasies, and outright lies? Why can't we simply tell ourselves to do the things we want to do? To understand how something works, one has to know its purposes. One function of the Self is to keep us from changing too rapidly. Each person must make some long-range plans in order to balance single-purposeness against attempts to do everything at once. But it is not enough simply to instruct an agency to start to carry out our plans. We also have to find some ways to constrain the changes we might later make — to prevent ourselves from turning those plan-agents off again! If we changed our minds too recklessly, we could never know what we might want next. We'd never get much done because we could never depend on ourselves.	Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003
Minority Rights	Political Philosophy	Gaus I 253 Minority rights/Political Philosophy/Kukathas: [Will] Kymlicka's⁽¹⁾ defence of group-differentiated rights immediately raised a range of questions and problems, and the literature on multiculturalism over the past decade has tackled many of them. >Minority rights/Kymlicka. Group rights: The first issue to be addressed was the question of whether groups could properly be the bearers of rights. To some it was plain that they could not: only individuals could have rights (Narveson, 1991⁽²⁾; Hartney, 1991⁽³⁾). According to one view, groups were fictitious entities - and fictitious entities could not be rights bearers (Graf, 1994⁽⁴⁾: 194). Yet in spite of such reservations, political theory has in recent years (with the rise of multiculturalism) become much more sympathetic to the idea of group rights. History: Even before multiculturalism acquired its current prominence, however, some philosophers had already advanced accounts of group rights. Joseph Raz (1986⁽⁵⁾: 207—8), for example, in his influential account of rights leaves space for collective rights. Larry May (1987⁽⁶⁾: 180), while remaining cautious about the extent to which groups should be recognized as rights holders, argued that moral theorists needed to examine more closely the actions and interests of social groups as possible bearers of rights and responsibilities. And Frances Svensson (1979)⁽⁷⁾ had earlier suggested that group rights were needed to do justice to the claims of native peoples. VsMulticulturalism: Nonetheless, theorists (or critics) of multiculturalism did not always mean the same thing when they invoked group rights or 'cultural' rights. Levy: The most helpful elucidation of the different kinds of rights claims made on behalf of cultural groups was offered by Jacob Levy (1997⁽⁸⁾: 24—5), who distinguished eight categories of rights. >Cultural Rights/Levy. Group rights: The consensus of opinion is that it is quite possible for groups to have rights, or for rights to be accorded both to groups and to individuals on the basis of identity. A group may hold a right as an independently recognized entity; and individuals may hold particular rights because they are members of particular collectivities. Problems: Nonetheless, this issue has remained controversial because of the implications of granting rights on the basis of group membership. >Group rights. Freedom/oppression: As Peter Jones put it, 'Group rights are often articulated as demands for group freedom, but they are also feared as vehicles for group oppression' (1999⁽⁹⁾: 354). VsRaz: Thus Raz's view of group rights, though widely accepted (Brett, 1991⁽¹⁰⁾; Freeman, 1995⁽¹¹⁾; Margalit and Halbertal, 1994⁽¹²⁾), has been criticized for being too capacious in as much as it identifies groups as no more than collectivities of individuals who share nothing more enduring than an interest in a matter (Réaume, 1988⁽¹³⁾; 1994⁽¹⁴⁾; Jones, 1999⁽⁹⁾: 359). Content/education/problems: The demands of some groups for rights in the form of exemptions, for example, have generated a substantial debate about the implications of such special rights. This debate becomes especially vigorous, however, when particular issues become salient: religion, education, and children. Children/religion: While most liberal defenders of multiculturalism have been ready to grant cultural minorities the right to live by their own beliefs, children and education have raised special problems. For many, the limits of multiculturalism are set by the need to protect the interests of children, which override even the rights of parents or communities to inculcate their own religious beliefs. >Religion, >Religious belief, >Multiculturalism. 1. Kymlicka, Will (1995a) Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Narveson, Jan (1991) 'Collective rights?' Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 4: 329—45. 3. Hartney, Michael (1991) 'Some confusions concerning collective rights'. Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 4: 293-314. 4. Graf, James A. (1994) 'Human rights, peoples, and the right to self-determination'. In Judith Baker, ed., Gmup Rights. Toronto: Umversity of Toronto Press, 186—214. 5. Raz, Joseph (1986) The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon. 6. May, Larry (1987) The Morality of Gmups: Collective Responsibility, Group-Based Harm, and Corporate Rights. Notre Dame, In: University of Notre Dame Press. 7. Svensson, Frances (1979) 'Liberal democracy and group rights: the legacy of individualism and its impact on American Indian tribes'. Political Studies, 23 (3): 421-39. 8. Levy, Jacob (1997) 'Classifying cultural rights'. In Will Kymlicka and Ian Shapiro, eds, Ethnicity and Group Rights: NOMOS xxwx New York: New York University Press, 22—66. 9. Jones, Peter (1999) 'Group rights and group oppression'. Journal ofP01itica1 Philosophy, 7 (4): 353-77. 10. Brett, Nathan (1991) 'Language laws and collective rights'. Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 4: 347_60. 11. Freeman, Michael (1995) 'Are there collective human rights?' Political Studies, Special Issue, 43: 25—40. 12. Margalit, Avishai and Moshe Halbertal (1994) 'Liberalism and the right to culture'. Social Research, 61: 491-510. 13. Réaume, Denise G. (1988) 'Individuals, groups, and rights to public goods'. University of Toronto Law Journal, 38: 1-27. 14.Réaume, Denise G. (1994) 'The group right to linguistic security: Whose right? What duties?' In Judith Baker ed., Gmup Rights. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 118-41. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Modal Logic		Modal logic: the modal logic is an extension of classical logic to systems in which possibility and necessity can also be expressed. Different approaches use operators to express "necessary" and "possible", which, depending on the placement within formulas, can let claims of different strengths win. E.g. there is an object which necessarily has the property F/it is necessary that there is an object with the property F. The introduction of possible worlds makes quantification possible for expressing possibility (There is at least one world in which ...) and necessity (For all worlds is valid ...). See also operators, quantifier, completion, range, possible worlds.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Modal Operators		Modal Operators: modal operators are symbols for expressing possibility and necessity. These operators do not belong to classical logic, but fall into the field of modal logic. Their placement at the beginning or in the course of formulas determines the relative strength of statements that can be obtained from the interpretation of these formulas. See also range, stronger/weaker, modal logic, possible worlds.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Modal Properties	Putnam	I (g) 189 Nature/essence/Kripke: e.g. statue: the statue and the piece of clay are two items. The fact that the piece of clay has a modal property, namely, "to be a thing that might have been spherical" is missing in the statue. VsKripke: that sounds initially odd: e.g. when I put the statue on the scale, do I measure then two objects? E.g. it is equally strange to say that a human being is not identical with the aggregation of its molecules. Intrinsic Properties/Putnam: e.g. suppose, there are "intrinsic connections" to my thoughts to external objects: then there is perhaps a spacetime region in my brain with quantity-theoretical connections with an abstract object which includes some external objects. >Intrinsic, >Extrinsic. Then this spacetime region will have a similar quantity-theoretical connection with other abstract entities that contain other external objects. Then the materialist can certainly say that my "thoughts" include certain external objects intrinsically, by identifying these thoughts with a certain abstract entity. Problem: if this identification should be a train of reality itself, then there must be real essences in the world in a sense that the set theory cannot explain. Nature/essential properties/PutnamVsKripke: Kripke's ontology presupposes essentialism, it cannot serve to justify it. >Essentialism, >Essence. I (g) 190 Term/possible world/Putnam: modern semantics: functions about possible worlds represent terms, e.g. the term "this statue" unequals the phrase "this piece of clay". PutnamVsPossible Worlds: question: in the actual world, is there an object to which one of these terms significantly and the other only accidentally applies to? Possible worlds provide too many objects. PutnamVsKripke/PutnamVsEssentialism: Kripke's ontology presupposes essentialism, it cannot justify it. Modal properties are not part of the materialistic means of the world but Kripke individuated objects by their modal properties. Essential Properties/Putnam: I have not shifted them into "parallel worlds" but instead into possible states of the actual world (other liquid than H₂0 water) which is insofar essentialist that we have thus discovered the nature of water. We just say water should not be anything else (intention). That is our use and not "built into the world" (intrinsic, Kripke ditto). VsMaterialism: this does not help the semantic reading because it presupposes reference (materialism wants to win reference from "intrinsic" causal relationship). >Materialism, >Reference, >intrinsic.	Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Modalities	Lewis	IV 37 Relative modality/Lewis: limited to areas of possible worlds. Necessity/possibility: are just the dual pair of relative arrangements whose characteristic relation is the two-digit general (universal) relation between worlds. >Possible world/Lewis, >Necessity/Lewis, >Possibility/Lewis, >Identity across worlds, cf. >Counterpart theory/Lewis.	Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Model Bias	Climatology	Edwards I 457 Model bias/climatology/Edwards: Though the injection of observational data continually corrects the analysis, the models continually “pull” in the direction of their inherent biases. These small biases do not much affect skill in the short time periods addressed by forecasters, but in reanalysis over decades model bias asserts itself. For example, for the first years of satellite observations the ECMWF (European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts) ERA-40 assimilation model exhibits a cold bias in the lower stratosphere, and other discrepancies in the southern hemisphere below 45°S.⁽¹⁾ Example: a) (…) a biased model systematically reaches toward a higher value. Each time observations are injected, they pull the result back toward the atmosphere’s actual state, but over time the model bias produces a markedly higher trend - more so when observations are less frequent. b) (…) both model and observations are unbiased. The model still drifts, but now its fluctuations are more randomly distributed around the real state of the atmosphere, producing a more accurate trend calculation over time. Statistical and empirical corrections can make reanalysis more accurate, but the underlying problem is not likely to be fully resolved.⁽²⁾ >Homogenization/climatology, >Reanalysis/climatology, >Climate data/Edwards. 1. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 270. 2. D. P. Dee, “Detection and Correction of Model Bias During Data Assimilation,” European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts, 2003, www.ecmwf.int; D. P. Dee, “Bias and Data Assimilation,” Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society 131, no. 613 (2005): 3323–.	Edwards I Paul N. Edwards A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming Cambridge 2013
Models	Climatology	Edwards I 474 Models/climatology/Edwards: Simon Shackley, described two “epistemic lifestyles” in climate modeling. In his terms, a) climate seers use models to “understand and explore the climate system, with particular emphasis on its sensitivity to changing variables and processes,” seeing the models as tools for this purpose. Meanwhile, b) climate model constructors see models as an end in themselves. They seek to “capture the full complexity of the climate system [in models] which can then be used for various applications.” Climate model constructors are more likely to focus on increased “realism,” an adjective referring not to accuracy but to the inclusion in the model of all physical processes that influence the climate. Climate seers, by contrast, tend to focus on modeling the most fundamental and best understood processes, and to use a variety of different models, including simpler zero-, one-, and two-dimensional models.⁽¹⁾ Edwards I 475 The model constructors’ approach also has a political dimension, since those who challenge GCM results often argue that they do not account for the effects of some unincluded process, such as cosmic rays.⁽²⁾ Adding more processes reduces modelers’ vulnerability to this line of attack, though at the same time it increases the opportunities to question the accuracy of parameterizations. Edwards I 476 Corrections: Controversies about tuning rage both inside and outside the climate modeling community. The philosopher-physicist Arthur Petersen notes that “simulationists hold divergent views on the norm of not adding ad hoc corrections to models.”⁽³⁾ Some accept these corrections as necessary; others view them almost as morally suspect and seek to eliminate them. David Randall and Bruce Wielicki argue that tuning “artificially prevents a model from producing a bad result.” Noting that some modelers refer to tuning as “calibration”—exploiting that term’s positive connotations - Randall and Wielicki write: “Tuning is bad empiricism. Calibration is bad empiricism with a bag over its head.” Yet Randall and Wielicki also acknowledge that, in the case of physical processes that are known to be important but are not well understood, there may be no choice.⁽⁴⁾ In general, modelers view tuning as a necessary evil. Most try to observe certain constraints. Tuning should not, for example, bring the tuned variable outside its known range of observed behavior. Edwards I 478 Provability of models: the logic of simulation modeling does not require, or even permit, definitive proof. For example, parameterizations by definition do not derive from exact physical principles; no one expects them to prove perfectly accurate. Naomi Oreskes, Kristin Shrader-Frechette, and Kenneth Belitz argued in the pages of Science that talk of “verification” or “validation” of models was bad epistemology.⁽⁵⁾ The word ‘verification’, they wrote, normally implies definitive proof. But models, Oreskes et al. argued, are essentially intricate inductive arguments. Edwards: This implies only that model results agree with observations. This agreement, by itself, tells us nothing about whether the model reached its results for the right reasons. >Proofs, >Provability, >Observation. 1. Shackley. “Epistemic Lifestyles.” Changing the atmosphere: Expert knowledge and environmental governance, 107-33. 2001. Cambridge: MA MIT Press. 2. H. Svensmark and N. Calder, The Chilling Stars: The New Theory of Climate Change (Icon Books, 2007). 3. A. Petersen, Simulating Nature: A Philosophical Study of Computer-Simulation Uncertainties and Their Role in Climate Science and Policy Advice (Het Spinhuis, 2007), 39. 4. D. A. Randall and B. A. Wielicki, “Measurements, Models, and Hypotheses in the Atmospheric Sciences,” Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 78, no. 3 (1997), 403–. 5. N. Oreskes et al., “Verification, Validation, and Confirmation of Numerical Models in the Earth Sciences,” Science 263, no. 5147 (1994): 641–.	Edwards I Paul N. Edwards A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming Cambridge 2013
Models	Quine	II 210 Models/QuineVsKripke: they enable proof of consistency but not a clear interpretation - when are objects identical? -Bischof Buttler ("no other thing"): identity does not follow necessarily. IX 223 Model: exists where contradictions cannot be deduced. X 77 Model/Quine: of a scheme: is a quantity-n-tuple: a set corresponds to each schema letters (for predicates), at the beginning of the n-tuple is a non-empty set U, the universal set or the range of values of the variables x, y, etc. the remaining sets of the model are the values of the set variables a, b, etc. Fulfillment: a model fulfills a scheme, if its set-theoretic analogue (sentence) it is true. >Set Theory/Quine. X 78 For example, a model 'U,‹U,β) fulfils the logical scheme "Ex(Fx. Gx)" ((s) quotation marks not for the model) if Ex(x ε α α. ζ ε β), i.e. if the two sets of the model are not elemental. ((s) Conjunction of properties or sentences: common elements of the corresponding elements > intersection, not union). For example a model 'U,‹U,β) fulfils the logical scheme ~E(Fx . ~Gx)" when the one set is a subset of the other.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Models	Stalnaker	I 146 Model/Stalnaker: a model is a pair consisting of an object domain D and a valuation function V. >Valuation function, >Domains. I 149 Model: For our modal predicate logic is then a quadruple ‹W,R,D,v›. D is the range function of W on the sets of individuals. For w ε W, Dw is the range of the world w. Valuation function: the valuation function attributes intensions to descriptive expressions. Intension: the intension here is a function of possible worlds on extensions. >Intensions, >Extensions. Necessity operator: The semantic rule of the necessity operator remains unchanged. >Operators. I 150 The rules for predicate logic are generalizations of the extensional rules. We only add an index for the worlds. E.g. rule for Universal quantification/universal quantifier/Stalnaker: IF Φ has the form ∀F, then is νs w (Φ) = 1 gdw. νs w(F) = D w. otherwise = 0. >Quantification, >Universal quantification.	Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Money Supply	Friedman	Landsburg I 14 Money supply/Friedman/Landsburg: (...) let's imagine a simple world where, as of a particular Monday morning, the populace collectively holds a total of $ 1 million. The government, which has been planning all along to buy $ 1 million worth of paper clips on Monday afternoon, makes the decision to pay for those paper clips with newly printed money (as opposed to using, say, tax revenue or borrowed funds). What should we expect to happen? As of Monday afternoon, the people who sell paper clips are holding more money than they held this morning. In fact, the total money supply has doubled, so if we average this over the entire population, the average person (call her Alice) is now holding twice as much as she held this morning. But that's more than she wants. If she wanted this much money, she would have arranged for it in the first Place (perhaps by depositing a bit more of her paycheque into her chequing account instead of her retirement account). Landsburg I 15 Problem: how is she going to get rid of this excess money? Discarding it seems like an exceptionally bad idea. Maybe she turns to her neighbour Bob and talks him into borrowing one of her dollars. But then Bob has an extra dollar to get rid of. Maybe she goes to the bank and buys a certificate of deposit. But then her banker, Carol, has more money than she wants in her vault. No matter where the money goes, the average person still has twice as much money as he or she did this morning and is still trying to get rid ofit. The other way to get rid of money is to spend it. So sooner or later, Alice (or someone) decides to buy an extra hamburger or an extra haircut or a more expensive sweater - or maybe she schedules a gutter repair she'd been planning to put off till next year. Prices: This bids up the prices of hamburgers, haircuts, sweaters, and home maintenance by, say, 10 percent. Because prices are higher, people are now willing to hold 10 percent more money than they held this morning. Unfortunately, the amount of money floating around has gone up not by 10 percent but by 100 percent. So the process continues until prices are bid up by fully 100 percent. Now people want to hold all the excess money and the process comes to a halt.* The bottom line: - If you double (or triple or quadruple) the money supply, prices will double (or triple or quadruple). The process might take a while, and some interesting stuff can happen along the way. A little reflection reveals a somewhat deeper moral: - A jump in the general level of prices (as opposed to an increase in the price of one specific good or another) is always caused by people trying to get rid of money. >Price level. Landsburg I 16 Why might people want to get rid of money? We've listed some reasons already - a wider acceptance of credit cards, an increase in street crime, a rise in the interest rate, or an increase in the supply of money, leaving people with more than they want to hold. Inflation/Friedman. Landsburg I 22 Money Supply/Friedman/Landsburg: (…) like many things, inflation in small doses is a little bit bad and inflation in higher doses is extremely bad. But why put up with any badness you don't have to put up with? It seems like the best scenario is no inflation at all - and the recipe to accomplish that scenario is zero growth in the money supply. Landsburg I 23 Question: (…) why not go even further? If Alice enjoys holding 10 weeks' income in the form of money, perhaps she'd be even happier holding 12 weeks' income. Maybe she could use a little nudge in that direction! We could provide that nudge with a negative inflation rate (also called deflation), which causes the money in Alice's pocket to grow over time in value, thus encouraging her to hold more of it. >Inflation, >Inflation/Friedman, >Deflation. Problem: If holding a little extra money makes Alice a little happier, why does she need a nudge? >Nudging. The answer is that when Alice chooses to hold more money—and hence to spend less money- she's helping to keep the price level down, which benefits not just her but (…) countless others. And if they in turn hold more money, then Alice shares in the benefits. As a result, everyone can be better off if everyone gets a little nudge. Negative Inflation/Friedman: So Friedman was led to contemplate a negative inflation rate, driven by a steady reduction in the money supply. (The government could, for example, collect some taxes in cash and burn 10 percent of the proceeds.) Problem: On the other hand, money supply growth has some advantages. Money supply growth/taxation: If the government pays for paper clips with newly minted money, then it doesn't have to pay for paper clips by taxing (say) coffee, and that's good for everyone who buys or sells coffee. Solution/Taxation/Friedman: After weighing this and other factors, Friedman in the end endorsed a small but positive inflation rate on the order of about 2 percent a year, but, believing that 2 percent a year was likely to be politically infeasible, declared himself perfectly willing to settle for as much as 5 percent. Problem: (…) in the short run, the price adjustments take place in fits and starts, which can have important consequences. >Quantity theory. * (…) People try to get rid of money by buying things, which drives up prices until people are willing to hold the extra money after all. You might wonder why we can't tell a different story: Maybe people try to get rid of money by lending it, which drives down interest rates until people are willing to hold the extra money after all. (Remember that when the interest rate is Iow, alternatives to money - like certificates of deposit - are less attractive.) The problem with that story is that it runs afoul of economic theory, which tells us that the interest rate must be fully determined by the supply and demand for current and future goods and services, leaving no room for it to be affected by changes in the supply and demand for money. Brocker I 397 Money Supply/FriedmanVsKeynesianism/Economic Crisis/Friedman: thesis: after the economic crisis of the early 1930s, central banks had not tried hard enough to prevent the collapse of banks. Solution/Friedman: a policy of steady money supply growth as a necessary and sufficient condition of macroeconomic stability, i.e. above all to preserve the value of money. >Monetarism. Peter Spahn, „Milton Friedman, Kapitalismus und Freiheit“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Econ Fried I Milton Friedman The role of monetary policy 1968 Landsburg I Steven E. Landsburg The Essential Milton Friedman Vancouver: Fraser Institute 2019 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Monopoly Price	Mises	Rothbard III 671 Monopoly Price/Mises/Rothbard: A succinct definition of monopoly price has been supplied by Mises:“ If conditions are such that the monopolist can secure higher net proceeds by selling a smaller quantity of his product at a higher price than by selling a greater quantity of his supply at a Iower price, there emerges a monopoly price higher than the potential market price would have been in the absence of monopoly.“⁽¹⁾ Rothbard: The monopoly price doctrine may be summed up as follows: A certain quantity of a good, when produced and sold, yields a competitive price on the market. A monopolist or a cartel of firms can, if the demand curve is inelastic at the competitive-price point, restrict sales and raise the price, to arrive at the point of maximum returns. >Elasticity. Rothbard III 672 If, on the other hand, the demand curve as it presents itselfto the monopolist or cartel is elastic at the competitive-price point, the monopolist will not restrict sales to attain a higher price. >Monopolies. Mises: As a result, as Mises points out, there is no need to be concerned with the "monopolist"(…) whether or not he is the sole producer of a commodity is unimportant and irrelevant for catallactic problems. It becomes important only if the configuration of his demand curve enables him to restrict sales and achieve a higher income at a monopoly price.⁽²⁾ If he learns about the inelastic demand curve after he has erroneously produced too great a stock, he must destroy or withhold part of his stock; after that, he restricts production of the commodity to the most remunerative level. Rothbard III 674 Inelasticity/Rothbard: The inelastic demand curve, giving rise to an opportunity to monopolize, may present itself either to a single monopolist of a given product or to "an industry as a whole" when organized into a cartel of the different producers. In the latter case, the demand curve, as it presents itselfto eachfirm, is elastic. At the competitive price, if one firm raises its price, the customers preponderantly shift to purchasing from its competitors. On the other hand, if the firms are cartelized, in many cases the lesser range of substitution by consumers would render the demand curve, as presented to the cartel, inelastic. This condition serves as the impetus to the formation of (…) cartels (…). >Cartels/Rothbard, >Monopoly price/Rothbard. 1. Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. p. 278. 2. Thus: The mere existence of monopoly does not mean anything. The publisher of a copyright book is a monopolist. But he may not be able to sell a single copy, no matter how low the price he asks. Not every price at which a monopolist sells a monopolized commodity is a monopoly price. Monopoly prices are only prices at which it is more advantageous for the monopolist to restrict the total amount to be sold than to expand sales to the limit which a competitive market would allow. (Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. p. 356)	EconMises I Ludwig von Mises Die Gemeinwirtschaft Jena 1922 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Monopoly Price	Rothbard	Rothbard III 671 Monopoly Price/Mises/Rothbard: A succinct definition of monopoly price has been supplied by Mises:“ If conditions are such that the monopolist can secure higher net proceeds by selling a smaller quantity of his product at a higher price than by selling a greater quantity of his supply at a Iower price, there emerges a monopoly price higher than the potential market price would have been in the absence of monopoly.“⁽¹⁾ Rothbard: The monopoly price doctrine may be summed up as follows: A certain quantity of a good, when produced and sold, yields a competitive price on the market. A monopolist or a cartel of firms can, if the demand curve is inelastic at the competitive-price point, restrict sales and raise the price, to arrive at the point of maximum returns. >Elasticity. Rothbard III 672 If, on the other hand, the demand curve as it presents itselfto the monopolist or cartel is elastic at the competitive-price point, the monopolist will not restrict sales to attain a higher price. >Monopolies. Mises: As a result, as Mises points out, there is no need to be concerned with the "monopolist"(…) whether or not he is the sole producer of a commodity is unimportant and irrelevant for catallactic problems. It becomes important only if the configuration of his demand curve enables him to restrict sales and achieve a higher income at a monopoly price.⁽²⁾ If he learns about the inelastic demand curve after he has erroneously produced too great a stock, he must destroy or withhold part of his stock; after that, he restricts production of the commodity to the most remunerative level. Rothbard III 674 Inelasticity/Rothbard: The inelastic demand curve, giving rise to an opportunity to monopolize, may present itself either to a single monopolist of a given product or to "an industry as a whole" when organized into a cartel of the different producers. In the latter case, the demand curve, as it presents itselfto eachfirm, is elastic. At the competitive price, if one firm raises its price, the customers preponderantly shift to purchasing from its competitors. On the other hand, if the firms are cartelized, in many cases the lesser range of substitution by consumers would render the demand curve, as presented to the cartel, inelastic. This condition serves as the impetus to the formation of (…) cartels (…). >Cartels/Rothbard, >Monopoly price/Rothbard. Rothbard III 674 Monopoly Price theories/Rothbard: We are devoting space to analysis of monopoly-price theory and its consequences because the theory, though invalid on the free market, will prove very useful in analyzing the consequences of monopoly grants by government. >Free market/Rothbard. 1) In the first place, it is not true that the “monopolist” (…) is removed from the influence of competition or has the power to dictate to consumers at will. The best of the monopoly-price theorists admit that the monopolist is as subject to the forces of competition as are other firms. The monopolist cannot set prices as high as he would like, being limited by the configurations of consumer demand. Rothbard III 675 Elasticity: Consumers make the curve elastic by their power of substituting purchases of other goods.⁽¹⁾ Furthermore, as the market advances, as capital is invested and the market becomes more and more specialized, the demand curve for each product tends to become more and more elastic. >Elasticity. 2) Monoploy profit vs. monopoly gain to a factors: (…) in the case of the monopolist, it is asserted, his unique position allows him to keep making (…) profits permanently. RothbardVs: To use such terminology is to misconceive the nature of "profit" and "loss." Profits and losses are purely the results of entrepreneurial activity, and that activity is the consequence of the uncertainty of the future. Entrepreneurship is the action on the market that takes advantage of estimated discrepancies between selling prices and buying prices of factors. The better forecasters make profits, and the incorrect ones suffer losses. >Gain and Loss. The same is true for the monopolist. In the evenly rotating economy, he obtains his "specific monopoly gain," not as an entrepreneur, but as the owner of the product which he sells. His monopoly gain is an added income to his monopolized product; whether for an individual or for a cartel, it is this product which earns more income through restriction of its supply. >Evenly Rotating Economy. Question: Why cannot other entrepreneurs seize the gainful opportunity and enter into the production of this good, thereby tending to eliminate the opportunity? In the case of the cartel, this is precisely the tendency that will always prevail and lead to the breakup of a monopoly-price position. >Cartels/Rothbard. Rothbard III 678 Monopoly gains/Rothbard: We have said that the gain is derived from income from the sale of a certain product. But this product must be produced byfactors, and we have seen that the return to any product is resolved into returns to the factors which produce it. >Production factors/Rothbard, >Factor income/Rothbard. Time: (…) no income, except time income, could accrue to the owner of a capital good, because every capital good must, in turn, be produced by higher-order factors. Ultimately, all capital goods are resolvable into labor, land, and time factors. Rothbard III 679 Monopoly price: To attain a monopoly price, the factor-owner must meet two conditions: (a) He must be a monopolist (…) over the factor; if he were not, the monopoly gain could be bid away by competitors entering the field; and (b) the demand curve for the factor must be inelastic above the competitive-price point. >Demand/Rothbard. Rothbard III 680 Can there be a world of monopoly prices? There can never, (…) be a world of monopoly prices, even assuming monopoly-price theory. Because of the fixity of consumers' monetary stock and the employment of displaced factors, monopoly prices could not be established in more than approximately half of the economy's industries. >Competition/Rothbard. Rothbard III 683 Competition: Incidentally, it is by no means true that the large firms will always be the strongest in a "price-cutting war." Often, depending on the concrete conditions, it is the smaller, more mobile firm, not burdened with heavy investments, that is able to "cut its costs" (particularly when its factors are more specific to it, such as the labor of its management) and outcompete the larger firm. In such cases, of course, there is no monopoly-price problem whatever. >Production factors. Rothbard II 690 Observability: Many writers have attempted to establish some criterion for distinguishing a monopoly price from a competitive price. Some call the monopoly price that price achieving permanent, long-run "monopoly profits" for a firm. This is contrasted to the "competitive price," at which, in the evenly rotating economy, profits disappear. >Evenly Rotating Economy. RothbardVs: Yet (…) there are never permanent monopoly profits, but only monopoly gains to owners of land or labor factors. Money costs to the entrepreneur, who must buy factors of production, will tend to equal money revenues in the evenly rotating economy, whether the price is competitive or monopoly. The monopoly gains, however, are secured as income to labor or land factors. There is therefore never any identifiable element that could provide a criterion of the absence of monopoly gain. >Measurements/Rothbard, >Observation/Rothbard, >Competition/Rothbard. Rothbard III 692 Scarcity of production factors/Rothbard: (…) the attempt to establish the existence of idle resources as a criterion of monopolistic "withholding" of factors [is not] valid. Idle labor resources will always mean increased leisure, and therefore the leisure motive will always be intertwined with any alleged "monopolistic" motive. It therefore becomes impossible to separate them. The existence of idle land may always be due to the fact of the relative scarcity of labor as compared with available land. This relative scarcity makes it more serviceable to consumers, and hence more remunerative, to invest labor in certain areas of land, and not in others. Rothbard III 903 Monopoly price/legal monopolies/Rothbard: [for the free market] (…) we buried the theory of monopoly price; we must now resurrect it. The theory of monopoly price, as developed there, is illusory when applied to the free market, but it applies fully in the case of monopoly and quasi-monopoly grants. >Legal monopolies/Rothbard. Observation/measuring/distinguishability: For here we have an identifiable distinction: not the spurious distinction between "competitive" and monopoly" or "monopolistic" price, but one between thefree-market price and the monopoly price. The "free-market price" is conceptually identifiable and definable, whereas the "competitive price" is not. The theory of monopoly price, therefore, properly contrasts it to the free-market price (…). 1. Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. p. 278. 2. Thus: The mere existence of monopoly does not mean anything. The publisher of a copyright book is a monopolist. But he may not be able to sell a single copy, no matter how low the price he asks. Not every price at which a monopolist sells a monopolized commodity is a monopoly price. Monopoly prices are only prices at which it is more advantageous for the monopolist to restrict the total amount to be sold than to expand sales to the limit which a competitive market would allow. (Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. p. 356) 3. As Mises warns: „It would be a serious blunder to deduce from the antithesis between monopoly price and competitive price that the monopoly price is the outgrowth of the absence of competition. There is always catallactic competition on the market. Catallactic competition is no less a factor in the determination of monopoly prices than it is in the determination of competitive prices. The Shape of the demand curve that makes the appearance of monopoly prices possible and directs the monopolists' conduct is determined by the competition of all other commodities competing for the buyers' dollars. The higher the monopolist fixes the price at which he is ready to sell, the more potential buyers turn their dollars toward other vendible goods. On the market every commodity competes with all other commodities.“ (Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. p. 278)	Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Montague Semantics	Hintikka	II 12 Montague/Hintikka: for Montague it was mostly about a framework for general meaning analysis. Possible World/Hintikka: Montague would need all linguistic (semantic, analytical) possible worlds. But it would require stronger arguments than the ones that Montague had available to limit them so that they would be less than the logically possible worlds. >Possible worlds, >Logical possibility, >Meaning/Montague. This makes his use of non-standard semantics even more puzzling in the later work. II 97 Quantifier/quantifiers/natural language/HintikkaVsMontague: his theory is not appropriate because of its treatment of quantifiers. >Quantifiers. Terminology: "PTQ": Montague: "PTQ" stands for the "proper treatment of quantification in ordinary English". Montague: Theses: (i) Meaning entities are functions of possible worlds on extensions. (ii) Semantic objects ((s) words) are linked to meaningful expressions by rules that correspond one-by-one to the syntactic rules by which the expressions are composed. That is, the semantic rules work from the inside out. (iii) Quantifiers: e.g. "a girl", e.g. "every man"... II 98 ...behave semantically as singular terms. That is, "John is happy" and "Every man is happy" are on the same level. Hintikka: ad (i) is based on the semantics of possible worlds. (It is a generalization of Carnap's approach). Ad (ii) is a form of the Frege principle (compositionality principle). Ad (iii) has been anticipated by Russell in the Principia Mathematica⁽¹⁾. Individual Area/Possible Worlds/Montague/Hintikka: Thesis: Montague assumes a constant range of individuals. HintikkaVsMontague: precisely this leads to problems. Especially in religious contexts. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.	Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Moral Philosophy	Ancient Philosophy	Gadamer I 45 Moral Philosophy/Antique Philosophy/Gadamer: The emergence of the concept of taste in the 17th century (...) leads (...) into contexts of moral philosophy that go back to antiquity. It is this humanistic and thus ultimately Greek component that becomes effective within the moral philosophy determined by Christianity. Greek ethics - the ethics of measurements of the Pythagoreans and Plato, the ethics of the Mesotes created by Aristotle - is in a deep and comprehensive sense an ethics of good taste. Gadamer I 46 Such a thesis certainly sounds strange to our ears. Firstly, because the ideal normative element in the concept of taste is usually misunderstood and the relativistic-sceptical reasoning about the differences in taste is in our ears. Ethics/KantVs: Above all, however, we are determined by Kant's moral-philosophical achievement, which has purified ethics of all aesthetic and emotional moments. >Judgement/Kant.	Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Morals	Nietzsche	Ries II 46 Moral/Nietzsche: social egoism. The "main rule" in relation to the crisis of value judgments: There are only moral interpretations of phenomena, but no moral phenomena "in themselves". Ries II 52 Moral/Nietzsche: drove economic forms of the animal kingdom: fear and power. Moral as a functional principle of atavistic impulses. Ries II 53 Moral/Nietzsche: the actual Circe of philosophy. Seduction through the thought of a "truly existing", the "beyond" the world of experience determined by death, suffering and powerlessness. Ries II 79 Moral/Christianity/On the Genealogy of Morality/Nietzsche: all Christian moral is an instrument of falsification and subjugation of original nature by what is not nature - God, reason, conscience. >Christanity/Nietzsche. Ries II 80 Moral/NietzscheVsSocial Nature/On the Genealogy of Morality/Nietzsche: the human is a social "animal", which in the course of the cruel history becomes a social being. Conscience: Remembrance of forced acts. (> Freud: Conscience = idiosyncratic memory). Cf. >Morality/Freud. Ries II 101 Moral/Mandeville: (1670 - 1733) already impulsive psychological explanation of the moral concepts. >Psychological theories on drives. Ries II 103 Moral/Nietzsche: there are no moral phenomena "in themselves", always only moral interpretations of these phenomena. (see above). Cf. >Cognitivism, >Emotivism. Moral as a model for explaining the world: traceability of the unknown back to the familiar. Social traffic rules. Displacement and sublimation as the two constitutive factors. Nietzsche understood his criticism of morality itself as a "high level" of morality. 1. F. Nietzsche Zur Genealogie der Moral, KGW VI. 2 --- Danto III 160 Moral/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche wants to tear us away from the prevailing habits of judging and thinking, let us see these attitudes from the outside, and let us recognize moral as 'a problem'.⁽¹⁾ Danto III 161 Nietzsche deals in particular with our belief in morality, i. e. a belief of the 2nd order over dogmas. Explanation/Nietzsche. It is the question of how far [a judgement] is life-promoting, life-preserving, species-preserving, maybe even species-breeding'.⁽²⁾ Danto III 162 NietzscheVsTradition: the old philosophers never questioned their identity according to Nietzsche. Danto III 163 Nietzsche tries to establish a science of morality. >Psychology/Nietzsche. Danto III 165 According to Nietzsche, there are no 'moral phenomena' but only a moral interpretation of phenomena. ⁽³⁾ ((s) See also Gilbert Harman: Ethics/Harman). There are no moral facts either.⁽⁴⁾ Ethics/Moral/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche does not require us to abondon our moral beliefs, but only to abandon our meta-ethical beliefs. Danto III 166 This gives us the opportunity to choose from a range of morals. Danto III 191 Moral/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche distinguishes between "masters's morality" and "slave morality".⁽⁵⁾ Danto III 192 Master/Nietzsche: Their existence depends on how far they are useful to the tribe, which in turn is a question of external circumstances. The supposedly noble ones need not have changed in order to be distinguished and slandered another time: everything depends on the possibilities offered to them to live out those emotions that shape their character and determine their superiority. Slaves/Nietzsche: The average members of the tribe, for whom those fight to threaten them in peacetime, are called 'slaves' by Nietzsche.⁽⁶⁾ Danto III 200 Resentment/slave morality: the slave fears not only the malice of the master and digs it up: he resents (resentment) the strength of the master as well as his own relative powerlessness. Danto III 201 He cannot act out his hostility on the paths open to the aristocrats. Slave's strategy: to get the master to accept the slave's scoreboard and to judge himself from the slave's perspective. Eventually, the master becomes evil in his own eyes. >Master/Slave. Danto III 204 Slave moral/Nietzsche/Danto: while it is logical for Hobbes that there is no injustice in the natural state, because injustice presupposes a social juridical structure, the slave morality by Nietzsche requires that there are evil persons, or at least something like that, which can be labelled negatively with reference to the "good".⁽⁷⁾ Danto III 205 The slave actually demands nothing less than that everyone should be equal to everyone and that everyone should align from the outside. The moral of everyone is the moral of the group to which they belong. Master's moral/Nietzsche/Danto: on the other hand, the master's moral is determined independently of any external criterion, and the aristocrat does not intend to align itself with others.⁽⁸⁾ Danto III 217 On the top rung of the leader of civilization is not the blonde beast, but the ascetic. He is a self-disciplined person who differs from others in that he does not exercise his power over others, but over himself. The self-controlling ascetic is an avatar (originally Avatara), a persona of the beast at the lower end of the scale. Religion is responsible for the higher development, after all, the ascetic is the aristocrat in the tamed state that is so feared by the slaves. He is what they have produced in the course of their resentment. >Civilization/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche, Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft, KGW V.2, p. 232. 2. F. Nietzsche Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI.2, p. 12 3. Ibid. p. 92. 4. F. Nietzsche, Götzen-Dämmerung, KGW VI,3 p. 92. 5. F. Nietzsche Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI.2, p. 218. 6. F. Nietzsche, Menschliches, Allzumenschliches, KGW IV, 2 S. 81f. 7. Cf. F. Nietzsche Genealogie der Moral, VI. 2, p. 284f. 8. Ibid. p. 284.	Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Morals	Rawls	I 190 Moral/judgement/justice/society/Rawls: moral judgments need impartiality. However, this can also be achieved by other means than accepting mutual disinterest in each other's goals. Solution: Justice as fairness assumes that an impartial person is one who judges in accordance with the principles of justice. >Justice/Rawls, >Society/Rawls, >Fairness/Rawls. See Principles: I 61 Principles/Rawls: 1. every person must have the same right to the widest possible fundamental freedom, insofar as it is compatible with the same freedom for others. 2. social and economic inequalities shall be arranged in such a way that they (a) are reasonably expectable for everyone's benefit; and (b) are linked to positions and administrative procedures that can be held by anyone.) I 190 Solution: we do not have to define impartiality from the perspective of an ideal observer, but rather from the perspective of the participants. It is they who have to give themselves these principles in the initial situation of a society to be established. RawlsVsUtilitarianism: he confuses impartiality with impersonality. >Utilitarianism. I 311 Moral/Rawls: What people are entitled to is not measured by intrinsic value. The moral value does not depend on supply and demand. When certain services are no longer in demand, moral merit does not decrease equally. I 312 The concept of moral value does not provide a first principle of distributive justice. The moral value can be defined as a sense of justice when the principles of justice are available. >Distributive Justice.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Motherese	Cultural Psychology	Upton I 61 Motherese/Cultural Psychology/Upton: This type of speech is also very widespread and has been identified in a range of cultures, including the Kung Bushmen of the Kalahari, forest dwellers in the Cameroons, the Yanomami of the Amazon Basin and the Eipo of New Guinea (Fernald, 1985)⁽¹⁾. However, it is not a universal feature of language and, in cultures where it is not used, language development follows the same progress although more slowly (Lieven, 1994)⁽²⁾. This suggests that such speech is useful but not essential for language development. Child-directed speech is thought to make language learning easier because of the way it simplifies language (Thiessen et al., 2005)⁽³⁾. Child-directed speech is also more effective than standard speech in getting an infant’s attention and studies have shown that infants prefer to listen to this type of speech (Singh et al., 2002⁽⁴⁾). Some researchers (e.g. Bombar and Littig, 1996)⁽⁵⁾ also believe that this type of talk is an important part of the emotional bonding process. 1. Fernald, A. (1985) Four-month-old infants prefer to listen to motherese. Infant Behaviour andDevelopment, 8: 181—95. 2. Lieven, E.V.M. (1994) Crosslinguistic and crosscultural aspects of language addressed to children, in Gallaway, C and Richards, BJ (eds) Input and Interaction in Languo.ge Acquisition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Thiessen, E.D., Hill, EA and Saffran,JR (2005) Infant-directed speech facilitates word seg mentation. Infancy, 1:53—71. 4. Singh, L., Morgan, J.L. and Best, C.T. (2002) Infants’ listening preferences: Babytalk or happy talk?, Infancy, 3: 365–94. 5. Bombar, M.L. and Littig, L.W. (1996) Babytallc as a communication of intimate attachment: an initial study in adult romances and friendships. Personal Relationships, 3(2): 137—58.	Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011
Motherese	Developmental Psychology	Upton I 60 Motherese/Developmenal psychology/Upton: [this is a] distinctive speech pattern characterised by a lot of repetition, simplified short utterances, raised pitch and exaggerated expression (Kuhl 2000)⁽¹⁾. Upton I 61 (…) during the 1970s it was observed that this speech pattern is used not only by mothers, but also by women who have not had children (Snow, 1972)⁽²⁾, fathers (Berko Gleason, 1973)⁽³⁾ and even four-year-old children (Shatz and Gelman, 1973)⁽⁴⁾. Thus a more accurate term for this distinctive form of speech is ‘child-directed speech’ (Matychuk, 2005)⁽⁵⁾. This type of speech is also very widespread and has been identified in a range of cultures. However, it is not a universal feature of language and, in cultures where it is not used, language development follows the same progress although more slowly (Lieven, 1994)⁽⁶⁾. This suggests that such speech is useful but not essential for language development. Child-directed speech is also more effective than standard speech in getting an infant’s attention and studies have shown that infants prefer to listen to this type of speech (Singh et al., 2002⁽⁷⁾). Some researchers (e.g. Bombar and Littig, 1996)⁽⁸⁾ also believe that this type of talk is an important part of the emotional bonding process. >Learning, >Learning theory, >Language acquisition, >Language development. 1. Kuhl, P(2000) A new view of language acquisition. Proceedings of the NationalAcademy of Science, 9 7(22): 11850—7. 2. Snow, CE (1972) Mother’s speech to children learning language. Child Development, 43 (2): 549–65. 3. Berko Gleason, J (1973) Code switching in children’s language, in Moore, TE (ed.) Cognitive Development and the Acquisition of Language. New York: Academic Press. 4. Shatz, M and Gelman, R (1973) The development of communication skills. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 38: serial no. 152. 5. Matychuk, P (2005) The role of child-directed speech in language acquisition: a case study. Language Sciences, 27: 301–79. 6. Lieven, EVM (1994) Crosslinguistic and crosscultural aspects of language addressed to children, in Gallaway, C and Richards, BJ (eds) Input and Interaction in Languo.ge Acquisition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 7. Singh, L., Morgan, J.L. and Best, C.T. (2002) Infants’ listening preferences: Babytalk or happy talk?, Infancy, 3: 365–94. 8. Bombar, M.L. and Littig, L.W. (1996) Babytallc as a communication of intimate attachment: an initial study in adult romances and friendships. Personal Relationships, 3(2): 137—58.	Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011
Motion	Frith	I 187 Movement/cognition/perception/life/Frith: from the way something moves, one can see whether it is a living being or, for example, a leaf. For example, about 14 light points are attached to the joints of a person. The person then moves in a dark room. N.B.: if you only look at a single moving point, you cannot see anything sensible in the movement. Even if all 14 points do not move, you cannot see anything sensible! In movements you immediately recognize something sensible. One can even say whether the figure is happy or sad⁽¹⁾. N.B.: even cats can be trained to recognize a cat from the points, and to recognize when the points are arranged randomly. I 194 Movement/interpretation/objective/intention/Frith: in movements, the internal models are the goals of the action. Problem: movements are ambiguous, e.g. I can go to the baker next door or to Patagonia. >Ambiguity, >Goals, >Motivation, >Intention, >Intentionality. I 195 Movement/interpretation: e.g. the person opposite me should repeat everything I do. I raise my left hand, the other raises the right. Is this a mistake? E.g. I take the right hand and touch my left ear, the other person takes the left hand and touches his/her left ear. Is this a mistake? N.B.: now to the correct test: in the middle of the table is a big red button. I lean forward and touch it with my forehead. What the other person is doing depends on my hands: if I have chained hands, but the other person does not, he/she will use his/her hands, when I have free hands, the other person will use his/her heads. I 197 Movement/imitation/interpretation/Frith: for example, the subject should move the arm rhythmically up and down while watching another person, moving the arms rhythmically sideways. This shows that we unconsciously tend to imitate others. N.B.: when the person moving sideways was replaced by a robot, the unconscious imitation did not happen. I 198 Movement/action/brain/interpretation/Frith: thesis: in case of the robot the brain only registers movements but no actions. >Actions. 1. E.g. www.biomotionlab.ca/Demos/BMLwalker.html (7/13/2023)	Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013
Motion	Russell	Kursbuch 8; p. 15 Motion/change/Russell: old/Zenon: "state of change" - today/VsZenon: at one time in one place, at another time in another place - wrong, to say that it is in the next moment located in the "adjacent place" - wrong: jump within a moment (Zenon has correctly identified this) Bertrand Russell Die Mathematik und die Metaphysiker 1901 in: Kursbuch 8 Mathematik 1967 15 Time: The banishment of the infinitely small quantity has peculiar consequences: e.g. there is no longer something like a next moment. (> Time/Russell). If there are to be no infinitely small quantities, no two moments follow one another directly, but there are always more moments inbetween. Consequently, there must be an infinite number of additional moments between two arbitrary moments. If the number were finite, then one would be closer to the first of the two moments and it would be the next! This is precisely where the philosophy of the infinite begins. Space: the same applies to the space. However small a space is, it can be further subdivided. In this way we never reach the infinitely small quantity. No finite number of divisions leads to a point. Nevertheless, there are points, but they are not achieved by successive divisions. Points are not infinitely small distances. Motion, change: strange results: earlier, it was thought that when something changes, it must be in a state of change when it moves, in a state of motion. This is wrong from today's point of view: If a body moves, one can only say that it is at one time at the place and at another time at a different place. We must not say that it will be at the next place in the next moment because there is no next moment. >Zeno, >Change, >Beginning, >Time, >Space.	Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996
Motivation	Minsky	I 168 Motivation/Minsky: Imagine that a thirsty child has learned to reach for a nearby cup. What keeps that child, afterward, from reaching for a cup in every other circumstance — say, when it is lonely or when it is cold? How do we keep separate what we learn for satisfying different goals? Artificial Intelligence/actions/goals/Minsky: One way is to maintain a separate memory bank for every distinct goal. To make this work, we must restrict each specialist to learn only when its own goal is active. We can accomplish that by building them into a cross-exclusion system so that, for example, Hunger's memories can be formed only when Hunger is active. Such a system will never get confused about which memories to use. Problem: (…) it would be too extravagant to have to keep completely different memories for every goal (…). Wouldn't it be better if all those specialists could share a common, general-purpose memory? Problem: Whenever any specialist tried to rearrange some memories to its own advantage, it might damage structures upon which the others have come to depend. There would be too many unpredictable interactions Solution: Society of Minds: If they were like people, they could communicate, negotiate, and organize. But because each separate specialist is much too small and specialized to understand how the others work, the best each can do is learn to exploit what the others can do, without understanding how they do it. >Society of Minds/Minsky.	Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003
Multiculturalism	Barry	Gaus I 257 Multiculturalism/Barry/Kukathas: According to Barry, multiculturalism is inconsistent with liberalism and a respect for liberal values and should therefore be rejected. (Barry 2001)⁽¹⁾ Galston: [William] Galston has termed 'Reformation liberalism'. Unlike 'Enlightenment liberalism', which emphasizes the importance of individual autonomy, 'Reformation liberalism', Galston maintains, values diversity and sees the importance of 'differences among individuals and groups over such matters as the nature ofthe good life, sources of moral authority, reason versus faith, and the like' (1995⁽²⁾: 521). BarryVsGalston: Barry rejects this distinction, but is especially critical nonetheless of those who are members of the diversity-promoting liberalism camp. Barry rejects three major arguments advanced in support of Reformation liberalism. 1) The first is that liberal theory values respect for persons and this implies respect for the cultures to which individuals belong. To this Barry replies that illiberal cultures often violate the requirement of equal respect and to that extent they do not deserve respect (2001⁽¹⁾: 128). 2) The second argument is that liberalism values diversity because it increases the range of options available to individuals. To this Barry responds that liberals prize individuality rather than diversity (2001⁽¹⁾: 129). 3) The third argument is that liberalism attaches great importance to the public/private distinction, and so should be committed to nonintervention in the private realm. To this Barry replies that liberalism has historically challenged the sanctity of parental and paternal authority, and sought to protect individuals from the groups to which they belong. Individuals/Barry: Individuals must be free to associate in any way they like (consistent with the law protecting the interests of those outside the association). But there are two important conditions: all participants in the association should be sane adults, and their participation should be voluntary (2001⁽¹⁾: 148). Group rights: Groups may then do as they please, provided those who do not like the way a group's affairs are run are able to exit without facing excessive costs (2001⁽¹⁾: 150). Problems/VsBarry: Barry's view imposes serious constraints, then, on the operation of groups. In the end, what it tolerates is only what Fish calls 'boutique multiculturalism'. (>Multiculturalism/Fish). It requires that illiberal practices not be condoned, that parents be required to send their children to school, and that generally the state ensures that children are appropriately educated and not made the victims of creationists and religious zealots - even if they are their parents. >Religion/education/Multiculturalism. Egalitarianism: In the end, Barry's view amounts to a reassertion of liberal egalitarianism as a doctrine that is simply incompatible with multiculturalism. VsBarry: (For criticisms of Barry see the papers in Kelly, 2002⁽³⁾; Per Barry: for another defence of liberal egalitarianism see Kernohan, 1998⁽⁴⁾.) 1. Barry, Brian (2001) Cultuæ and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism. Oxford: Polity. 2. Galston, William (1995) 'Two concepts of Liberalism', Ethics, 105(3): 516-34. 3. Kelly, Paul, ed. (2002) Multiculturalism Reconsidered: Cultuæ and Equality and Its Critics. Oxford: Polity. 4. Kernohan, Andrew (1998) Liberalism, Equality, and Cultural Oppression. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	EconBarry I Brian Barry Sociologists,economists, and democracy Chicago 1970 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Multiculturalism	Indigenous Peoples	Gaus I 258 Multicuturalism/Indigenous peoples/Kukathas: Generally, multiculturalism is assumed to speak not only for the interests of immigrant cultural minorities but also for the aboriginal peoples who are minorities in modern states. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, no less than Fiji, Malaysia, Indonesia, India and most of South and Central America, are home to peoples whose ancestry may be traced back to premodern times, and their interests are sometimes thought to be addressed by the development of the institutions of a multicultural society. Indigenous peoples VsMulticulturalism: Yet for many indigenous peoples multiculturalism is less than welcome, for its implication is the further marginalization of their communities and culture in a modern state more attuned to the needs of migrants than to those of aborigines. Kymlicka’s theory: The recognition of this issue has shaped the development of Kymlicka's theory, which is particularly aware of the distinctive concerns of indigenous peoples. His model of group-differentiated rights deliberately makes space for national minorities, as distinct from polyethnic groups. >Minorities/Kymlicka, >Diversity/Multiculturalism, >Minority rights/Kymlicka. Kukathas: Whether or not Kymlicka's theory is defensible, however, aboriginal groups around the world have pressed the case for the rights of indigenous minorities. (For a sceptical assessment of the notion of indigenous rights see Mulgan, 1989a⁽¹⁾. Mulgan, 1989b⁽²⁾ also suggests that, in the case of New Zealand, the land is occupied by two indigenous peoples: the Maori and Pakeha, or descendants of white settlers.) Moreover, many indigenous groups have insisted that, unlike immigrant peoples, what they need is not only recognition of their independent status but also rectification for past injustice. Indigenous rights/society/incorporation: Extended treatments of the problem of incorpo- rating aboriginal peoples into modern liberal democratic society, in a way that respects the integrity of aboriginal traditions, have been offered by Tully (1995)⁽³⁾ and, more recently, Ivison (2002)(4). Both suggest that a viable liberal order requires the establishment of a constitutional modus vivendi that incorporates recognition of aboriginal custom and culture. However, as Ivison argues, mere incorporation of indigenous law may not be enough given that circumstances vary and both society and indigenous societies are themselves changing (2002⁽⁴⁾ 141-62). Rectification: the problem of rectification for past injustice, however, remains a serious difficulty, particularly when the effluxion of time has made the matter of ascribing to present generations responsibility for past injustice a difficult one, morally, legally, and politically. Waldron: Jeremy Waldron (1992)⁽⁵⁾, for one, has suggested that public policy should focus on future welfare rather than past injustice if the aim is to do justice to the concerns of aboriginal people (see also Sher, 1981⁽⁶⁾; Goodin, 2001⁽⁷⁾). Though others have offered theories of rectification that might do justice to the demands of aboriginal peoples (Kukathas, 2003a⁽⁸⁾; Hill, 2002⁽⁹⁾), it seems unlikely that those demands will ever be met philosophically,(...). 1. Mulgan, Richard (1989a) 'Should indigenous peoples have special rights?' Orbis, 33 (3): 375—88. 2. Mulgan, Richard ( 1989b) Maori, Pakeha and Democracy. Auckland: Oxford University Press. 3. Tully, James (1995) Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4. Ivison, Duncan (2002) Postcolonial Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 5. Waldron, Jeremy (1992) 'Superseding historic injustice'. Ethics, 103: 4-28. 6. Sher, George (1981) 'Ancient wrongs and modern rights'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 10 (1): 3-17. 7. Goodin, Robert E. (2001) 'Waitangi tales'. Australasian Journal ofPhi10sophy, 78 (3): 309-33. 8. Kukathas, Chandran (2003a) 'Responsibility for past injustice: how to shift the burden'. Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 2 (2): 165-88. 9. Hill, Renée A. (2002) 'Compensatory Justice: Over Time and Between Groups'. Journal of Political Philosophy, 10 392-415. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Mysticism	Wittgenstein	McGinn I 115 Magical theories rather play a subliminal role than an official role: approaches to Wittgenstein: A philosophical contemplation (The brown book, 263 ff): one could almost imagine that the naming was performed by a strange sacramental act, and that this is a magical relationship between the name and the thing. Cf. >Magical thinking. It is a common theme in Wittgenstein, that meaning triggers strange and occult ideas, The Tractatus is rather a place for magic ideas, of which Wittgenstein moves away later. Wittgenstein III 133 Philosophy/Wittgenstein: thesis: the most important of philosophy is to distinguish the meaningful and logically sayable from the unspeakable. What can be said is unimportant to human existence. The mystical is not what the world is, but that it is! VII 21 Pointing/Saying/Tractatus/Tetens: Wittgenstein refuses to say that there is nothing that cannot be meaningfully described. >Description, >Senseless. Solution/Tractatus: there is "inexpressible" that "shows itself". This is the "mystical" (> Tractatus 6.522). Cf. >Circular reasoning. VII 25 Whole/World/Tractatus/Tetens: the expression "the whole reality" means the world "within the limits of my language". This can be logically displayed in a meaningful way. The rest is not nothing, but can only be shown. Whole/Tractatus: "the feeling of the world as a limited whole is the mystical" (6.45). >Wholes. VI 106 Golden Bough/Frazer/Wittgenstein/SchulteVsFrazer: the book suffers from the weakness of presenting ritual and magical customs as if they were based on pseudo-scientific theories.	W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001
Myth	Ricoeur	I 19 Myth/Ricoeur: The problem of double sense is not only peculiar to psychoanalysis: the phenomenology of religion also knows it; the great cosmic symbols, such as earth, sky, water, life, trees, stones, and the myths, those strange stories about the origin and end of things, are their daily bread. >Sense/Ricoeur. To the extent that it is phenomenological rather than psychoanalytical, the myths, rites and beliefs it examines are not fairy tales, but rather a way of relating to fundamental reality, whatever it may be. >Desire/Ricoeur, >Interpretation/Ricoeur.	Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976
Narcissism	Paulhus	Corr II 246 Narcissism/Dark Triad Traits/Personality Traits/Paulhus/Williams/Zeigler-Hill/Marcus: Narcissism refers to exaggerated feelings of grandiosity, vanity, self-absorption and entitlement (e.g., Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001)⁽¹⁾. (…) the Dark Triad literature has focused almost exclusively on the subclinical manifestation of narcissism that considers it to be a normally distributed personality trait in the general population. Narcissism is considered a ‘dark’ personality trait because it interferes with various aspects of interpersonal functioning and contributes to a range of negative social outcomes (e.g., Dowgwillo et al., 2016)⁽²⁾. >Personality/Traits, >Egoism, >Egocentrism. II 247 (…) the most frequently used instrument for measuring narcissism is the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Hall, 1979⁽³⁾, 1981⁽⁴⁾). There are multiple versions of the NPI but the most popular consists of 40 items that are presented in a forced-choice format such that respondents must best describe themselves using either a narcissistic statement (e.g., ‘I like to be the center of attention’) or a non-narcissistic statement (e.g., ‘I prefer to blend in with the crowd’). Despite the multidimensional nature of the NPI, most studies concerning the Dark Triad have focused exclusively on the overall composite NPI score rather than distinguishing among the subscales of the NPI. Although the use of a composite score for the NPI simplifies the presentation of results, neglecting the specific factors may be problematic due to the differences among those factors. >Method. 1. Morf, C. C., & Rhodewalt, F. (2001). Expanding the dynamic self-regulatory processing model of narcissism: Research directions for the future. Psychological Inquiry, 12,243—251. 2. Dowgwillo, E. A., Dawood, S., & Pincus, A. L. (2016). The dark side of narcissism. In V. Zeigler-Hill & D. K. Marcus (Eds.), The dark side of personality: Science and practice in social, personality, and clinical psychology. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 3. Raskin, R., & Hall, C. S. (1979). A Narcissistic Personality Inventory. Psychological Reports, 45, 590. 4. Raskin, R., & Hall, C. S. (1981). The narcissistic personality inventory: Alternate form reliability and further evidence of construct validity. Journal of Personality Assessment, 45, 159—162. Zeigler-Hill, Virgil; Marcus, David K.: “The Dark Side of Personality Revisiting Paulhus and Williams (2002)”, In: Philip J. Corr (Ed.) 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, pp. 245-262.	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Narcissism	Williams	Corr II 246 Narcissism/Dark Triad Traits/Personality Traits/Paulhus/Williams/Zeigler-Hill/Marcus: Narcissism refers to exaggerated feelings of grandiosity, vanity, self-absorption and entitlement (e.g., Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001)⁽¹⁾. (…) the Dark Triad literature has focused almost exclusively on the subclinical manifestation of narcissism that considers it to be a normally distributed personality trait in the general population. Narcissism is considered a ‘dark’ personality trait because it interferes with various aspects of interpersonal functioning and contributes to a range of negative social outcomes (e.g., Dowgwillo et al., 2016)⁽²⁾. II 247 (…) the most frequently used instrument for measuring narcissism is the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Hall, 1979⁽³⁾, 1981⁽⁴⁾). There are multiple versions of the NPI but the most popular consists of 40 items that are presented in a forced-choice format such that respondents must best describe themselves using either a narcissistic statement (e.g., ‘I like to be the center of attention’) or a non-narcissistic statement (e.g., ‘I prefer to blend in with the crowd’). Despite the multidimensional nature of the NPI, most studies concerning the Dark Triad have focused exclusively on the overall composite NPI score rather than distinguishing among the subscales of the NPI. Although the use of a composite score for the NPI simplifies the presentation of results, neglecting the specific factors may be problematic due to the differences among those factors. >Personality/Traits. 1. Morf, C. C., & Rhodewalt, F. (2001). Expanding the dynamic self-regulatory processing model of narcissism: Research directions for the future. Psychological Inquiry, 12,243—251. 2. Dowgwillo, E. A., Dawood, S., & Pincus, A. L. (2016). The dark side of narcissism. In V. Zeigler-Hill & D. K. Marcus (Eds.), The dark side of personality: Science and practice in social, personality, and clinical psychology. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 3. Raskin, R., & Hall, C. S. (1979). A Narcissistic Personality Inventory. Psychological Reports, 45, 590. 4. Raskin, R., & Hall, C. S. (1981). The narcissistic personality inventory: Alternate form reliability and further evidence of construct validity. Journal of Personality Assessment, 45, 159—162. Zeigler-Hill, Virgil; Marcus, David K.: “The Dark Side of Personality Revisiting Paulhus and Williams (2002)”, In: Philip J. Corr (Ed.) 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, pp. 245-262.	WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Natural Duties	Rawls	I 114 Natural duties/Rawls: Examples are mutual assistance or help for someone who is in danger, provided that one does not put oneself excessively in danger, the prohibition to discriminate against or harm someone else. >Duties. Positive/negative duties: the distinction is only important in relation to the problem of priorities. Duties/Rawls: the difference to obligations is that natural duties are independent of institutions or social practices. They arise regardless of our actions. I 115 We have never (as individuals) committed ourselves not to be cruel. The situation is different when international law is affected. Contracts are necessary here - but then the term "natural" duties no longer applies. Commitment to justice/Rawls: is a fundamental duty from the point of view of justice as fairness. It also refers to arrangements that will only be established in the future. >Justice/Rawls, >Fairness/Rawls. I 115/116 Reciprocity: does not follow from a contractual agreement between individuals, but from the second part of the fairness principle: (See Rawls I 111: "This arrangement has been approved.") >Reciprocity.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Natural Kinds	AI Research	Norvig I 443 Natural kinds/AI research/Norvig/Russell: Some categories have strict definitions: an object is a triangle if and only if it is a polygon with three sides. On the other hand, most categories in the real world have no clear-cut definition; these are called natural kind categories. For example, tomatoes tend to be a dull scarlet (…). There is, however, variation: some tomatoes are yellow or orange, unripe tomatoes are green (…). Problem: This poses a problem for a logical agent. The agent cannot be sure that an object it has perceived is a tomato, and even if it were sure, it could not be certain which of the properties of typical tomatoes this one has. This problem is an inevitable consequence of operating in partially observable environments. One useful approach is to separate what is true of all instances of a category from what is true only of typical instances. So in addition to the category Tomatoes, we will also have the category Typical (Tomatoes). - ((s) >Stereotypes/Philosophical theories, >Natural kinds/Philosophical theories). >Ontology/AI research, >Categories/AI research, >Knowledge representation/AI research. Norvig I 469 The problems associated with natural kinds and inexact category boundaries have been addressed by Wittgenstein (1953)⁽¹⁾, Quine (1953)⁽²⁾, Lakoff (1987)⁽³⁾, and Schwartz (1977)⁽⁴⁾, among others. 1. Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations. Macmillan 2. Quine, W. V. (1953). Two dogmas of empiricism. In From a Logical Point of View, pp. 20–46. Harper and Row. 3. Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind. University of Chicago Press. 4. Schwartz, S. P. (Ed.). (1977). Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds. Cornell University Press.	Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010
Nature	Barrow	I 44 World/nature/order/purpose/Kant/Barrow: although we can not prove that nature is arranged according to purposes, we need to arrange the observation data as if it was. >Teleology, >Purposes/Aristotle, >Observation, >Method, >Measurements, >Science, >Regularities, >Evolution, >Purposes.	B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001
Nature	Rothbard	Rothbard III 169 Nature/economics/ownership/Rothbard: (…) the origin of all property is ultimately traceable to the appropriation of an unused nature-given factor by a man and his “mixing” his labor with this natural factor to produce a capital good or a consumers’ good. >Action/Rothbard, >Property/Rothbard, >Labour/Rothbard, >Land/Rothbard. For when we trace back through gifts and through exchanges, we must reach a man and an unowned natural resource. In a free society, any piece of nature that has never been used is unowned and is subject to a man’s ownership through his first use or mixing of his labor with this resource. How will an individual’s title to the nature-given factor be determined? If Columbus lands on a new continent, is it legitimate for him to proclaim all the new continent his own, or even that sector “as far as his eye can see”? Clearly, this would not be the case in the free society that we are postulating. Columbus or Crusoe would have to use the land, to “cultivate” it in some way, before he could be asserted to own. Rothbard III 170 There is no requirement, however, that land continue to be used in order for it to continue to be a man’s property. Interaction: (…) the question whether or not labor has been mixed with land is irrelevant to its market price or capital value; in catallactics, the past is of no interest. Rothbard III 171 VsRothbard: Some critics, especially the Henry Georgists, assert that, while a man or his assigns may be entitled to the produce of his own labor or anything exchanged for it, he is not entitled to an original, nature-given factor, a “gift of nature.” For one man to appropriate this gift is alleged to be an invasion of a common heritage that all men deserve to use equally. RothbardVsVs: This is a self-contradictory position, however. A man cannot produce anything without the co-operation of original nature-given factors, if only as standing room. In order to produce and possess any capital good or consumers’ good, therefore, he must appropriate and use an original nature-given factor. He cannot form products purely out of his labor alone; (…). >Animals/Rothbard, >Land/Rothbard. Rothbard III 172 Production/Rothbard: We must remember, also, what “production” entails. When man “produces,” he does not create matter. He uses given materials and transforms and rearranges them into goods that he desires. >Production/Rothbard, >Goods/Rothbard. Property/ownership: When we are considering legitimacy of title, the fact that land always embodies past labor becomes extremely important.⁽¹⁾ If animals are also “land” in the sense of given original nature factors, so are water and air. We have seen that “air” is inappropriable, a condition of human welfare rather than a scarce good that can be owned. However, this is true only of air for breathing under usual conditions. For example, if some people want their air to be changed, or “conditioned,” then they will have to pay for this service, and the “conditioned air” becomes a scarce good that is owned by its producers. Radio waves: Furthermore, if we understand by “air” the medium for the transmission of such things as radio waves and television images, there is only a limited quantity of wave lengths available for radio and for television purposes. This scarce factor is appropriable and ownable by man. In a free society, ownership of these channels would accrue to individuals just like that of land or animals: the first users obtain the property.⁽²⁾ 1. See the vivid discussion by Edmond About, Handbook of Social Economy (London: Strahan & Co., 1872), pp. 19–30. Even urban sites embody much past labor. Cf. Herbert B. Dorau and Albert G. Hinman, Urban Land Economics (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1928), pp. 205–13. 2. [Ronald] Coase has demonstrated that Federal ownership of airwaves was arrogated, in the 1920’s, not so much to alleviate a preceding “chaos,” as to forestall this very acquisition of private property rights in airwaves, which the courts were in the process of establishing according to common law principles. Ronald H. Coase, “The Federal Communications Commission,” Journal of Law and Economics, October, 1959, pp. 5, 30-32.	Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Necessity	Armstrong	III 77 Logical Necessity/Armstrong: ist the strongest form - physical necessity: is weaker, because it is contingent! - Even weaker: universal quantification (is a mere regularity.) - Important Argument: it is impossible to infer from a law to universal quantification. - Law: physical necessity. III 96 Necessity/Universals/Armstrong: now we can clarify the concept of necessity between universals. - We translate "N(F,G)" (the assertion of a state, which is at the same time a relationship) as follows: the F-ness of something makes the G-ness of the same thing necessary by virtue of the universals F and G. That is not simply: universal quantification: for all x, x". F-ness makes it necessary that x is G - that would regularity theory. >Regularity Theory. Necessity/Armstrong: exists rather between types than between tokens: the F-ness of something, not a"s F-ness. III 163 Necessity/Possible Worlds/Armstrong: possible worlds do not need "possibilia" themselves. - Necessity: does not have to be equal in all possible worlds! In some possible worlds the necessity might not apply. A law of nature can have different status in different possible worlds. Notation: "square" N": necessity in all possible worlds - (strong necessity) III 166 Weak necessity: not all possible worlds - Notation:"necessary (square) ("Socrates exists > Socrates is human)" (operator before the entire conditional. (>Range/Scope). III 164 ArmstrongVsStrong N: requires U to be necessary - but Universals are contingent - III 165 VsStrong Necessity in possible worlds where there are no Fs and Gs it is obliged to uninstantiated universals. Place II 59 Necessity/Place: (conceptualist): only de dicto! - Only type of de re: causal necessity: but contrast here is not contingency, but independence - whether causal need is present, is observed a posteriori (therefore contingent) - contingent: i.e. the dependence was causal or it was not. Place II 59 Necessity/de dicto: (a priori): can something be denied without contradiction? (Linguistic question) - according to this criterion: token identity: typically contingent - type identity: typically necessary - Conceptualism/Place: contingent hypotheses of type-identity become a necessary truth, when the conventional criteria of attribution of universals change. II (c) 95 Necessity/Armstrong: stems only from identity! - Logical possibility: is not possible between separate entities (E.g. cause/effect) - (This is controversial). Martin II 135 Necessity/Contingency/Quine/Martin: puts both on the same level (like many precursors). Quine, early: seemed to tip towards the side of contingency, Quine, late: according to the necessity: Figures for physics, or principle of identity of empirically isomorphic theories.	Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Necessity	Place	Armstrong III 77 Logical Necessity/Armstrong: ist the strongest form - physical necessity: is weaker, because it is contingent! - Even weaker: universal quantification (is a mere regularity.) - Important Argument: it is impossible to infer from a law to universal quantification. - Law: physical necessity. Armstrong III 96 Necessity/Universals/Armstrong: now we can clarify the concept of necessity between universals. - We translate "N(F,G)" (the assertion of a state, which is at the same time a relationship) as follows: the F-ness of something makes the G-ness of the same thing necessary by virtue of the universals F and G. That is not simply: universal quantification: for all x, x". F-ness makes it necessary that x is G - that would regularity theory. >Regularity Theory. Necessity/Armstrong: exists rather between types than between tokens: the F-ness of something, not a"s F-ness. Armstrong III 163 Necessity/Possible Worlds/Armstrong: possible worlds do not need "possibilia" themselves. - Necessity: does not have to be equal in all possible worlds! In some possible worlds the necessity might not apply. A law of nature can have different status in different possible worlds. Notation: "square" N": necessity in all possible worlds - (strong necessity) Armstrong III 166 Weak necessity: not all possible worlds - Notation:"necessary (square) ("Socrates exists > Socrates is human)" (operator before the entire conditional. (>Range/Scope). Armstrong III 164 ArmstrongVsStrong N: requires U to be necessary - but Universals are contingent - III 165 VsStrong Necessity in possible worlds where there are no Fs and Gs it is obliged to uninstantiated universals. Place II 59 Necessity/Place: (conceptualist): only de dicto! - Only type of de re: causal necessity: but contrast here is not contingency, but independence - whether causal need is present, is observed a posteriori (therefore contingent) - contingent: i.e. the dependence was causal or it was not. Place II 59 Necessity/de dicto: (a priori): can something be denied without contradiction? (Linguistic question) - according to this criterion: token identity: typically contingent - type identity: typically necessary - Conceptualism/Place: contingent hypotheses of type-identity become a necessary truth, when the conventional criteria of attribution of universals change. Armstrong II (c) 95 Necessity/Armstrong: stems only from identity! - Logical possibility: is not possible between separate entities (E.g. cause/effect) - (This is controversial). Martin II 135 Necessity/Contingency/Quine/Martin: puts both on the same level (like many precursors). Quine, early: seemed to tip towards the side of contingency, Quine, late: according to the necessity: Figures for physics, or principle of identity of empirically isomorphic theories.	Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Necessity	Quine	I 344/45 Properties/Quine: are no necessary or contingent properties (VsModal Logic) - are only more or less important properties. >Properties/Quine. II 143 ff "Nec." is predicate in laws, extensional, no quote, but unclear - "Q" (functor) modal logic, intensional de re: is out of range: x = planets, x = 9, 9 odd - predicate applies to value of the variable, not to the name. - De Re: referencing position. De dicto: the term that is meant is in the sentence: "nec." planets odd: is wrong. De re: E.g. spy should be an essential property (wrong) - not a belief de re (essential property). Modal Logic/Quine: the entire metalanguage is context-dependent - what role does someone or something play? - Same level as essential properties. Necessity/(Quine: the whole concept only makes sense in the context! propositional attitude/Quine: is preserved! - But not de re. >de re/Quine, >de dicto/Quine. VII (h) 152 Necesity/Quine: works only for intensional objects, they should necessarily be like this or like that (s) conceptually. X 133 Necessity/principle/Quine: the principle of minimum mutilation is what underlies the logical necessity: it can explain the nature of the necessity which is connected to the logical and mathematical truth. - ((s) > Simplicity). Rorty IV 60 Necessary/contingent/Quine: there is no distinction between necessary and contingent truths.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Necessity	Stalnaker	I 18 Necessary a posteriori/Jackson: thesis: necessity is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts. It results from optional descriptive semantics that happens to characterize natural languages: a mechanism of establishing references. >Necessity a posteriori, >Reference. StalnakerVsJackson: the reference-defining mechanisms are not optional as part of meta-semantics. They are part of the presentation of why internal states can be representational at all. >Representation, >Mental states. I 53 Necessary proposition/Lewis/Stalnaker: according to Lewis, there is only one necessary proposition: the set of all possible worlds. >Necessity/Lewis. In order to know that it is true, i.e. that the real world is within this set. For this, you do not need to know any facts about the modal reality. Necessary truth is not made true by the facts. >Facts, >Truthmakers, >Actual world/Lewis. I 64 Metaphysical necessity/metaphysical possibility/Lewis/Louis/Stalnaker: it means: if you have a range of all possibilities, you can quantify with them. The modal operators are then just the quantifiers. >Metaphysical possibility. Error: one can then still be wrong, but only about how one has to understand a sentence - not about how a possible situation would have to be. >Understanding, >Situations. I 189 Necessary a posteriori/contingent a priori/Stalnaker: assuming the inventor’s name was Judson - then both sentences, both "Judson invented the zipper" and "Julius invented ...", are necessary and both are contingent. >Reference/Stalnaker. Contingent: both are contingent because the statement about Judson is a priori equivalent to the one about Julius. Necessary: both are necessary because the statement "Julius is Judson" is a statement with two rigid designators - although the reference is determined by various causal chains. >Proper names, >Rigidity, >Descriptions, >Contingency. I 201 Necessity/N/Quine/Kripke/Stalnaker: before Quine and Kripke, all N were considered to be verbal or conceptual. >de dicto, >Necessity/Kripke, >Necessity/Quine, >de re. Quine: one must always be skeptical about N, analyticity and a priori. Kripke: he was the first to move empiricism and terminology apart - by finding examples for contingent a priori and necessary a posteriori. Thereby, the separatation epistemic/metaphysical arose. >Epistemic/ontologic, >Metaphysics. I 202 Def nomologically necessary/Stalnaker: (in possible worlds x): nomologically necessary means true in all possible worlds that have the same laws as the possible world x ((s) relative to possible world x). Natural Laws/laws of nature/LoN/Stalnaker: thesis: laws of nature are contingent. They do not apply to possible worlds. >Natural laws, >Possible worlds. Some authors: laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. Logic/Stalnaker/(s): logic cannot show what is metaphysically possible. I 204 Necessity/conceptual/metaphysics/Stalnaker: the entire distinction is based on a confusion of a property of propositions with a property of linguistic and mental representations. Proposition: their contingency or necessity has nothing to do with our terms and their meanings. >Concepts, >Possibility. Possibilities: possibilities would be the same, even if we had never thought of them. >Conceivability/Chalmers. Conceptually possible: simple metaphysical possibilities that we can imagine are conceptually possible. >Metaphysical possibility. I 205 Necessary a posteriori/Kripke/Stalnaker: the need stems from the fact that the secondary intension is necessary - the a posteriori character stems from the fact that the primary intension is a contingent proposition. >Intensions/Stalnaker.	Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Negation	Frege	Chisholm II 181 ff Negation/Frege/Simons: negative facts pose a problem here. Solution: we simply take two truth values (true/false) and a function that swaps the two. WittgensteinVsFrege: a connection should not be represented as a function. Operator N: forms a conjugate's negation from a sentence: the asserted (the used variables) are false. Notation: x^: all values of x. Negation/Simons: negation only has the smallest range: atomic sentences. Operator N: always negates the disjunction, never the conjunction, because of Wittgenstein’s need for atoms. Ontology: only complexes and the verbs E! and N. Frege IV 61 Negation/denial/judgment/FregeVsKant: Kant speaks of affirmative and negative judgments. That is quite unnecessary. Even a negative judgment is a simple judgment. >Judgment, >Sentence, >Thought. IV 64 Negation/denial/Frege: negation is not equal to the judgments. It is not an "opposite pole" to the judgments. IV 69 Description/subordinate clause/name/Frege: E.g. "The negation of the notion that 3 is greater than 5" - this expression refers to a specific individual thing. This individual thing is a notion. The definite article turns the entire expression into a single name, a representative of a proper name. IV passim Thought/Frege: to every idea belongs its negation as an independent second idea. Thoughts are not made up, but grasped. Their truth is not their being thought. They are timeless, precisely because they must always carry a determination of time with them. Thus, "today" becomes "yesterday" and "I" become "He" (two thoughts). By replacing "horse" with "mare" the thought does not change, only the coloring. Tugendhat II 66f Negation/Frege: negation is not a property and does not always come with the sign of negation. E.g. "Christ is immortal" is not negative per se. The negation sign applies only to the propositional content. Proof: negation in sub clauses: only the whole sentence is asserted. In the clause (non-asserting) the "not" belongs to the propositional content from the outset. Tugendhat II 12 Proposition/Frege/Tugendhat: negation always refers to the propositional content, not to the assertion. >Proposition, >Propositional content.	F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Negation	Wessel	I 157 Negation/Frege: Frege does not distinguish between internal and external negation. >Internal negation, >External negation, >Negation/Frege, >G. Frege. I 325 Terms/Negation/Wessel: singular terms and categorical terms (which include everything) can not be negated. >Singular terms. General terms can be negated. >General terms. Negation of singular terms: is only possible in a range of 2 items and again leads to a singular term. "Non-object": is no term! Negation of "swimmer" is not "non-swimmers", but also e.g., iron.	Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999
Negation	Wiggins	II 295 Inner/outer negation/Brian Medlin: E.g. paradox of movement. Problem: to choose between the last moment of rest and the first movement (two Dedekind cuts) 1. "not moving rrr or rr (followed or led or both: of rest) 2. "it is not the case that x was moving: not rbr 3. x was moving: only bb or bbb This is a good example because it has no meaningless names. II 299 Inner/outer negation/Wiggins: the problem: (distinguishing between final rest/first movement) appears in a simple language elsewhere, even if one has avoided "is in motion". Instead formula with "satisfies": "at which point did it stopped being true that "not (x moved)" even though x itself still does not move?" No solution: intuitionistic, sentence of the excluded middle: then there is a problem in the meta language: between predicate negation and sentence negation. >Excluded middle. Standard solution for single negation in object language/meta language (+) - Problem: it does not explain why it is attractive to make the difference: a) it can be true that it is not the case, that El Dorado is located in Venezuela - and b) it is not true that El Dorado is not-in-Venezuela (dashes). This difference of predicate modification is not made clear in the modal logic. >Modal logic. II 300 Solution: uniform functor of predicates on predicates, long and short range, both forms derivable apart. Semantically different interpretations, to build syntactically distinguishable structures. Predicate negation: here the functor "no" leads from the predicate to its complement. II 301 Sentence negation: here the functor leads from the predicate to predicate, e.g. from the universal predicate "λx (Socrates is bald)" (assuming he was bald) to zero predicate "not[λx (Socrates is bald)])". II 301 Necessary/Wiggins: analog to inner/outer negation: Tradition: to blurr difference after the first method: E.g. "necessarily Socrates is a human" and "Socrates is necessarily a human". Wiggins pro second method >satisfaction for sentences with "necessary": Wiggins per existence as necessary property >existential generalization.	Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Neo-Republicanism	Dagger	Gaus I 174 Neo-Republicanism/Dagger: (...) the republican concepts and idioms of earlier eras still speak to present concerns. Thus Sandel tries in Democracy's Discontent⁽¹⁾ to devise a 'public philosophy' for the United States by reclaiming the republicanism of the American Founding and the 'political economy of citizenship' that governed American thinking about economic relationships, he argues, into the late nineteenth century. Dagger: But that is not to say that neorepublican theorists have shied away from prescription as they have explored the implications of republicanism for contemporary politics. To the contrary, their recommendations range from the specific - national or civic service programmes (Barber, 1984⁽²⁾: 298—303), campaign finance reform (Sunstein, 1988⁽³⁾: 1576—8), and compulsory voting (Dagger, 1997⁽⁴⁾: 145—51), for example - to such general issues as national identity (Miller, 1995)⁽⁵⁾, economic arrangements that foster citizenship and strong communities (Sandel, 1996⁽⁶⁾: Part Il; Sullivan, 1986⁽⁷⁾; ch. 7), and the justification of punishment (Braithwaite and Pettit, 1990)⁽⁸⁾. They are not so united on any of these points as to warrant the claim that there is a neorepublican programme for political change, but it is possible to discern four broad themes on which they do agree. These are the interrelated themes of political equality, freedom as self-government, deliberative politics, and civic virtue (cf. Sunstein, 1988⁽³⁾: 1548). Cf. >Equality/Neo-republicanism. 1. Sandel, Michael ( 1996) Democracy 's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Barber, Benjamin (1984) Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 3. Sunstein, Cass (1988) 'Beyond the republican revival'. Yale Law Journal, 97 (July): 1539-89. 4. Dagger, Richard (1997) Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism. New York: Oxford Umversity Press. 5. Miller, David (1995) On Normality. Oxford: Clarendon 6. Sandel, Michael ( 1996) Democracy 's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 7. Sullivan, William (1986) Reconstructing Public Philosophy. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 8. Braithwaite, John and Philip Pettit (1990) Not Just Deserts: A Republican Theory of Criminal Justice. Oxford: Clarendon. Dagger, Richard 2004. „Communitarianism and Republicanism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Neuroimaging	Canli	Corr I 310 Neuroimaging/Canli: One approach is to report the results of whole-brain analyses, in addition to analyses from a priori regions of interest.(⁽¹⁾-(⁶⁾) Another approach is to conduct functional connectivity analyses, to investigate how activation across spatially distinct regions is correlated. For example, in our study of state-trait associations of Extraversion and Neuroticism with ACC activation (Canli, Amin, Haas et al. 2004)⁽⁷⁾. >Neural networks, >Brain, >Extraversion, >Neuroticism. Corr I 311 We have developed a third approach (Omura, Aron and Canli 2005)⁽⁸), which represents an alternative to the traditional regions of interest (ROI) approach, which we termed the ‘regions of variance’ (ROV) approach. The ROI approach focuses on regions that have been shown to be consistently activated across prior studies that employed a similar task paradigm. VsROI: brain regions that exhibit a great deal of variance from one study participant to another may never show sufficient group-level activation to pass statistical thresholds in traditional imaging studies, and therefore not ever be reported. We therefore developed an alternative methodology that identifies regions of variance (ROVs), i.e., areas that display the most variability across subjects for a given within-subject contrast. We then treat these ROVs as regions of interest to assess whether particular variables of interest can explain the variance exhibited in these regions. The conceptual difference between the ROV and ROI approaches is considerable: ROVs are empirically derived and therefore devoid of any theoretical assumptions or biases about the neural substrate and its relation to the cognitive process under study. In contrast, ROIs typically represent considerable assumptions about the cognitive functions they are believed to play a role in. Problems/VsROV: we also discovered that the ROV approach does, on occasion, miss interesting brain-behaviour correlations. Corr I 312 For example, the ROV approach missed the association between Extraversion and ACC response to positive stimuli in the left hemisphere. It turned out that, although the correlation between Extraversion and ACC activation was highly significant, the actual range of values that contributed to this correlation was relatively narrow, producing a low degree of between-subject variance. >Measurements, >Method. 1. Phan, K. L., Wager, T., Taylor, S. F. et al. 2002. Functional neuroanatomy of emotion: a meta-analysis of emotion activation studies in PET and fMRI, Neuroimage 16: 331–48 2. Phillips, M. L., Drevets, W. C., Rauch, S. L. et al. 2003a. Neurobiology of emotion perception I: The neural basis of normal emotion perception, Biological Psychiatry 54: 504–14 3. Phillips, M. L., W. C. Drevets, et al. 2003b. Neurobiology of emotion perception II: Implications for major psychiatric disorders. Biological Psychiatry 54: 515–28 4. Wager, T. D., Phan, K. L., Liberzon, I. et al. 2003. Valence, gender, and lateralization of functional brain anatomy in emotion: a meta-analysis of findings from neuroimaging, Neuroimage 19: 513–31 5. Baas, D., Aleman, A. and Kahn, R. S. 2004. Lateralization of amygdala activation: a systematic review of functional neuroimaging studies, Brain Research Reviews 45: 96–103 6. Phan, K. L., T. D. Wager, et al. 2004. Functional neuroimaging studies of human emotions, CNS Spectrums 9: 258–66 7. Canli, T., Amin, Z., Haas, W. et al. 2004. A double dissociation between mood states and personality traits in the anterior cingulate. Behavioral Neuroscience 118: 897–904 8. Omura, K., Aron, A. and Canli, T. 2005. Variance maps as a novel tool for localizing regions of interest in imaging studies of individual differences, Cognitive Affect and Behavioural Neuroscience 5: 252–61 Turhan Canlı,“Neuroimaging of personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Newspapers	Policy of Hungary	Krastev I 76 Newspapers/Policy of Hungary/Krastev: Rather than censoring the press, in the old communist manner, Orbán has forced the closure of hostile newspapers on trumped-up economic grounds. And he has subsequently arranged for his wealthy friends and allies to buy much of the national and local media and to turn TV channels and newspapers alike into organs of state power. This is how he has shielded from public scrutiny both his electoral manipulation and epic levels of insider corruption. >Imitation/Policy of Hungary, >Tradition/Post-communist countries. The Orbán-style illiberal regimes that are on the rise in Eastern Europe thus combine Carl Schmitt’s understanding of politics as a melodramatic showdown between friends and enemies and the institutional façade of liberal democracy.	Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019
Non-Existence	Hintikka	II 37 Non-existent objects/unrealized possibilities/HintikkaVsQuine/Hintikka: thesis: there are non-existent objects in the actual world. >Possibilia. HintikkaVsQuine: the philosophers who reject them have thought too strongly in syntactic paths. Hintikka/thesis: one has to answer the question rather semantically (model-theoretically). >Model theory. Fiction/Ryle: test: is the paraphrase valid? >Fictions. Terence ParsonsVsRyle: Ryle's test fails in cases like e.g. "Mr. Pickwick is a fiction ". HintikkaVsParsons: the relevance of the criterion is questionable at all. >Relevance. II 38 Ontology/language/linguistically/HintikkaVsRyle: how should linguistic questions such as paraphrasability decide on the ontological status? >Ontology. Solution/Hintikka: for the question whether there are non-existent objects: model theory. E.g. Puccini's Tosca is about whether the soldiers have bullets in their rifle barrels. N.B.: even if they have some, they would be just fictional! Model Theory/Hintikka: the model theory provides a serious answer. ((s) "true in the model", means it is true in the story that the bullets are there). HintikkaVsParsons: one should not argue too strongly syntactically, i.e. not merely ask what conclusions can be drawn and which cannot. Acceptance/acceptability/inferences/Hintikka: asking for the acceptability of inferences and of language and intuitions is syntactic. Singular Terms/ontological obligation/existence/Parsons: Parsons argues that the use of singular terms requires us to use an existential generalization. And thus also requires a referent. That is, it is a commitment to an inference. HintikkaVsParsons. > href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-list.php?concept=Ontological+Commitment">Ontological commitment. II 39 Non-existent objects/substance/world/Tractatus/Hintikka: the reason why Wittgenstein postulated his "objects" as the substance of the world, ((s) which cannot be increased or diminished), is that their existence cannot be expressed.) >Existence statements. II 103 Non-existence/not well-defined/HintikkaVsMontague: the Montague semantics does not allow the question of existence or non-existence to be meaningless because an individual is not well-defined in a world. ((s) Because Montague assumes the domain of individuals to be constant). Individual Domain/solution/Hintikka: we have to allow that the individual domain is not constant. Problem: Quantification/belief context/existence/truth/Hintikka: in the following example we must presuppose existence so that the proposition can be true: (11) John is looking for a unicorn and Mary is looking for it too. ((a) the same unicorn). ((s) numbering sic, then continue with (8)) Range/quantifier/Hintikka: in the only natural reading of (11) one has to assume that the range of the implicit quantifier is such that "a unicorn" has a wider range than "searches/looks for". ((s) That is, that both are looking for the same unicorn). >Objects of thought, >Cob/Hob/Nob exmaple/Geach. Problem: how can one know whether both subjects believe in the same individual?	Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Non-Existence	Montague	Hintikka I 103 Non-existence/not well-defined/HintikkaVsMontague: Montague's semantics does not allow the question of existence or non-existence to be meaningless because an individual is not well-defined in a world. ((s) Because in Montague the domain of individuals is assumed to be constant). >Possible worlds, >Identity between worlds, >Individual domain, >Identification, cf. >Counterparts, >Counterpart relation, >Counterpart theory. Individual domain/solution/Hintikka: we have to allow that the individual domain is not constant. But there is a problem: Quantification/belief context/existence/truth/Hintikka: in the following example we must presuppose existence so that the proposition can be true: (11) John is looking for a unicorn and Mary is looking for it, too. ((s) the same unicorn). Cf. >Thought objects, >Belief objects. Range/quantifier/Hintikka: in the only natural reading of (11) one has to assume that the range of the implicit quantifier is such that "a unicorn" has a wider range than "looks for". >Range, >Quantification, >Narrow/wide range. ((s) That is, that both are looking for unicorns.) Problem: how can one know whether both subjects believe in the same individual?). >Unicorn example. I 103 Existence/W-Question/Unicorn/Hintikka: nevertheless the example (11) shows that the way of reading should not oblige us to accept the existence of unicorns. Cf. >Ontological commitment. Non-existence/epistemic context/intensional/belief/Hintikka: it is obviously possible that two people can look for the same thing, even if it does not exist. Solution: We allow that well-defined individuals do not exist in some worlds. For this, only a slight modification is necessary. Problem: with more complex sentences, all problems come back: I 104 Example: John does not know whether unicorns exist, yet he is looking for a unicorn because Mary is looking for it. Problem: here John must be able to recognize a special unicorn. (Otherwise the sentence that uses "it" would not be true), although he is considering the possible non-existence. >Anaphora, >Index Words, >Indexicality, >Identification. World line/Hintikka: in order to extent the Montague semantics, we must allow more or less unnatural world lines. >World lines, cf. >Four-dimensionalism.	Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Norms	Mackie	Stegmüller IV 254 Norms/standards/Mackie: are directly effective, not only on arrangements - impartial system of values: is accepted because it is convenient. >Values, >Ethics, >Morals, >Convention.	Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Numbers	Frege	II 18 f Numbers/Frege: e.g. 16 = 4², 4 x 4 = 4². Here we see that equality of meaning does not lead to equality of thought. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >Thoughts, >Equality, >Equations. II 66 ff The figure contains the expression of a concept. >Concepts. Properties will be expressed by a concept. A concept may fall under a higher one. E.g. there is at least one square root of 4. This is not a statement about a certain number 2, nor about -2, but about a concept, namely the square root of 4. II 81 f There are no variable numbers. Variable: do we not denote variable numbers by x, y, z? This way of speaking is used, but these letters are not proper names of variable numbers, like "2" and "3" are proper names of constant numbers. We cannot specify which properties "x" has in contrast to y. >Variables. Variable: is not a proper name of an indefinite or variable number. X has no properties (only in the context). "Indefinitely" is not an adjective, but an adverb for the process of calculating. Generality/Frege: generality is not a meaning but a hint. Proper Names: π, i, e are not variables! Generality: here, the number has to play two roles: as an object it is called a variable, as a property, it is called a value. Function: has generality, is a law. To any number of the x-range a number from the y-range is assigned. A function is not a variable! (An elliptic function is not an elliptic variable). The function is unsaturated. >Unsaturated. II 77 Number/object/calculating/addition/Frege: only from the meaning of the words "the number 4" (Frege: = object) we can say that it is the result of combining 3 and 1. Not of the concept. Calculation result: is an object, the result of the calculation: is not a concept. II 85 Number/Frege: e.g. "a variable takes on a value". Here, the number has to play two roles: as an object it is called a variable, as a property, it is called a value. I 38 Numbers/Frege: from physical observations no conclusions can be drawn about numbers. I 47 Quantity/Frege: quantity is a concept. Number: is an object. >Objects. I 48 Numbers/Newton: numbers are the ratio of each size to another. FregeVsNewton: here, the notions of size and ratio are presupposed. I 49 Numbers/Frege: Problem: numbers as sets: here, the concept of quantity is pressupposed. I 60 Number/Frege: number is no multiplicity. That would exclude 0 and 1. I 62 Number/one/unit/property/Frege: "One" cannot be a property. Otherwise, there would be no thing that does not have this property. I 82 Not the objects but the concepts are the bearers of the number. Otherwise, different numbers could be assigned to the same example. Thus the abstraction is accompanied by a judgment. I 90 A number is not the property of a concept. Number: is an abstract object, not a property -> see below. Number Equality/equality: number equality is a concept (not an object). I 100/101 Def Quantity/Frege: the quantity which belongs to the concept F is the scope of the concept equal numbered to the concept F. I 100 Scope/concept scope/Frege: if the straight a is parallel to straight b, then the scope of the concept of straight parallel to straight a is equal to the scope of the concept straight parallel to the straight b and vice versa - scope equality. >Term scope, >Equality. I 110 Number/Frege/(s): comes from the distinction concept term scope (quantity)/object (number). If the object is zero, the quantity that belongs to this concept is one. ((s) This is how Frege gets from 0 to 1: one is the number-of objects falling under the concept "equal-to-zero", namely one object. Zero ist the number of objects falling under the concept "equal-to-zero-and-not-equal-to-zero"). >Zero, >One. I 121 Numbers/Frege: numbers are not concepts. They are (abstract) objects (see above). Quantities are concepts. I 128 Term: e.g. square root of -1. This cannot be used with the definite article. I 135 Number/Frege: a number is neither heaps of things, nor a property of such. I 130 Number system/expansion/Frege: in the expansion, the meaning is not be established arbitrarily. E.g. the meaning of the square root is not already invariably established before the definitions, but it is determined by them. ((s) Frege: wants to point at the meaning as use within a system.). The new numbers are given to us as scopes of concepts. I 136 Each figure is an equation. >Equations. Berka I 83 Number/Frege: numbers must be defined in order to be able to present completeness of evidence at all - (> sequence).⁽¹⁾ 1- G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964	F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983
Numbers	Gödel	Berka I 348 Numbers/Gödel: numbers cannot be braught into a spatial arrangement. Goedel calls numbers classes of classes.⁽¹⁾ >Classes, >Numbers/Frege, >Numbers/Poincaré, >Numbers/Quine, cf. >Sets, >Set Theory. 1. K. Gödel: Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I, Mh. Math. Phys. 38 (1931), pp. 175-198.	Göd II Kurt Gödel Collected Works: Volume II: Publications 1938-1974 Oxford 1990 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983
Obedience	Ancient Philosophy	Gaus I 308 Obedience/Principled disobedience/Ancient philosophy/Keyt/Miller: The shallow contractualism of the Crito raises at once the problem of principled disobedience. >Contractualism/Ancient philosophy, >Social contract/Ancient philosophy. Crito/Plato: Since the covenant that Socrates, according to the Laws of Athens, tacitly consented to 'by deeds, not by words' (Cr. 52d) is not the origin of justice, nothing in the covenant prevents laws and lawful orders from being unjust. Indeed, the Laws concede that Socrates' lawful execution is unjust (Cr. 54bc). It is a Socratic principle, moreover, that one should never do anything unjust (Cr. 49b). Problem: Suppose, now, that the man ordered to administer the hemlock to Socrates realized that Socrates' execution was unjust. Would the personified Laws of Athens allow him to disobey the lawful order? They insist, after all, that they do not issue savage commands, but offer two alternatives: persuade or obey (Cr. 52a). (Those who do neither are guilty of using force, the antithesis of persuasion, against Athens: Cr. 51c2.) Persuasion: The interpretation of the 'persuade or obey' doctrine is the central interpretive issue concerning the Crito, and it has generated a mountain of commentary. Authoritarianism: Interpretations range from authoritarian at one end of the spectrum - 'Change the law if you can; if you cannot, do what it commands or else emigrate' - to liberal at the other end: Liberalism: 'You can disobey as long as you act justly and render a persuasive account of your action'. Every aspect of 'persuade or obey' raises a question. What is the nature of the disjunction? Persuasion: to whom is the persuasion addressed - the assembly or the popular courts? Obedience: to what is obedience owed - an official's command, a particular law or decree, or the legal Gaus I 309 system? Persuasion: what is it to persuade? Is it to fry to convince or to succeed in convincing? Does it count as persuasion if one renders a reasonable account of a just action, whether one convinces anyone or not? Crito/Plato: the interpretation of the Crito is further complicated by the fact that in Plato's Apology Socrates mentions several cases where he disobeyed or would disobey those in authority (AP. 29c—d, 32a—e). (Five lengthy studies of these matters are: Allen, 1980⁽¹⁾; Brickhouse and Smith, 1994⁽²⁾; Kraut, 1984⁽³⁾; Santas, 1979⁽⁴⁾; and Woozley, 1979⁽⁵⁾.) >Persuasion/Aristotle, >Totalitarianism, >Coercion/Ancient philosophy, >Constitution/Plato, >Constitution/Aristotle, >Politics/Plato, >Politics/Aristotle. 1. Allen, Reginald E. (1980) Socrates and Legal Obligation. Minneapolis: Umversity of Minnesota Press. 2. Brickhouse, Thomas C. and Nicholas D. Smith (1994) Plato 's Socrates. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3. Kraut, Richard (1984) Socrates and the State. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 4. Santas, Gerasimos (1979) Socrates: Philosophy in Plato 's Early Dialogues. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 5. Woozley, A. D. (1979) Law and Obedience: The Arguments of Plato's Crito. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Obedience	Psychological Theories	Haslam I 120 Obedience/Milgram experiment/psychological theories: (…) three new approaches to the experimental study of obedience have been developed that allow us to address real harm-doing without harming participants in the process. Cf. >Milgram experiment/psychological theories, >Vs Milgram. Haslam I 121 A. The first employs virtual reality simulations of the Milgram paradigm. In these it has been shown that behaviour in these simulations corresponds closely to that which is observed in the original paradigm (Slater et al., 2006)(1). B. The second involves using a technique called Immersive Digital Realism to train actors to play the role of normal participants in the Milgram paradigm (Haslam, Reicher and Millard, 2015)⁽²⁾. C. The third is based on the observation that what people do at 150 volts is a very accurate predictor of whether they will obey up to 450 volts. So why not stop the studies at the 150-volt mark where one can see if people will obey without getting them to actually do something harmful? This was the strategy adopted by Jerry Burger (2009a)⁽³⁾ in his replication of the Milgram paradigm. Haslam I 121 1. Several authors point to the need to consider the importance of disobedience as well as obedience (Bocchario and Zimbardo, 2010⁽⁴⁾; Dimow, 2004⁽⁵⁾; Jetten and Mols, 2014⁽⁶⁾; Passini and Morselli, 2009⁽⁷⁾; Rochat and Modigliani, 1995⁽⁸⁾). 2. A number of analyses point to features of the various relationships in the obedience paradigm that might help explain whether people obey or disobey authority. Wim Meeus and Quinten Raaijmakers (1995)⁽⁹⁾, for instance, argue that obedience does not result from an inability to resist scientific authority but rather from a cultural tendency to identify with the social system, combined with a tendency not to identify with our fellow citizens but to see them in terms of specific role positions – an analysis which suggests that in the Milgram studies participants relate to the learner in terms of the different roles that the two of them occupy rather than in terms of their common citizenship. 3. Rochat and Modigliani (1995)⁽⁸⁾: note that the villagers of Chambon were descendants of the persecuted Protestant minority in France (the Huguenots) and this meant that they likened the collaborationist Vichy Government to their own persecutors, and saw commonality between themselves and those who were persecuted. Their analysis concludes that once the persecutors became ‘them’ and the persecuted became ‘us’, the choice of whom to side with – of whether to obey or defy authority – became easy. See also >Goldhagen (1996)⁽¹⁰⁾. Haslam I 123 Reicher/Haslam: Thesis: We harm others to the extent that we listen to the appeals of malicious authorities above those of its victims. At the same time, there is now converging evidence that this has something to do with the extent to which we identify with one over the other (Haslam et al., 2014⁽¹¹⁾, 2015⁽²⁾; Reicher and Haslam, 2011a⁽¹²⁾; Reicher et al., 2012⁽¹³⁾). There are three areas in particular that need to be addressed in the future 1) We need to investigate the way in which different situational arrangements affect group formation and identification between the participant and the different parties within the obedience paradigm (Reicher and Haslam, 2011a⁽¹²⁾, 2011b⁽¹⁴⁾). Haslam I 124 2) We need to understand what sort of appeals make people side with the experimenter rather than with the learner, as well as the impact that participants’ own discourse has on their ability to disengage from these parties. 3) The aspect of language: only one of the exhortations, prods and prompts used be the experimenter in the studies is a direct order. In their replication study Burger and colleagues found that every time the experimenter gave this final prod, participants refused to continue (Burger, Girgis and Manning, 2011⁽¹⁵⁾), and in controlled studies of our own we observe that prod 4 (‘You have no other choice, you must go on’). is singularly ineffective in securing compliance (Haslam et al., 2014⁽¹¹⁾, 2015⁽¹⁶⁾). This is powerful evidence against the notion that participants in Milgram’s studies are simply following orders. 1. Slater, M., Antley, A., Davison, A., Swapp, D., Guger, C., Barker, C., et al. (2006) ‘A virtual reprise of the Stanley Milgram obedience experiments’, PLoS ONE, 1: e39. 2 Haslam, S.A., Reicher, S.D. and Millard, K. (2015) Shock treatment: Using immersive digital realism to restage and re-examine Milgram’s ‘Obedience to Authority’ research. PLoS ONE, 1O(3):e109015. 3. Burger, J. (2009a) ‘In their own words: Explaining obedience through an examination of participants’ comments’. Paper presented at the Meeting of the Society of Experimental Social Psychology, Portland, ME, 15—17 October. 4. Bocchiaro, P. and Zimbardo, P.G. (2010) ‘Defying unjust authority: An exploratory study, Current Psychology, 29: 155—70. 5. Dimow, J. (2004) ‘Resisting authority: A personal account of the Milgram obedience experiments’, Jewish Currents, January. 6. Jetten,J. and Mols, F. (2014) 5O:5O hindsight: Appreciating anew the contributions of Mi1grams obedience experiments, Journal of Social Issues, 70: 587—602. 7. Passini, S. and Morselli, D. (2009) 1Authority relationships between obedience and disobedience &, New Ideas in Psychology, 27: 9 6—106. 8. Rochat, F. and Modigliani, A. (1995) 4The ordinary quality of resistance: From Milgram’s laboratory to the village of Le Chambon’, Journal of Social Issues, 51: 195—210. 9. Meeus, W.H.J. and Raaijmakers, Q.A. (1995) ‘Obedience in modem society: The Utrecht studies’, Journal of Social Issues, 5 1: 155—75. 10. Goidhagen, D. (1996) Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. London: Little, Brown. 11. Haslam, S.A., Reicher, S.D. and Birney, M. (2014) ‘Nothing by mere authority: Evidence that in an experimental analogue of the Miigram paradigm participants are motivated not by orders but by appeals to science’, Journal of Social Issues, 70:473—88. 12. Reicher, S. and Haslam, S.A. (201 la) 4After shock? Towards a social identity explanation of the Milgram “obedience” studies’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 50: 163—9. 13. Reicher, S.D., Haslam, S.A. and Smith, J.R. (2012) 1Working towards the experimenter: Reconceptualizing obedience within the Milgram paradigm as identification-based followership’, Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7: 315—24. 14. Reicher, S.D. and Haslam, S.A. (201 lb) ‘Culture of shock: Milgram’s obedience studies fifty years on’, Scientific American Mind, 2 2(6): 3 0—5. 15. Burger, J.M., Girgis, Z.M., and Manning, C.C. (2011) ðln their own words: Explaining obedience to authority through an examination of participants’ comments’, Social Psychological and Personality Science, 2:460—6. 16. Haslam, S.A., Reicher, S.D. Millard, K. and McDonald, R. (2015) “Happy to have been of service”: The Yale archive as a window into the engaged followership of participants in Milgram’s “obedience” experiments’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 54: 55—83. Stephen Reicher and S. Alexander Haslam, „Obedience. Revisiting Milgram’s shock experiments”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Object	Minsky	I 199 Objects/properties/Artificial Intelligence/Minsky: It's usually impossible to perfectly define a word because you cannot capture everything you mean in just a phrase; an apple means a thousand things. However, you can usually say some of what you mean by making lists of properties. Properties/Minsky: The most useful sets of properties are those whose members do not interact too much. This explains the universal popularity of that particular combination of properties: size, color, shape, and substance. Because these attributes scarcely interact at all with one another (…). Orthogonality: you can imagine changing the color of a dress or its size, shape, or the fabric of which it's made, without altering any of its other properties. Representation: However, that doesn't explain why such changes do not interact inside the mind. Why is it so easy to imagine a small brown wooden cube or a long red silk skirt? The simplest explanation is that we represent each of the properties of material, color, size and shape in separate agencies. >Software-Agents/Minsky. I 204 Representation: How do we recognize our own ideas? At first, that must seem a strange question. But consider two different situations. In the first case, I hold up an apple and ask, What is this? We've already seen how such a sight could lead to activating polynemes for words like apple or fruit. In the second case, there is no apple on the scene, and I ask instead, What do we call those round, red, thin-peeled fruits? Yet this time, too, you end up with an apple thought. Isn't it remarkable that one can recognize a thing merely from hearing words? What is there in common to our recognizing things in two such different ways? The answer is that inside the brain, these situations really aren't so different. In neither case is there a real apple in the brain. In both cases, some part of mind must recognize what's happening in certain other parts of mind. We usually need additional information about constraints and relationships among the parts of things — for example, to represent the knowledge that the wheels of a car must be mounted underneath its body. To discover how we might represent such things is becoming a major concern of modern research in both psychology and Artificial Intelligence. >Representation/Minsky.	Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003
Object	Quine	I 102 Goodman: "Rabbitness": is a discontinuous space-time segment, which consists of rabbits. --- I 372f Objects of propositional attitude eliminated: "Thomas believes (Cicero has): no longer the form" Fab" a = Thomas, b = () - but: "Fa" where "F" is a complex expression - no longer "believes" term, but operator. I 402 Existence: does not arise from dichotomy "single thing" - "universal" - it does not matter whether they do exist. "Equator", "North Pole" - linking with stimuli is weak argument for primacy of physical objects, but makes terms accessible for all positions. >Existence/Quine. I 412 Object: name which is denoted by singular terms, accepts it as values - (but the singular term is eliminated!) - E.g. "glimmer", but not "glimmeriness". I 438 Ideal objects are not permitted - geometric objects are permitted (no identity without localization). I 435 Relativity: additional dimension: space-time: point moments are absolutely different, independent of relative movement of the viewpoint. II 30 Object/Quine: space-time piece can also be distributed or scattered. (Nominalism, Goodman). II 23 Physical object is deceptive - better space-time pieces - "space" and "places as such" untenable, otherwise there would be absolute standstill and absolute movement - 4-digit coordinates suffice - ontology of pure set theory - no more physical object. II 156 ff Object (physical)/Quine: arbitrarily scattered and arbitrarily singled out - pocket contents, single coin at various points in time, combination with the Eiffel Tower, space-time points, anything - are not so strongly body-oriented - identification like from one possible world to another: without content as long as no instructions are given - value of a variable. VI 32 Object/Ontology/Quine: bodies constitute themselves as ideal nodes in the centers of overlapping observation sentences - problem: observation sentences are not permanent - therefore the objectification (reification) is always already a theory. VI 34 Question: what should be considered real objectification and not just a theoretically useful one (like classes). VI 35 Abstract objects: it is pointless to speak of permanent stimulus phases - solution: pronouns and bound variables - Vs singular term: are often not referring - there must be unspecifiable irrational numbers - Solution: bound variable instead of singular term. VI 38f Objectification/Reification/Quine: for the first time in predicative connection of observation sentences - instead of their mere conjunction - "This is a blue pebble": calls for embedding pebble into the blue. VI 41 Abstract objects/Modal/Putnam/Parsons: modal operators can save abstract objects - QuineVsModal logic: instead quantification (postulation of objects) - so we can take the slack out of the truth function. >Modal Logic/Quine. VII (d) 69 Object/Quine: may be unconnected: E.g. USA Alaska. XII 36 Properties/Identity/Quine: Problem: (unlike objects) they are ultimately based on synonymy within a language - more language-specific identity. >Properties/Quine. V 39 Ultimately we do without rigorous individuation of properties and propositions. (different term scheme) - Frege dito: (Basic Laws): do not extend identity to terms. XII 68 Object/Theory/Quine: what is an object, ultimately, cannot be stated - only in terms of a theory - (ultimately overall theory, i.e. language use) - but wrong: to say that talk about things would only make sense within a wider range - that would correspond to the false thesis that no predicate applied to all things - there are universal predicates. >Mention, >use, >word, >object.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Objectivity	Wright	I 139 Subjective/objective/Wright: why do we not simply express all our "opinions about the strange with "I find .."? Answer: it is useful to have the objectified form of community, because often we can quite rightly accept a community response to the strange. ((s) otherwise the strange would not exist in the form in which we know it). >Language community, >Language behavior, >Language use, >Meaning, >Reference. I 139/40 There are terms that are too simple to argue about. E.g. the content of arithmetic assertions like "57 + 65 = 122" does not say anything about consensus and has therefore no logical consequences. >Arithmetics/Wittgenstein. But there would also be no standard of correctness to satisfy if not on every basal level could be a consensus presupposed. >Correctness/Wright. I 216 Representation/Wright: in contrast to that, the representative character of judgments e.g. on the forms of a children's puzzles has to do with: how very different we may be biologically constituted, or which natural laws would be effective, the variety of judgments must be seen as a symptom for cognitive dysfunction. >Cognitive coercion, >Judgments, >Knowledge, >Competence, >Laws of Nature.	WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Obligations	Rawls	I 113 Obligations/Rawls: 1. unlike moral requirements, obligations arise from voluntary action, whether explicitly or tacitly. >Actions, >Community. 2. the content of an obligation is always defined by an institution. >Institutions. 3. obligations are usually due to an individual, namely those individuals whose cooperation maintains a questionable arrangement. Examples are obligations resulting from a public office or marriage. It may be that someone is entitled to refuse obligations if this follows from the principle of fairness. >Fairness/Rawls, >Principles/Rawls. I 115/116 Reciprocity: does not follow from a contractual agreement between individuals, but from the second part of the fairness principle⁽¹⁾: I 116 (footnote) Commitments/M. Waltz/Rawls: Views to derive political obligations solely from consensus can be found in M. Walzer⁽²⁾. >Reciprocity, >M. Walzer. I 350 Duties/Commitment/Rawls: Question: under what conditions are we obliged to comply with an unfair law? It is a mistake that we would never be obliged to do this. >Laws, >Legislation, >Obligations, >Injustice. I 350 Up to certain limits, we are obliged to comply with unfair laws within the framework of our legal system. Problem: where are the limits? Different principles must be weighed here. Additional problem: our principles of justice accept an ideal society in perfect order, including strict compliance with laws. Inequality: when we are dealing with injustice, other principles come into play, including a theory of punishment, equitable justice, fair war, civil disobedience and military resistance. The theory of justice as fairness cannot be applied directly to it. >Punishment, >Punishment/Rawls. 1. See Rawls I 111: "This arrangement has been approved." 2. M. Walzer, Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War, and Citizenship, Cambridge, Mass. 1970, pp. Ix-xvi, 7-10,18-21, and ch. 5.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Obsolescence	Minsky	I 145 Obsolescence/ideas/knowledge//Minsky: Some ideas acquire undue influence. The Investment Principle: Our oldest ideas have unfair advantages over those that come later. The earlier we learn a skill, the more methods we can acquire for using it. Each new idea must then compete against the larger mass of skills the old ideas have accumulated. (Cf. Matthew principle). This is why it's so much easier to do new things in older ways. Obsolescence/Problem: The many superficial similarities will make it hard for you to tell which aspects of your old skills are unsuitable, and the easiest course is to keep applying your old technique, trying to patch each flaw until none show. Solution: In the long run, you'd probably do better by starting fresh with a new technique — and then borrowing what you can from your older skills. Evolution/Minsky: Evolution illustrates how processes can become enslaved by the investment principle. Why do so many animals contain their brains inside their heads — as with fish, amphibians, reptiles, birds, and bats? This arrangement was inherited long before our earliest aquatic ancestor first crawled upon the land three hundred million years ago. For many of those animals — woodpeckers, for example — another arrangement might serve at least as well. But once the pattern of centralizing so many functions in the head was established, it carried with it great networks of dependencies involving many aspects of anatomy. Because of this, any mutation that changed any part of that arrangement would disrupt many other parts and lead to dreadful handicaps, at least in the short run of evolution. And because evolution is so inherently short-sighted, it would not help if, over longer spans of time, such changes could lead to advantages. Cf. >Evolution/Dennett, >Evolution/Gould.	Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003
Online Search	Bostrom	I 186 Search/superintelligence/Bostrom: With advances in artificial intelligence, it would become possible for the programmer to offload more of the cognitive labor required to figure out how to accomplish a given task. In an extreme case, the programmer would simply specify a formal criterion of what counts as success and leave it to the AI to find a solution. To guide its search, the AI would use a set of powerful heuristics and other methods to discover structure in the space of possible solutions. I 187 We would enter the danger zone only when the methods used in the search for solutions become extremely powerful and general: that is, when they begin to amount to general intelligence - and especially when they begin to amount to superintelligence. There are (at least) two places where trouble could then arise. (1) The superintelligent search process might find a solution that is not just unexpected but radically unintended. (2) If the methods that the software uses to search for a solution are sufficiently sophisticated, they may include provisions for managing the search process itself in an intelligent manner. In this case, the machine running the software may begin to seem less like a mere tool and more like an agent. I 188 (…) open-ended search processes sometimes evince strange and unexpected non-anthropocentric solutions even in their currently limited forms I 189 E.g., The evolved designs often show remarkable economy. For instance, one search discovered a frequency discrimination circuit that functioned without a clock - a component normally considered necessary for this function. E.g., Another search process, tasked with creating an oscillator, was deprived of a seemingly even more indispensible component, the capacitor. >Superintelligence/Bostrom.	Bostrom I Nick Bostrom Superintelligence. Paths, Dangers, Strategies Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017
Ontology	Hintikka	II 40 Ontology/existence/non-existence/Hintikka: if we allow the range of our quantifiers to be extended for non-existent objects, the most urgent question is: Where are these non-existent objects? E.g. "everyone's lover", e.g. "no one's lover". Both are obviously possible but unlike Meinong's round square. >Non-existence, >Round square, >Logical possibility. E.g. "the envy of all", e.g. "which is envied by everyone". N.B.: both are incompatible. The former must love the latter, but the latter cannot be loved by the first. Everyone/all/nobody/Hintikka: it is no solution here to claim that "everyone" or "nobody" only goes via existent objects ((s) that is, we must allow non-existent or possible objects (>possibilia)). Meinong/Hintikka: Meinong gained the power of his arguments from the fact that we have to allow non-existent objects here. (Also >Terence Parsons). Non-existence/non-existent objects/localization/possible worlds/Hintikka: thesis: any non-existent object is in its own world. >Possible worlds. II 88 Ontology/thing/subject/object/Hintikka: the ontology of most philosophers is upside down. This is because they seek independent objects as building blocks. II 89 HintikkaVsTradition: solid objects are not the building blocks of our world. Instead, we are dealing with mass points which result in the objects as solutions of differential equations. Cf. >Four-dimensionalism, >Space-time. Geometry/Hintikka: for the same reason, geometry is more fundamental than quantum theory. Space/time/Kant/Hintikka: Kant, therefore, is right because of another reason, as our analysis shows: space and time are fundamental because the objects are formed in them. ((s) Because of the sometimes not closed curves, something is not an object in a possible world (here = time segment), but in another one). Space/time/Hintikka: the conceptual precedence of space and time also has other consequences: it shows that the expression "possible world" is inappropriate: II 90 Possible Worlds/Hintikka: the expression "possible worlds" presupposes that space-time is divided. II 90 Object/thing/identification/identity/individuation/space time/Hintikka: space time is still just a means of identification. What determines the result of the identification is the triple of the functions f, g, h. This function specifies the totality of the motions of the mass points in our model. They are the hard core of identification and individuation. Matter/Hintikka: identification and individuation are based on material reality. >Identification, >Individuation.	Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Ontology	Leibniz	Holz I 59f Ontology/construction/world/experience/rationality/identity/Leibniz: the construction of the ontology of Leibniz has two phases: 1. Deducability of all sensible, i.e. true and knowledge having sentences are proved by reducing them to identical sentences. (Deduction/reduction). (Predicative evidence). 2. The evidence of identity is to be proved as such to the world itself. Identity as the cause of the world is to find its cause once again in the constitution of the being of the world. >Reduction/Leibniz, >Identity/Leibniz. I 78 Logical/ontological/Leibniz/Holz: this transition from the concept of the infinite ((s) infinite because of infinitely many aspects) chain contained in the experienced limited finite a priori to the idea of the necessary being of the world has, in addition to the ontological one, a logical aspect: Logical: every being, every fact, is conditioned by all others. Therefore the concepts (predicates) of all others are to be assigned to the concept of a being! The inherence of all the other concepts in each individual concept, however, does not make any sense in terms of its logical extent (extensional). It cannot be performed as a predication (operational, finite). Undesirable consequence: the concept of each individual would then be the supreme and the emptiest generic concept of all beings. >Concept/Leibniz, >Particular/Leibniz. I 79 With this, it would not be a representation of the concrete individual anymore! Solution: the relation of the individual to the general (whole) can be expressed intensional (content-logical): the concept of the individual contains all possible predicates in a unique arrangement. That is, these predicates as a whole belong to all concepts of individuals in a different arrangement. >Possibility/Leibniz, >Predicate/Leibniz. Each concept has the same quantity of predicates, but it is not identical with all other concepts because the arrangement is correspondingly different. I 91 Logical/ontological: thus the logical constitution of the subject-being proves to be the ontological constitution of the world. Genus/World/Leibniz: the world can also be represented as the supreme genus, ontologically as the fullness of all possible reality. >Totality/Leibniz, >Ultimate justification/Leibniz.	Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994
Ontology	Quine	I 416 Existence/Quine: doubtful: "There are terms that...", "some of these propositions...", "there is something that he doubts...". - Meaningless: talking about two different meanings of "there is" for abstract and concrete objects, but of one single meaning of object. >Meaning/Quine. I 416 Theory: are isolated systems, mass point, infinitesimal size: each behavior is more typical, the closer you get to zero, therefore acceptable - but not approved in ontology. - Unlike geometrical object: Position of mass points had no meaning - therefore not individuable, no identity! (> Quine, Word and Object, 1960, § 52.) I 465f Ontology: in the end only words at all (names of objects) - but accpetance of ideal objects is no linguistic convention. II 25 Ontology that consisted only of materials and bodies would be very vague - but precision is just a question of classification. II 28 Numbers/Ontology: Numbers merely "facon de parler". - Higher classes are needed to replace numbers - otherwise there are only physical object. VII (a) 15ff Ontology/Quine: the phrase "To be is to be the value of a bound variable" does not decide between competing O. - We do not consider the variables to find out what there is! - The variable shows what a statement asserts - Problem: I cannot admit that there are things that the other one accepts and I do not. Deviations in the O involve those in the conceptual scheme - the upper links of the object language can be shared by counterparties and make discussion of language possible. >Semantic ascent/Quine. VII (f) 107 Ontology/Translation/Quine: we cannot find ontological definitions for totally foreign languages. VII (g) 132 Ontology/Quine: a theory may even include entities that are indefinable in the same theory. XII 38 Economical ontology/Quine: predicates instead of properties - sentences instead of propositions. >Predicates/Quine, >Sentences/Quine. XII 75ff Pythagorean Ontology/Pythagorism/Quine: a pythagorean ontology consists only of objects of one type, for example numbers or quantities or bodies. One could get these with Loewenheim. Quine: that should be avoided. Problem: after reduction an infinite range might still remain. Some numbers lose their number property but we do not know which. Solution: Ontological Relativity: it is useless to speak of the ontology of a theory in absolute terms including that "all are numbers". Solution: relativistic theory. Just as there is no absolute location or absolute speed. Problem: we need to specify a proxy function for a reduction and that is not possible with the axiom of choice (the strong form of Loewenheim). - A proxy function from above-countable to countable range is impossible because of the lack reversibility.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Ontology	Searle	I 33 In epistemological terms, it is laudable to say that the whole of reality is objective, neurobiologically it is simply wrong. >Constructivism. I 40 Ontology/Searle: wrong question: what kinds of things are there in the world? Correct: what must be the case that our empiricism is true? >Empiricism/Searle, >Existence/Searle. I 78f Reducibility is in any case a strange requirement of ontology, because in the past it was considered a classical proof of the non-existence of an entity if one traced it back to something else. >Reduction, >Reductionism. I 118 The ontology of observation, in contrast to its epistemology, is precisely the ontology of subjectivity. I 182 The ontology of unconscious states of mind consists solely in the existence of purely neurophysiological phenomena. I 183 This seems to be a contradiction: the ontology of unconscious intentionality consists entirely of objective, neurophysiological third person phenomena, and yet these states have an aspect shape! This contradiction dissolves when we consider the following: The concept of an unconscious intentional state is the concept of a state that is a possible conscious thought. The ontology of the unconscious consists in objective features of the brain that are capable of causing subjective conscious thoughts. >Object of thought, >Object of belief, >Intensional object. II 68 Representation: there is no ontology tied to representation. >Representation. V 163 Ontology: main question: are there criteria for ontological prerequisites? >Criteria. V 164 Existence/Quine: to accept something as an entity means to consider it as the value of a variable. Existence/SearleVsQuine: this criterion (value of a variable for existence) is confusing and meaningless. Alternative criterion: a theory presupposes and only the entities that it says exist. (This does not have to be done explicitly.) V 165 Ontology/Searle: one notation is as good as another, ontological conclusions should not be derived from it. It is also possible that there is no translation procedure to determine which statement is the simpler or better one. SearleVsQuine: according to Quine's criterion, two statements that actually include the same prerequisites would include different prerequisites! (This argument was put forward by William AlstonVsQuine). >Ontology/Quine. Stalnaker I 181 Ontology/language/metaphysics/Searle: one may not draw ontological conclusions from linguistic theories. >Identification principle.	Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Ontology	Thiel	Thiel I 18/19 Mathematics/Ontology/Mathematical Entities/Thiel: Def "Logicism" attributes mathematics (any object) to logic. The object of mathematics is then the object of logic. What is then the object of logic: logicism must say: actually no material object at all, but "all objects" in the sense that its statements apply to all objects in the world. We create the objects ourselves. "In itself" such an object never exists! >Mathematical entities, >Platonism. DubislavVs: Every convention must be made about something. So one must ask the conventionalist about which structures his axioms have to be regarded as consistent. >Beginning, >Axioms. I 312 In modern mathematics one speaks not only of "the" addition, but of "an addition" and introduces linking signs. For example, one writes addition as "$" if it is associative and commutative, if it is not the case, one might prefer to write the operation as multiplication "§" or something else. >Axioms/Hilbert. I 312/313 Ontology/object/mathematics/Thiel: the validity of such laws does not turn the subject area into a number area, just as the validity of any set-theoretical laws transforms the (ranges of) numbers into (ranges of) sets. >Numbers, >Sets. The recording of the possible types of operations does not provide any fundamental discipline. I 314 It may be that the universality of mathematics is based on the ever new applicability of the very general operations and not on the fact that mathematics deals with particularly general objects. >Generalization, >Generality. Although we always carry out the same set-theoretical operations in the different fields of mathematics, this does not mean that there are "sets" as autonomous objects. At most, a fundamental discipline should be envisaged that fulfils this task as a fundamental canon for "dealing with everything and everyone".	T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995
Openness	Psychological Theories	Corr I 60 Openness to experience/emotion/five-factor model/personality psychology/psychological theories: individuals who score highly on openness to experience seem to be more emotionally sensitive to art and beauty, and to experience a wider range of feelings and emotions than people low on this trait (McCrae 2007⁽¹⁾; Terracciano, McCrae, Hagemann and Costa 2003)⁽²⁾. Cf. >extraversion, >agreeableness, >conscientiousness, >introversion, >Five-Factor Model. 1. McCrae, R. R. 2007. Aesthetic chills as a universal marker of openness to experience, Motivation and Emotion 31: 5–11 2. Terracciano, A., McCrae, R. R., Hagemann, D. and Costa, P. T. Jr. 2003. Individual difference variables, affective differentiation, and the structures of affect, Journal of Personality 71: 669–703 Rainer Reisenzein & Hannelore Weber, “Personality and emotion”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press.	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Optimal Tax Rate	Saez	Saez I 134 Optimal Tax Rate/Saez/Zucman: (...) a body of work suggests that the top marginal tax rate that collects the most revenue possible from the rich hovers around 75%. By the rich we mean the members of the top 1%, people with more than $500,000 in income in 2019.⁽¹⁾ This estimate is the best that exists today on the basis of many empirical studies conducted over the last two decades. If there are limited tax-avoidance opportunities, the rich respond only modestly to tax changes: whenever their keep rate rises by 1% (instead of keeping 70 cents after taxes out of any extra dollar earned, they keep 70.7 cents), they work harder and increase their pre-tax earnings by about 0.25% in response.8 This means that the tax base does not shrink much when the rich are taxed more heavily, implying optimal top marginal tax rates in the vicinity of 75%.⁽²⁾ 1) (...)we’re talking about a marginal tax rate, a rate applied only to income earned above a high threshold, $500,000 today. The associated average tax rate is lower than that, because any dollar earned below this high threshold is taxed less. It’s only for the ultra-wealthy that marginal and average tax rates are the same. Example: (...) if tomorrow the marginal tax rate on income above $500,000 were increased to 75%, the average tax rate of the top 1% richest Americans would reach 60%.⁽³⁾ In other words, the optimal average tax rate on top bracket taxpayers is 60% - less than 60% for people at the bottom of the top 1%, up to 75% for the ultra-rich, and 60% on average among top one percenters. Given that the average macroeconomic tax rate is around 30%, an average rate of 60% means that the top 1% richest Americans would pay twice as much in tax, as a fraction of their income, as the average person. 2) (...) these optimal tax rates take into account all taxes, at all levels of government. Since payroll taxes are capped and sales taxes are insignificant at the top, the optimal top marginal rate of 75% should be thought of as combining the federal income tax, any state income taxes, and the corporate income tax.((s) Saez and Zucman are talking about the USA.) Saez I 135 3) Hiking top tax rates without any other change to the tax code or to enforcement would be a bad idea. The supply of tax dodges in circulation is too large. Before we can effectively tax the wealthy more, avoidance must be curtailed. We need to create the institutions that make a robust tax system sustainable in the long run, even in the era of extreme inequality. Cf. >Ramsey Rule, >Tax evasion, >Laffer curve. >Taxation, >Tax Avoidance, >Tax Competition, >Tax Compliance, >Tax Havens, >Tax Incidence, >Tax Loopholes, >Tax System. 1. See Diamond and Saez (2011) for a summary of the theoretical analysis: -Peter A. Diamond and Emmanuel Saez. “The Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic Research to Policy Recommendations.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 25, no. 4 (2011): 165–190. 2. Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2012) review the empirical literature and show that large documented behavioral responses to tax changes always arise from tax avoidance. - Emmanuel Saez, Joel Slemrod, and Seth Giertz. “The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review.” Journal of Economic Literature 50, no. 1 (2012): 3–50. In the case of tax systems with few avoidance opportunities such as Denmark, behavioral responses to tax changes are quantitatively small with elasticities in the range of 0.2–0.3 for top earners (Kleven and Schultz, 2014): -Hendrik Kleven and Esben Anton Schultz. “Estimating Taxable Income Responses using Danish Tax Reforms.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 6, no. 4 (2014): 271–301. 3. The average income above $500,000 is approximately $1,500,000 (Piketty, Saez, Zucman 2018): -Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Gabriel Zucman. “Distributional National Accounts: Methods and Estimates for the United States.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 133, no. 1 (2018): 553–609. Hence top bracket taxpayers would pay 75% on $1,000,000 and a lower rate on their first $500,000. If we assume that the tax rate on their first $500,000 is the average macroeconomic tax rate of 30%, this gives a total tax rate on top bracket taxpayers taxpayers of (2/3) × 75 + (1/3) × 30 = 60%.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Optimal Tax Rate	Zucman	Saez I 134 Optimal Tax Rate/Saez/Zucman: (...) a body of work suggests that the top marginal tax rate that collects the most revenue possible from the rich hovers around 75%. By the rich we mean the members of the top 1%, people with more than $500,000 in income in 2019.⁽¹⁾ This estimate is the best that exists today on the basis of many empirical studies conducted over the last two decades. If there are limited tax-avoidance opportunities, the rich respond only modestly to tax changes: whenever their keep rate rises by 1% (instead of keeping 70 cents after taxes out of any extra dollar earned, they keep 70.7 cents), they work harder and increase their pre-tax earnings by about 0.25% in response.8 This means that the tax base does not shrink much when the rich are taxed more heavily, implying optimal top marginal tax rates in the vicinity of 75%.⁽²⁾ 1) (...)we’re talking about a marginal tax rate, a rate applied only to income earned above a high threshold, $500,000 today. The associated average tax rate is lower than that, because any dollar earned below this high threshold is taxed less. It’s only for the ultra-wealthy that marginal and average tax rates are the same. Example: (...) if tomorrow the marginal tax rate on income above $500,000 were increased to 75%, the average tax rate of the top 1% richest Americans would reach 60%.⁽³⁾ In other words, the optimal average tax rate on top bracket taxpayers is 60% - less than 60% for people at the bottom of the top 1%, up to 75% for the ultra-rich, and 60% on average among top one percenters. Given that the average macroeconomic tax rate is around 30%, an average rate of 60% means that the top 1% richest Americans would pay twice as much in tax, as a fraction of their income, as the average person. 2) (...) these optimal tax rates take into account all taxes, at all levels of government. Since payroll taxes are capped and sales taxes are insignificant at the top, the optimal top marginal rate of 75% should be thought of as combining the federal income tax, any state income taxes, and the corporate income tax.((s) Saez and Zucman are talking about the USA.) Saez I 135 3) Hiking top tax rates without any other change to the tax code or to enforcement would be a bad idea. The supply of tax dodges in circulation is too large. Before we can effectively tax the wealthy more, avoidance must be curtailed. We need to create the institutions that make a robust tax system sustainable in the long run, even in the era of extreme inequality. Cf. >Ramsey Rule, >Tax evasion, >Laffer curve. >Taxation, >Tax Avoidance, >Tax Competition, >Tax Compliance, >Tax Havens, >Tax Incidence, >Tax Loopholes, >Tax System. 1. See Diamond and Saez (2011) for a summary of the theoretical analysis: -Peter A. Diamond and Emmanuel Saez. “The Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic Research to Policy Recommendations.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 25, no. 4 (2011): 165–190. 2. Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2012) review the empirical literature and show that large documented behavioral responses to tax changes always arise from tax avoidance. - Emmanuel Saez, Joel Slemrod, and Seth Giertz. “The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review.” Journal of Economic Literature 50, no. 1 (2012): 3–50. In the case of tax systems with few avoidance opportunities such as Denmark, behavioral responses to tax changes are quantitatively small with elasticities in the range of 0.2–0.3 for top earners (Kleven and Schultz, 2014): -Hendrik Kleven and Esben Anton Schultz. “Estimating Taxable Income Responses using Danish Tax Reforms.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 6, no. 4 (2014): 271–301. 3. The average income above $500,000 is approximately $1,500,000 (Piketty, Saez, Zucman 2018): -Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Gabriel Zucman. “Distributional National Accounts: Methods and Estimates for the United States.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 133, no. 1 (2018): 553–609. Hence top bracket taxpayers would pay 75% on $1,000,000 and a lower rate on their first $500,000. If we assume that the tax rate on their first $500,000 is the average macroeconomic tax rate of 30%, this gives a total tax rate on top bracket taxpayers taxpayers of (2/3) × 75 + (1/3) × 30 = 60%.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Optimization	Norvig	Norvig I 133 Optimization/Norvig/Russell: Linear programming is probably the most widely studied and broadly useful class of optimization problems. It is a special case of the more general problem of convex optimization, which allows the constraint region to be any convex region and the objective to be any function that is convex within the constraint region. Linear programming problems: here, constraints must be linear inequalities forming a convex set and the objective function is also linear. The time complexity of linear programming is polynomial in the number of variables. Def Convex: A set of points S is convex if the line joining any two points in S is also contained in S. A convex function is one for which the space “above” it forms a convex set; by definition, convex functions have no local (as opposed to global) minima. Under certain conditions, convex optimization problems are also polynomially solvable and may be feasible in practice with thousands of variables. Several important problems in machine learning and control theory can be formulated as convex optimization problems. >Search algorithms. Norvig I 155 Finding optimal solutions in continuous spaces is the subject matter of several fields, including optimization theory, optimal control theory, and the calculus of variations. The basic techniques are explained well by Bishop (1995)⁽¹⁾; Press et al. (2007)⁽²⁾ cover a wide range of algorithms and provide working software. As Andrew Moore points out, researchers have taken inspiration for search and optimization algorithms from a wide variety of fields of study: metallurgy (simulated annealing), biology (genetic algorithms), economics (market-based algorithms), entomology (ant colony optimization), neurology (neural networks), animal behavior (reinforcement learning), mountaineering (hill climbing), and others. In the 1950s, several statisticians, including Box (1957)⁽³⁾ and Friedman (1959)⁽⁴⁾, used evolutionary techniques for optimization problems, but it wasn’t until Rechenberg (1965)⁽⁵⁾ introduced evolution strategies to solve optimization problems for airfoils that the approach gained popularity. 1. Bishop, C. M. (1995). Neural Networks for Pattern Recognition. Oxford University Press 2. Press,W. H., Teukolsky, S. A., Vetterling,W. T., and Flannery, B. P. (2007). Numerical Recipes: The Art of Scientific Computing (third edition). Cambridge University Press 3. Box, G. E. P. (1957). Evolutionary operation: A method of increasing industrial productivity. Applied Statistics, 6, 81–101. 4. Friedman, G. J. (1959). Digital simulation of an evolutionary process. General Systems Yearbook, 4, 171–184. 5. Rechenberg, I. (1965). Cybernetic solution path of an experimental problem. Library translation 1122, Royal Aircraft Establishment	Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010
Optimization	Russell	Norvig I 133 Optimization/Norvig/Russell: Linear programming is probably the most widely studied and broadly useful class of optimization problems. It is a special case of the more general problem of convex optimization, which allows the constraint region to be any convex region and the objective to be any function that is convex within the constraint region. Linear programming problems: here, constraints must be linear inequalities forming a convex set and the objective function is also linear. The time complexity of linear programming is polynomial in the number of variables. Def Convex: A set of points S is convex if the line joining any two points in S is also contained in S. A convex function is one for which the space “above” it forms a convex set; by definition, convex functions have no local (as opposed to global) minima. Under certain conditions, convex optimization problems are also polynomially solvable and may be feasible in practice with thousands of variables. Several important problems in machine learning and control theory can be formulated as convex optimization problems. >Search algorithms. Norvig I 155 Finding optimal solutions in continuous spaces is the subject matter of several fields, including optimization theory, optimal control theory, and the calculus of variations. The basic techniques are explained well by Bishop (1995)⁽¹⁾; Press et al. (2007)⁽²⁾ cover a wide range of algorithms and provide working software. As Andrew Moore points out, researchers have taken inspiration for search and optimization algorithms from a wide variety of fields of study: metallurgy (simulated annealing), biology (genetic algorithms), economics (market-based algorithms), entomology (ant colony optimization), neurology (neural networks), animal behavior (reinforcement learning), mountaineering (hill climbing), and others. In the 1950s, several statisticians, including Box (1957)⁽³⁾ and Friedman (1959)⁽⁴⁾, used evolutionary techniques for optimization problems, but it wasn’t until Rechenberg (1965)⁽⁵⁾ introduced evolution strategies to solve optimization problems for airfoils that the approach gained popularity. 1. Bishop, C. M. (1995). Neural Networks for Pattern Recognition. Oxford University Press 2. Press,W. H., Teukolsky, S. A., Vetterling,W. T., and Flannery, B. P. (2007). Numerical Recipes: The Art of Scientific Computing (third edition). Cambridge University Press 3. Box, G. E. P. (1957). Evolutionary operation: A method of increasing industrial productivity. Applied Statistics, 6, 81–101. 4. Friedman, G. J. (1959). Digital simulation of an evolutionary process. General Systems Yearbook, 4, 171–184. 5. Rechenberg, I. (1965). Cybernetic solution path of an experimental problem. Library translation 1122, Royal Aircraft Establishment	Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010
Order	Augustine	Höffe I 106 Order/Augustine/Höffe: With its main theme, the "doctrine of the last things", of the end of the earthly world and the dawn of the new world, the heavenly Jerusalem, Augustine's writing is of an eschatological nature, in addition, because of the Manichaean influence, dualistic. In truth, Augustine is concerned with an otherworldly order, which is the eschatological, "Last Judgement" Höffe I 107 and which relativizes everything earthly, be it personal happiness, be it political conditions. Every theory of connection, even fusion, every interlocking of politics and religion is rejected without compromise. Fate: While man on earth is only a stranger, a pilgrim on his way home to God, the worldly state, because biased in the earthly, will be cast out into the community of demons or devils at the end of all days, in the Last Judgment. >State (Polity), >Society, >People, >Individuals, >Religion, >Politics.	Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016
Order	Feynman	I 657 Def Disorder/Feynman: the number of ways in which elements (molecules) can be arranged inside so that it looks the same from the outside. Def Order/Feynman: the fact that the number of possibilities to arrange elements so that the structure looks the same from the outside is limited. Disorder/Feynman: if all laws of physics are reversible, whence the irreversibility? How is it that our everyday situations are always out of balance? >Symmetries, >Laws, >Natural laws. How does disorder evolve out of order? We do not yet know the origin of order. E.g. container with mixed white and black balls. I 658 It would be very unlikely, but not excluded, that after a time the colors separate again. As time progresses, they are mixed again afterwards. So it is a possible explanation that today's order of the universe is simply a question of luck. >Entropy. This type of theory is not asymmetrical, because we can ask how the state looks either a bit into the future or to the past. In any case, we see a gray spot at the interface(?), because the molecules mix again. (I.e. in both directions). E.g. variant: we only look at one part of the container at once. Question: What should be derived from that for the regions that have not been seen? We have to assume the most likely case, and that is certainly not that the other molecules are also ordered. If our order stems from a fluctuation, we would not expect order to prevail in other places. Feynman: Thesis the universe was ordered in the past. This theory predicts that there is order in other places too, and that is what we observe (stars, galaxies). Our present order comes from a higher order at the beginning of time. Today's order is a reminder of an earlier order. Therefore, we have memories of the past and not the future. I 659 Knarre: works only, because it is part of the universe. If isolated for a long time, it would no longer be more likely to turn in one direction than the other. The asymmetrical behavior is connected with the asymmetry of the entire universe.	Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993
Order	Lorenz	Lorenz I XIII Society/Types/Animal/Lorenz: 1. Anonymous flocks, free of aggression, but also free of personal acquaintance. 2. Family life of the night-rowers, among others. Birds: clan only built on a local structure of the territories to be defended. 3. Strange large family of rats, whose members do not recognize each other personally, but through the smell of the clan, and behave in an exemplary social manner. Hostile to other clans. 4. Social order: through the bond of personal love and friendship prevented from mutual damage: e.g. greyleg goose. I 191 Definition flock/Animal/Lorenz: a flock is not a coincidental accumulation, but individuals responding to each other. Reciprocal triggering of attention. This is why walking in the same direction is characteristic of the flocks. I 192 Strangely enough, it is not clear what the purpose is of sticking together in fish, birds, and many mammals. Disadvantages: difficulty to procure food for so many animals, impossibility of concealment,... I 193 ...increased susceptibility to parasites. Lorenz: one has only found starved single animals regularly under sleeping trees every morning. I 195 Advantages: the predators are unable to concentrate on a goal. Interestingly, you can even experience the fact that you have to concentrate on a particular animal to catch one at all! The other bird, which seems to be easier to handle, is almost never caught because you have not followed its movements in the previous seconds. Surprisingly, one often picks between two equally appealing goals. I 196 If the presence of an enemy is suspected, flocks gather closer together. I 207 Marriage/animal/birds/Lorenz: in many birds, the partners do not place any importance on being together. I 208 Each animal defends its territory exclusively against its conspecific of the same sex. I 219 Society/Animals/Lorenz: 3. Form: a held together community through aggression directed outwardly. I 220 Bees, termites, ants, for example, recognize each other by the smell of their stick. They are extremely aggressive against strangers. I 231 Definition Group/Lorenz: a group is a community that is held together by a bond of personal ties. I 232 Individual reactions of single members. Real group formation is independent of the location. (Whereas in many species of animals a completely altered behavior can be observed in the case of transplantation from the place of origin, as well as in the case of conspecifics, they often fail to recognize one another). I 233 Group/Animals/Lorenz: In group-forming species, the linkage between partners is initiated differently: the future partners are more brittle to each other. I 236 E.g. Cichlid: the cichlid displays sharply passing aggression gestures towards the partner. >Psychological theories on Aggression.	Lorenz I K. Lorenz Das sogenannte Böse Wien 1963
Order	Thiel	Thiel I 201 Order/Mathematics/Thiel: Def Well-ordered: if an ordered set Mp is such that not only it itself, but also each of its non-empty subsets has such an element, in the sense of the order first element, then we call M< a well-ordered set. I 201/202 Well-ordered sets are special ordered sets, therefore each pairterm represents an order type for a well-ordered set and the order types can now be shown to be comparable with each other. In this sense, the order types of well-ordered sets are more "number-like" than other order types. We call them Def Ordinal Numbers. The order type of a finite set (which is well-ordered in any arrangement) coincides with its ordinal number and beyond that with its thickness. I 201f Def well-ordered: is a set, if every non-empty subset has a first element - i.e. every pairterm is also an order type - then all order types are comparable. Addition, multiplication potentiation especially: Example {1, 1, 2, 2..} shall be mapped to the naturally ordered set of basic numbers...I 202 Example {1,3,5...;2,4,6...} non-commutative. Terminology: ordinal number ω. In the case of ordinal numbers we can thus in a very specific sense go beyond the ordinal number ω of the naturally ordered set of basic numbers: The elements of a set of the power Ao of the basic numbers can still be ordered in various ways and thus lead to quite different transfinite ordinal numbers I 203 and quite different well-orders of these sets lead also in the indicated sense to "larger" ordinal numbers than . But one should not jump to conclusions about a deeper penetration into the realm of the infinite, because an ordered set with the ordinal number ω exp ω does not have the power of Ao exp Ao (which according to classical view would be the power of the continuum), but is still countable, i.e. of the same power Ao as an ordered set with the ordinal number ω. Without the condition that every quantity can be well ordered, which has not been substantiated up to now anywhere, one cannot reach higher powers. I 203 ω exp ω is still countable. Against: Power of the Continuum: Ao exp Ao ConstructivismVsCantor: Objection to the introduction of absolute transfinite numbers: arises from the definition of uniformity and similarity. They take place with recourse to illustration. According to the constructivist view, each representation must be represented as a function by a function term. However, this must refer to a fixed inventory of permitted mathematical means of expression. An illustration is then expressable or not. Example: The uniformity of two sets can be expressable in a formal system F1 (thus "exist") in another F2 however not. For a Platonist, of course, this is an untenable situation. He will say that the system F2 is simply too "weak in expression". The system would have to be extended. But according to the constructivists this is not possible: forbidden, because the means of expression necessary for their representation (or set-theoretical axioms, which would first secure the "existence" of the representation in question), would lead to a contradiction with the other means of expression or axioms. There is no known possibility to introduce transfinite cardinal numbers (and in axiomatic systems also transfinite ordinal numbers) as absolute milestones in infinity in a harmless way.	T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995
Ordinal Numbers	Thiel	Thiel I 199 Transfinite Ordinal Numbers/Cantor: we start from the basic numbers again, not only for counting, but now also with the aim of arranging. Now we also want to specify in which order the elements of a set are to be considered in a context. Def Ordered: A set is called ordered by KL, if for each two different of its elements a and b either aKb or bKa is valid. Arrangements are called w. There are very different arrangement possibilities. I 200 Def Pairterm: Then the representation of the relation term representing the order relation is additionally required: the "Pairterm". When comparing ordered sets, the term "illustration" is used. >Sets, >Order, >Mapping, >Relations.	T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995
Other Minds	Carnap	VI 186 Other minds/attribution/behaviorism/Carnap: 1st the attribution of behavior happens in relation to the body, it is not attributed to the soul 2nd the ascribed mental states are intrinsical! Not experiences of others. The whole series of experiences of other people consists in nothing more than a rearrangement of my experiences and their components. >Experience. VI 187 There is no other mind without a body. VI 70/71 Characteristics/definition/constitution/Carnap: Problem: e.g.other minds: the behavior is not the same as the other mind itself. Realism: the angry behavior is not the anger itself. >Description levels. Solution/Carnap: but one can transform all scientific (not metaphysical) statements about F into statements about K while retaining the logical value (truth value). Then F and K are logically identical. VI 72 A meaning for K that did not agree with F could not be given scientifically! (many authors VsCarnap). Carnap: this has to do with Leibniz's identity. VI 78/79 Other minds/Carnap: every psychic process, if it occurs as foreign psychic, is in principle recognizable (by behavior) or can be asked). Thus each statement can be transformed into a statement about the corresponding characteristics. It follows from this that all psychological objects can be traced back to physical objects (movements of expression, behaviour). VI 192 Intersubjectivity/Other minds/ascription/Carnap: through the statements of the other I not only learn the facts of the case, but also that it is known to the other. VI 193 Constitution: at no stage does something new enter the system through the information (behavior) of the other. There is only a rearrangement of the given elements. ((s) Otherwise the behaviour would be incomprehensible.) VI 194 The whole attribution never leaves the psychic basis. The constitutional system of the other branches off at a high level. >Constitution system. VI 194 Other Mindes/world/attribution/Carnap: between my world and the world of the other exists a certain analogy, his constitutional system is only a part of my own! ((s) Because I can only attribute my own experiences.) >Self-attribution/Chisholm. VI 233 Other minds/Carnap: the foreign psychic is ascribed to the other as his own psychic.	Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982
Ousia	Aristotle	Adorno XII 54 Being/Ousia/Aristotle/Adorno: Aristotle helps himself a little bit by saying that it is ousia the present and the here in the sense of the genesis, but according to the purely mental ontological rank the ousia is the first in the sense of the idea. >Idea/Aristotle, >Ontology/Aristole. AdornoVsAristotle: this is a somewhat violent separation of genesis and validity. It returns in Max Scheler's strange theory of ideas. (See Ideas/Scheler).	A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Paradoxes		Paradoxes: are contradictions within formally correct statements or sets of statements that lead to an existence assumption, which initially seemed plausible, to be withdrawn. Paradoxes are not errors, but challenges that may lead to a re-formulation of the prerequisites and assumptions, or to a change in the language, the subject domain, and the logical system. See also Russellian paradox, contradictions, range, consistency.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Paradoxes	Burge	Grover II 201 Paradoxies/Antinomies/Enhanced Liar/Burge/Grover: (Burge 1979⁽¹⁾, p. 178): II 202 In all variants we started with a) an incident with a liar-like sentence. b) then we argued that the sentence is pathological and concluded that it is not true in the wording of the pathological proposition. ((s) Here we are talking about "not true" and not "wrong"). Then we realized that this seems to come down to the following: c) that the sentence is true at the end! Burge: Thesis: there seems to be no change involved in the grammar or the linguistic meaning of the expressions. Grover: that suggests that the changes in evaluation occur in pragmatic terms. >Pragmatics. Burge: since the truth value changes without the meaning changing, an indexical element must be at work. >Indexicality, >Thruth values. Paradoxies/Parsons/Grover: similar: Thesis: the use of "true" and other semantic expressions related to paradoxes brings about a change of the range (the discourse range). >Domains. KripkeVsBurge/Grover: (Kripke 1975)⁽²⁾: the changeover to b) takes place at a later point in the development of the natural language. >Kripkean fixed points. GroverVsBurge: there is actually a transition to be made, but if the prosentential approach (oro-sentence theory) is correct, the inference of Burge is not valid: Burge/Grover: the transition to b) has the form: "S" is pathological, hence "S" is not true. This should be justified by the following: If "S" is pathological, the sentence is not an assertion. and If "S" is not an assertion, then "S" is neither true nor false. because then: (14) If "S" is pathological, "S" is not true, and "S" is not false. >Prosentential theory. Problem/Grover: if "true" were property-attributive (truth was conceived as a property), namely the same property for "true" and "not true" ((s) the property is then attributed or denied) and a property for "false" and "not false", then we must be able to make the transition to "S" is not true". ((s) with "true" or "false" it would only be about attributing or denying a single property!) Grover: does not want any property, of course. Grover: regardless of whether "true" is property-attributive, if (14) is a necessary condition for an expression to be pathological, then it looks as if Burge was right. For then we could infer that "S" is not true. But: GroverVsBurge: Perhaps "true" and "false" are not property-attributive, and perhaps (14) is not a necessary condition for being pathological: II 203 Then we can argue instead If "S" is pathological, then "S" is not true, We just have something like Provided "S" is not pathological, either S or not S. Expressibility/Important Point/Grover: then we do not need the expressibility ((s) completeness) that we seemed to need. Paradoxies/Liar/GroverVsBurge: Thesis: we can conclude that liar-sentences are pathological, but that does not force us to assume that they are not true. GroverVsBurge: I did say that his conclusion was not valid, but I think that actually there is no conclusion here, neither valid nor invalid: because if "true" is prosential, then ""S"is not true" does not express any proposition! >Propositions. ((s) Has no antecedent from "S" and that stands for any sentence and therefore for no content "everthing he said"). >"Everything he said is true" 1. Tyler Burge: 1979. Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4: 73–121. 2. Saul Kripke. Outline of a Theory of Truth. The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, No. 19.	Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Grover I D. L. Grover Joseph L. Camp Nuel D. Belnap, "A Prosentential Theory of Truth", Philosophical Studies, 27 (1975) pp. 73-125 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Paradoxes	Poincaré	Thiel I 322 Russell's Antinomy/solution: an attempt to avoid the Russellian paradox would be to say instead of "all" always "all, which". So now the suspicion is centered on "all". >Russell's paradox, >"All", >Universal quantification. Poincaré saw this suspicion confirmed and claimed: Conditions such as "~ (x ε x)" are unsuitable to determine a set, for they require a circulus vitiosus. >Sets, >Set theory, >Classes, cf. >Outermost class, >Circularity, cf. >Self-reference. He did not get to this diagnosis with the help of the Russellian antinomy, but with the antinomy constructed by Jules Richard: I 323 Richard's Antinomy: The totality E of all the decimal fractions which can be defined by a finite number of words (from the letters of a finite alphabet). Also, the totality E of the decimal fractions is countable. But then we can define a new decimal fraction d by the rule: Is the n-th number of the n-th decimal fraction of E 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, so the the corresponding number of d is 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,1,1. Since, by definition, d differs from the n-th decimal fraction from E at the n-th place, and this applies to an arbitrary n, d is different from every decimal fraction from E, and therefore does not belong to E. On the other hand, d must lie in E because we have defined it with finitely many words, and E was the totality of all such decimal fractions. Solution/Poincaré: he generalized the solution provided by Richard himself that E can be correctly explained only as the totality of not all but the decimal fractions which can be defined with a finite number of words without already introducing the concept of the totality E itself. >Definition, >Definability, >Introduction. Burali-Forti/Poincaré: Poincaré transferred this explanation also to other antinomies e.g. the antinomy of Burali-Forti: of the "set Ω of all ordinals". They can only be applied correctly to the set of all ordinals which can be defined without the introduction of the set Ω. (Otherwise, Ω + 1 always results). Thiel I 324 Poincaré: believed that he had found the decisive criterion: illegitimate, "non-predicative" conditions are those that contain such a circle. >impredicative/Russell. At first, it seemed sufficient to demand of expressions the relation between element and set that in "x ∈ y" the second relation term y should belong to exactly one step higher than x (simple > type theory), thus the requirement that every permissible expression should be formed not only "predicatively" (i.e. not impredicatively), but also all arguments occurring in it must satisfy this condition, to lead to a "ramifieded type theory", (ramified hierarchy). VsType Theory: Its complications included not only the fact that such a theory must also consider orders in addition to types, but also the more than annoying fact that now, for example, the upper limit of a non-empty set of real numbers (whose existence is presupposed in all continuity considerations in classical analysis) is of higher order than the real numbers whose upper limit it is. The consequence is that one can no longer quantify simply via "all real numbers", but only via all real numbers of a certain order. This is unacceptable for the field mathematics, and a huge obstacle to the "arithmetic program" of classical basic research. Especially for the logicism which follows. >Logicism. I 325 Poincaré's analysis carries even further than he himself presumed. E.g. (1) (1) is wrong With the variant "the only sentence numbered on this page is wrong". Or in the form of "I lie (now)". one accepts the necessary empirical regressions on book pages and "now", this leads to formal contradictions. The "liar" is weaker, originally in the letter of the apostle Paul to Titus, verse 12 of the first chapter. Luther: Z "One of them always said, their own prophet: the Cretans are always liars, evil beasts, and idle bellies." A <> "All Cretans lie (always)" Synonymous with the statement: "for this statement applies: if it is made by a Cretan, its opposite is true." --- I 326 K(A) > ~A (>separation rule: A, A > B >> B I 92) According to the separation rule, the statement ~ A becomes a true statement. This implies, however, that A is false, while we have derived this demand from the assumption that A is true. Since this is only assumed hypothetically, the reasoning (also I 315 Zermelo-Russell's antinomy) shows, with reference to the reductio ad absurdum: (A> A)> A, that A is indeed false. This does not lead to any formal contradiction, if there is a Cretan who makes at least one single true statement, A is then simply wrong. Nevertheless, Poincaré would dispute the admissibility: the definition of the abbreviation sign A is a universal statement, in which the variability range of the quantifier consists of all propositions, and therefore also contains the statement A itself, A is therefore impredicatively defined and therefore inadmissible. The applicability of the Poincaré criterion comes unexpectedly because the liar antinomy, due to the occurrence of metalogical terms such as "true" and "false" belongs to another, actually non-mathematical, type of conclusions that Peano classified as "linguistic".	T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995
Paradoxes	Thiel	I 321 False Conclusions/Thiel: only of interest if they are intentionally induced as "fallacies", or if they smuggle supposedly legitimate conclusions into an argument in the form of "sophisms", or as in Kant's case so-called "paralogisms" which have their reason "in the nature of human reason" and are therefore "inevitably though not indissoluble". Example: arithmetic fallacy: 5 = 7 (I 321 +). Example: Syllogism with a quaternia terminorum (hidden occurrence of four instead of three allowed terms in a final schema) Flying elephants are fantasy imaginations. Imaginations are part of our reality. So, flying elephants are part of our reality. Paradoxes are something contrary to ordinary opinion (doxa). Other form: fact wrapped in a puzzle solution. For example, that a strap placed tightly around the equator would suddenly protrude by 1/2π, i.e. by about 16cm, after being extended by only one meter. I 322 In everyday use, paradoxes are often only corny things, like the hypochondriac who only imagines himself to have delusions (question of definition) or "Murphy's law" that everything lasts longer, even if one has already considered it. Since the English scientific literature "paradoxically" compromises both paradoxes (not real antinomies) and antinomies, a distinction has not yet prevailed. I 327 Example "crocodile conclusion" (already known in ancient times): a crocodile has robbed a child, the mother begs to give it back. The crocodile places the task of guessing what it will do next. The mother (logically preformed) says: you won't give it back to me. Hence stalemate. Because the mother now argues that the crocodile must give the child back, because if the statement is true, she gets it back on the basis of the agreement, but if it is false, then it is just wrong that she does not get the child back, so because it is true that she gets it. The crocodile, on the other hand, argues that there is no need to give the child back, because if the mother's statement is false, she will not get it back because of the agreement, but if it is true, it means that she will not get the child back. Only a careful analysis reveals that the agreement made does not yet provide a rule for action. If "z" stands for giving back, "a" for the mother's answer (which is still indefinite and can therefore only be represented schematically by a), the agreement does not yet provide a rule system that can be followed, but rather the rule schema. "a" ε true >> z "a" ε false >> ~z If the range of variability of a is not restricted, then one can also make choices of a that are incompatible with Tarski's condition of adequacy for truth definitions. >Adequacy/Tarski, >Convention T. I 328 This states that for a predicate of truth "W" and any statement p, from which it can be meaningfully stated, always "p" ε W <> p has to apply. In the crocodile conclusion, the mother selects ~z for a, thereby turning the rule scheme into the rule system. (R1) "~z" ε true >> z (R2) "~z" ε false >> ~z The crocodile now concludes to R2 and Tarski (with ~z for p) to ~z. The mother, on the one hand, deduces after R1 and on the other hand metalogically from the falsity of "~z" and from there (after Tarski) further to z. Since the argumentation makes use of a predicate of truth and a predicate of falsehood as well as the connection between both, the crocodile conclusion is usually counted among the "semantic" antinomies. One can see in it a precursor of Russell's antinomy. >Russellean Paradox. I 328 One should not hastily deduce from this that the antinomies and paradoxes have no meaning for mathematics. Both Poincaré's criterion (predictiveness) and type theory force a restriction of the so-called comprehension axiom, which determines the conditions permissible as defining conditions for sets of forms of statement. >Impredicativeness, >Comprehension, >Type theory.	T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995
Parameterization	Meteorology	Edwards I 393 Parameterization/meteorology/climatology/Edwards: far from expressing pure theory, analysis models are data-laden.⁽¹⁾ And the same can also be said of all forecast models and general circulation models. Stephen Schneider writes: . . . even our most sophisticated ‘first principles’ models contain ‘empirical statistical’ elements within the model structure. . . .We can describe the known physical laws mathematically, at least in principle. In practice, however, solving these equations in full, explicit detail is impossible. First, the possible scales of motion in the atmospheric and oceanic components range from the submolecular to the global. Second are the interactions of energy transfers among the different scales of motion. Finally, many scales of disturbance are inherently unstable; small disturbances, for example, grow rapidly in size if conditions are favorable.⁽²⁾ Edwards: Hence the necessity of parameterization, much of which can be described as the integration of observationally derived approximations into the “model physics.” Schneider and others sometimes refer to parameters as “semi-empirical,” an apt description that highlights their fuzzy relationship with observational data. For the foreseeable future, all analysis models, forecast models, and climate models will contain many “semi-empirical” elements. >Wheather forecasting/Edwards, >Models/meteorology, cf. >Homogenization/climatology, >Reanalysis/climatology. Edwards I 465 Parameter: (…) the term is often used to distinguish, from dependent variables, quantities that may be more or less arbitrarily assigned values for purposes of the problem at hand” (emphasis added). So a parameter is a kind of proxy - a stand-in for something that cannot be modeled directly but can still be estimated, or at least guessed. Parameterization illustrates the interaction of computational friction with the limits of human knowledge. In an ideal climate model, the only fixed conditions would be the distribution and the altitude of continental surfaces. Virtually all other variables - sea-surface temperature, land-surface albedo (reflectance), cloud formation, etc. - would be generated internally by the model itself from the lower-level physical properties of air, water, and other basic elements of the climate system. Instead, most physical processes operating in the atmosphere require some degree of parameterization; these parameterized processes are known as the “model physics.” >Models/climatology. Parameter: (…) parameters represent a variable physical process rather than a fixed quantity. Edwards I 466 Parameterization/Example: A major parameterization in all climate models is radiative transfer. The atmosphere contains both gases (CO2, methane, nitrogen, ozone, oxygen, water vapor, etc.) and solids (particulate aerosols, ice clouds, etc.). Each one of these materials absorbs solar energy at particular frequencies. Each also emits radiation at other frequencies. Those emissions are then absorbed and re-radiated by other gases and solids. These radiative transfers play a huge role in governing the atmosphere’s temperature. Thus, models must somehow estimate how much radiation the atmosphere in a given grid box absorbs, reflects, and transmits, at every level and horizontal location. “Line-by-line models,” which combine databases of spectrographic measurements for the various gases with physical models, can carry out this summing.⁽³⁾ Edwards I 469 Ad hoc parameter/example: An example of an ad hoc parameter is “flux adjustment” in coupled atmosphere-ocean circulation models (AOGCMs). The interface between the atmospheric model and the ocean model must represent exchanges of heat, momentum (wind and surface resistance), and water (precipitation, evaporation) between the atmosphere and the ocean. These fluxes - flows of energy and matter between atmosphere and ocean—are very difficult to measure empirically. Yet they profoundly affect model behavior. Modelers spoke of flux adjustments as “non-physical” parameterizations - i.e., ones not based on physical theory—but also sometimes characterized them as “empirically determined.”⁽⁴⁾ Any given GCM’s model physics contains hundreds or even thousands of parameterizations. Edwards I 470 An entire subfield—climate model diagnosis - works out ways to isolate the origin of particular problems to specific parameterizations and their interactions. Tuning: “Tuning” means adjusting the values of coefficients and even, sometimes, reconstructing equations in order to produce a better overall model result. “Better” may mean that the result agrees more closely with observations, or that it corresponds more closely to the modeler’s expert judgment about what one modeler I interviewed called the “physical plausibility” of the change. >Models/climatology. 1. P. N. Edwards, “Global Climate Science, Uncertainty and Politics: Data-Laden Models, Model-Filtered Data,” Science as Culture 8, no. 4 (1999): 437–. 2. S. H. Schneider, “Introduction to Climate Modeling,” in Climate System Modeling, ed. K. E. Trenberth (Cambridge University Press, 1992). 3. J. T. Kiehl, “Atmospheric General Circulation Modeling,” in Climate System Modeling, ed. K. E. Trenberth (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 338. 4. 8. J. T. Houghton et al., Climate Change 1995: The Science of Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 1996).	Edwards I Paul N. Edwards A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming Cambridge 2013
Paratactic Analysis	Brandom	I 743 Paratactic analysis/Davidson: 1. focuses on tokenings, not on types. I 744 2. an exposed sentence tokening should stand in relation to the one that is attributed. I 745 3. essential relation of "equal speech". Problem: the substitution in the range of "that" does not preserve the truth value of the entire attribution. >Attribution, >Truth value, >Truth preservation. Solution: the sentence-tokening located within, is not part of the actual attribution. - BrandomVsDavidson: the relation between the two tokenings should be an anaphor and not demonstrative. - e.g. Galileo said (something in his mouth that commited him on that, what an assertive utterance of the following in my mouth would now commit me to). >Anaphora, >Demonstration.	Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Parent-Child Relationship	Psychological Theories	Slater I 18 Parent-Child Relationship/psychological theories: A major advance in both human and animal models of early social experience was the recognition that there was naturally occurring variability in maternal caregiving behavior. In her observations of mothers and their infants in the home environment, Mary Ainsworth developed codes for discriminating between sensitive and insensitive caregiving behavior (Ainsworth et al., 1978)⁽¹⁾. >M. Ainsworth. Infants who experienced sensitive caregiving were subsequently classified as secure in laboratory tests using the Strange Situation paradigm at 12 and 18 months. >Situation/Ainsworth, >Strange Situation. Infants’ security in the Strange Situation, in turn, has predicted aspects of subsequent child adaptation in preschool, childhood, and adolescence (Sroufe et al., 2005)⁽²⁾. The notion that individual differences in the quality of care received from the mother can have long-term effects on psychosocial outcomes has generally been supported in several major longitudinal studies (Belsky & Fearon, 2002)⁽³⁾. A rodent model for studying early maternal care uses naturally occurring variations in maternal behavior over the first eight days after birth (Champagne & Meaney, 2007)⁽⁴⁾. Direct observation of mother-pup interactions in normally-reared animals identified two forms of maternal behavior – those involving Licking/ grooming of pups (LG) and another characterized by arched-back nursing (ABN) in which a mother nurses her pups with her back conspicuously arched. Because the two types of maternal behavior tend to co-occur, mothers could be classified as either High or Low LG-ABN. The consequences for offspring of differential mothering were established by intergenerational stability of maternal behavior, with mothers who were high on LB-ABN showing similar maternal behavior to their offspring when they subsequently became mothers, and the offsprings’ increased exploratory activity and decreased startle responses as adults (Cameron, Champagne, & Parent, 2005)⁽⁵⁾. >Animal model, >Animal studies, >Experiments, >Method. Cross-fostering of high LG mothers to rat pups served to rule out genetic transmission of intergenerational effects. Offspring of low LG mothers matched to high LG foster mothers showed high LG maternal behaviors. Early exposure to high LG mothers also has produced effects on subsequent sexual and reproductive behavior of female offspring (Cameron et al., 2005⁽⁵⁾; Curley, Champagne, & Bateson, 2008)⁽⁶⁾. >Environment/Developmental psychology. 1. Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E., & Wall, S. (1978). Patterns of attachment: A psychological study of the strange situation. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 2. Sroufe, L. A., Carlson, E., Egeland, B., & Collins, A. (2005). The development of the person: The Minnesota study of risk and adaptation from birth to adulthood. New York, NY: Guilford Press 3. Belsky, J., & Fearon, R. M. P. (2002). Early attachment security, subsequent maternal sensitivity, and later child development: Does continuity in development depend upon continuity of caregiving? Attachment & Human Development, 4, 361–387. 4. Champagne, F., & Meaney, M. (2007). Transgenerational effects of social environment on variations in maternal care and behavioral response to novelty. Behavioral Neuroscience, 121, 1353–1363. 5. Cameron, N., Champagne, F., & Parent, C. (2005). The programming of individual differences in defensive responses and reproductive strategies in the rat through variations in maternal care. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 29, 843–865 6. Curley, J., Champagne, F., & Bateson, P. (2008). Transgenerational effects of impaired maternal care on behaviour of offspring and grand offspring. Animal Behaviour, 75, 1551–1561 Roger Kobak, “Attachment and Early Social deprivation. Revisiting Harlow’s Monkey Studies”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Pareto Optimum	Rawls	I 66 Pareto optimum/principle of efficiency/Rawls: simply corresponds to the Pareto optimum⁽¹⁾. I 67 The point is that a configuration is always efficient when it is impossible to change it without putting people (at least one person) at a disadvantage. An efficient configuration does not imply an absolute equal distribution. >Efficiency, >Equality, >Inequalities, >Distributive Justice. I 68 Within a range of optimal shapes, no shape is superior to the actual unequal distribution of another shape. The different characteristics are not comparable in this sense. I 79 The principle of efficiency can be applied to the basic structure (of a community) if it is applied to the [assumed] expectations of representative members⁽²⁾⁽³⁾. 1. See V. Pareto, Manuel d'économie politique, Paris, 1909, ch. VI, §53 and Appendix, §89. 2. See J. M. Buchananan "The Relevance of Pareto Optimality", Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 6, 1962. 3. J. M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent, Ann Arbor, 1962.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Parmenides	Hegel	Bubner I 66 Parmenides/Hegel/Bubner: Hegel attributes to Parmenides an almost Spinozistic pantheism. Everything be one and the differences void. >Pantheism, >Parmenides, cf. >Spinoza. Hegel: this is due to the denial of the negative, which he has made in the separation of spheres into truth and opinions of man. Then all the negatives belong to the erroneous opinions. These erroneous opinions are constantly shifting back and forth between being and nothing. ParmenidesVs: "Which form the negative can also take, it is not." >Nothingness, >Nonexistence. Hegel: this putting the negative aside leaves only a single truth, namely that being is. Being/Parmenides/Hegel: "Thinking produces itself, what is produced is the thought, so thinking is identical with its being, for there is nothing but being, this great affirmation". This is, however, an abstraction from any determinateness which is attributed to the kingdom of Doxa (erroneous opinions). >Thinking/Hegel. It makes no sense to speak of yet another being than that which is produced by thought. Thinking/being/Hegel/Bubner: the strange thing in the production thesis, into which Hegel dissolves the unity of being and thinking (in Parmenides), is questioned in other translations. In this case one can reverse the primary identity of being with itself as a reason for the existence of thought-content, while Hegel traced back the being to the spawning thinking itself. Being/Parmenides/Hegel: Beginning of Logic: Second Parmenides Exegesis: I 69 Definition being/Parmenides/Hegel: Being is the indefinite immediacy. Bubner: this is not simply a matter of heaven, but the absence of any quality (determinateness) is generated by radical abstraction from all that is defined, which means a denial of all mediation. >Abstractness/Hegel. Thus the immediate is the absolute emptiness in the beginning. This coincides with nothingness. Since there is nothing to permanently refer to, in order to characterize being in its peculiarity, the limit to nothingness has always been blurred. >Beginning. However, a reflection on the origin would show that the indeterminacy has arisen only by moving away all determinateness. In reality, therefore, the beginning is not at all the indifference of being and nothing, but in the "movement of the immediate disappearance of the one in the other. End/beginning/Parmenides/Hegel: the static developmental beginning would be the end. It is therefore necessary to go beyond the position of the absolute, and such a process itself constitutes a "second new beginning." Finite/infinite/idealism/Hegel/Bubner: the transition from the infinite to the finite (in the early idealistic construction) must then be accomplished in such a way that the infinite does not become finite. >Infinity/Hegel, >Finiteness/Hegel. I 72 There must be no boundary between the two, because then the infinite is no longer itself, but limited. This boils down to the principle that there is nowhere in heaven and on earth something that does not contain both being and nothing in itself. " Finite/infinite/boundary/Hegel/Bubner: it has always been passed over. Thus the fixing of one position against another, which made the transition necessary, is already faulty. Abstraction always comes too late, the process of passing over is always going on. This is the triumph of the "profound Heraclitus" over eleatism. Cf. >Heraclitus, >Eleatics.	Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Parts	Minsky	Minsky I 50 Parts/explanation/Minsky: The idea of a single, central Self doesn't explain anything. This is because a thing with no parts provides nothing that we can use as pieces of explanation! Then why do we so often embrace the strange idea that what we do is done by Someone Else — that is, our Self? Because so much of what our minds do is hidden from the [other] parts of us that are involved with consciousness. >Explanation, >Self/Minsky, >Self, >Consciousness, >Complexity, >Simplicity. I 146 Parts/wholes/Minsky: E.g. An obstacle is an object that interferes with the goal of moving in a certain direction. To be trapped is to be unable to move in any acceptable direction. Therefore we're trapped, since there are only four acceptable directions - up, down, left, or right - and each of them is separately blocked. Psychologically, however, there's something missing in that explanation: it doesn't quite describe our sense of being trapped. When you're caught inside a box, you feel as though something is trying to keep you there. The box seems more than just its separate sides; you don't feel trapped by any particular side. Artificial intelligence/Minsky: In order to represent this concept of trap or enclosure, we'll first need a way to represent the idea of a container. But the same idea is also important not only physically, but psychologically, as a mental implement for envisioning and understanding other, more complicated structures. This is because the idea of a set of all possible directions is one of the great, coherent, cross-realm correspondences that can be used in many different realms of thought. >Descriptions/Minsky.	Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003
Peer-to-Peer Networks	Benkler	Benkler I 83 Peer-to-Peer Networks/Communications Platforms/Benkler: Like distributed computing projects, peer-to-peer file-sharing networks are I 84 an excellent example of a highly efficient system for storing and accessing data in a computer network. These networks of sharing are much less “mysterious,” in terms of understanding the human motivation behind participation. Nevertheless, they provide important lessons about the extent to which large-scale collaboration among strangers or loosely affiliated users can provide effective communications platforms. I 85 What is truly unique about peer-to-peer networks as a signal of what is to come is the fact that with ridiculously low financial investment, a few teenagers and twenty-something-year-olds were able to write software and protocols that allowed tens of millions of computer users around the world to cooperate in producing the most efficient and robust file storage and retrieval system in the world. The broader point to take from looking at peer-to-peer file-sharing networks, however, is the sheer effectiveness of large-scale collaboration among individuals once they possess, under their individual control, the physical capital necessary to make their cooperation effective. The only actual social cost involved at the time of the transmission is the storage capacity, communications capacity, and processing capacity necessary to store, catalog, search, retrieve, and transfer the information necessary to replicate the files from where copies reside to where more copies are desired. I 86 By cooperating in these sharing practices, users construct together systems with capabilities far exceeding those that they could have developed by themselves, as well as the capabilities that even the best financed corporations could provide using techniques that rely on components they fully owned. >Peer Production/Shirky, >Peer Production/Zittrain.	Benkler I Yochai Benkler The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom New Haven 2007
Pegasus Example	Quine	I 306 ff Name: is a general term: > "=Socrates" "Is", the copula, the verb form does not create existence Fx. For us who know that Pegasus does not exist, the phrase "Pegasus flies" may not be true or false. But there are sentences that contain Pegasus, and yet they are neither true nor false for us: For example "Homer believed in Pegasus" but in this case one can be of the opinion that the position is not descriptive. For example in "Pegasus exists" the position of "Pegasus" is purely descriptive: certainly, if something like "Pegasus exists" is true, and then also Pegasus can be replaced by an equivalent description. Measured on this scale, the position is purely indicative but peculiar: I 307 a meaning of "(x)(x exists)" or (Ex)(x exists)" is hardly discernible. Abundance: what embarrasses us here is perhaps too much "abundance" that "exists" if we already have "(Ex)" may not have any independent function in our vocabulary. We understood "exists" as (Ex)(y=x) which applies to everything as well as "x=x". But there are also anomalies in this procedure. It seems strange that "Pegasus exists" should be wrong if "(x)(x exists)" is true and "Pegasus" takes a purely descriptive position. There is something wrong about granting Pegasus the purely descriptive position. I 312 Pegasus Example/Non-Existence/Quine: (Ex) (x = Pegasus) wrong with Pegasus as a singular term - right: with Pegasus as a general term = Pegasus - but: (Ex) (x is Pegasus) is wrong (for non-existence). >Existence/Quine, >General Terms/Quine, >Singular Terms/Quine. VII (a) 3 Pegasus/Existence/Quine: if one denies its existence, one does not negate the idea - not the mental entity - Solution: Russell: are descriptions: the unanalyzed part "Author of Waverley" has not, as Wyman ((s) = Meinong) assumed, an objective reference - a whole sentence, containing a description can still be true or false (but only as a complete sentence). Lauener XI 132 Pegasized/Socratized/Quine/Lauener: it should not be possible to eliminate a name in Russell’s way by paraphrasing it by a description. ((s) But this goes very well with Pegasus.) - One can assume an unanalysed, irreducible attribute of the "being-Pegasus", and re-express this with the verb ’is-Pegasus" or "pegasized" - so that we can use singular terms without having to assume that there are things they designate - ((s) "There is nothing that pegasizes".) "~(Ex) Fx". Stalnaker I 55 Pegasus/QuineVsWyman/Quine: could exist - the round square could not. Stalnmaker I 65 Wyman: Thesis: contradictions are meaningless - VsWyman: Stalnaker Quine, Lewis. Cf. >Unicorn example.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Q XI H. Lauener Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Perception	Goodman	I 112 Deception/Goodman: e.g. "jumping point" is an example of how the perception creates facts. Some subjects do not notice them, but they are not fooled! What is reality, depends on what we make it to be! I 142 ff If we assume that the range of stimulus and the range of seeing are completely different, statements can be made compatible by keeping them separated. >Seeing, >Perception, >World/Thinking; cf. >Rabbit-Duck-Head.	G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997
Perception	Tugendhat	I 203 Perception/Tradition: Perception refers to particulars. TugendhatVs: In reality perception refers neither to singular nor to general, but it is like. The like on the side of the individual and on the side of the general. >Generality. Individuals/Tugendhat: Linguistic-analytically, the consciousness of Einzelnes is just as little sensuous as of generals. Consciousness/Tugendhat: The reference to individuals is much more problematic than the consciousness of generals, which has a sensuous preform in the consciousness of the similarity. I 204 Sameness of Perception/Tugendhat: Here we must distinguish between the introspective and the behaviorist approach. Introspection: the like sensation or conception, does not correspond to the range of use of our ordinary predicates. >Introspection. Therefore, the conceptualist felt compelled to postulate a non-sensory conception, since there is no sensory conception corresponding to all red hues. >Conceptualism. Behaviorism: that an organism perceives in the same way is established in such a way that it reacts to stimuli in the same way. Conceptions are not needed. >Behaviorism. Perception/Tugendhat: Sameness as a psychological basis for the use of a predicate can only be invoked behavioristically. >Equality. I 458 Methodology/Method/Tugendhat: We must not yet presuppose perceptual objects at all. Therefore we must ask: "How is the situation to be established in which it is to be determined whether the predicate is true?" Answer: by distinguishing one space-time location from all other space-time locations. (Specification). >Individuation, >Identification,	Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Personality	Attachment Theory	Corr I 233 Personality/hyperacitvation/deactivation/attachment theory/Shaver/Mikulincer: When attachment figures are not reliably available and supportive, a sense of security is not attained, negative working models of self and others are formed, and secondary strategies of affect regulation come into play. According to Cassidy and Kobak (1988)⁽¹⁾, these secondary strategies are of two kinds: hyperactivation and deactivation of the attachment system. Hyperactivation (which Bowlby (1982/1969)⁽²⁾ called ‘protest’) is characterized by energetic, insistent attempts to get a relationship partner, viewed as insufficiently available or responsive, to pay more attention and provide better care and support. Hyperactivating strategies include clinging, controlling and coercive responses; cognitive and behavioural efforts to establish physical contact and a sense of ‘oneness’; and overdependence on relationship partners as a source of protection (Shaver and Mikulincer 2002)⁽³⁾. Deactivation refers to inhibition of proximity-seeking inclinations and actions, suppression or discounting of threats that might activate the attachment system, and determination to handle stresses alone (a stance Bowlby (1982/1969)⁽²⁾, called ‘compulsive self-reliance’). (Shaver and Hazan 1993)⁽⁴⁾. These tendencies are bolstered by a self-reliant attitude that decreases dependence on others and discourages acknowledgment of personal faults (Mikulincer and Shaver 2007)⁽⁵⁾. In examining individual differences in the functioning of the attachment system in infancy, childhood, adolescence and adulthood, attachment researchers have focused on a person’s attachment style – the pattern of relational needs, cognitions, emotions and behaviours that results from satisfactory or frustrating interactions with attachment figures. These styles were first described by Ainsworth (1967⁽⁶⁾; Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters and Wall 1978⁽⁷⁾). >Strange Situation/Ainsworth, >About the Attachment theory. 1. Cassidy, J. and Kobak, R. R. 1988. Avoidance and its relationship with other defensive processes, in J. Belsky and T. Nezworski (eds.), Clinical implications of attachment, pp. 300–23. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 2. Bowlby, J. 1982. Attachment and loss, vol. I, Attachment, 2nd edn. New York: Basic Books (original edn 1969) 3. Shaver, P. R. and Mikulincer, M. 2002. Attachment-related psychodynamics, Attachment and Human Development 4: 133–61 4. Shaver, P. R. and Hazan, C. 1993. Adult romantic attachment: theory and evidence, in D. Perlman and W. Jones (eds.), Advances in personal relationships, vol. IV, pp. 29–70. London: Jessica Kingsley 5. Mikulincer, M. and Shaver, P. R. 2007. Attachment in adulthood: structure, dynamics, and change. New York: Guilford Press 6. Ainsworth, M. D. S. 1967. Infancy in Uganda: infant care and the growth of love. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 7. Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E. and Wall, S. 1978. Patterns of attachment: assessed in the Strange Situation and at home. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Personality	Cognitive Psychology	Corr I 401 Personality/cognitive psychology/Matthews: The impact of the ‘cognitive revolution’ on personality arrived first via clinical psychology, and the insight that emotional pathology reflected distortions and impairments in cognition (Beck 1967)⁽¹⁾. Such ideas generated a wave of research on the cognitive deficits associated with trait anxiety (Spielberger 1972)⁽²⁾. Some years later, clinical research also inspired studies showing that anxiety relates to bias in selective attention and other cognitive functions (Williams, Watts, MacLeod and Matthews 1997)⁽³⁾. In the 1970s and 1980s, researchers also turned to a wider variety of traits, exploring the full range of processing functions differentiated by cognitive psychology (Eysenck 1981⁽⁴⁾). Recent research has continued efforts to build information-processing models of the major traits on the basis of performance data (Matthews 2008a)⁽⁵⁾. >Performance/Cognitive Psychology, >Personality Traits/Cognitive Neuroscience. Corr I 402 1) Studies of performance may be used to test predictions from theory. As noted previously, systematic performance research was first featured in psychobiological studies of E and N (Eysenck 1957⁽⁶⁾, 1967⁽⁷⁾). Corr I 403 2) Performance data may be used to relate personality to individual differences in the multiple processing modules that contribute to the cognitive architecture. Broad constructs like arousal or resources may fail to account for the full range of findings on personality and performance (e.g., Matthews and Gilliland 1999)⁽⁸⁾. 3) Investigate how individual differences in cognition may influence personality. For example, negative biases in attention, in interpretation of events, and in self-beliefs may contribute to development of an anxiety-prone personality (Wells and Matthews 2006⁽⁹⁾; Wilson, MacLeod, Matthews and Rutherford, 2006)⁽¹⁰⁾. >Method/Cognitive/Psychology. 1. Beck, A. T. 1967. Depression: causes and treatment. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 2. Spielberger, C. D. 1972. Anxiety as an emotional state, in C. D. Spielberger (ed.), Anxiety: current trends in theory and research, vol. I, pp. 481–93. London: Academic Press 3. Williams, J. M. G., Watts, F. N., MacLeod, C. and Mathews, A. 1997. Cognitive psychology and emotional disorders, 2nd edn. Chichester: Wiley 4. Eysenck, M. W. 1981. Learning, memory and personality, in H. J. Eysenck (ed.), A model for personality. Berlin: Springer. 5. Matthews, G. 2008a. Personality and information processing: a cognitive-adaptive theory, in G. J. Boyle, G. Matthews and D. H. Saklofske (eds.), Handbook of personality theory and testing, vol. I, Personality theories and models, pp. 56–79. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 6. Eysenck, H. J. 1957. The dynamics of anxiety and hysteria. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 7. Eysenck, H. J. 1967. The biological basis of personality. Springfield, IL: Thomas 8. Matthews, G. and Gilliland, K. 1999. The personality theories of H. J. Eysenck and J. A. Gray: a comparative review, Personality and Individual Differences 26: 583–626 9. Wells, A. and Matthews, G. 2006. Cognitive vulnerability to anxiety disorders: an integration, in L. B. Alloy and J. H. Riskind (eds.), Cognitive vulnerability to emotional disorders, pp. 303–25. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 10. Wilson, E. J., MacLeod, C., Mathews, A. and Rutherford, E. M. 2006. The causal role of interpretive bias in anxiety reactivity, Journal of Abnormal Psychology 115: 103–11 Gerald Matthews, „ Personality and performance: cognitive processes and models“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Personality	Shaver	Corr I 235 Personality/attachment style/social psychology/Shaver: Working from a personality and social psychological perspective, Hazan and Shaver (1987⁽¹⁾, 1990⁽²⁾) developed a self-report measure of adult attachment style suitable for use in experiments and surveys. >Affectional bond, >Attachment theory, >Self-description. In its original form, the measure consisted of three brief descriptions of feelings and behaviours in close relationships that were intended to characterize adult romantic analogues of the three infant attachment styles identified by Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters and Wall (1978)⁽³⁾. Secure: I find it relatively easy to get close to others and am comfortable depending on them and having them depend on me. I don’t worry about being abandoned or about someone getting too close to me. Avoidant: I am somewhat uncomfortable being close to others; I find it difficult to trust them completely, difficult to allow myself to depend on them. I am nervous when anyone gets too close and often, others want me to be more intimate than I feel comfortable being. Anxious: I find that others are reluctant to get as close as I would like. I often worry that my partner doesn’t really love me or won’t want to stay with me. I want to get very close to my partner and this sometimes scares people away. Over time, attachment researchers largely agreed that attachment styles are best conceptualized as regions in a two-dimensional (anxiety-by-avoidance) space (e.g., Brennan, Clark and Shaver 1998⁽⁴⁾; Fraley and Waller 1998⁽⁵⁾). These two dimensions are consistently obtained in factor analyses of attachment measures (e.g., Brennan, Clark and Shaver 1998⁽⁴⁾). Corr I 236 The two attachment-style dimensions, which are considered to be the two major kinds of attachment insecurity, can be measured with the thirty-six-item Experiences in Close Relationships inventory (ECR) (Brennan, Clark and Shaver 1998)⁽⁶⁾, which is reliable in both the internal-consistency and test-retest senses and has high construct, predictive and discriminant validity (Crowell, Fraley and Shaver 1999⁽⁷⁾; Mikulincer and Shaver 2007)⁽⁸⁾. >Behavior, >Personality, >Personality traits. 1. Hazan, C. and Shaver, P. R. 1987. Romantic love conceptualized as an attachment process, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 52: 511–24 2. Hazan, C. and Shaver, P. R. 1990. Love and work: an attachment-theoretical perspective, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 59: 270–80 3. Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E. and Wall, S. 1978. Patterns of attachment: assessed in the Strange Situation and at home. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 4. Brennan, K. A., Clark, C. L. and Shaver, P. R. 1998. Self-report measurement of adult romantic attachment: an integrative overview, in J. A. Simpson and W. S. Rholes (eds.), Attachment theory and close relationships, pp. 46–76. New York: Guilford Press 5. Fraley, R. C. and Waller, N. G. 1998. Adult attachment patterns: a test of the typological model, in J. A. Simpson and W. S. Rholes (eds.), Attachment theory and close relationships, pp. 77–114. New York: Guilford Press 6. Brennan, K. A., Clark, C. L. and Shaver, P. R. 1998. Self-report measurement of adult romantic attachment: an integrative overview, in J. A. Simpson and W. S. Rholes (eds.), Attachment theory and close relationships, pp. 46–76. New York: Guilford Press 7. Crowell, J. A., Fraley, R. C. and Shaver, P. R. 1999. Measurement of adult attachment, in J. Cassidy and P. R. Shaver (eds.), Handbook of attachment: theory, research, and clinical applications, pp. 434–65. New York: Guilford Press 8. Mikulincer, M. and Shaver, P. R. 2007. Attachment in adulthood: structure, dynamics, and change. New York: Guilford Press Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Personality Traits	Behavioral Genetics	Corr I 287 Personality traits//Behavioral Genetics/Munafò: Investigation of the association between DNA variants and psychological phenotypes has the potential to determine which genes influence heritable psychological traits, such as personality (Ebstein, Benjamin and Belmaker 2000⁽¹⁾; Eysenck 1977)⁽²⁾. Such research has a long history, beginning with the observation that behavioural phenotypes (including personality) tend to show greater similarity between pairs of individuals as genetic similarity increases. Problems: molecular genetic studies have so far been characterized more by the inconsistency of their results than by the provision of novel biological information. Given the large number of candidate genes that can be hypothesized to influence psychological traits, the extent of DNA sequence variation and the numerous, often conflicting, methods of measuring phenotypic variation in psychological and behavioural science, the task of evaluating competing statistical hypotheses is likely to be onerous. (VsMolecular genetics, VsBehavioral genetics). Traits/psychology: Most trait psychologists argue that a small number of factors can be used to account for individual differences in personality. For example, there is strong agreement that the dimensions of Extraversion-Introversion and Neuroticism-Stability are fundamental parts of any personality taxonomy. >Personality traits/psychological theories. Causality: Causal theorists of personality have attempted to go further and associate known neurobiological mechanisms with personality dimensions, measured using a range of instruments. >Causality/Developmental psychology. Behavior: Following Revelle’s typology (Revelle 1995)⁽³⁾, three fundamental behavioural dimensions have been proposed to correspond to differential activity in neurotransmitter systems (Ebstein, Benjamin Benjamin and Belmaker 2000⁽¹⁾; Munafò, Clark, Moore et al. 2003⁽⁴⁾): dopamine for approach behaviours, serotonin and noradrenaline for avoidance behaviours, and serotonin, noradrenaline and GABA for aggressive or fight-flight behaviours. There is considerable consensus over the construct validity of the first two of these dimensions, but there remains equally considerable debate over the third. 1. Ebstein, R. P., Benjamin, J., Belmaker, R. H. 2000. Personality and polymorphisms of genes involved in aminergic neurotransmission, European Journal of Pharmacology 410: 205–14 2. Eysenck, H. J. 1977. National differences in personality as related to ABO blood group polymorphism, Psychology Reports 41: 1257–8 3. Revelle, W. 1995. Personality processes, Annual Review of Psychology 46: 295–328 4. Munafò, M. R., Clark, T. G., Moore, L. R., Payne, E., Walton, R. and Flint, J. 2003. Genetic polymorphisms and personality in healthy adults: a systematic review and meta-analysis, Molecular Psychiatry 8: 471–84 Marcus R. Munafò,“Behavioural genetics: from variance to DNA“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.)2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press Corr I 329 Personality traits/Behavioral Genetics: Behaviour genetic analysis has shown that the two meta-traits have genetic origins (Jang et al. 2006)⁽¹⁾, and evidence is accumulating that Stability (>Personality traits/neurobiology) is related to serotonin, whereas Plasticity may be related to dopamine (DeYoung 2006⁽²⁾; DeYoung, Peterson and Higgins 2002;⁽³⁾ Yamagata, Suzuki, Ando et al. 2006)⁽⁴⁾. Serotonine and dopamine act as diffuse neuromodulators affecting a wide array of brain systems, and their broad influence is consistent with a role in the broadest level of personality structure. 1. Jang, K. L., Livesley, W. J., Ando, J., Yamagata, S., Suzuki, A., Angleitner, A., Ostendorf, F., Riemann, R. and Spinath, F. 2006. Behavioural genetics of the higher-order factors of the Big Five, Personality and Individual Differences 41: 261–72 2. DeYoung, C. G. 2006. Higher-order factors of the Big Five in a multi-informant sample, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 91: 1138–51 3. DeYoung, C. G., Peterson, J. B. and Higgins, D. M. 2002. Higher-order factors of the Big Five predict conformity: are there neuroses of health? Personality and Individual Differences 33: 533–52 4. Yamagata, S., Suzuki, A., Ando, J., Ono, Y., Kijima, N., Yoshimura, K., Ostendorf, F., Angleitner, A., Riemann, R., Spinath, F. M., Livesley, W. J. and Jang, K. L. 2006. Is the genetic structure of human personality universal? A cross-cultural twin study from North America, Europe, and Asia, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 90: 987–98 Colin G. DeYoung and Jeremy R. Gray, „ Personality neuroscience: explaining individual differences in affect, behaviour and cognition“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Personality Traits	Neuroscience	Corr I 329 Personality traits/hierarchy/causality/Neuroscience: Personality traits are arranged hierarchically, with correlated groups of more specific traits categorized together in broader traits. For example, the lower-level traits of talkativeness, assertiveness, enthusiasm and sociability are all grouped within the trait of Extraversion. A key premise of the factor-analytic approach is that specific traits fall within the same larger factor because of some shared underlying cause (Haig 2005)⁽¹⁾. Though this cause need not be exclusively biological, the correlational structure of traits provides a useful clue for personality neuroscience. >Extraversion, >Neuroticism, >Openness, >Big Five. 1. Haig, B. D. 2005. Exploratory factor analysis, theory generation, and scientific method, Multivariate Behavioural Research 40: 303–29 Colin G. DeYoung and Jeremy R. Gray, „ Personality neuroscience: explaining individual differences in affect, behaviour and cognition“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Personality Types	Psychological Theories	Corr I 11 Personality types/psychology/psychological theories: Personality theory has been persistently concerned with the description of individual differences. In principle, if there are naturally existing categories, we may speak of types, of natural categories. >Personality psychology. Though the word ‘type’ has been used to refer to types of temperament (Kagan 1994)⁽¹⁾, and attachment (Ainsworth et al. 1978)⁽²⁾, for example, the underlying determinants (such as anxiety) that produce these categories are continuous. However convenient for descriptive and even analytical purposes, these are not types in the sense of discrete, natural categories; nor are the popular Jungian types, measured by the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Continuous dimensions (traits and factors) are far easier to find. >Categorization, >Classification, >Type/Token, >Similarity, >Temperament, >Personality traits. 1. Kagan, J. 1994. Galen’s prophecy: temperament in human nature. New York: Westview Press 2. Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E. and Wall, S. 1978. Patterns of attachment: a psychological study of the strange situation. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum Susan Cloninger, “Conceptual issues in personality theory”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press.	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Perspective		Perspective: is the arrangement of objects as it arises with respect to the perception from a geometrical localization of the perceiver within an object space. In a broader sense, taking a foreign perspective also means taking the position of another person or group in the context of a discussion. See also bat example, foreign psychological.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Philosophy	McGinn	I 11 Philosophy/McGinn: Thesis: Philosophical problems are not strange beings, but limits of our cognition - Def Transcendental Naturalism/McGinn: Transcendental Naturalism: Thesis: our faculty of knowledge hinders the realization of the true nature of the objective world - but from this nothing follows for the ontology. >Terminology/McGinn, >Ontology.	McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001
Picture (Image)	Flusser	Blask I 26 Picture/Flusser: Thesis: The human forgets that he was the one who created the pictures. Imagination turned into hallucination. >Imagination, >Hallucination. --- Flusser I 111 ff Picture/Flusser: Specific definition: (sur)face covered with symbols. Definition Picture: A picture is a reduction of the "concrete" four-dimensional relations to two dimensions. Cave paintings in Lascaux, for example, can be regarded as "prospective projections": their intention was probably not to depict "concrete situations" (such as anatomy lessons) but to create desired situations: to serve a hunting magic. They do not want to show what ponies are like, but what you have to do to hunt them. On the other hand, for example, there is little magic on a street map: it does not show how roads should be, but how they really are. And yet it has a "value", showing the driver what to do to get into town. Then they're good pictures. I 112 For example, Lascaux: they are "good pictures" if they help to a successful hunt, and they do so if they reproduce the anatomy of the ponies correctly. Many pictures are pleasingly designed surfaces, neither streets nor ponies, and these are commonly referred to as pictures. I 135 Picture/Flusser: Technical images/techno-images: Pictures that do not mean scenes, but texts: For example, equations that lead to atomic bombs consist of unimaginable symbols. Therefore, the text that these equations cannot be regarded as meaningless. But the atomic bomb itself is unimaginable in a strange sense. And the same applies to the TV, the car, in short, to most of our technical products. If such texts work, they lead to even more insane codes. I 137 ff Technical Images/techno-images: We believe we criticize films, we think we understand TV programs: this is a dangerous mistake. Decryption is much more difficult. Traditional Picture: Scene picture < human Techno-images: Scene > Picture > human Traditional pictures are made by people, technical pictures are made by devices. I 138 In the traditional picture, the causal chain between scene and picture is interrupted by the human being. The technical images' causal chain is not interrupted, the technical image is a direct consequence of the scene, but there is no causal chain between reality and picture. The naïve belief that one does not have to learn to decipher cinema posters or advertisements contributes to the alienation that these pictures cause. Technical Text ↔ Apparatus Operator ↔ techno-image >Alienation, >Understanding, >Interpretation, >Interpretation("Deutung"). I 139 Def techno-images/Flusser: technical images are (sur)faces covered with symbols, which mean symbols of linear texts. For example, an X-ray of the broken arm is for the doctor both a map and a model of how the arm is to be treated, i.e. "prospective" and it is "beautiful" insofar as it is true and good. >Symbols, >Text. The specificity of the technical images is not to be found in the method of production (by apparatus) nor in the material (cathode tubes). Technical images are like all images symbols, but they do not mean scenes like traditional images, they mean concepts. Def techno-images: means terms, means texts. >Concepts. In this respect, traditionally created pictures are also technical images insofar they mean concepts: blueprints, diagrams, curves in statistics, etc. Strange kinship of technical images with ideograms: both are images that mean concepts. However, "concept" does not have the same meaning in both cases. >Meaning, >Meaning/intending. For example, one "feels" that the number "2", i.e. an ideogram, is a completely different kind of symbol than e.g. the photography of a bra in advertising, i.e. a technical image, although both terms mean. The essentially important of the technical codes always melts between the fingers. Ideogram translation into alphabetical code. "Two and two is four" and 2+2=4: the first seems to be the description of the second. We have the tendency to see to see pictorial scriptures in ideogrammatic codes, although they are linear. "2+2=4" is not the picture of a linear situation, however! It is the description of a scene! >Numbers, >Numerals. I 141 Ideograms: are not images but symbols of the type "letter". Def Scene: non-linear. Def Text: linear. Def ideograms: concepts which mean pictures. I 142 Ideograms are like technical picture above language. For example, you can also be translated with "Two and two makes four" and "Buy a bra!". Traditional pictures are "under language". They're being discussed. Although people can communicate with images, the belief that they are "generally understandable"is wrong. I 143 techno-images: the translation of technical images lies in a completely different direction beyond the spoken language than the translation of H20 into "water". "P", for example, means "Parking permitted" at first glance, but this new type of code has to destroy the alphabet over time. >Translation. Even if the "P" is replaced by the pictogram of a car. It could also be replaced by a reproduction of the Mona Lisa. >Convention. The way we learn to follow them is a different way than the way we learn mathematical formulas or alphabetical texts. >Learning. I 146 Technical pictures mean texts. For example, photography in the electron microscope depicts physical texts, the film depicts relationships from a film script, the statistical curve depicts relationships that set up economic texts with regard to an economic tendency. Technical codes a) Posters: directly understandable b) X-ray image: must be decoded. For example, when we hit the brake at a red traffic light, we do not pretend to read a text, but to see a picture where a foot hits a brake pedal. (See also Code/Flusser and Technology/Flusser). I 162 Techno-images/Flusser: only archeologists or biologists, astronomers or physicists use technical images "correctly", namely as symbols of concepts. Picture/Flusser: Video art does not provide technical images. Because they are not images there for concepts. I 163 Misbelief: technical images are codes of the mass media. Society is only interested in technical images that are broadcast amphitheatrically, and is left completely cold by the art discussion. >Society, >Art, >Aesthetics.	Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 Blask I Falko Blask Jean Baudrillard zur Einführung Hamburg 2013
Picture (Image)	Goodman	III 216f Picture/Goodman: pictures are more likely to compare with the temperature events, than with the heights of the mercury column. Because in the systems in question, the images are like the temperatures rather denoted, they do not denote themselves. Def seeing/Goodman: what properties a picture exemplifies or expresses is comparable to the use of a scale-free thermometer. >Seeing, III 217f Def saying/Goodman: to say what the picture exemplifies, is then a matter of fitting the correct words from a syntactically unlimited and semantically dense language. There will always be another expression, such that we cannot determine what is actually exemplified by the picture in question. To say what a picuture exemplifies is like measuring without giving tolerance ranges. III 218 Pictorial exemplification/Goodman: so in reality it is an inverted display or measuring system. Systems may not be equated with language. Languages have alphabets, pictorial systems do not. >Exemplification, >Terminology/Goodman. --- IV 121 Pictorial elements/Goodman: pictorial elements can never, how similar they may be, represent syntactic equivalents. Because without an alphabet we have no way to differentiate significant and insignificant differences for marks. A blurry horse-representation is certainly not a representation of a blurred horse. The blurriness belongs to the presentation or imagination. We do not have a lexicon of pictorial forms. Therefore, the theory of language cannot explain visual skills. IV 156 Photography/Goodman: a photograph of the surface of Mars reminds us that the mediumn does not provide its own scale for size and distance. >Photography. IV 169 Digital/analog/Goodman: is the picture composed of dots a digital picture? No! Because no symbol is digital or analog. IV 174 A complete scheme is only pictural if it is analog. Verbally, if it is digital. In other words, not each analog, full scheme is pictural and not each digital full scheme is verbal. Picture/Goodman: so we are unable to reach a definition of images. Cf. >Picture (mapping), >Map example.	G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997
Planets Example		Planet example: the planet example is an example by V.W.O. Quine (Quine, 1953, “From a logical point of view”, Cambridge, MA) From the necessity of the number 9 being odd, it cannot be inferred that the number of planets is necessarily odd even though the number of planets is equal to 9, and the identity 9 = 9 or number of planets = number of planets is necessary. See also opacity, de re, de dicto, necessity, range.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Planning	Minsky	Minsky I 45 Planning/artificial intelligence/Minsky: We cannot simply decide or choose to accomplish an enterprise that makes a large demand for time, because it will inevitably conflict with other interests and ambitions. Then we'll be forced to ask questions like these: What must I give up for this? What will I learn from it? Will it bring power and influence? Will I remain interested in it? Will other people help me with it? Will they still like me? Perhaps the most difficult question of all is, How will adopting this goal change me? Many of the schemes we use for self-control are the same as those we learn to use for influencing other people. >Self/AI/Minsky, >Conflicts/Minsky. We make ourselves behave by exploiting our own fears and desires, offering ourselves rewards, or threatening the loss of what we love. But when short-range tricks won't keep us to our projects for long enough, we may need some way to make changes that won't let us change ourselves back again. >Circularity/AI/Minsky. Minsky I 53 [Some personality traits may be necessary for planning]: Predictability: Because it is hard to maintain friendship without trust, we try to conform to the expectations of our friends. Self-Reliance: Thus, over time, imagined traits can make themselves actual! For even to carry out our own plans, we must be able to predict what we ourselves are likely to do — and that will become easier the more we simplify ourselves. >Personality traits/Minsky.	Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003
Planning	Rothbard	Rothbard III 279 Planning/range of choice/economy/Rothbard: It should be evident that the establishment of money tremendously broadens the range of choice open to everybody. The range of alternative uses that can be satisfied by units of money is far wider than the number of uses to which individual goods can be put. [Man] is always engaged in allocating means to the most highly valued of his alternative ends, as ranked on his value scale. His actions in general, and his actions in exchange in particular, are always the result of certain expectations on his part, expectations of the most satisfactory course that he could follow. >Time/Rothbard, >Action/Rothbard. Ex ante he appraises his situation, present and prospective future, chooses among his valuations, tries to achieve the highest ones according to his “know-how,” and then chooses courses of action on the basis of these plans. Plans are his decisions concerning future action, based on his ranking of ends and on his assumed knowledge of how to attain the ends. Every individual, therefore, is constantly engaged in planning. It is erroneous, (…) to assert that a free market society is “unplanned”; on the contrary, each individual plans for himself. But does not “chaos” result from the fact that individual plans do not seem to be co-ordinated? On the contrary, the exchange system, in the first place, co-ordinates individual plans by benefiting both parties to every exchange. >Society/Rothbard, >Market/Rothbard, >Exchange/Rothbard, >Consumption/Rothbard, >Utility/Rothbard.	Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Plato	Political Philosophy	Gaus I 309 Plato/Political philosophy/Keyt/Miller: after 2,400 years there is still no settled interpretive strategy for reading Plato. Since he writes dialogues rather than treatises, the extent to which his characters speak for their author is bound to remain problematic. The major divide is between interpreters who respect Platonic anonymity and those who do not (see D.L. III.50-1). A. Plato as anonymous author: [These interpreters of Plato] are impressed by the literary 'distancing' that Plato creates between himself and his readers. (The ideas attributed to Protagoras in the Theaetetus, for example, are thrice removed from Plato: they are expressed by Socrates, whose speeches are read in turn by Euclides, the narrator of the dialogue.) Characterology: Interpreters who take such distancing seriously might be called characterologists' since they hold that the characters in the dialogues are literary characters who speak for themselves, not for Plato. Characterologists take the dialogues to be 'sceptical', or aporetic, rather than 'dogmatic', or doctrinal, and emphasize their dramatic and literary elements. Leo Strauss: Thus, Leo Strauss, a particularly fervent characterologist, claims that the dialogues must be read as dramas: 'We cannot,' he says, 'ascribe to Plato any utterance of any of his characters without having taken great precautions' (1964⁽¹⁾: 59) (...) . B. Platonic persons as speaking for themselves: The opposing group of interpreters suppose that in each dialogue Plato has an identifiable spokesman: Socrates in the Gorgias and the Republic, the Eleatic Stranger in the Statesman, and the Athenian Stranger in the Laws (D.L. III.52). Such interpreters fall into three camps (1) Unitarians suppose that Plato's spokesmen present a consistent doctrine in all four dialogues. (2) Developmentalists believe that the doctrine expressed by Plato's spokesmen evolves from one dialogue to the next. They believe, of course, that the order of composition of our four dialogues can be established, the order usually favoured being, from earliest to latest, Gorgias, Republic, Statesman, Laws. (3) Particularists interpret each dialogue on its own. Though they allow that there may be thematic links among the four dialogues, Gaus I 310 they do not worry overly much about the relation of one dialogue in the group to the others. Griswold (1988)⁽²⁾ and Smith (1998⁽³⁾: vol. I) are two useful collections of essays on interpretive strategies, and Tarrant (2000)⁽⁴⁾ is a major new work on Platonic interpretation. Dialogues: Nomoi: in the Laws the Athenian Stranger enumerates seven claims to rule - the claim of the wellborn to rule the base-born, the strong to rule the weak, and so forth - and concludes that the greatest claim of all is that of the wise to rule the ignorant (Laws III.690a-d). This conclusion is the animating idea of the four political dialogues. Gorgias: in the Gorgias Socrates maintains that true statesmanship (politiké) differs from public speaking (rhetoriké) in being an art (techné) rather than an empirical knack (empeiria) - where an art, unlike an empirical knack, has a rational principle (logos) and can give the cause (aitia) of each thing (Gorg. 465a). He argues that none of the men reputed to be great Athenian statesmen practised true statesmanship (Gorg. 503b-c, 517a), and claims to be himself the only true statesman in Athens (Gorg. 521d6-9). Republic: in the Republic the role of reason and knowledge in politics is neatly encapsulated in the simile of the ship of state: just as a steersman must pay attention to sky, stars and wind if he is to be really qualified to rule a ship, so a statesman must have knowledge of the realm of Forms, a realm of incorporeal paradigms that exist beyond space and time, if he is to be really qualified to rule a polis (Rep. VI.488a7-489a6). Politikos: in the Statesman the Eleatic Stranger asserts that the only correct constitution is the one in which the rulers possess true statesmanship, all other constitutions being better or worse imitations of this one (Plt. 293c-294a, 296e4-297a5); and in the Laws the Athenian Stranger affirms the same principle (IX.875c3-d5). (The relations among these dialogues are discussed by Owen, 1953⁽⁵⁾; Klosko, 1986⁽⁶⁾; Laks, 1990⁽⁷⁾; Gill, 1995⁽⁸⁾; Kahn, 1995⁽⁹⁾; and Kahn, 1996⁽¹⁰⁾.) >Justice/Plato. Gaus I 311 Republic:/today’s discussion: the Republic is the most controversial work in Greek philosophy. There is no settled interpretation of the dialogue as a whole, of any of its parts, or even of its characters. Of the current controversies surrounding its political ideas the most notable concern its communism, its view of women, its hostility toward Athenian democracy, and its utopianism. >Plato. Aristotle/VsPlato: Plato's rejection of private, or separate, families and of private property (at least for the rulers and warriors of his ideal polis) is usually examined through the lens of Aristotle's critique of Platonic communism in Politics II.1-5. >Aristotle. Literature: T. H. Irwin (1991)⁽¹¹⁾ and Robert Mayhew (1997)⁽¹²⁾ reach opposite conclusions about the cogency of Aristotle's critique. Feminism: Whether Plato was a feminist and whether he masculinized women are hotly debated issues, especially among feminist philosophers. Tuana (1994)⁽¹³⁾ is a collection of diverse essays on this topic. (New books on the Republic appear regularly. Among the most notable are Cross and Woozley, 1964⁽¹⁴⁾; Annas, 1981⁽¹⁵⁾; White, 1979⁽¹⁶⁾; and Reeve, 1988⁽¹⁷⁾. Three recent collections of essays are particularly helpful: Fine, 1999⁽¹⁸⁾: vol. Il; Kraut, 1997b⁽¹⁹⁾; and Höffe, 1997⁽²⁰⁾.) Statesman/Politikos: (After long neglect the Statesman has recently come into the spotlight. Lane, 1998⁽²¹⁾, is a study of its political philosophy; and Rowe, 1995(22), is an extensive collection of papers on all aspects of the dialogue.) 1. Strauss, Leo (1964) The City and Man. Chicago: Rand McNally. 2. Griswold, Charles L. (1988) Platonic Writings/Platonic Readings. New York: Routledge. 3. Smith, Nicholas D., ed. (1998) Plato: Critical Assessments. Vol. l, General Issues of Interpetation. London: Routledge. 4. Tarrant, Harold (2000) Plato 's First Interpreters. London: Duckworth. 5. Owen, G. E. L. (1953) 'The place of the Timaeus in Plato's dialogues'. Classical Quarterly, 3: 79-95. 6. Klosko, George (1986) The Development of Plato 's Political Theory. New York: Methuen. 7. Laks, André (1990) 'Legislation and demiurgy: on the relationship between Plato's Republic and Laws'. Classical Antiquity, 9: 209-29. 8. Gill, Christopher (1995) 'Rethinking constitutionalism in Statesman 291—303'. In C. J. Rowe, ed., Reading the Statesman: Proceedings of the 111 Symposium Platonicum. Sankt Augustin: Academia. 9. Kahn, Charles H. (1995) 'The place of the Statesman in Plato's later work'. In C. J. Rowe, ed., Reading the Statesman: Proceedings of the 111 Symposium Platonicum. Sankt Augustin: Academia. 10. Kahn, Charles H. (1996) Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 11. Irwin, T. H. (1991) 'Aristotle's defense of private property'. In David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, eds, A Companion to Aristotle Politics. Oxford: Blackwell. 12. Mayhew, Robert (1997) Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Republic. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 14. Cross, R. C. and A. D. Wooziey (1964) Plato's Republic: A Philosophical Commentary. New York: St Martin's. 15. Annas, Julia (1981) An Intmduction to Plato's Republic. Oxford: Clarendon. 16. White, Nicholas P. (1979) A Companion to Plato's Republic. Indianapolis: Hackett. 17. Reeve, C. D. C. (1988) Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato 's Republic. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 18. Fine, Gail (1999) Plato 2: Ethics, Politics, Religion, and the Soul. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 19. Kraut, Richard, ed. (1997b) Plato's Republic: Critical Essays. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 20. Höffe, Otfried, ed. (1997) Platon Politeia. Berlin: Akademie. 21. Lane, M. S. (1998) Method and Politics in Plato's Statesman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 22. Rowe, C. J. (1995) Reading the Statesman: Proceedings of the 111 Symposium Platonicum. Sankt Augustin: Academia. Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Pluralism	Conservatism	Gaus I 135 Pluralism/Conservatism/Kekes: If pluralism takes a conservative form, it provides two important possibilities for its defenders. 1) The first is a universal and objective reason in favour of those political arrangements of the con- servative's society that protect the minimum requirements and against those political arrange- ments that violate them. It motivates, gives direction to, and sets the goal of intended reforms. 2) Second, pluralistic conservatism is most receptive to the view that the best guide to the political arrangements that a society ought to have beyond the minimum level is the history of the society. It is that history, rather than any metaphysical or utopian consideration, that is most likely to provide the relevant considerations for or against the political arrangements that present themselves as possibilities in that society. Diversity: the most reasonable answer to the question of how the diversity of values should affect political arrangements is that the arrangements that concern the minimum requirements of good lives are not affected at all, but those that concern requirements beyond the minimum are affected. Political arrangements ought to protect the universal and objective conditions that must be met by all good lives. Conservative PluralismVsLibelralism: (...) there will be (...) a significant difference between pluralistic conservative politics and the politics of others: this kind of conservatism is genuinely pluralistic, whereas the politics of the alternative approaches are not. Liberals socialists, and others are committed to regarding some few values as overriding. What makes them liberals, socialists, or whatever is their claim that when the few values they favour conflict with the less favoured ones, then the ones they favour should prevail. If they did not believe this, they would cease to be liberals, socialists, or whatever. Pluralistic conservatives reject this approach. Kekes, John 2004. „Conservtive Theories“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Pluralism	Rawls	Gaus I 240 Pluralism/diversity/Rawls/D’Agostino: [in relation to diversity] there are, (...) a variety of pluralisms, of stances towards and arguments about the purported political relevance of diversity. We might believe, for instance, that, 'in the limit' , diversity of evaluations would be eliminated by the progressive correction of epistemic and/or motivational deficiencies, much as monism presupposes. We might nevertheless also believe that, given human finitude (Chemiak, 1986)⁽¹⁾, such a 'limit' is unapproachable (to any very great degree) without forms of corrective action that would themselves be manifestly indefensible, ethico-politically, and, hence, that it cannot be demanded, as monism does demand, that we actually aim at the elimination of such diversity. Rawls: This seems to have been John Rawls's view in the book Political Liberalism and he grounds such weak pluralism, as I will call it, in his analysis of the so-called 'burdens of judgment' (1993⁽²⁾: ch. II, s. 2). These are, specifically, those 'hazards involved in the correct (and conscientious) Gaus I 241 exercise of our powers of reason and judgement in the ordinary course of political life' , which make it improbable that 'conscientious persons with full powers of reason, even after free discussion, will all arrive at the same conclusion' (1993⁽²⁾: 56, 58). Rawls himself characterizes this doctrine in terms of 'the practical impossibility of reaching reason- able and workable political agreement' (1993⁽²⁾: 63), and says that it expresses 'a political conception [that] tries to avoid, so far as possible, disputed philosophical theses and to give an account that rests on plain facts open to all' (1993⁽²⁾: 57, n. 10). >Pluralism/Political Philosophy. ((s) This is a weak version of pluralism; for the distinction of strong and weak pluralism see >Pluralism/D’Agostino. 1) Rawls points out that '[e]ven where we fully agree about the kinds of considerations that are relevant [to assessment and choice], we may disagree about their weight, and so arrive at different Lover- allJ judgments' (1993⁽²⁾: 56). Rawls himself of course treats this phenomenon in purely 'practical' terms: reduction of such diversity would require the deployment of morally impermissible tactics. D’AgostinoVsRawls: Some observations of Thomas Kuhn (1977⁽³⁾: 330ff) provide the basis, however, for an argument in favour of precisely this kind of diversity. 2) Rawls points out that 'all our [choice-relevant] concepts are vague and subject to hard cases and that this indeterminacy means that we must rely on judgement and interpretation... where reasonable persons may differ' (1993⁽²⁾: 56). Example: This might mean, schematically, that A considers X superior to Y whereas B does not because he, A, does judge that some choice-relevant concept (e.g. 'is just') applies to X whereas, because of indeterminacy or vagueness, she, B, does not. (A and B agree about 'core cases' for the application of the term but disagree about 'peripheral cases', which may, of course, still be important, ethico-politically.) Cf. >Diversity/Hart. Gaus I 242 3) Rawls notes, finally, that 'any system of social institutions is limited in the values it can admit so that some selection must be made from the full range of moral and political values that might be realized' (1993⁽²⁾: 57). Individuals/diversity/Ralws/D’Agostino: In Rawls's terminology, diversity in individuals' evaluations 'rests on plain facts open to all'. And, indeed, there may even, as Rawls himself believes, be versions of the diversity-endorsing doctrine of pluralism which manage to avoid 'disputed philosophical theses'. But there are also versions of pluralism which are more robust philosophically (than Rawls's weak pluralism), and which are argued for on quite different bases. >Pluralism/Berlin, >Diversity/Hart. 1. Cherniak, Christopher (1986) Minimal Rationality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 3. Kuhn, Thomas (1977) The Essential Tension. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Political Economy	Rawls	I 259 Political economy/Rawls: by this I mean economic arrangements and political arrangements as well as the background institutions that are related to them. Welfare economics/K. J. Arrow/Rawls: Defines welfare economics in a similar way^(1)(2)(3). Welfare/Rawls: I do not use this expression because it is reminiscent of utilitarianism. (RawlsVsUtilitarianism). >Utilitarianism, >Welfare economics, >Welfare state. The theory of justice as fairness treats social forms as closed systems. An economic system is also shaped by existing needs and necessities. The current cooperation between people in meeting these needs affects the way in which the needs of the future will look. These things are known and shared by such diverse authors as Marx and Marshall⁽⁴⁾ >Fairness/Rawls, >Society/Rawls. I 260 Social order/Rawls: Problem: how does this reciprocal influence of needs, satisfaction and new needs in the initial situation of a society to be established, where people stand behind a veil of ignorance in relation to their future position, affect the possible shaping? Solution: only the most general assumptions about primary public goods (e. g. freedoms) are made. >Veil of ignorance. I 263 Economy/disagreement/RawlsVsArrow, K. J/Rawls: different from what K. J. Arrow⁽⁵⁾ assumes, disagreement between parties is not a particular feature of idealism. In contract theory, it is part of the initial situation of a society to be established. It forms the content of the theory of justice as fairness. It tries to combine Kant's concept of the realm of purposes with that of autonomy and the categorical imperative. In this way, we can avoid metaphysical assumptions. >Contract Theory, >Purposes/Kant, >J.K. Arrow. 1. See K. J. Arrow and Tibor Scitovsky, Readings in Welfare, Homewood, 1969, p. 1. 2. A. Bergson, essays in Normative Economics, Cambridge, MA, 1966, pp 35-39,60-63,68f. 3. Amartya Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare, San Francisco, 1970, pp. 56-59. 4. See Brian Barry, Political Argument, London, 1965. 5. K. J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values 2nd. Ed. New York, 1963, pp. 74f, 81-86.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Political Elections	Schumpeter	Sobel I 29 Political elections/Schumpeter/Sobel/Clemens: (…) in the process of seeking election (or re-election) politicians must make promises to give benefits to narrow interest groups to earn their votes and political support (and campaign contributions). These groups "may consist of …exponents of an economic interest or of idealists of one kind or another or of People simply interested in staging and managing political shows ... Human nature in politics being what it is, they are able to fashion and within very wide limits" (CSD⁽¹⁾: 263) shape the outcomes of the political process. One such interest group is obviously those businesses being threatened by creative destruction Who seek to get government to restrict competition. In his book, Business Cycles (BC1)⁽²⁾, Schumpeter states: „Such struggles for a share in profits that have been made are, however, less important for our subject than the struggles to conserve the stream of profit itself... Taking industry as a whole, there is always an innovating sphere warring with an "old" sphere, which sometimes tries to secure prohibition of the new ways of doing things.“ (BC1⁽²⁾: 106-108) Sobel/Coemens: Schumpeter's arguments regarding the high level ofinfluence that special-interest groups have in the political process and how this influence would grow through time within a democracy was an insight that would not be widely recognized in the academic literature until much later.* One reason special-interest groups are able to achieve the upper hand in the political process is the widespread ignorance of voters regarding political issues, which Schumpeter recognized explicitly as one source of the failures of the democratic process: The reduced sense of responsibility and the absence of effective volition in turn explain the ordinary citizen's ignorance and lack of judgement in matters of domestic and foreign policy which are if anything more shocking in the case of educated People and ofpeople who are successfully active in non-political walks of life than it is with the uneducated people in humble situations. Information is plentiful and readily available. But this does not seem to make any difference ... the typical citizen drops down to a Iower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field. He argues and analyzes in a way which he would readily recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real interests. He becomes primitive again.“ (CSD⁽¹⁾: 261-262) >Information, >Democracy/Schumpeter, >Government policy/Schumpeter. Sobel I 30 When a large proportion of voters are not motivated to be informed and participate, this then gives well-organized subsets of voters and special-interest groups an upper hand in the political process to achieve their narrow ends at the expense of the general public.** Because of these limitations and failures of the democratic decision-making process, Schumpeter believed that there should be constraints on the scope of government action: „The second condition for the success of democracy is that the effective range of political decision should not be extended too far ... in order to function properly that all-powerful parliament must impose limits upon itself... a corresponding limitation of the activities of the state.“ (CSD)⁽¹⁾: 291-292) * This idea is most widely associated with the work of Mancur Olsen in his book, The Rise and Decline of Nations (1982)⁽³⁾. ** Modern public-choice theory also suggests that the political process tends to be biased toward producing short-sighted outcomes that favour creating highly visible current benefits to interest groups, especially when the costs are far into the future and hard to discern, while being biased against undertaking actions that create future benefits but that require current visible costs. More simply put, relative to markets, governments tend to place more weight on the aspects that are highly visible in the short term, rather than the long term. Schumpeter clearly agreed as democracy "forces upon the men at or near the helm a short-run view and it makes it extremely diffcult for them to serve such long-run interests of the nation as may require consistent work for far-off ends" (CSD⁽¹⁾: 287). 1. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy [CSD]. Harper & Brothers. 2. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1939). Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process, Volume 1 [BC1]. McGraw-Hill Book Company. 3. Olsen, Mancur (1982). The Rise and Decline of Nations. Yale University Press.	EconSchum I Joseph A. Schumpeter The Theory of Economic Development An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Cambridge/MA 1934 German Edition: Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Leipzig 1912 Sobel I Russell S. Sobel Jason Clemens The Essential Joseph Schumpeter Vancouver 2020
Political Realism	Brown	Gaus I 290 Political realism/Brown: Realists take the state to be the key international actor, assume that states pursue interests defined in terms of power and, thus, hypothesize a world which can be characterized as a 'struggle for power and peace', the subtitle of Hans J. Morgenthau's influential Politics among Nations (1948)⁽¹⁾. Presented with this thumbnail sketch, a political theorist might reasonably assume this doctrine to be connected with nineteenth-century German power politics of the school of Heinrich von Treitschke or, perhaps, at a higher level of sophistication, with the twentieth-century, right-wing, political philosopher and legal theorist Carl Schmitt, whose 'friend-enemy' distinction seem highly relevant here (Schmitt, 1996⁽²⁾; Treitschke, 2002⁽³⁾). Brown: (...) nothing could be further from the truth. Classic American realism emerged in the 1930s and 1940s. Its three most influential figures were the radical theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, the diplomat George Kennan, and the émigré international lawyer, political theorist and, from 1943 onwards, University of Chicago professor Morgenthau; their work is well described in a number of modern studies (Smith, 1986⁽⁴⁾; Rosenthal, 1991⁽⁵⁾; Murray, 1996⁽⁶⁾). >International relations/Niebuhr, >Balance of Power/Waltz, >Balance of power/Social choice theory, >International relations/Carr. Gaus I 291 Social choice theory: (...) the dominance of neorealist/neoliberal thought has significantly narrowed the range of questions that theorists of international relations deem appropriate or answerable. Whether states pursue relative gains or absolute gains (one way of distinguishing between neorealist and neoliberal assumptions) is an interesting question, but can hardly form a satisfactory basis for an examination of the foundations of the current international order (Grieco, 1988)⁽⁷⁾. VsSocial choice theory: older realists were more willing to criticize these foundations, and at least made some attempt to engage with issues such as the ethics of force, or the justice of a world characterized by great material inequalities. Classical realists such as Stanley Hoffman, influenced by the French thinker Raymond Aron, and the English school's Hedley Bull at least attempted to engage with the Third World's 1970s demand for a new international economic order (Aron, 1967⁽⁸⁾; Hoffman, 1981⁽⁹⁾; Bull, 1984⁽¹⁰⁾). Neorealism/neoliberalism: by way of contrast, neither neorealism nor neoliberalism make any attempt to consider, much less defend, the justice of the existing international order; anarchy is simply a given, an assumption that cannot be questioned, and concern with the internal characteristics of states, such as their poverty, is misdirected since states are posited to be similar in their behaviour, relevantly differentiated only by their capabilities. VsMorgenthau: in contrast to the practical realism of Morgenthau, the realism of the 'anarchy problematic' rests on a theoretical construct, but, perhaps paradoxically, its very limitations have actually opened up a space which, over the last two decades or so, a different kind of theory has attempted to fill. 1. Morgenthau, H. J. (1948) Politics among Nations. New York: Knopf. 2. Schmitt, C. (1996 ti9321) The Concept of the Political. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 3. Treitschke, H. von (2002) Politics. Extracts in C. Brown, T. Nardin and N. J. Rengger, eds, International Relations in Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4. Smith, M. J. (1986) Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger. Baton Rouge, IA: University of Louisiana Press. 5. Rosenthal, J. (1991) Righteous Realists. Baton Rouge, LA: University of Louisiana Press. 6. Murray, Alastair (1996) Reconstructing Realism. Edinburgh: Keele University Press. 7. Grieco, J. M. (1988) 'Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism'. International Oganisation, 42:485—508. 8. Aron, R. (1967) Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 9. Hoffmann, S. (1981) Duties beyond Borders. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. 10. Bull, H. (1984) Justice in International Relations: The Hagey Lectures. Waterloo, ON: University of Waterloo. Brown, Chris 2004. „Political Theory and International Relations“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	BrownMurray I Murray Brown On the theory and measurement of technological change Cambridge 1968 PolBrown I Wendy Brown American Nightmare:Neoliberalism, neoconservativism, and de-democratization 2006 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Politics	Freeden	Gaus I 8 Politics/Freeden: Politics is not just about physical force and the clash of economic interests, but also about the assignment of contested meaning to social phenomena. It is not just about the use of the law, of the police, or of illegitimate forms of violence, nor is it just about the maximization of economic assets through the manipulation of markets, or about the impact of personality on public life. It is also about deciding on the range of meanings attributed to concepts such as welfare (e.g. a mechanism of social parasitism or the institutional enabling of human flourishing) or freedom (e.g. the uninhibited assertion of individual powers against others or the rational expression of self-developing choices), and about selecting which of these meanings will be accorded legitimacy and supremacy in formulating public policy. Hence the control of political language, through which the understanding of such contested political concepts is mediated, is a cardinal and typical way of capturing the high ground of the social meanings and interpretations available to a given society. >Ideology/Freeden. Freeden, M. 2004. „Ideology, Political Theory and Political Philosophy“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Politics	Sunstein	I 42 Politics/Sunstein: should politics be made according to survey results? The theorem of Condorcet makes the question seem less pointless than it appears at first glance. >Decision Theory/Condorcet. However, this only applies to yes/no questions within groups whose members are most likely to be correct in their majority. This may be the case in consultative bodies in companies, or in certain specialist areas when a panel of experts is consulted. However, it would not work if the population of a country, such as the United States, were asked whether the Kyoto Protocol should be signed. I 44 In many areas, people are subject to systematic mistakes. However, the question remains whether group discussions help. >Democracy/Sunstein. Functioning democracies delegate certain issues to expert committees. >MorozovVsJarvis and MorozovVsShirky. I 45 In an experiment in Colorado in the summer of 2005, liberal and conservative groups were mixed together to discuss some issues such as whether the United States should sign a climate change agreement or whether affirmative action should be accorded to disadvantaged groups. ⁽¹⁾ The result was clear: in almost every group, the positions were more extremely polarized after the discussions, with the respective starting positions of the groups being more strongly represented. I 46 In addition, the respective groups found greater homogeneity. I 49 Group discussion/John Rawls: Thesis: The advantages lie in the combination of information and increasing the range of arguments.⁽²⁾ SunsteinVsRawls: see above. 1. See Reid Hastie, David Schkade, and Cass R. Sunstein, “What Really Happened on Deliberation Day?” (University of Chicago Law School, unpublished manuscript, 2006). 2. 8. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1971), 358–59.	Sunstein I Cass R. Sunstein Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge Oxford 2008 Sunstein II Cass R. Sunstein #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media Princeton 2017
Possibility	Field	I 86 Logically possible/possibility/diamond/KripkeVsField: "it is possible that" is not a logical truth. FieldVsKripke: yes it is, this is only due to Kripke's model-theoretical definition. - It should not be read "mathematically" or "metaphysically possible". >Logical truth, >Metaphysical possibility. --- I 87 E.g. Carnap: "He is bachelor and married": is logically wrong. >Meaning postulates. FieldVsCarnap: Meaning relations between predicates should not count to logic. - Then the sentence is logically consistent. Consistency operator/Field: MEx (x is red & x is round) should not only be true, but logically true. - ((s) Also without meaning postulates.) ((s) Meaning postulate/(s): here it is about the extent of the logic.) --- I 203 Geometric Possibility/Field: instead of logical possibility: there are different geometries. >Geometry. Precondition: there are empirical axioms which differentiate the possibility from impossibility. However, the existential quantifier must be within the range of the modal operator. >Existential quantification, >Modal operator, >Scope. --- I 218 Problem of Quantities/mathematical entities/me/Field: For example, it is possible that the distance between x and y is twice as long as the one between x and w, even if the actual distance is more than twice as long. Problem: extensional adequacy does not guarantee that the defined expression is true in every non-actual situation - that is, that we must either presuppose the substantivalism or the heavy duty Platonism. That is what we do in practice. I 192 Heavy Duty Platonism/Field: assumes size relationships between objects and numbers. >Substantivalism.	Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Possible Worlds	Carnap	Cresswell I 53 possible world/Wittgenstein (1922)⁽¹⁾, Carnap 1947)⁽²⁾: A world can be characterized by the "atomic facts" that are true in it - possible world: then number of individual situations - = subset of the set B of all space time points - (namely, the ones that are occupied by objects) - if two possible worlds match in the initial term, then in every term - i.e. possible worlds can be distinguished by the initial term - because each a1 is an element of D, each element of the range of the theory uniquely determines a possible world - i.e. a1 is a possible world! >Order, >Facts, >Situations, >Atomic sentences, >Atomism. 1. Ludwig Wittgenstein: Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung, W. Ostwald (Hrsg.), Annalen der Naturphilosophie, Band 14, 1921, S. 185–262. 2. Rudolf Carnap, Meaning and Necessity. A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic. 1947. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.	Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Possible Worlds	Cresswell	I VII Possible World/possible world/Cresswell: Main problem: how to adapt propositional attitudes. >Propositional attitudes, >Centered worlds, >Cross world identity. I 1 It does not matter if they exist, how it does not matter whether money or surrogate money is needed. I 6 It is pointless to want to decide about existence. LewisVs ersatz world: made from other things - e.g. from space time-points. >Ersatz worlds. I 4 Possible worlds are never part of the actual word. >Actual world, >Actuality, >Actualism. I 30 Therefore, they are also not "out there" (otherwise still part). I 16 We also do not have enough names for all possible worlds to put our empirical data into order. (Analogy: as we must postulate the past in order to arrange our present evidence). I 56f Possible World/Cresswell: we can equate any possible world with the set of things (objects) that exist in it. ((s) not an empty space.) Barcan formula: is valid for quantifiers, which can operate in any possible world on those things which exist in this possible world. >Barcan-Formula, >Possible world semantics, >Modal logic.	Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Possible Worlds	Stalnaker	I 17 Possible Worlds/StalnakerVsLewis: instead of actually existing worlds there are better ways how the world might have been. I 14 Possible Worlds/Time/Stalnaker: there are many analogies between times and worlds. >Actualism. Actualism: actualism corresponds to presentism. Def presentism/(s): only the present exists and only the current point in time. Four-dimensionalism/Stalnaker: four-dimensionalism corresponds to modal realism. >Four-dimensionalism. Def modal realism/(s): modal realism means that other worlds exist literally. Representative: a representative is David Lewis. >Modal realism, >David K. Lewis. Stalnaker: very few are realists in terms of possible world and times, but most are realists in terms of space. >Realism, >Space, >Time. I 27 Possible Worlds/StalnakerVsLewis: instead of something like "I and my surroundings" we assume a way how the world is, that is a property or state. >States, cf. >Situations. Important argument: properties may exist uninstantiatedly. >Instantiation. I 38 Possible Worlds: a possible world is no thing of a certain kind, nor an individual. A possible world is that to which truth is relative or what people differentiate in their rational actions. >Possibility, >Actions. I 52 Possible world: r: it is pointless to ask whether possible worlds satisfy certain conditions, e.g. is there a possible world in which water is not H₂O? This is pointless, the answer will always have the form of a necessary sentence: P-or-not-P. - But doubt about that will be a doubt about the content of the sentence and not doubt about a possible world. The same applies to the problem that you might not believe a necessary truth. Possible worlds/conditions: it is pointless to ask whether a possible world meets certain conditions. Possible world/necessary/Stalnaker: if it is true, e.g. that water is necessarily H₂O or e.g. that there are unattainable cardinal numbers, then these assertions express exactly this proposition, and the sentences that express these propositions tell us nothing about the nature of possible worlds. >Possible worlds/Kripke. Stalnaker: therefore it is impossible to characterize the entire range of all the possibilities. For then we would know the way how the range of all possibilities is different from that how it could be -> Wittgenstein: you should remain silent about things that you cannot talk about (Tractatus). StalnakerVsWittgenstein: but that does not help, because pointing also must have a content - therefore Ramsey says: "What you cannot say, you cannot whistle either". I 84/85 Possible worlds/Stalnaker: possible worlds are not just an exercise of our imagination, but part of our actions, e.g. scientific explanations.	Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Post-communist Era	Policy of Russia	Krastev I 86 Post-communist era/Policy of Russia/Krastev: Unlike East Europeans, Russians could not reconcile themselves to their system's collapse by portraying communist authority as a foreign occupation. For them, communism was not rule from abroad. Adding to the strangeness of the USSR's break-up was the fact that it involved the victory of one group of ex-communists over another. The leader of the Revolution, Boris Yeltsin, had been, until quite recently, a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party. Although almost everything else began to change in Russia after 1991, the ruling class remained more or less the same. Not the anti-communists but the ex-communists were the ones who profited most conspicuously from the end of the communist system. Krastev I 120 Post-communist era/Policiy of Russia/Krastev: One of the principal forces that corroded the legitimacy of communism was the limited extent to which Soviet elites could transmit their privileges to their own children. To be sure, nomenklatura children were zolotaya molodyozh (gilded youth), and everyone knew just how privileged they were. But they could not legally inherit their parents' status. Having finally escaped these constraints in 1991 , Russia's post-communist Krastev I 121 elites threw themselves enthusiastically into giving their own children a leg-up in the social competition for power, wealth and prestige. They often did so by sending them to study abroad. The problem was, many of these lucky kids decided never to return. And those who did came back with very different, non-Russian habits and beliefs. Krastev I 122 Nationalism/ethno-nationalism: (...) for someone who came of age in the Soviet Union, ethno-nationalism cannot possibly be such a decisive factor as many commentators allege. And although he used nationalistic rhetoric in justifying the annexation of Crimea, he is too acutely aware that nationalism destroyed the Soviet Union to be serious about celebrating the kind of ethnic homogeneity which would explode the multi-ethnic Russian Federation too.	Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019
Predicates	Davidson	Glüer II 94f Predicates/Davidson: shorter formulations with less relations do not lead to significant different predicates. - Toast-Example: "Strange goings on! Jones did it slowly, deliberately, in the bathroom, with a knife, at midnight. What he did was butter a piece of toast. (1967) (7) Jones buttered in the bathroom at midnight with a knife and deliberately a toast. (8) Jones buttering a toast at midnight (9) Jones is buttering a toast. Toast Example: Shorter formulations with fewer relations do not lead to different predicates. Toast bread Bsp/Davidson/Glüer: it is not clear why a predicate ad infinitum could not be modified: if we had to assume a change of meaning every time, we would be standing on an infinite >lexicon. II 95 Davidson proposes to interpret sentences like (9) as quantification of existence, and predicates like "buttertert" as three-digit, that is, with an additional event place not reflected at the surface of the sentence. Thus (9) is true precisely when (9') (Ex)(butter(Jones,a toast, x)) if there is at least one event x, so that x is a buttering of a toast by Jones. For Davidson, propositions of action have the form of existential quantifying predications, so they are not descriptions of action in the sense that they refer as a whole to a certain event. From such predications, however, singular terms can be formed, e.g. "the churning of the toast by Jones".((s) This is a description) Davidson: "dated particulars" non-repeatable entities with definite spatial temporal localization. More complex ones are to be interpreted as conjunctions. (8') (Ex)(buttered (Jones, a toast,x) and at midnight(x)) ((s) Cf. nowadays >frame theories.)	Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993
Predicates	Goodman	I 127 Predicate/denotation/Goodman: names and certain images denote singular. Predicates and certain other images denote in general (for example, images in a bird book.) >Denotation, >Singular terms, >General terms. --- II I (preface Putnam) Goodman/Putnam: not all predicates are equally projectable. >Grueness, >Induction. II IV Preface No predicate is disjunctive by itself or non-disjunctive (VsCarnap). >Disjunctive predicates. II IV Nevertheless, according to Carnap both "length" and "length squared" are qualitative. This selection of predicates that should be fundamental or not fundamental is too arbitrary. II V More radical solution: proposed by Wesley Salmon: to allow for inductive logic only ostensively defined basic predicates. To distinguish normal from pathological predicates. PutnamVs: unmotivated and too strict: E.g. we call a bacillus S-shaped when it looks like that under a microscope. Then the concept is not based on observation, but it is totally projectable II IV Grue/Goodman: if we take the familiar color predicates, "grue" is a disjunctive predicate. If we take, however, the unusual predicates grue and bleen as basic expressions then grue can be defined as green and observed before the point of time t or as bleen and not observed before t. >Grueness. II 61 Misleading is, to regard the issue of disposition as the one of explanation of hidden properties. I do not want to say that there is some object like the property combustible or the property "burning". It is, after all, predicates that produce relations. >Properties, >Dispositions. II 64 A predicate such as "flexible" can be regarded as an extension or continuation of a predicate like "biggt". The problem is to define these continuations only with manifest predicates. When are two objects much of the same kind? The fact that they both belong to any class, is not enough. Because: any pair of objects belongs to any class. And that both should belong exactly to the same class would be a demand too great, because two objects never belong to exactly the same class. II 74 Continuation/predicates: statement: "time-space is red": two continuations: it continues the two predicates "red" and "time-space" on p + t. Variant: real time-space p1 + t1, head rotation, other color: the predicate "U-blue possible" only continues the predicate "blue" on a wider range of real objects. II 77 One can move fictitious mountains to London in true statements, simply by applying on London a certain continuation of the predicate "mountainous". II 78 Statements about what is possible do not need to exceed the boundaries of the real world. We often confuse a description of the real world with the real world itself. II 79 The possible objects and predicates disappear. Predicates refer to reality, but have extensions that are related in a very specific way with the extensions of certain manifest predicates and usually go further. The problem of the continuation of "burning" to "combustible" is akin to the problem of induction. II 121 "Green" and "grue" seem to be completely symmetrical to each other (in terms of continuation), but "green" is much better anchored. >Grueness, >Projectability.	G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997
Preferences	Harsanyi	Gaus I 244 Preferences/diversity/pluralism/rational choice/Harsanyi/D’Agostino: (...) Arrow's Theorem, and its extensions, can be read as an argument for monism. Arrow courts chaos in providing, as pluralists would insist, for the recognition of diversity. >Arrow’s Theorem/D’Agostino. If the price for the avoidance of chaos is the abandonment of pluralism, this is anyway warranted by the fact that all apparent diversity is ethico-politically insignificant and merely conceals a deeper uniformity of assessments that sustains coherence in social arrangements. Harsanyi: This reading is implicit, for instance, in John Harsanyi's (1977)⁽¹⁾ attempt to show that, even when they differ in their assessments of options, individuals can be brought to share the same 'extended preferences' about social arrangements, and that coherent collective choice procedures can be defined on the basis of such ('extended') assessments. And, of course, it has indeed been suggested, more pertinently, that specifically liberal doctrines and institutions are incompatible with pluralism and, hence, with the evaluative diversity which this family of doctrines and arguments sanctions (see Kekes, 1992⁽²⁾; Crowder, 1994⁽³⁾). D’Agostino: Much recent liberal political theory can, however, profitably be interpreted, I submit, as an attempt to find a principled basis for acknowledging the demands both of diversity and of coherence. >Arrow’s Theorem/Weale, >Diversity/D’Agostino, >Pluralism/Political Philosophy. 1. Harsanyi, John (1977) 'Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics, and interpersonal comparisons of utility'. In his Essays on Ethics, Social Behaviour and Scientific Explanation. Dordrecht: Reidel. 2. Kekes, John (1992) 'The incompatibility of liberalism and pluralism'. American Philosophical Quarterly, 29: 141-51. 3. Crowder, George (1994) 'Pluralism and liberalism'. Political Studies, 42: 293-305. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Principle of Charity	Putnam	I (b) 56 Principle of Charity/N. L. Wilson: e.g. in a possible world electrons could be twice as heavy and neutral. These other particles, according to Wilson, would then be the electrons! >Meaning change, >Theory change, >Observation language, >Theoretical terms. I (b) 57 Principle of Charity/Wilson: e.g. someone who is erroneously using a name wrong, still refers to the one, he/she really meant. >Meaning/Intending), >Reference, >referential/attributive. PutnamVsWilson: the principle should only apply to real situations. Also beliefs should be distinguished by relevance. >Relevance. I (b) 58 Phenomena have priority during the reference, that means, if there were Bohr electrons in the other half of the universe, Bohr would nevertheless refer to our electrons. Contribution of the environment: it follows that XYZ (on twin earth) just looks like water, but it is not water. I (b) 58 Principle of Charity/PutnamVsWilson: the principle of charity is too numeric! Truths range from extremely trivial to important. There are also many dimensions. You cannot count beliefs! Reference/possible world/Putnam: e.g. electron, Bohr: suppose there were particles that had the properties falsely assumed by Bohr ("selectrons") but they only existed in the other half of the universe. Then Bohr would still not have referred to "selectrons" but to our electrons. Reason: the primacy of phenomena. His theory was to explain his phenomena, and these are also our phenomena. Principle of trust advance/meaning/knowledge/imagination/Putnam: I can know the meaning of "gold" without even having a clear idea! The principle of trust forbids us to assume that baptizing must be experts. It also forbids accepting omniscience. >Omniscience, >PutnamVsWilson.	Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Principles	Gould	IV 199 Principles/coincidence/evolution: there is, perhaps, a principle that can be found: "initial experimentation and later standardization". For example, around 1900 there were few car brands and a much wider range of construction types. Today there are hundreds of brands and much more uniform constructions. >Evolution, >Explanation, >Laws.	Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989
Principles	Rawls	I 4 Principles/Society/Rawls: 1. Everyone accepts and knows that the other members of society accept the same principles of justice. 2. The basic social institutions fulfill these principles in general and are known for doing so. I 7 Principles/Rawls: we are only interested in general principles of the justice of society as a whole, not in such special or private communities or for cross-national institutions. I 10/11 Principles/Justice/Rawls: Principles must be defined at the beginning. Our point of departure, the situation of equality, which should follow an election, corresponds to the natural state of the traditional theories of the social contract, but it is neither a concrete historical situation nor a primitive culture. >Social contract, >Natural state, >Equality. It is a purely hypothetical situation which should lead to a certain realization of justice. >Justice/Rawls. I 41 Principles/MillVsIntuitionism/Mill/Rawls: Mill argued that the principle of usefulness could be the only supreme principle, since otherwise there could be no arbitrator between competing criteria⁽¹⁾. >J.St. Mill, >Competition, >Interests, >Utility principle, >Utilitarianism. Principles/Sidgwick: the principle of usefulness is the only one that can play this role⁽²⁾. >H. Sidgwick. Rawls: that is what made the classical doctrine so attractive: that it tries to solve the problem of priorities and avoids intuitionism. >Intuitionism/Economics, >Priorities, >Preferences. RawlsVsMill/RawlsVsSidgwick/RawlsVsUtilitarism: we need to realize that there may be no way to dissolve the plurality of the different principles. >VsUtilitarianism. I 43 Principles/Rawls: I suggest that even in the "lexical order" (the piecemeal processing of principles according to an external order) the principle of equal distribution of rights should be treated as a priority rather than the regulation of economic or social inequalities. I 61 Principles/justice/Rawls: provisional wording: 1. every person must have the same right to the widest possible fundamental freedom, insofar as it is compatible with the same freedom for others. 2. social and economic inequalities shall be arranged in such a way that they (a) are reasonably expectable for everyone's benefit; and (b) are linked to positions and administrative procedures that can be held by anyone. The two principles are applied in chronological order. This means that abandoning the first principle cannot be offset by greater social or economic benefits. I 62 Deviations from equal distribution of social rights or economic benefits can only be justified by the fact that this is to everyone's advantage. ((s) This is a reference to utilitarianism. I 63 The chronological order of compliance also excludes that fundamental freedoms can be exchanged for economic benefits. I 64 Similarly, the chronological order of the principles means that people can only ever be talked about in the form of social role holders. I 83 Principles/Rawls: Redrafting of the Second Principle: Social and economic inequality must be arranged in such a way that (a) it provides the greatest benefit for the worst-off people and (b) it is linked to administrative bodies and positions which are open to all under conditions of fair equal opportunities. I 89 I assume that the two parts of the principle are arranged lexically. I 116 Principles/Rawls: there is nothing inconsistent about the fact that fairness makes unconditional principles possible. It is sufficient to show that, in the initial situation (of a society to be established), the parties agree to principles that define the natural obligations that then apply without fail. ((s)VsRawls: Contradiction: Rawls himself says that the natural duties, for example not to be cruel, are not subject to agreements. (See Rawls I 114). I 250 Principles/Rawls: reformulation in the light of the consideration of contingent individual and historical inequalities: First principle: Every person must have an equal right to the most comprehensive system of equal fundamental rights that is compatible with an equal system of freedom for all. Priority rule: the principles of justice are built in lexical order and therefore freedom can only be restricted for the benefit of freedom. There are two cases here: a) a less comprehensive freedom must increase the freedom of the total system of freedom shared by all, b) a restricted freedom must be acceptable to those affected by it. I 253 Principles/Categorical imperative/Kant/Rawls: in the sense of Kant, these principles are also categorical imperatives. They do not require any particular social conditions or individual goals. Only an interest in primary public goods (e. g. freedom) is assumed. The preference for these in turn is derived from the most general assumptions about rationality and the conditions of human life. I 302 Principles/Rawls: final version for Institutions/Rawls: the two principles of justice (see above) plus priority rules: 1. Priority rule: the principles of justice must be dealt with in lexical order, so that freedom may only be restricted in favour of greater freedom. Two cases are possible: a) Restricted freedom must strengthen the overall system of freedoms that benefit all. b) Freedom that is not equal must be accepted by those who enjoy fewer freedoms. 2. Priority rule: (Justice precedes efficiency and prosperity): The second principle of justice is lexical superior to the principle of efficiency and the one of maximizing benefits,... I 303 .... fair equal opportunities are superior to the difference principle. Two cases are possible: a) Opportunity inequality must increase the chances of the disadvantaged. b) An extreme savings rate must reduce the burdens on those affected. >Equal opportunities. General conception: all primary social goods (freedoms, rights, income, prosperity, conditions for self-esteem, etc.) shall be distributed equally, except where an unequal distribution of some or all of these goods is to the benefit of the least favoured. I 446 Principles/Rawls: while the principles of justice are those chosen in the initial position, the principles of rational decision or rationality are not chosen at all. This leads to the distinction between right and good. >Society/Rawls. 1. Mill, A System of Logic, bk. VI, ch. XII, sec. 7 and Utilitarianism, ch. V, paers. 26-31. 2. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, bk. IV ch. II and III.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Privatization	Moon	Gaus I 213 Privatization/welfare state/Moon: It is important to stress that state provision is not necessarily superior to private provision. Even if there are clear examples of 'market failures' , areas in which voluntary provision is incapable of providing an optimal level of services of one sort or another, it does not follow that government action will be superior. Just as real-world markets are subject to market failure, so real-world governments are subject to non-market failure. >Market failure, >State provision/Moon, >Adverse selection/Barr. The recognition that public provision can involve greater costs than voluntary programmes has led to calls for 'privatization' of some welfare state activities during the past 20 or 25 years. Different groups have advocated devolving to private parties those activities once performed by the state, ranging from the sale of nationalized industries to contracting with private firms to provide public services, such as running schools or supplying cleaning services to a government bureaucracy. In a similar vein, recent years have seen efforts to increase choice and simulate market processes within public programmes, such as the use of vouchers in public education, or the 'internal market' in Britain's National Health Service. In all of these initiatives, the hope is to increase efficiency, to make service providers more responsive to clients, and to enable people to receive more individualized services, reflecting their specific needs and interests. Problems: On the other hand, these developments raise the concern that even 'quasi-market' choice in areas such as pensions or education will adversely affect disadvantaged groups. For example, when the successful school in a system relying upon vouchers or other 'parental choice' mechanisms is able to attract more students than it has space for, the fear is that it may Gaus I 214 respond by excluding 'problem' children, possibly leaving them even worse off than before. Whether the issue is pensions, education, health care, or other areas of the welfare state, efficiency arguments for public versus private provision involve a balancing of their relative costs. * * For an excellent range of studies of the 'revolution in social policy' created by the move to 'quasi-markets' in a variety of policy areas and countries, see Bartlett, Roberts and Le Grand (1998)⁽¹⁾. 1. Bartlett, Will, Jennifer Roberts and Julian Le Grand, eds (1998) A Revolution in Social Policy: Quasi-Market Reforms in the 1990s. Bristol: Policy. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Probability Theory	Norvig	Norvig I 503 Probability theory/Norvig/Russell: Probability theory was invented as a way of analyzing games of chance. In about 850 A.D. the Indian mathematician Mahaviracarya described how to arrange a set of bets that can’t lose (what we now call a Dutch book). In Europe, the first significant systematic analyses were produced by Girolamo Cardano around 1565, although publication was posthumous (1663). By that time, probability had been established as a mathematical discipline due to a series of Norvig I 504 results established in a famous correspondence between Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat in 1654. As with probability itself, the results were initially motivated by gambling problems (…). The first published textbook on probability was De Ratiociniis in Ludo Aleae (Huygens, 1657)⁽¹⁾. The “laziness and ignorance” view of uncertainty was described by John Arbuthnot in the preface of his translation of Huygens (Arbuthnot, 1692)⁽²⁾: “It is impossible for a Die, with such determin’d force and direction, not to fall on such determin’d side, only I don’t know the force and direction which makes it fall on such determin’d side, and therefore I call it Chance, which is nothing but the want of art...” Laplace (1816)(3) gave an exceptionally accurate and modern overview of probability; he was the first to use the example “take two urns, A and B, the first containing four white and two black balls, . . . ” The Rev. Thomas Bayes (1702–1761) introduced the rule for reasoning about conditional probabilities that was named after him (Bayes, 1763)⁽⁴⁾. Bayes only considered the case of uniform priors; it was Laplace who independently developed the general case. Kolmogorov (1950⁽⁵⁾, first published in German in 1933) presented probability theory in a rigorously axiomatic framework for the first time. Rényi (1970)⁽⁶⁾ later gave an axiomatic presentation that took conditional probability, rather than absolute probability, as primitive. Objectivism: Pascal used probability in ways that required both the objective interpretation, as a property of the world based on symmetry or relative frequency, and the subjective interpretation, based on degree of belief—the former in his analyses of probabilities in games of chance, the latter in the famous “Pascal’s wager” argument about the possible existence of God. However, Pascal did not clearly realize the distinction between these two interpretations. The distinction was first drawn clearly by James Bernoulli (1654–1705). Subjectivism: Leibniz introduced the “classical” notion of probability as a proportion of enumerated, equally probable cases, which was also used by Bernoulli, although it was brought to prominence by Laplace (1749–1827). This notion is ambiguous between the frequency interpretation and the subjective interpretation. The cases can be thought to be equally probable either because of a natural, physical symmetry between them, or simply because we do not have any knowledge that would lead us to consider one more probable than another. Principle of indifference: The use of this latter, subjective consideration to justify assigning equal probabilities is known as the principle of indifference. The principle is often attributed to Laplace, but he never isolated the principle explicitly. Principle of insufficient reason: George Boole and John Venn both referred to [the principle of indifference] as the principle of insufficient reason; the modern name is due to Keynes (1921)⁽⁷⁾. Objectivism/Subjectivism: The debate between objectivists and subjectivists became sharper in the 20th century. Kolmogorov (1963)⁽⁸⁾, R. A. Fisher (1922)⁽⁹⁾, and Richard von Mises (1928)⁽¹⁰⁾ were advocates of the relative frequency interpretation. Propensity: Karl Popper’s (1959⁽¹¹⁾, first published in German in 1934) “propensity” interpretation traces relative frequencies to an underlying physical symmetry. Belief degree: Frank Ramsey (1931)⁽¹²⁾, Bruno de Finetti (1937)(13), R. T. Cox (1946)⁽¹⁴⁾, Leonard Savage (1954)⁽¹⁵⁾, Richard Jeffrey (1983)⁽¹⁶⁾, and E. T. Jaynes (2003)⁽¹⁷⁾ interpreted probabilities as the degrees of belief of specific individuals. Their analyses of degree of belief were closely tied to utilities and to behavior - specifically, to the willingness to place bets. Subjectivism: Rudolf Carnap, following Leibniz and Laplace, offered a different kind of subjective interpretation of probability - not as any actual individual’s degree of belief, but as the degree of belief that an idealized individual should have in a particular proposition a, given a particular body of evidence e. Norvig I 505 Confirmation degree: Carnap attempted to go further than Leibniz or Laplace by making this notion of degree of confirmation mathematically precise, as a logical relation between a and e. Induction/inductive Logic: The study of this relation was intended to constitute a mathematical discipline called inductive logic, analogous to ordinary deductive logic (Carnap, 1948⁽¹⁸⁾, 1950⁽¹⁹⁾). Carnap was not able to extend his inductive logic much beyond the propositional case, and Putnam (1963)⁽²⁰⁾ showed by adversarial arguments that some fundamental difficulties would prevent a strict extension to languages capable of expressing arithmetic. Uncertainty: Cox’s theorem (1946)⁽¹⁴⁾ shows that any system for uncertain reasoning that meets his set of assumptions is equivalent to probability theory. This gave renewed confidence to those who already favored probability, but others were not convinced, pointing to the assumptions (primarily that belief must be represented by a single number, and thus the belief in ¬p must be a function of the belief in p). Halpern (1999)⁽²¹⁾ describes the assumptions and shows some gaps in Cox’s original formulation. Horn (2003)⁽²²⁾ shows how to patch up the difficulties. Jaynes (2003)⁽¹⁷⁾ has a similar argument that is easier to read. The question of reference classes is closely tied to the attempt to find an inductive logic. Reference class problem: The approach of choosing the “most specific” reference class of sufficient size was formally proposed by Reichenbach (1949)⁽²³⁾. Various attempts have been made, notably by Henry Kyburg (1977⁽²⁴⁾, 1983⁽²⁵⁾), to formulate more sophisticated policies in order to avoid some obvious fallacies that arise with Reichenbach’s rule, but such approaches remain somewhat ad hoc. More recent work by Bacchus, Grove, Halpern, and Koller (1992)⁽²⁶⁾ extends Carnap’s methods to first-order theories, thereby avoiding many of the difficulties associated with the straightforward reference-class method. Kyburg and Teng (2006)⁽²⁷⁾ contrast probabilistic inference with nonmonotonic logic. >Uncertainty/AI research. 1. Huygens, C. (1657). De ratiociniis in ludo aleae. In van Schooten, F. (Ed.), Exercitionum Mathematicorum. Elsevirii, Amsterdam. Translated into English by John Arbuthnot (1692 2. Arbuthnot, J. (1692). Of the Laws of Chance. Motte, London. Translation into English, with additions, of Huygens (1657). 3. Laplace, P. (1816). Essai philosophique sur les probabilit´es (3rd edition). Courcier Imprimeur, Paris. 4. Bayes, T. (1763). An essay towards solving a problem in the doctrine of chances. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 53, 370–418. 5. Kolmogorov, A. N. (1950). Foundations of the Theory of Probability. Chelsea. 6. Rényi, A. (1970). Probability Theory. Elsevier/North-Holland. 7. Keynes, J. M. (1921). A Treatise on Probability. Macmillan. 8. Kolmogorov, A. N. (1963). On tables of random numbers. Sankhya, the Indian Journal of Statistics, Series A 25. 9. Fisher, R. A. (1922). On the mathematical foundations of theoretical statistics. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series A 222, 309–368. 10. von Mises, R. (1928). Wahrscheinlichkeit, Statistik und Wahrheit. J. Springer 11. Popper, K. R. (1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Basic Books. 12. Ramsey, F. P. (1931). Truth and probability. In Braithwaite, R. B. (Ed.), The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 13. de Finetti, B. (1937). Le prévision: ses lois logiques, ses sources subjectives. Ann. Inst.Poincaré, 7, 1-68. 14. Cox, R. T. (1946). Probability, frequency, and reasonable expectation. American Journal of Physics, 14(1), 1–13. 15. Savage, L. J. (1954). The Foundations of Statistics. Wiley. 16. Jeffrey, R. C. (1983). The Logic of Decision (2nd edition). University of Chicago Press. 17. Jaynes, E. T. (2003). Probability Theory: The Logic of Science. Cambridge Univ. Press. 18. Carnap, R. (1948). On the application of inductive logic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 8, 133-148. 19. Carnap, R. (1950). Logical Foundations of Probability. University of Chicago Press 20. Putnam, H. (1963). ‘Degree of confirmation’ and inductive logic. In Schilpp, P. A. (Ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, pp. 270–292. Open Court. 21. Halpern, J. Y. (1999). Technical addendum, Cox’s theorem revisited. JAIR, 11, 429–435. 22. Horn, K. V. (2003). Constructing a logic of plausible inference: A guide to cox’s theorem. IJAR, 34, 3–24. 23. Reichenbach, H. (1949). The Theory of Probability: An Inquiry into the Logical and Mathematical Foundations of the Calculus of Probability (second edition). University of California Press 24. Kyburg, H. E. (1977). Randomness and the right reference class. J. Philosophy, 74(9), 501-521. 25. Kyburg, H. E. (1983). The reference class. Philosophy of Science, 50, 374–397. 26. Bacchus, F., Grove, A., Halpern, J. Y., and Koller, D. (1992). From statistics to beliefs. In AAAI-92, pp. 602-608. 27. Kyburg, H. E. and Teng, C.-M. (2006). Nonmonotonic logic and statistical inference. Computational Intelligence, 22(1), 26-51.	Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010
Probability Theory	Russell	Norvig I 503 Probability theory/Norvig/Russell: Probability theory was invented as a way of analyzing games of chance. In about 850 A.D. the Indian mathematician Mahaviracarya described how to arrange a set of bets that can’t lose (what we now call a Dutch book). In Europe, the first significant systematic analyses were produced by Girolamo Cardano around 1565, although publication was posthumous (1663). By that time, probability had been established as a mathematical discipline due to a series of Norvig I 504 results established in a famous correspondence between Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat in 1654. As with probability itself, the results were initially motivated by gambling problems (…). The first published textbook on probability was De Ratiociniis in Ludo Aleae (Huygens, 1657)⁽¹⁾. The “laziness and ignorance” view of uncertainty was described by John Arbuthnot in the preface of his translation of Huygens (Arbuthnot, 1692)⁽²⁾: “It is impossible for a Die, with such determin’d force and direction, not to fall on such determin’d side, only I don’t know the force and direction which makes it fall on such determin’d side, and therefore I call it Chance, which is nothing but the want of art...” Laplace (1816)(3) gave an exceptionally accurate and modern overview of probability; he was the first to use the example “take two urns, A and B, the first containing four white and two black balls, . . . ” The Rev. Thomas Bayes (1702–1761) introduced the rule for reasoning about conditional probabilities that was named after him (Bayes, 1763)⁽⁴⁾. Bayes only considered the case of uniform priors; it was Laplace who independently developed the general case. Kolmogorov (1950⁽⁵⁾, first published in German in 1933) presented probability theory in a rigorously axiomatic framework for the first time. Rényi (1970)⁽⁶⁾ later gave an axiomatic presentation that took conditional probability, rather than absolute probability, as primitive. Objectivism: Pascal used probability in ways that required both the objective interpretation, as a property of the world based on symmetry or relative frequency, and the subjective interpretation, based on degree of belief—the former in his analyses of probabilities in games of chance, the latter in the famous “Pascal’s wager” argument about the possible existence of God. However, Pascal did not clearly realize the distinction between these two interpretations. The distinction was first drawn clearly by James Bernoulli (1654–1705). Subjectivism: Leibniz introduced the “classical” notion of probability as a proportion of enumerated, equally probable cases, which was also used by Bernoulli, although it was brought to prominence by Laplace (1749–1827). This notion is ambiguous between the frequency interpretation and the subjective interpretation. The cases can be thought to be equally probable either because of a natural, physical symmetry between them, or simply because we do not have any knowledge that would lead us to consider one more probable than another. Principle of indifference: The use of this latter, subjective consideration to justify assigning equal probabilities is known as the principle of indifference. The principle is often attributed to Laplace, but he never isolated the principle explicitly. Principle of insufficient reason: George Boole and John Venn both referred to [the principle of indifference] as the principle of insufficient reason; the modern name is due to Keynes (1921)⁽⁷⁾. Objectivism/Subjectivism: The debate between objectivists and subjectivists became sharper in the 20th century. Kolmogorov (1963)⁽⁸⁾, R. A. Fisher (1922)⁽⁹⁾, and Richard von Mises (1928)⁽¹⁰⁾ were advocates of the relative frequency interpretation. Propensity: Karl Popper’s (1959⁽¹¹⁾, first published in German in 1934) “propensity” interpretation traces relative frequencies to an underlying physical symmetry. Belief degree: Frank Ramsey (1931)⁽¹²⁾, Bruno de Finetti (1937)(13), R. T. Cox (1946)⁽¹⁴⁾, Leonard Savage (1954)⁽¹⁵⁾, Richard Jeffrey (1983)⁽¹⁶⁾, and E. T. Jaynes (2003)⁽¹⁷⁾ interpreted probabilities as the degrees of belief of specific individuals. Their analyses of degree of belief were closely tied to utilities and to behavior - specifically, to the willingness to place bets. Subjectivism: Rudolf Carnap, following Leibniz and Laplace, offered a different kind of subjective interpretation of probability - not as any actual individual’s degree of belief, but as the degree of belief that an idealized individual should have in a particular proposition a, given a particular body of evidence e. Norvig I 505 Confirmation degree: Carnap attempted to go further than Leibniz or Laplace by making this notion of degree of confirmation mathematically precise, as a logical relation between a and e. Induction/inductive Logic: The study of this relation was intended to constitute a mathematical discipline called inductive logic, analogous to ordinary deductive logic (Carnap, 1948⁽¹⁸⁾, 1950⁽¹⁹⁾). Carnap was not able to extend his inductive logic much beyond the propositional case, and Putnam (1963)⁽²⁰⁾ showed by adversarial arguments that some fundamental difficulties would prevent a strict extension to languages capable of expressing arithmetic. Uncertainty: Cox’s theorem (1946)⁽¹⁴⁾ shows that any system for uncertain reasoning that meets his set of assumptions is equivalent to probability theory. This gave renewed confidence to those who already favored probability, but others were not convinced, pointing to the assumptions (primarily that belief must be represented by a single number, and thus the belief in ¬p must be a function of the belief in p). Halpern (1999)⁽²¹⁾ describes the assumptions and shows some gaps in Cox’s original formulation. Horn (2003)⁽²²⁾ shows how to patch up the difficulties. Jaynes (2003)⁽¹⁷⁾ has a similar argument that is easier to read. The question of reference classes is closely tied to the attempt to find an inductive logic. Reference class problem: The approach of choosing the “most specific” reference class of sufficient size was formally proposed by Reichenbach (1949)⁽²³⁾. Various attempts have been made, notably by Henry Kyburg (1977⁽²⁴⁾, 1983⁽²⁵⁾), to formulate more sophisticated policies in order to avoid some obvious fallacies that arise with Reichenbach’s rule, but such approaches remain somewhat ad hoc. More recent work by Bacchus, Grove, Halpern, and Koller (1992)⁽²⁶⁾ extends Carnap’s methods to first-order theories, thereby avoiding many of the difficulties associated with the straightforward reference-class method. Kyburg and Teng (2006)⁽²⁷⁾ contrast probabilistic inference with nonmonotonic logic. >Uncertainty/AI research. 1. Huygens, C. (1657). De ratiociniis in ludo aleae. In van Schooten, F. (Ed.), Exercitionum Mathematicorum. Elsevirii, Amsterdam. Translated into English by John Arbuthnot (1692 2. Arbuthnot, J. (1692). Of the Laws of Chance. Motte, London. Translation into English, with additions, of Huygens (1657). 3. Laplace, P. (1816). Essai philosophique sur les probabilit´es (3rd edition). Courcier Imprimeur, Paris. 4. Bayes, T. (1763). An essay towards solving a problem in the doctrine of chances. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 53, 370–418. 5. Kolmogorov, A. N. (1950). Foundations of the Theory of Probability. Chelsea. 6. Rényi, A. (1970). Probability Theory. Elsevier/North-Holland. 7. Keynes, J. M. (1921). A Treatise on Probability. Macmillan. 8. Kolmogorov, A. N. (1963). On tables of random numbers. Sankhya, the Indian Journal of Statistics, Series A 25. 9. Fisher, R. A. (1922). On the mathematical foundations of theoretical statistics. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series A 222, 309–368. 10. von Mises, R. (1928). Wahrscheinlichkeit, Statistik und Wahrheit. J. Springer 11. Popper, K. R. (1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Basic Books. 12. Ramsey, F. P. (1931). Truth and probability. In Braithwaite, R. B. (Ed.), The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 13. de Finetti, B. (1937). Le prévision: ses lois logiques, ses sources subjectives. Ann. Inst.Poincaré, 7, 1-68. 14. Cox, R. T. (1946). Probability, frequency, and reasonable expectation. American Journal of Physics, 14(1), 1–13. 15. Savage, L. J. (1954). The Foundations of Statistics. Wiley. 16. Jeffrey, R. C. (1983). The Logic of Decision (2nd edition). University of Chicago Press. 17. Jaynes, E. T. (2003). Probability Theory: The Logic of Science. Cambridge Univ. Press. 18. Carnap, R. (1948). On the application of inductive logic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 8, 133-148. 19. Carnap, R. (1950). Logical Foundations of Probability. University of Chicago Press 20. Putnam, H. (1963). ‘Degree of confirmation’ and inductive logic. In Schilpp, P. A. (Ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, pp. 270–292. Open Court. 21. Halpern, J. Y. (1999). Technical addendum, Cox’s theorem revisited. JAIR, 11, 429–435. 22. Horn, K. V. (2003). Constructing a logic of plausible inference: A guide to cox’s theorem. IJAR, 34, 3–24. 23. Reichenbach, H. (1949). The Theory of Probability: An Inquiry into the Logical and Mathematical Foundations of the Calculus of Probability (second edition). University of California Press 24. Kyburg, H. E. (1977). Randomness and the right reference class. J. Philosophy, 74(9), 501-521. 25. Kyburg, H. E. (1983). The reference class. Philosophy of Science, 50, 374–397. 26. Bacchus, F., Grove, A., Halpern, J. Y., and Koller, D. (1992). From statistics to beliefs. In AAAI-92, pp. 602-608. 27. Kyburg, H. E. and Teng, C.-M. (2006). Nonmonotonic logic and statistical inference. Computational Intelligence, 22(1), 26-51.	Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010
Probability Theory	Schurz	I 110 Probability theory/theorems/Schurz: a) unconditioned probability: (objective und subjective) (T1) p(~A) = 1 – p(A) (complementary probability) (T2) p(A) ≤ 1 (upper bound) (T3) p(A u ~A) = 0 (contradiction) (T4) p(A1 v A2) = p(A1) + p(A2) – p(A1 u A2) (general law of addition). b) conditioned probability (for formulas X in antecedens position) (PT1) If B > A is exhaustive, gilt p(A I B) = 1. The converse is not valid. (PT2) p(A u B) = p(A I B) mal p(B) (PT3) Für jede Partition B1,...Bn: p(A) = ∑ _1≤i≤n p(A I Bi) times p(Bi) (general law of multiplication) (PT4): Def Bayes-Theorem, 1st version: p(A I B) = p(B I A) times p(A)/p(B) (PT5) Def Bayes-Theorem, 2nd version: for each partition A1,...An: p(Ai I B) = p(B I Ai) times p (Ai) /∑ _1≤i≤n p(B I Ai) times p(Ai). (PT6) Symmetry of probabilistic dependence: p(A I B) > p(A) iff p(B I A) > p(B) iff p(B I A) > p(B I ~A) (analog for ≥). Def Partition/Schurz: exhaustive disjunction. I 110 Consequence relation/probability/consequence/probability theory/Schurz: the probability-theoretic inference relation can be characterized as follows: a probability statement A follows probabilistically from a set D of probability statements iff. A follows logically from D and the Kolmogorov axioms (plus mathematical definitions). >Probability. I 112 Probability theory/Schurz: still unsolved problems: (a) objective probability: definitional problems. Definition of statistical probability: problem: with one random experiment one can potentially produce infinitely many infinitely increasing sequences of results, Why should they all have the same frequency limit? Why should they have one at all? Problem: even worse: from a given sequence of results, one can always construct a sequence with an arbitrarily deviating frequency limit value by arbitrary rearrangement or place selection. I 113 Law of large numbers/Schurz: ("naive statistical theory"): is supposed to be a solution for this problem: the assertion "p(Fx) = r" does not say then that in all random sequences the frequency limit is r, but only that it is r with probability 1. StegmüllerVs/KutscheraVs: This is circular! In the definiens of the expression "the probability of Fx is r" the expression "with probability 1" occurs again. Thus the probability is not reduced to frequency limits, but again to probability. >Circularity. Rearrangement/(s): only a problem with infinite sets, not with finite ones. Mises/solution: "statistical collective". 1. every possible outcome E has a frequency threshold in g, identified with probability p(E), and 2. this is insensitive to job selection. From this follows the general product rule/statistic: the probability of a sum is equal to the product of the individual probabilities: p(Fx1 u Gx2) = p(Fx1) times p(Gx2). Probability /propensity//Mises: this result of Mises is empirical, not a priori! It is a substantive dispositional statement about the real nature of the random experiment (>Ontology/Statistics). The Mises probability is also called propensity. >Propensity. Singular Propensity/Single Case Probability/Single Probability/Popper: many Vs. Probability theory/Schurz: problem: what is the empirical content of a statistical hypothesis and how is it tested? There is no observational statement that logically follows from this hypothesis. >Verification. That a random sequence has a certain frequency limit r is compatible for any n, no matter how large, with any frequency value hn unequal to r reached up to that point. Bayes/Schurz: this is often raised as an objection by Bayesians, but it merely expresses the fact that no observational theorems follow from statistical hypotheses. I 115 Verification/Statistics/Schurz: Statistical hypotheses are not deductively testable, but they are probabilistically testable, by sampling. I 115 Principal Principle/PP/Statistics/Schurz: subjective probabilities, if objective probabilities are known, must be consistent with them. Lewis (1980): singular PP: subjectivist. Here "objective" singular propensities are simply postulated. >Propensities. SchurzVsPropensity/SchurzVsPopper: it remains unclear what property a singular propensity should correspond to in the first place. Solution/de Finetti: one can also accept the objective notion of probability at the same time. Conditionalization/Statistics/Schurz: on an arbitrary experience datum E(b1...bn) over other individuals b1,..bn is important to derive two further versions of PP: 1. PP for random samples, which is needed for the subjective justification of the statistical likelihood intuition. 2. the conditional PP, for the principle of the closest reference class and subject to the inductive statistical specialization inference. PP: w(Fa I p(Fx) = r u E(b1,...bn)) = r PP for random samples: w(hn(Fx) = k/n I p(Fx) = r) = (nk) rk times (1 r)n k. Conditional PP: w(Fa I Ga u p(Fx I Gx) = r u E(b1,...bn)) = r. Principal principle: is only meaningful for subjective a priori probability. I.e. degrees of belief of a subject who has not yet had any experience. Actual degree of belief: for him the principle does not apply in general: e.g. if the coin already shows heads, (=Fa) so the act. dgr. of belief of it is of course = 1, while one knows that p(Fx) = ½. a priori probability function: here all background knowledge W must be explicitly written into the antecedent of a conditional probability statement w( I W). Actual: = personalistic. Apriori probability: connection with actual probability: Strict conditionalization/Schurz: let w0 be the a priori probability or probability at t0 and let w1 be the actual probability I 116 Wt the knowledge acquired between t0 and t1. Then for any A holds: Wt(A) = w0(A I Wt). Closest reference class/principle/Schurz: can be justified in this way: For a given event Fa, individual a can belong to very many reference classes assigning very different probabilities to Fx. Then we would get contradictory predictions. Question: But why should the appropriate reference class be the closest one? Because we can prove that it maximizes the frequency threshold of accurate predictions.	Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006
Production Function	Solow	Harcourt I 47 Production function/technical progress/Solow/Harcourt: The use of the malleability assumption and a simple marginal productivity theory of distribution underlies the early post-war work on aggregate production functions: the attempts to sort out from actual statistics the increases in output per man that are due to technical progress, i.e. shifts of an aggregate production function, from those which are due to capital deepening, i.e. movements along a given production function. >Aggregate production function. Solow: Solow⁽¹⁾ assumed a coiistant-returns-to-scale aggregate production function, static expectations and competitive conditions. It followed that paying factors their marginal products exhausted the total product, which consisted of a Clark-Ramsey one all-purpose commodity, see J. B. Clark [1889]⁽²⁾, Ramsey [1928]⁽³⁾. (Capital may then be measured in the same units as output, remembering that one is a stock, the other a flow, see Solow [1956a]⁽⁴⁾, p. 101.) >Economic models. Cobb-Douglas function: Solow did not specify the form of the production function until after he made the empirical fittings when Cobb-Douglas gave the best fit. Technical progress was assumed to be neutral and completely disembodied, i.e. left all factors unaffected, so that marginal rates of substitution between factors at given factor ratios were unchanged, though, at each ratio, there was a mystical rise of the same proportion in the total output associated with each ratio. All capital goods were treated alike, whether they were newly created and incorporated the latest advances in technical knowledge (and the effects of the pull of expected factor prices) or whether they were fossils inherited from the past, previous years' investments which in fact could be expected to reflect the then prevailing technical conditions, expectations and relative factor prices. >Factor prices, >Factors of production, >Cobb-Douglas production function. Harcourt I 48 Harcourt: It was as if we were in Swan's world where, at any moment of time, all existing capital goods could be costlessly and timelessly taken to pieces and, using the latest booklet of instructions as our guide, changed into the latest cost-minimizing form as indicated by expectations of future product and relative factor prices. >T. W. Swan. (Indeed, the expectations themselves must be a mirror image of present happenings.) >Expectations. Thus disembodied neutral technical progress may be likened to a mysterious manifestation of grace - when two or more, in this case, capital and labour, are gathered together in this life, there immediately occurs a rise (of considerable dimensions) in total factor productivity. >Technical progress. Progress/technology: With a production function and technical progress of these natures, it is almost inevitable that 'technical progress' will explain most of the growth in output per man (…). Harcourt I 50 Solow's method is a most ingenious means whereby annual observations which are viewed as if they came from underlying production functions which drift up neutrally over time (…) are boiled down into observations on one function which itself is an appropriately scaled down image of all the others. Harcourt I 114 Production function/Solow/Harcourt: Solow's⁽⁵⁾ production function has as one input an 'effective‘ stock of capital which is obtained by summing together all profitable vintages, each layer weighted by its respective productivity (which due to technical progress will rise as we go from earlier to later vintages, (…)). This avoids the need to calculate the contribution to total output of each layer of 'fossils' in the stock. It also makes it unnecessary to distribute labour (or to know its distribution) over the range of vintages in use. It is, of course, assumed, though, that the actual labour supply may be treated as if it had been distributed so that marginal and average products were equalized, vintage to vintage, so maximizing total output, with earlier vintages worked less labourintensively than later ones. >Aggregate production function, >Surrogate production function, >Pseudo-production function. 1. Solow, R. M.1957] 'Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function', Review of economics and Statistics, xxxix, pp. 312-20. 2. Clark, J. B. [1889] 'The Possibility of a Scientific Law of Wages', Publication of the American Economic Association, iv, pp. 39-63. 3. Ramsey, F. P. [1928] 'A Mathematical Theory of Saving', Economic Journal, xxxvm, pp. 543-59. 4. Solow, R. M. [1956a] 'The Production Function and the Theory of Capital', Review of Economic Studies, xxin, pp. 101-8. 5. Solow, Robert M. [1963a] (Professor Dr. F. De Vries Lectures, 1963) Capital Theory and the Rate of Return (Amsterdam: North-Holland).	Solow I Robert M. Solow A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth Cambridge 1956 Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972
Progress	Gould	IV 112 Thinking/progress/Gould: progress in science requires new ways of thinking. Examples: See Natural Laws/Lyell, Gradualism/Gould. IV 186 Progress/evolution/Gould: there is no progress in evolution to better individual parts: the eyes of the trilobites, for example, have never been reached in their complexity or sharpness by the later anthropodes, let alone surpassed. III 16 Progress/life/trends: new trends may be explained by a change in the range of variations of entire systems (instead of individual entities within the systems). It is just an inversion of terms, not a mathematical procedure. Gould thesis: evolution: the history of life as a whole is not marked by progress! Not even by a directed evolutionary force. III 34 Progress/Gould: some assume a development towards complexity or differentiation. Gould: even for these earmarked replacement terms, progress cannot be defined as the main impulse of life. We have the need to view evolution as predictable and progress-oriented. Thesis: the human is not the crown of creation. Trend: there are more and more animals in evolution - the time of the human is simply short ((s)GouldVsAnthropic Principle > Anthropic Principle). III 39 It is a mistake to understand evolution as an ascending ladder. Bacteria are actually no less complex than we are. III 86 Trend: progress is not walking a path, but a complex series of transitions or lateral steps. III 92 The trend is not a ladder, but a chain of reinforcements. III 89 Success/evolution: what are real "success stories" in evolution? E.g. rats, bats, antelopes. These three groups dominate the world of mammals, both in number and ecological distribution. Most successful: bony fish: bony fish make up almost 50% of all vertebrate species. There are hundreds of times as many bony fish species as the primates and five times as many as all mammals put together. III 121 Progress/sport/Gould: improved performance: progress in spots can be depicted by an asymptote. What is remarkable, is that women have a much steeper improvement curve than men. Progress/livestock breeding: the progress in livestock breeding is often 13% per year. The breeding of thoroughbred horses is economically more interesting than all other breeding projects! It can therefore be assumed that thoroughbred horses have long since reached their optimum. III 123 Sports/progress: the records in the running disciplines (200m, 10,000m) have improved by the same relative amount regardless of distance: namely from 5.69 to 7.57 metres per minute in a decade (marathon: 9.18). If you extrapolated that, then women should soon run faster than the men. However, extrapolation is a mostly unsuitable means. Sports/women: advantages of the female body are the fat distribution and thus buoyancy. E. g. crossing the English Channel and swimming distance to Catalina Island: here the women already hold the world record today. Many women would beat most (untrained) men in all disciplines anyway. III 167 Progress/evolution/Darwin/Gould: Darwin initially rejected the term evolution because it is linked to progress. The term does not appear in the first edition of the "Origin of Species". III 175 Progress/nature/Gould: struggle: a)"biotic": the biotic struggle describes the struggle between living beings and for food; it can produce progress, as in faster running, better thinking, stronger physical condition, etc. b)"abiotic": abiotic is e. g. the fight of a plant at the edge of the desert. This cannot bring about any progress, because the environment does not change over a long period of time. Progress: the argument of the predominance of biotic competition is not enough, something must be added. If the environment is relatively empty, the inferior variants can continue to exist next to it. III 177 Progress/Darwin/Gould: question: why did Darwin smuggle progress back in through the back door by writing about the supremacy of biotic competition in a constantly overcrowded world? (KropotkinVsDarwin). After the demise of the Permian period, 95% of marine invertebrates had disappeared. Nothing was crowded. Darwin: was only able to pull himself out of the affair by considering the fossils to be artifacts (gaps in the finds). III 179 Progress/Gould: how can one define "higher" if evolution produces a parasite with every alleged progress? >Evolution, >Explanation.	Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989
Proofs	Barrow	I 44 Kant/Barrow: although we cannot prove that nature is arranged purposefully, we have to arrange the observational data as if it were. I 88 Proofs/Laws/Barrow: We cannot prove the law of gravity. >Provability, >Laws, >Laws of nature, >Gravitation, >Nature.	B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001
Proper Names	Logic Texts	Read III 133 f If a description has a Def narrow range: we take it to describe various objects in different worlds. Def wide range: means that they refer to the same object in all the worlds, regardless of how many planets there are in that world. This gives the >planets-example a different hue. Real names always have a long range (rigid designators, for all the worlds). >Rigidity, >Descriptions, >Singular Terms. descriptions: are therefore not always rigid, depending on theory. (Not rigid, just for the actual world). III 138 Names/Mill: have no sense, they are purely denotative (also Kripke: no sense, because non-modal statements can have different truth values). - FregeVsKripke/FregeVsMill: names do have a sense.	Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Properties	Gould	III 203 Properties/evolution/abilities/specialization/evolution/Gould: founding members of very successful lineages are generally unspecialized. They tolerate a wide range of environmental changes. >Evolution, >Explanation.	Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989
Properties	Millikan	I 11 Properties/Kind/Millikan: properties and kind exist only in the actual world (our real world). MillikanVsNominalism. >Nominalism. I 197 Property/Millikan: Thesis: A property is only a property by virtue of opposing properties - properties that they exclude or are incompatible with them. ((s)> disjunctive property). I 264 Identity/Sameness/Property/Millikan: how can we describe the identity of a property? 1. we consider only those properties that individuals can have. I 265 Leibniz Principle/Millikan: we turn around the Leibniz Principle by adding an operator for natural necessity. (F)(G){[NN(x)Fx equi Gx] equi F = G}. >Leibniz principle, >Indistinguishability. I 266 Properties/identity/Millikan: The traditional objection that properties are the same when all their instances are the same is divided into two arguments. 1. Objections from those who believe that properties correspond one-to-one to possible concepts: "Argument from the meaning"/argument from meaning/Armstrong: (Armstrong not pro): (Has often confused the problem of universals): If universals are to be meanings, and if a semantic criterion for the identity of predicates is accepted, then it follows that every predicate type corresponds to its own universal. ((s) This can be re-invented newly infinitely many times). Problem/Millikan/(s): already diversity of linguistic expressions entails difference in the corresponding properties. Inflationism/Deflationism/Millikan: Realists have interpreted this argument inflationistically, and nominalists have interpreted it deflationistically. >Deflationism. Millikan: for this, however, one has to equate meaning with intension - that is to say, to combine meaning with the concepts that one has of the things that are mapped with the expressions. Solution/Millikan: we differentiate meaning and intension, therefore, it can have different concepts for one and the same variant in re. Therefore, we can ignore this objection. For example, the concepts that Hubots and Rubots have (> Terminology/Millikan) of the "square" are different variants in nature, because they are governed by different intensions. This could be misunderstood in that way that for the ancient Hesperus and Phosphorus concepts there would have been concepts of different celestial bodies,... I 267 ...because they were ruled by different intensions. ((s) general problem: there are too many properties in such approaches). 2. Type of objections against the view that properties are the same when their instances coincide: that there are so many counterexamples. For example, even if it can be that every living creature with a heart is a living being with kidneys, it does not show that having the one property would be equal to having the other property. Solution: the instances must already coincide with natural necessity. For example, suppose there is only one single object in the world with a particular green color, and this object would also have a unique form. It would still not follow from this that the property of having this hue would be equal to the property of having this form. Certainly, there are also no principles of natural necessity that link these properties. Millikan: but not all the counter-arguments against the inverse Leibniz principle are so easy to invalidate. E.g. Properties for materials in general: e.g. properties that can have gold: a certain spectrum, electrical conductivity, melting point, atomic weight. Suppose each of these properties is only once applicable to gold and therefore identifies the material. N.B.: then each of these properties necessarily coexists with the others. Nevertheless, the properties are not identical! But how do we actually know that it is not one and the same property? How do we know that they are not like a form that is once touched and once seen? This is a question of epistemology, not of ontology. But it cannot be answered without making ontological assumptions. I 268 General Properties/Material/Millikan: in order e.g. that the particular conductivity of gold and the particular spectrum of gold could be one and the same property, the entire range of possible electrical conductivities would have to be mapped one-to-one to the entire range of possible spectra. That is, the particular conductivity could not be the same as this particular spectrum, if not other spectra coincided with other conductivities. Properties/Millikan: Thesis: Properties (one or more digits) that fall into the same domain are characteristics that are opposite to each other. Of course, one area can also contain a different area. For example, "red" includes "scarlet" instead of excluding it, and "being two centimeters tall plus minus one millimeter" means "2.05 centimeters tall plus minus 1 millimeter" than excluding it. The assumption that two properties can only be the same when the complete opposite domains from which they come coincide, suggests that the identity of a property or a property domain is tied to the identity of a broader domain from which it comes and is thus tied to the identity of its opposites. Now we are comparing Leibniz's view with that of Aristotle: Identity/Leibniz/Millikan: all simple properties are intrinsically comparable. However, perhaps not comparable in nature, because God created only the best of possible worlds - but they would be metaphysically comparable. Complex properties/Leibniz/Millikan: that would be propertes that are not comparable. They also include absences or negations of properties. They have the general form "A and not B". I 271 Properties/Millikan: properties are not loners like substances. Self-identity/property: a property is itself, by virtue of the natural necessary comparison to other properties. Representation/exemplification/Millikan: if an opposite is missing, no property is represented. E.g "Size is exemplified by John" has no opposite. The negation is not made true by the fact that size would have a property that would be contrary to being exemplified by John. "Being exemplified by John" says of substance John that it has that property. >Terminology/Millikan.	Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Property	Buchanan	Boudreaux I 47 Property/Buchanan/Boudreaux/Holcombe: (...) if there is no clear definition of property rights in the air, then [a] factory will be reluctant to negotiate with the town council. It will likely simply continue to pollute without the town being compensated to bear the cost of the pollution. >Externalities/Buchanan. Clearly defined property rights thus promote bargaining to mutual advantage - that is, toward greater efficiency of resource use - while the absence of such rights stymies such bargaining. Buchanan/Tullock: In The Calculus of Consent, Buchanan and Tullock say „If property rights are carefully defined, should not the pure laissez-faire organization bring about the elimination of all significant externalities? … After human and property right are initially defined, will externalities that are serious enough to warrant removing really be present? Or will voluntary co-operative arrangements among individuals emerge to insure the elimination of all relevant external effects?“ (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962/1999(1): 44) 1. Buchanan, James M., and Gordon Tullock (1962/1999). The Calculus of Consent. Liberty Fund.	EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Boudreaux I Donald J. Boudreaux Randall G. Holcombe The Essential James Buchanan Vancouver: The Fraser Institute 2021
Propositions	Davidson	I (b) 24f False theory: the objects would be the meanings of sentences, that is, the propositions. Whoever ascribes a thought to another must relate that other to an object, and for this purpose the person who does this ascription must identify the object in question by pointing at it or marking it. On the other hand, there is no reason why the attributor should be in any particular relation to the object to be identified. All he has to do is refer to him in the way he refers to anything else. I (b) 34 DavidsonVs: with that, it would be arranged that, e.g. if a Frenchman attributed the same state of consciousness to Paul as I do, the same subject would be named by us both, while the proposition in question of the Frenchman would not be the same as mine. It should not concern us that the Frenchman and I use different words, it is similar to ounces and carats. This "relativism", however, contains nothing that could show that the properties measured with ounces or carats are not "real". >Measuring/Davidson. Dummett III 64 Meaning/Truth/Davidson: Thesis: Understanding the proposition before knowing that the proposition is true.	Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982
Psychological Resilience	Rutter	Slater I 206 Resilience/psychology/Rutter: in his 1987 review “Psychosocial Resilience and Protective Mechanisms” (Rutter 1987)⁽¹⁾ Rutter comments on some of the commonly observed protective factors noted by earlier reviews (e.g., Garmezy, 1985)⁽²⁾, such as self-esteem, harmonious families, and external support systems. Then he raises a critical question as to whether these protective factors represent something distinct from widely established risk factors (i.e., low self-esteem, discordant families, and lack of support) or the positive pole of bi-polar dimensions. In other words, has something “new” been identified or are we rediscovering the full range of key variables that relate to adaptation along a continuum from negative to positive? In a well-known passage on the utility of naming the opposite poles of the same underlying dimension. >Distinctions/order/Rutter. RutterVsTradition: Rutter focused on interactions and moderating effects. >Resilience/psychological theories. Tradition: Much confusion accompanied the early research on resilience in relation to distinguishing factors that were generally “good” or “bad” under most circumstances from factors that played a special role under particular circumstances. RutterVsTradition: In this article, Rutter emphasized that protective factors imply interactions or special roles when risk is high; in other words, these variables moderate risk in some way with differential effects that cannot be predicted simply from what may happen under low-risk conditions. There is a different or multiplicative effect under high- compared to low-risk conditions. Slater I 207 Personality traits/resilience/Rutter: thesis: resilience is not a personality trait. (Cf. Cicchetti and Garmezy, 1993⁽³⁾. Given that the same trait can function in different ways across people and situations and the life course, and given that development changes the capacity of a person to respond and adapt, the notion of a resiliency trait is untenable. Protection/Rutter: a protective function is not the same thing as a pleasant or rewarding experience. Inoculations are a classic example of a protective intervention in medicine. Similarly, discipline by parents, often implicated as protective for young people in risky contexts, may not be enjoyable at the time the intervention is imposed. Slater I 208 Rutter: Four factors might lead to resilience: 1) reduction of risk; 2) reduction of negative chain reactions; 3) promotion or support of self-esteem and self-efficacy; 4) opening up of opportunities. >Resilience/developmental psychology. 1. Rutter, M. (1987). Psychosocial resilience and protective mechanisms. American journal of Orthopsychiatry, 57, 316—331. 2. Garmezy, N. (1985). Stress-resistant children: The search for protective factors. In J. E. Stevenson (Ed.), Recent research in developmental psychopathology: Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry Book Supplement 4 (pp. 213—233). Oxford: Pergamon Press. 3. Cicchetti, D., & Garmezy, N. (199 3). Prospects and promises in the study of resilience. Development and Psychopathology, 5,497—502. Ann S. Masten, “Resilience in Children. Vintage Rutter and Beyond”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Psychology	Quine	V 58 Psychology/Peirce: can only be based on external facts - Quine: Problem: how can you do that when you do not speak of things such as internal ideas? - Solution: Let us talk about the language - ((s)> semantic ascent/Quine) - ((s) only shared situations and language behavior) - QuineVs: (see below) Psychology is not "shared observation" but observation sentences. simple compliance - ((s) Psychology does not identify the situation. >Observation Sentences/Quine XII 91 Epistemology/Psychology/Quine: if sensory stimuli are the only thing, why not just turn to psychology? TraditionVsPsychology/Quine: this used to appear circular. No Circle/QuineVsVs: Solution: we just have to refrain from deducting science from observations. If we only want to understand the connection between observation and science, we need all the information we can get. Also those from science, which is investigating exactly this connection. >Science/Quine XII 92 Psychology/Quine: cannot provide a translation into logical, set-theoretical and observation concepts such as rational reconstruction, because we have not grown up to learn this. That is precisely why we should insist on rational reconstruction: Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Quine: pro: it makes the physicalistic terms superfluous at the end. XII 98 Epistemology/Quine: still exists within psychology and thus within empirical sciences. Epistemology studies the human subject. Aim: to find out how observation is related to theory and to what extent theory goes beyond observation. XII 99 Rational Reconstruction/Naturalized Epistemology/Quine: the rational reconstruction survives: by giving clues to psychological processes as an imaginative construction. >Rational Reconstruction/Quine New: that we can make free use of empirical psychology. >Epistemology/Quine: Old: wanted to include empirical sciences, so to speak, to assemble them from sense data. New: now, conversely, epistemology is part of psychology. >Epistemology/Quine XI 100 Gestalt Theory/Gestalt Psychology/Quine: VsSensory Atomism. QuineVs Gestalt Psychology: no matter if shape or atoms push themselves into the foreground of consciousness, we take the stimuli as input. Priority is what is causally closer. QuineVsAntipsychologism. I 44 Evidence/Irritation/Quine: any realistic theory of evidence is inextricably linked to the psychology of stimulus and reaction. To call a stone at close range a stone is already an extreme case. I 154 Like other sciences, psychology favours the uniformity of nature already in the criteria of its concepts. A connection between the individual senses cannot succeed. No chain of subliminal relationships ranges from sounds to colors. We need a separate quality space for each of the senses. Worse still: within one space we have to distinguish between subspaces: a red and a green ball can be less far apart in the quality space of the child than from a red cloth.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Public Good	Coase	Kiesling I 42 Public good/Coase/Kiesling: (…) Coase (…) points out relevant aspects of the question that other scholars are overlooking, and he emphasizes the essential role of institutional detail and knowing that detail to be able to produce sound economic theory. Coase uses Mill and Samuelson as analytical foils. Eample: Lihgthouses: [Coase] notes that a) Mill’s argument supports government taxation to pay (private or public) lighthouse owners for their services while b) Samuelson makes a different argument, that zero marginal cost for an additional ship means that the lighthouses should be provided to everyone, and therefore through government ownership. Both Mill and Samuelson engage in a casual observation of reality, pointing out that in their day the provision of lighthouses was a government function and then deducing that private lighthouses were not sustainable due to the free-rider problem. CoasVsMill, John Stuart/CoaseVsSamuelson: Coase challenges that claim, and through it the theory they developed, with his empirical investigation of the history of the British lighthouse system. Lighthouses initially emerged as private commercial entities, but in 1836 were nationalized and operated by governments (Candela and Geloso, 2019)⁽¹⁾. Kiesling I 43 (…) , the British government first nationalized the lighthouses and then supervised the collection of light dues to create a General Lighthouse Fund. Different types of vessels paid different dues, some by journey and some as an annual fee, so price discrimination was reflected in their monopoly grants (foreign ships always paid more than domestic ones). Between the 16th and early 19th centuries, though, Britain had private lighthouses, the owners of which overcame free riding by collecting port fees and bundling lighting services with other maritime safety services such as pilotage and ballastage. There were also other substitute means of providing light and guidance along the coast, particularly in the 16th and 17th centuries. For instance, as Rosolino Candela and Vincent Geloso have analyzed, entrepreneurs provided floating lighthouses or lightships along the English coast, with construction funded by voluntary contributions, subscriptions, and user fees that differed for different types of vessels (price discrimination) (Candela and Geloso, 2018)⁽²⁾. Institution: Coase’s examination of this rich history was detailed and showed the diversity of institutional arrangements that existed in maritime safety. For example, in a shallow port with shifting sands, having a local pilot bring the ship into port had substantial value as a private good to the ship’s captain, and the lighthouse service was a complement to such pilotage. A lighthouse owner could charge a fee for pilotage that bundled the light service with it (Candela and Geloso, 2019)⁽¹⁾. Such arrangements were common in Britain and elsewhere. Market: The more important way of thinking about the situation was to characterize it as a market for maritime safety services, which involved a variety of services that could be provided in a variety of ways by different private parties. Lighthouses were but one part of that broader market. Public good theory that focused only on one service often overlooked alternative institutional arrangements and, from Coase’s perspective, missed the important economic theory that would help us understand why and how such institutional arrangements emerged and were beneficial to both producer and consumer (in constrast, see Bertrand (2006)⁽³⁾ for a critique of Coase’s argument). Coase: If we theorize without understanding the actual markets and institutional frameworks about which we theorize, our theories have little meaning and are no more than “blackboard economics” likely to be derided as irrelevant when economics can and does provide valuable insights. 1. Candela, Rosolino A., and Vincent Geloso (2019). Why Consider the Lighthouse a Public Good? International Review of Law and Economics 60: 105852. 2. Candela, Rosolino A., and Vincent J. Geloso (2018). The Lightship in Economics. Public Choice 176, 3-4: 479-506. 3. Bertrand, Elodie (2006). The Coasean Analysis of Lighthouse Financing: Myths and Realities. Cambridge Journal of Economics 30, 3: 389-402.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Public Sphere	Benkler	Benkler I 176 Public Sphere/Networked Public Sphere/Benkler: Modern democracies and mass media have coevolved throughout the twentieth century. The first modern national republics - the early American Republic, the French Republic from the Revolution to the Terror, the Dutch Republic, and the early British parliamentary monarchy - preexisted mass media. They provide us with some model of the shape of the public sphere in a republic without mass media, what Jürgen Habermas called the bourgeois public sphere. However, the expansion of democracies in complex modern societies has largely been a phenomenon of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries - in particular, the post–World War II years. During this period, the platform of the public sphere was dominated by mass media - print, radio, and television. In authoritarian regimes, these means of mass communication were controlled by the state. In democracies, they operated either under state ownership, with varying degrees of independence from the sitting government, or under private ownership financially dependent on advertising markets. I 177 Networked Public Sphere: The Internet as a technology, and the networked information economy as an organizational and social model of information and cultural production, promise the emergence of a substantial alternative platform for the public sphere. The networked public sphere, as it is currently developing, suggests that it will have no obvious points of control or exertion of influence — either by fiat or by purchase. Def Public Sphere/Benkler: For purposes of considering political freedom, I adopt a very limited definition of “public sphere.” The term is used in reference to the set of practices that members of a society use to communicate about matters they understand to be of public concern and that potentially require collective action or recognition. [However], not even all communications about matters of potential public concern can be said to be part of the public sphere. I 178 The public sphere is, then, a sociologically descriptive category. It is a term for signifying how, if at all, people in a given society speak to each other in their relationship as constituents about what their condition is and what they ought or ought not to do as a political unit. I 181 Def Public Sphere/Habermas: Habermas defines the public sphere as “a network for communicating information and points of view (i.e., opinions expressing affirmative or negative attitudes)”; which, in the process of communicating this information and these points of view, filters and synthesizes them “in such a way that they coalesce into bundles of topically specified public opinions”.⁽¹⁾ >Habermas/Public Sphere. Taken in this descriptive sense, the public sphere does not relate to a particular form of public discourse that is normatively attractive from some perspective or another. It defines a particular set of social practices that are necessary for the functioning of any complex social system that includes elements of governing human beings. There are authoritarian public spheres, where communications are regimented and controlled by the government in order to achieve acquiescence and to mobilize support, rather than relying solely on force to suppress dissent and opposition. There are various forms of liberal public spheres, constituted by differences in the political and communications systems scattered around liberal democracies throughout the world. I 178 Mass Media/Public Sphere: Mass media structured the public sphere of the twentieth century in all I 179 advanced modern societies. They combined a particular technical architecture, a particular economic cost structure, a limited range of organizational forms, two or three primary institutional models, and a set of cultural practices typified by consumption of finished media goods. The structure of the mass media resulted in a relatively controlled public sphere—although the degree of control was vastly different depending on whether the institutional model was liberal or authoritarian—with influence over the debate in the public sphere heavily tilted toward those who controlled the means of mass communications. >Mass Media/Benkler, >Public Sphere/Schmitt. 1. Jürgen Habermas: Between Facts and Norms, Contributions to Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).	Benkler I Yochai Benkler The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom New Haven 2007
Punishment	Social Psychology	Parisi I 139 Punishment/Social Psychology/Nadler/Mueller: In the absence of compelling evidence to prove guilt, juries sometimes use the fact of the defendant's prior criminal record as a reason to convict (T. Eisenberg and Hans, 2009⁽¹⁾). This is especially true when Parisi I 140 the prior crimes are similar to the current accusation (Greene and Dodge, 1995⁽²⁾; Lloyd-Bostock, 2000⁽³⁾; Wissler and Saks, 1985⁽⁴⁾). Perception: When perceiving persons, we immediately decide whether their intentions toward us are good, and how competent they are to carry out their intentions (Fiske, Cuddy, and Glick, 2007)⁽⁵⁾. We also use that information to make decisions about how blameworthy an actor is. Inferences about character drive judgments of responsibility, blame, and even causation (Alicke, 1992⁽⁶⁾, 2000⁽⁷⁾; Alicke and Yurak 1995⁽⁸⁾. Nadler, 2012⁽⁹⁾; Nadler and McDonnell, 2012⁽¹⁰⁾). Personality traits: Bad motives are one source of inferring bad character, but they are not necessary. Even mildly negative personality traits spur inferences about character that influence blame judgments. For example, a woman who carelessly fails to supervise her unruly dogs is blamed more for an ensuing death if she is asocial and has an unhealthy lifestyle, compared to if she is highly social and has a healthy lifestyle (Nadler and McDonnell, 2012)⁽¹⁰⁾. Victims: The moral character of victims can also influence blame judgments. Harm to innocent victims induces more blame than harm to dangerous criminals, or victims perceived as tainted in other ways. Thus, for example, a person who shoots a stranger in his house is blamed more when the victim turns out to be his daughter's boyfriend than when the victim is a burglar, even when holding constant the shooter's perceptions of danger (Alicke, Davis, and Pezzo, 1994)⁽¹¹⁾. Moral character: A woman's allegedly questionable moral character (e.g. drinking, drug use, premarital sex, respectability) disadvantages her throughout the justice process and leads to more victim blaming as well as lighter punishment (Burt and Albin, 1981⁽¹²⁾; C. Jones and Aronson, 1973⁽¹³⁾). If they question a woman's moral character, prosecutors are less likely to file charges in the first place (Spohn et al., 2001)⁽¹⁴⁾. Additionally, convictions are less likely and sentences are shorter when a woman's sexual history is mentioned, even if she is relatively inexperienced (L'Armand and Pepiton, 1982)⁽¹⁵⁾. >Apologies/Social Psychology, >Attractiveness/Social Psychology, >Retribution/deterrence/Social Psychology. Parisi I 141 Rules/social status: Expressive theories of punishment posit that punishment communicates rules and social norms (Duff, 2011⁽¹⁶⁾; Durkheim, 2014⁽¹⁷⁾), and sends a message to victims, offenders, and third parties alike, which announces and corrects the wrong that was committed. Thus, criminal punishment involving identifiable victims can function as a device that communicates how valued and respected the victim is (Hampton, 1988⁽¹⁸⁾; 1994⁽¹⁹⁾). Punishment can serve to reset the status quo by expressing that the victim is valuable enough to justify the spending of resources to detect, prosecute, and punish the offender who has harmed her (Bilz, 2014). Bilz (2014) has shown experimentally that both victims and third parties perceive punishment as raising the victim's social standing, and failure to punish as lowering it. 1. Eisenberg, T. and V. Hans (2009). "Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes." Cornell Law Review 94: 1353. 2. Greene, E. and M. Dodge (1995). "The Influence of Prior Record Evidence on Juror Decision Making." Law and Human Behavior doi:10.1007/BF01499073. 3. Lloyd-Bostock, S. (2000). " The Effects on Juries of Hearing about the Defendant's Previous Criminal Record: A Simulation Study." Criminal Law Review 1:734-755. 4. Wissler, R. L. and M. J. Saks (1985). "On the Ineffcacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt." Law and Human Behavior 9(1): 37-48. doi:10.1007/BF01044288. 5. Fiske, S. T., A. J. C. Cuddy, and P. Glick (2007). "Universal Dimensions of Social Cognition: Warmth and Competence." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 1 1 (2):77—83. doi:16/ j.tics.2006.11.005. 6. Alicke, M. D. (1992). "Culpable Causation." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 63(3): 368-378. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.63.3.368. 7. Alicke, M. D. (2000). "Culpable Control and the Psychology Of Blame." Psychological Bulletin 126(4): 556-574. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.126.4.556. 8. Alicke, M. D. and T. J. Yurak (1995). "Perpetrator Personality and Judgments of Acquaintance Rape“.Journal of Applied Social Psychology 25(21):1900-1921. 9. Nadler, J. (2012). "Blaming as a Social Process: The Influence of Character and Moral Emo- tion on Blame." Law and Contemporary Problems 75: 1. 10. Nadler, J. and M.-H. McDonnell (2012). "Moral Character, Motive, and the Psychology of Blame." Cornell Law Review 97:255. 11. Alicke, M. D., T. L. Davis, and M. V. Pezzo (1994). "A Posteriori Adjustment of A Priori Decision Criteria." Social Cognition 12(4):281-308. 12. Burt, M. R. and R. S. Albin (1981). "Rape Myths, Rape Definitions, and Probability of Conviction.“ Journal of Applied Social Psychology 11(3):212-230. 13. Jones, C. and E. Aronson (1973). "Attribution of Fault to a Rape Victim as a Function of Respectability of the Victim." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 26(3): 415-419. doi:10.1037/h0034463. 14. Spohn, C., D. Beichner, E. D. Frenzel, and D. Holleran (2001). Prosecutors' Charging Decisions in Sexual Assault Cases: A Multi-Site Study, Final Report (No. 197048). National Institute of Justice. 15. L'Armand, K. and A. Pepitone (1982). "Judgments of Rape A Study of Victim-Rapist Relationship and Victim Sexual History." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 8(1): 134-139. doi:10.1177/014616728281021. 16. Duff, A. (2011). "Retrieving Retributivism," in M. D. White, ed., Retributivism: Essays on Theory and Policy, 3-24. New York: Oxford University Press. 17. Durkheim, E. (2014). The Division of Labor in society. New York: Simon and Schuster. 18. Hampton, Jean (1988). "Punishment as Defeat," in Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hampton, eds., Forgiveness and Mercy, 124—132. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Cam- bridge. 19. Hampton, Jean (1994). "Retribution and the Liberal State." J. Contemp. Legal Issues 5: 117. Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press	Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Quantifiers	Cresswell	I 137f Quantifiers/everyday language/Quine/Kaplan/Geach/Cresswell: not 1st order: E.g. some critics only admire each other 2nd order: (Eφ)(Exφx u (x)(φx > x is a critics) u (x)(y)((φx u x admires y) > (x ≠ y u φy))). That is not equivalent to any 1st order sentence - involves plural noun phrases (plural quantification). The following is not correct: "two Fs are G". One would have to assume that "admire" should be valid in both directions - (then x is a K u y is a K u x ≠ y ... "). Better: "admire each other" is a predicate that is applied to pairs. 139 Correct: "Smart and Armstrong are present" for "S. is a and A is a". Problem: "King and Queen are a lovable couple", then "The King is an adorable ..." analog: E.g. "similar", e.g. "lessen". Solution/Cresswell: applying predicate to quantities. I 140 .. "admires another linguist" must be a predicate which is applied to all logicians. - This shows that quantification of higher level is required. >Second order logic. Problem: this leads to the fact that the possibilities to have different ranges are restricted. I 142 Higher order quantifiers/plural quantifiers/Boolos: Thesis: these do not have to go via set theoretical entities, but can simply be interpreted as semantically primitive. ((s) basic concept). Cresswell: perhaps he is right. Hintikka: game theory. >Game-theoretical semantics. CresswellVsHintikka: only higher order entities. 2nd order quantification due to reference to quantities. I 156 Branching quantifiers/Booles/Cresswell: "for every A there is a B". (x)(Ey) (x = z ⇔ y = w) u (Ax > By) (z)(Ew) 2nd order translation: EφEψ(x)(z)((x = z ⇔ φ(x) = ψ(z)) u (Ax > Bφ(x)). Function/unique image/assignment/logical form/Cresswell: "(x = z ⇔ φ(x) = ψ (z)" says that the function is 1: 1. Generalization/Cresswell: If we replace W, C, A, B, and R by predicates that are true of all, and Lxyzw by Boolos ((x = z ⇔ y = w) u Ax> By) we have a proof of non-orderability of 1st order. >Orderability.	Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Quantifiers	Russell	Hintikka I 173 Quantification/quantifier/acquaintance/description/Russell/Hintikka: in Russell, the quantifiers (or the domain of bound variables) go only via objects of the acquaintance. ((s) physically present things). Description/Theory of Description/Russell: descriptions are eliminated in the context in favor of quantifiers. There are only quantifiers and bound variables. >Bound variables. Russell/Hintikka: one could paraphrase it as the following: the concept "is always true" is the only one occuring in propositions which originally contained certain descriptions. Power/Russell/Hintikka: the force ((s) semantic force) of the reduced propositions depends on the individual range of the variable. N.B./Hintikka: now it is only a part of the story that Russell has successfully eliminated non-existent objects (E.g., the current King of France is bald). His reduction continues: Quantifier/Russell/Hintikka: the quantifiers go only via objects of the acquaintance. ((s) objects of which we only know by description are not allowed, they cannot be quantified via according to Russell, which is more than the elimination of non-existent objects because there are also existing objects which we know only by description). Hintikka I 173 Denotation/Russell/Hintikka: N.B.: a brilliant feature of Russell's theory of the denotation of 1905 is that it is the quantifiers which denote! Theory of Description/Russell: (end of "On Denoting")⁽¹⁾ Thesis: contains the reduction of descriptions on objects of acquaintance. >Acquaintance. I 174 Hintikka: this connection is astonishing. It also appears to be circular, only to admit objects of acquaintance. Solution: we must see what successfully denotating phrases actually denote: they denote objects of acquaintance. Ambiguity/uniqueness/Hintikka: it is precisely ambiguity that leads to the failure of the existential generalization. E.g. Waverley/Russell/Hintikka: that only objects of acquaintance are allowed, shows his own example: "the author of Waverley" in (1) is actually a primary event, i.e. his example (2). "Whether"/Russell/Hintikka: only difference: wanted to know "whether" instead of "did not know". Secondary Description/Russell: can also be expressed in the way that George wanted to know from the man who actually wrote Waverley whether he was Scott. I 175 That would be the case if George IV had seen Scott (at a distance) and had asked "Is that Scott?". HintikkaVsRussell: why does Russell choose an example with a perceptually known individual? Do we not normally deal with individuals of flesh and blood, whose identity is known to us, rather than merely with perceptual objects? Knowledge who/knowledge what/perception object/Russell/Hintikka: precisely in the case of perception objects, it seems as if the kind of uniqueness that we need for a knowledge-who does not exist. Hintikka I 178 Quantifier/Quantification/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell systematically confuses two types of quantifiers. (A) of the acquaintance, (B) of the description. Problem: Russell had not realized that the difference cannot be defined solely in relation to the actual world! Solution/Hintikka: we need a relativization to sets of possible worlds, which change with the different propositional attitudes. >Possible world, >Propositional attitude. Hintikka I 180 Elimination/Eliminability/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: in order to eliminate merely seemingly denotating descriptions, one must assume that the quantifiers and bound variables go via individuals that are identified descriptively. ((s) >intensional object ). Otherwise the real Bismarck would not be an admissible value of the variables with which we express that there is an individual of a certain kind. Problem: then these quantifiers must not be constituents of the propositions, for their range of values consists not merely of objects of acquaintance. So Russell's mistake was a twofold one. 1. Quantifier/Variable/Russell/Hintikka: by 1905 he had already stopped thinking that quantifiers and bound variables are real constituents of propositions. Def apparent variable/Russell/Hintikka: = bound variable. 2. Acquaintance/Russell: values of the variables should only be objects of the acquaintance. (HintikkaVsRussell). Hintikka I 180 Quantifiers/HintikkaVsRussell: now we can see why Russell did not distinguish between different quantifiers (acquaintance/description): for him, quantifiers were only notational patterns, and for them it is not necessary to define the range of possible interpretation, therefore it does not make a difference when the domain changes! Quantification/Russell: for him it was implicitly objective (referential), in any case not substitutional. >Domains, >Referential quantification, cf. >Substitutional quantification. 1. Russell, B.(1905). On Denoting. Mind 14 (56):479-493	Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Quantifiers	Wittgenstein	Hintikka I 15 ff Language as a universal medium/LUM/Hintikka: the thesis of language as a universal medium (LUM) does not include the impossibility of semantics at all. It is just not possible to articulate. For example Frege has the opinion that the meaning of quantifiers cannot be appropriatly expressed linguistically. >Circular reasoning, >Levels, >Description levels, >Semantics. I 57 ff Object/property/relation/Wittgenstein/Tractatus/Hintikka: additional proof that Wittgenstein ascribes relations and properties to the objects should be the treatment of names. According to the opinion criticized by Hintikka they must stand on the same level. >Object, >Properties. If there were no categorical distinction between Wittgenstein's objects all quantifiers would necessarily have the same area and any fixing would be impossible. Here, as so often, it is revealing what a philosopher does not know what he says: Quine has said that it shows which entities the philosopher lets apply, once he expresses his willingness to quantification. So Wittgenstein says: I 58 "One can describe the world completely by completely generalized sentences, i.e. without assigning any name from the outset to a certain object. To then arrive at the customary way of expression one simply has to after an expression: "There is one and only one x, which..." And this x is a. I 104 ... Precisely because of this timelessness of simple objects their substantiality is not affected by the instability or even the rise and fall of the temporal objects, these changes do not affect the range of Wittgenstein's quantifiers. I 124 Second Order Logic/Frege/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: quantifiers of higher level are accepted by both without any hesitation. >Second Order Logic. I 153f Quantifiers/logic/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: since existence in the Tractatus is inexpressible, it is something a priori. - ((s) then there are no quantifiers.) - E.g. Wittgenstein: if there are Schmitz and Meier in the room, they are necessarily there. - In contrast, Russell: with him the classes of objects are determined by our lexicon, our grammar. - ((s) about it is quantified.) - Wittgenstein: instead: disjunction. >Disjunction, >Grammar.	W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Questions	Ancient Philosophy	Gadamer I 372 Questions/Ancient Philosophy/Gadamer: (...) in the Socratic-Platonic dialectic the art of questioning [is] raised to conscious handling (...). However, this art is a matter of its own. (...) [it is] reserved (...) for those who want to know, who therefore already have questions. The art of questioning is not the art of resisting the compulsion of opinions - it already presupposes this freedom. It is not at all an art in the sense in which the Greeks speak of >Techne, not a teachable skill through which one becomes powerful in the knowledge of truth. The so-called epistemological digression of the 7th letter is rather aimed precisely at setting this strange art of dialectic in its uniqueness against all that can be taught and learned. The art of dialectic is not the art of arguing victoriously against everyone. On the contrary, it is possible that he or she who exercises the art of dialectic, i.e. the art of questioning and seeking truth, will be the loser in arguing in the eyes of the listeners. Dialectic as the art of questioning only proves its worth in the fact that the one who knows how to ask is able to capture his or her questioning, and that means: the direction into the >open. The art of questioning is the art of asking further questions, i.e. it is the art of thinking. It is called dialectic, because it is the art of having a real conversation.	Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Quote/Disquotation	Brandom	I 800 Principle of disquotation: "P " should occur simultaneously inside and outside quotation marks. If a speaker agrees with "p", then he believes that p. I 801 BrandomVs: the combination of translation and disquotation (= type repetition) is not generally suitable as an analysis of the relation between the reported and the reporting token in indirect speech attributions. >Attribution, >Inderect speech. Three types of exceptions - ambiguities: 1st example: Cicero, Roman orator, or "Cicero" spy in World War II. The arrangement corresponds to the Paderewski case, but the double use of "Cicero" does not allow for any inconsistency or paradox. Paderewski is coreferent, the two "Cicero" is not. I 799 For example, someone hears from the pianist Paderewski, and thinks he is musical. Later he hears about a politician who was also prime minister of the Polish government in exile and does not consider him musical. (In reality it is both times Ignaz Paderewski). The parallel would not be that the inventor of the bifocal spectacles would not have invented the lightning rod, but that the inventor of the lightning rod would not have invented the lightning rod. I 801 Quote/indirect speech/Brandom: quote redemption = repetition of types - three types of exceptions - 1) "Cicero": spy: not co-referential with Roman orator, but no inconsistency or paradox because of double occurrence - 2) Paderewski: co-referential. I 803 3) Kripke's dilemma: only occurs under adequacy conditions: the speaker must be able to distinguish his case by "pure logic" or "semantic introspection". Brandom: why should we not rightly conclude that proper names are sometimes used in such a way that the principle of citation extinction is not applicable, because of the dual use of not only the "Cicero" type but also the "Paderewski" type? You can't find an answer. >Proper names, >Causal theory of names, >Description levels.	Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Ramsey Sentence	Schurz	I 213 Ramsey-sentene/RS/Theoretical Terms/Schurz: Here Theoretical Terms are not eliminated completely, but existentially quantified over them. Given a theory , which we now take to be a single theorem T(τ1,...τn,) (the conjunction of all axioms of T. Theoretical terms: τ1,...τn. Moreover, there are various non-theoretical terms π which are not written on separately. Then the Ramsey theorem of T is: (5.8 1) R(T): EX1,...Xn: T(X1,...Xn) Everyday language translation: there are theoretical entities X1,..Xn which satisfy the assertions of the theory. Pointe: an empirical (not theoretical) proposition follows from T exactly if it follows from R(T). ((s) It follows from the theory if it follows from the Ramsey theorem of the theory, i.e., from the assumption that the theoretical entities exist.) Thus, it holds: (5.8 -2) E(R(T)) = E(T) Notation: E(T): empirical proposition that follows from theory T. Schurz: i.e. a theory and its Ramsey theorem have the same empirical content. >Carnap-sentence/Schurz, >Empirical content. Ramsey-sentence: Here no more theoretical terms occur! Instead of it: "theoretical" variables. Therefore many, including Ramsey, saw the Ramsey theorem as an empirical theorem (not as a theoretical one. Ramsey theorem: should thus be the sought empirically equivalent non-theoretical axiomatization of the theory. HempelVs/MaxwellVs/Schurz: this is problematic because the RS asserts the existence of certain entities that we call "theoretical". Ramsey theorem/interpretation/realism/instrumentalism/Schurz: the interpretation of the RS as theoretical or non-theoretical depends on whether one interprets 2nd level quantifiers realistically or instrumentally. (a) instrumentalist interpretation: here one assumes that the range of individuals D consists of empirically accessible individuals, and runs the variables Xi over arbitrary subsets of D. (There are no theoretical individuals here). >Instrumentalism/Schurz. Whether these extensions correspond to certain theoretical real properties or not is inconsequential. (Sneed 1971⁽¹⁾, Ketland 2004⁽²⁾, 291) I 214 Ramsey-sentence/instrumentalism: is then model-theoretically an empirical theorem! Because the models that determine the truth value of R(T) are purely empirical models (D, e1,...em). " ei": extensions of the empirical terms, pi: empirical terms of T. Structuralism: calls these empirical models "partial" models (Balzer et al. 1987⁽³⁾,57). Empirical model/Schurz: is easily extendible to a full model (D, e1,...em, t1,..tn), ti: are the extensions of the theoretical terms. Pointe: this does not yet mean that R(T) is logically equivalent to E(T). Because R(T) is a 2nd level proposition and E(T) contains 1st level propositions. >Structuralism/Schurz. Def Ramsey-eliminable: if there is a 1st level empirical proposition equivalent to a RS L, then the theortical term is called Ramsey-eliminable. (Sneed 1971⁽¹⁾, 53). b) Realist interpretation: (Lewis, 1970⁽⁴⁾, Papineau 1996⁽⁵⁾): assumes that the existence quantified variables denote real theoretical entities. The models are then no longer simple realist models: >Realism/Schurz. 1. New theoretical individuals are added to the individual domain. New: Dt. 2. not every subset of Dt corresponds to a real property. En. Ex In the simplest case, one must assume a set Et of extensions of "genuine" theoretical properties over which 2nd level variables run. Realism/Ramsey-sentence: new: now not every empirical model of instrumentalistically interpreted RS is extensible to a model of realistically interpreted Ramsey-sentence, because the quantifiers (Exi) of R(T) can have satisfactions in the power set of Det but no satisfactions in Et. In philosophical words: an empirical model, which fulfills the RS instrumentalistically, cannot be read off whether the respective theoretical entities, whose existence is postulated by R(T), are merely useful fictions or real existing entities. Instrumentalism: Proposition: Theoretical entities are useful fictions. Realism/Ramsey Theorem: here R(T) contains more than just the empirical content of a theory, it also contains the total synthetic content: if we assume that the meaning of Theoretical Terms is not determined by anything other than this theory itself, then the assertion that T makes about the world seems to be precisely that of R(T): there are unobservable entities X1,...Xn that satisfy the total assertion of the theory T(X1,...Xn). >Carnap-sentence/Schurz. 1. Sneed, J. D. (1971). The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics. Dordrecht: Reidel. 2. Ketland, J. (2004). "Empirical Adequacy and Ramsification", British Journal for the Philosoph y of Science 55, 287-300. 3. Balzer, W. et al (1987). An Architectonic for Science. Dordrecht: Reidel. 4. Lewis, D. (1970). "How to definie Theoretical Terms", wiederabgedruckt in ders. Philosophical Papers Vol I. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Papineau, D. (1996). "Theory-dependent Terms", >Philosophy of Science 63, 1- 20.	Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006
Rawls	Gaus	Gaus I 100 Rawls/liberalism/Gaus: Rawls repeatedly describes as ‘comprehensive’ ‘philosophical’, ‘moral’ and ‘religious’ ‘doctrines’ (1996⁽¹⁾: xxv, 4, 36, 38, 160) or ‘beliefs’ (1996⁽¹⁾: 63). Indeed, so often does Rawls characterize comprehensiveness in terms of moral, religious and philosophical doctrines or beliefs that a reader may be tempted to conclude that a doctrine is comprehensive if and only if it is moral, religious or philosophical. But though it is tempting to understand ‘comprehensive conceptions’ in this way, it would be wrong. Rawls is clear that ‘the distinction between the political conception and other moral conceptions is a matter of scope; that is, the range of subjects to which a conception applies and the content a wider range requires’ (1996⁽¹⁾: 13). >Liberalism/Gaus. 1. Rawls, John (1996) Political Liberalism, new edn. New York: Columbia University Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Reaction Range			Link to abbreviations/authors
Reaction Range	Jensen	Slater I 124 Reaction range/genetic theories/psychology/Jensen: the genetic concept of “reaction range,” [indicates] the observation that the same genotype can give rise to rather different observable traits in different environments. Jensen (1969⁽¹⁾ discussed this problem on pages 63-64. Another problem is, that different genotypes may show different reaction ranges: some may be more buffered than others from environmental circumstances. [Jensen] noted that this implies that heritability estimates may vary for subgroups within population groups, specifically pointing out that no estimates of the heritability of intelligence were available to African-American groups, and that samples that included European-Americans of the same lower SES (socioeconomic status) level as many African-Americans were not sufficiently relevant, as the SES measure might not reflect racial differences in the environmental conditions that actually impact development of intelligence and/or academic performance. >Intelligence tests/Jensen, >Heritability/Jensen. 1. Jensen, A. R. (1969). How much can we boost IQ and scholastic achievement? Harvard Educational Review, 3, 1–123. Wendy Johnson: „How Much Can We Boost IQ? Updated Look at Jensen’s (1969) Question and Answer“, in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Reading Acquisition	Neuroimaging	Upton I 101 Reading acquisition/Neuroimaging/Upton: (…) evidence from neuro-imaging studies and studies of patients with cerebellar lesions also play an important role in a range of high-level cognitive functions, such as language, previously believed to be under the sole control of the cortex (Booth et al., 2007)⁽¹⁾. According to the cerebellar deficit hypothesis (Nicolson et al., 1995)⁽²⁾, both literacy and automaticity problems can be explained by abnormal cerebellar function. Indeed, there is evidence from both behavioural and neuro-imaging tests that dyslexia is associated with cerebellar impairment in about 80 per cent of cases (Nicholson et al., 2001)⁽³⁾. It therefore seems that not only does motor development create the opportunity for cognitive functions to develop,(…) but that the interrelatedness of cognitive and motor development might also be based on shared neural systems (Ojeman, 1984⁽⁴⁾; Diamond, 2000⁽⁵⁾). >Language, >Language acquisition, >Speaking, >Writing. 1. Booth JR1, Wood L, Lu D, Houk JC, Bitan T., „The role of the basal ganglia and cerebellum in language processing.“ In: Brain Res. 2007 Feb 16;1133(1):136-44. Epub 2006 Dec 26. 2. Nicolson RI1, Fawcett AJ, Dean P. „Time estimation deficits in developmental dyslexia: evidence of cerebellar involvement.“, In: Proc Biol Sci. 1995 Jan 23;259(1354):43-7. 3. Nicolson, RI, Fawcett, AJ and Dean, P (2001) Developmental dyslexia: the cerebellar deficit hypothesis. Trends in Neurosciences, 24(9): 508–11. 4. Ojeman, GA (1984) Common cortical and thalamic mechanisms for language and motor functions. American Journal of Physiology, 246: 901–3. 5. Diamond, LM (2000) Sexual identity, attractions, and behavior among young sexual-minority women over a two-year period. Developmental Psychology, 36: 241–50.	Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011
Real Numbers	Dedekind	Thiel I 192 Definition Dedekind's cuts/real numbers/Dedekind⁽¹⁾: I find (...) the essence in the continuity in the reversal, namely in the following principle: if all points of the line disintegrate into two classes in such a way that each point of the first class is to the left of every point of the second class, so one and only one point exists, which brings this division of all points into two classes. ConstructivismVsDedekind: since the mathematical means used in this provision are not explicitly mentioned, the requirement of constructivist basic critics remains unfulfilled to regard an abstract entity as "given" when a concrete expression representing it is given, so that abstract objects can ultimately be traced back to corresponding properties of the expressions expressing it. >Constructivism, >Dedekind cuts. VsConstructivism: Representatives of the "classical" point of view reject this as "too narrow," because the explicit statement of the means of expression used to define the Dedekind's cuts limits the range of definable real numbers. "New" real figures can only be introduced by the extension of the means permitted at a certain stage and only to be justified. I 192/193 This applies if we abandon the mixing of the arithmetic and the geometrical point of view in the speech of the "number line" (also used in the explanation of the Dedekind method) in favor of a clear separation. To speak of the totality of "all" real numbers and also of the totality of "all" points on a line or straight line. Infinite/infinity/constructive: an infinite set is present if it can be enumerated by a generation process. Weaker sense: a set of principles must be known. Stronger meaning: The totality of the real numbers is not available. It is not a definite set. Classical analysis on real numbers presupposes a stronger view. Already in every statement about "all" real numbers, the totality is interpreted as being actual. Cf. >Intuitionism. 1. Dedekind, R. (1872). Stetigkeit und irrationale Zahlen. Nachdruck 1965: Braunschweig: Vieweg.	T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995
Reality	Chisholm	II 24 Reality/real/Chisholm/Rutte: 1) this way of appearing, - 2) arranged in the way it appears - 3) the right causation. Reality must be distinguished from the outer world. >World, >Ontology, >Outer world. II 41 Reality/Rutte: we may have success by guess but only testing hypotheses implies realism and uniformity. Rutte, Heiner. Mitteilungen über Wahrheit und Basis empirischer Erkenntnis, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Wahrnehmungs- und Außenweltproblems. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986	Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Reality	Kant	Strawson V 76 Reality/StrawsonVsKant: why should the object of consciousness not have a distinct (from this independent) existence, even if they coincide point by point with the experience? --- Stra V 156 "Everything else"/StrawsonVsKant: the term that everything would be arranged differently with respect to the present time, is completely empty (> Skepticism/Davidson). - Equally empty: the assumption of a change in the external temporal relations. --- Stra V 231 Reality/appearance/Kant: it is pointless to deny that there is something beyond our experience, as it would be pointless for the blind to deny that the objects have further characteristics- what we must deny is that any other aspect of reality is in a kind of systematic connection with the aspects that we already know - noumenal world/StrawsonVsKant unnecessary to ever assume unperceivable - instead modest noumenon: that what we can still discover.	I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Recognition	Millikan	I 13 MillikanVsHolism: It is about understanding without holism and without the myth of what is given, how we test our apparent abilities, to recognize things, and our apparent meanings. >Holism/Millikan. I 299 Consistency/Millikan: the test of them is at the same time a test of our ability to identify something, as well as the test on the fact that our concepts map what they are supposed to map. >Consistency. MillikanVsQuine: but this is not about establishing "conditions for identity". And also not about "shared reference" ("the same apple again"). This is part of the problem of uniformity, not identity. This is not the problem of deciding how to split an exclusivity class. >Terminology/Millikan. I 300 E.g. to decide when red stops and orange starts. Instead it is about learning e.g. to recognize red under other circumstances.	Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Reduction	Quine	XII 92 Definition Reduction Sentence/Carnap/Quine: weaker than definition: provides no equivalent sentences without the term in question, but only implications. XII 93 No full explanation but only partial explanation. Implication here: the reduction sentences name a few sentences that are implied by sentences with this term and imply some other sentences, that imply sentences with this term. - This does not provide a genuine reduction, but a fictional story of language acquisition. ((s) > "Rylean Ancestors"). VII (a) 19 Conceptual Scheme/Reduction/Quine: we want to see how far a physicalist scheme can be reduced to a phenomenalist one. The latter has epistemological priority. The choice between conceptual schemes is guided by purposes and interests. XI 143 Reduction/Ontology/Quine/Lauener: for ontological reduction, it is not extensional equality that is decisive, but the preservation of the relevant structure. For example Frege's, v. Neumann's and Zermelo's definitions do not produce equivalent predicates, but are nevertheless suitable for reduction, because all three represent a structure-preserving model of arithmetic. Extensional Equality(s): ensures the uniformity of the quantities considered. The reduction then takes place at the description level. It would not reduce the ontology. XI 146 Reduction/Theory/Quine/Lauener: by the condition that an n-tuple of arguments applies to a predicate exactly when the open sentence is fulfilled by the corresponding n-tuple of values, we avert an impending trivialization. We can do this by determining the proxy function. If the truth values of the closed sentences are preserved, we can actually speak of a reduction to the natural numbers. (Ways of Paradox, p. 203). XI 145 Def Proxy Function/Quine/Lauener: is a function that assigns each object of the original theory a function of the new theory. Example "The Goedel number of". This need not be expressed in one theory or another. It is sufficient if we have the necessary means of expression at the meta level. Reduction: from one theory to another: so we need a special function for this XI 146 whose arguments are from the old theory and whose values are from the new theory. Proxy Function/Quine/Lauener: does not need to be unique at all. Example: Characterization of persons on the basis of their income: here different values are assigned to an argument. For this we need a background theory: We map the universe U in V in such a way that both the objects of U and their proxies are contained in V. If V forms a subset of U, U itself can be defined as background theory, within which its own ontological reduction is described. XI 147 VsQuine: this is not a reduction at all, because then the objects must exist. QuineVsVs: this is comparable to a reductio ad absurdum: if we want to show that a part of U is superfluous, we may presuppose this for the duration of argument U (>Ontology). Lauener: that brings us to >ontological relativity. Löwenheim/Ontology/Reduction/Quine/Lauener: if a theory of its own requires a super-countable range, we can no longer present a proxy function that would allow a reduction to a countable range. This would require a much stronger framework theory, which could no longer be discussed away absurdly as reductio ad absurdum according to Quine's proposal. XII 60 Specification/Reduction/Quine: we cannot find a clear difference between specifying one item area and reducing that area to another. We have not discovered a clear difference between the clarification of the concept of "expression" and its replacement by that of number. ((s) > Goedel Numbers). And now, if we are to say what numbers actually are, we are forced to reveal them and instead assign a new, e.g. set-theoretical model to arithmetic. XII 73 Reduction/Ontology/Quine: an ontology can always be reduced to another if we know of a reversibly unique deputy function f. Reason: for each predicate P of the old system, there is a predicate of the new system that takes over the role of P there. We interpret this new predicate in such a way that it applies exactly to the values f(x) of the old objects x to which P applied. Example: Suppose f(x): is the Goedel number of x, Old system: is a syntactical system, Predicate in the old system: "... is a section of___" an x New system: the corresponding predicate would have the same extension (coextensive) as the words "...is the Gödel number of a section whose Goedel number is___". (Not in this wording but as a purely arithmetic condition.) XII 74 Reduction/ontological relativity/Quine: it may sound contradictory that the objects discarded in the reduction must exist. Solution: this has the same form as a reduction ad absurdum: here we assume a wrong sentence to refute it. As we show here, the subject area U is excessively large. XII 75 Löwenheim/Skolem/strong form/selection axiom/ontology/reduction/onthological relativity/Quine: (early form): thesis: If a theory is true and has a supernumerable range of objects, then everything but a countable part is superfluous, in the sense that it can be eliminated from the range of variables without any sentence becoming false. This means that all acceptable theories can be reduced to countable ontologies. And this in turn can be reduced to a special ontology of natural numbers. For this purpose, the enumeration, as far as it is explicitly known, is used as a proxy function. And even if the enumeration is not known, it exists. Therefore, we can regard all our items as natural numbers, even if the enumeration number ((s) of the name) is not always known. Ontology: could we not define once and for all a Pythagorean general purpose ontology? Pythagorean Ontology/Terminology/Quine: consists either of numbers only, or of bodies only, or of quantities only, etc. Problem: suppose, we have such an ontology and someone would offer us something that would have been presented as an ontological reduction before our decision for Pythagorean ontology, namely a procedure according to which in future theories all things of a certain type A are superfluous, but the remaining range would still be infinite. XII 76 In the new Pythagorean framework, his discovery would nevertheless still retain its essential content, although it could no longer be called a reduction, it would only be a manoeuvre in which some numbers would lose a number property corresponding to A. We do not even know which numbers would lose a number property corresponding to A. VsPythagoreism: this shows that an all-encompassing Pythagoreanism is not attractive, because it only offers new and opaque versions of old methods and problems. >Proxy function.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Reductionism	Logic Texts	Read III 28 Reductionism: was central for Wittgenstein. For Russell it was quite clear that the assumption of an additional fact between two statements was absurd and unnecessary: E.g. "Kennedy is President," and "Oswald killed Kennedy," a third fact, a sort of conjunctural fact that makes the connection absurd and lavish. >Atomism, >Atomic sentences. If you know the two separate facts, you learn nothing new when you connect them. There is no extra fact behind the link, which is added to the separated facts. Similar to disjunctive. What makes "A or B" true is not another strange disjunctive fact, but exactly the same fact that makes one of the two limbs true! >Fact. Otherwise regress. >Regress. III 30 Reductionism: would have to declare the truth of a negative statement like "Ruby did not kill Kennedy" as the result of the truth of another statement that would be incompatible with "Ruby killed Kennedy." III 31 RussellVsReductionism: argues against such argumentation that a regress threatens: "B is incompatible with A" is itself a negative statement. To explain its truth, we would need a third statement C which is incompatible with "C is compatible with A," and so on. ReadVsRussell: this is a strange objection, because it would also be valid against any conjunction. And then truth conditions for conjunctive and disjunctive statements must not be subjunctive or disjunctive. >Disjunction, >Conjunction.	Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Reductionism	Quine	Quine VII (b) 40 Reductionism/QuineVsCarnap: his space time quadrupel set preuppose a sedentary world - the quadruples still increase the set of the general properties. Refined form of reductionism: any incident either increases the probability (likelihood) of a statement or deminishes it. Schiffer I 2 QuineVsReductionism: the semantic cannot be reduced to more fundamental facts because of the indeterminacy of translation - so he saw the whole semantics skeptical. Quine IV 412 Def Reductionism (radical form): according to him, every single meaningful expression can be translated into an expression of immediate experience. QuineVsReductionism: radical form: erroneous translatability of individual observations into individual expressions. >HolismVs. >Holism. Weaker form: still the idea: each (synthetic) statement is clearly assigned a certain range of sensory irritations. (False). Vs:Reactions to sensory stimuli are not rigid in humans. (>"Super Spartan"/Putnam). Two dogmas: 1. Reductionism 2. Differentiation analytic/synthetic. VII (b) 39 Radical Reductionism/Quine: 1. Example: Carnap's translation into sense data language plus logical notation plus higher set theory. Empiricism/Quine: is often wasteful in its ontology. Carnap: was the first empiricist to consistently reduce. VII (b) 40 But his work is still just a fragment of the whole program. His space-time-point quadruples presuppose a world with little movement ("laziest world"). Principle of least movement, should be the guideline for the construction of a world from experience. QuineVsCarnap: did not appear to notice that his treatment of physical objects lacked reduction! The quadruples maximize and minimize certain general characteristics (over all features) and with increasing experience the truth values are revised in the same sense. But this does not help to see how a statement of the form "property q is at x,y,z,t" could ever be translated into Carnap's original sense data language and logic. Problem: the "is on" remains an undefined connection. The canon shows us how to use it, but not how to eliminate it! Carnap later recognized this and no longer used it. Reductionism/Dogma/Quine: 2. more refined form: each utterance is associated with a uniform range of possible sensations, so that each occurrence increases either the likelihood of the truth of the statement. VII (b) 41 or diminishes it. This is of course included in the verification theory. Quine Thesis: (comes from Carnap's "structure"): our statements stand before the tribunal of experience not individually, but as a whole corpus. >Quine-Duhem thesis.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Reference	Boer	I XIV Definition mental reference/terminology/Boer: Thinking of: be a mental analogue to speaker reference. Speaker reference/some authors: thesis: never exists in isolation, but is only partial aspect of a speech act (utterance). --- I XV Mental reference: should then only be a partial aspect of thinking-of-something. Probably, there is also predication. Definition mental reference/Boer: to be in a state of thought with a content of thought which defines a fulfillment condition of which the object is a constituent. Problem: non-existent objects. --- I 20 Mental reference/Boer: it is hardly controversial to assume that it is a participation-independent relation, i.e. weakly metaphysical intentional. It is controversial whether mental reference is also strongly metaphysical intentional. Belief attribution: in everyday life, we regard e.g. "Some people believe that Atlantis sank in the sea" as true. Problem: one may be afraid to attribute to these people an intentional relation to something non-existent. Mental reference/Boer: Thesis: after having accepted the distinction "there is/exists", we can consider mental reference as an existence-independent relation. On the other hand: Belief/Boer: (instead of mental reference): here it is not so clear whether this is an existence-independent relation, solely because of the fact that we have the being/existent distinction. Thought content/GI: Problem: we still do not know what thought contents are. Platonism/N.B.: if we assume that thought content could be equated with propositions, states, or properties and that they would be accepted as Platonic in existence without having to participate in the world, then we would not have to assume the belief relation as existence-independent. But for this we need a proper theory of the nature of thought contents and attitude relations to them. --- I 21 Mental reference/concept dependency/Boer: is it also dependent on the concept? Concept dependency/logical form/Boer: according to (D5) would it be sufficient that mental reference (thinking about) implies that for a representation z, an intrinsic property of z and a behavior-determining relation Q: A) x has Q z z B) z contains something that expresses or maps y for x C) Whether x has the relation Q to a representation of y depends on whether the representation has one or more of a range of intrinsic features. But this presupposes believe as a concept-dependent relation. Believe/question: whether believe is a relation mediated by representations. So B) z has a fulfillment condition defined by y and C) as above. Believe/Representation/Boer: to clarify whether believe is a representational-mediated relation, we need a theory of propositional attitudes.	Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986
Reference	Chisholm	I 51 Each kind of reference can be understood with the help of self-attribution. 1) The one who means must be able to make himself an object; 2) He must understand propositions and facts; Direct attribution (self-attribution) is the original form of all attribution. I 133 But this is not yet self-consciousness: in addition, we need knowledge that it is the subject itself, to which the property is attributed. >Self-consciousness, >Self-ascription. --- II 24 real/Rutte: for calling something real: conditions: 1) this way of appearing, - 2) arranged in the way it appears - 3) the right causation. - Reality must be distinguished from the outside the world. >World. Rutte, Heiner. Mitteilungen über Wahrheit und Basis empirischer Erkenntnis, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Wahrnehmungs- und Außenweltproblems. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 II 112/113 Reference/Brandl: other way of reference, depending on whether description or acquaintance - the latter allows reference without information, or even to ignore information - BrandlVsRussell: different motivation of the distinction. Between the appearance of the object and our knowledge of how the object is the cause of the phenomenon. Description allows us to exceed the limits of our experience II 105f Reference/Reference/Brandl: by sign or speaker? by speaker - Strawson: dito, so use of the sign refers, not the sign - problem: intentionality would have to explain sign. BrandlVsChisholm: thesis: it is no use to decide whether the linguistic or psychological (intentionality) should have primacy. Directedness is incomprehensible if the designation of the words has not yet been introduced. - A separation of the areas would either lead to total behaviorism or psychologism. >Behaviorism, >Psychologism. II 107 "Unity" would also not explain anything. - Also here question about primacy: either "thinking of" or talking about objects. - Solution: differentiate different kinds of singular term for different types of reference - but only a kind of intentionality. >Intentionality. II 108 Domain/Russell: non-singular propositions are always related to a domain of objects, not unambiguous - singular propositions: contain the object as a genuine component" (by acquaintance).>Acquaintance. QuineVsRussell: confusion of mention and use. >Domains, >Use, >Mention. Brandl, Johannes. Gegen den Primat des Intentionalen. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986	Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Reflection	Gadamer	I 347 Reflection/History of Effects/Hermeneutics/Gadamer: Our whole presentation about horizon formation and horizon fusion should (...) describe the full extent of the consciousness of the history of effects. >History of Effect/Gadamer, >Hermeneutics/Gadamer, >Understanding/Gadamer. But what kind of consciousness is this? Here lies the crucial problem. No matter how much one emphasizes that the consciousness of the history of effects is, as it were, inserted into the effect itself. As consciousness it seems to be essentially in the possibility to rise above what it is consciousness of. The structure of reflexivity is basically given with all consciousness. It must therefore also apply to the awareness of the history of effects. Doesn't this force us to agree with Hegel, and doesn't the absolute mediation of history and truth, as Hegel thinks, appear to be the foundation of hermeneutics? Ultimately, it is Hegel's position that legitimizes [19th century historism], even if the historians who were inspired by the pathos of experience preferred to refer to Schleiermacher and Wilhelm von Humboldt instead. GadamerVsSchleiermacher/GadamerVsHumboldt: Neither Schleiermacher nor Humboldt have really thought their position through. They may emphasize the individuality, the barrier of strangeness that our understanding has to overcome, but in the end only in an infinite consciousness the understanding finds its completion and the thought of individuality its justification. Hegel/Gadamer: It is the pantheistic enclosure of all individuality in the Absolute that makes the miracle of understanding possible. Thus, here too, being and knowledge permeate each other in I 348 the Absolute. Neither Schleiermacher's nor Humboldt's Kantianism is thus an independent systematic affirmation of the speculative completion of idealism in Hegel's absolute dialectic. The criticism of the philosophy of reflection⁽¹⁾ that Hegel meets, meets with them. VsHegel/Gadamer: For us it is about thinking of the historical consciousness of the effect in such a way that in the consciousness of the effect the immediacy and superiority of the work does not dissolve again into a mere reflexion reality, thus to think of a reality where the omnipotence of reflection is limited. This was precisely the point against which the criticism of Hegel was directed, and at which in truth the principle of the philosophy of reflection proved to be superior to all his critics. >Reflection/Hegel. I 350 VsReflection Philosophy/Gadamer: [The] question arises how far the dialectical superiority of reflection philosophy corresponds to a factual truth and how far it merely creates a formal appearance. The fact that the criticism of speculative thinking, which is practiced from the standpoint of finite human consciousness, contains something true, cannot be obscured by the argumentation of the philosophy of reflection in the end. >Young Hegelians/Gadamer. Examples for reflection/Gadamer: That the thesis of scepticism or relativism wants to be true itself and in this respect cancels itself out is an irrefutable argument. But does it achieve anything? The argument of reflection, which proves to be so victorious, rather strikes back at the arguing party by making the truth value of reflection appear suspicious. It is not the reality of skepticism or relativism that is affected by this, but the truth claim of formal argumentation in general. 1. The expression philosophy of reflection has been coined by Hegel against Jacobi, Kant and Fichte. Already in the title of "Glauben und Wissen" but as a "philosophy of reflection of subjectivity". Hegel himself counters it with the reflection of reason.	Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Reflective Equilibrium	Political Philosophy	Gaus I 226 Reflective equilibrium/Political philosophy/Lamont: theorists, the general population, and hopefully politicians, engage in a collective cognitive process through discussion and debate in order to come up with principles and policies to better cohere with the moral judgements and beliefs of the people. >Reflective equilibrium/Rawls. Of course, theorists can achieve such an equilibrium only by finding out what people believe (Miller, 1999⁽¹⁾: chs 3—4; Swift et al., 1995⁽²⁾). Fortunately, over the last couple of decades, there has been a sustained effort to collect the data necessary to this project (Elster, 1995⁽³⁾; Hochschild, 1981⁽⁴⁾; Kluegel and Smith, 1986⁽⁵⁾; Miller, 1999⁽¹⁾). Miller: David Miller (1999⁽¹⁾: ch. 4) has surveyed the empirical studies, partly summarizing the findings as follows: in people's thinking about social distribution, (there is) a tendency to favour more equality than presently exists in liberal democracies. This is partly to be explained by considerations of desert and need: people do not regard income inequalities of the size that currently obtain as deserved, and at the bottom of the scale they think it unfair that people cannot earn enough to meet their needs. (1999⁽¹⁾: 91) Frohling and Oppenheimer: In a series of experiments conducted to see what distributive principles people would choose, Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992⁽⁶⁾) presented the subjects with four principles for distributing income: (l) maximizing the average income, (2) maximiz- ing the minimum income, (3) maximizing the average subject to a floor constraint (no income to fall below $x), and (4) maximizing the average subject to a range constraint (the gap between top and bottom incomes not to exceed $y). Maximizing the average subject to a floor constraint (or safety net) was chosen by the vast majority of individuals, while maximizing the average was a distant second. Lamont: The alternative used to gauge support for the difference principle - maximizing the minimum income - had very little support. Rawls: So while Rawls (1993⁽⁷⁾: 8) popularized the theory of reflective equilibrium, his own theory of distributive justice gains little support from it. >J. Rawls. VsRawls: Some critics of his difference principle provide one reason for this. Although the argument, outlined above, for the difference principle gives moral weight to reducing the influence of factors over which people have no control, it gives little positive weight to choice and responsibility. Under the difference principle, the social structure is designed to maximize the position of the least advantaged group (characterized by Rawls, 1972⁽⁸⁾: 97, as the bottom socio-economic quartile), no matter what choices individual members of that group have made. If the general public has a stronger view of the moral weight that should be given to responsibility, as Samuel Scheffler (1992)⁽⁹⁾ has argued they do, then the degree of support the public believes is owed to the disadvantaged will depend on whether the disadvantage is due to a disability, a lack of motivation, or an individual lifestyle choice. Such considerations have influenced resource egalitarians and desert theorists (...). >Inequalities/Dworkin, >Inequalities/Resource-based view (RBV), >Distributive justice/ Resource-based view (RBV), cf. >Distributive Justice/Libertarianism. 1. Miller, David (1999) Principles of Social Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Swift, A., G. Marshall, C. Burgoyne and D. Routh, (1995) 'Distributive justice: does it matter what the people think?' In James R. Kluegel, David S. Mason and Bernard Wegener, eds, Social Justice and Political Change. New York: Aldine De Gruyter, 15—47. 3. Elster, Jon (1995) 'The empirical study of justice'. In David Miller and Michael Walzer, eds, Pluralism, Justice, and Equality. New York: Oxford University Press, 81-98. 4. Hochschild, Jennifer L. (1981) What; Fair: American Beliefs about Distributive Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 5. Kluegel, James R. and Eliot R. Smith (1986) Beliefs about Inequality. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine De Gruyter. 6. Frohlich, N. and J. Oppenheimer (1992) Choosing Justice: An Experimental Appoach to Ethical Theory. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 7. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 8. Rawls, John (1972) A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 9. Schemer, Samuel (1992) 'Responsibility, reactive attitudes, and liberalism in philosophy and politics'. Lamont, Julian, „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Regularities	Lewis	II 198 Regularity: there is always an alternative regularity that could have fulfilled the same function if the whole process had only started differently. II 224 Regularity/Lewis: rules of syntax and semantics are not even regularities. II 234 Communication depends not only on truthfulness, but also on principles of usefulness and relevance. However, these regularities are not independent language conventions. They are by-products. >Convention/Lewis. V XI Natural Laws/Lewis: at least they are regularities without exception. Not all regularities are laws, of course. Def Natural Laws/Ramsey: Laws are those that enter into the truth systems (buy into) that are unsurpassed in severity and simplicity. This is enough for the Humean Supervenience. >Humean supervenience. Simplicity/Lewis: what is simple is certainly not contingent. And the regularities (or candidates for truth systems) are supervised on the arrangement of qualities. V XIII Probability/Lewis: Probabilities are in play from the beginning. If Ramsey says that laws are regularities that enter into the best systems, the question is: what kind of systems? >Probability/Lewis. V 70 Zeit/Lewis: in the life of ordinary people there is a regularity: For example, hair grows, relative to the external time. Time traveller: no regularity at external time, but there is a way of assigning coordinates to his or her travel stages and only one, so that the regularities, as they correspond to his or her attribution, match with those normally assumed in relation to external time: This is the personal time of the time traveler: for example his hair grows, etc. but it is not really time, it only plays the same role in his life as the role it plays in the life of a normal person. (functional, not operational). >Time traveller/Lewis. V 122 Law/natural law/Lewis: this is a kind of regularity theory of lawfulness, but a collective and selective one at the same time: collective: because regularities do not acquire their status as a law from themselves, but through a system within which they are either axioms or theorems, selective: because not every regularity is worthy of being called a law. Laws should have at least the following characteristics (based on chance). V 123 (1) Simplicity, rigour and their balance can only be determined in the light of competing hypotheses. But I don't want to make lawfulness dependent on the kind of access. Nevertheless, our laws would be different if our approach were different, at least in the sense that we can keep our standards fixed and ask what the laws would be like in counterfactual situations. >Simplicity. (2) With this approach, it is not possible to say whether certain generalisations are lawful, whether they are true or false, and whether the laws are the true lawful ones. Three possibilities: something can be wrong, randomly true, or lawfully true. (3) I do not say that the competing systems of truths must consist entirely of regularities. Nevertheless, the regularities in the best systems should be laws. >Best explanation. Laws: should not mention indiviuals, not even the Big Bang, but such laws should not be excluded a priori. (4) Simplicity: in order to be able to compare them, we must not allow our theories to be simply formulated with particularly trivial terms. V 124 This means that the theory must not make all properties the same! Really simple systems may only be called those that integrate real natural characteristics as simply as possible. But then it is also useless to say that natural properties are those which occur in laws ((s) that would be circular). (5) What about a regularity that occurs in some but not all systems? Three options: 1. it is not a law, (you can take the average) 2. it is a law (association), 3. It is uncertain whether it is a law. Lewis pro 1, but I hope that nature is kind enough to show us the right system in the end. I also hope that some systems are completely out of the question. Then it will not matter whether the standards themselves are unfounded.	Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Regulation	Psychological Theories	Corr I 64 Regulation/psychological theories/Reisenzein/Weber: Research on habitual tendencies of ‘handling’ anger initially distinguished two coping styles: anger-out (showing overt, aggressive reactions) and anger-in (suppressing the overt expression of anger; Spielberger 1999)⁽¹⁾. Neither of these strategies is very effective in reducing anger, however (Deffenbacher, Oetting, Thwaites et al. 1996)⁽²⁾. More recent research has taken a broader range of anger regulation strategies into view (Linden, Hogan, Rutledge et al. 2003)⁽³⁾, including effective anger-reduction strategies such as non-hostile feedback and humour (e.g., Geisler, Wiedig-Allison and Weber in press; Weber and Wiedig-Allison 2007)⁽⁴⁾. Theory and research on anxiety regulation focused traditionally on the dichotomy of avoiding versus approaching anxiety-related information (e.g., Byrne 1964⁽⁵⁾; Krohne 2003)⁽⁶⁾. For example, Krohne (2003) distinguished between cognitive avoidance and vigilance as the two fundamental forms of anxiety regulation and proposed that avoidance is motivated by the short-term hedonistic desire to reduce the feeling of fear, whereas vigilance is motivated by the epistemic desire to gain information about the threatening event. According to Krohne, these two coping strategies are uncorrelated at the dispositional level, that is, individuals may score either low or high on both dimensions. A general taxonomy of emotion regulation methods that subsumes the described strategies was proposed by Gross (1998)⁽⁷⁾; John and Gross 2007)⁽⁸⁾. This taxonomy distinguishes five classes of emotion regulation strategies: situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment (e.g., vigilance versus avoidance), reappraisal and response modulation. >Anxiety, >Fear, >Emotion, >Self-regulation. 1. Spielberger, C. D. 1999. Manual for the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory-2. Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources 2. Deffenbacher, J. L., Oetting, E. R., Thwaites, G. A., Lynch, R. S., Baker, D. A., Stark, R. S., Thacker, S. and Eiswerth-Cox, L. 1996. State-trait anger theory and the utility of the trait anger scale, Journal of Counseling Psychology 43: 131–48 3. Linden, W., Hogan, B. E., Rutledge, T., Chawla, A., Lenz, J. W. and Leung, D. 2003. There is more to anger coping than ‘in’ or ‘out’, Emotion 3: 12–29 4. Weber, H. and Wiedig-Allison, M. 2007. Sex differences in anger-related behaviour: comparing expectancies to actual behaviour, Cognition and Emotion 21: 1669–98 5. Byrne, D. 1964. Repression-sensitization as a dimension of personality, in B. A. Maher (ed.), Progress in experimental personality research, vol. I, pp. 169–220. New York: Academic Press 6. Krohne, H. W. 2003. Individual differences in emotional reactions and coping, in R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer and H. H. Goldsmith (eds.), Handbook of affective science, pp. 698–725. New York: Oxford University Press 7. Gross, J. J. 1998. The emerging field of emotion regulation: an integrative review, Review of General Psychology 2: 271–99 8. John, O. P. and Gross, J. J. 2007. Individual differences in emotion regulation, in J. J. Gross (ed.), Handbook of emotion regulation, pp. 351–72. New York: Guilford Press Rainer Reisenzein & Hannelore Weber, “Personality and emotion”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Reinforcement Sensitivity	Corr	Corr I 348 Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory/Corr: The Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST) of personality represents a bold attempt to account for the neuropsychological regulation of behaviour, and how individual differences in neuropsychological systems give rise to what we commonly label ‘personality’. RST is based upon notions of central states of emotion and motivation that mediate the relations between stimulus input and behavioural response: here ‘stimulus’ and ‘response’ can be internal processes, processes, and only inferred from ingenious behavioural experiments (e.g., sensory preconditioning; see McNaughton and Corr 2008)⁽¹⁾. Corr I 349 RST encompasses a number of approaches that move at different paces. This point is well made by Smillie, Pickering and Jackson (2006, p. 320)⁽²⁾, who note that, although RST is often seen as a theory of personality, it is ‘more accurately identified as a neuropsychology of emotion, motivation and learning. In fact, RST was born of basic animal learning research, initially not at all concerned with personality’. An (…) important aspect of RST is the distinction between those parts that belong to the conceptual nervous system (cns) and those parts that belong to the central nervous system (CNS) (a distinction advanced by Hebb 1955)⁽³⁾. Def cns/conceptual nervous system/Hebb: The cns component of RST provides the behavioural scaffolding, formalized within some theoretical framework (e.g., learning theory; see Gray 1975⁽⁴⁾; or, ethoexperimental analysis; see Gray and McNaughton 2000)⁽⁵⁾; Def CNS/Central Nervous System/Hebb: the CNS component specifies the brain systems involved, couched in terms of the latest knowledge of the neuroendocrine system (see McNaughton and Corr 2008)⁽¹⁾. As noted by Gray (1972a)⁽⁶⁾, these two levels of explanation must be compatible. Corr I 360 Post-2000 RST: see >Terminology/Corr, Anxiety/Corr. Corr I 371 RST/Corr:Of importance is the translational nature of this research: we can now go from basic non-human animal studies to human ones, armed with a rigorous theory to guide the difficult process of understanding the neuropsychology of human personality. As an example of such translational research, Perkins and Corr (2006)⁽⁷⁾ confirmed that the basic defensive reactions of rodents to cats in ethologically-valid situations are found in human defensive reactions to a range of threatening situations. Remaining problems: a) how best to characterize BAS processes and how to measure them by questionnaire (Corr 2008a(8); Pickering and Smillie 2008)⁽⁹⁾; b) what is the relationship between conscious awareness, its functions and emotion/motivation (Gray 2004⁽¹⁰⁾; Corr 2006⁽¹¹⁾, 2008a)⁽¹²⁾; c) how best to operationalize reward and punishment variables in the laboratory and what predictions we should make about their possible interaction (Corr 2002a⁽¹³⁾, 2008a⁽¹²⁾); d) what is the most appropriate way to measure FFFS (Fight–Flight–Freeze System;>Terminology/Gray) , BIS (Behavioral Inhibition System, >Terminology/Corr) and BAS (Behavioral Approach system, >Terminology/Corr) in human beings, and how such measures can be validated; and e) are the principles of frustrative non-reward and relief of non-punishment useful in explaining counter-productive and paradoxical behaviour (McNaughton and Corr in press). On top of these problems are wider ones, ranging from the role of ‘free will’ in behaviour, and how individual behaviour is regulated by society (e.g., effective penal systems). 1. Corr, P. J. and McNaughton, N. 2008. Reinforcement sensitivity theory and personality, in P. J. Corr (ed). The reinforcement sensitivity theory of personality, pp. 155–87. Cambridge University Press 2. Smillie, L. D., Pickering, A. D. and Jackson, C. J. 2006. The new reinforcement sensitivity theory: implications for personality measurement, Personality and Social Psychology Review 10: 320–35 3. Hebb, D. O. 1955. Drives and the C. N. S. (Conceptual Nervous System), Psychological Review 62: 243–54 4. Gray, J. A. 1975. Elements of a two-process theory of learning. London: Academic Press 5. Gray, J. A. and McNaughton, N. 2000. The neuropsychology of anxiety: an enquiry into the functions of the septo-hippocampal system. Oxford University Press 6. Gray, J. A., 1972a. Learning theory, the conceptual nervous system and personality, in V. D. Nebylitsyn and J. A. Gray (eds.), The biological bases of individual behaviour, pp. 372–99. New York: Academic Press 7. Perkins, A. M. and Corr, P. J. 2006. Reactions to threat and personality: psychometric differentiation of intensity and direction dimensions of human defensive behaviour, Behavioural Brain Research 169: 21–8 8. Corr, P. J. 2008a. Reinforcement sensitivity theory (RST): Introduction, in P. J. Corr (ed). The reinforcement sensitivity theory of personality, pp. 1–43. Cambridge University Press 9. Pickering, A. D. and Smillie, L. D. 2008. The behavioural activation system: challenges and opportunities, in P. J. Corr (ed). The reinforcement sensitivity theory of personality, pp. 120–54. Cambridge University Press 10. Gray, J. A. 2004. Consciousness: creeping up on the Hard Problem. Oxford University Press 11. Corr, P. J. 2006. Understanding biological psychology. Oxford: Blackwell 12. Corr, P. J. 2008a. Reinforcement sensitivity theory (RST): Introduction, in P. J. Corr (ed). The reinforcement sensitivity theory of personality, pp. 1–43. Cambridge University Press 13. Corr, P. J. 2002a. J. A. Gray’s reinforcement sensitivity theory: tests of the joint subsystem hypothesis of anxiety and impulsivity, Personality and Individual Differences 33: 511–32 Philip J. Corr, „ The Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory of Personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Relation-Theory	Bigelow	I 55 Quantity/relational theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: Quantities are general relations between objects. They seem to be consequences of the intrinsic properties of objects. But one would not have to postulate an intrinsic relation "greater than", but only e.g. the size. >Quantity, >Sizes/Physics, >Relations, >Objects, >Intrinsic, >Properties. Greater than/relational property/problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: one might wonder if there really is an intrinsic property to be that and that big. Cf. >Haecceitism. Relational property/Bigelow/Pargetter: one might be tempted to assume that everything is based on relational properties, rather than vice versa. But we are not going to go into that here. Intrinsic property/Bigelow/Pargetter: we think that in the end they can be defended against relational properties as a basis. Nevertheless, we certainly need relational properties, e.g. for the order of events. These do not just stand in time. So we definitely need relations. Relations/Bigelow/Pargetter: we definitely need relations. Because events never stand for themselves. >Events. I 56 Also for expressions such as "twice the size" etc. Quantity/Bigelow/Pargetter: Quantities cannot be based on properties alone, but need relations. For example, having this or that mass is then the property of being in relation to other massive objects. Participation/BigelowVsPlato: Plato has all things in a more or less strong relation to a single thing, the form. We, on the other hand, want relations between things among themselves. >Methexis, >Plato. BigelowVsPlato: we can then explain different kinds of differences between objects, namely that they have different relational properties that other things do not have. E.g. two pairs of things can differ in different ways. I 57 Relational Theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: can handle differences of differences well. Question: can it cope well with similarities? For example, explain what mass is at all? Problem: we need a relation between a common property and many relations to it. There are many implications (entailments) which are not yet explained. Property/Bigelow/Pargetter: 1. in order to construct an (intrinsic) property at all, we must therefore specify the many possible relations it can have to particalur. Solution: one possibility: the sentence via the property of the 2nd level. 2. Problem: how can two things have more in common than two other things? Ad 1. Example Mass Common/Commonality/Bigelow/Pargetter: must then be a property of relations (of the many different relations that the individual objects have to "mass"). I 58 Solution: property of the 2nd level that is shared by all massive things. For example, "stand in mass relations". >Comparisons, >Comparability, >Similarity, >Identity. Entailment/N.b.: this common (2nd level property) explains the many relations of the entailment between massive objects and the common property of solidity. Problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: our relational theory is still incomplete. Problem: to explain to what extent some mass-relations are closer (more similar) than others. Relations/common/Bigelow/Pargetter: also the relations have a common: a property of the 2nd level. Property 2. Level/difference/differentiation/problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: does not explain how two things differ more than two other things. >Levels/order, >Description levels. It also does not explain how, for example, differences in masses relate to differences in volume. For example, compare the pairs "a, b" "c, d" "e, f" between which there are differences in thicknesses with regard to e.g. length. Then two of the couples will be more similar in important respects than two other pairs. I 59 Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: the relation of proportion. This is similar to Frege's approach to real numbers. Real numbers/Frege: as proportions between sizes (Bigelow/Pargetter corresponds to our quantities). >Real numbers, >Quantity/Bigelow. Bigelow/Pargetter: three fundamental components (1) Individuals (2) Relations between individuals (3) Relations of proportions between relations between individuals. Proportions/Bigelow/Pargetter: divide the relations between individuals into equivalence classes. >Proportions/Bigelow. Mass/Volume/Proportions/Bigelow/Pargetter: N.b. all masses are proportional to each other and all volumes are proportional to each other, but masses and volumes are not proportional to each other. Equivalence classes/Bigelow/Pargetter: arrange objects with the same D-ates into classes. So they explain how two things ((s) can be more similar in one respect, D-able) than in another. >Determinates/Determinables, >Equivalence classes. Level 1: Objects Level 2: Properties of things Level 3: Proportions between such properties. Proportions/Bigelow/Pargetter: are universals that can introduce finer differences between equivalence classes of properties of the 2nd level. Different pairs of mass relations can be placed in the same proportion on level 3. E.g. (s) 2Kg/4kg is twice as heavy as 3Kg/6Kg. N.b.: with this we have groupings that are transverse to the equivalence classes of the mass relations, volumetric relations, velocity relations, etc. Equal/different/Bigelow/Pargetter: N.B:: that explains why two relations can be equal and different at the same time. E.g. Assuming that one of the two relations is a mass relation (and stands in relation to other mass relations) the other is not a mass relation (and is not in relation to mass relations) and yet... I 60 ...both have something in common: they are "double" once in terms of mass, once in terms of volume. This is explained on level 3. Figures/Bigelow/Pargetter: this shows the usefulness of numbers in the treatment of quantities. (BigelowVsField). >Hartry Field, >Numbers, >Mathematical Entities, >Ontology. Real numbers/Frege: Lit: Quine (1941⁽¹⁾, 1966⁽²⁾) in "Whitehead and the Rise of Modern Logic") Measure/Unit/Measuerment Unit/To Measure/Bigelow/Pargetter:"same mass as" would be a property of the 2nd level that a thing has to an arbitrary unit. >Measurement, >Equality. Form/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: his theory of forms was not wrong, but incomplete. Objects have relations to paradigms (here: units of measurement). This is the same relation as that of participation in Plato. I 61 Level 3: the relations between some D-ates can be more complex than those between others. For mass, for example, we need real numbers, other terms are less clear. Quantities/Bigelow/Pargetter: are divided into different types, which leads to interval scales or ratio scales of measurement, for example. >Scales. Pain/Bigelow/Pargetter: we cannot compare the pain of different living beings. Level 3: not only explains a rich network of properties of the 2nd level and relations between objects,... I 62 ...but also explain patterns of entailments between them. NominalismVsBigelow: will try to avoid our apparatus of relations of relations. >Nominalism. BigelowVsNominalism: we need relations and relations of relations in science. Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not claim to have proven it here. But it is the only way to solve the problem of the same and the different (problem of the quantities with the 3 levels). >Realism/Bigelow, >Problem of quantities. Simplicity/BigelowVsNominalism: will never be as uniform as our realistic explanation. Nominalism would have to accept complex relational predicates as primitive. >Simplicity. Worse still, it will have to accept complex relations between them as primitive. 1. Quine, W.V.O. (1941). Whitehead and the rise of modern logic. In: The philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (ed. P.A. Schilpp). pp.125-63. La Salle, Ill. Open Court. 2. Quine, W.V.O. (1966). Selected logic papers. New York: Random House.	Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Relations	Armstrong	III 84f Relations/Order/Stages/Universals/Armstrong: Laws of Nature are a second order relation between universals. If it is a law of nature that Fs are Gs: between F-ness and G-ness: non-logical, contingent necessity Notation: N(F,G) it follows: (x)(Fx>Gx), but not vice versa (also simple regularity without necessity possible). Lewis: if two universals are in relation and this relation is in relation to a regularity, then there is a link to this regularity. - This second link is an entailment. Question: is regularity part of the relation? Then it is a surplus above the regularity. Form: (P&Q)>P(P = regularity). Alternative: P>(PvQ): Armstrong pro. But how can that be forced into the form N(F,G)>(x)(Fx>Gx)? Martin II 128 Logical relations: cannot exist between separate entities - causal relations: only between separate ones. Martin II 133 Armstrong: this principle results, in turn, from the idea that absolute necessity arises only from identity - MartinVs: here you must keep a close eye on the range of the examples. >Natural laws, >Regularities.	Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Relations	Martin	Armstrong III 84f Relations/Order/Stages/Universals/Armstrong: Laws of Nature are a second order relation between universals. If it is a law of nature that Fs are Gs: between F-ness and G-ness: non-logical, contingent necessity Notation: N(F,G) it follows: (x)(Fx>Gx), but not vice versa (also simple regularity without necessity possible). Lewis: if two universals are in relation and this relation is in relation to a regularity, then there is a link to this regularity. - This second link is an entailment. Question: is regularity part of the relation? Then it is a surplus above the regularity. Form: (P&Q)>P(P = regularity). Alternative: P>(PvQ): Armstrong pro. But how can that be forced into the form N(F,G)>(x)(Fx>Gx)? Martin II 128 Logical relations: cannot exist between separate entities - causal relations: only between separate ones. Martin II 133 Armstrong: this principle results, in turn, from the idea that absolute necessity arises only from identity - MartinVs: here you must keep a close eye on the range of the examples. >Natural laws, >Regularities.	Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Relative Clauses	Geach	I 106 Complex terms/Relative Clause/Geach: the relation of pronoun-antecedent analog to the variable-operator is ambiguous - solution: resolution by an additional pronoun: "if", "and" etc. ((s) It is not about unity but about dissolving the unity.) Symbolic language/Geach: (e.g. quantum theory): can dissolve unity by definition: E.g. y belongs to the class of Ps: this can be different depending on whether with equality sign or epsilon: for a class x, y belongs to x and if something belongs to x, it is P. >Element relation, >Equality, >Equal sign, >Identity. E.g. wrong: "Only a woman who has lost any sense of shame is drunk". - Correct: "A woman will only become... if she .." otherwise it follows: Men never get drunk. I 120 Relative Clause/Geach: Difference: E.g.: "man who killed his brother"/"man, so that..." - "So that"/Principia Mathematica⁽¹⁾/Russell/PM: "so that" is an undefined basic concept in Principia Mathematica⁽¹⁾. GeachVsQuine: this is equally unclear. Cf. >Lambda calculus, >Basic concept. Geach: "so that" cannot be distinguished from "and" in quantifier notation. E.g.: "The woman whom every Englishman appreciates is, above all, his mother": The relative clause here is not a general term: otherwise all appreciate the same mother! But in "... his queen ..." Solution/Geach: this has nothing to do with the relative-clause, but with the range of application expressions. >Latin prose theory: >Terminology. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.	Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972
Relative Price	Rothbard	Rothbard III 281 Relative Price/Rothbard: The available goods are ranked, along with the possibility of holding the money commodity in one’s cash balance, on each individual’s value scale. Then, in accordance with the rankings and the law of utility, the individual allocates his units of money to the most highly valued uses: the various consumers’ goods, investment in various factors, and addition to his cash balance. Rothbard III 282 The law of the interrelation of consumers' goods is: The more substitutes there are availablefor any given good, the more elastic will tend to be the demand schedules (individual and market)for that good. By the definition of "good," two goods cannot be "perfect substitutes" for each Other, since if consumers regarded two goods as completely identical, they would, by definition, be one good. All consumers' goods are, on the other hand, partial substitutes for one another. When a man ranks in his value scale the myriad of goods available and balances the diminishing utilities of each, he is treating them all as partial substitutes for one another. A change in ranking for one good by necessity changes the rankings of all the other goods, since all the rankings are ordinal and relative. A higher price for one good (owing, say, to a decrease in stock produced) will tend to shift the demand of consumers from that to other consumers' goods, and therefore their demand schedules will tend to increase. >Demand/Rothbard, >Supply/Rothbard, >Price/Rothbard. Conversely, an increased supply and a consequent Iowering of price for a good will tend to shift consumer demand from other goods to this one and Iower the demand schedules for the other goods (for some, of course, more than for others). It is a mistake to suppose that only technologically similar goods are substitutes for one another. The more money consumers spend on pork, the less they have to spend on beef, or the more money they spend on travel, the less they have to spend on TV sets. Suppose that a reduction in its supply raises the price of pork on the market; it is clear that the quantity demanded, and the price, of beef will be affected by this change. Elasticity: If the demand schedulefor pork is more than unitarily elastic in this range, then the higher price will cause less money to be spent on pork, and more money will tend to be shifted to such a substitute as beef. The demand schedules for beef will increase, and the price of beef will tend to rise. >Elasticity/Rothbard. Inelasticity: On the other hand, if the demand schedule for pork is inelastic, more consumers' money will be spent on pork, and the result will be a fall in the demand schedule for beef and consequently in its price. Rothbard III 283 Consumer goods: (…) consumers' goods, in so far as they are substitutes for one another, are related as follows: When the stock of A rises and the price of A therefore falls, (1) if the demand schedule for A is elastic, there will be a tendency for a decline in the demand schedules for B, C, D, etc., and consequent declines in their prices; (2) if the demand schedule for A is inelastic, there will be a rise in the demand schedules for B, C, D, etc., and a consequent rise in their prices; (3) if the demand schedule has exactly neutral (or unitary) elasticity, so that there is no change in the amount of money expended on A, there will be no effect on the demands for and the prices of the other goods. Rothbard III 285 While all consumers’ goods compete with one another for consumer purchases, some goods are also complementary to one another. These are goods whose uses are closely linked together by consumers, so that movements in demand for them are likely to be closely tied together. Rothbard III 286 This discussion of the interrelation of consumers’ goods has treated the effect only of changes from the stock, or supply, side. The effects are different when the change occurs in the demand schedule instead of in the quantity of stock. (…) the demand schedules are determined by individual value scales and that a rise in the marginal utility of a unit of A necessarily means a relative fall in the utility of the other consumers’ goods. >Marginal utility/Rothbard, >Stock keeping/Rothbard, >Comparative Advantage, >Durable goods.	Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Relativism	Feyerabend	II 24 Relativism/Feyerabend: a free society is a relativistic society. II 118 Relativism/Feyerabend: Relativism concerns traditions, not opinions, concepts, theories. The latter are only useful in the context of a tradition. Relativism/Feyerabend: Relativism does not assert that all traditions have the same value. Or that traditions in themselves are neither good nor bad. He maintains that they contain such properties only if they are examined from the point of view of (another) tradition. II 130 Relativism/Feyerabend: it is often assumed that relativism leaves the individual free range. Double error: it is not about the individual, but about tradition, not about possibilities, but about rights. >Cultural relativism, >incommensurability, >western rationalism.	Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979
Relativism	Protagoras	Gaus I 306 Relativism/ Protagoras/Keyt/Miller: In the opening and only surviving sentence of his work on Truth, Protagoras famously proclaimed that 'man is the measure of all things, of things that are, that they are, and of things that are not, that they are not'. Plato takes Protagoras to mean that 'things are to me as they appear to me, and are to you as they appear to you' (Crat. 386a) and in general that 'what seems true to each Emanl is true for each Emanl' (Crat. 386c). Moral relativism is just one application of this universal relativism. In Socrates' elaborate account of Protagoras in Plato's Theaetetus, ontological and moral relativism are discussed in tandem. By the man-measure principle, if the wind feels cold to me but not to you, then the wind is cold for me but not cold for you (Tht. 152b); and by the same principle, 'whatever things appear just and fine to each polis are so for it as long as it holds by them' (Tht. 167c4—5). As the latter passage makes plain, the man—measure formula in Plato's view applies to collections of men as well as to individual men. In one passage Protagoras is even made to apply his formula to individuals and poleis indifferently: 'what seems to each private person and to each polis actually is Ifor theml' (Tht. 168b5—6). Since by the man—measure formula 'seems F to a' entails 'is F for a', there is for Protagoras nothing more ultimate than appearances, nothing deeper than convention. In particular, as Socrates duly notes, on Protagorean principles no polis is just by nature (Tht. 172b). The extent to which Socrates' account of Protagoras can safely be attributed to the historical Protagoras remains an open question. >Relativism/Ancient philosophy. Protagoras/Plato: The very fact that Protagoras does not speak for himself in the dialogue but only through Socrates should put the reader on his guard; it may be Plato's way of disclaiming historical accuracy. Some scholars think, nevertheless, that there are clues within the speeches of Socrates that allow a careful reader to distinguish the ideas that are authentically Protagorean from those that are Plato's own invention. When Socrates refers to the 'secret doctrine' of Protagoras at Theaetetus 152cl0, for example, this is taken by such scholars to indicate that Plato is shifting from an account of Protagoras' explicit doctrine to an implication that in Plato's view can be reasonably drawn from the explicit doctrine (see, for example, McDowell, 1973⁽¹⁾: 121—2). Gaus I 307 Plato’s Protagoras: some scholars such as Gregory Vlastos (1956⁽²⁾: xvii) believe that Protagoras' Great Speech (>Protagoras/Plato) presupposes his relativism, whereas others such as S. Moser and G. L. Kustas (1966)⁽³⁾ deny any connection with relativism. In any case a strong argument can be made that the Great Speech is inconsistent with a thoroughgoing relativism. Justice: in the Great Speech justice is given to man by Zeus to serve a particular purpose, namely, to create the bonds of friendship that hold a polis together. This end, or goal, would seem to limit the range of conceptions of justice. A notion that falls outside this range, that does not promote the bonds of friendship, would seem, by the theory of the Great Speech, not to be a notion of justice at all. >Democracy/Protagoras. Gaus I 307 Demoracy/relativism: (...) there does seem to be a natural alliance between Protagorean relativism and democracy if the locus of relativism is the individual (Taylor, 1976(4): 83—4). By such relativism whatever seems good to citizen A is good for A, and whatever seems good to citizen B is good for B (Tht. 166c—d). But A and B cannot be friends if they thwart each other's good. Thus, if there are to be the bonds of friendship, without which a polis cannot exist, A must take account of what seems good to B, and B of what seems good to A, and in general each citizen must take account of what seems good to every other citizen. Otherwise stasis results. But this 'live and let live' philosophy is one of the defining features of democracy. Vs: On the other hand, when the locus of relativity is shifted from the Gaus I 308 individual to the polis, Protagorean relativism does not seem to favour democracy over any other form of government: if oligarchy or monarchy seems just to the citizens of a polis, oligarchy or monarchy is just for them. (Rosen, 1994⁽⁵⁾, is a useful survey of the extensive literature on both sides of this issue.) 1. McDowell, John (1973) Plato Theaetetus. Oxford: Clarendon. 2. Vlastos, Gregory (1956) 'Introduction' to Plato's Protagoras. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merill. 3. Moser, S. and G. L. Kustas (1966) 'A comment on the relativism of the "Protagoras"'. Phoenix, 20: 111-15. 4. Taylor, C. C. W. (1976) Plato Protagoras. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Rosen, F. (1994) 'Did Protagoras justify democracy?' Polis, 13: 12-30. Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Relativism	Psychological Theories	Upton I 137 Relativism/Psychological theories/Upton: (…) we now recognize that cognitive development goes beyond [the years of childhood >Cognitive development/Piaget)] and a fourth stage of cognitive development has been suggested by a number of theorists (e.g. Commons et al. 1984⁽¹⁾; Sinnott, 1994⁽²⁾; Yan and Arlin, 1995)⁽³⁾. Called ‘post-formal thought’, this stage has been suggested to be typified by relativistic thinking, whereby adults recognize that knowledge depends on the subjective perspective of each individual and that there is, therefore, no absolute truth (…). >Cognitive development, >Stages of development, >Adulthood. Perry (1970)⁽⁴⁾ studied cognitive growth in college students and found that there was a shift from the initial assumption when entering college that there was an absolute truth to be found, to a gradual recognition that questions might have many answers. (…) we move from absolutist to relativist thinking and, according to some theorists, this results in the use of a greater variety of thinking styles (Zhang, 2002)⁽⁵⁾. Furthermore, it is suggested that advanced thinkers relish the challenge of finding the paradoxes and inconsistencies in ideas so as to attempt to reconcile them (Basseches, 1984)⁽⁶⁾. 1. Commons. ML, Richards, FA and Armon, C (1 984) Beyond Formal Operations: Late adolescent and adult cognitive development. New York: Praeger. 2. Sinnott J.D. (2002) Postformal Thought and Adult Development. In: Demick J., Andreoletti C. (eds) Handbook of Adult Development. The Springer Series in Adult Development and Aging. Springer, Boston, MA 3. Yan. B and Arlin PK (1995) Nonabsolute/relativistic thinking: a common factor underlying models of postformal reasoning? Journal of Adult Development, 2: 223-40. 4. Perry, WG (1970) Forms of Intellectual and Ethical Development in the College Years. New York: Holt, Rhinehart. 5. Zhang, LF (2002) Thinking styles and cognitive development. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 163: 179-95. 6. Basseches, M (1984) Dialectical Thinking and Adult Development. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Further reading: Kitchener, KS, Lynch, CL, Fischer, KW and Wood, PK (1993) Developmental range of reflective judgment: the effect of contextual support and practice on developmental stage. Developmental Psychology, 29:893—906. Available online at https ://gseweb.harvard.edu/ —ddl/articles Copy! Kitchener-etal 1993 DevRangeReflectjudgem.pdf.	Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011
Representation	Minsky	Münch III 127 Representation/Minsky: Problem: How does one represent "ordinary"? >Normality, >Representation, >Image theory, >Mapping. Marvin Minsky, “A framework for representing knowledge” in: John Haugeland (Ed) Mind, design, Montgomery 1981, pp. 95-128 Minsky I 157 Representation/Minsky: rearrangements of memory: E.g. what would we need to imagine moving things around a room? First we'd need some way to represent how objects are arranged in space. (…) we could use the following simple four-step script: 1. Store the state of A in M-1. 2. Store the state of B in M-2. 3. Use M-2 to determine the state of A. 4. Use M-1 to determine the state of B. A memory-control script like this can work only if we have memory-units that are small enough to pick out couch-sized portions of the larger scene. M-1 and M-2 would not do the job if they could store only descriptions of entire rooms. In other words, we have to be able to connect our short-term memories only to appropriate aspects of our current problems. Learning such abilities is not simple, and perhaps it is a skill some people never really master. Our pair-exchanging script needs more machinery. Because each memory-unit must wait until the previous step is finished, the timing of each script step may have to depend on various condition sensors. >Lokalization.	Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992
Representation	Rorty	I 162 Representation/Rorty: requires judgment - unlike impressions (sensory impressions). >Judgements, >Sensory impressions. SellarsVsLocke: Locke puts both together. I 278f Rorty: representation, as it used by the psychologist is ambiguous: it includes images and propositions as well as opinions. Only the latter two are used as premises. Images, however, are abrupt. British empiricism threw them together. RortyVsRepresentation: the thesis of the system of internal representations is not just a mix of images and propositions, but a general confusion of causing events and conclusions! >Beliefs/Rorty. But it takes place in the minds of philosophers, not of the psychologists. II (c) 76 Camps: Anti-representationalism: with Nietzsche and Dewey. - On the other hand: later Wittgenstein, Sellars, Davidson: new perspective on language and reality. >Nietzsche, >Dewey, >Wittgenstein, >Wilfrid Sellars, >Davidson. II (e) 112 PragmatismVsRepesentationalism/Rorty: there is no fixed, final truth, which would have to be represented. PragmatismVsCorrespondence theory: there is no privileged language of representation. >Pragmatism , >Correspondence theory. VI 45 Representation/realism/Rorty: representation involves realism. >Realism. VI 51 R/Wittgenstein/Rorty: the relevant object range is never "there" in the relevant sense - VI 49 Representation/RortyVsWright: fundamentally different outputs can be considered a representation of the same input. Basically, everything can be an arbitrary R of anything, you just have to agree in advance. VI 54 Representation/McDowell’s Wittgenstein/Rorty: thesis the bewildering variety of rules makes it impossible to draw an interesting line between the discourses in terms of representationality or non-representationality. ((s) knowledge, morality, the comic, etc.). >McDowell's Wittgenstein. RortyVsKripke: Kripke’s Wittgenstein answered that with a petitio principii. >Kripke's Wittgenstein. VI 63 Representation/PutnamVsRepresentation/Rorty: Language penetrates too deeply into the world - VI 71f Putnam: still uses the term representation. RortyVs. R/Rorty: we should not understand our relationship to the rest of the universe in representational terms but in purely causal terminology. (PutnamVs). DavidsonVsRepresentation: language and research can be explained by exclusive reference to causal interactions with the world. Representation unnecessary. (McDowellVsDavidson: responsibility to the world.) >Judgment/McDowell. VI 107f Representation/image/Rorty: equally ambiguous: of course, an able historian reproduces the facts the way they are! So there is a notion of representation, which allows to distinguish efficient from less efficient historians. But when philosophers argue about the accuracy of a representation, they do not only argue about sincerity or diligence. It’s more about the question: can we pair pieces of the world and pieces of beliefs or sentences in such a way that we are able to state that the relations between the latter correspond to the relations between the former? VI 125 f RortyVsRepresentation: even if you are against representationalism, that does not mean to deny that most things in the universe are independent from us in causal terms. They are only not in a representational way independent from us! >Metaphysical realism. VI 130 Representation/Language/RortyVsSellars: language does not represent anything. >Language/Rorty, >Language. VI 139 Representation/knowledge/Rorty: epistemological interpretation: knowledge as an image of the object: separation. - In contrast, dealing with the object: no separation between object and handling. VI 140 Language/R/Rorty: Thesis: language and knowledge have nothing to do with illustration, but rather with coping. Charles Taylor: handling. Coping is more primary than representation. Rorty: no break between linguistic and non-linguistic coping.	Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Representation (Presentation)	Gadamer	I 114 Representation/Game/Art/Gadamer: All representation is (...) as far as possible a representation for someone. The fact that this possibility is meant as such is what makes the play character of art so peculiar. The closed space of the world of the game lets the one wall fall, as it were.⁽¹⁾ The cult play and the play ("play" as in acting in a play, German: "Schauspiel") clearly do not represent in the same sense as the playing child. In that they represent, they do not point out, but at the same time point beyond themselves to those who watch and participate in them. Here, play is no longer the mere representation of an ordered movement, nor is it also the mere representation in which the playing child is absorbed, but it is "representing for ...". This instruction inherent in all representation is, as it were, fulfilled here and becomes constitutive for the existence of art. Cf. >Play/Gadamer. I 121 Performance/Act/Play/Theatre/Music/Gadamer: The performance of a play is (...) not simply detachable from it as something that does not belong to its essential being, but is as subjective and fluid as the aesthetic experiences in which it is experienced. Rather, it is in the performance and only in it - and this is most clearly demonstrated by the music - that one encounters the work itself, just as the divine is encountered in the cult. Here the methodical gain becomes visible, which the starting point of the concept of play brings in. The work of art cannot simply be isolated from the conditions of access under which it appears, (...) [The work] itself belongs in the world it presents itself to. Acting is only really where it is played (...). Art/Gadamer: The thesis is thus that the being of art cannot be determined as the object of an aesthetic consciousness, because conversely the I 122 aesthetic behaviour is more than it knows about itself. It is a part of the process of being of representation and belongs to the game as a game in its essence. I 137 Representation/Gadamer: The viewer does not behave in the distance of the aesthetic consciousness that is art, but in the communion of being there. Cf. >Aesthetic Consciousness/Gadamer. In the end, the real emphasis of the tragic phenomenon lies in what is presented and recognized there and in what participation is obviously not arbitrary. As much as the tragic play, which is festively performed in the theatre and which is an exceptional situation in the life of everyone, it is not like an adventurous experience and does not cause an intoxication of numbness from which one awakens to one's true being, but I 138 the elevatedness and the shock that comes over the viewer, in reality deepen his or her continuity with him- or herself. The tragic melancholy arises from the self-knowledge that the viewer receives. >Affirmation/Gadamer, >Tragedy/Gadamer, >Catharsis/Gadamer, >Literature/Gadamer. 1 Cf. Rudolf Kassner, Zahl und Gesicht, p. 161 f. Kassner suggests that "the most strange unity and duality of child and doll" is connected to the fact that the fourth "always open wall of the spectator" is missing here (as in the cultic act). I thus conclude that it is this fourth wall of the spectator, which closes the play world of the artwork.	Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Reswitching	Economic Theories	Harcourt I 124 Reswitching/reverse capital/Economic theories/Harcourt: The phenomena of double- (or re-) switching and capital-reversing were first noticed in the literature by Joan Robinson [1953-4⁽¹⁾,1956⁽²⁾], Champernowne [1953-4]⁽³⁾ and Sraffa [1960]⁽⁴⁾ (whose book, it will be remembered, though published in 1960, had an enormously long gestation period dating back at least to the mid-1920s). >D. G. Champernowne, >Joan Robinson, >Piero Sraffa. Double-switching is associated essentially with the possibility that the same method of production may be the most profitable of a number of methods of production at more than one rate of profits (r) even though other methods are more profitable at rates in between. Capital-reversing is the value of capital moving in the same direction, when alternative rates of interest are considered, so that a technique with a lower degree of mechanization, as measured, for example, by its level of output per head and value of capital per head, is associated with a lower rate of profits. That is to say, it is the most profitable technique at this rate of profits and, in particular, is more profitable than a more mechanized technique (in the two senses above) which was either equi-profitable or more profitable than this one at higher rates of profits. (All these comparisons must be taken to occur in the neighbourhood of a switch point.) Joan Robinson [1956⁽²⁾], pp. 109- 10, called this a 'perverse' relationship, a curiosum, and acknowledged Ruth Cohen for pointing out the possibility to her, so that it has become known in the literature as the Ruth Cohen curiosum (RCC). Harcourt I 125 In the same passages she describes (but does not name) double-switching (which is not the same thing as capital-reversing) but the implications of the phenomena were neither realized nor spelt out: see Robinson [1970a]⁽⁵⁾, pp. 309-10. Both phenomena imply that the same physical capital goods may have more than one value, because a different real-wage rate and set of relative prices will be associated with each rate of profits and the capital goods associated with the method have to be valued at their appropriate set of prices. Double-switching and capital-reversing may occur in an industry (Sraffa's example in Sraffa [1960]⁽⁴⁾, chapter xn) and in an economy (the original cases discussed by Joan Robinson [1953-4⁽¹⁾, 1956⁽²⁾] and Champernowne [1953-4]⁽³⁾ in a context, one ought to add, that goes back at least to Wicksell and probably to Ricardo: see Sraffa [1960]⁽⁴⁾). Before entering the realm of controversy, it may clarify the subsequent arguments if we give now some very simple examples of the two phenomena. >Wicksell effects, >David Ricardo. (…) we show the w-r relationships of two techniques, one of which is a straight line (bb), the other, concave to the origin {ad). Technique b has a higher output per man than technique a, i.e. qb{= wbmax)>qa{ = wamax). It will be recalled that the value of kb is constant (the price Wicksell effect is neutral), no matter what are the values of r and w, and that ka is smaller, the smaller is the value of r (a negative price Wicksell effect). At a rate of profits greater than rba technique b is the more profitable; at rba the two are equi-profitable, while below rba (and above rab) technique a is the more profitable. In the lower half of the figure we plot in an unbroken line the values of capital per head (in terms of the consumption good) of the technique that would actually be in use at each value of r. Harcourt I 127 We repeat the analysis, this time measuring capital in terms of labour time per head, i.e. as real capital per head, kx. With our present assumptions, the value of kx of any given technique, no matter what is the shape of its w-r relationship, is smaller, the smaller is the value of r. Harcourt I 128 Reverse capital/double switching: When only two techniques are considered, and we are comparing stationary states, capital-reversing implies double-switching and vice versa. However, when more than two are considered, it is possible to have capital-reversing without double-switching, i.e. any one technique is the most profitable of all for a self-contained range of values of r and once it retires it never makes a comeback. Def Ruth Cohen curiosum: This refers to the possibility that as we change the interest rate producers switch the process of production from a to ft, but as we change it further in the same direction they return to a. Harcourt I 129 This would have the unfortunate consequence that we could no longer say that the lowering of the interest rate brings about a process of 'deepening' and each process is more capital-intensive than its predecessors. Harcourt I 130 This curiosum is also discussed by Piero Sraffa in chapter 12 of his book⁽⁴⁾. He shows that producers may shift from one activity to another as the interest rate changes but return to the first activity as it changes further in the same direction. The phenomenon may indeed be observed in the production of a single good. But (…) it is impossible with the whole basis of production. Levhari: We cannot switch from one matrix to another in response to a change in the interest rate and then return to the first matrix in response to further changes in the same direction. So even though we cannot order the activities according to 'degree of mechanization', we can do so with the matrices. (Levhari [1965]⁽⁶⁾, p. 99 HarcourtVsLevhari: That is to say, Levhari claimed to have shown that double-switching was impossible in an 'indecomposable' or 'irreducible' technology, 'a situation in which every single output requires, directly or indirectly as input for its production something .. . of every single other output'. (Levhari and Samuelson [1966]⁽⁷⁾, pp. 518-19.) This proposition was shown conclusively to be false (except under very special conditions) in a series of papers in the 1966, 1967 and 1968 issues of the Quarterly Journal of Economics by Pasinetti [1966a]⁽⁸⁾, Morishima [1966]⁽⁹⁾, Bruno, Burmeister and Sheshinski [1966]⁽¹⁰⁾, Garegnani [1966]⁽¹¹⁾, Samuelson [1966a]⁽¹²⁾, Robinson and Naqvi [1967]⁽¹³⁾, Bruno, Burmeister and Sheshinski [1968]⁽¹⁴⁾. >P.A. Samuelson. Harcourt I 131 Production: Suppose that there is more than one method available for producing directly or indirectly a commodity which will be in surplus and therefore part (or even the whole) of the net product of the year's production, after account has been taken of the amount of commodities used up as means of production in the production process. The forces of competition are assumed to ensure that the same rates of profits and wages will be paid in all industries. (Samuelson [1966a]⁽¹²⁾, p. 575, attributes this result to the workings of ruthless competition, allied with geometry.) Notice that this implies nothing about what determines their actual sizes or the distribution of income. Neoclassical theory: Then the neoclassical parables (>Neoclassicals/Samuelson) lead us to believe that as we arbitrarily consider lower rates of profits, methods associated with higher outputs per head become eligible, values of capital per head and per unit of output become greater and the distribution of income may be obtained by multiplying the quantities of factors by their respective marginal products which may be treated as if they were equal to the equilibrium real wage and rate of profits. Or, rather, the distribution of income, which, under very special circumstances, equals the simple Marshallian elasticity of the factor-price frontier envelope, may be treated as equivalent to that which would be obtained by this alternative procedure. >A. Marshall, >Factor price frontier, >Equilibrium/Neoclassical economics, >Neo-neoclassicals, >Reswitching/Samuelson, >Cambridge Capital Controversy, >Reswitching/reverse capital/Neoclassical economics. 1. Robinson, Joan (1953-4). 'The Production Function and the Theory of Capital', Review of Economic Studies, xxi. 2. Robinson, Joan [1957] 'Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation - A Comment', Economic Record, xxxm, pp. 103-8. 3. Champernowne, D. G. [1953-4] 'The Production Function and the Theory of Capital: A Comment', Review of Economic Studies, xxi, pp. 112-35 4. Sraffa, Piero[1960] Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 5. Robinson, Joan, [1970a] 'Capital Theory Up to Date', Canadian Journal of Economics, in, pp. 309-17. 6. Levhari, D. [1965] 'A Nonsubstitution Theorem and Switching of Techniques', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXIX, pp. 98-105. 7. Levhari, D. and Samuelson, P. A. [1966] 'The Nonswitching Theorem is False', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXX, pp. 518-19. 8.Pasinetti, L.L. [1966a] 'Changes in the Rate of Profit and Switches of Techniques', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXX, pp. 503-17. 9. Morishima, M. [1966] 'Refutation of the Nonswitching Theorem', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXX, pp. 520-5. 10. Bruno, M., Burmeister, E. and Sheshinski, E. [1966] 'Nature and Implications of the Reswitching of Techniques', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXX, pp. 526-53. 11. Garegnani, P. [1966] 'Switching of Techniques', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXX, pp. 554-67. 12.Samuelson, P.A. [1966a] 'A Summing Up', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXX. pp. 568-83. 13. Robinson, Joan and Naqvi, K. A. [1967] 'The Badly Behaved Production Function', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXXI, pp. 579-91. 14. Bruno, M., Burmeister, E. and Sheshinski, E. [1968] 'The Badly Behaved Production Function: Comment', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXXII, pp. 524-5. Bruno, M. [1969] 'Fundamental Duality Relations in the Pure Theory of Capital and Growth', Review of Economic Studies, xxxvi, pp. 39-53.	Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972
Reswitching	Neoclassical Economics	Harcourt I 145 Reswitching/capital reversing/Neoclassical economics/Harcourt: Unfortunately, for the neoclassical revivalists, all these results (see Reswitching/Economic theories) disappear when we drop our very special assumption (which is, however, related to Marx, vols. I and n, in which the organic composition of capital is uniform in all uses) that each w-r relationship is a straight line.* >Reswitching/Economic theories, >Cambridge Capital Controversy, >Labour/Marx, >K. Marx, >Value theory/Marx. Harcourt: For now the possibility that the same method will be the most profitable at two (or more) values of r, while others are more profitable in between, becomes inevitable. (Note, though, that it is the possibility which is inevitable: curved w-r relationships do not automatically imply that double-switching will occur.) >Reswitching/Economic theories. Reswitching: A case where it does occur is (…) [this]: technique b (which has a straight-line w-r relationship) comes back after giving way to technique a (which has a curved one) between the rates of profits of rba and rab. It will be noticed that qb - output per man of technique b - exceeds qa. If, therefore, we were to compare the sustainable steady states of consumption per head at different rates of profits, instead of obtaining the neoclassical parable …. For the „parables“ see >Neoclassicals/Harcourt. …- investment in more roundabout methods of production as r falls allows higher sustainable standards of living in the long run - we would have instead a 'dip' over the range rba-rab (…). Reverse capital: While reswitching will do the trick, capital-reversing is all that is needed to obtain 'perverse' steady-state movements: see Bruno, Burmeister and Sheshinski [1966]⁽¹⁾, Pasinetti [1966a]⁽²⁾. It should also be obvious, all too painfully so, perhaps, that either reswitching or capital-reversing, or the two combined, destroy parables (1) and (2) as well. Here, the parables again: Harcourt I 122 (1) an association between lower rates of profits and higher values of capital per man employed; (2) an association between lower rates of profits and higher capital-output ratios; (3) an association between lower rates of profits and (through investment in more 'mechanized' or 'round-about' methods of production) higher sustainable steady states of consumption per head (up to a maximum); (4) that, in competitive conditions, the distribution of income between profit-receivers and wage-earners can be explained by a knowledge of marginal products and factor supplies. Harcourt I 146 As the destruction by capital-reversing of parable (1) - from Pasinetti [1966a]⁽²⁾, pp. 516-17: Harcourt I 147 „The conclusion simply is that, on this problem, the whole theory of capital seems to have been caught in the trap of an old mode of thinking. Without any justification, except that this is the way economists have always been accustomed to think, it has been taken for granted that, at any given state of technical knowledge, the capital goods that become profitable at a lower rate of profits always entail a higher 'quantity of capital' per man. The foregoing analysis shows that this is not necessarily so; there is no connection that can be expected in general between the direction of change of the rate of profits and the direction of change of the 'quantity of capital' per man.“ (pp. 516-17). * It would be ironic if, nearly 100 years later, the rival theory of value to that of Ricardo and Marx should founder on the assumption which Bohm-Bawerk found so objectionable in Marx's theory. On this, see Dobb [1940]⁽³⁾, p. 74 nl, and generally for a brilliant - and highly relevant - account of the historical and analytical background to the present debate. 1. Bruno, M., Burmeister, E. and Sheshinski, E. [1966] 'Nature and Implications of the Reswitching of Techniques', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXX, pp. 526-53. 2. L.L. Pasinetti [1966a] 'Changes in the Rate of Profit and Switches of Techniques', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXX, pp. 503-17. 3. Dobb, M. H. [1940] Political Economy and Capitalism (London: Routledge).	Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972
Reswitching	Robinson	Harcourt I 151 Reswitching/Robinson/Harcourt: (…) consider the case where we compare two methods, in neither of which is labour applied uniformly over time. Then it is clear that the ratio of the costs of the methods of producing a unit of net output at different values of r can fall below and rise above unity.* A. (…) method A - has a large input of labour at the beginning of its (two-period) gestation period, B. method B - has a larger gestation period (three periods) than A, a small input of labour at the start and a large one towards the end which is, however, less than the total input in A. The total input of labour in A is less than that in B. Then at very high values of r, interest on interest on interest on the cost of labour employed at the start of method B must exceed the wage and interest costs of method A, so that A is preferred to B. Capital cost: (If we ignore wage costs and talk instead in terms of real capital, we would say that the real capital cost of B is greater than that of A. Since both methods produce the same output, clearly A will be preferred.) Input/labour/time: At very low or zero values of r, A will also be preferred because it has the lower total input of labour (and time!). But there is an intermediate range of values of r where the investment of most of B's labour for a shorter period than A's at moderate rates of interest makes B's total cost less than A's. Hence B is preferred. The analogy between this result and the possibility of multiple rates of return to investment in present value calculations has been noticed by several writers, for example, Bruno, Burmeister and Sheshinski [1966](1), pp. 528 and 533. Harcourt I 152 Sraffa: Sraffa and Joan Robinson used this uneven distribution of labour through 'horizontal' or 'instant' time to describe the possibilities of double-switching and capital-reversing. Sraffa [1960]⁽²⁾, p. 81 passim, used his reduction to 'dated' labour examples (whereby the contribution of each input of labour to the value of a commodity is given by its wage cost accumulated forward at the appropriate rate of profits over the 'periods' between its input and the emergence of the product) as the analogy to make the point. Joan Robinson's explanation in Robinson [1956]⁽³⁾, pp. 109-10, may be put as follows. Robinson: Suppose that the gestation period of technique a is longer than that of technique b, but that the input of labour is concentrated at the beginning of the period while that of b is concentrated at the end. Consider their w-r relationships which, together with their respective capital values (…). We know that at the wage rate, wba (and the rate of profits, rba) the two methods are equiprofitable. Now consider the wage rate, wa. Then both techniques will be associated with lower values of r, ra and rb respectively. Harcourt I 154 But because the fall in the rate of profits from rba to ra has a much greater relative impact on the value of ka than the corresponding fall to rb has on kb (which is none), technique a is able to pay the same wage rate - wa - and a higher rate of profits (ra>rb) than can technique b. But when the wage rate gets very high so that it comes near to absorbing all of qa (but only a lot of qb) there are no longer the profits left over to allow the payment of a higher rate of profits (on the lower k) for a than that paid for b - hence, first, the reswitching at rab and then, secondly, b becoming the more profitable technique at values of r below rab. Capital goods: It is the heterogeneity of capital goods (whether fixed or circulating) as well as the time pattern of production which gives rise to the possibility of double-switching. Sraffa: This is clear in Sraffa's description of the timelessness of the concept of 'dated' labour and has been made explicit by Champernowne [1953-4, 1966]⁽⁴⁾, Morishima [1966]⁽⁵⁾, Robinson and Naqvi [1967]⁽⁶⁾ and Robinson [1970a]⁽⁷⁾. As Sraffa and Morishima point out, a process involving a lapse of time from input to output can be regarded as an instantaneous process requiring heterogeneous capital goods by introducing as many fictitious intermediate goods and sectors as we require. Each input then acquires its appropriate profits component, suitably compounded, on the way, with the 'earlier' inputs, not in time but in stage of production, being compounded more times. Laobur/Sraffa/Harcourt: This, as I understand it, is the essence of Sraffa's concept of 'dated' labour. Sraffa is always dealing at an instant of time with those properties of an economic system which are independent of change. It is also natural for anyone thinking, as Sraffa is, in the Ricardian-Marxian mould, of 'divergences of prices from values' changing as the rate of profits changes, to sense the possibility of such double substitutions of machines for labour.** * In Samuelson's example, w does not change as r does. Sraffa [1960], pp. 34-8, however, llustrates the same phenomena, though, admittedly, in a different context, in an example in which w does change (in a manner determined by its functional relationship with r) and the same result is obtained. ** I am indebted to M. H. Dobb for this comment. 1. Bruno, M., Burmeister, E. and Sheshinski, E. [1966] 'Nature and Implications of the Reswitching of Techniques', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXX, pp. 526-53. 2. Sraffa, P. (1960) Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 3. Robinson, Joan [1956] The Accumulation of Capital (London: Macmillan). 4. Champernowne, D. G. [1953-4] 'The Production Function and the Theory of Capital: A Comment', Review of Economic Studies, xxi, pp. 112-35 5. Morishima, M. [1966] 'Refutation of the Nonswitching Theorem', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXX, pp. 520-5. 6. Robinson, Joan and Naqvi, K. A. [1967] 'The Badly Behaved Production Function', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXXI, pp. 579-91. 7. Robinson, Joan [1970a] 'Capital Theory Up to Date', Canadian Journal of Economics, in, pp. 309-17.	EconRobin I James A. Robinson James A. Acemoglu Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 Robinson I Jan Robinson An Essay on Marxian Economics London 1947 Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972
Reswitching	Samuelson	Harcourt I 131 Reswitching/Samuelson/Harcourt: [Samuelson] started with a heterogeneous capital-goods model whereby there were many different ways of producing the consumption good, methods which required different inputs of direct and indirect labour, i.e. labour applied after being transformed into commodities, and therefore different inputs of the same good treated as a capital good, into itself. (When producing itself, its form and the quantities used varied from method to method, so that we have in effect heterogeneous capital goods.) >Capital structure, >Capital theory, >Capital/Robinson, >Cambridge Capital Controversy. Harcourt I 132 „I want to consider a special subclass of realistic cases, to present certain valid results which hold rigorously for such models .. . it would serve no purpose... to consider a model in which there were not diverse physical capital goods .. . it would evade the issue to consider a model in which capital goods were not highly specific to one use and to one combination of co-operating labour. None of these issues will be dodged in the slightest.“ (Samuelson [1962]⁽¹⁾, p. 196.) Harcourt: Taking each method in turn he 'costed' them up at different rates of profits to find the maximum equilibrium real-wage rate that could be associated with each. The range of rate of profits is from zero to a maximum which is determined by the commodity's own rate of growth when the real-wage rate is zero and radioactive depreciation is allowed for. Harcourt I 133 Production/labour: (…) The w-r relationship, (…) , is a straight line if, when r = 0, the ratio of the labour value of the means of production to the direct labour used in the production of commodity 1 is the same as the corresponding ratio associated with the production of commodity 2, and the time patterns of the inputs are uniform, so that the relative prices of the two commodities are independent of the rate of profits, even when it is positive. (They are in fact equal to the ratio of the direct labour inputs per unit of output of the two commodities.) It follows that the value of'capital' - means of production - is similarly independent of the value of r, in the sense that it does not change when we consider different values of r. Harcourt I 134 Value* theory: Students of Marx will prick up their ears here for this is, if you like, the pure labour theory of value case - uniform organic compositions of capital. 'Pure' is perhaps an unfortunate word since it may be taken to imply that the labour theory of value is simply the proposition that prices are proportional to embodied labour whereas, in fact, it implies that prices are determined by embodied labour. >Value theory/Marx. Labour theory/Sraffa: In this sense, Sraffa has a labour theory of value: see Harcourt and Massaro [1964b]⁽²⁾, Meek [1967]⁽³⁾, pp. 161-78. >Piero Sraffa. Harcourt I 136/137 Labour/capital: Samuelson, in fact, assumed that the physical capital to labour ratios of each activity in a technique were the same and that the net product consisted of the consumption good. As a result, he could order techniques according to the maximum real-wage rates (physical outputs per head when r = 0). 1. Samuelson, P. A. [1962] 'Parable and Realism in Capital Theory: The Surrogate Production Function', Review of Economic Studies, xxix, pp. 193-206. 2. Harcourt, G. C. and Massaro, Vincent G. [1964a] 'A Note on Mr Sraffa's Sub- systems', Economic Journal, LXXTV, pp. 715-22. [1964b] 'Mr Sraffa's Production of Commodities', Economic Record, XL, pp.442-54. 3. Meek, R. L. [1967] Economics and Ideology and Other Essays. Studies in the Development of Economic Thought (London: Chapman and Hall).	EconSamu I Paul A. Samuelson The foundations of economic analysis Cambridge 1947 Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972
Return on Investment	Solow	Harcourt I 7 Capital/Measurements/return on investment/Fisher/SolowVsFisher/Solow/Harcourt: Solow [1963a⁽¹⁾, 1966⁽²⁾, 1967⁽³⁾, 1970⁽⁴⁾]: Solow's purpose was, in part, to get away from the obstacles of the measurement of capital and its related problems by developing instead the concept of the rate of return on investment. His own contributions were to graft technical progress on to Fisher's analysis and to apply the resulting concepts empirically, in order to obtain estimates of the orders of magnitude of the rates of return on investment in post-war U.S.A. and West Germany. >Irving Fisher. Joan RobinsonVsSolow: It is argued that neither in theory nor in empirical work has Solow been able completely to escape from the need to define and measure aggregate capital and to work within the confines of a one-commodity model. >Aggregate Capital. Harcourt I 94 Return on investment/Solow/Harcourt: What, then, is the rate of return on investment? Consider a planned economy which has a stock of heterogeneous capital goods, produces a certain volume of one consumption good and is at full employment with its inputs efficiently allocated. (Efficient means only that it is impossible to have more of anything without less of something else.) Compare this situation with possible neighbourhood efficient arrangements in which there is a little less consumption and therefore more capital goods (in physical, not necessarily in value terms). Now change over to an alternative arrangement by saving, i.e. reducing consumption. This allows a one-period gain (the next) in consumption over what it would have been. Make sure that the biggest gain is chosen for a given reduction in consumption now. Finally suppose that in the period after the next the economy reaches the position that it intended to be at by that period anyway. That is, the economy over the three periods has had decided for it - we are all technocrats now - a consumption stream C₀ -h, C₁+j, C2, .. . instead of one of C₀, C₁, C₂, . . . Then a natural definition of the one-period rate of return on investment (R1) is R₁ = j-h/ h = j/h -1 . . .perfectly natural usage. For „technocrats“ see >Capital theory/Solow. Harcourt I 95 Saving/prices/implicit assumptions/Harcourt: We should note the vital importance in all these definitions of an implicit assumption either that saving may be transformed into investment without affecting relative prices or that we are analysing a one-commodity model. Without these assumptions, saving, in the sense of consumption forgone, will not necessarily add the additional consumption because, depending on how prices change, it will be associated with different amounts and types of investment. Hence Solow concentrates on small changes - the notional changes of the neoclassical procedure – and the prices corresponding to a switch-point rate of profits: see Solow [1967⁽⁵⁾, 1970⁽⁶⁾]. Measurements: Solow claims that calculating the rate of return requires no measure of the stock of capital, not even necessarily a mention of it, although in some of his theoretical examples and in his empirical work he is unfaithful to himself. He also claims that neoclassical theory, in so far as it centres around the rate of return, can escape from the malleability assumption and 'can accommodate fixity of form and proportions both' (p. 27). Malleability: As an aside but very much related to the malleability assumption, he comments that J. B. Clark's jelly assumption (see Stigler [1941]⁽⁷⁾, chapter xi, and Samuelson [1962]⁽⁸⁾) makes the analysis easier (…). Substitution: Moreover it contains the important kernel of truth that substitution possibilities are easier over longer periods of time even though at any moment of time capital goods may be highly specific and substitution possibilities ex post (if not ex ante) limited: see Hicks [1932]⁽⁹⁾, pp. 19-21. Harcourt I 96 SalterVsSolow: This seems to be literally true only if we are considering the working out in actual time of the possibilities which exist at the beginning of a Marshallian long period, while not allowing anything to change, other han what was expected to change at the start of the period. The application of results from this analysis to real-world happenings is, therefore, suspect, as Salter [1960⁽¹⁰⁾, 1965⁽¹¹⁾], for example, has so clearly shown. >Return on investment/Neo-Keynesianism. Harcourt I 96 SolowVsNeo-Keynesianism: Rates of return on investment are calculated by Solow for two 'poles apart' models of planned economies. The first is an all-purpose onecommodity model with a smooth, well-behaved, constant-returns-toscale production function; the second is Worswick's stockade dictator version of Joan Robinson's model of accumulation (see Worswick [1959]⁽¹²⁾). One-period and perpetuity rates of return are obtained and these are shown, in the neoclassical case, to equal the net marginal product of capital. Harcourt: The two extreme cases are chosen in order to show '. . . that the rate of return . . . does not depend for its existence and meaning on the possibility of defining "marginal productivities" or having smoothly variable proportions between the factors of production' (Solow [1963a],⁽¹³⁾ p. 30). Harcourt I 97 Saving/investments: These results are offered as the answer (or, rather, an answer) to the important question: What is the pay-off to society from an extra bit of saving transformed into capital formation? Harcourt I 110 Return on investment/Solow/Harcourt: Solow uses a Ricardo-Sraffa system with circulating capital; (…) he shows that the rate of interest is an accurate measure of the social rate of return on investment, provided only that the economy is at full employment and uses competitive pricing, and that we are comparing one stationary state with another which has the same labour force but uses, at the given rate of profits, a different equi-viable technique, namely one that requires more circulating capital, commodity by commodity. Both stationary states are in long-run competitive equilibrium; their net products consist entirely of consumption goods. In order for one economy to move (technocratically) from its technology to the other's, consumption must be cut in one period (or for a number of periods in more complicated cases). Solow shows that the extra consumption per period obtained in perpetuity as a result of this move, when expressed in terms of the common set of prices at the given rates of interest (and wages) and as a proportion of the consumption forgone, similarly measured, equals the rate of interest. Harcourt I 111 This ratio, (…) is Solow's measure of the rate of return in perpetuity, R_∞= p/h. 1. Solow, R. M [1963] 'Heterogeneous Capital and Smooth Production Functions: An Experimental Study', Econometrica, xxxi, pp. 623-45. 2. Solow, R. M., Tobin, J., von Weizsacker, C. C. and Yaari, M. [1966] 'Neoclassical Growth with Fixed Factor Proportions', Review of Economic Studies, xxxm, pp. 79-115. 3. Solow, R. M. [1967] 'The Interest Rate and Transition between Techniques', Socialism, Capitalism and Economic Growth, Essays presented to Maurice Dobb, ed. by C. H. Feinstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 30-9. 4. Solow, R. M [1970] 'On the Rate of Return: Reply to Pasinetti. Economic Journal, LXXX, pp.423-8. 5. Solow, R. M. [1967] 'The Interest Rate and Transition between Techniques', Socialism, Capitalism and Economic Growth, Essays presented to Maurice Dobb, ed. by C. H. Feinstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 30-9. 6. Solow, R. M [1970] 'On the Rate of Return: Reply to Pasinetti. Economic Journal, LXXX, pp.423-8. 7. Stigler, George J. [1941] Production and Distribution Theories: The Formative Period (New York: Macmillan). 8. Samuelson, P. A. [1962] 'Parable and Realism in Capital Theory: The Surrogate Production Function', Review of Economic Studies, xxix, pp. 193-206. 9. Hicks, J. R. [1932] The Theory of Wages (London: Macmillan). 10. Salter, W. E. G. [1960] Productivity and Technical Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 11. Salter, W. E. G. [1965] 'Productivity Growth and Accumulation as Historical Processes', Problems in Economic Development, ed. by E. A. G. Robinson (London: Macmillan), pp. 266-91. 12. Worswick, G. D. N. [1959] 'Mrs. Robinson on Simple Accumulation. A Comment with Algebra', Oxford Economic Papers, xi, pp. 125-41. 13. Solow, Robert M. [1963a] (Professor Dr. F. De Vries Lectures, 1963) Capital Theory and the Rate of Return (Amsterdam: North-Holland).	Solow I Robert M. Solow A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth Cambridge 1956 Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972
Review	Schurz	I 128 Verification/strict case/Mill/Schurz: (not statistical): consists of two activities: 1. method of agreement: truth/falsity, verification/falsification. 2. method of difference: relevance/irrelevance. >Relevance, >Truth, >Verification, >Falsification. 1st Method of matching/Mill: A sample, "experimental group". I 129 This is a selection of individuals from a range for which just the property A is valid and not an arbitrary property, Ex "All ravens are black" should not be compared with nails, flowers, and gorillas. 2nd Method of difference/mill: to check the relevance, one chooses an A control sample (control group) to which also A applies. Representativeness/strict case/Mill/Schurz: the A sample should represent the A individuals in the population as well as possible. I 130 Falsifying individuals should differ from verifying ones in some qualitative property. Now, if we vary the accompanying circumstances as much as possible, we maximize our chance of finding falsifying individuals in the A sample (sufficient reason). >Sufficiency. Principle of sufficient reason/Leibniz: had considered this as metaphysical necessity. >Necessity, >Essence, >Essentialism. Principle of sufficient reason/SchurzVsLeibniz: but it is generally valid only in deterministic universes. In indeterministic universes there are also random exceptions without any reason. However, the principle is heuristically useful. Representativity/Popper: the representativity requirement belongs to the strict scrutiny so called by Popper: one should not examine the expansion under heat only on metals. I 131 Methodical induction/law hypotheses//Schurz: a) when testing a given strict hypothesis, one first tests for truth and then for relevance. b) if one searches for an unknown cause or law hypothesis for a given effect, one proceeds in reverse. I 134 Statistical case: Check for presumptive truth/Statistics/Schurz: method of Acceptance intervals: Ex law hypothesis: p(Kx I Ax) = 80 %.AG out of 100 trees examined, 75 were diseased. How do you infer the plausibility of the population frequency hypothesis p(K I A) from the sampling frequency hn(K I A)? According to Fisher (1956)⁽¹⁾, one can calculate the statistical probability that the sampling frequency has a certain size, or lies in a certain size interval, given the hypothesis is true. This is based on the binomial distribution. (...). I 137 Check for presumptive relevance/statistical/Schurz: A control group: in the simplest case, consists of individuals who do not have trait A. I 141 Statistical representativeness/criterion/definition/Schurz: difference from strict case: now the representativeness requirement says not only that the accompanying circumstances should vary as much as possible, but more specifically that all other relevant factors in the A sample should be distributed as equally as possible in frequency. Bsp factors other than car exhaust that make trees sick, e.g., pest infestations. Representativeness/definition: if all relevant characteristics in the sample are equally distributed as in the population. The assumption that this is the case is of course based on induction and cannot be guaranteed by any method. Criterion: to make this possible at all, it must be ensured that the criterion of representativeness is obtained independently of the definition of representativeness. Or rather, its fulfillment must be able to be guaranteed independently of the inductive generalization step. Solution: the criteria are derived from the method of sample generation. Method: most important: random sampling. The probability distribution of deviation from the population is then statistically calculable. Random selection implies universal accessibility. narrow random selection: completely blind. wide: with equal chances of getting into the selection. I 175 Testing/Schurz: a theoretical hypothesis can be tested against not just one, but as many as possible equally plausible indicators. I 176 Indicator: for each one, it is necessary to check whether and which hidden variables are introduced by it. 1. Fisher, R.A. (1956). Statistical Methods and Scientific Inference. New York: Hafner Press, (New edition Oxford Univ. Press, 1995).	Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006
Risk Perception	Economic Theories	Parisi I 69 Risk perception/Economic theories/Jolls: It is important, (...) that firms not be required to provide anecdotes reflecting highly unusual events, as an emphasis on worst-case scenarios could produce excessive responses (Sunstein, 2002)⁽¹⁾. If requirements of truthful accounts sweep in extremely unusual or unlikely scenarios, consumers might overreact - or alternatively they might lose faith and fail to attach any weight at all to the accounts. Note that worst-case scenarios are likely to be much more easily avoided with the proposal of a legal requirement that firms provide truthful accounts of actual occurrences than with the alternative strategy - frequently used by government - of public information campaigns concerning consumer risks. Such campaigns have often resulted in the use of extremely Parisi I 70 vivid and salient images, to the point of seriously risking overreaction or even backlash as a result of citizens’ perceptions of government “manipulation.” A well-known anti-drug advertisement from the 1980s, for instance, featured a picture of an egg frying in a pan with the voice-over, “This is your brain on drugs” (Dewan, 2004)⁽²⁾. >Optimism bias/Economic theories. Parisi I 71 Optimism bias/automobile safety: A context in which evidence from a range of sources supports the existence of substantial optimism bias is automobile safety (for example, Arnould and Grabowski, 1981⁽³⁾; Camerer and Kunreuther, 1989⁽⁴⁾). Underestimation of the risk of death or injury in an automobile accident may occur because people underestimate the likelihood that the average person will be involved in such an accident (Lichtenstein et al., 1978)⁽⁵⁾; the likelihood that they will be involved in such an accident relative to the likelihood that the average person will be so involved (for example, Dejoy, 1989⁽⁶⁾; Svenson, Fischhoff, and MacGregor, 1985⁽⁷⁾); or some combination of the two effects.* >Behavioral law/Economic theories. * See Jolls (1998)⁽⁸⁾ for further discussion of the evidence in these studies. 1. Sunstein, Cass R. (2002). “Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law.” Yale Law Journal 112: 61–107. 2. Dewan, Shaila K. (2004). “The New Public Service Ad: Just Say ‘Deal With It’.” New York Times, January 11. 3. Arnould, Richard J. and Henry Grabowski (1981). “Auto Safety Regulation: An Analysis of Market Failure.” Bell Journal of Economics 12: 27–48. 4. Camerer, Colin F. and Howard Kunreuther (1989). “Decision Processes for Low Probability Events: Policy Implications.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 8: 565–592. 5. Lichtenstein, Sarah, Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff, Mark Layman, and Barbara Combs (1978). “Judged Frequency of Lethal Events.” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory 4: 551–578. 6. DeJoy, David M. (1989). ‘The Optimism Bias and Traffic Accident Risk Perception.” Accident Analysis and Prevention 21: 333–340. 7. Svenson, Ola, Baruch Fischhoff, and Donald MacGregor (1985). “Perceived Driving Safety and Seatbelt Usage.” Accident Analysis and Prevention 17: 119–133. 8. Jolls, Christine (1998). “Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules.” In Symposium: The Legal Implications of Psychology: Human Behavior, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, Vanderbilt Law Review 51: 1653–1677. Jolls, Christine, „Bounded Rationality, Behavioral Economics, and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press.	Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Risks	Rawls	I 168 Risks/Rawls: In the initial situation of a society to be established, when members find themselves behind a veil of ignorance about their future position, it is first of all that everyone has information about their own abilities. It is therefore unlikely that everyone will have the same chances of finding out who they are later on. In any case, a newcomer has knowledge of his or her abilities and bases his or her risk assessments on this knowledge. But at the last stage of the initial situation, however, there is complete ignorance of contingent facts, the construction of individual expectations is based solely on the principle of inadequate reason (principle of insufficient reason). This principle is used to assess probabilities in the absence of any information. Def principle of insufficient reason: under the condition of lack of any information, all possible results are equally likely. I 169 Initial situation/Rawls: then we can link different types of information within a strictly probabilistic framework and draw conclusions about probabilities without further knowledge⁽¹⁾. Vs Principle of insufficient reason: see J. M. Keynes⁽²⁾. Solution/Carnap: an alternative system of inductive logic with other theoretical means than those of the classical principle⁽³⁾. Principle of insufficient reason/Rawls: excludes that initial opportunities are ignored. Solution/Rawls: in the initial situation we have the possibility to accept the two principles of justice according to the theory of justice as fairness, then the imponderables can be circumvented: Cf. I 61 Principles/justice/Rawls: provisional wording: 1. every person must have the same right to the widest possible fundamental freedom, insofar as it is compatible with the same freedom for others. 2. social and economic inequalities shall be arranged in such a way that they (a) are reasonably expectable for everyone's benefit; and (b) are linked to positions and administrative procedures that can be held by anyone. This guarantees fundamental freedoms. 1. See W. Feller, Probability and Profit, pp. 27f. 2. See J. M. Keynes, A Treatise on Probability, London, 1921, ch. IV. 3. R. Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability, 2nd. ed. Chicago, 1962.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Robots	Gershenfeld	Brockman I 167 Robots/Gershenfeld: What’s interesting about amino acids is that they’re not interesting. They have attributes that are typical but not unusual, such as attracting or repelling water. But just twenty types of them are enough to make you. In the same way, twenty or so types of digital-material part types - conducting, insulating, rigid, flexible, magnetic, etc. - are enough to assemble the range of functions that go into making modern technologies like robots and computers. By digitizing not just designs but the construction of materials, the same lessons that von Neumann and Shannon taught us apply to exponentially increasing fabricational complexity. >Noise/Shannon, >Symbols/Neumann, >Life, >Computers, >Technology. Gershenfeld, Neil „Scaling”, in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press.	Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019
Robustness	Minsky	I 194 Robustness/resilience/Artificial Intelligence/Minsky: Most machines that people build stop working when their parts break down. Isn't it amazing that our minds can keep on functioning while they're making changes in themselves? How could anything be so robust? Here are some possibilities: Duplication: It is possible to design a machine so that every one of its functions is embodied in several duplicated agents, in different places. Self-Repair: Many of the body's organs can regenerate — that is, they can replace whichever parts are lost to injury or disease. However, brain cells do not usually share this ability. Consequently, healing cannot be the basis of much of the brain's robustness. ((s) Cf. >Brain/McGinn: the brain has a theory of the brain.) Distributed Processes: It is possible to build machines in which no function is located in any one specific place. Instead, each function is spread out over a range of locations, so that each part's activity contributes a little to each of several different functions. Accumulation: Consider any learning-scheme that begins by using the method of accumulation — in which each agent tends to accumulate a family of subagents that can accomplish that agent's goals in several ways. Later, if any of those subagents become impaired, their supervisor will still be able to accomplish its job, because other of its subagents will remain to do that job, albeit in different ways. >Software-Agents/Minsky.	Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003
Rules	Gould	III 140ff Rules/Gould: same rules do not always mean the same practice! The system is manipulated by trying and legal advantages are achieved. Changes get around, so there is a smaller range of variations. >Evolution, >Explanation.	Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989
Schematic Letters	Quine	II 201f Problem: do not reify properties and classes. Solution: distinction between schematic letters and quantifiable variables. --- IX 7ff~ Predicate letters: F, G, etc. do not introduce anything explicit. --- IX 7ff~ Statement schemes: the predicate letters F, G ... should never be considered as variables that take attributes or classes as values - they are kept away from quantifiers and do not appear in statements at all. --- X 32 Proposition/Object/Quine: If a sentence is supposed to be the name of a proposition (some writers pro, QuineVs), then the proposition is an object - then correct: p or not p for all propositions p - then p is not even variable over objects, and once schematic letter for sentences, but only variable - (no semantic ascent necessary). --- X 47 Schematic letters/Quine: placeholders for sentences of the object language. They do not belong to the object language itself. --- X 77 Model/Quine: of a scheme: is a quantity n-tuple: each schematic letter (for predicates) corresponds to a set, at the beginning of the n-tuple is a non-empty set U, the universal set or value range of the variables x, x, etc. the remaining sets of the model are the values of the set variables a, b, etc. Satisfaction: a model fulfills a scheme, if its set-theoretic analogue (sentence) is true.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Schleiermacher	Gadamer	I 347 Schleiermacher/Historism/Gadamer: In the final analysis, it is in Hegel's position that [19th century historism] finds its legitimation, even if the historians who inspired the pathos of experience preferred to refer to Schleiermacher and Wilhelm von Humboldt instead. GadamerVsSchleiermacher/GadamerVsHumboldt: Neither Schleiermacher nor Humboldt really thought their position through to the end. They may emphasize individuality, the barrier of strangeness that our understanding has to overcome, but in the end, understanding is only completed in an infinite consciousness and the idea of individuality finds its justification. Hegel/Gadamer: It is the pantheistic enclosure of all individuality into the Absolute that makes the miracle of understanding possible. So here, too, being and knowledge permeate each other in I 348 the Absolute. Neither Schleiermacher's nor Humboldt's Kantianism is thus an independent systematic affirmation of the speculative completion of idealism in Hegel's absolute dialectic. >Schleiermacher as an author. 1. The expression philosophy of reflection has been coined by Hegel against Jacobi, Kant and Fichte. Already in the title of "Glaube und Wissen" but as a "philosophy of reflection of subjectivity". Hegel himself counters it with the reflection of reason.	Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Scope		Scope, range, logic, philosophy: range is a property of quantifiers or operators to be able to be applied to a larger or smaller range. For example, the necessity operator N may be at different points of a logical formula. Depending on the positioning, the resulting statement has a considerably changed meaning. E.g. great range "It is necessary that there is an object that ..." or small range "There is an object that is necessarily ....". See also quantifiers, operators, general invariability, stronger/weaker, necessity, Barcan Formula.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Scope	Castaneda	Frank I 178 Range,scope, advanced/of descriptions/Russell: "there is only one .." - "if ...". >Descriptions, >Range, >Identification, >"Exactly one", >One, cf. >Quantification. Hector-Neri Castaneda(1966b): "He": A Study on the Logic of Self-consciousness, in : Ratio 8 (Oxford 1966), 130-157	Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Scope	Cresswell	I, 179f Scope/Cresswell: E.g. everyone loves someone: a) everyone is such that someone is so that the former loves the second b) someone - someone is so that everyone is so that he, the second named, loves him, the former - game theoretical semantics/CresswellVsHintikka: has brought nothing new, what Kamp/Heim did not already have - game theory: sequence of choice. >Hans Kamp, >Irene Heim, >File change semantics, >Game-theorical semantics. II 48 Scope/description/propositional attitudes/Cresswell: sentences about propositional attitudes can always give descriptions a wide range. That is, to make them rigid. >Narrow/Wide, >Rigidity. II 126 *He/scope/Cresswell: wide scope: then it can also be interpreted as "I". Narrow scope: allows "he", "she" or "it". Gods-example/solution/Cresswell:> - speaker index. >Two omniscient Gods/Cresswell, more authors on >"Two omniscient Gods". II 126 "Now"/scope/Cresswell: analog to the case of "I". Narrow scope: here "now" becomes "then". "Here"/Cresswell: Problem: that "people coordinates" could lead to an infinite list - because of the context dependency. CresswellVs: instead I use (Cresswell, 1973a⁽¹⁾, pp. 110-119.) properties of utterances. II 143 Hob/Cob/Nob-Example/Geach/Cresswell: (Geach 1957⁽²⁾, 628): Cresswell: needs a quantifier, which is simultaneously inside and outside the scope of the attitude-verb. - Solution/Hill/Kraut: intensional objects as surrogates for individuals and a further quantifier. >Cob/Hob/Nob-case. II 150 Names/scope/Cresswell: normally names** have a wider reach than modal operators - this is the "modal objection" VsKripke. KripkeVsVs: (Kripke, 1972⁽³⁾, p. 279.) 1. Cresswell, M. J. (1973). Logics and Languages. London: Methuen. 2. Geach, P. (1957). Mental Acts. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 3. Kripke S. A. (1972). Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann (eds.) (1972), 253-355	Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Scope	Geach	I 118 Range/scope: Tradition: Tmesis, logically indivisible operator: either or: E.g. either both: young and stupid or evil - or either young or stupid and evil. I 144 Range: problem with descriptions, not with names. Description, >Nmae. E.g. it is (logically) chronologically possible that Caesar was the father of Brutus. Description: Caesar = man who not begat Brutus. Then: narrow scope: logical impossibility; the whole sentence is wrong. Wide scope: someone who is described among other things as non-producer of Brutus ... This sentence remains true. >Narrow/wide.	Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972
Scope	Quine	I 244 Scope is ambiguous: it cannot be decided by parentheses. - Indefinite singular term: "one", "some", "each member" - "not a"/"not every" - "I think one is such that ..."/"is one such I believe ... ". >Singular terms. I 243 ff Scope/Quine: e.g. "large European butterfly": should this apply to butterflies that are large by European standards, or to all large butterflies that happen to come from Europe? I 244 The delicate thing about this question is that it cannot be clarified by a decision between two bracket positions. There is no such problem if adjectives are used categorically i.e. not attributively: For example, "Round black box" and "Round black box" do not need to be distinguished. The problem is particularly central with indefinite singular terms: (1) If (any) member contributes something, he/she gets a badge. (2) If each member contributes something, I will be surprised. (1) Claims from each member, if they contribute something, they get a badge. Sentence (2) does not claim accordingly from each member: If he/she contributes anything, I will be surprised. I 246 There are 3 reasons why (1) and (2) are not ambiguous. 1) "it": We cannot see only the first sentence as the scope of any member. 2) A simple and irreducible characteristic of German usage is that "everyone" always demands the shortest possible range. 3) "any" always requires the greater of two possible scopes. This third reason applies to (3): (3) If (any) member contributes something, I will be surprised. I 275 ff "So that" is supposed to eliminate ambiguities of the scope. The simplification of theories is the central motif behind the radical artificiality of modern logical notation. I 277 We need to include rules of timeliness to eliminate ambiguities of the kind. "George married a widow" and "George married Maria, and Maria is a widow". I 288 The scope of a quantifier does not quite coincide with the scope of an indefinite singular term "all" or "something", because this encompasses the indefinite singular term itself. Rather, the scope of a quantifier is the clause that the "so that" determines. VII (h) 148 Necessity/possibility/Quine: is not a general feature of the objects concerned but depends on the way of reference. Modal Logic/Quantification/Quine: it is not allowed to quantify into modal contexts from outside. VII (h) 149 It is therefore not a question of singular terms, but of the scope of quantification. VII (h) 154 Scope/Russell: a change in the scope of a description is neutral to the truth value of any sentence. Quine: but only if the description designates something. >Quantification, >Opacity.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Scope	Russell	Hintikka I 166 Scope/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not know that there is also a third possibility for the scope of a quantifier ((s) "medium range"/Kripke). (4) ~(Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x ) & George IV knew, that (Scott = x)].	Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Seeing	Lewis	V 274 Perception/Seeing/Match/Lewis: certainly does not mean that the same is going on in the mind or the soul as before one’s eyes, rather it is about the informational content. Visual experience: is best characterized by the typical causal role. >Causal role/Lewis. The content is the content of the belief, which tends to be caused by it. >Content/Lewis. Problem: the same visual experience can cause very different beliefs - but not all the content can be characterized by belief. E.g. Rabbit-Duck-Head: the belief can be characterized by the disjunction rabbit or duck, but then results in the belief that there are ink and paper. >Experience/Lewis, >Belief/Lewis, >Rabbit-duck-head/Lewis. V 275 Hallucination/Lewis: not seeing, because the scene did not cause the experience. - E.g. If I hallucinated my brain and it just happens to be in accordance. t’s my brain that causes this, but it’s not the same as seeing. - (>veridical ). V 280 Seeing/Grice: requires a causal standard process. V 281 Hallucination: no real counterfactual dependence on the scene - if it changes, the hallucination does not necessarily have to change - the other way around: congruence with real seeing: not caused by the scene itself. V 280 Seeing/Perception/Kripke/Lewis: (Kripke 1972)⁽¹⁾ LewisVsGrice: causal standard process would lead to the fact that no one knew enough about reflection in the past to be able to have had a concept about seeing. Solution/Kripke: descriptions made rigid. >Description/Kripke, >Rigidity/Kripke. V 283 Seeing/Lewis: is distinguishing - but: perfect match - e.g. in a dark scene - that would allow a wide range of alternatives - which is undesirable. - Seeing a dark scene is not seeing. 1.Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann (eds.) (1972), 253-355	Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Seeing	Radner	I 415 Colors/Seeing/Animal/Radner: Bees. Compared to our shifted (400 800 nm) frequency range : 300 700 nm. Bees do not see red, but ultraviolet. They can distinguish yellow hues (rape, wallflower, charlock), which look the same for us. These can be differentiated by us when we look at them through an ultraviolet filter! Definition Purple/Meyers Encyclopedia: Mixed color, additive composed of the two colors at the end of the spectrum (different depending on weighting). For example, human. Red and blue, "blue-red", does not occur in the spectrum itself. >Colors, >Perception, >Animals. I 418 Purple/Animal/Radner: there are different purple hues for different animals: "UV Purple", "Bee Purple", etc. Seeing/Hetero-Phenomenology/Animal/Radner: 1st person: there are attempts to simulate how the bees' facet eye look like through blurred, segmented photographs. Radner: It only pretends to show how it looks for the bees. In reality, it shows what it would look like for us if we had facets. I 418 Environment/Animal/Radner: The (Uexkull's) environment of an animal can be explored independently of any consideration of its inner world. >Environment, >Environment/Uexküll. I 419 Phenomenology/Radner: my point of view can be called "phenomenology": one describes how the world would appear to an organism if it had the sense experiences (3rd person), or how it would appear to me if I had certain characteristics in common with it (1. person) to explain or predict an aspect of the sensory systems of an organism or its recognition of objects. >Heterophenomenology, >First Person.	Radner I Daisie Radner "Heterophenomenology. Learning About the Birds and the Bees", in: Journal of Philosophy 91 (1994) pp. 389-403 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Selection	Gould	I 52 Selection/Darwin/Gould: I am convinced that natural selection has been the main but not the only means of change. I 94 Selection/GouldVsDawkins: if the selection directly affected a gene responsible for body strength when favouring a stronger body, then the theory of Dawkins could be justified. If bodies were unambiguous location maps of their genes, then the fighting parts of DNA could show itself outwards and the selection could have a direct effect on them. But bodies are not built that way. There is no gene for such unambiguous parts of morphology as the left patella or a fingernail. Hundreds of genes contribute to the structure of most body parts and their action is channelled through a kaleidoscopic series of environmental influences, through embryonic, postnatal, internal and external influences. Body parts are not simply transferred genes, and the selection is not even directed at certain body parts! It accepts or rejects whole organisms. II 19 ff Selection/Gould: if natural selection drives evolution by keeping preferred variants from a spectrum that is randomly distributed around an average value, a lack of variation will drive this process out of the way. Because natural selection does not produce anything itself. Against it: II 21 Sexual reproduction: sex creates a huge range of variations by mixing the genetic material of two individuals. Question: but why do the males have to be almost as big and complex as females? Darwin has shown that the natural selection is a battle between individuals, therefore, to pass on as many genes as possible. Since males are indispensable because of the sexual reproduction that the variation must guarantee, they become independent tools of evolution. They are not created for the benefit of their species, as independent tools they intervene in the struggle in their very own way. II 22 When fighting for females, heavyweights simply have a better chance. Combat avoidance strategies can be added to complex organisms. II 51 Selection/Gould: Gould is directed against the assumption of a consistent selection, i. e. the assumption that there is an effect of selection on each level at the same time, or the theory that every detail that can be found on an organism results from the selection. Each individual behavior may be a wonderful adaptation, but it must be shaped within a prevailing limitation. II 173 Selection/Gould: Gould suggests recognizing the selection (not evolution) on several levels. >Evolution, >Explanation.	Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989
Selective Attention	Cognitive Psychology	Corr I 409 Selective Attention/cognitive psychology/Matthews: Selective attention refers to focusing attention on one of several stimulus sources. Personality may influence the efficiency of selective attention. Furnham and Strbac (2002)⁽¹⁾found that extraverts were more resistant to background noise than introverts across a range of tasks; extraverts may indeed prefer to study with music or other noise in the background. Anxiety and Neuroticism are also commonly found to be associated with selective attention deficits, a result that may reflect a more general attentional impairment related to these traits. Newton, Slade, Butler and Murphy (1992)⁽²⁾ found that both Extraversion and low Neuroticism were associated with faster speed of visual search, when subjects were required to find a single letter target in a random display of letters. Schizophrenia: Difficulties in inhibiting aberrant thoughts and images may contribute to the ‘positive symptoms’ of schizophrenia including hallucinations and delusions (Lubow and Gewirtz 1995)⁽³⁾. Schizotypal individuals may be deficient in inhibition of irrelevant stimuli. Studies using attentional tasks that provide measures of latent inhibition have confirmed this hypothesis (e.g., Tsakanikos 2004)⁽⁴⁾. Anxiety: A variety of paradigms have been used to demonstrate that anxiety relates to preferential selection of threat stimuli (see Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin et al. 2007⁽⁵⁾; Williams, Watts, MacLeod and Mathews 1997⁽⁶⁾ for reviews). Corr I 410 Unconscious bias: is bias unconscious or does it reflect a voluntary strategy of active search for potential threats? (See Matthews and Wells 2000⁽⁷⁾). It is plausible that both types of process may be involved. Mathews and Mackintosh (1998)⁽⁸⁾ proposed a dual-process approach, within which bias is produced initially by an automatic threat evaluation system, but may be compensated by voluntary effort. >Attention/Cognitive psychology, >Attention control/Cognitive psychology. 1. Furnham, A. and Strbac, L. 2002. Music is as distracting as noise: the differential distraction of background music and noise on the cognitive test performance of introverts and extraverts, Ergonomics 45: 203–17 2. Newton, T., Slade, P., Butler, N. M. and Murphy, P. 1992. Personality and performance on a simple visual search task, Personality and Individual Differences 13: 381–2 3. Lubow, R. E. and Gewirtz, C. 1995. Latent inhibition in humans: data, theory, and implications for schizophrenia, Psychological Bulletin 117: 87–103 4. Tsakanikos, E. 2004. Latent inhibition, visual pop-out and schizotypy: is disruption of latent inhibition due to enhanced stimulus salience?, Personality and Individual Differences 37: 1347–58 5. Bar-Haim, Y., Lamy, D., Pergamin, L., Bakermans-Kranenburg, M. J. and van IJzendoorn, M. H. 2007. Threat-related attentional bias in anxious and nonanxious individuals: a meta-analytic study, Psychological Bulletin 133: 1–24 6. Williams, J. M. G., Watts, F. N., MacLeod, C. and Mathews, A. 1997. Cognitive psychology and emotional disorders, 2nd edn. Chichester: Wiley 7. Matthews, G. and Wells, A. 2000. Attention, automaticity and affective disorder, Behaviour Modification 24: 69–93 8. Mathews, A. and Mackintosh, B. 1998. A cognitive model of selective processing in anxiety, Cognitive Therapy and Research 22: 539–60 Gerald Matthews, „ Personality and performance: cognitive processes and models“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Self	Minsky	Minsky I 39 Self/software agents/artificial intelligence/AI/Minsky: Even if our old ideas about the mind are wrong, we can learn a lot by trying to understand why we believe them. Instead of asking, What are Selves? we can ask, instead, What are our ideas about Selves? - and then we can ask, What psychological functions do those ideas serve? When we do this, it shows us that we do not have one such idea, but many. We exploit these beliefs whenever we solve problems or make plans. I'll refer to them, rather vaguely, as a person's self-images. In addition to our self-images, our ideas about ourselves also include ideas about what we'd like to be and ideas about what we ought to be. >Conflicts/Minsky. Minsky I 42 One function of the Self is to keep us from changing too rapidly. Each person must make some long-range plans in order to balance single-purposeness against attempts to do everything at once. But it is not enough simply to instruct an agency to start to carry out our plans. We also have to find some ways to constrain the changes we might later make — to prevent ourselves from turning those plan-agents off again! If we changed our minds too recklessly, we could never know what we might want next. We'd never get much done because we could never depend on ourselves. Minsky I 50 The idea of a single, central Self doesn't explain anything. This is because a thing with no parts provides nothing that we can use as pieces of explanation! Then why do we so often embrace the strange idea that what we do is done by Someone Else — that is, our Self? Because so much of what our minds do is hidden from the parts of us that are involved with consciousness. >Consciousness, >Explanation, >Analysis, >Complexity, >Simplicity.	Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003
Self- Consciousness	Maturana	I 70 Self-consciousness/I-conscoiusness/Maturana: is no neurophysiological phenomenon, just focus on yourself. >Consciousness, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification. Therefore it is an epiphenomenon. >Epiphenomenon. It is not explanable by physiological factors such as excitation, inhibition, network structures, coding etc. I 205 Self-consciousness/Maturana: is outside of the physical! It belongs to the range of interactions as a way of co-existence. >Operation/Maturana, >Body. I 276 It is found only in the language - Condition: distinction of oneself from others who could be oneself. >Language, >Intersubjectivity.	Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000
Self- Consciousness	Nietzsche	Danto III 146 Self-Consciousness/Nietzsche/Danto: Why are we self-conscious? We could think, feel, want to remember that we could also 'act' in every sense of the word: and yet all this did not need to 'step into our consciousness'.⁽¹⁾ Danto: Nietzsche says that a large part of our behaviour is automatic. Seen in this way, consciousness accompanies almost none of the more important bodily functions. Danto III 147 Consciousness is 'a danger to the organism'.⁽²⁾ Danto: Where consciousness comes in, clumsiness and error suddenly occurs. Nietzsche believes that consciousness is merely an insufficiently developed 'organ'. Since it only appeared late on the evolutionary stepladder, its range and function are not quite clear and its performance is not yet optimal. >Consciousness/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, KGW V, 2. p. 272. 2. Ibid. p. 56.	Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Self-Determination	Deci	Corr I 441 Self-Determination Theory/SDT/Deci/Ryan: Thesis: aspects of people’s interpersonal environments and their own individual differences will affect the degree to which they are able to satisfy their basic psychological needs and sustain their growth-oriented nature. The outcome of this ongoing interaction of people’s inherent proactivity with the social environment that is either supportive or thwarting of their basic psychological needs has a profound impact on their motivation, cognition, affect and wellbeing. Three basic and universal psychological needs: the needs for competence, autonomy and relatedness.⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾ Corr I 442 SDT has many components that deal with the interactions of people’s needs, personalities and social contexts. Among them are ones that: address types of motivation, specifically - intrinsic motivation and four types of extrinsic motivation; - consider developmental processes through which these types of motivation change; - examine how aspects of the social context enhance versus deplete the different types of motivation; - relate types of motivation to a range of outcomes including learning, performance, cognitive functioning and wellbeing; - relate various aspirations or life-goals to basic psychological need satisfaction and both performance and wellbeing outcomes; - explore the importance of autonomy across cultures; and - apply these components of SDT to such life-domains as parenting, education, work and healthcare. >Motivation/Deci/Ryan. 1. Deci, E. L. and Ryan, R. M. 1985. Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human behaviour. New York: Plenum 2. Deci, E. L. and Ryan, R. M. 2000. The ‘what’ and the ‘why’ of goal pursuits: human needs and the self-determination of behaviour, Psychological Inquiry 11: 227–68 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Self-Determination	Ryan	Corr I 441 Self-Determination Theory/SDT/Deci/Ryan: Thesis: aspects of people’s interpersonal environments and their own individual differences will affect the degree to which they are able to satisfy their basic psychological needs and sustain their growth-oriented nature. The outcome of this ongoing interaction of people’s inherent proactivity with the social environment that is either supportive or thwarting of their basic psychological needs has a profound impact on their motivation, cognition, affect and wellbeing. Three basic and universal psychological needs: the needs for competence, autonomy and relatedness.⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾ Corr I 442 SDT has many components that deal with the interactions of people’s needs, personalities and social contexts. Among them are ones that: address types of motivation, specifically - intrinsic motivation and four types of extrinsic motivation; - consider developmental processes through which these types of motivation change; - examine how aspects of the social context enhance versus deplete the different types of motivation; - relate types of motivation to a range of outcomes including learning, performance, cognitive functioning and wellbeing; - relate various aspirations or life-goals to basic psychological need satisfaction and both performance and wellbeing outcomes; - explore the importance of autonomy across cultures; and - apply these components of SDT to such life-domains as parenting, education, work and healthcare. >Motivation/Deci/Ryan. 1. Deci, E. L. and Ryan, R. M. 1985. Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human behaviour. New York: Plenum 2. Deci, E. L. and Ryan, R. M. 2000. The ‘what’ and the ‘why’ of goal pursuits: human needs and the self-determination of behaviour, Psychological Inquiry 11: 227–68 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Self-Organization	Ostrom	Brocker I 730 Self-Organization/levels/economy/social goods/Ostrom: Market and state organisations inevitably have a multi-level problem: there are rules at a operational, collective or constitutional level. Brocker I 731 Problem: to test rules and their effects in theory, it is assumed that when rules are changed, those at lower levels are kept constant. ⁽¹⁾ Self-organization: this assumption cannot be established in systems with self-organizing actors. Actors must be able to switch between levels to solve problems. Individuals who do not have autonomy for self-organization and self-administration remain imprisoned in their one-level world. ⁽²⁾ Brocker I 732 For the study of strategies for the sustainable management of common goods (social goods), Ostrom selects very different examples from different regions of the world (Switzerland, Japan, Philippines, Spain) with different cultures and environmental conditions. ⁽³⁾ Question: are there general principles for the establishment of management rules and cooperation between the actors that can be recognised by these different cases? Operational Rules/Ostrom: (see also Organization/Ostrom): here there are also construction principles that have a decisive influence on the sustainability of the presented resource management systems: 1. clearly defined limits for households or persons who have the right to withdraw units from the common land. 2. congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions 3. arrangements for collective decisions: most people can participate in decisions about changes to the operational rules. 4. supervision: the supervisors are accountable to the owners (of common goods) or even are owners themselves. 5. graduated sanctions for breaches of the rules 6. conflict resolution mechanisms: participants have quick access to low-cost local arenas that resolve conflicts. 7. minimal recognition of the right to organise: the right of owners to develop their own institutions is not called into question by any external state authority. 8. embedded companies: (for larger, more complex systems): here, appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution and administration are embedded in several levels. Common goods/overuse: None of the above rules in itself is sufficient to prevent Hardin's "tragedy of the common good" (see Social Goods/Hardin) - i.e. the forced overuse of common goods. Brocker I 734 Free-rider problem/solution/Ostrom: only investments in cost-effective, self-organized monitoring make the promises of the individual users credible. At the same time, they participate in the surveillance themselves in order to prevent exploitation by their neighbours. Learning/Sanctions: for learning it is important that the sanctions are not existentially threatening at the beginning. Brocker I 734 State intervention: Problem: Self-regulation and self-initiative are threatened by state intervention and regulation.⁽⁴⁾⁽⁵⁾ >Social Goods/Ostrom., >Free-rider. 1. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge 1990. Dt.: Elinor Ostrom, Die Verfassung der Allmende. Jenseits von Staat und Merkt, Tübingen 1999, p. 68. 2. Ibid. p. 70 3. Ibid. p. 72f 4. Hanisch „Cooperatives in Rural Devolopment and Poverty Alleviation“, in: Jos Bijman/Roldan Muradian/Jur Schuurman (Ed.) Cooperatives, Economic Democratization and Rural Development, Cheltenham/Northampton 2016, p. 55 5. Helen Markelova Ruth Meinzen-Dick/Jon Hellin/Stephan Dohrn, „Collective Action for Smallholder Market Access“, in: Food Policy 34/1, 2009, p. 5 Markus Hanisch, „Elinor Ostrom Die Verfassung der Allmende“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	EconOstr I Elinor Ostrom Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action Cambridge 1990 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Self-Regulation	Rizzo	Parisi I 64 Self-regulation/economics/Rizzo/Whitman/Jolls: Mario Rizzo and Glen Whitman’s (2009)⁽¹⁾ work on “self-regulation” highlights both the optimism bias featured by Bibas and perceptions related to the loss aversion in Bibas’s plea bargaining treatment. >Optimism bias/Bibas, >Loss aversion/Bibas. “People are afflicted by optimism bias,” Rizzo and Whitman (2009⁽¹⁾, p. 916, emphasis omitted) write, “which causes them to underestimate their personal likelihood of suffering adverse consequences.” Status quo bias: Individuals suffer, too, from “status quo bias: the psychological tendency of people to maintain current arrangements” rather than departing from them (Rizzo and Whitman, 2009⁽¹⁾, p. 915). Like loss aversion, the tendency to maintain “current arrangements” is associated with a role for changes in states of affairs, rather than merely final states, and this tendency thus marks a similar instance of nonoptimization within the definition given above.* Solution/Rizzo/Whitman: In response to these forms of boundedly rational behavior, Rizzo and Whitman (2009⁽¹⁾, p. 943) emphasize that people “have numerous means at their disposal to mitigate the effects” of such behavior - means of mitigation that the authors term “ ‘self-debiasing’ or ‘self-regulation.’ ” Bias: As in Bibas’s work - although here applied to the self rather than the legal system - Rizzo and Whitman’s account of “debiasing” refers both to measures that seek to reduce optimism-based nonomniscience and to measures that shape the decision-making behavior of nonoptimizing individuals. ((s) For non-optimization and non-omniscience see >Bounded rationality/Jolls.) * See Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1991)⁽²⁾ for further discussion of the relationship between loss aversion and status quo bias. 1. Rizzo, Mario J. and Douglas Glen Whitman (2009). “The Knowledge Problem of New Paternalism.” Brigham Young University Law Review 2009: 905–968. 2. Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler (1991). “Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5: 193–206. Jolls, Christine, „Bounded Rationality, Behavioral Economics, and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press.	Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Semantics	Evans	II 210 Interpretive semantics/interpretational semantics/Evans: Interpretive semantics would have to assume an entity for any type of semantic expression. - A set, a truth value, a function of quantities on truth values, etc.- which could be attributed to the events of this kind under any interpretation. Then we could take the specification of the type of attribution as a specification of the underlying system, which has a word in common with others. II 213 Instead of a single unsorted range, it will be appropriate to divide the area into fundamental types of objects: places, times, material objects, living objects, events... Then we can understand e.g. "A set of pairs of living objects and times" as an object. >Object.	EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Semantics	Stalnaker	I 17 Meta-Semantics/Stalnaker: meta-semantic facts: meta-semantic facts are e.g. which language is spoken in a possible world - or whether we interpret the language with our language from the real world or with the one they speak there - or if we actually denote the language of the real world or the local language of the possible worlds from the perspective of the possible worlds itself. These facts ensure that our signs have the representational properties that they have. On these facts, it depends what is said or thought. Cf. >Semantic facts. I 82 Semantics/syntax/language-independent/Stalnaker: the step from syntax to semantics frees the theory from language dependence. >Language dependence. I 149 Modal Semantics/Stalnaker: modal semantics should allocate a separate range to each possible world ((s) but then you can no longer call possible worlds "ways of how things could be"). I 191 Semantics/Stalnaker/(s): semantics is the meanig from the real world. Meta-semantics: meta-semantics is the meaning from respective possible worlds because meta-semantics asks by which facts the semantic value is created and the facts must be from the respective possible world. I 192 Semantics: semantics says which semantic values have the expressions of a language. Meta-semantics: meta-semantic says what facts determine the semantic values. Pre-Semantics/Kaplan: pre-semantics refers to those who believe that a name that is at the end of a historic chain means something. >David Kaplan. Semantics/Kaplan: semantics rather gives us the meaning than telling us how it could be discovered. this is similar to Kripke. I 196 Possible world/actual world/meta-semantics/MS/Stalnaker: meta-semantics: takes into account the facts that determine the semantic values, i.e. ultimately it takes into account the differences between possible worlds. Therefore, meta-semantics is suitable if you want to consider a possible world as actual world. It is the meta-semantically understood primary intension of a statement that provides the information that we want to transmit. >Intensions/Stalnaker. I 199 Two-dimensional semantics/Stalnaker: two-dimensional semantics should be interpreted meta-semantically - not semantically. >Twodimensional semantics. Meta-semantics: meta-semantics is fact based, therefore we do not have access to a priori truth. Semantics: semantics must take internal states. I 213/14 Semantics/meta-semantics/semantics/Stalnaker: e.g. assuming we can only say how things possibly are, given the facts, how they actually are. Then: semantics: the set S only expresses the proposition Q under condition P. Meta-semantics: sentence S expresses only a conditional proposition, not a singular one, i.e. not the content depends on the facts, but it is relative itself.	Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Sense	Ricoeur	I 18 Sense/Freud/Psychoanalysis/Language/Ricoeur: [the] dynamics - this energetics, yes hydraulics - of desire and repression [expresses] itself only within semantics: the "drive fates", to take up a Freudian expression, can only be reached through the "sense fates". Herein lies the profound reason for all the analogies between dream and joke, dream and myth, dream and work of art, dream and religious "illusion" etc. All these "psychic productions" are in the realm of meaning and belong to a single question: how does the word come to desire? How does the desire cause the word to fail and fail even to speak? This new perspective on the totality of human speech, on what the desiring person wants to say, gives psychoanalysis a claim to participate in the great debate on language. I 19 As a desiring person, I walk in disguise - larvatus prodeo; and with this, language is immediately distorted: it wants to say something else than it says, it has a double meaning, it is ambiguous. The dream and its analogues are thus located in a region of language that announces itself as the place of complex meanings, where in an immediate sense another sense opens up and at the same time hides itself; we want to call this region of double meaning symbol (...). >Interpretation of dreams/Ricoeur. Double meaning: The problem of double sense is not only peculiar to psychoanalysis: the phenomenology of religion also knows it; the great cosmic symbols, such as earth, sky, water, life, trees, stones, and the myths, those strange stories about the origin and end of things, are their daily bread. To the extent that it is phenomenological rather than psychoanalytical, the myths, rites and beliefs it examines are not fairy tales, but rather a way of relating to fundamental reality, whatever it may be. >Desire/Ricoeur, >Interpretation/Ricoeur.	Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976
Sentence Formation	Developmental Psychology	Upton I 73 Sentence formation/language acquisition/Developmental psychology/Upton: The two-word utterance, so-called telegraphic speech, which develops around the age of two years (at about the same time that the vocabulary spurt occurs), provides an (…) effective means of communication and is a universal feature of language development (Boysson-Bardies, 1999)⁽¹⁾. Slobin (1972)⁽²⁾ identified a range of functions for these telegraphic utterances: Utterance - Function See doggie - Identification Book there - Location More milk - Repetition All gone - Non-existence My candy - Possession Big car - Attribution Mama walk - Agent action Where ball? - Question (…) young children move rapidly from producing two-word utterances to create three-, four- and five-word combinations and so begin the transition from simple to complex sentences (Bloom, 1998)⁽³⁾. As well as getting longer, utterances also become more grammatical and the transition from early word combinations to full-blown grammar is rapid. By the time children reach their fourth birthday, they have mastered an impressive range of grammatical devices. Indeed, they seem to assimilate the structures of their native language without explicit instruction or correction (Brown and Hanlon, 1970)⁽⁴⁾, which has often been cited as evidence for language acquisition being driven by an innate process. >Language acquisition, >Innatenss, >Chomsky. 1. Boysson-Bardies, B. (1999) How Language Comes to Children: From birth to two years (trans. M DeBevoise). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2. Slobin, D.I. (1972) Children and language: they learn the same way all around the world. Psychology Today, 6(2): 71–4. 3. Bloom, L. (1998) Language Acquisition in its Developmental Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 4. Brown, R and Hanlon C (1970) Derivational complexity and order of acquisition in child speech, in Hayes, J (ed.) Cognition and the Development of Language. New York: Wiley.	Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011
Sequences	Lyons	I 78 Def sequential/Linguistics/Lyons: means a fixed order of words. This is not syntagmatic! Syntagmatically compatible words can be in variable order, e.g. Latin. General: Logical form: Differentiation between syntagmatic/sequential (or non-sequential): Suppose there are two groups of units, X and Y, X = {a, b}, Y = {p, q} Italic/spelling : a realizes a, etc. X, Y: are variable quantities that stand for the realization of the units, Suppose these substantial units cannot occur simultaneously (they can be consonants or vowels), but are arranged sequentially among themselves. Then there are three relevant options (I): linear order fixed: Example X must occur before Y. I.e. ab, aq, bp, bq are possible, but not pa, qa, pb and qb. (II): "free": "free" in so far as XY and YX can occur, but XY = YX! ((s), i.e. the sequence is irrelevant. This is different than when it makes a difference, but both forms are allowed). (i.e. non-sequential, but syntagmatic). (III): fixed or free in another sense: it does not matter, because XY is not equal to YX. I 80 (= sequential-syntagmatic).	Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995
Similarity Metrics	Nozick	II 174 Similarity Metrics/Similarity/Possible Worlds/Nozick: the measure for the next world must be: what if the antecedent is true. - E.g. alphabetical order on the shelf: is an explanatory, not merely a representative order. - Why are the things there? >Order, >Possible worlds, >Cross world identity, >Explanation. Variant: content arranged, but coincidentally the same order - then the alphabetical order is not an explanation. - ((s) Then the neighborhood is no next world, but an irrelevant world.) II 241 Closure/Nearest World/Similarity Metrics/Nozick: when the condition (3) (believe nothing wrong) Condition (3) "If p would be false, S would not believe it" was to be completed, then, if p implies q, the non-q-situation must not be further away from the actual world than the nearest non-p-world. >Closure, >Omniscience/Nozick, >Real world, >Actuality. NozickVsClosure under known implication: we do not have to know or believe all the consequences of our knowledge. II 242 Closure/knowledge/Skepticism/Nozick: if our knowledge were closed under known implication, then if p implies q, the non-q-situation must not be further from the actual world than the nearest non possible world. >Brains in a vat, >Skepticism. Problem: when this is a "non-tank" world, then the statement would demand that the world of the skeptic does not exist, that the tank-world is not further away from the actual world, than any other non possible world. Problem: we would believe p, even if it is wrong, then we do not know that p. >Belief, >Knowledge. All conditionals, which say that we believe nothing wrong, would be wrong. >Conditional. Closed: would be the concept of knowledge only if the world of the skeptic might exist, if p were not true. So when our concept of knowledge would be so strong, skepticism would be right. >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories, >Concepts. Nozick: but we do not have to accept that.	No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994
Singular Terms	Quine	I 102 Distinction singular/general term: independent from stimulus meaning. - Name or general term for space-time segments: the same stimulus meaning ("rabbitness"). >General terms. I 212 Difference verb/noun/adjective: less important - difference singular term/general term very important. I 231 Ambiguity: the name Paul is not ambiguous, no general term but singular term with dissemination - ambiguity action/habit: ice skaters, delivery (action, object). I 236 Ambiguities:. "one" (can be "any") - "nothing", "nobody" indefinite singular term (E.g. Polyphemus). I 244 Range ambiguous: cannot be decided by parentheses - indefinite singular term: one, any, any member - "not a"/"not every" - "I think one is so that..."/"is one so that I think ...". I 258 Indefinite terms do not denote objects - Indefinite singular term must therefore be in a purely denoting position: "Tax auditor is looking for someone" (position denoted - "someone" not denoted). >Someone/Geach. I 273 Opaque verb: "hunts lions" puts nothing in relation, does not denote a lion - relative term police chasing a man. I 285 Indefinite singular term: disappears in quantification "something is an x such that", "everything is an x..". I 300 "Now", "then" Quine: singular term like "I", "you" - StrawsonVs: "now" no limits. "I 311 Singular term: can always be traced back to the form "=a" (unless variable) - i.e. actually general term (Predicate)! E.g. "=Mom", "=Socrates", "=Pegasus". I 323 Elimination of singular term: fusion of "=" with a piece of text - "=" remains! - Together with variables in predicative position - "=" predicative general term. I 327 Definitions: Instructions for transformation, restore singular term! - Flexible, without truth value gaps. --- VII (h) 144 Singular term/Quine: can be eliminated by paraphrase. >Elimination.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Situations	Ainsworth	Corr I 234 Strange Situation/Ainsworth/terminology/attachment theory/Shaver/Mikulincer: a person’s attachment style – the pattern of relational needs, cognitions, emotions and behaviours (…) results from satisfactory or frustrating interactions with attachment figures. These styles were first described by Ainsworth (1967⁽¹⁾; Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters and Wall 1978)⁽²⁾ based on her observations of infants’ responses to separations from and reunions with mother in a laboratory ‘Strange Situation’ assessment procedure. >Attachment theory, >Psychological needs, >Affectional bond. Ainsworth classified infants into one of three style categories: secure, anxious or avoidant. Main and Solomon (1990)⁽³⁾ later added a fourth category, ‘disorganized’, characterized by odd, awkward behaviour and unusual alternations or mixtures of anxiety and avoidance. The responses of infants classified as secure in the Strange Situation are thought to reflect a solid sense of attachment security. Such infants react to separation from mother with overt expressions of distress but then recover quickly when reunited with her and return to exploring the environment with interest and enthusiasm.⁽²⁾ Avoidant infants, in contrast, seem to possess negative working models and to rely on attachment-system deactivation as a self-regulating defence. They show little overt distress when separated from mother, although their heart rate indicates autonomic arousal, and they actively avoid her upon reunion.⁽²⁾ >Self-regulation, >Behavior, >Stages of development. 1. Ainsworth, M. D. S. 1967. Infancy in Uganda: infant care and the growth of love. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 2. Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E. and Wall, S. 1978. Patterns of attachment: assessed in the Strange Situation and at home. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 3. Main, M. and Solomon, J. 1990. Procedures for identifying infants as disorganized/disoriented during the Ainsworth strange situation, in M. T. Greenberg, D. Cicchetti and M. Cummings (eds.), Attachment in the preschool years: theory, research, and intervention, pp. 121–60. University of Chicago Press Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Situations	Funder	Corr I 27 Situations/Funder: The key question of psychology is: what causes people to behave the way they do? It is the question, whether behaviour is mainly determined by the characteristic personality of the individual, or his or her immediate situation (Mischel 1968⁽¹⁾; Kenrick and Funder 1988⁽²⁾). Among other implications, the debate seemed to pit two major sub-fields of psychology against each other: personality psychology, which generally emphasizes the influence of the person, and social psychology, which emphasizes the situation (Funder and Ozer 1983⁽³⁾; Ross and Nisbett 1991⁽⁴⁾). Strong effects of situations and strong effects of persons can and often do coexist in the very same data, and the degree to which a given behaviour is affected by one of these variables may be unrelated to the degree to which it is affected by the other. Corr I 28 FunderVsLewin/BanduraVsLewin: (Bandura 1978 ⁽⁵⁾) we will need One is P = f (S,B) (i.e., to know everything about a person entails knowledge of what he or she would do in any situation). This notion resembles Mischel’s (1999)⁽⁶⁾ ‘if . . . then’ conception in which an individual’s personality is represented in terms of his or her characteristic pattern of behaviour across situations (see Shoda, Mischel and Wright 1994⁽⁷⁾). The other formula is S = f (P,B) (complete understanding of a situation entails knowing what any person would do in it), reminiscent of Bem and Funder’s (1978⁽⁸⁾) ‘template matching’ conception which described situations in terms of the people who would behave in specified ways within them. Corr I 29 Situations/Asendorpf/Funder: are difficult to define: question’. One problem concerns where to set the boundaries. For example, one might very simply describe a situation in terms of place or locality,…((s) where this locality may be a country or a shop.) Temporal dimension: a snapshot of the exact and complex arrangement of all things physical, psychological and social at a particular moment in time. But because every moment is always different from the next, this approach makes it difficult to state where one situation ends and the next begins. A second definitional problem involves perspective. See >Situations/Murray. Corr I 31 Level 1: macro/physico-biological/environmental. At this level, the broadest of the three, a situation is simply the raw sensory information available to us, unfiltered by perception. Level 2: meso/canonical/consensual. This level of description refers to properties of the situation that are consensual in a social, cultural and sociological way. Level 3: micro/subjective/functional. The micro/subjective/functional level describes the psychological demand-properties of the situation as it registers on the individual. Cf. >Situations/Murray. 1. Mischel, W. 1968. Personality and assessment. New York, NY: Wiley 2. Kenrick, D. T. and Funder, D. C. 1988. Profiting from controversy: lessons from the person-situation debate, American Psychologist 43: 23–34 3. Funder, D. C. and Ozer, D. J. 1983. Behaviour as a function of the situation, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 44: 107–12 4. Ross, L. and Nisbett, R. E. 1991. The person and the situation: perspectives of social psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill 5. Bandura, A. 1978. The self-system in reciprocal determinism, American Psychologist 33: 344–58 6. Mischel, W. 1999. Personality coherence and dispositions in a cognitive-affective personality system (CAPS) approach, in D. Cervone and Y. Shoda (eds.), The coherence of personality: social-cognitive bases of consistency, variability and organization, pp. 37–60. New York: Guilford Press 7. Shoda, Y., Mischel, W. and Wright, J. C. 1994. Intraindividual stability in the organization and patterning of behaviour: incorporating psychological situations into the idiographic analysis of personality, Journal Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 67: 674–87 8. Bem, D. J. and Funder, D. C. 1978. Predicting more of the people more of the time: assessing the personality of situations, Psychological Review 85: 485–501 Seth A Wagerman & David C. Funder, “Personality psychology of situations”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press.	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Slavery	Rawls	I 167 Slavery/average benefits/Rawls: against the principle of average benefit one could argue that it requires the same risk acceptance from all. Since in the beginning there was never a situation in which all parties involved could agree, the principle should be rejected. Extreme example: A slave keeper could argue that in the circumstances of his society, the institution of slavery is necessary to produce the greatest average happiness. Furthermore, he would argue that he himself, in the initial situation of a society to be established (in which all parties involved stand behind a veil of ignorance with regard to their later position in society), would have voted for slavery with the risk of ending up as a slave themselves. Rawls: At first glance, this could be dismissed as absurd, one could think that it makes no difference what he chooses; as long as individuals have agreed to a concept of justice with real risks, no one is bound to such requirements. Contract theory/Rawls: if one takes the view of contracts as a basis, however, the argument of the slave keeper is correct: it would be a mistake if the slaves wanted to answer that the argument was superfluous, since there is no actual choice and no equal distribution of opportunities. The treaty doctrine is purely hypothetical: if a version of justice were chosen in the initial situation, its principles would be those that were applied. It is not an argument that such an understanding was not intended or would ever be. We cannot have both: a hypothetical interpretation without concrete information about the result... I 168 ...and later by reassessing the risk, rejecting principles we no longer want to have. G. HarmanVsRawls/Rawls: Gilbert Harman pointed out to me that I had made this mistake myself⁽¹⁾. Solution/Rawls: The theory of justice as fairness refutes the slave owner argument already in the initial situation. >Principles/Rawls). Here, according to the theory of justice as fairness, we have the possibility to accept the two principles of justice, then the imponderables can be circumvented: I 61 Principles/justice/Rawls: provisional wording: 1. every person must have the same right to the widest possible fundamental freedom, insofar as it is compatible with the same freedom for others. 2. social and economic inequalities shall be arranged in such a way that they (a) are reasonably expectable for everyone's benefit; and (b) are linked to positions and administrative procedures that can be held by anyone. This guarantees fundamental freedoms. 1. See G. Harman "Constitutional Liberty and the Concept of Justice", Nomos VI: Justice, ed. C. J. Friedrich and J. W. Chapman, New York, 1963.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Social Cost	Ostrom	Kiesling I 26 Social cost/Ostrom/Kiesling: The pervasiveness of transaction costs includes difficulty defining property rights, so there are resources and contexts in which groups of people use resources communally and have to figure out how to make the best use of them. >Transaction costs/Coase, >Social cost/Coase, >Law/Coase, >Information/Coase. Institutional analysis: Elinor Ostrom pioneered the comparative institutional analysis of situations with common pool resources, for which she was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2009. Example: Consider the example of an agricultural village with an irrigation network, a situation that Ostrom analyzed in her 1990 book, Governing the Commons⁽¹⁾. If digging private wells and self-irrigating is either too costly or not feasible for individuals, then the people in the village will benefit from the alternative arrangement of a shared irrigation network. Problem: But in a shared network the villagers run into the problem that each of them has an incentive to draw as much water as possible, which can lead to scarcity and waste because the irrigation network is a common-pool resource. >Free-rider Problem. Incentive: Ostrom identified the fundamental cause of the incentive problem as a lack of well-enough defined (imperfectly defined) property rights. Cf. >Property rights/Coase. In combining extensive field work and data with game theory (the irrigation situation is an example of a Prisoner’s Dilemma, i.e., individuals in a group choose to act in their own self-interest - at the expense of the others -which does not produce the best outcome for everyone), Ostrom’s insight was that the villagers evolved an institutional framework that enabled them generally to avoid the “tragedy of the commons,” - to avoid scarcity and waste—by developing a system of use rights to the common pool. To do so, they use governance to make the best possible use of the resource. Cf. >Prisoner’s Dilemma. This field of comparative institutional analysis builds on the institutional and transaction cost foundations in Coase’s work, and applies Coase’s approach of examining how people actually arrange their transactions, find approaches to reducing conflict, and develop welfare-enhancing governance institutions as a result. >Ronald Coase, >Elinor Ostrom, >Institutions/Ostrom, >Social goods/Ostrom. 1. Ostrom, Elinor (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press.	EconOstr I Elinor Ostrom Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action Cambridge 1990
Social Minimum	Van Parijs	Gaus I 126 Social Minimum/Van Parijs/Gaus/Mack: (...)each person has the greatest possible opportunity to do whatever she might want to do (leximin opportunity) (1995(1):25). As Van Parijs explains, this last condition requires that 'in a free society, the person with least opportunities has opportunities that are no smaller than those enjoyed by the person with the least opportunities under any other feasible arrangement' (1995⁽¹⁾: 25). And this in turn leads to the requirement that a society provides the highest sustainable basic income for all (...) RawlsVsVan Parijs: see Rawls 2002⁽²⁾: 179. >Justice/Rawls, >Social Minimum/Rawls, >J. Rawls. Van Parijs: (...) the equalization of external endowments that drives redistribution: if someone produces without using resources in scarce supply she has the right to her full product, but because production always requires such resources, his basic income proposal does not lead to exploitation of the industrious. fruits of Green labour. Coincidence: Van Parijs's intuition is that luck must be irrelevant to justice (1995⁽¹⁾: 160): if some have managed to actually produce while others have tried and failed because of bad luck or natural adversities (see also Steiner, 2001)(3), they have a claim on those who do produce. Gaus I 127 Traditional liberalismVsVan Parijs/Gaus: this is not an intuition shared by the liberty tradition (Rand, 1957)⁽⁴⁾. It violates doctrinal commitment (...) of the liberty tradition against seizure of the fruits of another's labour, a commitment that, unsurprisingly, Van Parijs rejects (1995⁽¹⁾: 145ff). Moreover, Van Parijs's position seems to illustrate how violations of [the] commitment (...) also compromise persons' claims to self-sovereignty (...). >Liberalism. 1. Van Parijs, Phillipe (1995) Real Freedom for All: What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? Oxford: Clarendon. 2. Rawls, John (2002) Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly Cambridge, MA: Belknap. 3. Steiner, Hillel (2001) 'The ethics of redistribution'. Acta Philosophica Fennica, 68: 37-45. 4. Rand, Ayn (1957) Atlas Shrugged. New York: Dutton. Mack, Eric and Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Social Movements	Offe	Gaus I 269 Social Movements/Claus Offe/West: Closest to the Marxist paradigm - indeed almost continuous with schools of Western and neo-Marxism, which acknowledge the changing nature of capitalism and corresponding decline of working- class activism - are theories of new social movements as a response to the crises of 'welfare state' capitalism (WSC) (Offe, 1984⁽¹⁾; 1985⁽²⁾). Welfare state capitalism: A starting-point for such theories is the neocorporatist inclusion of the working class into the institutional structures of capitalist society through trade union and party political representation. The social democratic legal order characteristic of WSC supplements civil and political rights (cherished by Gaus I 270 liberal democracy) with 'social welfare rights' realized through provision of social welfare (health, education, housing), social security (unemployment, sickness and retirement benefits), measures of economic redistribution (progressive taxation) and Keynesian economic policies (full employment, demand management) (Marshall, 1963⁽³⁾: 74—126; Offe, 1985⁽²⁾: 821—5). >Liberalism, >Democracy, >Democratic theory. State capitalism: These developments involve a considerable expansion of the state's activities in comparison with liberal capitalism. Production: The associated decline of working-class activism is reinforced by the changing nature of production in the transition from 'Fordism' or 'Taylorism' to 'post-Fordism' and 'post-Taylorism' (Lash and Urry, 1987)⁽⁴⁾. >S. Lash, >J. Urry. This involves, in the first place, the decline of traditional manufacturing and the rise of the service sector, which is geographically more dispersed and indus- trially less organized. But, second, the Fordist model - of mass, assembly-line production of a relatively small range of products for mass consumption - is gradually replaced by more diversified and decentralized forms of production and consumption. Classes/identity: Both developments undermine traditional forms of working-class solidarity and organization and tend to support a multiplication and diversification of forms of identity apart from class. Citizens/welfare state: If the welfare state denies the escalating demands of citizens, then it risks a loss of authority or legitimacy (Offe, 1985⁽²⁾: 818—20; Habermas, 1976⁽⁵⁾). >J. Habermas. But the demands of citizens must inevitably grow, because the expansion of the state's responsibilities erodes such 'uncontested and non-contingent premises of politics' as the family, religion and the work ethic (Offe, 1985⁽²⁾: 819). Neoliberalism/Huntington: It is, of course, precisely this 'crisis of governability' (Huntington, 1975⁽⁶⁾; O'Connor, 1973⁽⁷⁾) that has motivated neoliberal attempts to revive the less expansive state of liberal capitalism. Social movements: The changing nature of capitalism is (...) related not only to diminishing activism of the traditional working class but also to the rise of the women's, peace and environmental movements (Offe, 1985⁽²⁾: 825—32). For Offe, [New Social Movements] (NSMs) offer a potentially more promising response to the crisis of the welfare state in the form of a reconstituted civil society independent of the state. >Civil Society. 1. Offe, Claus (1984) Contradictions of the Welfare State, ed. John Keane. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2. Offe, Claus (1985) 'New social movements: challenging the boundaries of institutional politics'. Social Research, 52 (4): 817-68. 3. Marshall, T. H. (1963) Sociologv at the Crossmads and Other Essays. London: Hememann. 4. Lash, Scott and John Urry (1987) The End of Organized Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity. 5. Habermas, Jürgen (1976) Legitimation Crisis, trans. T. McCarthy. London: Heinemann. 6. Huntington, S. P. (1975) 'The United States'. In M. Crozier et al., eds, The Crisis of Democracy. New York: New York Umversity Press. 7.O’Connor 1973 West, David 2004. „New Social Movements“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Offe I Claus Offe Strukturprobleme des kapitalistischen Staates Frankfurt/M. 1972 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Society	Harris	Gaus I 216 Society/David Harris/Moon: Because concepts of positive rights and equal opportunity are not well defined outside of specific social contexts, they are often combined with arguments appealing to ideals of citizenship and social solidarity. The basic argument is that the welfare state should guarantee the inclusion of all citizens as full members of a democratic society, which requires that an extensive range of social rights be provided. David Harris: Harris offers a communitarian version of the argument from solidarity. He argues that 'full membership' in a society requires that each person be able to enjoy 'a certain style of life' and 'certain life chances' (1987⁽¹⁾: 147). Although he recognizes that modern societies include a plurality of different groups, he insists that there are more or less common standards of what an individual must be able to do and how one must be able to live if one is not to be excluded or socially marginalized. These standards determine the needs of members of that society, and should be equally available to all citizens as a matter of right, for only in that way can the equal status of members be recognized and respected (1987⁽¹⁾: 154-7). Moon: This line of argument supports the institutional welfare state in which services are provided in kind in part because 'citizens have a right to that specific resource', such as 'edu-cation', rather than a right 'to income which may or may not be spent on education' (1987(1): 150). Further, the universal provision of certain services is expressive of, and may contribute to, a sense of community and equal citizenship. Finally, providing services in kind may be a form of 'justified paternalism' to the extent that 'some persons may be imprudent or wasteful or be unable to make adequate use of cash' (1987⁽¹⁾: 150-1). Family: Harris's account relies upon an analogy between political society and the family: just as we have obligations towards, and rights against, members of our family, irrespective of what they may have done for us individually, so we have obligations towards, and rights against, our fellow citizens. Moon: The stress on obligations is crucial, for the possibility of enjoying one's rights depends upon the willing support of social policies on the part of the citizenry, and to claim one's rights one must be prepared to fulfil the 'system of duties' that 'underlies the structure of citizen rights' (1987⁽¹⁾: 160). Fundamental needs: (...) Harris goes on to argue that the pragmatic difficulties involved in determining whether someone's unfulfilled needs are a result of his own choices are so great that we should presume that there are no such cases, and should rely upon a 'sense of duty or community to prevent or minimize abuse of the system' (1987⁽¹⁾: 161). Gaus I 217 MoonVsHarris: 1) (...) the founding of rights and obligations on 'membership' is deeply problematic, in as much as it begs the question of whether the social order of which we are to be members is just. 2) (...) ironically, welfare states have a systematic tendency to undermine the very communitar- ian sentiments and relationships that would support the values of solidarity and equality. Although participating in a common programme, such as a national health service or medicare, may give rise to feelings of solidarity with others, what people actually experience may often be quite different. In many cases it is more like being reduced to the status of a client, attempting to meet one's needs through an impersonal and unresponsive bureaucracy.* 3) (...) the commitment to equality can sometimes sit uneasily with the commitment to democracy. Consider, for example, Albert Weale's argument for earnings-related welfare state schemes, such as social security in the US. Weale argues that such schemes increase the total volume of government transfers, thus leading to greater 'egalitarian effectiveness'. >Equality/Weale, >Solidarity/Welfare economics. *This is an important theme in Wolfe's analysis and critique of state provision (see 1989⁽²⁾: esp. chs 4 and 5). 1. Harris, David (1987) Justifying State Welfare. Oxford: Blackwell. 2. Wolfe, Alan (1989) Whose Keeper? Social Science and Moral Obligation. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	LingHarris I Zellig S. Harris A Theory of Language and Information: A Mathematical Approach Oxford 1991 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Society of Minds	Minsky	Norvig I 434 Society of Minds/Minsky/Norvig/Russell: In his highly influential Society of Mind theory, Marvin Minsky (1986⁽¹⁾, 2007⁽²⁾) proposes that human minds are constructed from an ensemble of agents. >Intelligence, >Human level intelligence, >Artificial general intelligence. 1. Minsky, M. L. (1986). The society of mind. Simon and Schuster 2. Minsky, M. L. (2007). The EmotionMachine: Commonsense Thinking, Artificial Intelligence, and the Future of the Human Mind. Simon and Schuster. Minsky I 59 Society of Minds/Minsky: [e.g. “B-Brains”]: There is one way for a mind to watch itself and still keep track of what's happening. Divide the brain into two parts, A and B. Connect the A-brain's inputs and outputs to the real world — so it can sense what happens there. But don't connect the B-brain to the outer world at all; instead, connect it so that the A-brain is the B-brain's world! Now A can see and act upon what happens in the outside world — while B can see and influence what happens inside A. [E.g.], A seems disordered and confused. Inhibit that activity. A appears to be repeating itself. Make A stop. Do something else. A does something B considers good. Make A remember this. To the extent that the B-brain knows what is happening in A, the entire system could be considered to be partly self-aware. I 90 Society of mind/Minsky: If each K-line can connect to other K-lines, which, in turn, connect to others, then K-lines can form societies. I 82 Def K-Line: Def K-Line/Minsky: A K-line is a wirelike structure that attaches itself to whichever mental agents are active when you solve a problem or have a good idea. When you activate that K-line later, the agents attached to it are aroused, putting you into a mental state much like the one you were in when you solved that problem or got that idea. Example: You want to repair a bicycle. Before you start, smear your hands with red paint. Then every tool you need to use will end up with red marks on it. When you're done, just remember that red means ‘good for fixing bicycles.’ I 92 Society: According to our concept of memory, the K-lines of each agency grow into a new society. So, to keep things straight, let's call the original agents S-agents and call their society the S-society. Given any S-society, we can imagine building memories for it by constructing a corresponding K-society for it. When we start making a K-society, we must link each K-line directly to S-agents, because there are no other K-lines we can connect them to. Efficiency/problem: the connections to the original S-agents will become increasingly remote and indirect. Then everything will begin to slow down — unless the K-society continues to make at least some new connections to the original S-society. Solution: That would be easy to arrange, if the K-society grows in the form of a layer close to its S-society. I 168 Society of Minds/Minsky: Problem: Whenever any specialist tried to rearrange some memories to its own advantage, it might damage structures upon which the others have come to depend. There would be too many unpredictable interactions Solution: Society of Minds: If they were like people, they could communicate, negotiate, and organize. But because each separate specialist is much too small and specialized to understand how the others work, the best each can do is learn to exploit what the others can do, without understanding how they do it. >Motivation/Minsky, >Software-Agents.	Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010
Software	Wolfram	Brockman I 278 Software/Wolfram: Today’s programming will be obsolete in a not very longtime. For example, people no longer learn assembly language, because computers are better at writing assembly language than humans are, and only a small set of people need to know the details of how language gets compiled into assembly language. A lot of what’s being done by armies of programmers today is similarly mundane. There’s no good reason for humans to be writing Java code or JavaScript code. We want to automate the programming process so that what’s important goes from what the human wants done to getting the machine, as automatically as possible, to do it. This will increase that equalization, which is something I’m interested in. A one-line piece of code already does something interesting and useful. It allows a vast range of people make computers do things for them. Brockman I 279 What will the world look like when most people can write code? One feature of code is that it’s immediately executable; it’s not like writing. When you write something, somebody has to read it, and the brain that’s reading it has to absorb the thoughts that came from the person who did the writing. Brockman I 280 What [would] the world would look like if most people could code. Clearly, many trivial things would change: Contracts would be written in code (…), Brockman I 281 simple things like that would change. But much more profound things would also change. Take high school education. The raw material for a typical high school student’s essay is something that’s already been written; students usually can’t generate new knowledge easily. But in the computational world, that will no longer be true. If the students know something about writing code, they’ll access all that digitized historical data and figure out something new. Then they’ll write an essay about something they’ve discovered. The achievement of knowledge-based programming is that it’s no longer sterile, because it’s got the knowledge of the world knitted into the language you’re using to write code. >Inventions/discoveries, >Creativity, >Knowledge, >Learning, >Programming, >Computers. Wolfram, Stephen (2015) „Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Civilization” (edited live interview), in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press.	Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019
Software Agents	AI Research	Norvig I 64 Software Agents/artificial intelligence/Russell/Norvig: agents base their actions on a direct mapping from states to actions. Such agents cannot operate well in environments for which this mapping would be too large to store and would take too long to learn. Goal-based agents, on the other hand, consider future actions and the desirability of their outcomes. Problem-solving agents use atomic representations, (…) that is, states of the world are considered as wholes, with no internal structure visible to the problem-solving algorithms. Norvig I 4 Computer agents are expected to do more: operate autonomously, perceive their environment, persist over a prolonged time period, adapt to change, and create and pursue goals. A rational agent is one that acts so as to achieve the best outcome or, when there is uncertainty, the best expected outcome. Norvig I 235 Knowledge based Agents/logical agents: The central component of a knowledge-based agent is its knowledge base, or KB. A knowledge base is a set of sentences. (Here “sentence” is used as a technical term. It is related but not identical to the sentences of English and other natural languages.) Each sentence is expressed in a language called a knowledge representation language and represents some assertion about the world. Norvig I 240 Semantics: The semantics defines the truth of each sentence with respect to each possible world. Model: instead of “possible world” we need to be more precise and use the term model. Whereas possible worlds might be thought of as (potentially) real environments that the agent might or might not be in, models are mathematical abstractions, each of which simply fixes the truth or falsehood of every relevant sentence. Norvig I 241 Knowledge Base: The KB can be thought of as a set of sentences or as a single sentence that asserts all the individual sentences. The KB is false in models that contradict what the agent knows (…). Norvig I 242 Completeness: an inference algorithm is complete if it can derive any sentence that is entailed. Fortunately, there are complete inference procedures for logics that are sufficiently expressive to handle many knowledge bases. Real world: if [the knowledge base] KB is true in the real world, then any sentence α derived from KB by a sound inference procedure is also true in the real world. So, while an inference process operates on “syntax”—internal physical configurations such as bits in registers or patterns of electrical blips in brains - the process corresponds Norvig I 243 to the real-world relationship whereby some aspect of the real world is the case by virtue of other aspects of the real world being the case. Grounding: grounding [is] the connection between logical reasoning processes and the real environment in which the agent exists. In particular, how do we know that KB is true in the real world? A simple answer is that the agent’s sensors create the connection. Cf. >Semantics, >Syntax; for the philosophical discussion see also >Facts/Wittgenstein, >States of Affairs/Wittgenstein, >Foundation/Philosophical theories. Norvig I 257 Forward chaining: The forward-chaining algorithm (…) determines if a single proposition symbol q - the query - is entailed by a knowledge base of definite clauses. It begins from known facts (positive literals) in the knowledge base. If all the premises of an implication are known, then its conclusion is added to the set of known facts. Norvig I 258 It is easy to see that forward chaining is sound: every inference is essentially an application of Modus Ponens. Forward chaining is also complete: every entailed atomic sentence will be derived. The easiest way to see this is to consider the final state of the inferred table (after the algorithm reaches a fixed point where no new inferences are possible). Cf. >Fixed points. Forward chaining is an example of the general concept of data-driven reasoning – that is, reasoning in which the focus of attention starts with the known data. It can be used within an agent to derive conclusions from incoming percepts, often without a specific query in mind. Backward chaining: works backward from the query. If the query q is known to be true, then no work is needed. Otherwise, the algorithm finds those implications in the knowledge base whose conclusion is q. If all the premises of one of those implications can be proved true (by backward chaining), then q is true. Backward chaining is a form of goal-directed reasoning. It is useful for answering specific questions such as “What shall I do now?” and “Where are my keys?” Often, the cost of backward chaining is much less than linear in the size of the knowledge base, because the process touches only relevant facts. Norvig I 275 History: John McCarthy’s paper “Programs with Common Sense” (McCarthy, 1958⁽¹⁾, 1968⁽²⁾) promulgated the notion of agents that use logical reasoning to mediate between percepts and actions. Allen Newell’s (1982)⁽³⁾ article “The Knowledge Level” makes the case that rational agents can be described and analyzed at an abstract level defined by the knowledge they possess rather than the programs they run. The declarative and procedural approaches to AI are analyzed in depth by Boden (1977)⁽⁴⁾. The debate was revived by, among others, Brooks (1991)⁽⁵⁾ and Nilsson (1991)⁽⁶⁾, and continues to this day (Shaparau et al., 2008)⁽⁷⁾. Meanwhile, the declarative approach has spread into other areas of computer science such as networking (Loo et al., 2006)⁽⁸⁾. Norvig I 278 Current state: The current state of theoretical understanding is summarized by Achlioptas (2009)⁽⁹⁾. The satisfiability threshold conjecture states that, for each k, there is a sharp satisfiability threshold rk, such that as the number of variables n→∞, instances below the threshold are satisfiable with probability 1, while those above the threshold are unsatisfiable with probability 1. The conjecture was not quite proved by Friedgut (1999)⁽¹⁰⁾: a sharp threshold exists but its location might depend on n even as n → ∞. Despite significant progress in asymptotic analysis of the threshold location for large k (Achlioptas and Peres, 2004⁽¹¹⁾; Achlioptas et al., 2007⁽¹²⁾), all that can be proved for k=3 is that it lies in the range [3.52,4.51]. Current theory suggests that a peak in the run time of a SAT solver is not necessarily related to the satisfiability threshold, but instead to a phase transition in the solution distribution and structure of SAT instances. Empirical results due to Coarfa et al. (2003)⁽¹³⁾ support this view. In fact, algorithms such as survey propagation (Parisi and Zecchina, 2002⁽¹⁴⁾; Maneva et al., 2007⁽¹⁵⁾) take advantage of special properties of random SAT instances near the satisfiability threshold and greatly outperform general SAT solvers on such instances. Neural networks: The idea of building agents with propositional logic can be traced back to the seminal paper of McCulloch and Pitts (1943)⁽¹⁶⁾, which initiated the field of neural networks. >Frame problem, >Environment/AI research, >Universe/AI research, >Decisions/AI research, >Uncertainty/AI research. 1. McCarthy, J. (1958). Programs with common sense. In Proc. Symposium on Mechanisation of Thought Processes, Vol. 1, pp. 77–84. 2. McCarthy, J. (1968). Programs with common sense. In Minsky, M. L. (Ed.), Semantic Information Processing, pp. 403–418. MIT Press. 3. Newell, A. (1982). The knowledge level. AIJ, 18(1), 82–127. 4. Boden, M. A. (1977). Artificial Intelligence and Natural Man. Basic Books 5. Brooks, R. A. (1991). Intelligence without representation. AIJ, 47(1–3), 139–159. 6. Nilsson, N. J. (1991). Logic and artificial intelligence. AIJ, 47(1–3), 31–56. 7. Shaparau, D., Pistore, M., and Traverso, P. (2008). Fusing procedural and declarative planning goals for nondeterministic domains. In AAAI-08. 8. Loo, B. T., Condie, T., Garofalakis, M., Gay, D. E., Hellerstein, J. M., Maniatis, P., Ramakrishnan, R., Roscoe, T., and Stoica, I. (2006). Declarative networking: Language, execution and optimization. In SIGMOD-06. 9. Achlioptas, D. (2009). Random satisfiability. In Biere, A., Heule, M., van Maaren, H., and Walsh, T. (Eds.), Handbook of Satisfiability. IOS Press. 10. Friedgut, E. (1999). Necessary and sufficient conditions for sharp thresholds of graph properties, and the k-SAT problem. J. American Mathematical Society, 12, 1017–1054. 11. Achlioptas, D. and Peres, Y. (2004). The threshold for random k-SAT is 2k log 2−o(k). J. American Mathematical Society, 17(4), 947–973. 12. Achlioptas, D., Naor, A., and Peres, Y. (2007). On the maximum satisfiability of random formulas. JACM, 54(2). 13. Coarfa, C., Demopoulos, D., Aguirre, A., Subramanian, D., and Yardi, M. (2003). Random 3-SAT: The plot thickens. Constraints, 8(3), 243–261. 14. Parisi, M. M. G. and Zecchina, R. (2002). Analytic and algorithmic solution of random satisfiability problems. Science, 297, 812–815. 15. Maneva, E., Mossel, E., and Wainwright, M. J. (2007). A new look at survey propagation and its generalizations. JACM, 54(4). 16. McCulloch, W. S. and Pitts, W. (1943). A logical calculus of the ideas immanent in nervous activity. Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics, 5, 115–137.	Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010
Software Agents	Norvig	Norvig I 64 Software Agents/artificial intelligence/Russell/Norvig: agents base their actions on a direct mapping from states to actions. Such agents cannot operate well in environments for which this mapping would be too large to store and would take too long to learn. Goal-based agents, on the other hand, consider future actions and the desirability of their outcomes. Problem-solving agents use atomic representations, (…) that is, states of the world are considered as wholes, with no internal structure visible to the problem-solving algorithms. Norvig I 4 Computer agents are expected to do more: operate autonomously, perceive their environment, persist over a prolonged time period, adapt to change, and create and pursue goals. A rational agent is one that acts so as to achieve the best outcome or, when there is uncertainty, the best expected outcome. Norvig I 235 Knowledge based Agents/logical agents: The central component of a knowledge-based agent is its knowledge base, or KB. A knowledge base is a set of sentences. (Here “sentence” is used as a technical term. It is related but not identical to the sentences of English and other natural languages.) Each sentence is expressed in a language called a knowledge representation language and represents some assertion about the world. Norvig I 240 Semantics: The semantics defines the truth of each sentence with respect to each possible world. Model: instead of “possible world” we need to be more precise and use the term model. Whereas possible worlds might be thought of as (potentially) real environments that the agent might or might not be in, models are mathematical abstractions, each of which simply fixes the truth or falsehood of every relevant sentence. Norvig I 241 Knowledge Base: The KB can be thought of as a set of sentences or as a single sentence that asserts all the individual sentences. The KB is false in models that contradict what the agent knows (…). Norvig I 242 Completeness: an inference algorithm is complete if it can derive any sentence that is entailed. Fortunately, there are complete inference procedures for logics that are sufficiently expressive to handle many knowledge bases. Real world: if [the knowledge base] KB is true in the real world, then any sentence α derived from KB by a sound inference procedure is also true in the real world. So, while an inference process operates on “syntax”—internal physical configurations such as bits in registers or patterns of electrical blips in brains - the process corresponds Norvig I 243 to the real-world relationship whereby some aspect of the real world is the case by virtue of other aspects of the real world being the case. Grounding: grounding [is] the connection between logical reasoning processes and the real environment in which the agent exists. In particular, how do we know that KB is true in the real world? A simple answer is that the agent’s sensors create the connection. Cf. >Semantics, >Syntax; for the philosophical discussion see also >Facts/Wittgenstein, >States of Affairs/Wittgenstein, >Foundation/Philosophical theories. Norvig I 257 Forward chaining: The forward-chaining algorithm (…) determines if a single proposition symbol q - the query - is entailed by a knowledge base of definite clauses. It begins from known facts (positive literals) in the knowledge base. If all the premises of an implication are known, then its conclusion is added to the set of known facts. Norvig I 258 It is easy to see that forward chaining is sound: every inference is essentially an application of Modus Ponens. Forward chaining is also complete: every entailed atomic sentence will be derived. The easiest way to see this is to consider the final state of the inferred table (after the algorithm reaches a fixed point where no new inferences are possible). Cf. >Fixed points. Forward chaining is an example of the general concept of data-driven reasoning – that is, reasoning in which the focus of attention starts with the known data. It can be used within an agent to derive conclusions from incoming percepts, often without a specific query in mind. Backward chaining: works backward from the query. If the query q is known to be true, then no work is needed. Otherwise, the algorithm finds those implications in the knowledge base whose conclusion is q. If all the premises of one of those implications can be proved true (by backward chaining), then q is true. Backward chaining is a form of goal-directed reasoning. It is useful for answering specific questions such as “What shall I do now?” and “Where are my keys?” Often, the cost of backward chaining is much less than linear in the size of the knowledge base, because the process touches only relevant facts. Norvig I 275 History: John McCarthy’s paper “Programs with Common Sense” (McCarthy, 1958⁽¹⁾, 1968⁽²⁾) promulgated the notion of agents that use logical reasoning to mediate between percepts and actions. Allen Newell’s (1982)⁽³⁾ article “The Knowledge Level” makes the case that rational agents can be described and analyzed at an abstract level defined by the knowledge they possess rather than the programs they run. The declarative and procedural approaches to AI are analyzed in depth by Boden (1977)⁽⁴⁾. The debate was revived by, among others, Brooks (1991)⁽⁵⁾ and Nilsson (1991)⁽⁶⁾, and continues to this day (Shaparau et al., 2008)⁽⁷⁾. Meanwhile, the declarative approach has spread into other areas of computer science such as networking (Loo et al., 2006)⁽⁸⁾. Norvig I 278 Current state: The current state of theoretical understanding is summarized by Achlioptas (2009)⁽⁹⁾. The satisfiability threshold conjecture states that, for each k, there is a sharp satisfiability threshold rk, such that as the number of variables n→∞, instances below the threshold are satisfiable with probability 1, while those above the threshold are unsatisfiable with probability 1. The conjecture was not quite proved by Friedgut (1999)⁽¹⁰⁾: a sharp threshold exists but its location might depend on n even as n → ∞. Despite significant progress in asymptotic analysis of the threshold location for large k (Achlioptas and Peres, 2004⁽¹¹⁾; Achlioptas et al., 2007⁽¹²⁾), all that can be proved for k=3 is that it lies in the range [3.52,4.51]. Current theory suggests that a peak in the run time of a SAT solver is not necessarily related to the satisfiability threshold, but instead to a phase transition in the solution distribution and structure of SAT instances. Empirical results due to Coarfa et al. (2003)⁽¹³⁾ support this view. In fact, algorithms such as survey propagation (Parisi and Zecchina, 2002⁽¹⁴⁾; Maneva et al., 2007⁽¹⁵⁾) take advantage of special properties of random SAT instances near the satisfiability threshold and greatly outperform general SAT solvers on such instances. Neural networks: The idea of building agents with propositional logic can be traced back to the seminal paper of McCulloch and Pitts (1943)⁽¹⁶⁾, which initiated the field of neural networks. >Frame problem. 1. McCarthy, J. (1958). Programs with common sense. In Proc. Symposium on Mechanisation of Thought Processes, Vol. 1, pp. 77–84. 2. McCarthy, J. (1968). Programs with common sense. In Minsky, M. L. (Ed.), Semantic Information Processing, pp. 403–418. MIT Press. 3. Newell, A. (1982). The knowledge level. AIJ, 18(1), 82–127. 4. Boden, M. A. (1977). Artificial Intelligence and Natural Man. Basic Books 5. Brooks, R. A. (1991). Intelligence without representation. AIJ, 47(1–3), 139–159. 6. Nilsson, N. J. (1991). Logic and artificial intelligence. AIJ, 47(1–3), 31–56. 7. Shaparau, D., Pistore, M., and Traverso, P. (2008). Fusing procedural and declarative planning goals for nondeterministic domains. In AAAI-08. 8. Loo, B. T., Condie, T., Garofalakis, M., Gay, D. E., Hellerstein, J. M., Maniatis, P., Ramakrishnan, R., Roscoe, T., and Stoica, I. (2006). Declarative networking: Language, execution and optimization. In SIGMOD-06. 9. Achlioptas, D. (2009). Random satisfiability. In Biere, A., Heule, M., van Maaren, H., and Walsh, T. (Eds.), Handbook of Satisfiability. IOS Press. 10. Friedgut, E. (1999). Necessary and sufficient conditions for sharp thresholds of graph properties, and the k-SAT problem. J. American Mathematical Society, 12, 1017–1054. 11. Achlioptas, D. and Peres, Y. (2004). The threshold for random k-SAT is 2k log 2−o(k). J. American Mathematical Society, 17(4), 947–973. 12. Achlioptas, D., Naor, A., and Peres, Y. (2007). On the maximum satisfiability of random formulas. JACM, 54(2). 13. Coarfa, C., Demopoulos, D., Aguirre, A., Subramanian, D., and Yardi, M. (2003). Random 3-SAT: The plot thickens. Constraints, 8(3), 243–261. 14. Parisi, M. M. G. and Zecchina, R. (2002). Analytic and algorithmic solution of random satisfiability problems. Science, 297, 812–815. 15. Maneva, E., Mossel, E., and Wainwright, M. J. (2007). A new look at survey propagation and its generalizations. JACM, 54(4). 16. McCulloch, W. S. and Pitts, W. (1943). A logical calculus of the ideas immanent in nervous activity. Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics, 5, 115–137.	Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010
Software Agents	Russell	Norvig I 64 Software Agents/artificial intelligence/Russell/Norvig: agents base their actions on a direct mapping from states to actions. Such agents cannot operate well in environments for which this mapping would be too large to store and would take too long to learn. Goal-based agents, on the other hand, consider future actions and the desirability of their outcomes. Problem-solving agents use atomic representations, (…) that is, states of the world are considered as wholes, with no internal structure visible to the problem-solving algorithms. Norvig I 4 Computer agents are expected to do more: operate autonomously, perceive their environment, persist over a prolonged time period, adapt to change, and create and pursue goals. A rational agent is one that acts so as to achieve the best outcome or, when there is uncertainty, the best expected outcome. Norvig I 235 Knowledge based Agents/logical agents: The central component of a knowledge-based agent is its knowledge base, or KB. A knowledge base is a set of sentences. (Here “sentence” is used as a technical term. It is related but not identical to the sentences of English and other natural languages.) Each sentence is expressed in a language called a knowledge representation language and represents some assertion about the world. Norvig I 240 Semantics: The semantics defines the truth of each sentence with respect to each possible world. Model: instead of “possible world” we need to be more precise and use the term model. Whereas possible worlds might be thought of as (potentially) real environments that the agent might or might not be in, models are mathematical abstractions, each of which simply fixes the truth or falsehood of every relevant sentence. Norvig I 241 Knowledge Base: The KB can be thought of as a set of sentences or as a single sentence that asserts all the individual sentences. The KB is false in models that contradict what the agent knows (…). Norvig I 242 Completeness: an inference algorithm is complete if it can derive any sentence that is entailed. Fortunately, there are complete inference procedures for logics that are sufficiently expressive to handle many knowledge bases. Real world: if [the knowledge base] KB is true in the real world, then any sentence α derived from KB by a sound inference procedure is also true in the real world. So, while an inference process operates on “syntax”—internal physical configurations such as bits in registers or patterns of electrical blips in brains - the process corresponds Norvig I 243 to the real-world relationship whereby some aspect of the real world is the case by virtue of other aspects of the real world being the case. Grounding: grounding [is] the connection between logical reasoning processes and the real environment in which the agent exists. In particular, how do we know that KB is true in the real world? A simple answer is that the agent’s sensors create the connection. Cf. >Semantics, >Syntax; for the philosophical discussion see also >Facts/Wittgenstein, >States of Affairs/Wittgenstein, >Foundation/Philosophical theories. Norvig I 257 Forward chaining: The forward-chaining algorithm (…) determines if a single proposition symbol q - the query - is entailed by a knowledge base of definite clauses. It begins from known facts (positive literals) in the knowledge base. If all the premises of an implication are known, then its conclusion is added to the set of known facts. Norvig I 258 It is easy to see that forward chaining is sound: every inference is essentially an application of Modus Ponens. Forward chaining is also complete: every entailed atomic sentence will be derived. The easiest way to see this is to consider the final state of the inferred table (after the algorithm reaches a fixed point where no new inferences are possible). Cf. >Fixed points. Forward chaining is an example of the general concept of data-driven reasoning – that is, reasoning in which the focus of attention starts with the known data. It can be used within an agent to derive conclusions from incoming percepts, often without a specific query in mind. Backward chaining: works backward from the query. If the query q is known to be true, then no work is needed. Otherwise, the algorithm finds those implications in the knowledge base whose conclusion is q. If all the premises of one of those implications can be proved true (by backward chaining), then q is true. Backward chaining is a form of goal-directed reasoning. It is useful for answering specific questions such as “What shall I do now?” and “Where are my keys?” Often, the cost of backward chaining is much less than linear in the size of the knowledge base, because the process touches only relevant facts. Norvig I 275 History: John McCarthy’s paper “Programs with Common Sense” (McCarthy, 1958⁽¹⁾, 1968⁽²⁾) promulgated the notion of agents that use logical reasoning to mediate between percepts and actions. Allen Newell’s (1982)⁽³⁾ article “The Knowledge Level” makes the case that rational agents can be described and analyzed at an abstract level defined by the knowledge they possess rather than the programs they run. The declarative and procedural approaches to AI are analyzed in depth by Boden (1977)⁽⁴⁾. The debate was revived by, among others, Brooks (1991)⁽⁵⁾ and Nilsson (1991)⁽⁶⁾, and continues to this day (Shaparau et al., 2008)⁽⁷⁾. Meanwhile, the declarative approach has spread into other areas of computer science such as networking (Loo et al., 2006)⁽⁸⁾. Norvig I 278 Current state: The current state of theoretical understanding is summarized by Achlioptas (2009)⁽⁹⁾. The satisfiability threshold conjecture states that, for each k, there is a sharp satisfiability threshold rk, such that as the number of variables n→∞, instances below the threshold are satisfiable with probability 1, while those above the threshold are unsatisfiable with probability 1. The conjecture was not quite proved by Friedgut (1999)⁽¹⁰⁾: a sharp threshold exists but its location might depend on n even as n → ∞. Despite significant progress in asymptotic analysis of the threshold location for large k (Achlioptas and Peres, 2004⁽¹¹⁾; Achlioptas et al., 2007⁽¹²⁾), all that can be proved for k=3 is that it lies in the range [3.52,4.51]. Current theory suggests that a peak in the run time of a SAT solver is not necessarily related to the satisfiability threshold, but instead to a phase transition in the solution distribution and structure of SAT instances. Empirical results due to Coarfa et al. (2003)⁽¹³⁾ support this view. In fact, algorithms such as survey propagation (Parisi and Zecchina, 2002⁽¹⁴⁾; Maneva et al., 2007⁽¹⁵⁾) take advantage of special properties of random SAT instances near the satisfiability threshold and greatly outperform general SAT solvers on such instances. Neural networks: The idea of building agents with propositional logic can be traced back to the seminal paper of McCulloch and Pitts (1943)⁽¹⁶⁾, which initiated the field of neural networks. >Frame problem. 1. McCarthy, J. (1958). Programs with common sense. In Proc. Symposium on Mechanisation of Thought Processes, Vol. 1, pp. 77–84. 2. McCarthy, J. (1968). Programs with common sense. In Minsky, M. L. (Ed.), Semantic Information Processing, pp. 403–418. MIT Press. 3. Newell, A. (1982). The knowledge level. AIJ, 18(1), 82–127. 4. Boden, M. A. (1977). Artificial Intelligence and Natural Man. Basic Books 5. Brooks, R. A. (1991). Intelligence without representation. AIJ, 47(1–3), 139–159. 6. Nilsson, N. J. (1991). Logic and artificial intelligence. AIJ, 47(1–3), 31–56. 7. Shaparau, D., Pistore, M., and Traverso, P. (2008). Fusing procedural and declarative planning goals for nondeterministic domains. In AAAI-08. 8. Loo, B. T., Condie, T., Garofalakis, M., Gay, D. E., Hellerstein, J. M., Maniatis, P., Ramakrishnan, R., Roscoe, T., and Stoica, I. (2006). Declarative networking: Language, execution and optimization. In SIGMOD-06. 9. Achlioptas, D. (2009). Random satisfiability. In Biere, A., Heule, M., van Maaren, H., and Walsh, T. (Eds.), Handbook of Satisfiability. IOS Press. 10. Friedgut, E. (1999). Necessary and sufficient conditions for sharp thresholds of graph properties, and the k-SAT problem. J. American Mathematical Society, 12, 1017–1054. 11. Achlioptas, D. and Peres, Y. (2004). The threshold for random k-SAT is 2k log 2−o(k). J. American Mathematical Society, 17(4), 947–973. 12. Achlioptas, D., Naor, A., and Peres, Y. (2007). On the maximum satisfiability of random formulas. JACM, 54(2). 13. Coarfa, C., Demopoulos, D., Aguirre, A., Subramanian, D., and Yardi, M. (2003). Random 3-SAT: The plot thickens. Constraints, 8(3), 243–261. 14. Parisi, M. M. G. and Zecchina, R. (2002). Analytic and algorithmic solution of random satisfiability problems. Science, 297, 812–815. 15. Maneva, E., Mossel, E., and Wainwright, M. J. (2007). A new look at survey propagation and its generalizations. JACM, 54(4). 16. McCulloch, W. S. and Pitts, W. (1943). A logical calculus of the ideas immanent in nervous activity. Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics, 5, 115–137.	Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010
Sorites	Wright	II 229 Sorites/color/Wright: Tradition: small changes need to be survived by the predicate. Problem: in the end everything is orange and simultaneously everything is red - Suppose f is a term that is related to the predicate F in a way that: any object that can be applied to the F can be transformed into one where the predicate F cannot be applied, simply by performing a sufficient change in terms of f. Term f: corresponds to E.g. age in the case of childhood, color, in the case of "red", number of hairs in the case of "bald", etc. II 234 Tradition: according to it, we must regard our color predicates as nontransitive. >Transitivity, >Color words, >Definitions, >Definability, >Vagueness. II 236 Tradition: demands double observability of color predicates 1. as a consequence of our general concept of the use conditions and 2. from the character of our learning (training). >Learning, >Observability. >Conditions.	WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Sovereignty	Walzer	Gaus I 292 Sovereignty/international politics/Walzer/Brown: for Walzer, the rights of political communities derive from the rights of their members and '[t]he moral standing of any particular state depends on the reality of the common life it protects and the extent to which the sacrifices required by that protection are willingly accepted and thought worthwhile' (1992⁽¹⁾: 54). Cf.>Sovereignty/International political theory. Brown: what distinguishes this position from that of the human rights regime is that it is up to the members of a political community to determine what kind of 'common life' they wish to live, and it cannot be assumed that their choice will be based on the rights of the individual; thus the universal element in this position does not concern what the community chooses, but rather its right to choose for itself the arrangements under which it is governed. >Lifeworld. Community: for Walzer (1992⁽¹⁾: 90), communal Gaus I 293 autonomy should be respected, and outsiders may only intervene when it is clear that the common life of a community does not exist or has broken down, for instance into slavery, massacre or genocide. This position, which Walzer initially established in the context of a discussion of the ethics of warfare has been defended in a series of books over the last two decades, and is consistent with the general account of justice presented in his major work of 'domestic' political theory, Spheres of Justice (1983⁽²⁾; see also Walzer, 1987⁽³⁾; 1994⁽⁴⁾). VsWalzer: one obvious objection to Walzer' s position - and is that the picture these to Nardin's and Frost's (>Sovereignty/International political theory) - writers paint of the state does not seem to be drawn from life. Even if one accepts that communities should have the right to choose their form of government, overriding thereby the putative rights of individuals - and many would deny this, arguing that there is no intrinsic value to >diversity - it is by no means clear that the 'fit' between existing states and political communities allows this communal right to be activated under the Westphalian system. >International political theory/Brown, >International law/International political theory. 1. Walzer, M. (1992) Just and Unjust Wars (1977), 2nd edn. New York: Basic. 2. Walzer, M. (1983) Spheres of Justice. London: Martin Robertson. 3. Walzer, M. (1987) Interpretation and Social Criticism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 4. Waver, M. (1994) Thick and Thin: Moral mgument at Home and Abroad. Notre Dame, In: University of Notre Dame Press. Brown, Chris 2004. „Political Theory and International Relations“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Space	Flusser	I 121 Room/Picture/Flusser: Relations in the picture: relation of the type "top"/"bottom" are absolute relations, they also mean "sublime" and "correct". If you relativize them and say "above" and "to the right of", the information contained in the image is lost. The sun in Fig. I 114 is not above the dog, but at the top of the picture! And since it is there, it is "higher", "more sublime", "more glorious", etc. than the dog. Sun and dog stand in an absolute relationship, preformed by the picture, they are each in their "right place". The circling time arranges the elements in the picture "justly", "correctly", i.e. in sublime and infamous, correct and awkwardly ruling and subjugated places of the picture. In the picture H O H, the O occupies a central, dominant position. This is no longer noticeable in the equation 2H+O=H2O. >Images, >Coding. I 217 Space/Flusser: Spatial experience: The image of the experience of time must be spatial. For techno-imagination it is impossible to imagine time without space and vice versa. >Techno-image/Flusser, >Terminology/Flusser. I 218 An object is closer the more it touches me. This scale does not have to be less accurate than the conventional linear scale. >Perspective. I 219 However, there must be new ways of measuring that are already indicated. e.g. the so called "proxemics": since all scales start with me, they cannot be infinite, they have to enter all "notches" from "here" to "future". >Measurements, >Future, >Time. I 220 Since all standards apply only to my "interest in the world ", they can no longer separate space and time. They cannot be "four-dimensional", because this is a conceptual abstraction of images. >Interest, >Society, >Community. I can transcend the world's limitations regarding "here now" by involving other people. It is not space travel and nuclear research that broaden the world of technology imagined, but rather commitment to others and the expansion of interests. >Image/Flusser. I 221 When space becomes measurable through interest, it becomes "ethical" again, as in the magical level of consciousness. Proximity becomes "sublime", the fly in my vicinity is more annoying than Chinese-Russian border disputes. But: the realization of the technical image world (techno image, >Image/Flusser)) view is the end of humanism and appalling: In such a context, the phrase "love thy neighbour" means closeness and not closeness to people. >Humanism.	Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996
Space	Hume	I 110 Space/Hume: space is realizable in the arrangement of the visible and palpable objects. What is given is not part of the space but space is part of what is given. Expansion: affects only property of perceptions. This is not true for time. >Substantivalism, >Empty Space.	D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997
Space	Leibniz	Holz I 132 Space/Leibniz: space is the order. It is not an in-itself, but the structure of a material plurality, which in turn possesses the actual substantial in-itself in the self-limiting nature of the original force. There is no (infinite) "empty space". The idea of this would be a futile action: to work without doing something with it. There would be no observable change for anyone. The space appears only in the mutual representation. Spatiality is something different than space. Space and time are something ideal. cf. >Space/Kant, cf. >Relationism, >Substantivalism. I 133 Space outside the world is just imaginary. (Scholasticism already represented this view). Space/Leibniz: the arrangement of things causes the appearance of space in perception. Appearance/"well-founded"/Leibniz: the appearance of space is "well-founded" when it is related to the multiplicity of things. Space is "imaginary" or "ideal" when the multiplicity is seen as being isolated from the things. (s). e.g. as a set? Movement/Leibniz: something steps into the place of something else. ((s) Not replacing a previously "empty space"). I 134 What encompasses all these places is "space". For this, one does not need to assume "absolute reality" of space. Space/time/LeibnizVsKant: is epitome of possible relationships, but not as forms of intuition, but rather real ontological as structures of the relationship of the material in themselves to one another. In-itself/Leibniz: in-itself is the force. Two aspects: 1. Intensional as a point of force. 2. Extensional in effects. >Intension, >Extension.	Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994
Space Time	Einstein	Kanitscheider I 164 Event/General Theory of Relativity/Kanitscheider: every event is a point in four-dimensional space-time that can be described independently of all conceptual constructions such as vector bases and coordinate systems. Space-time/Einstein: somewhere between 10^-15 and 10^-33 cm the smooth manifold image of space-time breaks down. >Gravitation/Einstein, >Covariance/Einstein. Space-time/Kanitscheider: A space-time also has more general qualities than the metric, namely affine, projective, topological. Kanitscheider I 166/167 Def light cone/Kanitscheider: shows the character of Einstein's gravitational theory well: if we pick out a point e in space-time, it represents a physical event. The cone of light from e is then the story of a spherical flash of light that converges inward towards e and then diverges outward again from e. The cone of light reflects the local causal structure of the Relativity Theory. All allowed processes are represented by world lines lying inside or at most (in the case of photons and neutrinos) on the mantle of the cone. All events in the past cone can affect e and all in the future cone can be affected by e. The gravitation-free space-time of the SR (matter-free universe) can be distinguished from the generally relativistic space-times filled with gravitational fields by the local light cone structure. In the SR (without matter) the cones are all arranged the same. In the AR (with matter) they are inclined according to the strength of acting gravitational fields. (Effect on the causal structure and time by the gravitation of matter). Kanitscheider I 170 Space-time/Einstein: over time, Mach's principle lost its weight and space-time was prioritized by matter! She took on the properties of material objects. >Mach's principle, >Theory of relativity, >Space-time/Kanitscheider.	Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Species	Gould	I 223 Species/Gould: an average invertebrate species lived about 5 - 10 million years unchanged. It hardly changes in time and dies out without successors. At a higher level, evolution is basically a matter of the different successes of species and not a slow transformation of lineages. II 331 Species/Gould: Definition species: species are defined as populations isolated from all others in reproduction. When brought together with other species, they will not mix. Key question for the origin of a new species: how do isolation mechanisms develop? II 332 Traditional point of view: an originally unified population is separated from continents by drifting apart, by newly formed mountain ranges, the newly isolated groups would adapt to their new environment by adaptation. After a certain time, the populations become so different that they can no longer be crossed. New view: the ultimate success of a species may depend on the evolution of adaptation, but the act of species formation itself can be a coincidental event. Taxonomists have discovered that many groups of closely related species are not very different in form, behavior, and even in genetic equipment. However, there are striking differences in the number and shape of chromosomes, and these differences produce the isolation mechanisms that they receive as a separate species. The main change occurs in a single individual. Who should it breed with? IV 198 Species: biodiversity has certainly increased over time. Today's oceans contain at least twice as many species as the oceans in the Palaeozoic. Therefore, one could expect that they not only contain more species, but also more diverse species of organisms, with fundamentally different blueprints. But this is not the case! Today, twice as many species are put in much fewer groups of higher taxa. Today's seas are dominated by fewer groups: primarily by mussels, snails, crabs, fish and sea urchins. Each group includes many more species than any tribe in the Palaeozoic ever had. This steady decrease of organic construction types with a strong increase in the number of species is probably the most prominent trend of fossil documents! IV 199 Causality/coincidence/evolution: there may be one principle that can be identified: "initial experimentation and later standardization". For example, around 1900 there were few car brands and a much wider range of construction types. Today, there are hundreds of brands and much more uniform construction. Evolution/species richness: the change from a few species and many groups to a few groups and many species would occur even in the case of purely coincidental extinction if every speciation process at the beginning of life's history had been accompanied by average major changes. IV 201 Extinction: each is inevitable forever. An extinct experiment will never be repeated. The chances are mathematically too slim. Biologists speak of the "principle of the irreversibility of evolution". Order/coincidence/Gould: coincidental processes produce a high degree of order. The fact that they result in certain patterns does not speak against their coincidence. IV 327 Species/Gould: each species is a concatenation of improbabilities. Every species, whether human, coral or squid, is the last link in a chain that stretches back to the beginning of life. If any of these species had died out or evolved in any other direction, the end results would be very different. For example, our ancestors, the fish, developed a special fin with a stable, central bony axis. Without them, they could not have developed ashore. Nevertheless, these fins did not develop in anticipation of the necessities of rural life. They developed as adaptations to a local habitat. Necessity: human brains did not develop on a direct and necessary ascending ladder, but on winding paths full of accidents. III 264 Species/Gould: in the early days of evolution, the greatest spectrum of forms was reached, and most of the early experiments were extinct. It was accidental and not by predictable causes. Today, there are only a small number of possibilities left. >Evolution, >Explanation, >Darwinism.	Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989
Spectrum Allocation	Economic Theories	Kiesling I 27 Spectrum Allocation/Economic theories/Kiesling: Radio waves are electromagnetic waves with a range of frequencies (measured in megahertz, or millions of cycles per second). The radio “spectrum” is the set of these frequencies. Different parts of the spectrum, with different wavelengths, are suitable for different uses, and have been divided accordingly - broadcast radio, short wave radio, television, mobile phones, wireless internet, the Global Positioning System, and so on. Kiesling I 28 If multiple users are too close to each other and try to use the same frequency (for example, two FM radio operators broadcasting at 93.1 megahertz), the interference between them would disrupt both broadcasts, and that frequency would not be put to its best use. Users of the radio spectrum must leave enough space between frequencies to avoid interference. Since the origins of broadcast radio in the early 20th century, new technologies have radically altered the interference problem, continually creating new opportunities for communication, but simultaneously, generating new demands that drive conflicts. Commercial uses of spectrum started around the turn of the 20th century for ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore communications. In 1912, concerns about maritime safety led to legislation requiring radio stations to have federal Department of Commerce-issued licenses. With the introduction of broadcasting in the 1920s, spectrum scarcity became a problem (Hazlett, 1998)⁽¹⁾. Political conflicts arose over how to govern the use of the spectrum. (Most strikingly, the Navy argued for a government monopoly under their control.) Congress passed legislation in February 1927, establishing the Federal Radio Commission (FRC). The FRC created and granted licenses according to “public interest, necessity, or convenience” (Coase, 1959⁽²⁾: 14). >Spectrum allocation/Coase. Regulation: In 1934 the FRC’s regulatory jurisdiction was transferred to the new Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which to this day regulates radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable communications in the United States. Between 1927 and 1981, the FRC/FCC awarded licenses using comparative public interest hearings, a process that according to the US Congressional Budget Office “weighs the relative merits of the contending applicants” - and a process that telecommunications economist Thomas Hazlett called “socially wasteful and politically charged” (1998⁽¹⁾: 530). Lotteries: In 1981 the FCC switched from the hearings to using lotteries to allocate spectrum licenses, which de-politicized the process but did not ensure efficient license allocation and continued the process of wasteful rent seeking (as lottery applicants had to fill out voluminous documents to establish their “public interest” credentials). Kiesling I 29 Specific authorization: Up until the switch to the lottery system, and worried about interference, the FCC did not issue “spectrum licenses” granting permission to use a given bandwidth, but very specific authorizations that mandated the service, technology, and business model to be used. This decision greatly restricted competition among licensees; in addition, many potential competitors were denied licenses. >Administrative agencies. Cartelization/Problem: The result was a cartelization of wireless markets via government regulation. Substantial profits accrued to those who succeeded in the comparative public interest hearing process, while the radio spectrum was underused compared to its capacity. >Cartels, >Monopolies. Innovations: Innovations were thwarted as no market in spectrum existed: new applicants or networks had to apply for permission to use part of the spectrum from the FCC - and they were dependably opposed by incumbent operators and the regulators rarely granted permission. In the face of technological progress in electronics, the social burdens of these restrictions grew substantially over time. Had entrepreneurs been able to buy spectrum rights, wireless innovations bringing new products and services to market could have competed for consumers. Instead, these new value-creating opportunities were all too rarely realized. >Innovations. 1. Hazlett, Thomas W. (1990). The Rationality of U. S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum. The Journal of Law and EconomicsVolume 33, Number 1 2. Coase, Ronald H. (1959). The Federal Communications Commission. Journal of Law and Economics 2: 1-40.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Spirit	Dilthey	Gadamer I 232 Spirit/Dilthey/DiltheyVsHegel/Gadamer: Dilthey opposes the idealistic construction of [the Hegelian concept of the absolute spirit]: "Today we must start from the reality of life". He writes: "We seek to understand it and to present it in adequate terms. By thus separating the objective spirit from the one-sided foundation in the general reason that expresses the essence of the world spirit, and also from the ideal construction, a new concept of it becomes possible. Several things are included in it: language, custom, every kind of way of life, every style of life, as well as family, civil society, state and Gadamer I 233 right. And now, what Hegel distinguished as the absolute spirit from the objective spirit: art and religion and philosophy, also fall under this term. Spirit/DiltheyVsHegel: Undoubtedly this is a reshaping of the Hegelian concept. What does it mean? To what extent does it reflect the reality of life? Most significant is apparently the extension of the concept of the objective spirit to art, religion and philosophy. Because this means that Dilthey does not see in them immediate truth but expressions of life. By equating art and religion with philosophy, he also rejects the claim of the speculative concept. In doing so, Dilthey does not deny at all that these figures take precedence over the other figures of the objective spirit, provided that "precisely in their powerful forms" the spirit is objectified and recognized. Now, it was this primacy of a completed self-knowledge of the spirit that led Hegel to conceive of these figures as those of the absolute spirit. There was nothing foreign in them and the spirit was therefore completely at home with itself. For Dilthey too, as we saw, the objectivations of art represented the real triumph of hermeneutics. Gadamer: So the contrast to Hegel is reduced to this one thing: according to Hegel, the return of the spirit is completed in the philosophical concept, whereas for Dilthey the philosophical concept has not a meaning of recognition but of expression. Absolute Spirit/Dilthey/Gadamer: is there an absolute spirit for Dilthey too? (...) [i.e.] a complete self-transparency, complete erasure of all strangeness (...)? For Dilthey it is not a question that there is and that it is the historical consciousness that corresponds to this ideal and not speculative philosophy. It sees all phenomena of the human-historical world only as objects by which the spirit recognizes itself more deeply. Insofar as it understands them as objectivations of the spirit, it translates them back "into the spiritual vitality from which they came"⁽²⁾. The formations of the objective mind are thus objects of self-knowledge of that mind for the historical consciousness. Historical consciousness extends itself into the universal, insofar as it understands all the circumstances of history as an expression of the life from which they originate; "life grasps life here"⁽³⁾. 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schr. Vll, 150. 2. Ges. Schr. Vll V, 265 3. Ges. Schr. Vll VII, 136	Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Spontaneous Order	Austrian School	Coyne I 24 Spontaneous order/Austrian School/Coyne/Boettke: The systematic development of thinking about spontaneous order was achieved during the eighteenth century by scholars of the Scottish Enlightenment. Thinkers like Adam Ferguson, David Hume, and Adam Smith appreciated the idea that mechanisms existed to solve complicated problems and generate complex orders absent design or control by an individual or group ofindividuals. Moreover, given the nuance and complexity of these orders they could not be designed using human reason because they extended beyond what the human mind could grasp. A crucial feature of the theory of spontaneous order is that its operation does not depend on an ideal model of people. For example, it does not require that people are benevolent, other-regarding, or that they possess extraordinary intelligence. Instead, the theory of spontaneous order takes People as they are, and demonstrates how individuals, each pursuing their own plans and purposes, can contribute to the emergence of a broader order that benefits others in society. Carl Menger: Following in the footsteps of the Enlightenment thinkers, Carl Menger emphasized that a central question in the social sciences was how institutions that generate benefits to society could emerge absent a central planner designing them. The importance of this question can be seen throughout the work of Austrian economists, who emphasize the importance of emergent orders for understanding numerous aspects of human civilization. Order: When we use the word "order," we are referring to coordination among people pursuing their own ends. >Human Action, >Means and ends. Two types of order: a) A planned order is one that is rationally constructed using human reason. Hayek referred to these types of orders as "organizations." Organizations are ends-oriented, meaning that they are designed With a specific intended purpose, or end, in mind. b) The second type of order is spontaneous. Rather than being designed, a spontaneous order is emergent in that it results, as an unintended consequence, from the interactions of people who are pursuing their own ends. In contrast to an organization, which is ends-driven, a spontaneous order is means-driven. That is, a spontaneous order is the result of people employing means to achieve their diverse individual goals rather than the result of a preconceived plan with one defined end. 1) They are a result of human action but not of human diesign. Coyne I 25 2) Second, a spontaneous order can readily be described as an order, meaning that identifiable patterns emerge from the interactions of those in the system. The operation of the market process allows us to make broad predictions of the patterns that will emerge. For examples, property rights allow for exchange that allows for the emergence of prices. The prices reflect the trade-off, or opportunity costs, of scarce resources. We can also say that resources will continue to be reallocated to their highest-valued uses as people respond to changes in prices and to the feedback provided by profit and loss. >Profit and loss, >Markets, >Prices, >Opportunity costs. 3) The third characteristic is that spontaneous orders require feedback mechanisms - both positive and negative - to guide people's behaviours as they seek to coordinate with others. In the context of markets, profit and loss serve this role. >Feedback. Coyne I 26 Profit and loss provide feedback to entrepreneurs about perceived profit opportunities and the viability of production plans implemented to exploit those opportunities. Hard budget constraints in the form of finite monetary resources prompt people to act on the profit-and-loss feedback and adjust their behaviour accordingly. If they fail to adjust their behaviour in the face of feedback, they will eventually run out of money and go out of business. 4) Fourth, general rules of conduct regarding what is appropriate behaviour are followed by those whose actions produce the spontaneous order. These rules, which can be informal or formal, frame interaction among people and influence the specifics of the order that emerges. Markets are grounded in the property rights that facilitate interaction and exchange and allow for the emergence of prices. Beyond property rights, there is a wide range of rules that allow markets to operate. For example, informal norms, such as manners, and formal rules, such as standards set by professional associations, matter a great deal in facilitating interactions among people. 5) The final characteristic is that spontaneous orders are highly complex and nuanced, which suggests that they cannot be fully understood using human reason. Because of this, people contributing to the order do not need to understand their contribution or the broader order itself. One of the most powerful aspects of markets is that they generate orderly outcomes despite the fact that people do not know, and do not need to know, how they are contributing to the broader pattern of order. In addition, the fact that the details of spontaneous orders are beyond the grasp of human reason means that these orders can extend far beyond what could be achieved using the human mind to intentionally design these orders. Coyne I 27 Complexity: appreciating the limits of human reason as a tool for designing policy. The reality is that the intelligence of even the most well-trained expert is severely limited relative to the complexity of the numerous spontaneous orders that characterize human life. Knowledge/Hayek: Knowledge of our limited human reason - what F.A. Hayek referred to as "negative knowledge"- is itself an important type of knowledge for guiding our actions and avoiding harmful policies even if they are motivated by the best of intentions. >Interventions, >Interventionism.	Coyne I Christopher J. Coyne Peter J. Boettke The Essential Austrian Economics Vancouver 2020
State (Polity)	Buchanan	Brocker I 568 State/Buchanan: Buchanan's approach leads to a separation of law and state. The state only stands for the validity of the legal system. See Constitution/Buchanan. According to Buchanan, the state becomes the embodiment of the arbitrator who controls the parties, assuming that everyone tries to cheat. ⁽¹⁾ Buchanan cites the universal desire for disarmament as the reason for the conclusion of contracts in order to reduce costs. Brocker I 569 Protective State/Buchanan: a protective cover to ensure the exchange of private goods. Problem: this does not secure the handling of public goods. Productive State/Buchanan: Question: Which regulatory system must be introduced to ensure the possible and reasonably desired improvement in the situation compared to natural distribution or to a society consuming only private goods? Solution/Buchanan: the post-constitutional contract (which presupposes the constitutional contract to secure private property) creates a genuinely political system for the creation and distribution of public goods. >Majorities/Buchanan , >Public Goods. Brocker I 570 Amartya SenVsBuchanan: this is precisely what reinforces existing inequalities: because the burdens on the financing of public goods beyond legal protection also affect those who do not benefit from them.⁽²⁾ 1. James M. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty. Between Anarchy and Leviathan, Chicago/London 1975. Dt.: James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit. Zwischen Anarchie und Leviathan, Tübingen 1984, S. 96f. 2. Amartya Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare, San Francisco u. a 1970, S. 25 Wolfgang Kersting, „James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 Boudreaux I 21 State/Buchanan/Boudreaux/Holcombe: „The state has its origin in, and depends for its continuance upon, the desires of individuals to fulfil a certain portion of their wants collectively. The state has no ends other than those of its individual members and is not a separate decision-making unit. State decisions are, in the final analysis, the collective decisions of individuals.“⁽¹⁾ Government Debt/Boudreaux/Holcombe: When analyzing the activities of government, the costs and benefits of government policies fall on individuals, not on aggregates or groups. The argument that domestically held public debt is no burden because “we owe it to ourselves” is revealed as fallacious once we recognize that the aggregate—ourselves—is really composed of many individuals, some of whom will pay the taxes to finance the debt repayment, and some of whom will receive the proceeds when they redeem the bonds they hold. Boudreaux I 74 State/Buchanan/Boudreaux/Holcombe: Ideally, the outputs of the productive state result from collective agreement in which individuals exchange their tax payments for the collectively produced outputs - outputs such as pollution abatement, roads, and municipal parks. Problem: But how can citizens determine the size and range of duties of the productive state that will be most welfare-enhancing? How can they ensure that the state does what the people wish it to do and only what they wish it to do? (…) Buchanan’s answer was to limit the activities of the state to those that command agreement from all of its constituents. But this benchmark of consensus on state activities presents a challenge. >Agreement/Buchanan, >Democracy/Buchanan, >Government/Buchanan. In the real world, people have not agreed to the activities of the state. Under what conditions could people be depicted as being in agreement with institutions to which they have not actually agreed? >Solution/Buchanan: Buchanan extended the market-exchange logic - one in which all parties to an exchange voluntarily agree to it - to collective activity >Collective Action/Buchanan. 1. James M. Buchanan, “The Pure Theory of Government Finance: Suggested Approach” (1949)	EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 Boudreaux I Donald J. Boudreaux Randall G. Holcombe The Essential James Buchanan Vancouver: The Fraser Institute 2021
Statistical Learning	Norvig	Norvig I 825 Statistical learning/Norvig/Russell: Statistical learning methods range from simple calculation of averages to the construction of complex models such as Bayesian networks. They have applications throughout computer science, engineering, computational biology, neuroscience, psychology, and physics. ((s) Cf. >Prior knowledge/Norvig). Bayesian learning methods: formulate learning as a form of probabilistic inference, using the observations to update a prior distribution over hypotheses. This approach provides a good way to implement Ockham’s razor, but quickly becomes intractable for complex hypothesis spaces. Maximum a posteriori (MAP) learning: selects a single most likely hypothesis given the data. The hypothesis prior is still used and the method is often more tractable than full Bayesian learning. Maximum-likelihood learning: simply selects the hypothesis that maximizes the likelihood of the data; it is equivalent to MAP learning with a uniform prior. In simple cases such as linear regression and fully observable Bayesian networks, maximum-likelihood solutions can be found easily in closed form. Naive Bayes learning is a particularly effective technique that scales well. Hidden variables/latent variables: When some variables are hidden, local maximum likelihood solutions can be found using the EM algorithm. Applications include clustering using mixtures of Gaussians, learning Bayesian networks, and learning hidden Markov models. Norvig I 823 EM Algorithm: Each involves computing expected values of hidden variables for each example and then recomputing the parameters, using the expected values as if they were observed values. Norvig I 825 Learning the structure of Bayesian networks is an example of model selection. This usually involves a discrete search in the space of structures. Some method is required for trading off model complexity against degree of fit. Nonparametric models: represent a distribution using the collection of data points. Thus, the number of parameters grows with the training set. Nearest-neighbors methods look at the examples nearest to the point in question, whereas kernel methods form a distance-weighted combination of all the examples. History: The application of statistical learning techniques in AI was an active area of research in the early years (see Duda and Hart, 1973)⁽¹⁾ but became separated from mainstream AI as the latter field concentrated on symbolic methods. A resurgence of interest occurred shortly after the introduction of Bayesian network models in the late 1980s; at roughly the same time, Norvig I 826 statistical view of neural network learning began to emerge. In the late 1990s, there was a noticeable convergence of interests in machine learning, statistics, and neural networks, centered on methods for creating large probabilistic models from data. Naïve Bayes model: is one of the oldest and simplest forms of Bayesian network, dating back to the 1950s. Its surprising success is partially explained by Domingos and Pazzani (1997)⁽²⁾. A boosted form of naive Bayes learning won the first KDD Cup data mining competition (Elkan, 1997)⁽³⁾. Heckerman (1998)⁽⁴⁾ gives an excellent introduction to the general problem of Bayes net learning. Bayesian parameter learning with Dirichlet priors for Bayesian networks was discussed by Spiegelhalter et al. (1993)⁽⁵⁾. The BUGS software package (Gilks et al., 1994)(6) incorporates many of these ideas and provides a very powerful tool for formulating and learning complex probability models. The first algorithms for learning Bayes net structures used conditional independence tests (Pearl, 1988(7); Pearl and Verma, 1991(8)). Spirtes et al. (1993)(9) developed a comprehensive approach embodied in the TETRAD package for Bayes net learning. Algorithmic improvements since then led to a clear victory in the 2001 KDD Cup data mining competition for a Bayes net learning method (Cheng et al., 2002)⁽¹⁰⁾. (The specific task here was a bioinformatics problem with 139,351 features!) A structure-learning approach based on maximizing likelihood was developed by Cooper and Herskovits (1992)⁽¹¹⁾ and improved by Heckerman et al. (1994)(12). Several algorithmic advances since that time have led to quite respectable performance in the complete-data case (Moore and Wong, 2003(13); Teyssier and Koller, 2005(14)). One important component is an efficient data structure, the AD-tree, for caching counts over all possible combinations of variables and values (Moore and Lee, 1997)(15). Friedman and Goldszmidt (1996)(16) pointed out the influence of the representation of local conditional distributions on the learned structure. Hidden variables/missing data: The general problem of learning probability models with hidden variables and missing data was addressed by Hartley (1958)⁽¹⁷⁾, who described the general idea of what was later called EM and gave several examples. Further impetus came from the Baum–Welch algorithm for HMM learning (Baum and Petrie, 1966)(18), which is a special case of EM. The paper by Dempster, Laird, and Rubin (1977)⁽¹⁹⁾, which presented the EM algorithm in general form and analyzed its convergence, is one of the most cited papers in both computer science and statistics. (Dempster himself views EM as a schema rather than an algorithm, since a good deal of mathematical work may be required before it can be applied to a new family of distributions.) McLachlan and Krishnan (1997)⁽²⁰⁾ devote an entire book to the algorithm and its properties. The specific problem of learning mixture models, including mixtures of Gaussians, is covered by Titterington et al. (1985)⁽²¹⁾. Within AI, the first successful system that used EM for mixture modeling was AUTOCLASS (Cheeseman et al., 1988⁽²²⁾; Cheeseman and Stutz, 1996⁽²³⁾). AUTOCLASS has been applied to a number of real-world scientific classification tasks, including the discovery of new types of stars from spectral data (Goebel et al., 1989)⁽²⁴⁾ and new classes of proteins and introns in DNA/protein sequence databases (Hunter and States, 1992)⁽²⁵⁾. Maximum-likelihood parameter learning: For maximum-likelihood parameter learning in Bayes nets with hidden variables, EM and gradient-based methods were introduced around the same time by Lauritzen (1995)⁽²⁶⁾, Russell et al. (1995)⁽²⁷⁾, and Binder et al. (1997a)⁽²⁸⁾. The structural EM algorithm was developed by Friedman (1998)⁽²⁹⁾ and applied to maximum-likelihood learning of Bayes net structures with Norvig I 827 latent variables. Friedman and Koller (2003)⁽³⁰⁾. describe Bayesian structure learning. Causality/causal network: The ability to learn the structure of Bayesian networks is closely connected to the issue of recovering causal information from data. That is, is it possible to learn Bayes nets in such a way that the recovered network structure indicates real causal influences? For many years, statisticians avoided this question, believing that observational data (as opposed to data generated from experimental trials) could yield only correlational information—after all, any two variables that appear related might in fact be influenced by a third, unknown causal factor rather than influencing each other directly. Pearl (2000)⁽³¹⁾ has presented convincing arguments to the contrary, showing that there are in fact many cases where causality can be ascertained and developing the causal network formalism to express causes and the effects of intervention as well as ordinary conditional probabilities. Literature on statistical learning and pattern recognition: Good texts on Bayesian statistics include those by DeGroot (1970)⁽³²⁾, Berger (1985)⁽³³⁾, and Gelman et al. (1995)⁽³⁴⁾. Bishop (2007)⁽³⁵⁾ and Hastie et al. (2009)⁽³⁶⁾ provide an excellent introduction to statistical machine learning. For pattern classification, the classic text for many years has been Duda and Hart (1973)⁽¹⁾, now updated (Duda et al., 2001)⁽³⁷⁾. The annual NIPS (Neural Information Processing Conference) conference, whose proceedings are published as the series Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, is now dominated by Bayesian papers. Papers on learning Bayesian networks also appear in the Uncertainty in AI and Machine Learning conferences and in several statistics conferences. Journals specific to neural networks include Neural Computation, Neural Networks, and the IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks. 1. Duda, R. O. and Hart, P. E. (1973). Pattern classification and scene analysis. Wiley. 2. Domingos, P. and Pazzani, M. (1997). On the optimality of the simple Bayesian classifier under zero-one loss. Machine Learning, 29, 103–30. 3. Elkan, C. (1997). Boosting and naive Bayesian learning. Tech. rep., Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of California, San Diego. 4. Heckerman, D. (1998). A tutorial on learning with Bayesian networks. In Jordan, M. I. (Ed.), Learning in graphical models. Kluwer. 5. Spiegelhalter, D. J., Dawid, A. P., Lauritzen, S., and Cowell, R. (1993). Bayesian analysis in expert systems. Statistical Science, 8, 219–282. 6. Gilks, W. R., Thomas, A., and Spiegelhalter, D. J. (1994). A language and program for complex Bayesian modelling. The Statistician, 43, 169–178. 7. Pearl, J. (1988). Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Networks of Plausible Inference. Morgan Kaufmann. 8. Pearl, J. and Verma, T. (1991). A theory of inferred causation. In KR-91, pp. 441–452. 9. Spirtes, P., Glymour, C., and Scheines, R. (1993). Causation, prediction, and search. Springer-Verlag. 10. Cheng, J., Greiner, R., Kelly, J., Bell, D. A., and Liu, W. (2002). Learning Bayesian networks from data: An information-theory based approach. AIJ, 137, 43–90. 11. Cooper, G. and Herskovits, E. (1992). A Bayesian method for the induction of probabilistic networks from data. Machine Learning, 9, 309–347. 12. Heckerman, D., Geiger, D., and Chickering, D. M. (1994). Learning Bayesian networks: The combination of knowledge and statistical data. Technical report MSR-TR-94-09, Microsoft Research. 13. Moore, A. and Wong, W.-K. (2003). Optimal reinsertion: A new search operator for accelerated and more accurate Bayesian network structure learning. In ICML-03. 14. Teyssier, M. and Koller, D. (2005). Ordering-based search: A simple and effective algorithm for learning Bayesian networks. In UAI-05, pp. 584–590. 15. Moore, A. W. and Lee, M. S. (1997). Cached sufficient statistics for efficient machine learning with large datasets. JAIR, 8, 67–91. 16. Friedman, N. and Goldszmidt, M. (1996). Learning Bayesian networks with local structure. In UAI-96, pp. 252–262. 17. Hartley, H. (1958). Maximum likelihood estimation from incomplete data. Biometrics, 14, 174–194. 18. Baum, L. E. and Petrie, T. (1966). Statistical inference for probabilistic functions of finite state Markov chains. Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 41. 19. Dempster, A. P., Laird, N., and Rubin, D. (1977). Maximum likelihood from incomplete data via the EM algorithm. J. Royal Statistical Society, 39 (Series B), 1–38. 20. McLachlan, G. J. and Krishnan, T. (1997). The EM Algorithm and Extensions. Wiley. 21. Titterington, D. M., Smith, A. F. M., and Makov, U. E. (1985). Statistical analysis of finite mixture distributions. Wiley. 22. Cheeseman, P., Self, M., Kelly, J., and Stutz, J. (1988). Bayesian classification. In AAAI-88, Vol. 2, pp. 607–611. 23. Cheeseman, P. and Stutz, J. (1996). Bayesian classification (AutoClass): Theory and results. In Fayyad, U., Piatesky-Shapiro, G., Smyth, P., and Uthurusamy, R. (Eds.), Advances in Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining. AAAI Press/MIT Press. 24. Goebel, J., Volk, K., Walker, H., and Gerbault, F. (1989). Automatic classification of spectra from the infrared astronomical satellite (IRAS). Astronomy and Astrophysics, 222, L5–L8. 25. Hunter, L. and States, D. J. (1992). Bayesian classification of protein structure. IEEE Expert, 7(4), 67–75. 26. Lauritzen, S. (1995). The EM algorithm for graphical association models with missing data. Computational Statistics and Data Analysis, 19, 191–201. 27. Russell, S. J., Binder, J., Koller, D., and Kanazawa, K. (1995). Local learning in probabilistic networks with hidden variables. In IJCAI-95, pp. 1146–52. 28. Binder, J., Koller, D., Russell, S. J., and Kanazawa, K. (1997a). Adaptive probabilistic networks with hidden variables. Machine Learning, 29, 213–244. 29. Friedman, N. (1998). The Bayesian structural EM algorithm. In UAI-98. 30. Friedman, N. and Koller, D. (2003). Being Bayesian about Bayesian network structure: A Bayesian approach to structure discovery in Bayesian networks. Machine Learning, 50, 95–125. 31. Pearl, J. (2000). Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference. Cambridge University Press. 32. DeGroot, M. H. (1970). Optimal Statistical Decisions. McGraw-Hill. 33. Berger, J. O. (1985). Statistical Decision Theory and Bayesian Analysis. Springer Verlag. 34. Gelman, A., Carlin, J. B., Stern, H. S., and Rubin, D. (1995). Bayesian Data Analysis. Chapman & Hall. 35. Bishop, C. M. (2007). Pattern Recognition and Machine Learning. Springer-Verlag. 36. Hastie, T., Tibshirani, R., and Friedman, J. (2009). The Elements of Statistical Learning: Data Mining, Inference and Prediction (2nd edition). Springer- Verlag. 37. Duda, R. O., Hart, P. E., and Stork, D. G. (2001). Pattern Classification (2nd edition). Wiley.	Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010
Statistics	Gould	III 139 Statistic/Gould: why should a shrinkage of the variation range be a sign of deterioration? >Evolution, >Explanation, >Darwinism.	Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989
Strange Situation	Ainsworth	Upton I 57 Strange Situation/Ainsworth/Upton: The standard method for assessing attachment type in infancy is the Strange Situation developed by Ainsworth and Bell (1970)⁽¹⁾. This 20-minute procedure has eight episodes, designed to expose infants to increasing amounts of stress. Carers (typically mothers) and their one-year-old infants are observed in a playroom through a two-way mirror. The child’s attachment behaviours around their parents when in an unfamiliar environment are recorded. The infants experience the following situations: 1. The mother and infant enter the room, which looks like a typical GP waiting room with chairs, magazines and some toys. 2. The mother and infant are left alone. The mother sits quietly on a chair, responding if the infant seeks attention. The infant usually plays with available toys. 3. A stranger enters the room, talks to the mother, then gradually approaches the infant with a toy. 4. The mother leaves the stranger alone in the room with the infant. The stranger tries to engage the infant with toys. If the infant becomes distressed the scenario ends here. 5. The mother returns and waits to see how the infant greets her. The stranger leaves quietly and the mother waits until the infant settles, and then she leaves again. 6. The infant is left in the room alone. If the infant becomes distressed the scenario ends here. 7. The stranger returns and again tries to engage the infant with toys. 8. The mother returns, the stranger leaves and the reunion behaviour is noted. Observers are particularly interested in four infant behaviours: separation anxiety, willingness to explore, stranger anxiety and response to the mother following separation (reunion behaviour). >Strange Situation/Attachment theory. Upton I 59 VsAinsworth: The Strange Situation has been criticised for being ethnocentric in its approach and assumptions, as it does not take into account the Upton I 60 diversity of socialising contexts that exist in the world. Cultural values influence the nature of attachment. (Cole and Tan, 2007)⁽²⁾. >Attachment theory/Cultural psychology, >Cultural values. 1. Ainsworth, M and Bell, S (1970) Attachment, exploration and separation: illustrated by the behaviour of 1 year olds in a Strange Situation. Child Development, 41:49—65. 2. Cole, P.M. and Tan, P.Z. (2007) Emotion socialization from a cultural perspective, in Grusec, J.E. and Hastings, P.D. (eds) Handbook of Socialization. New York: Guilford.	Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011
Strange Situation	Attachment Theory	Upton I 57 Strange Situation/Attachment theory/Upton: According to attachment theory, infants who have formed a good attachment to their mothers should be able to use them as a secure base from which to explore the novel environment. The stranger’s entrance should inhibit the infant’s exploration and cause them to move a little closer to their mother. When the mother leaves the room, the infant is expected to try to bring her back by crying or searching behaviours. A reduction in exploration of the room and toys is also expected. Following the parent’s return, infants should seek to re-engage in interaction. If distressed, they may also want to be cuddled and comforted. The same responses should be seen following the second separation and reunion. Based on their observations, Ainsworth and Bell (1970)⁽¹⁾ found that 66 per cent of infants behaved in this way and so classified them as securely attached. >M. Ainsworth, >Situations. Upton I 58 Insecurely attached children: reacted in two quite different ways: a) Insecure-avoidant children showed little concern at their mothers’ absence. Instead of greeting their mothers on reunion, they actively avoided interaction and ignored their parents’ bids for interaction. These infants comprised 22 per cent of the sample. b) Insecure-resistant children were distressed by their mothers’ absence, and behaved ambivalently on reunion, both seeking contact and interaction and angrily rejecting it when it was offered. These infants accounted for 12 per cent of the sample. Later research (Main and Solomon, 1986)⁽²⁾ added a further category, insecure-disorganised, which consisted of children who showed contradictory behaviour patterns and seemed to be confused or apprehensive about approaching their parents. >Attachment Theory/Cultural Psychology, >About the Attachment theory. 1. Ainsworth, M and Bell, S (1970) Attachment, exploration and separation: illustrated by the behaviour of 1 year olds in a Strange Situation. Child Development, 41:49—65. 2. Main, M and Solomon, J (1986) Discovery of an insecure-disorganized/disoriented attach ment pattern, in Brazelton, TB and Yogman, MW (eds) Affective Development in Infancy. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.	Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011
Strength of Theories	Quine	IX 237ff Stronger/weaker/theory/system/Quine: Problem: Comparability: it fails if both of the two systems have theorems that cannot be found in the other - it also depends on contingencies of interpretation and not on structure. >Comparisons, >Comparability. If we can interpret the primitive logic characters (only "ε" in set theory) new so that we can ensure that all theorems of this system are made to translations of the theorems of the other system, then the latter system is at least as strong as the other. >Systems. If this is not possible in the other direction, one system is stronger than the other one. Definition "ordinal strength"/set theory: numerical measure: the smallest transfinite ordinal number whose existence you cannot prove anymore in the system. The smallest transfinite number after blocking of the apparatus shows how strong the apparatus was. Relative strength/proof theory: Goedel incompleteness sentence: since the number theory can be developed in set theory, this means that the class of all theorems (in reality all Goedel numbers of theorems) of a present set theory can be defined in this same set theory, and different things can be proven about them. >Incompletenes/Goedel. One can produce an endless series of further based on a arbitrary set theory, of which each in the proof-theoretic sense is stronger than its predecessors, and which is consistent when its predecessors were. - One must only add via Goedel numbering a new arithmetic axiom of the content so that the previous axioms are consistent. Ordinal strength: is the richness of the universe. >Goedel numbers. --- X 71 Metalanguage/Set Theory/Quine: in the metalanguage a stronger set theory is possible than in the object language. In the metalanguage a set of z is possible so that satisfaction relation z applies. - ((s) A set that is the fulfillment relation (in form of a set of arranged pairs) - not in the object language, otherwise Grelling paradox. >Meta language, >Set theory, >Grelling's paradox, >Metalanguage.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Structures	Vollmer	I 130 Structure/to fit/Vollmer: To fit does not mean that the structure is the same. - E.g. screw and screw drawing - E.g. eye/frequency range. Cf. >Proto Geometry.	Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988
Style	Bourdieu	I 94 Style/Art/Bourdieu: in contrast to the unspecific perception of the work of art, the genuinely aesthetic one is equipped with a socially trained and acquired principle of relevance. This principle of choice allows the aesthetic view... to define the stylistic features and only they can be defined and retained, which - with a view to the overall range of stylistic possibilities - characterise a very specific way of dealing with these elements (e.g. leaves and clouds). The style is then understood as the display mode. Only the work of art can be stylistically characterized,... --- I 95 ...which presupposes at least an implicit reference to simultaneous (to distinguish a work from concurrently given) or successive (to differentiate it from earlier or later works by the same or another artist) co-options or equivalents. A painting like the Broadway Boogie-Woogie only gains its full significance for those who already have a previous idea of, for example, a work by Mondrian and have associated expectations. (See Aesthetics/visual/knowledge/perception/Gombrich). >Aesthetic experience, >Aesthetic consciousness, >Taste, >Seeing/Gombrich, >Perception/Gombrich.	Bourd I P. Bourdieu La distinction. Critique sociale du jugement, Paris 1979 German Edition: Die feinen Unterschiede. Kritik der gesellschaftlichen Urteilskraft Frankfurt/M. 1987
Substitution (Insertion)	Gödel	I Berka 306 Inserting/replacing/substitution/Goedel: individual variables (free and bound) may be replaced by any other, provided there occurs no overlap of the range of equally naming variables.⁽¹⁾ >Scope, >Variables, >Individual variables, >Substitution, >Substitutability, >Formulas, >Free variables, >Bound variables. 1. K. Gödel: Die Vollständighkeit der Axiome des logischen Funktionenkalküls, in: Mh, Math. Phys. 37 (1930), pp. 349-360.	Göd II Kurt Gödel Collected Works: Volume II: Publications 1938-1974 Oxford 1990
Substitutional Quantification	Quine	V 140 Substitutional quantification/Quine: is open for other grammatical categories than just singular term but has other truth function. - Referential quantification: here, the objects do not even need to be specifiable by name. >Referential quantification, >Truth functions, >Singular terms. --- V 141 Language learning: first substitution quantification: from relative pronouns. - Later: referential quantification: because of categorical sentences. Substitution quantification: would be absurd: that every inserted name that verifies Fx also verifies Gx - absurd: that each apple or rabbit would have to have a name or a singular description. - Most objects do not have names. --- V 140 Substitutional Quantification/Referential Quantification/Truth Function/Quine: referential universal quantification: can be falsified by one single object, even though this is not specifiable by a name. - The same substitutional universal quantification: in contrast, remains true. - Existential quantification: referential: may be true due to a non-assignable value. - The same in substitutional sense: does not apply for lack of an assignable example. --- V 146f Substitutional Quantification/Quine: Problem: Blind spot: substitutional universal quantification: E.g. none of the substitution cases should be rejected, but some require abstention. - Existential quantification: E.g. none of the cases is to be approved, but some abstention is in order.- then neither agree nor abstain. (Equivalent to the alternation). --- Ad V 170 Substitutional Quantification/(s): related to the quantification over apparent classes in Quine’s meta language? --- V 175 Numbers/Classes/Quantification/Ontology/Substitutional quantification/Quine: first substitutional quantification through numbers and classes. - Problem: Numbers and classes can then not be eliminated. - Can also be used as an object quantification (referential quantification) if one allows every number to have a successor. - ((s) with substitution quantification each would have to have a name.) Class quantifier becomes object quantifier if one allows the exchange of the quantifiers (AQU/AQU/ - EQu/EQu) - so the law of the partial classes of one was introduced. --- X 124 Substitutional quantification/Quine: requires name for the values of the variables. Referential quantification/(s) speaks of objects at most. - Definition truth/Substitutional Quantification/Barcan/Quine: applying-Quantification - is true iff at least one of its cases, which is obtained by omitting the quantifier and inserting a name for the variable, is true. - Problem: almost never enough names for the objects in a not overly limited world. - E.g. No Goedel numbers for irrational numbers. - Then substitutional quantification can be wrong, because there is no name for the object, but the referential quantification can be true at the same time - i.e. both are not extensionally equal. X 124 Names/logic/substitutional quantification/Quine: Problem: never enough names for all objects in the world: e.g. if a set is not determined by an open sentence, it also has no name. - Otherwise E.g. Name a, Determination: x ε a - E.g. irrational numbers cannot be attributed to integers. - (s) > substitution class. --- XII 79f Substitutional Quantification/Quine: Here the variables are placeholders for words of any syntactic category (except names) - Important argument: then there is no way to distinguish names from the rest of the vocabulary and real referential variables. ((s) Does that mean that one cannot distinguish fragments like object and greater than, and that structures like "there is a greater than" would be possible?). XII 80 Substitutional Quantification/Quine: Problem: Assuming an infinite range of named objects. - Then it is possible to show for each substitution result of a name the truth of a formula and simultaneously to refute the universal quantification of the formula. - (everyone/all). - Then we have shown that the range has at least one unnamed object. - ((s) (> not enough names). - Therefore QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification. E.g. assuming the range contained the real name - Then not all could be named, but the unnamed cannot be separated. - The theory can always be strengthened to name a certain number, but not all - referential quantification: attributes nameless objects to itself. - Trick: (see above) every substitution result with a name is true, but makes universal quantification false. ((s) Thus an infinite number of objects secured). - A theory of real names must be based on referential quantification.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Superintelligence	Bostrom	I 61 Superintelligence/Bostrom: Biological enhancements: Compared with possible breakthroughs in machine intelligence, however, biological enhancements I 62 would be relatively slow and gradual. They would, at best, result in relatively weak forms of superintelligence (…). Brain–computer interfaces/Bostrom: look unlikely as a source of superintelligence. Networks/superintelligence: Improvements in networks and organizations might result in weakly superintelligent forms of collective intelligence in the long run; but more likely, they will play an enabling role similar to that of biological cognitive enhancement, gradually increasing humanity’s effective ability to solve intellectual problems. Forms: I 64 (1) Def Speed superintelligence/Bostrom: Speed superintelligence: A system that can do all that a human intellect can do, but much faster. Because of[ the] (…) time dilation of the material world, a speed superintelligence would prefer to work with digital objects. (…) it could interact with the physical environment by means of nanoscale manipulators, since limbs at such small scales could operate faster than macroscopic appendages. I 65 Def Collective superintelligence/Bostrom: A system composed of a large number of smaller intellects such that the system’s overall performance across many very general domains vastly outstrips that of any current cognitive system. Collective intelligence excels at solving problems that can be readily broken into parts such that solutions to sub-problems can be pursued in parallel and verified independently. I 66 A system’s collective intelligence could be enhanced by expanding the number or the quality of its constituent intellects, or by improving the quality of their organization. A new conference format that lets scholars exchange information more effectively, or a new collaborative information-filtering algorithm that better predicted users’ ratings of books and movies, would clearly not on its own amount to anything approaching collective superintelligence. I 67 (2) Collective superintelligence could be either a) loosely or b) tightly integrated. a) To illustrate a case of loosely integrated collective superintelligence, imagine a planet, MegaEarth, which has the same level of communication and coordination technologies that we currently have on the real Earth but with a population one million times as large. I 338 foot note Vs: A planet large enough (…) would implode, unless it were made of very light matter or were hollow (…). I 68 b) Tightly integrated: If we gradually increase the level of integration of a collective intelligence, it may eventually become a unified intellect—a single large “mind” as opposed to a mere assemblage of loosely interacting smaller human minds. I 338 foot note On some views of consciousness, such as the global workspace theory, it seems one might expect more integrated brains to have more capacious consciousness. Cf. Baars (1997)⁽¹⁾, Shanahan (2010)⁽²⁾, and Schwitzgebel (2013)⁽³⁾.) (3) Def Quality superintelligence/Bostrom: A system that is at least as fast as a human mind and vastly qualitatively smarter. I 338 foot note Even small groups of humans that have remained isolated for some time might still benefit from the intellectual outputs of a larger collective intelligence. For example, the language they use might have been developed by a much larger linguistic community, and the tools they use might have been invented in a much larger population before the small group became isolated. I 69 (…) normal human adults have a range of remarkable cognitive talents that are not simply a function of possessing a sufficient amount of general neural processing power or even a sufficient amount of general intelligence: specialized neural circuitry is also needed. This observation suggests the idea of possible but non-realized cognitive talents (…) I 70 Direct and indirect reach: a) Indirect reaches of superintelligence: Superintelligence in any of these forms could, over time, develop the technology necessary to create any of the others. The indirect reaches of these three forms. b) Direct reaches: (…) depend on the degree to which they instantiate their respective advantages—how fast a speed superintelligence is, how qualitatively superior a quality superintelligence is, and so forth. (…)quality superintelligence would be the most capable form of all, inasmuch as it could grasp and solve problems that are, for all practical purposes, beyond the direct reach of speed superintelligence and collective superintelligence. >Hardware/Bostrom, >Software/Bostrom. I 111 Anthropomorphism/BostromVsAnthropomorphism: It is important not to anthropomorphize superintelligence when thinking about its potential impacts. Anthropomorphic frames encourage unfounded expectations about the growth trajectory of a seed AI and about the psychology, motivations, and capabilities of a mature superintelligence. >Anthropomorphism/superintelligence/Yudkowsky. 1. Baars, Bernard J. 1997. In the Theater of Consciousness: The Workspace of the Mind. New York: Oxford University Press. 2. Shanahan, Murray. 2010. Embodiment and the Inner Life: Cognition and Consciousness in the Space of Possible Minds. New York: Oxford University Press. 3. Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2013. “If Materialism is True, the United States is Probably Conscious.” Working Paper, February 8.	Bostrom I Nick Bostrom Superintelligence. Paths, Dangers, Strategies Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017
Superintelligence	Russell	Brockman I 25 Superintelligence/Stuart Russell: Traditional argumentation: “Human-level or superhuman AI is impossible”⁽¹⁾. Stuart RussellVsTradition: This is an unusual claim for AI researchers to make, given that, from Turing onward, they have been fending off such claims from philosophers and mathematicians. The claim, which is backed by no evidence, appears to concede that if superintelligent AI were possible, it would be a significant risk. Brockman I 27 Traditional Defense of strong AI: Any machine intelligent enough to cause trouble will be intelligent enough to have appropriate and altruistic objectives.⁽²⁾ Stuart RussellVs: This argument is related to Hume’s is-ought problem and G. E. Moore’s naturalistic fallacy, suggesting that somehow the machine, as a result of its intelligence, will simply perceive what is right, given its experience of the world. This is implausible; for example, one cannot perceive, in the design of a chessboard and chess pieces, the goal of checkmate; the same chessboard and pieces can be used for suicide chess, or indeed many other games still to be invented. Traditional Argument against strong AI/VsStrong AI: Intelligence is multidimensional, “so ‘smarter than humans’ is a meaningless concept.”⁽³⁾ Stuart RussellVsVs: It is a staple of modern psychology that IQ doesn’t do justice to the full range of cognitive skills that humans possess to varying degrees. IQ is indeed a crude measure of human intelligence, but it is utterly meaningless for current AI systems, because their capabilities across different areas are uncorrelated. How do we compare the IQ of Google’s search engine, which cannot play chess, with that of Deep Blue, which cannot answer search queries? >AI/Stuart Russell. 1. Cf. The AI 100 report (Peter Stone et al.), sponsored by Stanford University, includes the following: “Unlike in the movies, there is no race of superhuman robots on the horizon or probably even possible,” https :1/ai 1 00.stanford.edul 201 6-report. 2. Cf. Rodney Brooks, for example, asserts that it’s impossible for a program to be “smart enough that it would be able to invent ways to subvert human society to achieve goals set for it by humans, without understanding the ways in which it was causing problems for those same human s,” http ://rodneybrooks.com/the-seven-deadly-sins-of-predicting-the-future-of-ai. 3. Kevin Kelly, “The Myth of a Superhuman AI,” Wired, April 25,2017. Russell, Stuart J. „The Purpose put into the Machine”, in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press.	Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019
Superintelligence	Tallinn	Brockman I 97 Superintelligence/Tallinn: Thesis: the central point of the AI risk is that superintelligent AI is an environmental risk. (…) the universe was not made for us; instead, we are fine-tuned by evolution to a very narrow range of environmental parameters. Any disturbance, even temporary, of this precarious equilibrium and we die in a matter of minutes. Silicon-based intelligence does not share such concerns about the environment. That’s why it’s much cheaper to explore space using machine probes rather than “cans of meat.” Moreover, Earth’s current environment is almost certainly suboptimal for what a superintelligent AI will greatly care about: efficient computation. Hence, we might find our planet suddenly going from anthropogenic global warming to machinogenic global cooling. One big challenge that AI safety research needs to deal with is how to constrain a potentially superintelligent AI - an AI with a much larger footprint than our own - from rendering our environment uninhabitable for biological life-forms. It’s hard to overemphasize how tiny and parochial the future of our planet is, compared with the full potential of humanity. On astronomical timescales, our planet will be gone soon (unless we tame the sun, also a distinct possibility) and almost all the resources - atoms and free energy - to sustain civilization in the long run are in deep space. >Artificial Intelligence, >Artificial General Intelligence, >Strong Artificial Intelligence. “Pareto-topia”/Eric Drexler: the idea that AI, if done right, can bring about a future in which everyone’s lives are hugely improved, a future where there are no losers. A key realization here is that what chiefly prevents humanity from achieving its full potential might be our instinctive sense that we’re in a zero-sum game—a game in which players are supposed to eke out small wins at the expense of others. ((s) No source indicated for “pareto-topia”; cf. ⁽¹⁾). 1. https://www.effectivealtruism.org/articles/ea-global-2018-paretotopian-goal-alignment/ Tallinn, J. “Dissident Messages” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press.	Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019
Supervenience	Lewis	V XIII Supervenience/Lewis: E.g. successive events - so the Humean supervenience can explain mental states (as owner of >causal roles) - only problem: probability that the >arrangement of qualities will continue in one way or another. >Humean supervenience.	Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Supply	Rothbard	Rothbard III 151 Supply/Rothbard: It is important to be on one’s guard here against a common confusion over such a term as “an increase in demand.” Whenever this phrase is used by itself in this work ((s) i.e. Rothbard. 1962. Man, Economy and State) it always signifies an increase in the demand schedule, i.e., an increase in the amounts that will be demanded at each hypothetical price. This “shift of the demand schedule to the right” always tends to cause an increase in price. It must never be confused with the “increase in quantity demanded” that takes place, for example, in response to an increased supply. Rothbard III 152 Demand/Rothbard: An increased supply schedule, by lowering price, induces the market to demand the larger quantity offered. This, however, is not an increase in the demand schedule, but an extension along the same demand schedule. It is a larger quantity demanded in response to a more attractive price offer. This simple movement along the same schedule must not be confused with an increase in the demand schedule at each possible price. >Demand/Rothbard, >Stock keeping/Rothbard. Rothbard III 243 Supply/Rothbard: [Example:] If the market price were two grains of gold, this seller would sell no butter, since even the first pound in his stock ranks above the acquisition of two grains on his value scale. At a price of three grains, he would sell two pounds, each of which ranks below three grains on his value scale. At a price of four grains, he would sell three pounds, etc. Supply curve/price: It is evident that, as the hypothetical price is lowered, the individual supply curve must be either vertical or leftward-sloping, i.e., a lower price must lead either to a lesser or to the same supply, never to more. This is, of course, equivalent to the statement that as the hypothetical price increases, the supply curve is either vertical or rightward-sloping. Cf. >Demand/Rothbard, >Price/Rothbard. Utility: Again, the reason is the law of utility; as the seller disposes of his stock, its marginal utility to him tends to rise, while the marginal utility of the money acquired tends to fall. Of course, if the marginal utility of the stock to the supplier is nil, and if the marginal utility of money to him falls only slowly as he acquires it, the law may not change his quantity supplied during the range of action on the market, so that the supply curve may be vertical throughout almost all of its range. Rothbard III 254 Stock keeping: (…) the greater the proportion of old stock to new production, other things being equal, the greater will tend to be the importance of the supply of old possessors compared to that of new producers. The tendency will be for old stock to be more important the greater the durability of the good. For supply schedule see >Demand/Rothbard. >Demand schedule.	Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Syntax	Geach	I 116 Syntax: replacing salva congruitate: the word chain remains correct when it is replaced. QuineVs: Replacing changes syntax: e.g. Copernicus was a complete idiot, if and only if the earth is adisk. - different ranges: a) Copernicus with predicate + sentence b) complex predicate. Then there is no ambiguous word chain, but different analyzes are possible. Ambiguity: "An astronomer is a great idiot iff the earth is flat" can be seen as an operator (like negation). Different brackets are possible. Syntax/Quine/Geach: Quine's 1st Syntactic insight: spurious names: these are a problem of range - for real names the problem does not exist. >Names/Quine, >Range/Quine, >Improper names. GeachVsQuine: he, himself blurs the distinction by regarding names as abbreviations of certain descriptions. >Descriptions/Quine. I 120 3rd Syntactic insight of Quine: E.g. "lx (2x² + 3x³)". This function of a number: twice its square plus three times its third power - such complex descriptions can be eliminated by usage definition. (Russell):> Relative-clause. I 126 4th Syntactic insight of Quine: Introducing a predicate by a schema letter F. >Schematic letters/Quine. Problem: E.g.: "Every sentence or its opposite is true" must not become "(Every sentence is true) or (Every sentence is not true)". Solution: "F() is then -__ or __s opposite is true". Geach: sub-clauses (relative-clauses) and pronouns are not mere substitutes. - This is even a mistake in modern logic books. >Clauses, >Substitution, >Proxy.	Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972
Syntax	Prior	I 46 Syntax/Prior: variables and constants belong to the same syntactic category. >Variables, >Constants Problem: what is the meaning of the quantifier with quantification over properties? >Quantification over properties, >Quantification, >Quantifiers. Should the following variable (to be bound by the quantifier) belong to it? >Bound Variables. Solution: if we consider lambda operators as the only operators that may bind the variables, then the quantifier can build the sentence : ∏(λxφx) (which is equivalent to the simple φ) is briefly ∏φ, everything φ-s. The quantifier builts the sentence. >Lambda calculus, >Lambda notation, >Range. Syntactic status of Lambda: symbolic crutch. Problem: e.g. Something is not the case: SN: S builds a sentence out of a one-digit compound or an adverb. >Sets, >Clauses, >Adverbs.	Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Systems	Luhmann	Baraldi I 195 System/Environment/Luhmann/GLU/(s): System is the basic concept of system theory. Outside: is always more complex than the inside. >Outside/inside/Luhmann. System: helps to reduce complexity. No system can operate outside its borders. Each system is identified by its own operation. >Operation/Luhmann. Environment: is not surrounded by borders but by horizons. It itself is not a system. It has no own operations. But it is not passive. >Environment/Talcott Parsons. --- Reese-Schäfer II 47 System/Luhmann/Reese-Schäfer: autopoietic systems have no other form of environmental contact than self contact. >Autopoiesis. Take only environmental impacts by transforming them into their own frequency. - E.g. social system has no use for consciousness. --- AU Cass 3 System/closed systems/Luhmann: closed systems cannot be found in the world. - We only consider open systems: biology, social system etc. - So-called operational (closed) systems are only seemingly different. --- AU Cass 4 System/Luhmann: a system can distinguish itself from the environment. --- AU Cass 8 System/environment/complexity/Luhmann: the environment of a system is always more complex than the system. Therefore, the system cannot establish a point-to-point relationship with the environment. - Therefore complexity must be reduced or ignored . For example, call different things by the same name. >Complexity/Luhmann. --- AU Cass 8 System/Luhmann: a system has subdivisions - E.g. planning for the system. - Dor the subdividions, the system is environment itself. Loosely coupled systems are more stable. - E.g. employees can be exchanged. >Form/Luhmann. Fixed coupling is not found in nature. - In systems not everything is connected with everything! - Not like Newton. --- AU Cass 11 System/Luhmann: a system is not an object but a difference. I am in my environment. I am not in society, otherwise others would think my thoughts, etc. Individuals/Systems theory: In this way, system theory allows individualism. HabermasVsLuhmann: radical individualism is not sought. LuhmannVsHabermas: the society does not have to strive for a "human aim". - ((s) This is an aim for humans, society is not a human.) --- AU Cass 14 System/Luhmann: E.g. conflicts are systems. - Because it brings the other in a limited range of variation of responses. Conflicts have an organizing force. VsSystemtheory/VsLuhmann: critiques say, here conflicts are underexposed. LuhmannVsVs: not here. Conflict: can lead to a too strong integration. Conflicts are spreading more with a fixed coupling. >Form/Luhmann.	AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Baraldi I C. Baraldi, G.Corsi. E. Esposito GLU: Glossar zu Luhmanns Theorie sozialer Systeme Frankfurt 1997 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001
Systems	Waltz	Brocker I 629 System/System Theory/Waltz: Waltz describes his own theory as systems theory. DüsbergVsWaltz: rightly pointed out that Waltz only refers to an own area (international politics), which has an inner structure (a structure), which influences the behaviour of the parts.⁽¹⁾ Waltz knows no "outside world" (environment) as they are thematized by Talcott Parsons or Niklas Luhmann. >T. Parsons, >N. Luhmann, >Outer world. Brocker I 630 Structure/Waltz: exists by the arrangement of the parts in the system and by the principle of order of these parts. ⁽²⁾ Parts/"units"/Waltz: units are separate units within the system that are connected by constant actions. The most important units of his theory are states that form sovereign units. >Sovereignty/Waltz, States/Waltz. 1.Volker Düsberg, ‚Balance of Power‘ und ‚Hegemonie‘: Zur Kritik der Ansätze von Kenneth N. Waltz und Robert O. Keohane, Köln 1992, p. 13-14 2. Kenneth N. Waltz Theory of International Politics, Reading, Mas. 1979, p. 79. Carlo Masala, „Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	PolWaltz I Kenneth N. Waltz Man,the State and War New York 1959 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Taste	Gadamer	I 41 Taste/Gadamer: The history of the concept of taste follows (...) the history of absolutism from Spain (>Taste/Gracian) to France and England and coincides with the prehistory of the third estate. Taste is not only the ideal that sets up a new society, but for the first time this ideal of "good taste" is what has been called "good society" ever since. It no longer recognizes itself and legitimates itself by birth and rank, but basically by nothing more than the commonality of its judgments or, better, by the fact that it knows how to claim to be able to judge by the narrow-mindedness of its interests and the privacy of its preferences. Thus, the concept of taste undoubtedly refers to a mode of knowledge. It is under the sign of good taste that one is capable of distancing oneself from oneself and one's private preferences. Taste is therefore by its very nature not something private, but a social phenomenon of the first order. Cf. >Taste/Kant. I 42 The decisiveness of the taste judgement includes its validity. Good taste is always certain of its judgement, i.e. it is by its very nature a sure taste, an acceptance and rejection that knows no wavering, squinting at others and no searching for reasons. So the taste is more like a sense. It does not have prior knowledge for reasons. >Fashion/Gadamer, >Style/Gadamer. I 44 Thus taste is by no means limited to the beauty of nature and art, judging it by its decorative quality, but encompasses the whole range of morals and decency. Even the concepts of custom are never given as a whole or clearly defined in a normative sense. Rather, the arrangement of life by the rules of law and morals is an incomplete one, in need of productive supplementation. It requires the power of judgement to assess the concrete cases correctly. I 62 Taste/Art/Gadamer: It is (...) obvious that the concept of taste loses its meaning when the phenomenon of art comes to the fore. The standpoint of taste is secondary to that of the work of art. The sensitivity of choice that makes it up often has a levelling function in relation to the originality of the ingenious work of art. The taste avoids the unusual and monstrous. It is a superficial sense, it does not get involved in the original of an artistic production. Already the rise of the concept of genius in the 18th century shows a polemical point against the concept of taste. >Genius/Kant. I 90 Taste/Gadamer: (...) the unity of an ideal of taste that distinguishes and unites a society [is] characteristically different from what constitutes the figure of aesthetic education. Taste still follows a standard of content. What is valid for a society, what taste prevails in it is what determines the commonality of social life. Such a society chooses and knows what belongs to it and what does not. Even the possession of artistic interests is not arbitrary and universal for them, but what artists create and what society values belongs together in the unity of a lifestyle and an ideal of taste. Aesthetic education: The idea of aesthetic education, on the other hand - as we derive it from Schiller (>Aesthetics/Schiller) - consists precisely in no longer allowing a standard of content and in dissolving the unity of a work of art's belonging to its world. The expression of this is the universal expansion of the possessions that the aesthetically educated consciousness claims for itself.	Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Taxation	Minimal State	Gaus I 121 Taxation/Minimal state/Gaus/Mack: The market anarchist and the minimal statist share a crucial premise, namely, that the value to individuals of their receipt of protective services will motivate almost everyone to pay for those services. >Market anarchism, >Minimal state/Gaus, >Society/Minimal state, >Social googds/Minimal state, >Markets/Minimal state. Gaus I 122 Govvernment/Liberalism: Liberal tradition thesis: Government is justified largely on the grounds of market failure: although the market generally provides for both a free and a prosperous society, it is not perfect (Buchanan, 1975⁽¹⁾: ch. 3). Thus the classical liberal political economists of the nineteenth century (...) insisted that the market depended on a political framework that it could not itself provide; the market could not itself provide a coercive public apparatus for the enforcement of property rights and contracts (Robbins, 1961⁽²⁾; Gaus, 1983⁽³⁾). Minimal stateVsLiberalism/market anarchismVsLiberalism: Market anarchists and minimal statists may challenge these widely held views. They may argue, 1) first, that coercive state provision of public goods tends to oversupply them, so that it has its own offsetting inefficiencies (Buchanan and Tullock, 1965⁽⁴⁾). And, 2) they may insist, market and contractual arrangements can be envisioned that will yield funding for public goods - especially rights-protective public goods - that is not significantly suboptimal (Buchanan, 1975(1); Narveson, 1988⁽⁵⁾: 238). >Social goods/Minimal state. Minimal stateVsMarket anarchism/Gaus: Advocates of the minimal state that depict it as a natural monopoly seem better positioned to make this argument than are market anarchists. Such a minimal state will, to a considerable degree, be able to tie its clients’ purchase of non-public aspects of rights protection to their also paying for public aspects of rights protection. >Society/Minimal state, >Individuals/Minimal state, >Minimal state/Gaus. Minimal state theoryVsLiberalism: If crucial public goods would be significantly underproduced in the absence of individuals being required to contribute to their funding (and requiring such contributions would yield a satisfactory level of the production of those public goods), members of the liberty tradition are faced with a hard choice. On the one hand, they may stick with unreconstructed versions of that tradition’s basic norms at the cost of precluding the mutual benefits associated with those public goods (while no doubt insisting that the public good characteristics of law enforcement are typically overestimated, and that most of what the state should do is to provide essentially privately consumed protection services). Or, on the other hand, they may legitimate the coercive takings that are, by hypothesis, needed to fund those valuable goods at the cost of weakening at least some of those central norms. Social goods: How great will be the doctrinal cost of [a] weakening of liberty tradition norms? (>Social goods/Minmall state). We can identify three approaches to justification: (1) that coercive public goods provision is fully consistent with the basic commitments of the liberty tradition; (2) that the goods at stake justify overriding liberty; and (3) that such provision is benign paternalism. Gaus I 123 Small state: If the arguments that support the Taxing Minimal State are extended to legitimize coercive takings for the production of other sorts of public goods (for example, the public good of mosquito abatement) or to correct other types of market failure (say, the regulation of natural monopolies), then we have gone beyond the Minimal State to the Small State. The more types of goods and services that are accepted as significantly public and, hence, as justifiably financed through taxation, the larger the Small State becomes. 1. Buchanan, James M. (1975) The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2. Robbins, Lord (1961) The Theory of Economic Policy in Classical English Political Economy. London: Macmillan. 3. Gaus, Gerald F. (1983) ‘Public and private interests in liberal political economy, old and new’. In S. I. Benn and G. F. Gaus, eds, Public and Private in Social Life. New York: St Martins, 183–222. 4. Buchanan, James M. and Gordon Tullock (1965) The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 5. Narveson, Jan (1988) The Libertarian Idea. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Mack, Eric and Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. >Tax Avoidance, >Tax Competition, >Tax Compliance, >Tax Evasion, >Tax Havens, >Tax Incidence, >Tax Loopholes, >Tax System, >Optimal tax rate.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Taxation	Rothbard	Rothbard III 913 Taxation/Rothbard: Taxation (…) takes from producers and gives to others. Any increase in taxation swells the resources, the incomes, and usually the numbers of those living off the producers, while diminishing the production base from which these others are drawing their sustenance. >Government spending/Rothbard, >Government Budget/Rothbard, >Interventions/Rothbard. Clearly, this is eventually a self-defeating process: there is a limit beyond which the top-heavy burden can no longer be carried by the diminishing stock of producers. Incentives: Narrower limits are also imposed by the disincentive effects of taxation. Marginal utility: The greater the amount of taxes imposed on the producers - the taxpayers - the Iower the marginal utility of work will be, for the returns from work are forcibly diminished, and the greater the marginal utility of leisure forgone. >Labour/Rothbard. Not only that: the greater will be the incentive to shift from the ranks of the burdened taxpayers to the ranks of the tax-consumers, either as full-time bureaucrats or as those subsidized by the government. >Bureaucracy/Rothbard. As a result, production will diminish even further, as people retreat to leisure or scramble harder to join the ranks of the privileged tax-consumers.⁽¹⁾ >Income tax/Rothbard, >Government spending/Rothbard, >Government Budget/Rothbard, >Interventions/Rothbard, >Neutral taxation/Rothbard, >Neutral taxation/Economic theories, >Cost principle/Rothbard, >Benefit principle/Rothbard, >Excise tax/Rothbard, >Income tax/Rothbard, >Tax shifting/Rothbard. Rothbard III 933 Taxes: (…) tax has been ultimately levied on the incomes of original factors, and the money transferred from their hands to the government. >Factors of production/Rothbard. Government budget: The income of the government and of those subsidized by the government has been increased at the expense of the tax producers, and therefore consumption and investment demands on the market have been shifted from the producers to the expropriators by the amount of the tax. Money value/prices: As a consequence, the value of the monetary unit will remain unchanged (barring a difference in demands for money between the taxpayers and the tax-consumers), but the array of prices will shift in accordance with the shift in demands. Example: Thus, if the market has been spending heavily on clothing, and the government uses the revenue mostly for the purchase of arms, there will be a fall in the price of clothes and a rise in the price of arms, and a tendency for nonspecific factors to shift out of the production of clothing and into the production of armaments. Factor incomes: As a result, there will not finally be, as might be assumed, a proportional 20-percent fall in all original factor incomes as the result of a 20-percent general sales tax. Gains and losses: Specific factors in industries that have lost business from the shift from private to governmental demand will lose proportionately more in income; specific factors in industries gaining in demand will lose proportionately less - some may gain so much as to gain absolutely from the change. Marginal productivity: Nonspecific factors will not be affected as much proportionately, but they too will lose and gain according to the difference that the concrete shift in demand makes in their marginal value productivity. Effect on consumption: (…) the general sales tax is a conspicuous example of failure to tax consumption. The sales tax is commonly supposed to penalize consumption, rather than income or capital. Yet we find that the sales tax reduces, not just consumption, but the incomes of original factors. The general sales tax is therefore an income tax, albeit a rather haphazard one. Politics: a) Many "right-wing" economists have advocated general sales taxation, as opposed to income taxation, on the grounds that the former taxes consumption but not savings-investment; b) many "left-wing" economists have opposed sales taxation for the same reason. RothbardVs: Both are mistaken; the sales tax is an income tax, though of a more haphazard and uncertain incidence. The major effect of the general sales tax will be that of the income tax - to reduce the consumption and the saving-invest- ment of the tax payers.⁽²⁾ Investments: In fact, since (…) the income tax by its nature falls more heavily on savings-investment than on consumption, we reach the paradoxical and important conclusion that a tax on consumption will fall more heavily on savings-investment than on consumption in its ultimate incidence. Rothbard III 937 Taxation/purchasing power/inflation/Rothbard: [there is a] very common view that, in a business boom, the government should increase taxation "in order to sop up excess purchasing power," and thereby halt the inflation and stabilize the economy. RothbardVs: (…) let us note the oddity of assuming that a tax is somehow less of a social cost, less of a burden, than a price. Rothbard: By what reasoning are [buyers] better off, now that taxes have been increased by precisely the amount that their monetary funds have dwindled? In short, the "tax price" has gone up in order that the prices of other goods may decline. Why is a voluntary price, paid willingly by buyers and accepted by sellers, somehow "bad" or burdensome for the buyers, while at the same time a "price" levied compulsorily on the same buyers for dubious governmental services for which they have not demonstrated a need is somehow "good"? Why are high prices burdensome and high taxes not? >Inflation, >Government spending/Rothbard. 1. In the less developed countries, where a money economy is still emerging from barter, any given amount of taxation will have a still more drastic effect: for it will make monetary incomes much less worthwhile and will shift people's efforts from trying to make money back to untaxed barter arrangements. Taxation can therefore decisively retard development from a barter to a monetary economy, or even reverse the process. See C. Lowell Harriss, "Public Finance" in Bernard F. Haley, ed.,A Survey of Contemporary Economics (Homewood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, 1952), p. 264. For a practical application, see P.T. Bauer, "The Economic Development of Nigeria," Journal of Political Economy, October, 1955, pp. 400 ff. If any government taxes in kind, there is then no span of time between taxation and the extraction of physical resources from the private sector. Both take place in the same act. 2. Mr. Frank Chodorov, in his The Income Tax - Root of All Evil (New York: Devin-Adair, 1954), fails to indicate what other type of tax would be "better" from a free-market point ofview, than the income tax. It is clear from our discussion that there are few taxes indeed that will not be as bad as the income tax from the viewpoint of the free market. Certainly sales or excise taxation will not fill the bill. Mr. Chodorov, furthermore, is surely wrong when he terms income and inheritance taxes unique denials of the right of individual property. Any tax whatever infringes on property right, and there is nothing in an "indirect tax" which makes the infringement any less clear. It is true that an income tax forces the subject to keep records and disclose his personal dealings, thus imposing a further loss in his utility. The sales tax, however, also forces record-keeping; the difference again is one of degree rather than of kind, since here the directness covers only retail storekeepers instead of the bulk of the population.	Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Term Scope	Frege	II 28 Term scope/Frege: if two concepts have the same scope, two functions have accordingly the same value range. >Value progression. I 100/101 Def Number/amount/Frege: the set which belongs to the concept F is the scope of the concept "numerically equal to the concept F". I 100 Scope/term scope/Frege: if the straight line a is parallel to the straight line b, then the scope of the concept "straight line parallel to straight line a" is equal to the scope of the concept "straight line parallel to straight line b", and vice versa. This is equality of the term scope. IV 96 Subject/predicate/concept/term scope/Frege: e.g. "All A are B". False: that A was "subject" and B was "predicate". Correct: the predicate "is part of the class". "Some"/FregeVsSchröder: "some" is not a subject. IV 98/99 "Some" does not always designate the same part of a class. This leads to contradictions, "some" is considered the subject. >Subject, >Predicate, >Identity, >Copula, >Sentence, >Someone. IV 99 Universal quantification/Frege: universal quantification is a class below a class. Existential quantification: is an individual below a class. IV 100 "Are" and "is" have no content, i.e. they are copula and not an identity. IV 95 Class/Frege: class is a term scope, not a concept. >Concept, >Object, IV 108 Term scope/scope/Frege: does not have its existence in the individuals, but in the concept itself, i.e. in what is said about an object. IV 112 Scope/concept/term scope/Frege: the scope does not consist of the objects that fall under the concept like a forest consists of trees, but it only has a grip in the concept itself. ((s) Thus, research may reveal that nothing falls under the concept).	F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993
Terminology	Benkler	Benkler I 43 Terminology/Benkler: Rights-based exclusion: mak[ing] money by exercising exclusive rights—licensing or blocking competition. I 44 Exclusive-rights-based business models, (…), represent only a fraction of our information production system. I 43 Romantic Maximizer: [are e.g.] authors, composers [who] sell to publishers. I 65 Copyleft: asserting [one’s] own copyright claims, but only to force all downstream users who wanted to rely on [one’s own] contributions to make their […] contributions available to everyone else […]. This legal artifice allowed anyone to contribute to the GNU [General Public License or GPL] project without worrying that one day they would wake up and find that someone had locked them out of the system they had helped to build. I 60 Commons: “Commons” refers to a particular institutional form of structuring the rights to access, use, and control resources. It is the opposite of “property” in the following sense: With property, law determines one particular person who has the authority to decide how the resource will be used. I 61 The salient characteristic of commons, as opposed to property, is that no single person has exclusive control over the use and disposition of any particular resource in the commons. I 79 Accreditation: Rather than using the full-time effort of professional accreditation experts, the sys- I 80 tem is designed to permit the aggregation of many small judgments, each of which entails a trivial effort for the contributor, regarding both relevance and accreditation of the materials. I 183 Accreditation is different from relevance, requires different kinds of judgments, and may be performed in different ways than basic relevance filtering. [Sources of accreditation are: professional journalists, parties, academia, civil servants, and possibly large corporations]. I 169 Babel Objection: Having too much information with no real way of separating the wheat from the chaff forms what we might call the Babel objection. >Babel Objection/Benkler. I 183 Relevance: Not everything that someone considers to be a proper concern for collective action is perceived as such by most other participants in the political debate. A public sphere that has some successful implementation of universal intake must also have a filter to separate out those matters that are plausibly within the domain of organized political action and those that are not. What constitutes the range of plausible political topics is locally contingent, changes over time, and is itself a contested political question, as was shown most obviously by the “personal is political” feminist intellectual campaign. I 313 Information/Knowledge: The distinction between information and knowledge is a tricky one. I use “information” here colloquially, to refer to raw data, scientific reports of the output of scientific discovery, news, and factual reports. I use “knowledge” to refer to the set of cultural practices and capacities necessary for processing the information into either new statements in the information exchange, or more important in our context, for practical use of the information in appropriate ways to produce more desirable actions or outcomes from action. >Information/Benkler, >Information/Arrow. I 314 Knowledge: In this context, I refer mostly to two types of concern. The first is the possibility of the transfer of implicit knowledge, which resists codification into what would here be treated as “information”—for example, training manuals. The second type of knowledge transfer of concern here is formal instruction in an education context (…). >Information/Benkler.	Benkler I Yochai Benkler The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom New Haven 2007
Terminology	Chalmers	I 20 Deflationary/Terminology/Chalmers: a deflationary concept of belief would be purely psychological (explaining behavior), not phenomenal (connected with Qualia). Which is the true concept, is not so decisive for my project. More important is the separation of the psychological and the phenomenal. I 28 Alertness/Attention/awareness/Terminology/Chalmers: Consciousness is always accompanied by attention, but not always vice versa. Awareness (also attention) falls more on the psychological side of differentiation. I 29 Newell (1992)⁽¹⁾ distinguishes between "awareness" and "consciousness". Chalmers: With "awareness" (attention) I will mean from now on "psychological consciousness" (behavior explaining, functional). I 154 Definition Proto-phenomenal Property/Chalmers: as the only one, a proto-phenomenal property does not contain experience itself, but it can contain several simultaneously present ones. This is strange to us, but cannot be excluded a priori. This would suggest a causal role of the phenomenal. To represent such a theory would simply mean to accept another possible world where something else had the role of causation, but such a world would not be logically excluded. > Dualism. I 232 Registration/Chalmers: registrations are judgments in a weaker sense: representational states, e.g. of the facial field, which are not yet judgments. 1. A. Newell, SOAR as a unified theory of cognition: Issues and explanations. Behavioral and Brain Studies 15, 1992: pp.464-92. Schwarz I 207 (annotation) Definition Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, that is, the world parameter inserts the world of the respective situation (corresponding as time parameter the point of time of the situation, etc.). Definition "diagonal proposition"/terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978⁽¹⁾): diagonal propositions are primary truth conditions. Definition horizontal proposition/Lewis: horizontal propositions are secondary truth conditions. (1980a⁽²⁾, 38, 1994b⁽³⁾, 296f). Newer Terminology: Definition A Intension/Primary Intension/1-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the A intension is for primary truth conditions Definition C-Intension/Secondary Intension/2-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the C intension is for secondary truth conditions. Definition A-Proposition/1-Proposition/C-Proposition/2-Proposition/Terminology/Schwarz: corresponding. (Jackson 1998a⁽⁴⁾, 2004⁽⁵⁾, Lewis 2002b⁽⁶⁾, Chalmers 1996b⁽⁷⁾, 56,65) Definition meaning₁/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975⁽⁸⁾,173): meaning₁ refers to secondary truth conditions Definition meaning₂/Lewis/Schwarz: meaning₂ is complex function of situations and worlds on truth values, "two-dimensional intension". Schwarz: Problem: this means quite different things: Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: in Lewis not determined by meta-linguistic diagonalization as Stalnaker's diagonal propositions. Also not via a priori implication as in Chalmer's primary propositions. 1. Robert c. Stalnaker [1978]: “Assertion”. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9, New York: Academic Press, 315–332, und in [Stalnaker 1999a] 2. David Lewis [1980a]: “Index, Context, and Content”. In S. Kanger und S. ¨Ohmann (ed.), Philosophy and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, und in [Lewis 1998a] 3. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, and in [Lewis 1999a] 4. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 5. Frank Jackson [2004]: “Why We Need A-Intensions”. Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277 6. David Lewis [2002a]: “Tensing the Copula”. Mind, 111: 1–13 7. David Chalmers [2002]: “Consciousness and its Place in Nature”. In D. Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, 247–272 8. David Lewis [1975]: “Languages and Language”. In [Gunderson 1975], 3–35. And in [Lewis 1983d]	Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Terminology	Davidson	Frank I 628 Myth of the Subjective/DavidsonVsPrivate Language: according to the myth every subject looks at its private objects - Vs: Ideas have only then truth conditions when they represent something, that is, when they are interpretable. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica 38 (1984), 101-111 - - - Graeser I 174 Primary Meaning/Davidson/Graeser: ("A nice derangement of epitaphs"): meaning on a particular occasion - is, in fact, in contrast to the general conception: that we do not have to know first what the words normally mean but what the speaker means.	Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002
Terminology	Flusser	I 71 - I 68 Technical Images/techno-images/Terminology/Flusser: "auto-reflexive" function of the technical images. I 103 Technical Images/techno-images/Flusser: are to be regarded genetically as a step back from the texts (especially optics and chemistry) and they are consequences of scientific progress. I 135 techno-images: pictures that do not mean scenes, but texts. I 148 Technology/Flusser: Apparatus - Operator Def Apparatus: "Tool for generating technical images". Def Operator: "Technician for apparatus". I 166 Technology/Flusser: Def Apparatuses: are historical products, products of linear texts. Apparatuses are designed by texts and generate technical images. (techno-images). I 210 Symbols not only show meaning, but conceal meaning, they are not only meaningful but are also giving insanity. Hell arises when people forget that in the codified world they are not only staggering around like in a dungeon, but that the codified world has been agreed to allow this oblivion of death. I 202 Politics/Flusser: Def Politicize/Flusser: Politicizing carries the private into public space. On television, politicians enter the private sphere and depoliticize it. Rötzer I 58 Art/Flusser: Art making is about making something that has never been there before and therefore cannot be foreseen by any given program. Rötzer I 71 Culture/Flusser: if the selection of sounds is determined by chance, one speaks of nature, it is determined by humans, one speaks of culture. Flusser I 102 Photography/Flusser: Photographs are not the photographer's attempt to get a picture of the world, but rather attempts to get an impression of concepts the photographer has regarding a picture. I 84 ff Codes/Flusser: a) Pre-alphabet b) Alphabet c) Post-alphabet Code functionality: a) TextsI 86 Steps/Image/Flusser: 1. pictograms 2. ideograms 3. hieroglyphics 4. letters. (1 3 precursor of the alphabet: all linear codes) I 107 Alienating/Estrangement/Distancing/Flusser: Alienation 1: the human being is expelled from the "world", tries to bridge the abyss with pictures (Magic Consciousness). >Pictures/Flusser, >Techno-image/Flusser. Alienation 2: The mediation performance of the image is disturbed, the human leaves the world of images and tries to bridge the abyss with texts. 109 New point of view: historical awareness. Over time, the texts become opaque, unimaginable (>Alienation 3). Our texts no longer mediate, because behind them we no longer see images, but ourselves as creators.	Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 Rötz I F. Rötzer Kunst machen? München 1991
Terminology	Goodman	I 88 Art: There are characteristics to define a mode of symbolization that indicates whether something is a work of art. 1. Syntactic density: syntactic density is, where certain minimal differences serve to distinguish symbols, e.g. a scale free thermometer (in contrast to a digital instrument.) 2. Semantic density: semantic density is, where symbols are available for things that differ only by minimal differences from each other, e. g. not only the scale free thermometer mentioned above, but also common German, as long as it is not syntactically dense. 3. Relative fullness: relative fullness is, where comparatively many aspects of a symbol are significant, e. g. the drawing of a mountain of Hokusai consisting of a single line, in which every property such as line, thickness, shape, etc. counts. Contrary to the same curve as a depiction of the stock market trend of a day, in which only the height of the values above the basis counts. 4. Exemplification: in the exemplification, a symbol, whether or not it is denoted, is symbolized by the fact that it serves as a sample of properties which it possesses literally or metaphorically. 5. Multiple and complex reference is also possible, where one symbol fulfils several related and interacting reference functions, some direct and others mediated by other symbols. --- III 128 Definition symbol scheme: a symbol scheme consists of characters. Definition characters: characters are certain classes of utterances or inscriptions. Characteristic of the character in a notation is that its elements can be freely interchanged without any syntactic effects (class of marks). Score requires character separation. A character in a notation is an abstraction class of character indifference among inscriptions. Definition inscriptions: inscriptions include statements. An inscription is any brand visually, auditively, etc. that belongs to a character. An inscription is atomic if it does not contain any other inscription, otherwise it is compound. For example, a letter is considered atomic, including spaces. In music, the separation in atomic/together cannot always be recognized immediately, it is more complex. The atoms are best sorted into categories: key sign, time sign, pitch sign. III 128/129 Definition mark: a mark is an individual case of a character in a notation and it includes inscriptions. Actual marks are rarely moved or exchanged. All inscriptions of a given brand are syntactically equivalent. And this is a sufficient condition that they are "genuine copies" or replicas of each other, or are spelled in the same way. No mark may belong to more than one character (disjunctiveness) a mark that is unambiguously an inscription of a single character is still ambiguous, if it has different objects of fulfillment at different times or in different contexts. Definition type (opposite: use, Peirce): the type is the general or class whose individual cases or elements are the marks. Goodman: I prefer to do without the type altogether and instead name the cases of use of the type replica. Definition case of use: the case of use the replica of a type ("genuine copy"). There is no degree of similarity necessary or sufficient for replicas. Definition genuine copy: a genuine copy of a genuine copy of a genuine copy... must always be a genuine copy of "x". If the relation of being a genuine copy is not being transitive, the whole notation loses its meaning (see below: strictly speaking, a performance may not contain a single wrong note). Score requires character separation. Definition Notation: 1. Condition is character indifference among the individual cases of each character. Character indifference is a typical equivalence relation: reflexive, symmetrical, transitive. (No inscription belongs to one character to whom the other does not belong). 2. Demand to notation: the characters must be differentiated or articulated finally. For every two characters K and K' and every mark m that does not actually belong to both, the provision that either m does not belong to K or m does not belong to K' is theoretically possible. 3. The (first) semantic requirement for notation systems is that they must be unambiguous. Definition ambiguity: ambiguity consists of a multitude of fulfillment classes for one character. Definition redundancy: redundancy consists of a multitude of characters for one fulfillment class. III 133 Definition syntactically dense: a schema is syntactically dense if it provides an infinite number of characters that are arranged in such a way that there is always a third between two. Such a scheme still has gaps. For example, if the characters are rational numbers that are either less than 1 or not less than 2. In this case, the insertion of a character corresponding to 1 will destroy the density. Definition consistently dense: if there is no insertion of other characters at their normal positions, the density is destroyed. Definition ordered syntactically: e. g. by alphabet Definition discreetly not overlapping: note how absurd the usual notion is that the elements of a notation must be discreet: first, characters of a notation as classes must be rather disjoint! Discretion is a relationship between individuals. Secondly, there is no need for inscriptions of notations to be discreet. And finally, even atomic inscriptions only need to be discreet relative to this notation. Definition disjunct/disjunctiveness: no mark may belong to more than one character. The disjunctiveness of the characters is therefore somewhat surprising since we do not have neatly separated classes of ordered spheres of inscriptions in the world, but rather a confusing mixture of marks. Semantic disjunctiveness does not imply the discreetness of the objects of fulfillment, nor do syntactic disjunctiveness of the characters imply the discreetness of the inscriptions. On the other hand, a schema can consist of only two characters that are not differentiated finally. For example, all marks that are not longer than one centimeter belong to one character, all longer marks belong to the other. III 213 Definition fullness: the symbols in the picturial schema are relatively full, and fullness is distinguished from both the general public of the symbol and the infinity of a schema. It is in fact completely independent of what a symbol denotes, as well as the number of symbols in a scheme. Definition "attenuation": for the opposite of fullness I use attenuation. Definition density: e.g. real numbers, no point delimitation possible. The opposite of dense is articulated. III 232 ff Syntactic density, semantic density and syntactic fullness can be three symptoms of the aesthetic. Syntactic density is characteristic for non-linguistic systems; sketches differ from scores and scripts. Semantic density is characteristic of representation, description and expression through which sketches and scripts differ from scores. Relative syntactic fullness distinguishes the more representational among the semantically dense systems from the diagrammatic ones, the less from the more "schematic" ones. Density is anything but mysterious and vague and is explicitly defined. It arises from the unsatisfactory desire for precision and keeps it alive. III 76ff Def scheme: a scheme implicit set of alternatives. III 128 Def symbolic scheme: a symbolic scheme consists of characters. >Symbols. III ~ 140 Def symbol system: a symbol system is a symbol diagram, which is correlated with a reference region. III 76 A description does not work in isolation, but in its belonging to a family. III 195 The text of a poem, a novel or a biography is a character in a notation scheme. As a phonetic character with comments as the satisfaction of objects it belongs to an approximately notational system. >Systems. III 195 As a character with objects as the satisfaction of objects it belongs to a discursive language. >Satisfaction.	G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997
Terminology	Grice	II 36 Def M-intention/Grice: "that H intends to do this-and-that" instead of "that H does such-and-such." This is an intentional act. II 38 The candidate means that Waterloo was in 1815, but he does not intend that the teacher believes that II 44 Def #-psi/terminology/Grice: #-psi is a mode indicator that is correlated with the propositional attitude psi from a given range of propositional attitudes. H is to actively "psi" that p - Exceptions: "Do not go past the border": H himself should have the intention. III 102 R-correlation stands for: referential correlation. D-correlation stands for: denotational correlation. III 103 Difference reference/denotation: Peter's dog is an R-correlate of "Fido". Every thing with long fur is a D-correlate of "shaggy". Resulting method: for S "Fido is shaggy" means the same as "Peter’s dog has long fur". III 104 Problem: the "designated pair" between Fido/Peter's dog (not cat). What is the meaning of "designated"? III 105 The situation may be brought about accidentally where sentences mean something else - this complementary relationship can only be eliminated by the condition of the intention to make a difference. Cohen I 395 Def conversationalist hypothesis/CH/Grice: the meaning of the logical particles "~", "u", "v" and ">" is not different from the particles used in natural language. "And", "or", "if, then" and "not": where they appear inconsistent, this appearance is due to the different assumptions with which natural language utterances are usually understood. Cohen I 395ff Def semantic hypothesis (Cohen): many occurrences of logical particles in natural conversation differ from their meaning in formal contexts - although there are cases where they are consistent. Cohen I 402 Thesis: everyday languange meaning is richer than truth functional meaning. Cohen I 410 Image: "that is a tree". Assumption: it is a painted tree. Cohen I 412 Conversationalist hypothesis/Cohen: the conversationalist hypothesis assumes that the conversation implicature transmits that the antecedent is true only if the consequent is true.	Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Cohen I Laurence Jonathan Cohen "Some Remarks on Grice’s Views about the Logical Particals of Natural Languages", in: Y. Bar-Hillel (Ed), Pragmatics of Natural Languages, Dordrecht 1971, pp. 50-68 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Cohen II Laurence Jonathan Cohen "Mr. Strawson’s Analysis of Truth", Analysis 10 (1950) pp. 136-140 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Terminology	Hilbert	Berka I 58 Normal form/Berka: the normal form is another method to replace truth tables. An excellent (canonical) normal form was introduced by Hilbert/Ackermann (1928). Berka I 112 Definition convertible/Hilbert/Berka: a formula is convertible into another means when the equivalence of the two is derivable. Definition pranex/Hilbert: pranex is a formula in which all quantifiers are at the beginning and the ranges extend to the end. Definiton deduction-equal/Hilbert: two formulas are deduction-equal, if each is derivable from the other. Each formula is deduction-equal to each such formula, which results from it by replacing any free individual variable (IV) with a bound variable which has not previously occurred, and the universal quantifier belonging to the introduced bound variables (in any order) are placed at the beginning. ("Exchange of free variables against bound ones"). This can also be done in reverse order. Definition Skolem's normal form/Hilbert: the Skolem's normal form is a prenexic formula (that is, all quantifiers at the beginning, range to the end), where there is nowhere among the previous quantifiers a universal quantifier before an existential quantifier. Each formula is deduction-equal to a Skolem normal form. (s) Each formula can be transformed into a Skolem normal form. Note (I 116) This Skolem normal form is the "proof-theoretic" one. Definiton fulfillment theoretic Skolem normal form/Hilbert: the fulfillment of the theoretic Skolem normal form is dual to the proof-theoretic Skolem normal form, i.e. the universal quantifiers and existence quantifiers exchange their roles. >Duality. Insert/Hilbert/(s): inserting is used here for free variables. Rename/Hilbert/(s): renaming is used here for bound variables⁽¹⁾. 1. D. Hilbert & P. Bernays: Grundlagen der Mathematik, I, II, Berlin 1934-1939 (2. Aufl. 1968-1970).	Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983
Terminology	Kauffman	Dennett I 306 Definition "Epistasis"/Kauffman: Interactions between genes. Suitability landscape strongly determines the development. For example, the creation of a sonnet: forces us to remove some of the beautiful parts that we have worked hard on, because they do not fit into the overall scheme. Kauffman I 117/118 Definition State Space/Kauffman: Range of possibilities of the light pattern, 2 exp n. With 1000 molecules and a change after a trillionth of a second, the existence time of the universe would not be sufficient to complete a cycle (running through all possible states). I 121 Networks/Kauffman: Question: How to create networks with short status cycles? Is it difficult to produce them, so they are extremely unlikely? Solution: Attractor: more than one trajectory can enter the same state cycle. If attractors are small, more order is created. I 176 Definition "Supracritical Behavior"/Kauffman: here: abrupt increase in the diversity of the biosphere. Similar to a nuclear chain reaction. While the biosphere as a whole is supracritical, like a mass of split atomic nuclei, the individual cells that make up the biosphere must be subcritical. This protects the system from chaos. ((s) e.g. So that a house can be built from bricks, not from crumbs.). I 189 System/cell/order/evolution/supracritical/Kauffman: the fact that we eat our food and do not merge with it indicates a fundamental fact: Biosphere: supracritical Cells: subcritical If we merged with our food, a supercritical explosion would be triggered in the organism. I 393 Definition Recipient-based communication/Larry Wood: all actors in a system that seek to coordinate behavioural patterns share what happens to them. This is included in the decision-making process. There is a superordinate team goal. For example, fighter pilots can do without ground support. They react to those other machines that fly the least distance away from them. Similar to the example of flocks of birds.	Kau II Stuart Kauffman At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity New York 1995 Kauffman I St. Kauffman At Home in the Universe, New York 1995 German Edition: Der Öltropfen im Wasser. Chaos, Komplexität, Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft München 1998 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Terminology	Klein	Brocker I 939 Terminology/Klein: Branding: the creation of brand awareness and thus a corresponding consumer behaviour, which dramatically increased their profit margins in the 1990s. This process of creating new demand markets - no longer the material product, but only the brand is produced, advertised, demanded and bought in any material product - runs parallel to the abolition of traditional industrial production and conventional forms of work and employment in the global North. >Jobs/Klein. Klein calls the sports shoe marketer Nike, who does not own any of the production factories in which he has his shoes manufactured, the 'prototype of the product-free brand'⁽¹⁾. Brocker I 933 "Branding Breakthrough"/Klein: brand penetration: for consumers no price is too high for brand awareness: "For brand obsessed Brocker I 934 buyers consuming almost turned into a fetish and the brand name is attributed a talisman-like power"⁽²⁾ This allows companies to engage in an ever-increasing range of economic activities. Brocker I 937 »Culture-Jamming«: Klein describes the practice of parodying advertising and intelligently subverting its message as 'an X-ray of the unconscious content of an advertising campaign'⁽³⁾. >Advertising. Naomi Klein, No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies, Toronto 2000. (Tenth Anniversary Edition with a New Introduction by the Author, New York 32010.) Dt.: Naomi Klein, No Logo! Der Kampf der Global Players um Marktmacht – Ein Spiel mit vielen Verlierern und wenigen Gewinnern, Frankfurt/M. 2015 (zuerst 2001) p. 202 2. Ibid. p. 152 3. Ibid. p. 282 Christine Bauhardt, „Naomi Klein, No Logo! (2000)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Terminology	Mayr	I 45 Def genotype: nucleic acids, (total number of genes) Def phenotype: proteins, lipids, macromolecules, (total of characteristics, environmentally dependent). I 43 Def Integron/Mayr: An integron is a system created by integration of subordinate units on a higher level. Integrons evolve by natural selection. They are adapted systems at each level because they contribute to the fitness (suitability) of an individual. I 205 Def Parthenogenesis: Asexuality: in some organisms, individuals develop themselves from the eggs, fertilization is not necessary. E.g. Aphids, plankton crustaceans: here sexual and asexual generations alternate. I 324 Def Altruism: (Trivers, 1985)⁽¹⁾: action that benefits another organism at the expense of the actor, with the costs and benefits being defined as reproductive success. I 175 Def Class/Biology/Mayr: Grouping of entities that are similar and related to each other. Classification: two important functions: a) recovery of information. b) comparative research. Information storage. I 177 Def "Variety": (Linné, even Darwin): Deviations that are slightly smaller than those of a new species. ("typological" or "essential concept of species"). ("Common essence" ("Nature")). I 178 Def Twin species: (discovered only recently: spatially separated, but equally developed, discovered in almost all animal species), forces a new criterion for the delineatation of species: reproductive isolation of populations. I 179 Def Species/Mayr: device for protecting balanced, harmonic genotypes. "Biological concept of species" seeks biological reasons for the existence of species. Maybe there are other properties by chance. I 183 Def Species Taxa: special populations or population groups corresponding to the species definition. They are entities. I 373 Def Similarity: certain characteristics must occur together with other characteristics from which they are logically independent. I 49 Def knowledge/Mayr: facts and their interpretation. I 279 Def r-selection: strongly fluctuating, often catastrophically exposed population size, weak intraspecific competition, very fertile. K-Selection: constant population size, strong competition, stable life expectancy. I 41 Def Reductionism/Mayr: Reductionism considers the problem of explanation fundamentally as solved as soon as the reduction to the smallest components is completed. I 186 Def Feature/Biology/Mayr: a distinguishing feature or attribute. Is arbitrarily chosen by the taxonomists. Often led to very strange "unnatural" groups. At the end of the 18th century, attempts were made to replace the Linné system with a more natural one. I 211 Def Preformation: Eggs produce individuals of the same species. Therefore it was concluded that egg or sperm is already a miniature of the future organism. I 212 Def Epigenesis: Development during the life history of the individual, in contrast to ontogeny and phylogeny. I 219 Def Induction/Biology/Mayr: Influence of already existing tissues on the development of other tissues. By proteins. It is important for almost all organisms. I 349 Def Life/Mayr: Activities of self-developed systems, controlled by a genetic program. Def Life/Rensch⁽²⁾: Living beings are hierarchically ordered, open systems, predominantly organic compounds, which normally appear as circumscribed, cell-structured individuals of temporally limited constancy. Def Life/Sattler 1986⁽³⁾: an open system that replicates and regulates itself, shows individuality, and subsists on energy from the environment. MayrVs: all contain superfluous and do not go into the genetic program, which is perhaps the most important. More description than definition. 1. R. L. Trivers (1985). Social evolution. Menlo Park: Benjamin/Cummings. 2. B. Rensch (1968). Biophilosophie. Stuttgart: G. Fischer. S. 54. 3. R. Sattler (1986). Biophilosophy. Berlin: Springer. S. 228.	Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998
Terminology	Minsky	Minsky I 73 Terminology/Minsky: Puzzle Principle: We can program a computer to solve any problem by trial and error, without knowing how to solve it in advance, provided only that we have a way to recognize when the problem is solved. >Trial and error/Minsky. I 74 Progress Principle: Any process of exhaustive search can be greatly reduced if we possess some way to detect when progress has been made. Then we can trace a path toward a solution (...). >Problem Solving/Minsky. I 78 Difference-engine: must contain a description of a desired situation. It must have subagents that are aroused by various differences between the desired situation and the actual situation. Each subagent must act in a way that tends to diminish the difference that aroused it. >Goals/Minsky. I 82 K-line/Minsky: Whenever you get a good idea, solve a problem, or have a memorable experience, you activate a K-line to represent it. A K-line is a wirelike structure that attaches itself to whichever mental agents are active when you solve a problem or have a good idea. When you activate that K-line later, the agents attached to it are aroused, putting you into a mental state much like the one you were in when you solved that problem or got that idea. >Memory/Minsky. I 83 P-agents: were used before in solving a problem. Q-agents: are agents of your recent thoughts. I 92 S-agents: let's call the original agents S-agents and call their society the S-society. Given any S-society, we can imagine building memories for it by constructing a corresponding K-society for it. When we start making a K-society, we must link each K-line directly to S-agents, because there are no other K-lines we can connect them to. >Society of Minds/Minsky. I 121 Uniframe/Minsky: a description constructed to apply to several different things at once. ((s) E.g.building blocks may be arranged in different ways and create tools for different functions). I 124 Accumulation/Minsky: Uniframing doesn't always work. We often try to make an everyday idea precise - but just can't find much unity. Then, we can only accumulate collections of examples. I 127 The Exception Principle: It rarely pays to tamper with a rule that nearly always works. It's better just to complement it with an accumulation of specific exceptions. I 145 The Investment Principle: Our oldest ideas have unfair advantages over those that come later. The earlier we learn a skill, the more methods we can acquire for using it. Each new idea must then compete against the larger mass of skills the old ideas have accumulated. (Cf. Matthew effect). I 155 Def Immanence Illusion: Whenever you can answer a question without a noticeable delay, it seems as though that answer were already active in your mind. I 161 Def Recursion Principle: When a problem splits into smaller parts, then unless one can apply the mind's full power to each subjob, one's intellect will get dispersed and leave less cleverness for each new task. I 166 Def Cross-exclusion/Minsky: if several urgent needs occur at once, there must be a way to select one of them. (…) cross-exclusion, (…) appears in many portions of the brain. In such a system, each member of a group of agents is wired to send inhibitory signals to all the other agents of that group. I 167 Conservation: Force all activities to depend upon some substance or other kind of quantity of which only a certain amount is available. Negative Feedback: Supply a summary device that estimates the total activity in the agency and then broadcasts to that agency an inhibitory signal whose strength is in proportion to that total. This will tend to damp down incipient avalanches. Censors and Suppressors: The conservation and feedback schemes tend to be indiscriminate. I 198 Polynemes: are involved with our long-term memories. A polyneme is a type of K-line; it sends the same, simple signal to many different agencies: each of those agencies must learn, for itself, what to do when it receives that signal. When you hear the word apple, a certain polyneme is aroused, and the signal from this polyneme will put your Color agency into a state that represents redness. The same signal will set your Shape agency into a state that represents roundness, and so forth. Isonome: Each isonome controls a short-term memory in each of many agencies. For example, suppose we had just been talking about a certain apple, and then I said, Please put it in this pail. In this case, you would assume that the word it refers to the apple. Def Pronomes/Terminology/Minsky: we need to have machinery we can use as temporary handles for taking hold of, and moving around, those active fragments of mental states. To emphasize the analogy with the pronouns of our languages, I'll call such handles pronomes.	Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003
Terminology	Nietzsche	Ries II 11 Crisis/Nietzsche: is to be pushed forward to revaluate all values. Ries II 11 Amor fati/Nietzsche: the highest state a philosopher can attain: to think Dionysian in relation to existence. Ries II 13 Noon/Nietzsche: A mature old tree, embraced by the rich love of a vine and hidden from itself. At the moment of happiness, the course of time seems to stop. Ries II 16 Nietzsche: Seafaring passion for the "unknown", which lies in a direction "where all the suns of mankind have so far gone down". Ries II 17 Zarathustra/Nietzsche: Thesis: the meaning of life is love. Ries II 19 Happiness/Nietzsche: Zarathustra: the happiness of my existence, to express its puzzle form, I have already died as my father, as my mother I am still alive, and I am getting old. Ries II 20 Nietzsche/Biography: Nietzsche met Jacob Burckhardt. During the Franco-German war, he was a voluntary nurse for several months. Ries II 25 "Dark antiquity": The term comes from Jacob Burckhardt. (Not literally!). Ries II 28 Apollonian/Nietzsche: Symbol of the world as an apparition, in the sense of the Schopenhauer concept of imagination. Deceptive liberation from the terrible Dionysian knowledge of "primal pain". Apollonian/Nietzsche: Art medium Dionysian/Nietzsche: Wisdom Apollonian/Dionysian/Nietzsche: in the end, they both speak each other's language. There is no point in a world game circling in itself, which the will in eternal lust plays with itself. Ries II 29 Tragedy: Schopenhauer: Pathos as primal pain - Nietzsche primordial lust. Ries II 30 Nietzsche: Zarathustra: From the smile of Dionysus the Olympic gods were born, from his tears the human was created. Ries II 30 Pessimism/Nietzsche: "Beyond Good and Evil": a philosophy that dares to lower morality itself into the world of appearances, namely appearance as deception, illusion, delusion, error. Ries II 29/30 Nietzsche/Biography/Ries: by the "Birth of the Tragedy" he was scientifically dead as a philologist. Ries II 49 Human/All too human/Nietzsche: 2nd main piece: "The Wanderer and his Shadow": "Shadow philosophy"/Shadow/Nietzsche: in which the "objects" lose their physicality. Noon/Nietzsche: Whosoever had an active and stormy morning, whose soul is overwhelmed by a strange quietness around the noon of life... It is a death with awake eyes. Ries II 50 Jesus/Christianity/Nietzsche: Parable "The Prisoners" (The Gay Science): the son of the guard: I will save you, but only those of you who believe that I am the son (Jesus) of the prison guard. Ries II 55 Gay Science/Nietzsche: Science of the free spirit. Ries II 57 Eternal return/Nietzsche: (Zarathustra) the thought invaded Nietzsche in August 1881 at the lake of Silvaplana. Like when one day or at night a demon in your loneliest solitude stalked you and said: "You will have to live this life as you loved it and love it now, once more and countless times. And there will be nothing new about it, but every pain and every desire and every thought and sigh and all unspeakably small and big things of your life must come back to you and everything in the same order and also this spider and this moonlight between the trees... would you not bow down and grind your teeth and curse the demon who spoke like that? >Eternal return/Nietzsche. The question with everyone and everything: 'Do you want to do this again and again and countless times?' would lie as the heaviest weight on your actions!" Ries II 58/ 59 Zarathustra/Nietzsche: as a classic figure, reversal of history, "overcoming morality". Zarathustra, who once created the most fatal error of morality, himself - he is also the first to recognize him the heavyweight has given way from things. The whole divine horizon has been wiped away. Ries II 60/61 The last human/Nietzsche: Opposite image of the superhuman, vegetating at the end of civilization. The last man smells badly! Ries II 62 Three stages: past, present, future: Camel/Nietzsche: idealistic stage, obedience, theological absolutism "thou shalt". Löwe/Nietzsche: idealism turns against itself, against the thousand-years old "great dragon" of the "thou shalt" dominating it: "I will". Ries II 63 Kind/Nietzsche: but the freedom of this "I want" is still constituted by what it denies: morality, metaphysics, religion. Only the third stage brings the innocence of becoming beyond good and evil. >Morality/Nietzsche, >Metaphysics/Nietzsche, >Religion/Nietzsche. Ries II 64 Self-conquest/Nietzsche: Where I found something alive, I found the will to power... life itself spoke to me: I am what must always overcome itself. The will overcomes itself to its purest form: the will to power. Thus constant repetition, thereby circularity, thus return of the same always! Ries II 65 Dionysian/Nietzsche: Existence in Dionysian immediacy remains subject to appearances. Ries II 70 Redemption of the "higher humans": Figures/Equalities/Zarathustra/Nietzsche/Ries: Schopenhauer: Schopenhauer is caricatured by Nietzsche in the Zarathustra as the fortune teller of great fatigue. The two kings/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: 1. despiser of the false representation of the political 2. the Conscientious of the spirit (the scientist). The old Sorcerer/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: Richard Wagner. The old Pope/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: the pious man mourning for the "dead God" and pious in this grief. The ugliest man/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: "the murderer of God", the great self-loathing and disgusted by humans. The voluntary beggar/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: the selfless human. The shadow of Zarathustra: the free spirit. They are all as the "remnant of God" deeply desperate and failed. They all caricature themselves at the donkey festival. The always same Ries II A of the donkey as the Dionysian saying-yes to the whole of being. Ries II 71 Noon/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: through the "noon abyss" Zarathustra falls "into the well of eternity". The ship is no longer being praised for its departure into the unknown, but for its return to the "quietest bay". --- Danto III 207 Terminology/Blonde Beast/Nietzsche/Danto: the expression blonde beast has no direct reference to Germans or Aryans in Nietzsche. This passage refers to "Roman, Arabic, Germanic, Japanese nobility, Homeric heroes, Scandinavian Vikings".⁽¹⁾ Most likely, the "Blonde Beast" is a literary topos for "Lion", the so-called King of the Animals. Danto III 218 Internalisation/Terminology/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche calls internalisation the phenomenon that a drive still discharges when prohibited, but not against an external object, but rather an internal object, the person himself. This phenomenon plays a role in the further development of consciousness. ⁽²⁾ >Internalization. Danto III 219 Bad conscience: It is possible that people may remain in the state of mere self-aggression or mere self-loathing. That is what Nietzsche calls a guilty conscience. 1. Vgl. F. Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral, KGW VI. 2, p. 289. 2. Ibid. p. 338	Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Terminology	Norvig	Norvig I 8 Terminology/Russell/Norvig: Although decidability and computability are important to an understanding of computation, the notion of tractability has had an even greater impact. Roughly speaking, a problem is called intractable if the time required to solve instances of the problem grows exponentially with the size of the instances. The distinction between polynomial and exponential growth in complexity was first emphasized in the mid-1960s (Cobham, 1964⁽¹⁾; Edmonds, 1965⁽²⁾). It is important because exponential growth means that even moderately large instances cannot be solved in any reasonable time. Norvig I 106 Pattern databases: The idea behind them is to store these exact solution costs for every possible subproblem instance (…) Norvig I 108 Def Problem: A problem consists of five parts: the initial state, a set of actions, a transition model describing the results of those actions, a goal test function, and a path cost function. The environment of the problem is represented by a state space. A path through the state space from the initial state to a goal state is a solution. Norvig I 135 And/or nodes/search trees: or: In a deterministic environment, the only branching is introduced by the agent’s own choices in each state. We call these nodes OR nodes And: In a nondeterministic environment, branching is also introduced by the environment’s choice of outcome for each action. We call these nodes AND nodes. A solution for an AND–OR search problem is a subtree that (1) has a goal node at every leaf, (2) specifies one action at each of its OR nodes, and (3) includes every outcome branch at each of its AND nodes. Norvig I 148 Competitive ratio: Typically, the agent’s objective is to reach a goal state while minimizing cost. (Another possible objective is simply to explore the entire environment.) The cost is the total path cost of the path that the agent actually travels. It is common to compare this cost with the path cost of the path the agent would follow if it knew the search space in advance—that is, the actual shortest path (or shortest complete exploration). In the language of online algorithms, this is called the competitive ratio; we would like it to be as small as possible. >Online search/Norvig. Norvig I 162 Def Pruning: Pruning allows us to ignore portions of the search tree that make no difference to the final choice. Def Heuristic evaluation functions: allow us to approximate the true utility of a state without doing a complete search. Def utility function: (also called an objective function or payoff function), defines the final numeric value for a game that ends in terminal state s for a player p. In chess, the outcome is a win, loss, or draw, with values +1, 0, or 1 2 . Some games have a wider variety of possible outcomes; the payoffs in backgammon range from 0 to +192. Def Zero-sum game: is (confusingly) defined as one where the total payoff to all players is the same for every instance of the game. Chess is zero-sum. “Constant-sum” would have been a better term, but zero-sum is traditional and makes sense if you imagine each player is charged an entry fee of 1/2 . Norvig I 165 Minimax Algorithm/gaming: The minimax algorithm (…) computes the minimax decision from the current state. It uses a simple recursive computation of the minimax values of each successor state, directly implementing the defining equations. The recursion proceeds all the way down to the leaves of the tree, and then the minimax values are backed up through the tree as the recursion unwinds. The minimax algorithm performs a complete depth-first exploration of the game tree. For real games, of course, the time cost is totally impractical, but this algorithm serves as the basis for the mathematical analysis of games and for more practical algorithms. Norvig I 208 Def node consistency: A single variable (corresponding to a node in the CSP network) is node-consistent if all the values in the variable’s domain satisfy the variable’s unary constraints. Def arc consistency: A variable in a CSP is arc-consistent if every value in its domain satisfies the variable’s binary constraints. More formally, Xi is arc-consistent with respect to another variable Xj if for every value in the current domain Di there is some value in the domain Dj that satisfies the binary constraint on the arc (Xi,Xj). >Constraint Satisfaction Problems/CSP/Norvig. Norvig I 210 Def Path consistency: Arc consistency tightens down the domains (unary constraints) using the arcs (binary constraints). To make progress on problems like map coloring, we need a stronger notion of consistency. Path consistency tightens the binary constraints by using implicit constraints that are inferred by looking at triples of variables. Norvig I 211 Def K-consistency: Stronger forms of propagation can K-CONSISTENCY be defined with the notion of k-consistency. A CSP is k-consistent if, for any set of k − 1 variables and for any consistent assignment to those variables, a consistent value can always be assigned to any kth variable. For forward chaining, backward chaining: see >Software agents/Norvig. Norvig I 266 Propositions: The idea of associating propositions with time steps extends to any aspect of the world changes over time. Fluent: We use the word fluent (from the Latin fluents, flowing) to refer an aspect of the world that changes. “Fluent” is a synonym for “state variable”. Norvig I 346 Skolemize: Skolemization is the process of removing existential quantifiers by elimination. In the simple case, it is just like the Existential Instantiation rule (…): translate ∃x P(x) into P(A), where A is a new constant. Norvig I 410 Nondeterministic action: The programming languages community has coined the term demonic nondeterminism for the case where an adversary makes the DEMONIC choices, contrasting this with angelic nonde- Norvig I 411 terminism, where the agent itself makes the choices. We borrow this term to define angelic semantics for HLA descriptions. Norvig I 468 Closed-world assumption: as implemented in logic programs, provides a simple way to avoid having to specify lots of negative information. It is best interpreted as a default that can be overridden by additional information. 1. Cobham, A. (1964). The intrinsic computational difficulty of functions. In Proc. 1964 International Congress for Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, pp. 24–30. 2. Edmonds, J. (1965). Paths, trees, and flowers. Canadian Journal of Mathematics, 17, 449–467.	Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010
Terminology	Russell	Norvig I 8 Terminology/Russell/Norvig: Although decidability and computability are important to an understanding of computation, the notion of tractability has had an even greater impact. Roughly speaking, a problem is called intractable if the time required to solve instances of the problem grows exponentially with the size of the instances. The distinction between polynomial and exponential growth in complexity was first emphasized in the mid-1960s (Cobham, 1964⁽¹⁾; Edmonds, 1965⁽²⁾). It is important because exponential growth means that even moderately large instances cannot be solved in any reasonable time. Norvig I 106 Pattern databases: The idea behind them is to store these exact solution costs for every possible subproblem instance (…) Norvig I 108 Def Problem: A problem consists of five parts: the initial state, a set of actions, a transition model describing the results of those actions, a goal test function, and a path cost function. The environment of the problem is represented by a state space. A path through the state space from the initial state to a goal state is a solution. Norvig I 135 And/or nodes/search trees: or: In a deterministic environment, the only branching is introduced by the agent’s own choices in each state. We call these nodes OR nodes And: In a nondeterministic environment, branching is also introduced by the environment’s choice of outcome for each action. We call these nodes AND nodes. A solution for an AND–OR search problem is a subtree that (1) has a goal node at every leaf, (2) specifies one action at each of its OR nodes, and (3) includes every outcome branch at each of its AND nodes. Norvig I 148 Competitive ratio: Typically, the agent’s objective is to reach a goal state while minimizing cost. (Another possible objective is simply to explore the entire environment.) The cost is the total path cost of the path that the agent actually travels. It is common to compare this cost with the path cost of the path the agent would follow if it knew the search space in advance—that is, the actual shortest path (or shortest complete exploration). In the language of online algorithms, this is called the competitive ratio; we would like it to be as small as possible. >Online search/Norvig. Norvig I 162 Def Pruning: Pruning allows us to ignore portions of the search tree that make no difference to the final choice. Def Heuristic evaluation functions: allow us to approximate the true utility of a state without doing a complete search. Def utility function: (also called an objective function or payoff function), defines the final numeric value for a game that ends in terminal state s for a player p. In chess, the outcome is a win, loss, or draw, with values +1, 0, or 1 2 . Some games have a wider variety of possible outcomes; the payoffs in backgammon range from 0 to +192. Def Zero-sum game: is (confusingly) defined as one where the total payoff to all players is the same for every instance of the game. Chess is zero-sum. “Constant-sum” would have been a better term, but zero-sum is traditional and makes sense if you imagine each player is charged an entry fee of 1/2 . Norvig I 165 Minimax Algorithm/gaming: The minimax algorithm (…) computes the minimax decision from the current state. It uses a simple recursive computation of the minimax values of each successor state, directly implementing the defining equations. The recursion proceeds all the way down to the leaves of the tree, and then the minimax values are backed up through the tree as the recursion unwinds. The minimax algorithm performs a complete depth-first exploration of the game tree. For real games, of course, the time cost is totally impractical, but this algorithm serves as the basis for the mathematical analysis of games and for more practical algorithms. Norvig I 208 Def node consistency: A single variable (corresponding to a node in the CSP network) is node-consistent if all the values in the variable’s domain satisfy the variable’s unary constraints. Def arc consistency: A variable in a CSP is arc-consistent if every value in its domain satisfies the variable’s binary constraints. More formally, Xi is arc-consistent with respect to another variable Xj if for every value in the current domain Di there is some value in the domain Dj that satisfies the binary constraint on the arc (Xi,Xj). >Constraint Satisfaction Problems/CSP/Norvig. Norvig I 210 Def Path consistency: Arc consistency tightens down the domains (unary constraints) using the arcs (binary constraints). To make progress on problems like map coloring, we need a stronger notion of consistency. Path consistency tightens the binary constraints by using implicit constraints that are inferred by looking at triples of variables. Norvig I 211 Def K-consistency: Stronger forms of propagation can K-CONSISTENCY be defined with the notion of k-consistency. A CSP is k-consistent if, for any set of k − 1 variables and for any consistent assignment to those variables, a consistent value can always be assigned to any kth variable. For forward chaining, backward chaining: see >Software agents/Norvig. Norvig I 266 Propositions: The idea of associating propositions with time steps extends to any aspect of the world changes over time. Fluent: We use the word fluent (from the Latin fluents, flowing) to refer an aspect of the world that changes. “Fluent” is a synonym for “state variable”. Norvig I 346 Skolemize: Skolemization is the process of removing existential quantifiers by elimination. In the simple case, it is just like the Existential Instantiation rule (…): translate ∃x P(x) into P(A), where A is a new constant. Norvig I 410 Nondeterministic action: The programming languages community has coined the term demonic nondeterminism for the case where an adversary makes the DEMONIC choices, contrasting this with angelic nonde- Norvig I 411 terminism, where the agent itself makes the choices. We borrow this term to define angelic semantics for HLA descriptions. Norvig I 468 Closed-world assumption: as implemented in logic programs, provides a simple way to avoid having to specify lots of negative information. It is best interpreted as a default that can be overridden by additional information. 1. Cobham, A. (1964). The intrinsic computational difficulty of functions. In Proc. 1964 International Congress for Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, pp. 24–30. 2. Edmonds, J. (1965). Paths, trees, and flowers. Canadian Journal of Mathematics, 17, 449–467.	Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010
Terminology	Wright	I 41 "Platitude"/Wright: "P" is true if and only if "P" corresponds with the facts correspondence platitude Correspondence platitude/CP/Wright: "P" is true if and only if things are as "P" says that they are - Deflationism/Wright: accepts (like us) following platitudes: claiming something means, representing something as true, any truth enabled content has a meaningful negation, to be true means to correspond with the facts, a statement can be justified without being true, and vice versa. I 60 Epistemic Constraint/EC: if P is true, then there is evidence for that -> enforces revision of logic, otherwise P cannot be true if there is no evidence. I 99 Platitudes: are called so because they are intended to help preventing a weighty metaphysical realm. I 108ff Definition evidence transcendence: the presence of decidable parameter does not have to ensure that the answer to the question is equally decidable. I 115 Error theory: Mackie (ethics), Field (mathematics). Everything would have to be traced back to a metaphysical realm to make it true. But there is no metaphysical realm. ad I 115ff Error theory/elsewhere: a theory that seeks to explain why our intuitions are different than the theory asserts. I 118ff Convergence 1: weak: only trend - more: Convergence 2: enforces convergence - Definition minimal capacity for truth: requires use of standards for assertibility and thus the existence of criteria - Vs "appropriate circumstances" unclear - VsWright: discourse about the strange: not minimal capable of truth. - WrightVs: there are no "permissive conditions" - Convergence platitude/representation platitude/Wright: divergent output can only be explained by divergent input - Definition cognitive coercion: a discourse enforces cognitive coercion if divergences can only be explained by divergent input - Tradition: moral discourse does not satisfy the criteria of cognitive coercion - Wright: but cognitive coercion is compatible with flexible standards, it is an additional condition for minimal truth-capable discourses. I 138 Wright pro convergence also in the discourse about the strange. I 150 Solidification/Wright: a solidification will change the modal status. Whether P is true, may be contingent, but if P is true, the statement is necessary that P is actually true. - Problem: this should not apply for the basic equation for shape - Another problem: "if S would be in the same circumstances, it would judge equally": if too much remains still valid in other possible worlds, the equation would be true in all possible worlds and the distinction gets questionable.	WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Terminology	Zittrain	I 68 Terminology/Zittrain: hourglass architecture of the internet: Email – www – phone … SMTP – http – RTP… TCT – UDP … IP Ethernet – PPP CSMA – asnyc – sonet …. Copper – fiber – radio … I 70 Generativity: What makes something generative? There are five principal factors at work: (1) how extensively a system or technology leverages a set of possible tasks; (2) how well it can be adapted to a range of tasks; (3) how easily new contributors can master it; (4) how accessible it is to those ready and able to build on it; and (5) how transferable any changes are to others—including (and perhaps especially) nonexperts. Leverage: Leverage makes a difficult job easier. I 71 Adaptability: Adaptability refers to how easily the system can be built on or modified to broaden its range of uses. Ease of mastery: A technology’s ease of mastery reflects how easy it is for broad audiences to understand how to adopt and adapt it. I 72 Accessibility: The easier it is to obtain access to a technology, along with the tools and information necessary to achieve mastery of it, the more generative it is. I 73 Transferability: Transferability indicates how easily changes in the technology can be conveyed to others.	Zittrain I Jonathan Zittrain The Future of the Internet--And How to Stop It New Haven 2009
Texts	Flusser	I 105 Texts/Flusser: Thesis: Almost everyone can "write". Texts are getting "cheaper" all the time and less valuable. The world of texts is no longer characteristic of our codified world. Although it is much denser than ever. The level of consciousness that these codes correspond to has not yet been reached. That is why they are so extraordinarily dangerous: they program us without being seen through and threaten us as opaque walls. I 124ff Texts/Flusser: The Qualitative Second Jump (Fig. I 107) "Alienation 2". The text tells "everything in an order". Fig.: The stick figures emerge out of the frame, arranged one after the other: sun, male, male, dog. All separate. The symbols of the descriptive text have nothing in common with the symbols of the described text. The orthographic rules are much more complicated. >Symbols, >Description levels. I 125 The jump out of the picture is a strange gesture: the jump is not performed with the legs, but with the hands, like how one ruffles up a sweater. Not the theoretically infinite number of lines of the surface, but the significant lines of the elements. I 127 At first glance, it is evident that linear codes can transmit far less information than two-dimensional codes of the surface. Many pages of text are necessary to describe a very simple picture. The importance of the "sublime" is lost. >Sublime, >Gärdenfors. I 128 Imagination/Descartes/Flusser: Descartes did not have less, but more imagination than a drawer, so he had to translate the two-dimensional geometry into equations. >Equations. Simply put: all texts mean pictures and without pictures there are no texts. I 133 Books/Flusser: Wittgenstein shows that they are either tautological, meaningless, or contradictory. I 134 ... and that the apparent meaning of texts is based on "grammatical errors", i. e. on incorrect manipulation of the codes. >Code/Flusser. I 158 f Texts/Picture/Flusser: Relationship between picture and text: Diachronic: Texts in function of pictures: e.g. Romanesque churches: conceptual thinking put at the service of magic. >Magical thinking. If, on the other hand, images are used in function of texts (e.g. in fibulas), then magical thinking has been put into the service of historicization (of literacy). In the cloister one should learn to imagine something in reference to the biblical texts, in the fibula to describe pictures in terms. I 161 Synchronic: viewed synchronously, the question is posed differently: images have been currently displaced from the center of the codified world. Picture books are either too expensive or too cheap to play a similar role to the cloisters. In our world, a walk through a nocturnal city street is more imaginative than a walk through a picture gallery. I 164 Text/Technical Image: relation text/technical image: the belief that observation is a "meeting" of the observer with the observed has long been shaken. >Observation, >Perception.	Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996
That	Cresswell	II 30 That/attribution of propositional attitudes/Cresswell: "that" should be a function that is applied to the referents of the partial expressions. Value: of this function is then the structure (>Structure = >Sense). Argument/(s): here reference of the parts of the complement sentence. Reference/that-clause/Cresswell: (very similar to Frege): the reference of the that-clause is the sense (the mode of being given) of the complement sentence (of the sentence that follows the "that"). That/meaning: if it is a function, it is a triple or quadruple ... - II 69 Notation/Cresswell: D: Range D0: refers to the set of all sets of possible worlds D1: to the universe of things >Semantic categories/meaning categories D(0/1): is a class of (one-digit) functions of things (elements of D1) on sets of possible worlds (Elements of D0), etc.	Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Theories	Lamont	Gaus I 230 Theories/principles/justification/Lamont: (...) theories [on distributive justice] have been characterized mainly according to the content of their approach to the moral demands of welfare (or luck) and responsibility. It is important to note here some of the complications of these characterizations and Gaus I 231 also other ways of conceptualizing the distributive justice literature. Most theorists are accurately described by a number of non-equivalent labels. The classifications used here are widespread in the contemporary literature, but there are nevertheless subtle differences in the ways different authors use these labels. Content/principle/justification: one important distinction is between the content of a distributive principle, and its justification. Content: 'Content' refers to the distribution ideally recommended by a principle, whereas 'justification' refers to the reasons given in support of the principle. Theorists can be distinguished and labelled according to the content of their theory or according to the justification they give. Problems: 1) (...) the common labels used here refer sometimes to the content and other times to the justifications for various positions. 2) (...) most groups of theories have justifications from a number of different sources and single writers even will sometimes use more than one source of justification for their theory. Most combinations of content and justification, in fact, have been tried. For instance, different libertarians use natural rights, desert, utilitarianism or contractarianism in the justification of their theories; different desert theorists use natural rights, contractarianism and even utilitarianism (Mill 1877⁽¹⁾; Sidgwick, 1890⁽²⁾). Partly this comes about because there are different versions of justifications which nevertheless, due to some similarity, share the same broad label. Contract theory: For instance, contractarianism features in the justifications of many theories, and covers both Hobbesian and Kantian contractarians, after Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant (Hampton, 1991⁽³⁾). A) Hobbesian contractarians, such as David Gauthier, attempt to justify morality in terms of the self-interested reasons individuals have for agreeing to certain terms of social co-operation. B) Kantian contractarians, such as John Rawls, appeal to moral reasons to justify the terms of social cooperation that would be worthy of consent, usually arguing for distributions on the egalitarian end of the spectrum. A Hobbesian contractarian, as you might suspect, is more likely to argue for libertarian oriented systems (Buchanan, 1982⁽⁴⁾; Gauthier, 1987⁽⁵⁾; Levin, 1982⁽⁶⁾). However, there are also followers of Hobbes who insist his contractarianism is better read to justify some important aspects of the welfare state, rather than a merely minimalist government (Kavka, 1986⁽⁷⁾; Morris, 1998⁽⁸⁾: ch. 9; Vallentyne, 1991⁽⁹⁾). So theorists who share the 'contractarian' label may also be characterized by a libertarian rejection of redistribution or an egalitarian insistence on widespread distribution (...). Equality/egalitarianism: the most common alternatives to characterizing distributive justice theories along the dimensions of welfare and responsibility have been to characterize them either along the related dimension of equality, or according to the degree of egalitarianism the theories prescribe. So each of the theories already surveyed here could alternatively be categorized according to its treatment, or approach, to equality (Joseph and Sumption, 1979⁽¹⁰⁾; Rakowski, 1991)⁽¹¹⁾. >Equality/Sen. Sen: in his influential lecture 'Equality of what?' (1980)⁽¹²⁾, Amartya Sen addresses the question of what metric egalitarians should use to determine the degree to which a society realizes the ideal of equality. A range of alternative variables for what should be equalized have since been introduced (Daniels, 1990⁽¹³⁾) and refined, including the resource egalitarians discussed above (Dworkin, 2000)⁽¹⁴⁾, equal opportunity for welfare (Arneson, 1989⁽¹⁵⁾; 1990⁽¹⁶⁾; 1991⁽¹⁷⁾), equal access to advantage (Cohen, 1989)⁽¹⁸⁾, and equal political status (Anderson, 1999)⁽¹⁹⁾. Gaus I 232 Concepts/content/theories: Another complication (...) comes from differences in how the very topic of distributive justice itself is conceived, with some theorists emphasizing process rather than content or justification. Principles: [many theories] address the question of distributive justice by recommending principles intended as normative ideals for institutions, which themselves will significantly determine the distribution of resources. These theories reflect progress and a growing consensus throughout most of the twentieth century about what is not acceptable. For example, all of the theories on offer reject the inequalities characteristic in feudal, aristocratic, and slave societies, as well as the inequalities inherent in systems that restrict access to goods, services, jobs or positions on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity or religion. Deciding processes: On the other hand, some theorists believe that the ongoing existence of reasonable disagreement reflects importantly on the very nature of distributive justice. They argue that, within the area of reasonable disagreement about what are the best distributive ideals, the additional questions to examine are whether the processes for deciding distributive questions are just. So, some argue that certain distributive justice issues should be dealt with at the constitutional level, variously described, while other issues are properly decided at the legislative level. Just processes; a subgroup of these theorists also take the view that some decisions about distributive justice issues can be partly or fully justified because they are the result of a just process (Christiano, 1996⁽²⁰⁾; Gaus, 1996⁽²¹⁾). Rational argument alone may be able to exclude some systems as unjust, but others will be justified not simply on the grounds of their content, but also by the process by which they were reached. >Liberalism/Lamont. 1. Mill, John S. (1877) Utilitarianism, 6th edn. London: Longmans, Green. 2. Sidgwick, Henry (1890) The Methods of Ethics, 4th edn. London: Macmillan. 3. Hampton, Jean (1991) 'Two faces of contractarian thought'. In Peter Vallentyne, ed., Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier 's Morals by Agreement. New York: Oxford University Press, 31—55. 4. Buchanan, Allen (1982) 'A critical introduction to Rawls' theory of justice'. In H. Gene Blocker and Elizabeth H. Smith, eds, John Rawls' Theory of Social Justice: An Introduction. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press. 5. Gauthier, David Peter (1987) Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon. 6. Levin, Michael (1982) 'A Hobbesian minimal state'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1 1 (4): 338-53. 7. Kavka, Gregory S. (1986) Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 8. Morris, Christopher (1998) An Essay on the Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 9. Vallentyne, Peter (1991) Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement. New York: Cambridge University Press. 10. Joseph, Keith and Jonathan Sumption (1979) Equality. London: Murray. 11. Rakowskl, Eric (1991) Equal Justice. Oxford: Clarendon. 12. Sen, Amartya (1980) 'Equality of what?' In Sterling M. McMurrin, ed., Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 195-220. 13. Daniels, Norman (1990) 'Equality of what: welfare, resources, or capabilities?' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50 (Fall): 273-96. 14. Dworkin, Ronald (2000) Soveæign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 15. Arneson, Richard (1989) 'Equality and equal opportunity for welfare, Philosophical Studies, 56: 77-93. 16. Arneson, Richard (1990) 'Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism and equal opportunity for welfare', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19: 159-94. 17. Arneson, Richard (1991) 'Lockean self-ownership: towards a demolition', Political Studies, 39 (l): 36-54. 18. Cohen, G. A. (1989) 'On the currency of egalitarian justice'. Ethics, 99 906_44. 19. Anderson, Elizabeth (1999) 'What is the point of equality?' Ethics, 109 (2): 287-337. 20. Christiano, Thomas (1996) The Rule of the Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory. Boulder, CO: Westview. 21. Gaus, Gerald (1996) Justificatory Liberalism. New York: Oxford University Press. Lamont, Julian 2004. „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Theories	Quine	I 34 Theory does not have to be based on intention, it was internalized in the past. I 56 QuineVsVerification: it is pointless to equate a sentence within the theory with one outside - Inter-theoretically no meaning - no additions with "or" ((s) Cf. Goodman, Davidson, "fake theories"). >Verification, >Additional hypotheses. I 57 For the time being, we retain our beliefs in theory creation. I 74 Basics for a theory: Carnap: terms - Quine: sentences. I 393 Theory is only predication, universal quantification, truth function (for derived properties) - general term (for primary properties) - (no "because"). I 429 Theory: are isolated systems, mass point, infinitesimal size: behavior in every case more typical, the closer you get to zero, therefore it is acceptable - but not allowed in ontology - unlike geometric object: Position of mass points made no sense - therefore no individuation - no identity. (> Quine, Word and Object, 1960⁽¹⁾, §52.) I 431 Paraphrase (no synonymy): Newton could be reformulated relativistically - like Church: "true in a higher sense" - sometimes acceptable. I 432 Theory: Structure of meaning, not choice of objects (Ramsey, Russell) Quine: new: even with physical objects they are also theoretical. Reason: sentences are semantically primary. >Frege principle. 1. Quine, W. V. (1960). Word and Object. MIT Press --- II 45 Equivalence of theories: is discovered when one discovers the possibility of reinterpretation - both true - but possibly logically incompatible. --- VI 134 Theory/Empirically equivalent/logically equivalent/Quine: Two theories can be logically incompatible and yet empirically equivalent. E.g. Riemann/Euclidean geometry. Case 1: even untransformable theories (in the same terminology, where each implies certain sentences that the other one does not imply) are empirically equivalent - no problem. Case 2: additional theoretical terms Case 3: logically incompatible. Davidson: can be traced back to case 2 - because contentious sentences depend on theoretical terms which are not empirical - therefore they are still empirically equivalent. Solution: theoretical term in question in two spellings (according to theory) - that makes them logically compatible. >Theoretical terms. VI 136 Empirically equivalent/logically incompatible/Theory/Quine: Case 2: (theory for global worlds without context embedding): solution: eliminate exotic terms (without predictive power) Important argument: then it is about consistency (otherwise QuineVsConsistency theory). Elimination: justified by the fact that we have no other access to the truth except our own theory. >Elimination. VI 139 Empirically equivalent/logically incompatible/Theory/Quine: Variant/Davidson: Both theories are valid, truth predicate: in comprehensive, neutral language. QuineVsDavidson: how much further should the variables reach then? - We need a stop, because we do not want a third theory - "everything different"/Important argument: the two systems definitely describe the same world - purely verbal question. --- XII 70 Theory form/Quine: after abstraction of the meanings of the non-logical vocabulary and the value range of the variables - reinterpretation of the theory form provides models. >Vocabulary, >Reinterpretation, >Abstraction, >Models.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Theories	Sellars	I XXII/XXIII Theory/SellarsVsQuine: the database itself is part of the theory. Sensory impressions or sense stimulations are quasi-theoretical entities of an everyday theory of perception. >Impressions/Sellars, >Sensations/Sellars, >Everyday language, cf. >Folk psychology. I XLIII Theory/language: the language of the scientific world view must preserve the basic structures of the everyday world view. For example, colors are homogeneous properties. (But not according to the scientific image). So Sellars later creates the concept of Sensa, which only occurs in sentient organisms. Where the ordinary human perceives something blue, on the side of science occurs the sensum. Sensa themselves are not colored, just as the states of feeling are. Colored alone are the objects of the everyday world. Also not the physical objects. Otherwise one would have to isolate a colored surface and ask for its thickness, which leads to contradictions: I 74 Reification of the methodological distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical discourse, incorrect substantive distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical existence. >Reification. I 85f Theory/tradition: thesis a theory explains laws by deriving theoretical correlations of these laws from a small amount of postulates about hidden entities. - SellarsVsTradition: the assumptions of a theory are not formed by an uninterpreted calculus, but by a model. ((s) uninterpreted: because supported by unobservable.) Def Model/Sellars: the description of a range of known objects that behave in the usual way. - A model gets a comment. - This restricts analogies. Sellars: continuous transition to the everyday world. >Models/Sellars, >Model theory, >Analogies. I 87 SellarsVs logistical picture of forming theories: most explanations did not arise from the head of the theorists as a finished product. Between science and everyday life, there is a continuous transition. The distinction between theory language and observation language belongs to the logic of the terms of inner episodes. >Theory language, >Observation language. I 100 The entities imported from the theory are states of the perceiving subject, not a class of individual objects.	Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977
Theory of Mind	Psychological Theories	Slater I 150 Theory of Mind/ToM/psychological theories: the hypothesis, of a lack of theory of mind has had a significant impact on the way cognitive researchers view the architecture of the mind Slater I 151 and it has been taken as strong support for the idea that the human brain is equipped with a ToM module. >Theory of Mind/Premack/Woodruff, >Theory of Mind/Dennett: “How does one demonstrate that an individual has the capacity to conceive mental states?” - >Autism. In fact, following Baron-Cohen et al.’s (1985)⁽¹⁾ findings, autism soon became a test case for many theories of typical development where the ToM module is thought to play a central role (see e.g., Frith & Happé, 1995⁽²⁾; Happé, 1993⁽³⁾). >False-Belief Task/Happé. Slater I 152 ToM/Autism/VsBaron-Cohen see also >Autism/Baron-Cohen. ToM impairments are not specific to ASD and can also be found in a range of other conditions, most notably in schizophrenia (for a meta-analysis, see Sprong, Schothorst, Vos, Hox, & Van Engeland, 2007⁽⁴⁾) but also in unipolar and bipolar depression (e.g., Inoue, Tonooka, Yamada, & Kanba, 2004⁽⁵⁾; Kerr, Dunbar, & Bentall, 2003⁽⁶⁾), conduct disorders (e.g., Happé & Frith, 1996)⁽⁷⁾, right hemisphere damage (Surian & Siegal, 2001⁽⁸⁾), and other conditions. Similarly, the executive dysfunction account has been criticized for lacking specificity, with executive function deficits found in attention deficit hyperactivity disorders (ADHD), schizophrenia, obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), etc. It is important to note, however, that these first two criticisms are problematic only If one considers that there ought to be a single explanation for all the symptoms found in ASD. Slater I 153 What is relevant, (…) is whether the universality criterion (>Autism/psychological theories) is met. Indeed, if the ToM account is a valid explanation for the socialization and communication issues universally found in the condition, it follows that ToM deficits should also be universal. Therefore early experimental evidence demonstrating that some individuals diagnosed with an ASD did pass ToM task was rightly taken as a threat to the mindblindness hypothesis. In fact, Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith already acknowledged this problem in their 1985⁽¹⁾ paper. 1. Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind.” Cognition,21, 13—125. 2. Frith, U., & Happé, F. (1995). Autism: Beyond ‘theory of mind.” In: J. Mehler& S. Franck (Eds), Cognition on cognition (pp. 13—30). Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 3. Happé, F. (1993). Communicative competence and theory of mind in autism: A test of relevance theory. Cognition, 48, 101—119. 4. Sprong, M., Schothorst, P., Vos, E., Hox, J., & Van Engeland, H. (2007). Theory of mind in schizophrenia: meta-analysis. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 191, 5—13. 5. Inoue, Y., Tonooka, Y., Yamada, K., & Kanba, S. (2004). Deficiency of theory of mind in patients with remitted mood disorder. Journal of Affective Disorders, 82,403—409. 6. Kerr, N., Dunbar, R I. M., & Bentall, R. P. (2003). Theory of mind deficits in bipolar affective disorder. Journal of Affective Disorders, 73, 253—259. 7. Happé, F., & Frith, U. (1996). Theory of mind and social impairment in children with conduct disorder. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 14, 385-398. 8. Surian, L., & Siegal, M. (2001). Sources of performance on theory of mind tasks in right hemisphere damaged patients. Brain and Language, 78, 224—232. Coralie Chevallier, “Theory of Mind and Autism. Beyond Baron-Cohen et al’s. Sally-Anne Study”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Theory of Relativity	Feyerabend	I 80 Relativity Theory/Feyerabend: E.g. Mercury perihelion: the famous deviation is explained by the relativity theory. The explanation shows that the prerequisite for derivation is not the general theory of relativity, but, apart from relativistic assumptions, always contains classical physics! In addition, the relativistic calculation ("blackboard solution") does not refer to the planetary system in the real world, but to the completely fictitious case of a centrally asymmetric universe that contains nothing apart from its singularity in the middle. Why are such strange assumptions made? Usual answer: we are dealing with approximations. Classical physics does not occur here, because the theory of relativity would be incomplete. Both schemes result from the general theory of relativity. You just have to neglect the sizes that are all too small. So the theory of relativity is applied consistently and in the correct way. >Aproximations. I 81 FeyerabendVs: this is a useful representation of the approximation method, but it does not reflect the real situation in the general theory of relativity! The classical theory is not used because it was proved to be correct, but in the hope that it will be useful! The approximations do not arise from relativistic calculations, but are introduced to be able to apply the theory of relativity to the case! (I 82), heliocentric theory at the time of Galileo, ad-hoc approximations to many quantitative results of the theories are not correct and surprisingly qualitatively inadequate. E.g. von Neumann: replaced the semi-intuitive concepts of Dirac and Bohr with incredibly complicated concepts. The relationship to experience becomes more obscure than ever. >Experience, >Perception, >Observation, >Theories, >Method.	Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979
Thinking	Brandom	I 230 f Similarity Theory (Actuator-Semantics) Searle, "similar to" Language is arranged prior to thoughts - Relational Theory: "Relation to". Representatives: Davidson: neither language nor thought has priority, none is completely explainable through the other - we are essential, not only accidental beings with beliefs. >Belief/Davidson. --- I 872 Thought/Davidson: you can only have thoughts, if you are an interpreter of language of others. >Language, >Language and thought.	Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Time	Flusser	I 119 Time in the image/Flusser: can be turned into circles: the time in the image is a stream that flows on the surface to hold its elements together. E. g. H O H (in a frame) means a scene in which the orbiting time arranges the elements spatially. I 120 You can roll them spatially apart on two sides:"H₂O": then hydrogen and oxygen are causes, 2. 2H + O, then they are consequences of water. In the first explanation, the scene meant by the picture is the end point of a synthetic process, in the second, of an analytical process. Both explanations order the elements in chronological order. >Analyticity/Syntheticity, >Meaning/Intending. I 121 However, the information originally contained in the picture is lost, which affects the spatial and especially not procedural relation. The two explanations are in a sense profanations of the original saint. >Space, >Processes. The order of the picture is not an explanatory order like that of the text, but a total order. >Explanation, >Order, >Images/Flusser. I 132 Time/Flusser: whatever the time experienced may be, it cannot be linear: it comes from all sides. It cannot flow from the past to the future, because it is the future and not the past that arrives. The present cannot be a point on a ray, for it is the place where all time gathers, i.e. becomes present. >Past, >Present, >Future, On the other hand, the historical time cannot be more abstract than the magical time, because it can pre-program our concrete experience just as well as the magical time. >Magical thinking. You can believe in them as well as in the magical one. Recipients of a textual message (linear) live in a completely different world than that of the magical mood. >Texts/Flusser. They no longer experience the world as "scenes" but as "events" and that means: they experience time as irrevocable. >Events. I 214 ff Time/Flusser: Time experience in linear consciousness experiences time as a stream flowing from the past into the future, historical past is irrevocably past. For techno-imaginary consciousness this is pure madness. a) as soon as you get an impression of the concept of historical time, it becomes apparent that it flows in the opposite direction: from the future to the past: what arrives is not yesterday, but tomorrow. b) Presence becomes visible as the center of time. Time is recognizable as a tendency to visualization. For historical consciousness, the present is a point on a line, so the present is unreal once it is, it is no longer. >Historiography, >History. I 215 For historical consciousness, only becoming is true. For techno-imagination (TI), such an ontology is a typical example of madness. >Terminology/Flusser. 1st consequence: For them, only the present is real, because it is the place where the only possible (the future) arrives to be realized, (meaning at the present). 2nd consequence: The past is a hole in the present. However, the past does not appear as a "third time form" (besides the present and the future) but as an aspect of the present - as a "memory." I 216 3rd Consequence: "politicization" of time: I am constant, the world is variable. Trying to expand the present so that others can be with me in it. 4th Consequence: historical causal chains become senseless: the future arrives, it does not "follow" from something. Birds, for example, do not build nests "because" they are programmed by genetic information, but during nest building it turns out that birds have genetic information. For example, the French Revolution does not lead to the Russian Revolution, but the Russian Revolution shows that the French Revolution had an internal contradiction. Although we have this new experience of time, we will not have the consciousness of having it. I 217 A new, inprogressive future is on the horizon. Progress has been "suspended" in the past. >Progress.	Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996
Toleration	Kukathas	Gaus I 256 Toleration/society/group rights/Kukathas: Kukathas (1997⁽¹⁾; 2001⁽²⁾; 2003b⁽³⁾), in particular, has argued vigorously that toleration is so important a liberal virtue that a liberal order will tolerate a diversity of cultures even if some of them are highly illiberal. What a good society protects is freedom of association, not autonomy. And for as long as individuals are free to exit the arrangements or communities or groups within which they find themselves, that order is legitimate - even if it might be one in which many groups or communities are highly illiberal in as much as they are themselves intolerant of diversity. Group rights/KukathasVsKymlicka: This view, however, gives no particular rights to groups as such, and denies them the external protections advocated by Kymlicka and others; though it also denies outside authorities any right to intervene to lift internal restrictions imposed by such communities upon their members. >Diversity/Multiculturalism, >Group rights/Political philosophy, >Minority rights/Political philosophy, >Minorities/Multiculturalism, >Multiculturalism. 1. Kukathas, Chandran (1997) 'Cultural toleration'. In Will Kymlicka and Ian Shapiro, eds, Ethnicity and Group Rights: NOMOS XXXIX New York: New York University Press, 69—104. 2. Kukathas, Chandran (2001) 'Is Feminism Bad for Multiculturalism?' Public Affairs Quarterly, 15 (2): 83-98. 3. Kukathas, Chandran (2003b) The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Trait Differences	Fleeson	Corr II 231 Intrapersonal Personality Trait Differences/Density Distribution Approach/Study/Fleeson/Rauthmann/Schmitt: Fleeson’s (2001⁾⁽¹⁾ definition of traits as density distributions of states comes with several assumptions (…).The first assumption predicts that individuals express their personality trait-levels on all behavioral levels. This means, for example, that even a person with an extremely low extraversion trait-level (level 1 on a 7-point scale) sometimes shows extremely extraverted behavior (level 7). [This can occur] in reaction to pronounced differences between situations or because of different temporarily activated goal-processes within a person. Second (…) it was assumed that the average behavioral manifestation of a trait is highly stable and predictable even though each single behavioral manifestation is not. (…) intra-individual density distributions of states can be used to index the individual trait-level to some degree. [And third] the shape of the density distribution of states entails unique details of an individual’s personality. State variability (…) reflects a person’s responsiveness (sensitivity, reactivity) to situational cues and characteristics. >Situations, >Behavior, >Dimensional approach. II 232 [The first study by Fleeson (2001)⁽¹⁾] revealed that the individual personality state variability was lower as compared to the total personality state variability, but not much, with the individual standard deviation roughly amounting to .90 and the total stand deviation roughly amounting to 1.20. This result clearly II 233 confirms Fleeson’s claim that personality states and their variability across situations contain important personality information over and above personality trait-levels. [The results also showed] that personality states can vary across situations as much as affective states do. [Fleeson also found] that ‘individuals differ from themselves over time at least as much as they differ from each other at the average level’ (Fleeson 2001⁽¹⁾, p. 1016). [Fleeson’s second assumption was also supported]. [He found that the] average correlation between randomly selected states ranged from .28 (Conscientiousness) to .54 (Intellect), with the average correlation across all Big Five constructs amounting to .39. The third assumption predicted that, in addition to the mean of the state density distribution, its shape as described by the standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis would vary systematically and in a stable manner between individuals. This assumption received mixed support. (…) the average correlation of state variability across traits was .38 suggesting that individuals differ not only in their trait-specific situational reactivity but also in their general reactivity. II 234 (…) Study 2 [by Fleeson (2001)⁽¹⁾ simply] replicated the results of Study 1. II 235 Study 3 tested whether high state variability, high stability of this variability and high stability of the average state were, at least partly, due to idiosyncratic scale usage. Despite differences in material, results were similar to those of Study 1 and 2. Importantly, average within-person state variability (quantified by the standard deviation) amounted to about 70% of the total variability across all participants and measurement occasions and was similar in size to the trait variability between individuals. Moreover, the two most important parameters of the individual state density distribution – level (mean) and variability (standard deviation) – were again very high (…) across individuals and constructs. II 236 VsFleeson: First, most research has used people’s self-reports of personality states in experience sampling. These may approximate, but are not actual behavior. Second, the exact underlying processes and mechanisms (which can be biophysiological, perceptual, cognitive, motivational, intentional, volitional, regulatory, behavioral, or social-interactional) that constitute, drive, generate, or explain density distributions are poorly understood as of yet. Third, it was initially not quite clear what exactly a trait is and how density distributions ‘capture’ traits. Lastly, while a density distribution approach is based on the same principles as Classical Test Theory (where a ‘true’ trait score may be buried in a distribution of scores measured at different occasions), it is not a formalized theory of traits, states, or their relations. >Personality traits. 1. Fleeson, W. (2001). Towards a structure- and process-integrated view of personality: Traits as density distributions of states. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 1011–1027. Rauthmann, John F.; Schmitt, Manfred: “Personality Traits as State Density Distributions Revisiting Fleeson (2001)”, In: Philip J. Corr (Ed.) 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, pp. 224-244.	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Transaction Costs	Coase	Kiesling I 12 Transaction costs/Coase/Kiesling: The basic idea is deceptively simple: transaction costs determine what a firm does in house and what inputs it buys, so firms perform functions internally that are cheaper (given a specific level of quality) for them to accomplish than through independent contracts in markets. >Firms/Coase. The firms contract with others for functions that are cheaper to accomplish through markets than by organizing internally. This paradigm may seem basic, but it has sparked a wide range of research and created new fields of inquiry in economics, management, and political science. If a firm is successful and faces sufficient demand to expand, it can expand by increasing the amount of its production, by expanding into related product lines (product differentiation), or by merging with a competitor (horizontal integration). It can also integrate backward by producing its own inputs, or forward into more finished goods and marketing (vertical integration). Coase argued that the comparison between transaction costs and organization costs determine the size and boundaries of the firm as well as the extent of vertical integration. „[A] firm will tend to expand until the costs of organising an extra transaction within the firm become equal to the costs of carrying out the same transaction by means of an exchange on the open market or the costs of organising in another firm.“ (1937⁽¹⁾: 395) >Specialization/Adam Smith. Kiesling I 23 Transaction cost/externalities/Coase/Pigou/Kiesling: (…) when defining property rights is prohibitively costly or not feasible (as in, say, air pollution), bargaining to negotiate transfers of rights cannot happen. Property rights definition and enforcement costs are a category of transaction costs. Low transaction cost: Situations with low transaction costs are more likely to see welfare-enhancing bargaining, while … High transaction cost: …high transaction costs can prevent such conflict resolution. Example: An example of Pigou’s that Coase discusses for other reasons illustrates the challenge of transaction costs: the operation of a railroad through rural land in the 19th century. Railroad companies purchased land and built rail networks to run trains pulled by coal-fired steam locomotives, which threw off sparks that could cause fires that destroyed some adjoining crops or woodlands. In a situation such as the transcontinental railroad in the United States, the railroad company operated over thousands of miles and could potentially emit sparks on land owned by thousands of different farmers. This situation and others like it present a considerable transaction cost challenge, one that is common in many situations where there is a conflict in resource uses. Bargaining: In order for the farmers to bargain with the railroad over the rights to emit sparks and the rights to unharmed crops enough farmers would have to gather together to represent the interests of all affected farmers - in other words, the transaction costs would be high. In situations like these, the courts determine which party has legal liability for harms created, and enforce compensation if necessary. Pervasiveness: An overarching theme of Coase’s work on social cost is that transaction costs are pervasive. Because of that pervasiveness courts are important institutions whose decisions have implications for both the efficiency of outcomes and the distribution of profits across parties. >Law/Coase. Kiesling I 33 Def Transaction costs/Coase/Kiesling: Transaction costs, that is, the costs of defining property rights, shape incentives and how we organize the use of resources. As the example in the previous chapter of spectrum license auctions shows, these ideas have significant policy implications, even if their implementation takes decades. The use of emission permit trading in the United States to reduce air pollution is another example; it too, has long-lasting and great beneficial effects. Emission permits: The design of the emission permit trading program has several Coasean features, particularly the emphasis on institutional design to reduce transaction costs. 1. Coase, Ronald H. (1937). The Nature of the Firm. Economica 4, 16: 386-405. Shirky I 29 Transaction Costs/Institutions/Coase/Shirky: each institution has to invest considerable effort to maintain its own structure and internal discipline. Self-preservation can become the ultimate goal. This type of transaction costs is one of the fundamental limitations of institutions of all kinds. >Institutions. Transaction costs/Coase/Shirky: Ronald Coase answered in his famous essay of 1937 "The Nature oft he Firm" ⁽¹⁾ why there are companies at all: They make it possible to reduce transaction costs. Shirky I 30 In the end, it is cheaper to organise workers in a company than to have them all competing against each other in the labour market. Transaction costs arise, for example, if options are to be discovered and agreements between participants have to be concluded. A company is successful if the costs of managing employees are lower than the potential profit from it. 1. R. H. Coase, Economica 4(16), November 1937, pp. 386-405, also at www.cerna.ensmp.fr/Enseignement/CoursEcoIndus/SupportsdeCours/COASE.pdf.	Shirky I Clay Shirky Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organizations New York 2009
Translation	Field	II 147ff Untranslatable/Translation/Extension/Deflationism/Field: Problem: Incorporation of untranslatable sentences. - Solution: potential extension of one's own language by accepting truth-preservation in conclusion. >Truth transfer, >Extensions, >Deflationism, >Language dependence. II 148 Names by index: "Georg-i": the George, to which Mary refered at the occasion of Z. Cf. >Situation semantics. II 149 Per sentence theory: "UTT Guru, Z": the sentence the Guru uttered at Z. - The special sentence is then superfluous. II 152 Disquotational truth: Problem: untranslatable sentences are not disquotational true. >Disquotational truth, >Disquotationalism. II 161 Def Quasi-translation/Def Quasi-meaning/FieldVsChurch/FieldVsSchiffer/Field: this is what most understand as meaning: not literal translation but reproduction as the interpreter understands the use of the corresponding words in his own language at the point of time in his actual world. >Stephen Schiffer. Comparison: is preserved in the quasi-translation at the moment, not in a literal translation. >Comparisons, >Comparability. Sententialism/Sententionalism/Field: Thesis: If we say that someone says that snow is white, we express a relation between the person and the sentence. 1. Quasi-translation and quasi-meaning instead of literal. 2. "La neige est blanche" quasi-means the same as #Snow is white# - (#) what stands between #, should be further translated (quasi-). - In quasi-translation, the quasi-meaning is preserved. >Speaker intention, >Intention-based semantics, >Truth conditions. II 273 Translation/Parameter/Field: in many cases, the relativization of the translation to a parameter is necessary to make it recognizable as a translation. - E.g. "finite": the non-standard argument tells us that there are strange models, so that "is in the extension of "finite" in M" functions as a "translation" of "finite" which maintains the inferential role of all what we say in pure mathematics. N.B.: "Is in the extension of "finite" in M" is a parameterized expression. Solution: what we are doing is to "translate" the one-digit predicate "finite" into the two-digit predicate "is in the extension of "finite" in x", along with the statements to determine the value of x on a model M with the necessary characteristics.	Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Trial and Error	Minsky	Minsky I 73 Trial and error/computers/AI/Minsky: By trial and error we mean programming the machine systematically to generate all possible structures within some universe of possibilities. For example, suppose you wished to have a robot machine that could build a bridge across a stream. The most efficient program for this would simply execute a specific procedure, planned out in advance, to precisely place some boards and nails. Of course, you couldn't write such a program unless you already knew how to build a bridge. But consider the alternative below, which is sometimes called the generate and test method. It consists of writing a two-part program. [A.] Generate. The first process simply produces, one after another, every possible arrangement of the boards and nails. [B.] Test. The second part of the process examines each arrangement to see whether the problem has been solved. >Puzzle principle/Terminology/Minsky. This possibility makes us reexamine all our old ideas about intelligence and creativity, since it means that, in principle, at least, we can make machines solve any problems whose solutions we can recognize. >Intelligence/Minsky.	Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003
Truth	Rorty	II (e) 116f Truth/Rorty: love of truth not as love for something non-human, but as relation to the fellow human beings. Love of truth as affable willingness to talk made the quasi-object as the target of a search (Platonic idea of the natural order or universally valid convictions, Habermas) entirely superfluous. III 100 Truth/Art/ethics/Rorty: with Davidson, I believe that the distinction true/false can also be applied to sentences of the type "Yeats was a great poet" and "democracy is better than tyranny". V 32 Semantic theory of truth/Tarski: Truth leads back to justification. VI 8f Truth: absolute concept: in the following sense: true for me, but not for you... in my culture, but not in yours, true back then, but not today such statements are strange and pointless. It makes more sense: justified for me but not for you. >Truth criterion, >Justification. VI 11 Justification: relative! Justification is a criterion for truth. VI 199 Truth: not a goal of research! A goal is something of which you can know if you are heading towards or coming away from it. >Goals. VI 327 Truth/Rorty: is a property of sentences. Truth/existence/Rorty: Of course it was true in the past that women should not be suppressed, just like the planetary orbits were true! Truth is ahistorical, but this is not so because true statements are made true by ahistorical entities. >Truthmakers. Horwich I 444 Pragmatism/James/Davidson/Rorty: 1) Truth is not used explanatorily. - 2) beliefs are explained by causal relation. - 3) There are no true-makers. - 4) If no true-makers, then no dispute between realism and anti-realism that accepts this true-makers. Horwich I 454 Truth/DavidsonVsTarski/Rorty: can therefore not be defined in terms of satisfaction or something else. - We can only say that the truth of a statement depends on the meaning of the words and the arrangement of the world. - So we are rid of the correspondence theory. >Correspondence, >Correspondence theory. Horwich I 456 Truth/Putnam: if they were not a property, the truth conditions would be everything you could know about them. Putnam pro truth as a property. Putnam: Then our thoughts would not be thoughts. >Truth conditions.	Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Truth	Tarski	Glüer II 22 Truth theory/Davidson: the defined T-predicate (truth predicate) in the metalanguage can be translated back into the object language and the state before the elimination of the true can be restored. >Truth predicate, >Object language, >Metalanguage. Object language and metalanguage should contain the predicate true. >Homophony. Davidson, however, can evade the dilemma by not giving a definition. He calls it a definition of truth in Tarski's style, hereafter referred to as T-theory. --- Rorty IV (a) 22 True/Tarski: the equivalences between the two sides of the T-sentences do not correspond to any causal relationship. >Tarski scheme, >Equivalence. Davidson: there is no way to subdivide the true sentences so that on the one hand they express "factual", while on the other side they do not express anything. Cf. >Correspondence, >Correspondence theory. --- Berka I 396 Truth/Tarski: we start from the classical correspondence theory. I 399 We interpret truth like this: we want to see all sentences as valid, which correspond to the Tarski scheme - these are partial definitions of the concept of truth. - Objectively applicable: is the truth definition, if we are able, to prove all the mentioned partial definitions on the basis of the meta language.⁽¹⁾ 1. A.Tarski, „Grundlegung der wissenschaftlichen Semantik“, in: Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique, Paris 1935, Vol. III, ASI 390, Paris 1936, pp. 1-8 --- Berka I 475 Truth-Definition/truth/Tarski: wrong: to assume that a true statement is nothing more than a provable sentence. - This is purely structural. Problem: No truth-definition must contradict the sentence definition. N.B.: but this has no validity in the field of provable sentences. - E.g. There may be two contradictory statements that are not provable. - All provable statements are indeed content-wise true. Nevertheless the truth definition must also contain the non-provable sentences. >Provability, >Definitions. Berka I 482 Definition true statement/Tarski: x is a true statement, notation x ε Wr iff. x ε AS (meaningful statement) and if every infinite sequence of classes satisfies x. >Satisfaction/Tarski. That does not deliver a truth criterion. >Truth criterion. No problem: nevertheless the sense of x ε Wr (x belongs to the class of true statements) gets understandable and unambiguous. I 486 Relative Truth/accuracy in the range/Tarski: plays a much greater role than the (Hilbertian) concept of absolute truth, which was previously mentioned - then we modify Definition 22 (recursive fulfillment) and 23 (truth). As derived terms we will introduce the term of the statement that a) in a domain of individuals with k elements is correct and b) of the statement that is true in every domain of individuals.⁽²⁾ 2. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol. 1, Lemberg 1935 --- Horwich I 111 Truth/Tarski: is a property of sentences - but in the explanation we refer to "facts". - ((s) Quotation marks by Tarski). >Facts. Horwich I 124 Truth/true/eliminability/Tarski: truth cannot be eliminated with generalizations if we want to say that all true sentences have a certain property. E.g. All consequences of true sentences are true. Also not eliminable: in particular statements of the form "x is true": E.g. the first sentence that Plato wrote, is true. Because we do not have enough historical knowledge.⁽³⁾ ((s) The designation "the first sentence..." is here the name of the sentence. This cannot be converted into the sentence itself. Eliminability: from definition is quite different from that of redundancy.) >Elimination, >Eliminability, cf. >Redundancy theory. 3. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75 --- Skirbekk I 156 Definition Truth/Tarski: a statement is true when it is satisfied by all objects, otherwise false. Skirbekk I 158 Truth/Tarski: with our definition, we can prove the (semantic, not the logical) sentence of contradiction and the sentence definition. - The propositional logic does not include the term true at all. Truth almost never coincides with provability. All provable statements are true, but there are true statements that cannot be proved. - Such disciplines are consistent but incomplete. >Incompleteness/Gödel). There is even a pair of contradictory statements, neither of which is provable.⁽⁴⁾ 4. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in: G. Skirbekk (ed.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996	Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977
Truth Value Gaps	Quine	I 307 Truth Value Gap/Non-existence/Quine: We interpreted "exists" as (Ex)(y=x) which applies to everything just like "x=x". But also with this procedure anomalies result. It seems strange that "Pegasus exists" should be wrong if "(x)(x exists)" is true and "Pegasus" takes a purely descriptive position. Something is wrong if Pegasus is granted the purely descriptive position. >Descriptive position. I 308 The sense should be that the term concerned is used exclusively to indicate an object about which the rest of the sentence can say something. We can call this "truth value gaps" (the expression comes from Strawson). With open sentences we have not been disturbed by the fact that they have no truth value, but they can already be recognized by the way they are written. Here the gaps are disturbing precisely because they are not recognizable. Perhaps best with trivalent logic ("undecidable")? QuineVs: one does not assume that the difficulties come from a pedantic distinction between what is true and what is neither true nor false. If one were to summarize both categories under the rubric of the false, nothing would be gained. For they are distinguished from one another by the fact that one category contains the negations of all their elements, while the other does not contain a single negation of their elements. I 318 Singular descriptions "the", e.g. "the setting of the sun" Iota operator "i" (inverted, without dot) (ix)(...x...) "This x, for that applies" Here no synonymy is claimed by additional information (as in § 33). The logical theory made possible by the canonical framework treats ambiguous terms and indicator words as if they had fixed objects of reference. I 319 Let us now compare the identity statement "y = (ix)(...x...)" with the quantification: (1) (x)(...x...if and only if x = y) can be read briefly as "...y...and exclusively y". If either (1) or the reformulation applies to an object y, both are probably true. Nevertheless, both may differ in their conditions of falsity with respect to truth values! Because one can understand these gaps in such a way that "y = (ix)(...x...)" in relation to each object y has no truth value, if it applies to none, while "...y....and exclusively y" is simply wrong in relation to any object, if it doesn't apply to any. So we can simply put our aversion to gaps into action and equate "y = (ix)( ...x...) with "...y... and exclusively y" and accordingly fill the truth value gaps of "y = (ix)(...x..)" with the truth value incorrectly. This step enables us to make the singular identifications disappear at all. I 327 Definition/singular terms/truth value gaps/Quine: if we interpret definitions as instructions for the transformation of singular terms, we can avoid the annoyance of truth value gaps: I 328 The definition of the singular descriptions is then simple as follows: Def Singular Description: Write "y = (ix)(...x...)" and "(ix)(...x...) exists" as notation variants of "...y...and exclusively y." And with recourse to §37: Write "(ix)(...x...) " as abbreviation of (7) (Ey)[y = (ix)(...x...) and y ], (In this representation, we have " y " as any open sentence.) If we apply the three parts of the above definition successively and repeatedly, they are sufficient to make "(ix)(...x...)" accessible again to any position where free variables may occur. I 389/90 Conditional: the indicative conditional is unproblematic. In unquantified form "if p then q" it is perhaps best expressed as containing a truth value gap (§ 37) if its antecedence is false.(See also EFQ (ex falso quodlibet): ex falso quodlibet). I 449 In the case of the indicative conditional, the initial problems are the truth value gaps and the ambiguity of the truth conditions. They are solved by being able to dispense with the indicative conditional in favor of a truth function. I 447 StrawsonVsRussell: Strawson has misnamed Russell's theory of descriptions because of their treatment of truth value gaps. III 282 Truth Value Gap/Quine: comes from everyday language, in logic we have to fill it. And be it arbitrary. Every sentence should have a truth value (true or false). >Everyday language. XI 39 Canonical Notation/Quine/Lauener: closes truth value gaps.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Truth Values	Quine	VII (d) 71 Propositional Calculus/indistinguishability/theoretical terms/Quine: "p", "q" etc. refer to propositional concepts, whatever they may be. But we know that propositional concepts like truth values are not distinguishable in terms of the calculus, the expressiveness of the calculus is limited. VII (f) 112 Truth Values/Quine: can be allowed as abstract entities. VII 115 Truth Value/Quine: is not an abstract entity to which we appeal with assertions. VII (h) 154 Range/Russell: a change in the range of a description is neutral to the truth value of any sentence. Quine: but only if the description designates something. Lauener XI 38 Quantification/Lauener/(s): truth values can only be attributed to quantified sentences. Quine I 226 Vagueness/Quine: leaves the truth values untouched. Therefore it can be useful. >Vagueness. I 263ff Truth Value/intension/extension/Quine: in extensional contexts a singular term may be replaced by a singular term with the same name without changing the truth value of the sentence. This is not possible in opaque (intensional) contexts. >Intensions, >Extensions, >Opacity. I 266 Opaque Contexts/Truth Value/Frege: in a construction with a propositional attitude, a sentence or term may not denote truth values, a class or an individual, but functions as the "name of a thought" or the name of a property or an "individual concept". ((s) In non-intensional contexts, a sentence in Frege's work designates a truth value, "The True," or "The False". > "Great Fact", >"Slingshot Argument"). II 192 From today's point of view, quantifier logic is nothing more than a further development of the logic of truth functions. The truth value of a truth function can be calculated on the basis of the truth values of the arguments. Why then does quantifier logic not become decidable by truth tables? This validity criterion would be too strict because the quantified sub-expressions are not always independent of each other. Some sub-expressions may turn out to be untrue, but are unworthy of a closer look at an assignment to truth values. See also >Truth tables. III 281 Truth value/Existence/Nonexistence/Ontology/Logic/Quine: which truth values have sentences like "Zerberus barking"? (See also >Unicorn example). The answer "wrong" would be premature. III 282 Problem: for all sentences that would be wrong, there would be a negation that would be true! Our derivation methods do not prove anything in case the object does not exist. What would have to be proved is based on an unfulfilled condition. Truth value gap/Quine: comes from everyday language, in logic we have to fill it. And be it arbitrary. Every sentence should have a truth value (true or false). >Everyday language. That was the reason for the convenient extension of the term conditional in § 3,m which generally allowed a truth value for the whole conditional. We now need a similar extension for singular terms, which do not describe anything. But this cannot be achieved by an all-encompassing decision. But this can be done for simple sentences, from which we derive rules for compound sentences. Def simple predicate: is a predicate if it does not explicitly have the form of a quantification, negation, conjunction, alternation etc. of shorter components. If a simple predicate is applied to a singular term that does not denote anything, the sentence in question is to be considered false. Then e.g. "Zerberus barks" is wrong, because it represents an application of the predicate "[1] barks" to "Zerberus". V 112 Truth values/Language learning/Quine: truth values correspond to a more advanced level of learning. Using different theories for different subject areas V 113 we finally learn (if at all) which judgement to make in the indeterminate cases of conjunction or alternation in the middle of the table. Logic/Learn languages/Quine: bivalent logic is a theoretical product which, like all theory, is only learned indirectly. How, we can only speculate about that. VI 128 Singular terms/truth value/sense/divalued logic/unicorn/Quine: in the case of unrelated singular terms or failed descriptions, we may not know the truth value. It is not profitable to describe such sentences as meaningless, since the existence of the object could turn out (e.g. Pluto). It is alright to leave the truth value open, but not the meaning of a sentence! VI 129 Singular terms/truth value/sense/divalued logic/unicorn/Quine: in the case of unrelated singular terms or failed descriptions, we may not know the truth value. It is not profitable to describe such sentences as meaningless, since the existence of the object could turn out (e.g. Pluto). It is alright to leave the truth value open, but not the meaning of a sentence! VI 131 Antirealism/Sentence of the excluded Middle/Dummett/Quine: Dummett turns against the sentence of the excluded middle with epistemological arguments. (Also Brouwer): No sentence is true or false, as long as no procedure for the determination of the truth value is known.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Q XI H. Lauener Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982
Twin Studies	Bouchard	Corr II 158 Twin Studies/Behaviour/MISTRA/Study/Bouchard/Johnson: Researchers had realized early on that twins who were separated early in infancy and reared in different homes could offer particularly strong tests of genetic influence because, at least in the most direct sense of ‘environmental influence’ (after birth), any similarity in such pairs has to be due to genetic influence. (…) the Minnesota Study of Twins Reared Apart (MISTRA; Segal, 2012)⁽¹⁾ II 157 brought the gravitational centre of discussion ‘around the corner’ from general denial to general acceptance of the idea of genetic influences on behaviour II 158 and psychological characteristics. At 139 pairs, MISTRA was by far the largest study of reared-apart twins. The sample was recruited beginning in 1979 over a period of 20 years, through many different sources ranging from members of the adoption movement and social work and other professionals to individuals who had recently learned they had a twin, heard of the project, and were seeking help in finding the co-twin. II 159 The lengths of separation and contact of course also varied with age at study – older twins had more time either to be separated or in contact – which ranged from 19 to 68 years (…). (…) Bouchard fully expected that he would find that some individual characteristics would show genetic influences and others not. [He also] also expected that reared-apart twins would be distinctly less similar than reared-together twins, again more so for some characteristics than others. II 160 MISTRA has generated almost 200 scientific papers due to its extremely extensive assessment and long-running nature. (…) perhaps one stands out as having had particular impact on the field (…): The Minnesota Study of Twins Reared Apart’ (Bouchard, Lykken, McGue, Segal, & Tellegen, 1990)⁽²⁾, published in Science in 1990. (…) it focused on genetic influences on IQ [and] it explored and compared reared-apart and reared-together twin similarity (…). The MISTRA [of this particular study] assessment included three independent measures of IQ. >Intelligence, >Intelligence tests, >Method, >Measurements. Findings: The first study results were intra-class correlations of these three IQ scores in the MISTRA MZ twins. In reared-apart MZ (MZA) twins who directly/formally share effectively no environmental influences, these correlations are optimal because they are especially for data organized in groups (…). II 161 They are direct estimates of the proportions of variance that can be attributed to genetic influence. Two were .78; the third was .69, with a mean of .75. It is suggested here that, assuming appropriateness of the assumption of no environmental similarity, genetic influences account for about 70% of population variance in IQ in adulthood. [Another possibility is that lacing separated twins in similar homes] could then induce similar behaviours and psychological characteristics in the twins. Separate indices of similarity of twins’ adoptive parent socioeconomic status (…) coupled with the associations between these home features and IQ, indicated not just no significant impact of placement similarity on IQ, but also measured its impact at effectively 0. II 162 Twins who had been reared together and remained in closer contact in adulthood had been observed to be more similar in some ways than those maintaining less (Rose & Kaprio, 1988)⁽³⁾, but there was evidence in another reared-together sample that similarity did more to encourage contact than vice-versa (Lykken, Bouchard, McGue, & Tellegen, 1990)(4). The MISTRA contact data indicated no greater similarity with greater time together before separation, time apart to first reunion, total time, or percentage of lifetime spent apart. II 163 [The 1990 MISTRA study⁽²⁾ also indicated that there is] substantial genetic variance on all the characteristics. They also, perhaps even more surprisingly, very often indicated that MZA twins are almost as similar as MZT twins, sometimes even as similar as the same person assessed twice within some rather short time-span such as a month (…).This suggested that neither common upbringing nor ongoing contact between family members does much to make them similar, at least in adulthood. II 164 [Another implication by Bouchard et al. (1990)⁽²⁾ was that] MZA twins must be so similar because their basically identical genomes lead them to experience more similar environments. (…) environmental options and the experiences and lessons they offer more often accentuate and deepen genetic influence than dampen it. >Nature versus nurture. 1. Segal, N. L. (2012). Born together, reared apart: The landmark Minnesota twin study. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Bouchard, T., Jr., Lykken, D. T., McGue, M., Segal, N. L., & Tellegen, A. (1990). Sources of human psychological differences: The Minnesota Study of Twins Reared Apart. Science, 250, 223–228. 3. Rose, R. J., & Kaprio, J. (1988). Frequency of social contact and intrapair resemblance of adult monozygotic co-twins – Or does shared experience influence personality after all? Behavior Genetics, 18, 309–328. 4. Lykken, D. T., Bouchard, T. J., Jr., McGue, M., & Tellegen, A. (1990). Does contact lead to similarity or similarity to contact. Behavior Genetics, 20, 547–561. Johnson, Wendy: “Genetic Influences on Behaviour Revisiting Bouchard et al. (1990)”, In: Philip J. Corr (Ed.) 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, pp. 155-170.	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Understanding	Sterelny	I 357 Animal/Thinking/Mind/Understanding/Sterelny: do primates understand something of the mind of others? What would such an understanding show? What is the simplest mind capable of doing so? When and why and how became primates "mind readers". >Theory of mind. Thesis: I move within the "hypothesis of social intelligence": selection according to social skills. I 358 Representation/method/mind reading/mind/animal/Sterelny: Actions are best pursued by the representation of the mental states that produce these actions. >Mind, >Mental states, >Representation. Imitation, too, is evidence of cognitive refinement, but it does not point to the ability to read the mind. >Imitation. I 359 Thesis: even relatively simple animals can represent meta. ((s) They represent the representations of others.) Advantage/Sterelny: to anticipate foreign actions. >Prediction. I 360 For this, the mind reading animal must know whether a novelty or rearrangement of the preferences or only of the instrumental beliefs causes. Definiton information gradient/knowledge/Dennett: the information gradient describes groups in which the members have a very different level of knowledge. >Information/Sterelny. Information/mind reading/Animal/Sterelny: there are even less refined methods of using other things than sources of information as imitation: I 361 "Stimulus increase": stimulus increase means increased attention for the interests of others. I 361 Selection/Sterelny: if there should have been a selection according to mind reading, then mind readers must behave differently than the behaviour readers, and the adaptive advantages must be found in the mind reader's behavior. >Selection, >Evolution, >Adaptation, >Behavior.	Sterelny I Kim Sterelny "Primate Worlds", in: The Evolution of Cognition, C. Heyes/L. Huber (Eds.) Cambridge/MA 2000 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Sterelny II Kim Sterelny Dawkins vs. Gould: Survival of the Fittest Cambridge/UK 2007
Universals	Bigelow	I VII Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro: they help to create a unified picture and to understand probabilities. They help to establish a unified theory of modalities (possibility, necessity) that we find in science. >Probability, >Modalities, >Possibility, >Necessity. I 82 Universals/science/Bigelow/Pargetter: we have encountered universals that are useful for physics, now we are looking at those that are useful for chemistry: Chemical components: are structures made up of elements. Universal: is the property of having a certain structure, which in turn is related to the universals that determine the elements. These are structural universals. Structural universals/Bigelow/Pargettesr e.g. expressed by the predicate "to be methane" or "Methane"; Instantiated: by a carbon atom and four hydrogen atoms in a certain constellation. >Essence, >Properties. This constellation is an essential property. Instantiation: by methane molecules. >Instantiation. N.b.: this universal is intrinsically connected to other universals: the universals, being hydrogen, being carbon and be bound. >Intrinsicness. I 87 Structural Universals/Level/Bigelow/Pargetter: Level 1: material individuals who have the property of being butane or methane, etc. These are then methane molecules, etc. These individuals have parts with different properties and relations. Level 2: Properties and relations of the individuals of the 1st Level. Property: For example, the property to be methane. Level 3: Relations or proportions between properties or relations between individuals, no matter whether they are properties of the 1st or 2nd level (sic) of these individuals. For example,"having the same number of instances as". Cardinal numbers/Frege: Frege needed this construction for the cardinal numbers. Family: this relation between properties have the form of a family, including e.g. "having twice as many instances","having four times as many instances", etc. Proportion: these "numerical" proportions will also exist between more complex properties of the 2nd level: e.g. "conjunctive property: being carbon and be part of this molecule". >Proportions. For example, if the molecule is methane, these two properties are in a ratio characterized by the proportion 4:1. Structural universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: we can then characterize it as a relational property of an object. It relates the molecule to various properties. These properties are being carbon, being hydrogen and being bound. Universal: e.g. being methane: is then identical with a highly conjunctive relational property of the 2nd level of an individual (molecule). I 88 Property: the property of being methane stands in a pattern of internal proportions to other properties, e.g. being hydrogen, being bound, etc. Mereology/Chemistry/Bigelow/Pargetter: but these relations are not mereological. >Mereology. Relations/Bigelow/Pargetter: these relations are internal relations and they are essential. Essentialism/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro: we need essential properties here. But this is better than seeking refuge in magic (see above). >Essentialism. I 89 Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: could not exist as these universals if they were not in these relations with each other. These are the structural universals. I 164 Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: a full theory of universals needs a pre-semantic source for universals (pre-semantic/s): something that does not require truthmakers. >Truthmakers, >Semantics. Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: we need something that instantiates something without ever being instantiated. Existence of 2nd level/Bigelow/Pargetter: is also required by a theory of universals. From which, however, you cannot deduce any existence of the 1st level without additional premises. Causes as structural universals. >Levels/order, >Description levels, >Derivation, >Derivability I 293 Fundamental Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: are vectors. >Vectors. Basic forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: are aggregates of vectors: thesis: they are structural universals. >Forces. For example, mass: each specific mass corresponds to a specific property. Nevertheless, massive objects have something in common: that they have mass. This corresponds to a relation of a higher level. These relations are internal and essential, not external. That is, the particular mass properties could not be them if they were in different relations to other objects. >Exterior/interior, >Extrinsic. Common: this is the fact that all massive things are related to other massive things. Property of the 1st level: Example: velocity in the plane. Relation 1st level: For example, difference in velocity or direction. Therefore, there are two relations of the 1st level. Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: are more complex vectors, since they themselves are relations of the 2nd level. Fundamental forces can be of different sizes and directions. I 293 They are thus in a cluster of internal relations of higher degrees to other fundamental forces. That makes sure that they are a family with something in common. Necessary/Properties/Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: the fact that one fundamental force is twice as great as the other, or perpendicular to another; it is not contingent. Solution: they would otherwise be different from the forces they are. On the other hand, Contingent: whether things are connected by a force is contingent. >Contingency, >Necessity. Structural Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: (see above: methane example) Forces: the constitutive properties of structural universals can also be fundamental forces, including vectors with size and direction. Internal relations: there are many of them within a structural universal. And they also establish the connections to individuals. Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: we said it is local. So it cannot be a relation only between completely nonlocal universals. Structural universals: must therefore have a local element. Solution: their relational properties embed particulars as well as universals. Fundamental cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: if it is a structural universal, it will be a conjunctive relation of a higher level between single events. >Causes, >Causation. I 294 Causal relations/Bigelow/Pargetter: after all, they have a rich and essential nature. And they are not primitive basic concepts. They are explained by vectors and structural universals. They exist independently alongside causes and effects. >Causal relations, >Effect. Modalities/Bigelow/Pargetter: some are essentially causal. But: Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: is not essentially modal for its part. >Modalities, >Causation. I 378 Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: are things in the world like others. In particular, they are namable. >Naming, >Identification, >Individuation. I 379 There is no essential connection between universals and predicates. I.e. universals can be in subject position. ((s) But can we quantify via them?). Therefore, we have no problem with higher-level logic (2nd level logic). >Predicates, >Predication. Universals: should not be dominated by semantic theory. They should not have to be arranged according to a hierarchy. Nevertheless, they have a hierarchical pattern with individuals as a basis. Paradoxes: are avoided by prohibiting universals from instantiating themselves or other universals. Self-reference/Bigelow/Pargetter: however, this is only a problem if mathematics is based a priori on logic alone. And we do not want that. For example, we do not assume that each linguistic description determines a quantity. >Self-reference, >Sets, >Set theory, >Descriptions, >Mathematics, >Logic, >Ultimate justification.	Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Use	Millikan	I 72 Use/stabilization function/Millikan: Question: why do words have a stabilization function and a standardization function? >Terminology/Millikan. Def genetic type/Millikan: we need a genetic type if we classify words only because of their affiliation to families (reproductively established families). So Tokens count as "the same word". Function: this is not a reference to a function: that shows the example of the parrot. E.g. a Martian who by chance expresses a word which a Frenchman would use in the situation, does not express a French word but a Martian one. Language/Davidson/Millikan: language is as difficult to determine as propositions. (Quine: dito in word and object). Equality/Definition/Davidson: Languages are identical when identical sentences express identical propositions. >Language/Davidson, >Proposition/Davidson, >Translation/Davidson. I 73 Identity/equality/words/propositions/sentences/Millikan: this is about the history of use, not about form or function. Form/function/Millikan: form and function can be relevant for subordinate lexicon entries, so that types which correspond to superordinate entries are divided with modern usage by family and form in accordance. Function: also subdivision into "verb", "noun", etc. Definition Lowest types/lexicon entries: Entries are also asked if they have "the same meaning". But this is not Fregean sense! Stabilization function/SF/Millikan: some lexicon meanings are not distinguished by actual functions, but the lowest types are classified by independent stabilization functions of the tokens! And so they correspond to branches of the family. Each of these stabilization functions can provide further transmission of tokens of the word. There are stabilization functions arranged in layers,... I 74 ...some of which stir from earlier times of use, others from more modern times. Meaning/Word Meaning/Millikan: word meaning is therefore divided into historically earlier and later meanings. >Word meaning. I 77 Use/history/language/Millikan: the history of use is often not documented. History: here it can be about temporally closer or distant stabilization functions. E.g. "You will go to ..." is this indicative or imperative? Stabilization function/Millikan: the stabilization function is part of the public importance. Only through stabilization functions can one differentiate the word meaning and the speaker meaning. I 152 Use/word usage/Evolution/Millikan: Programs for repeating words have survived because they have led to consistent sets of beliefs. The programs pass the tester only if they work in accordance with a normal explanation. Intentional icon: when they have passed the test, such token are elements of intentional icons, with direct Fregean sense. Derived eigenfunction: has a word when I hear it for the first time. It becomes an inner term. Over time this becomes an intentional icon. >Terminology/Millikan.	Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Utilitarian Liberalism	Gaus	Gaus I 105 Utilitarian Liberalism/Gaus: Utilitarian moral theories hold that we can possess knowledge of both the good and the right; pace Rawls, these are not matters of ‘reasonable pluralism’. The most straightforward versions of utilitarianism maintain that the good is either pleasure, happiness or preference satisfaction, and the right is the overall maximization of the good. Bentham: Bentham, interestingly, did not think that the principle of utility could be proven; he did, though, contend that it could not reasonably be denied (1987⁽¹⁾: ch. 11, s. 11). Any reasonable person would see that pleasure is the ultimate end: consequently the principle of utility was beyond reasonable dispute. Whether or not the principle of utility could be established by reason was and is, though, a matter of dispute. Mill: Mill, famously, advanced a proof (1963c⁽²⁾: ch. 4). SidgwickVsMill: Sidgwick, in contrast, insists that basic intuitions must be drawn upon in any argument for utilitarianism; in the end, Sidgwick appeared to accept that one could be an egoist and yet not irrational (1962⁽³⁾: 418–22). Gaus I 106 Whether utilitarianism underwrites liberal politics and economics (...) turns on economic theory, public choice, theories of institutional design (Goodin, 1996)⁽⁴⁾, and so on. In that sense liberal utilitarianism is indeed a partially comprehensive theory, with various theories of economics and politics being part of the case for liberal utilitarianism. >Markets/McCulloch, >Markets/Utilitarianism. Many philosophers are apt to reject liberal utilitarianism just because it turns on empirical claims; these anti-utilitarians often advance fanciful ‘what if’ examples, showing that under strange circumstances, utilitarianism might lead to strange results. In contrast, utilitarians typically have high confidence in these theories, and see no reason to suppose that our theory of political right should be independent of our best empirical theories of economics and politics (Goodin, 1982)⁽⁵⁾. >Utilitarianism/Gaus, >Utilitarianism/Chapman. 1. Bentham, Jeremy (1987) Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. In Utilitarianism and Other Essays, ed. Alan Ryan. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 2. Mill, John Stuart (1963c) Utilitarianism. In J. M. Robson, ed., The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, vol. X, 203–59. 3. Sidgwick, Henry (1962) The Methods of Ethics, 7th edn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 4. Goodin, Robert E., ed. (1996) The Theory of Institutional Design. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 5. Goodin, Robert E. (1982) Political Theory and Public Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Utilitarian Liberalism	Goodin	Gaus I 106 Utilitarian Liberalism/Goodin/Gaus: Whether utilitarianism underwrites liberal politics and economics (...) turns on economic theory, public choice, theories of institutional design (Goodin, 1996)⁽¹⁾, and so on. In that sense liberal utilitarianism is indeed a partially comprehensive theory, with various theories of economics and politics being part of the case for liberal utilitarianism. >Markets/McCulloch, >Markets/Utilitarianism. Many philosophers are apt to reject liberal utilitarianism just because it turns on empirical claims; these anti-utilitarians often advance fanciful ‘what if’ examples, showing that under strange circumstances, utilitarianism might lead to strange results. In contrast, utilitarians typically have high confidence in these theories, and see no reason to suppose that our theory of political right should be independent of our best empirical theories of economics and politics (Goodin, 1982)(2). >Utilitarianism/Gaus, >Utilitarianism/Chapman, >Rights/Utilitarianism, >Rights/Consequentialism. 1. Goodin, Robert E., ed. (1996) The Theory of Institutional Design. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Goodin, Robert E. (1982) Political Theory and Public Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Utilitarianism	Dworkin	Brocker I 601 Utilitarianism/Rights/Dworkin: for utilitarianism, maximizing the overall well-being is the central objective. Rights, for example in the form of ownership guarantees, can also benefit the overall welfare. It can never be ruled out that sacrificing fundamental individual interests of individuals or groups could increase the overall benefit. >Rights. DworkinVsUtilitarianism: Rights always protect the individual with reference to fundamental and central interests. Dworkin does not mean to say that all rights absolutely apply as well as the prohibition of torture. The fundamental point is again a logical one: rights only play their own normative role if they outdo collective goals in cases of conflict. Otherwise, any justification could be directly related to the objective ⁽¹⁾. DworkinVsUtilitarianism: central objection: Utilitarianism can also take external preferences "impartially" into account such as discrimination against dark-skinned. ⁽²⁾ Problem: The purely aggregative ((s) summing up) thought of the best possible satisfaction of all possible preferences of all possible people knows no distinction between relevant and irrelevant, acceptable and unacceptable preferences. >Relevance, >Acceptability. PerfectionismVsDworkin: there are many kinds of external preferences that should be exempted from Dworkin's criticism: For example, external preferences such as taking sides with members of disadvantaged groups to which you yourself do not belong.⁽³⁾ >Perfectionism. Brocker I 605 LadwigVsDworkin: Dworkin, when he wrote the essays gathered in Civil Rights taken seriously, still believed he could draft an ethically completely neutral theory of rights and justice (so also Dworkin 1985 ⁽⁴⁾). >Civil rights. This may explain his strange assumption that the logical distinction between personal and external preferences is sufficient for criticism of utilitarianism, regardless of their content. DworkinVsDworkin: In later writings (Dworkin 1990b ⁽⁵⁾; 2011 ⁽⁶⁾), however, Dworkin professes an ethical basis of his liberalism. The organizing idea behind his ever-increasing attempts to recognize unity in the world of values is now dignity. >Liberalism. 1. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge, Mass. 1977 (erw. Ausgabe 1978). Dt.: Ronald Dworkin, Bürgerrechte ernstgenommen, Frankfurt/M. 1990, p. 161f. 2. Ibid. p. 382-385 3. Cf. Coleman, Jules L., »The Rights and Wrongs of Taking Rights Seriously«, in: Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 4204, 1978, p. 916f. 4. Ronald Dworkin, , A Matter of Principle, Oxford 1985. 5. Ronald Dworkin. »Foundations of Liberal Equality«, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, XI, Salt Lake City 1990 (b), 1-191. 6. Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue. The Theory and Practice of Equality, Cambridge, Mass./London 2002. Bernd Ladwig, „Ronald Dworkin, Bürgerrechte ernstgenommen“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Dworkin I Ronald Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously Cambridge, MA 1978 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Validity	Logic Texts	Salmon I 41 Validity/W.Salmon: affects arguments (= groups of statements), not individual statements. Menne I 25 Menne: We become aware of laws through experience, but that does not mean that their validity is based on experience. Hoyningen-Huene II 100 Propositional logic: Validity of conclusions of propositional logic: conditions: 1. The validity of the conclusion depends on the multiple occurrence of certain (partial) statements. II 101 2. The validity is dependent on certain junction points occurring in it. 3. The validity is independent of the sense of the (partial) statements. II 102 Def Truth transfer/Hoyningen-Huene: positive: the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion. 4. The validity of the conclusion requires truth transfer, i.e. that a true premise conjunction never occurs together with a false conclusion. >Truth transfer, Predicate logic: II 229 Adequacy conditions 1. The validity of the conclusion depends on the multiple occurrence of predicates (which refer to the same range of individuals) and possibly the logical constants (from the same range of individuals). II 230 2. The validity depends on the quantifiers and possibly the connectives that occur. 3. The validity is independent of the sense. 4. Validity requires truth transfer. >Connective, >Sense, >Quantifier, >Logical constant. Read III 71 Validity/Read: Problems: VsClassical logic: Classical logic does not succeed in including as valid those inferences whose correctness is based on the connections between non-logical expressions. If an object is round, then it follows that it is not square. But this conclusion is not valid thanks to its form, but thanks to its content. Logical Universe: Problem: one can find inferences whose invalidity can only be seen by looking at a larger universal range of definitions. ((s) See also Problems with the introduction of new connectives: >tonk.)	Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Sal I Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 German Edition: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sal II W. Salmon The Foundations Of Scientific Inference 1967 SalN I N. Salmon Content, Cognition, and Communication: Philosophical Papers II 2007 Me I A. Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1997 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Values	Conservatism	Gaus I 133 Values/Conservatism/Kekes/Gaus: Conservatives are committed to political arrangements that foster good lives, so they must have a view about what lives are good, about what obligations, virtues, and satisfactions are worth valuing. They must have a view, that is, about the values that make lives good. Values, however, appear to be diverse. There are countless obligations, virtues, and satisfactions, countless ways of combining them and evaluating their respective importance, and so there seem to be countless ways in which lives can be good. Conservatives, therefore, must have a view about the diversity of values because it has a fundamental influence on the reasons that can be offered for or against particular political arrangements. Problems: The problem is that there are three widely held but mutually exclusive views: absolutism, relativism, and pluralism. Absolutism: Absolutists believe that the diversity of values is apparent, not real. They concede that there are many values, but they think that there is a universal and objective standard that can be appealed to in evaluating their respective importance. >Absolutism/Kekes. Gaus I 134 Relativism: RelativismVsAbsolutism: Relativists regard the diversity of values as real: there are many values and there are many ways of combining and ranking them. (...) all values, therefore, are context-dependent. >Values/Relativism. Pluralism: Pluralists are in partial agreement and disagreement with both absolutists and relativists. According to pluralists, there is a universal and objective standard, but it is applicable only to some values. The standard is universal and objective enough to apply to some values that must be recognized by all political arrangements that foster good lives, but it is not sufficiently universal and objective to apply to all the many diverse values that may contribute to good lives. The standard, in other words, is a minimal one. (For accounts of pluralism in general, see Kekes, 1993⁽¹⁾; Rescher, 1993⁽²⁾.) 1. Kekes, John (1993) The Morality of Pluralism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2. Rescher, Nicholas (1993) Pluralism. Oscorf: Clarendon. Kekes, John 2004. „Conservtive Theories“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Values	Pluralism	Gaus I 134 Values/Pluralism/Kekes: According to pluralists, there is a universal and objective standard, but it is applicable only to some values. The standard is universal and objective enough to apply to some values that must be recognized by all political arrangements that foster good lives, but it is not sufficiently universal and objective to apply to all the many diverse values that may contribute to good lives. The standard, in other words, is a minimal one. (For accounts of pluralism in general, see Kekes, 1993⁽¹⁾; Rescher, 1993⁽²⁾.) Cf. >Values/Conservatism. [Pluralism] regards some political arrangements as necessary for good lives, but it allows for a generous plurality of possible political arrangements beyond the necessary minimum. The standard operates in the realm of moral necessity, and it leaves open what happens in the realm of moral possibility. The standard thus accommodates part of the universal values of absolutism and part of the context-dependent values of relativism. >Values/Relativism. Absolutism prevails in the realm of moral necessity; relativism in the realm of moral possibility. >Absolutism/Kekes. 1. Kekes, John (1993) The Morality of Pluralism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2. Rescher, Nicholas (1993) Pluralism. Oscorf: Clarendon. Kekes, John 2004. „Conservtive Theories“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Values	Relativism	Gaus I 134 Values/Relativism/Kekes: Relativists regard the diversity of values as real: there are many values and there are many ways of combining and ranking them. There is no universal and objective standard that could be appealed to in resolving disagreements about the identity and comparative importance of values. A good society, however, requires some consensus about what is accepted as a possibility and what is placed beyond limits. The political arrangements of a good society reflect this consensus, and the arrangements change as the consensus does. What counts as a value and how important it is depends, then, according to relativists, on the consensus of a society. A value is what is valued in a particular context; all values, therefore, are context-dependent. Ultimate justification: the ultimate appeal of relativists is to point at their arrangements and say: this is what we do here. Fideism: Just as absolutism is naturally allied to a rationalistic orientation, so relativism is readily combined with fideism. If there is no discernible moral order in reality, then the best guide to good lives and to the political arrangements that foster them is the faith that has prevailed in a society. But the faith of one society is different from the faith of another. It is only to be expected therefore that good lives and political arrangements will correspondingly differ. VsRelativism: Relativism appears to avoid the dangers of dogmatism and repression that so often engulf absolutism, but it does not. Relativism is no less prone to dogmatism and repression than absolutism. From the fact that the political arrangements of the relativist's society are not thought to be binding outside of it, nothing follows about the manner in which they are held within. Cf. >Absolutism/Kekes, >Conservatism/Kekes, >Values/Conservatism. Kekes, John 2004. „Conservtive Theories“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Values	Russell	I 71 Values/Principia Mathematica⁽¹⁾/Russell: when we speak of "values of φ z^", they are assigned to the φ and not to the z^. >Valuation, >Propositional function, >Functions/Russell, >Truth value, >Value range, >Value progression, >Predication. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.	Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996
Variable Elimination	Norvig	Norvig I 545 Variable Elimination/Norvig/Russell: The basic idea of variable elimination—that repeated computations within the overall sum-of-products expression can be avoided by caching—appeared in the symbolic probabilistic inference (SPI) algorithm (Shachter et al., 1990)⁽¹⁾. Cf. the elimination algorithm (…) developed by Zhang and Poole (1994)⁽²⁾. Criteria for pruning irrelevant variables were developed by Geiger et al. (1990)⁽³⁾ and by Lauritzen et al. (1990)⁽⁴⁾ (…). Dechter (1999)⁽⁵⁾ shows how the variable elimination idea is essentially identical to nonserial dynamic programming (Bertele and Brioschi, 1972)⁽⁶⁾, an algorithmic approach that can be applied to solve a range of inference problems in Bayesian networks - for example, finding the most likely explanation for a set of observations. This connects Bayesian network algorithms to related methods for solving CSPs (>Constraint satisfaction problems) and gives a direct measure of the complexity of exact inference in terms of the tree width of the network. Wexler and Meek (2009)⁽⁷⁾ describe a method of preventing exponential growth in the size of factors computed in variable elimination; their algorithm breaks down large factors into products of smaller factors and simultaneously computes an error bound for the resulting approximation. >Bayesian networks/Norvig, >Uncertainty/AI research. 1. Shachter, R. D., D’Ambrosio, B., and Del Favero, B. A. (1990). Symbolic probabilistic inference in belief networks. In AAAI-90, pp. 126–131. 2. Zhang, N. L., Qi, R., and Poole, D. (1994). A computational theory of decision networks. IJAR, 11, 83–158. 3. Geiger, D., Verma, T., and Pearl, J. (1990). Identifying independence in Bayesian networks. Networks, 20(5), 507–534. 4. Lauritzen, S., Dawid, A. P., Larsen, B., and Leimer, H. (1990). Independence properties of directed Markov fields. Networks, 20(5), 491–505 5. Dechter, R. (1999). Bucket elimination: A unifying framework for reasoning. AIJ, 113, 41–85. 6. Bertele, U. and Brioschi, F. (1972). Nonserial dynamic programming. Academic Press. 7. Wexler, Y. and Meek, C. (2009). MAS: A multiplicative approximation scheme for probabilistic inference. In NIPS 21.	Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010
Variable Elimination	Russell	Norvig I 545 Variable Elimination/Norvig/Russell: The basic idea of variable elimination—that repeated computations within the overall sum-of-products expression can be avoided by caching—appeared in the symbolic probabilistic inference (SPI) algorithm (Shachter et al., 1990)⁽¹⁾. Cf. the elimination algorithm (…) developed by Zhang and Poole (1994)⁽²⁾. Criteria for pruning irrelevant variables were developed by Geiger et al. (1990)⁽³⁾ and by Lauritzen et al. (1990)⁽⁴⁾ (…). Dechter (1999)⁽⁵⁾ shows how the variable elimination idea is essentially identical to nonserial dynamic programming (Bertele and Brioschi, 1972)⁽⁶⁾, an algorithmic approach that can be applied to solve a range of inference problems in Bayesian networks - for example, finding the most likely explanation for a set of observations. This connects Bayesian network algorithms to related methods for solving CSPs (>Constraint satisfaction problems) and gives a direct measure of the complexity of exact inference in terms of the tree width of the network. Wexler and Meek (2009)⁽⁷⁾ describe a method of preventing exponential growth in the size of factors computed in variable elimination; their algorithm breaks down large factors into products of smaller factors and simultaneously computes an error bound for the resulting approximation. >Bayesian networks/Norvig, >Uncertainty/AI research. 1. Shachter, R. D., D’Ambrosio, B., and Del Favero, B. A. (1990). Symbolic probabilistic inference in belief networks. In AAAI-90, pp. 126–131. 2. Zhang, N. L., Qi, R., and Poole, D. (1994). A computational theory of decision networks. IJAR, 11, 83–158. 3. Geiger, D., Verma, T., and Pearl, J. (1990). Identifying independence in Bayesian networks. Networks, 20(5), 507–534. 4. Lauritzen, S., Dawid, A. P., Larsen, B., and Leimer, H. (1990). Independence properties of directed Markov fields. Networks, 20(5), 491–505 5. Dechter, R. (1999). Bucket elimination: A unifying framework for reasoning. AIJ, 113, 41–85. 6. Bertele, U. and Brioschi, F. (1972). Nonserial dynamic programming. Academic Press. 7. Wexler, Y. and Meek, C. (2009). MAS: A multiplicative approximation scheme for probabilistic inference. In NIPS 21.	Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010
Variables	Quine	V 129 Variables/Quine: Their archetype are the pronouns - in the relative clause the relative pronoun stands for the name of the object. --- VI 37/38 Variable/Quine: allows us to manoeuvre every occurrence of "a" into a context of "a =" and to treat the resulting context as an unanalysable predicate "A" that absorbes the singular term - singular term: can be re-introduced later as a description. --- VII (a) 13 Bound variable/Quine: instead of it, we can say that something is in the range of a pronoun. --- VII (f) 107ff Variables/Quine: "F": not bindable - Only apparent predicates, vacancies in the sentence chart - "p", "q", etc. stand for whole expressions, they are sometimes viewed as if they needed entities whose names are these expressions (these are called propositions) - "p" "q", etc. are never bound variables! - "p>q" not a sentence, but a scheme. --- VII (f) 110 Not bindable variable/Quine: E.g. "p". If it were considered to be the name of some entity, it would have to be a bindable variable, which is not the case - e.g. "F" on a par with "p": if predicates are to be the names of some entity, they would have to be regarded as bindable variables, which they are not. VII (f) 110 Variables/Numbers/Quine: in "x + 3 > 7" "x" should be regarded as a pseudo-number - "x + 3> 7" should be considered a pseudo-sentence or scheme. It cannot be quantified. VII (f) 111 Variables/Quine: Greek letters: completely different status: they occur in a language about language: E.g. (3) (∃a)(φ v ψ) is on a semantically higher level than "x + 3> 7". (3) is a name of a sentence or expression - Greek letters are standing for sentences here - they are quantifiable - "φ": grammatically substantival, occupies the place of names of sentences. - "p": grammatically sentential (sentence form): has the place of complete sentences. --- IX 194f Universal variable/Systematic ambiguity/Quine: possibly at the expense of adding new and unreduced predicates "T0", "T1", "T2",... that are added to "ε", we can get rid of the special, indexed variables in favor of the universal variables x, y.... - in fact, "Tnx" can easily be expressed with help of "ε" and the logic: "∃z(x,y ε z)" ensures compliance of the type in x and y and vice versa ensures compliance of the type with x and y that xⁿ, yⁿ ε ϑ ^{n + 1}, that ∃z(x,y, ε z). - Thus disappears Russell’s grammatical constraint, that declared "x^m ε y ⁿ" meaningless if m + 1 unequal n - "m ε y ⁿ" now becomes useful for all m and n - if m + 1 unequal n, so "x^m ε y ⁿ" simply becomes wrong. --- X 95 Variables/Quine: quantifiable variables should never be in predicate places, but always in name places.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Variables	Russell	XXI I Variables/Russell/Gödel: exist only to enable truth function. >Truth functions. Finite/Infinite/Ramsey: the problem of solving infinite propositions is not so critical. - Gödel: then Russell’s Apercu that propositions about classes can be interpreted as propositions about their elements literally becomes true, provided that n is the number of the (finite) individuals in the world, and provided we neglect the zero class. >Proposition, >Classes/Russell, >Empty set, >Individual/Russell. I 28 Pseudo-variable/Peano/Russell: the symbol (x). φ x denotes a particular proposition and there is no sense of difference between (x). j x and (y). φ y if they occur in the same context. - ((s)> Quine: alphabetical variant). - o is x in (x) φ x not an ambiguous part of an expression and such an expression itself remains the bearer of a very specific meaning despite the ambiguity of the x in φ x. Pseudo-variables: exist if the extension does not go over the entire range. A proposition with a state of affairs x is not a function of x. Extension: is the function of which all or some values are asserted. I 29 Ambiguous assertion and the real variable: any arbitrary value φ x of the function φ x^ can be asserted. - Real Variable: φx. - If x varies, a different proposition results. I 30 Pseudo-variable: is obtained if we put a universal quantifier before it. I 73 Pseudo-Variable: several possible values can be meant. Descriptions always contain pseudo-variables. Sentences without pseudo-variables: are observation sentences e.g. This is red. I 74 Pseudo-Variable/Principia Mathematica⁽¹⁾/Russell/(s): E.g. (y).φ(x,y), which is a function of x - here y is a pseudo-variable, x is the real variable. - ((s) E.g. everything smaller than x - instead of y it could also say z here). 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.	Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996
Variation	Vavilov	Gould II 132ff Variation/Evolution/Vavilov/Gould: Nikolai I. Vavilov was the leading Mendelian geneticist in Russia. In 1936, he served as the main target for the Soviet agronomist T. D. Lyssenko, who had a great influence under Stalin. Vavilov was attacked because of his theory, the so-called law of homologues rows in variation. Vavilov had collected barley, oats and millet from a wide variety of different breeds of wheat from various locations, and noted that within the different species of a genus, but also frequently within the species of related groups, remarkably similar series of varieties could be found. II 135 Definition homologous: similar due to inheritance of the same genes, Definition analogous: similar due to forced adaptation to the environment. Vavilov thesis: The new species emerge by developing genetic differences that exclude crossbreeding with related species. But the new species is not all genetically different from its ancestors. Most of them remain untouched. The parallel variations thus represent the "play through" of the same genetic abilities, which are inherited as blocks of one species to another. Gould: Darwin does not disagree with such a thesis, since it gives the selection an important role. While each variety can represent a predictable latent ability, its development in any climate or geographic region requires selection to maintain the adaptive variant and eliminate others. DarwinismVsVavilov: However, Vavilov's thesis comes into conflict with strict Darwinism, since it weakens the main doctrine that selection is the creating force of evolution. >Evolution, >Darwinism, >Ch. Darwin. II 136 Random and undirected variation plays a major role in Darwin because it determines the central position of selection by guaranteeing that the evolutionary variation itself cannot be attributed to variation. >Mutation. The variation is only the raw material. It arises in all directions and is at least not arranged preferably in an adaptive way. The direction is slowly being determined by natural selection, as the more adapted generations proliferate. However, if the possibilities are very limited and one species shows all of its different varieties, then this choice cannot be explained by selection alone. That's how Vavilov sets himself apart from Darwin. VavilovVsDarwin: Variation does not take place in all directions, but in classes that are analogous to those of chemistry and crystallography. GoudlVsVavilov: Vavilov underemphazised the creative role of the environment. II 139 Lysenko/Gould: Lysenko was a charlatan and undialectic (against his own assertion) by considering plants as modelling clay in the hands of the forming environment. Vavilov died in the name of an apparant Lamarckism. There was an excessively strict Darwinism in the Soviet Union, which misinterpreted Darwin. >Lamarckism. II 140 Gould: From today's perspective, Vavilov has cast a glimpse of something important. New species do not inherit their adult form from their ancestors. They will receive a complex genetic system and a number of development opportunities. This set of options narrows the variation width to a line along which the selection can select points that it cannot move. II 141 In recent experiments with recurring traits in bred mice one has not found Darwinian homologous series in the sense of Vavilov. The simplest and most common conclusion would be to consider snails with a smooth shell on all islands as related and those with a ribbed shell as members of another related group. However, we now know that the complex set of properties always arises independently. VsVavilov: he has overemphasized the internal limitations and reduced the power of selection too much. >Selection.	Vavilov I Nikolai I. Vavilov Origin and Geography of Cultivated Plants Cambridge 2009 Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989
Veil of Ignorance	Rawls	I 136 Veil of Ignorance/society/Rawls: this is about excluding contingent peculiarities when establishing a new form of society. To this end, the parties are to remain behind a veil of ignorance in the >initial situation of a society to be established, with regard to alternatives concerning their own individual case. I 137 This is intended to ensure that the principles in question are chosen on the basis of general considerations. Certain facts are said to be unknown: No one knows their place in society, class affiliation or social status, or their endowment with goods, intelligence, strength, and so on. Even his individual psychology, such as his propensity to optimism or pessimism, risk appetite or affiliation to a certain generation. On the other hand, general facts about human society should be known: people understand political problems and economic theory, social organization and the laws of the human psyche. I 138 There should be no restrictions on general information, i. e. on general laws and theories. ((s) Rawls assumes here that there are psychological laws, especially laws of moral psychology. (DavidsonVsRawls: VsPsychological Laws: see Anomalous Monism/Davidson). Initial Condition/problems/Rawls: it must be clarified that proposals belong to the range of permissible alternatives and general consequences of proposed principles must be known. I 139 The initial state is not a general assembly, that would be too much of a strain on the imagination. On the other hand, it is important that it does not matter who accepts the perspective of the initial state or when he does it. This is what the veil of ignorance is supposed to guarantee: the information available should be relevant but always the same. VsRawls: one can argue that the veil is irrational. RawlsVsVs: it is about ensuring that everyone can be convinced by the same arguments. Then people's points of view can be picked out by chance, the other people will behave in the same way. In addition, it is possible to accept an arbitrator who declares a ban on coalition, but this is superfluous if one assumes that the consultations of the parties are the same. Since no one has any further information, he cannot adjust the situation to his personal advantage. I 140 The only exception: an egoist could basically refuse to make his savings available to posterity. He could decide to do that without having any further information. The question of intergenerational justice must therefore be tackled elsewhere. I 141 Unanimity/conformity: in the initial state it is not a matter of agreement on concrete random facts (which are not known anyway). Otherwise, only trivial problems could be solved. I 142 Through the veil of Ignorance, the two principles of justice (see Principles/Rawls) are preferred to the criterion of usefulness. I 143 Rationality/Initial state: even in the initial state, where individuals have only general information, we assume that they strive to have more of it than less in relation to primary public goods (e. g. freedoms, infrastructure, etc.). I 166 Veil of Ignorance/Rawls: there is no problem with the assumption that newcomers arriving at the initial situation, which of course have less information. The veil of ignorance erases every basis for distinguishing different levels of information.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Verification	Quine	I 56 QuineVsVerification: it is pointless to equate a sentence with one outside of the theory - Inter-theoretically this has no meaning. >Meaning, >Theories, >Reference, >Incommensurability, >Comparisons, >Comparability. VII (b) 38 Verification Theory/Verificationism/Quine: but what are the methods or the nature of the relation between a statement and the experiences that should contribute to confirmation or refutation? 1. Most naïve view: radical reduction: direct report. This precedes the actual verification theory for a long time. (Locke and Hume, Tooke). Tooke: a term should be the name of a sense date or a part of it, or an abbreviation for it. Quine: that's ambivalent between: Sense Data/Quine: can be understood as a) event b) quality. This remains vague as far as the contribution to the whole statement is concerned. Verification theory/Quine: we better take whole statements as units of meaning VII (b) 39 to translate them into sense data language, not expression for expression. VII 40 Reductionism/Two Dogmas/Quine: 2. More refined form: each utterance is associated with a uniform range of possible sensory impressions, so that each occurrence either increases the probability (likelihood) of the truth of the utterance VII (b) 41 or narrows it. This, of course, is contained in the verification theory. Quine thesis: (based on Carnap's "construction"): our statements stand before the tribunal of experience not individually, but as a whole corpus. (>Quine-Duhem-Thesis).	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Verificationism	Quine	VII (b) 37 Verification Theory of Meaning/Peirce/Quine: the method of empirically determining the confirmation or refutation of a statement is its meaning. Then an analytical statement is the boundary case that is confirmed no matter what the case is. Synonymy exists when the method of empirical confirmation or refutation is the same. This is then about cognitive synonymy of statements, not generally about linguistic forms. ((s) Terms below the sentence level). Meaning/Term/Cl.Lewis/Quine: Meaning of an expression: "a criterion in mind" mental criterion (criterion in mind) in relation to which one is able to accept or reject the expression in the face of a fact. (Cl. I. Lewis 1948,p.133). VII (b) 38 Verification Theory/Verificationism/Quine: but what are the methods or the nature of the relation between a statement and the experiences that should contribute to confirmation or refutation? 1. Most naïve view: radical reduction: direct report. This precedes the actual verification theory for a long time. (Locke and Hume, Tooke). Tooke: a term should be the name of a sense date or a part of it, or an abbreviation for it. Quine: that is ambivalent between: Sense Data/Quine: can be understood as a) event b) quality. This remains vague as far as the contribution to the whole statement is concerned. Verification Theory/Quine: we better take whole statements as units of meaning, VII (b) 39 to translate them into sense data language, not expression for expression. VII (b) 40 Reductionism/Two Dogmas/Quine: 2. More refined form: each utterance is associated with a uniform range of possible sensory impressions, so that each occurrence either increases the probability (likelihood) of the truth of the utterance VII (b) 41 or narrows it. This, of course, is contained in the verification theory. Quine thesis: (comes from Carnap's "construction"): our statements stand before the tribunal of experience not individually, but as a whole corpus. (>Quine-Duhem-Thesis). Two Dogmas/Quine: the verification theory thus shows us the intimate connection of the two dogmas of empiricism: 1. Analytic/Synthetic and 2. Reductionism. X 23 Verification Theory/Peirce/Quine: roughly: "tell me what difference the truth/falsehood of a proposition would make for the possible experience, and you have said everything about its meaning. QuineVsPeirce: that also equates the concept of proposition with the concept of objective information. Basic order: is here the totality of possible distinctions and combinations of sensory perceptions. Introspection: some knowledge theorists would catalogue these alternatives by introspecting the sense data, others (naturalists) would observe the nerve irritation (at the nerve ends). Problem: one cannot clearly assign the sensory evidence to individual sentences ((s) formulations). (Indeterminacy of empiricism). XI 76 Def Synonymy/Verification Theory/Meaning/Lauener: according to verification theory, two statements are synonymous if the method of their empirical verification is the same. Def Analyticity: is then the borderline case where there is no need for a method of confirmation. XII 11 Verificationism/Quine: what is its status? Ultimately, the theory of meaning must also be empirical. Because analyticity is not tenable, the verification theory of meaning is not tenable either. XII 96 Verification Theory/Quine: the Viennese Circle did not advocate verification theory strongly enough. Problem: many sentences are theoretical. Thus the concept of facts has no meaning! Subject Matter/QuineVsSubject Matter/QuineVsWittgenstein: the term has no meaning, because most propositions are theoretical (except for the pure observation sentences). But this is not a problem for the verification theory of meaning. Verification theory of Meaning/Quine: pro: the kind of meaning necessary for language learning and translation is the empirical meaning and nothing more. XII 105 Epistemology/Quine: thus becomes semantics. But it still revolves around observation (because of the verification theory of meaning). If we go beyond the observation sentences, epistemology merges with psychology and linguistics. >Verification, >Confirmation.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Vitalism	Mayr	I 29 Vitalists/Vitalism/Mayr: Appropriateness (before Kant). >Purposefulness. "Protoplasm": a special substance that inanimate matter lacks. I 31 Vitality, "élan vital". Fluid: (no liquid) Debate "Preformations/Epigenesis Theory 2nd half of the 18th century. Preformationists: believed that the parts of an adult individual were already present in smaller form at the beginning of its development. (Caspar Friedrich Wolff refuted preformation, needed causal power "vis essentialis"). I 33 Epigenetics: assumed that they appeared as products of a development, not at the beginning. >Terminology/Mayr. Blumenbach, rejected "vis essentialis" and spoke of "educational drive" that plays a role not only in the embryo but also in growth, regeneration and reproduction. I 35 Selection theory: made vitalism superfluous: Haeckel:"We recognize in Darwin's selection the decisive proof for the exclusive effectiveness of mechanical causes in the entire field of biology... definitive end of all teleological and vitalistic interpretations of organisms".⁽¹⁾ I 35 Protoplasm: the search for it promoted a flourishing branch of chemistry: colloid chemistry. It was finally discovered that there is no protoplasm! Word and concept disappeared. Life: it became possible to explain it by means of molecules and their organisation! Organic/inorganic: in 1828 urea was synthesized: first proof of the artificial conversion of inorganic components into an organic molecule! I 38 Vitalism: Strange phenomenon: among the physicists of the 20th century vitalistic ideas arose. Bohr: in organisms, certain laws could have an effect that cannot be found in inanimate matter. Bohr looked in biology for evidence of its complementarity and drew on some desperate analogies. MayrVsBohr: there is really nothing that can be considered.(Unclear only in the subatomic field). Cf. >Eccles/Popper. 1. E. Haeckel (1869/1879). Über Entwicklungsgang und Aufgabe der Zoologie. In. Jeanuische zeitung 5 s. 353-370.	Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998
Walzer	Lamont	Gaus I 233 Walzer/Lamont: Of the communitarian philosophers, Michael Walzer (1983)⁽¹⁾ is perhaps the most specific in proposing a methodology for arriving at just distributive principles. For Walzer, criteria for the just distribution of goods in a society are relative both to the particular goods in question and to the particular society's values and understandings of those goods. Walzer argues that goods such as political membership, market commodities, education, health care prestige, political office, professional expertise, or income are always understood and interpreted in a Gaus I 234 social context. Concepts/meaning/culture/society/relativism: different societies have different meanings, understandings, and values associated with these goods. The particular meanings of the goods, moreover, determine their proper distribution. So social meanings of goods give rise to distributive principles valid only in a given society, within the sphere of those goods. Injustice occurs when the distributive criteria for one good are allowed to encroach on the sphere of another (Walzer, 1983)⁽¹⁾. For example, if a given society's interpretation of health care is that it should be distributed according to need, then injustice occurs when health care becomes inaccessible to the needy ill and available only to those who have money, or talent, or fame. Similarly, if a particular society's interpretation of education is that it should be distributed equally or according to merit, then injustice occurs when it is in fact distributed according to wealth or social connection (Gutmann, 1980)⁽²⁾. Relativism: however, no argument for the injustice of such distributions of health care or education can be given independently of a particular society's views, histories, and culture. Walzer's claim is that the philosopher's attempt to derive distributive criteria for abstract goods from abstract reasons is 'undemocratic'. Democracy: democracy, for Walzer, requires that real people base principles on their actual views, whatever they are, in deliberation with others. The outcome of the deliberation and democratic struggle will be principles reflecting compromises arising from the actual historical processes of each society, and there is no reason to expect much similarity from culture to culture in the resulting ideals (Fisk, 1989)⁽³⁾. Distribution/justice: the right way to distribute the goods will depend only on the requirement that all members of the society actually participate in a manner free of dominance in the development of the principles. Society: thus, Walzer himself goes so far as to say that even a caste system, where people's positions of birth determine their access to a whole range of social goods, is permissible, so long as the social meanings inherent in the caste system are genuinely shared by the society (Mulhall and Swift, 1996⁽⁴⁾: 140). >Relativism/Walzer. 1. Walzer, Michael (1983) Spheres of Justice. Oxford: Martin Robertson. 2. Gutmann, Amy (1980) Liberal Equality. London: Cambridge University Press. 3. Fisk, Milton (1989) The State and Justice: An Essay in Political Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4. Mulhall, Stephen and Adam Swift, eds (1996) Liberals and Communitarians. Cambridge: Blackwell. Lamont, Julian 2004. „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Weather Data	Meteorology	Edwards I 394 Weather data/metereology/Edwards: Meanwhile, global data sets are produced by simulations, which are constrained but not determined by instrumental observations. In earlier work I described this relationship as “model-data symbiosis,” a mutually beneficial but also mutually dependent relationship.⁽¹⁾ This idea aligns with recent work by philosophers of science on “models as mediators”—a semi-autonomous “third force” in science, functioning in the spaces between the real world, instrumentation, and theory.⁽²⁾ As Margaret Morrison and Mary Morgan argue, Scientific models have certain features which enable us to treat them as a technology. They provide us with a tool for investigation, giving the user the potential to learn about the world or about theories or both. Because of their characteristics of autonomy and representational power, and their ability to effect a relation between scientific theories and the world, they can act as a powerful agent in the learning process. That is to say, models are both a means to and a source of knowledge.⁽³⁾ Edwards I 395 The concept of model-data symbiosis also supports the claims of the philosophers Stephen Norton and Frederick Suppe, who argue that “to be properly interpreted and deployed, data must be modeled.” Defining scientific methods essentially as ways of controlling for the possibility of artifactual results, Norton and Suppe argue that model-data symbiosis pervades all sciences—even the laboratory sciences, in which data modeling allows investigators to remove or correct for artifactual elements. “Even raw data,” they argue, “involve modeling built into the instrumentation.” One example is a thermoelectric probe, which derives ambient temperature from the current generated by two dissimilar metals joined inside the probe. Relating these currents to temperature requires parameters for each metal’s magnetic permeability. The probe’s temperature measurements must be understood as outputs of a physically instantiated mathematical model.⁽⁴⁾ Edwards: If Norton and Suppe are right, seeking purity in either models (as theories) or data (as unmediated points of contact with the world) is not only misguided but impossible. Instead, the question is how well scientists succeed in controlling for the presence of artifactual elements in both theory and observation – Edwards I 396 and this is exactly how the iterative cycle of improving data assimilation systems (and the observing network) proceeds. Thus, in global climate science (and perhaps in every model-based science), neither pure data nor pure models exist. Not only are data “theory-laden”; models are “data-laden.” Today: Modern analysis models blend data and theory to render a smooth, consistent, comprehensive and homogeneous grid of numbers (…) a data image, rather than a data set. >Models/metereology. Edwards I 397 Models: Using models to make data global legitimized the possibility of alternative data images. The logic goes as follows: You will never get perfect knowledge of initial conditions. No practical observing mesh will ever be fine enough to do full justice to the atmosphere’s huge range of scales of energy and motion, from the molecular to the global. Furthermore, there will always be errors in the instruments, errors in the transmission, and errors in the analysis model. On top of that, the chaotic nature of weather physics means that tiny variations in initial conditions (here, read “analyzed global data”) often produce highly divergent outcomes. Therefore, using a single analyzed data set as input to a single deterministic forecast model will always entail a substantial margin of error, especially for periods longer than one or two days. Solution: In the early 1990s, forecasters began to turn this apparent defect in their method into an advantage. In a technique known as “ensemble forecasting,” for every forecast period they now generate an “ensemble” Edwards I 398 of slightly different data sets - different global data images, versions of the atmosphere—which collectively reflect the probable range of error. Typically the ensemble contains twelve or more such data sets. Forecasters then run the forecast model on each of these data sets, producing a corresponding ensemble of forecasts.⁽⁶⁾ Edwards: Characterized statistically, the differences among these forecasts represent a forecast of the forecast error. >Climate data/climatology. 1. Edwards, “Global Climate Science, Uncertainty and Politics.” 2. Morgan and Morrison, Models as Mediators. 3. M. Morrison and M. S. Morgan, “Models as Mediating Instruments,” in Models as Mediators: Perspectives on Natural and Social Sciences, ed. M. S. Morgan and M. Morrison (Cambridge University Press, 1999). 4. Norton and Suppe, “Why Atmospheric Modeling Is Good Science,” 70, 72, 5. Lorenz, “Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow”; E. N. Lorenz, “A Study of the Predictability of a 28-Variable Atmospheric Model (28-Variable Atmosphere Model Constructed by Expanding Equations of Two-Level Geostrophic Model in Truncated Double-Fourier Series),” Tellus 17 (1965): 321–; E. S. Epstein, “Stochastic Dynamic Prediction,” Tellus 21, no. 6 (1969): 739–; C. E. Leith, “Theoretical Skill of Monte Carlo Forecasts,” Monthly Weather Review 102, no. 6 (1974): 409–; R. N. Hoffman and E. Kalnay, “Lagged Average Forecasting, an Alternative to Monte Carlo Forecasting,” Tellus, Series A—Dynamic Meteorology and Oceanography 35 (1983): 100–. 6. Z. Toth and E. Kalnay, “Ensemble Forecasting At NMC: The Generation of Perturbations,” Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 74, no. 12 (1993): 2317–; M. S. Tracton and E. Kalnay, “Operational Ensemble Prediction at the National Meteorological Center: Practical Aspects,” Weather and Forecasting 8, no. 3 (1993): 379–.	Edwards I Paul N. Edwards A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming Cambridge 2013
Welfare State	Habermas	IV 510 Welfare State/Habermas: the social, i.e. initially private consequential burdens of the class conflict cannot be kept away from the political public. Thus the welfare state becomes the political content of mass democracy. This shows that the political system cannot emancipate itself from the utility value orientations of the citizens without trace; it cannot produce mass loyalty to any extent, but must also make verifiable offers of legitimacy with the social state program. Tariff policy: the legal institutionalisation of collective bargaining has become the basis of a reformist policy that has led to pacification of the class conflict by the welfare state. IV 511 Problem: Social policy faces the dilemma that is expressed at the fiscal level in the zero-sum game of public budgets for social policy tasks on the one hand and for tasks of economic and growth-promoting infrastructure policy on the other. Both the direct negative effects of the capitalist employment system and the dysfunctional side effects of economic growth controlled by capital accumulation on the lifeworld must be absorbed. The welfare state must not violate the conditions of stability and mobility requirements, because corrective interventions generally only do not trigger reactions on the part of the privileged groups if they do not affect vested rights. This means that not only the scope of welfare state services, but also the nature and organisation of services of general interest must be adapted to the structure of the exchange regulated by money and power IV 512 between the formally organised areas of action and their environments. The accumulation process must only be guarded by state intervention and must not be changed in any way. Austromarxism: interprets this as the result of a class compromise. Representatives: Otto Bauer, Karl Renner. HabermasVsAustromarxism: Rather, the social opposition with its institutionalization loses its structuring power for the lifeworld of social groups. IV 515 Democracy/social state/Habermas: mass social state democracy is an arrangement that makes the class antagonism still built into the economic system harmless under one condition, namely that the growth dynamics guarded by state interventionism does not slacken.	Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Welfare State	Political Philosophy	Gaus I 210 Welfare state/Political philosophy/Moon: Some of the programmes of the welfare state, such as public schools and old age pensions, were first developed in the nineteenth century, but what might be called the 'institutional' welfare state did not fully emerge until after World War Il, when most democratic countries adopted a more or less integrated range of programmes of welfare provision and policies of economic management. The institutional welfare state is characterized by a range of programmes designed to meet different needs and to provide security against various contingencies. >Institutions, >Institutionalism, >Education, >Education Policy, >Welfare economics. Brian Barry: At least as an ideal, as Brian Barry (1990)⁽¹⁾ points out, the institutional welfare state would not even require a general safety net, since specialized programmes would cover all of the different conditions that prevent people from meeting their needs. In reality, of course, there will always be some who fall between the cracks, and so the welfare state must have a programme of 'social assistance' to cover residual cases. The emergence of the institutional welfare state is reflected in the enormous growth of government expenditures to finance its programmes, both in absolute terms and in relation to national income. In the UK, for example, social expenditure increased from less than 6 percent of GNP in 1920 to 25 percent in 1996—7 (Barr, 1998⁽²⁾: 171). Political theories on welfare state: tional frameworks. Students of the welfare state have offered a variety of classifications of welfare regimes, and disagree among themselves even about whether particular countries (notably, the US) even qualify as welfare states. Some students of welfare politics emphasize the difference between selective and universal welfare states (e.g. Rothstein, 1998)⁽³⁾; others discern liberal, corporatist, and social democratic regimes (e.g. Esping- Andersen, 1990)(⁴⁾; while yet others distinguish among social democratic, Christian democratic, liberal, and wage-earner welfare states (Huber and Stephens, 2001)⁽⁵⁾. More philosophically oriented theorists place the welfare state in the context of different traditions of political thought, and differ- ent ideals and/or patterns of justification. Thus, some discuss the minimal state and the arguments for and against it (e.g. Nozick, 1974⁽⁶⁾; Schmidtz and Goodin, 1998(⁷⁾⁾; others consider the 'residual' versus the 'institutional' welfare state (e.g. Barry, 1999)⁽⁸⁾; yet others find four distinct strands, laissez-faire, feminism, socialism, and Fabianism (Clarke, Cochrane and Smart, 1987⁽⁹⁾). While most recognize that class is a major concern of the welfare state, an increasing number of theorists see that gender is at least as important (Gordon, 1990⁽¹⁰⁾; Fraser, 199⁷⁽¹¹⁾). Cf. >Minimal State. Moon: As a political formation the welfare state tends todivide theorists who in other respects share a view Gaus I 211 of politics. Thus, defenders and critics of the welfare state include people who identify themselves as (inter alia) >conservatives, >liberals, >communitarians, >socialists, and postmodernists, and so both its critics and its defenders find themselves with strange allies and opponents. Common features: In spite of the great variability mentioned above, welfare states share important features; four of the most important are a democratic political system, a largely private market economy, a wide range of public programmes that provide monetary support or services as a matter of right, and an active role for the state in managing the economy to dampen the business cycle and to regulate economic activities. Efficiency: (...) many welfare services are provided through market transactions, such as the purchase of life or medical insurance. Why, then, should the state be involved in providing welfare, either directly in the form of specific services (such as health care or education) or in the form of resources or income to enable people to meet their own needs? Government programmes, after all, both involve an element of coercion and impose uniformity. Gaus I 212 Market: The alternative to state provision is often taken be the market, where profit-seeking firms provide consumers with goods and services. But this is an oversimplification, as families and voluntary associations also lay key roles. Private provision: The rise of the welfare state with its compulsory programmes has led to the demise of many of these voluntary associations and private firms reducing citizens' autonomy and imposing uniformity on them. The more extensive the welfare state, the more it has displaced other welfare institutions.* Efficiency: One reason for substituting state for private provision is that state provision (either of services or of resources) can sometimes be more effective than private provision, either because it can provide services or resources more cheaply, or because private provision is incapable of providing an optimal (or even adequate) level of services. For Problems: see >Market failure, >Public goods. For a Minimal welfare state: >Welfare state/Friedman. Gaus I 214 Distributional justice: A second line of argument supporting the welfare state appeals to the idea of justice rather than efficiency. The policies of the welfare state do not simply make it possible for individuals to realize their own interests more effectively, but generally redistribute income. Efficiency-based arguments normally take the outcome produced by market exchange, prior to governmental taxation and transfers, as their baseline, and show that a particular policy can at least in principle make everyone better off than they would be given that baseline. But to the extent that welfare policies deliberately redistribute income, those whose income goes down would normally (though not necessarily) be worse off; such policies could be justified, then, only by invoking values other than efficiency. >Distributive justice/welfare economics. VsEfficency-based approaches: (...) the appeal to e Iciency is itself problematic, in as much as the pretax/pretransfer baseline it takes for granted must be justified. There are some risks which we face, when we think of our lives taken as a whole, that cannot be covered by any form of private provision, because they reflect conditions into which we are born, such as congenital handicaps, genetic predispositions to certain diseases, and the cultural and economic disadvantages one's parents may suffer. >Distributive justice/Welfare economics. * See Paul (1997)⁽¹²⁾, particularly the articles by Beito, Davies, and the references cited therein for an account of non-state forms of welfare. 1. Barry, Brian (1990) 'The welfare state versus the relief of poverty'. Ethics, 100 (June): 503-29. 2. Barr, Nicholas (1998) The Economics of the Welfare State, 3rd edn. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 3. Rothstein, Bo (1998) Just Institutions Matter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4. Esping-Andersen, Gosta (1990) Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Umversity Press. 5. Huber, Evelyne and John D. Stephens (2001 ) Development and Crisis of the Welfare State. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 6. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell. 7. Schmidtz, David and Robert Goodin (1998) Social Welfare and Individual Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge Umversity Press. 8. Barry, Norman (1999) Welfare, 2nd edn. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 9. Clarke, John, Allan Cochrane and Carol Smart (1987) Ideologies of Welfare. London: Hutchinson. 10. Gordon, Linda, ed. (1990), Women, State, and Welfare. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. 11. Fraser, Nancy (1997) Justice Interruptus. New York: Routledge. 12. Paul, Ellen, ed. (1997) The Welfare State. Cambridge: Cambridge Umversity Press. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications Mause I 579ff Welfare State/Political Theories: given the empirical diversity of the structure of the welfare state in the various countries, one must assume that one is dealing with a mixed system in the specific case of an examined country. The term welfare state is criticized as conservative. (Schmidt 2005) ⁽¹⁾. For the division into system types see Esping-Andersen 1990⁽²⁾ and 1999⁽³⁾. Mause I 581 History of the welfare state: the oldest strand of comparative welfare research used key socio-economic variables such as the state of economic development, the spread of employees in the non-agricultural sector ("employment rate") and other concepts of macro-sociological modernisation. (Customs officer 1963 ⁽⁴⁾; Wilensky 1975 ⁽⁵⁾. Functionalistic explanations: here we are concerned, among other things, with the diffusion of social policy effects across territorial borders, e.g. social learning (Hall 1993) ⁽⁶⁾. Garbage can theory: this is about the contingent interaction of political processes, one example being the multiple streams approach. (Kingdon 1984)⁽⁷⁾. Newer approaches, on the other hand, focused on concepts such as power, conflict and institutions and examined decision-making processes. Party Difference Thesis/Hibbs: (Hibbs 1977) ⁽⁸⁾: The party-political composition of governments is significantly reflected in internationally and historically variable levels of social expenditure. (Castles 1982 ⁽⁹⁾; Schmidt 2005 ) 1. Manfred G. Schmidt, Sozialpolitik in Deutschland. Historische Entwicklung und internationaler Vergleich, Wiesbaden 2005 2. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1990. The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Princeton 1990. 3. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. Social foundations of postindustrial economies. Oxford 1999. 4. Zöllner, Detlev. Öffentliche Sozialleistungen und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung. Ein zeitlicher und internationaler Vergleich. Berlin 1963. 5. Wilensky, Harold L. 1975. The welfare state and equality. Structural and ideological roots of public expenditures. Berkeley 1975. 6. Peter A. Hall, 1993. Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state. The case of economic policymaking in Britain. Comparative Politics 25( 3): 275– 296. 7. Kingdon, John W., Agendas, alternatives, and public policies. Boston/ Toronto 1984. 8. Hibbs, Douglas A. 1977. Political parties and macroeconomic policy. American Political Science Review 71: 1467– 1487. 9. Castles, Francis G. The impact of parties on public expenditure. In The impact of parties: Politics and policies in democratic capitalist states, Hrsg. Francis G. Castles, 21– 96. London 1982.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Wholes	Maturana	I 171 Whole/part/Maturana: a whole can not operate as its own component: unit has two non-overlapping regions that are distinguished (as simple/composite) - ((s) of connection of level and domain: the level "has a range".) >Domains/Maturana, >Simplicity, >Complexity, >Unity, >Levels, >Parts, >Part-of-Relation.	Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000
Wikipedia	Zittrain	I 243 Wikipedia/Zittrain: Some schools and universities have banned the citation of Wikipedia in student papers, ⁽¹⁾ while signing up for plagiarism detection services like TurnitIn.com and automatic essay-grading tools like SAGrader.com, which “uses computational intelligence strategies to grade students [sic] essays in seconds and respond with detailed, topic-specific feedback.”⁽²⁾ 1. Middlebury College’s History Department banned the use of Wikipedia as a source in early 2007. See A Stand Against Wikipedia, INSIDE HIGHER ED., Jan. 26, 2007, http://insidehighered.com/news/2007/01/26/wiki; Noam Cohen, A History Department Bans Citing Wikipedia as a Research Source, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2007, at B8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/21/education/21wikipedia.html. Other schools are frowning upon Wikipedia as a source as well. Matt Reilly, Source of the Problem, THE DAILY ORANGE, Apr. 2, 2007, available at http://www.dailyorange.com/home/index.cfm?event=displayArticle&ustory_id=fe593637-958b-44e6-9f03-b8cba4264ec6 2. 19. SAGrader, IdeaWorks, http://www.ideaworks.com/sagrader/index.html (last visited May 22, 2007).	Zittrain I Jonathan Zittrain The Future of the Internet--And How to Stop It New Haven 2009
Words	Ancient Philosophy	Gadamer I 409 Word/Ancient Philosophy/Gadamer: (...) Greek philosophy [started] with the realization that the word is only a name, i.e. that it does not represent the true being. This is precisely the intrusion of philosophical questions into the initially undisputed bias of the name. Belief in words and doubt about words describe the problem situation in which the thinking of the Greek Enlightenment saw the relationship between word and thing. Through them, the model of the name becomes a counter-image. The name that you give, that you can change, motivates doubt about the truth of the word. Can one speak of the truth of names? But is it not necessary to speak of the truth of words, that is, to demand the unity of word and thing? And did not the most profound of all early thinkers, Heraclitus, not discover the profundity of the play on words? This is the background on which Plato's "Kratylos" rises, the basic script of Greek thought about language, which contains the whole range of problems (...).⁽¹⁾ >Word/Plato, >Names/Plato, >Language/Plato. 1. Their presentation in Hermann Steinthal, Die Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen und Römern mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die Logik, 1864, is still of great value (in the meantime, here is a book by K. Gaiser functioning as a representative: "Name und Sache in Platons Kratylos". (Treatise of the Heidelberg Academy of Sciences, Philos.-histor. Class Abh. 3, year 1974) Heidelberg 1974)	Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Words	Plato	Gadamer I 410 Word/Plato/Gadamer: Two theories discussed in Plato's "Cratylos" attempt to determine the relationship between word and thing in different ways. A. Conventionalism: Conventionalist theory sees in the unambiguousness of language use, as achieved by agreement and practice, the only source of word meanings. B. Similarity theory: The theory opposing it represents a natural agreement between word and thing, which is precisely what is called correctness (orthotés). Conventionalism/Gadamer: The limit of conventionalism is: one cannot arbitrarily change what words mean if language is to be. The problem of "special languages" shows the conditions under which such rebaptisms take place. Name/Cratylos: Hermogenes in "Cratylos" himself gives an example: the rebaptizing of a servant⁽¹⁾. The inner dependence of the servant's life, the coincidence of his person with his function makes possible what otherwise fails because of the person's claim to his or her "being-for-themselves", to the preservation of his or her honor. Likewise, children and lovers have language through which they communicate in the world that is only their own, but even this not so much through arbitrary fixation as through the development of a habit of language. Always the commonality of a world - even if it is only a played one - is the precondition for "language". Similarity theory: [its] limit is also clear: one cannot criticize language with regard to the things meant in the sense that the words do not correctly represent the things. Language is not there at all like a mere tool that we use, that we build up to communicate and distinguish with it.⁽²⁾ Gadamer: Both interpretations of the words start from their existence and being present and let things be for themselves as if they were known in advance. For this very reason they start too late from the outset. Plato/Gadamer: So one has to ask oneself whether Plato, who has the inner untenability of the two extreme positions, wants to put in question Gadamer I 411 a common prerequisite. Plato's thesis: With this discussion of contemporary theories of language, Plato wants to show that in language, in the claim to linguistic correctness (orthotes tön onomaton), no objective truth (aletheia tön onton) is attainable and that, without the words (aneu ton onomaton), one must recognize the existing purely from oneself (auta ex heauton)⁽³⁾. Gadamer: This is a radical shift of the problem to a new level. The dialectic at which this is aimed obviously claims to place thinking on itself and to open it to its true objects, the "ideas", in such a way that the power of words (dynamis tön onomaton) and their demonic mechanization in the sophistic art of argumentation is overcome. Recognition/Truth: The exaggeration of the range of words (onomata) by dialectic is of course not meant to mean that there really is a wordless recognition, but only that it is not the word that opens the access to truth, but the other way round: that the "adequacy" of the word is only to be judged from the recognition of things. >Language/Plato. Gadamer I 412 The element of true speeches remains the word (onoma and rhema) - the same word in which truth is hidden beyond recognition and completely void.⁽⁴⁾ Gadamer I 415 Truth/correctness/word/Cratylos/Plato/Gadamer: [It makes sense] to speak of an absolute perfection of the word, in so far as there is no sensual relationship at all between its sensual appearance and its meaning, and thus no distance. Cratylos would therefore have no reason to be bent back under the yoke of the image scheme. It is true that the image, without being a mere duplication of the original image, is similar to the original image, that is, as something that is different and refers to the other that it represents by its imperfect similarity. But this obviously does not apply to the relationship of the word to its meaning. In this respect, it is like the flash of a completely obscured truth when Socrates - in contrast to the paintings (zöa) - recognizes that the words are not only correct but also true (aléthe)(5). The "truth" of the word, of course, does not lie in its correctness, in its correct application to the matter. Rather, it lies in his perfect spirituality, i.e., the openness of the sense of the word in the sound. In this sense, all words are "true", i.e. their being is reflected in their meaning, while illustrations are only more or less similar and insofar - measured by the appearance of the thing - more or less correct. >Correctness/Plato, >Sophists/Plato. Gadamer I 416 Word/number/sign/Plato/Gadamer: one understands that not the word but the number is the actual paradigm of the noetic, the number, the naming of which is obviously pure convention and whose "precision" consists precisely in the fact that every number is defined by its position in the series, i.e. is a pure construct of intelligibility, an ens rationis, not in the attenuating sense of its being, but in the sense of its perfect rationality. This is the actual result to which the "Cratylos" refers, and this result has a highly momentous consequence which in truth influences all further thinking about language. >Logos/Plato. Gadamer I 418 The legitimate question of whether the word is nothing more than a "pure sign" or whether it does have something of the "image" in itself is fundamentally discredited by that. >Image/Plato. 1. Krat. 384 d. 2. Krat. 388 c. 3. Krat. 438 d-439 b. 4. But Cf. on >Mimesis as well as the significant change from "mimesis" to "methexis" which Aristotle attests in his Metaphysics A 6, 987 b 10-13 5. Krat. 430 d 5.	Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Working Models	Bowlby	Corr I 238 Working models/Bowlby/attachment theory/Shaver/Mikulincer: were originally formed in actual social situations. Bowlby (1982/1969)⁽¹⁾ argued that interactions with attachment figures are stored in at least two kinds of working models: representations of attachment figures’ responses (working models of others) and representations of the self’s lovability and competence (working models of self). He argued that, ‘If an individual is to draw up a plan to achieve a set-goal not only does he have to have some sort of working model of his environment, but he must have also some working knowledge of his own behavioural skills and potentialities’ (1982/1969⁽¹⁾, p. 112). >Attachment theory, >About attachment theory. 1. Bowlby, J. 1982. Attachment and loss, vol. I, Attachment, 2nd edn. New York: Basic Books (original edn 1969) Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press Upton I 57 Internal Working models/Bowlby/Upton: Bowlby (…) believed that the earliest bonds formed by children with their carers have an impact that continues throughout life, through the development of an internal working model (IWM). The IWM is a central premise of attachment theory and is essentially a mental model of the self, the carer and the relationships between these two (Bowlby, 1969)⁽¹⁾. This internalised set of expectations about how relationships work is thought to influence the child’s responses to others, even in adulthood (Bretherton and Mulholland, 2009)⁽²⁾. Therefore, a child whose IWM is based on maladaptive relationships is likely to repeat this pattern of behaviours throughout life. >Expectations, >Relationships, >Social relations. It is important to note, however, that these relationship templates are not developed solely on the basis of interactions with one carer. Bowlby argued that contact with a greater variety of people with whom infants can form attachments could lead to a more fully developed IWM, which would help the child form relationships with a wide range of people later on in life. He also did not see the IWM as permanently and unalterably fixed during infancy, arguing that it can be modified as the infant develops new types of relationship. >Affectional bond, >Attachment theory. 1. Bowlby, J. (1969) Attachment and Loss: Vol. 1: Attachment. New York: Basic Books. 2. Bretherton, I., & Mulholland, K. A. (1999/2009?). Internal working models in Attachment Relationships: An construct revised. In J. Cassidy, & P. R. Shaver (Eds.), Handbook of attachment: Theory, Research, and clinical applications (pp. 89-111). New York: The Guilford Press.	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011
Writing	Ricoeur	II 25 Speaking/Writing/Ricoeur: (...) the transition from speaking tow writing has ist conditions in the theory of >discourse (...), especially in the dialectic of event and meaning (...) >Discourse/Ricoeur, >Dialogue/Ricoeur. Writing/Plato/Ricoeur: [Plato criticized] writing as a kind of alienation (...). Writing/Ricoeur: What happens in writing is the full manifestation of something that is in a virtual state, something nascent and inchoate, in living speech, namely the detachment of meaning from the event. But this detachment is not such as to cancel the fundamental structure of discourse (...). The semantic autonomy of the text which now appears is still governed by the dialectic of event and meaning. Moreover, it may be said that this dialectic is made obvious and explicit by writing. Writing/text/Ricoeur: What happens in writing is the full manifestation of something that is in a virtual state, something nascent and inchoate, in living speech, namely the detachment of meaning from the event. But this detachment is not such as to cancel the fundamental structure of discourse (...). The semantic autonomy of the text which now appears is still governed by the dialectic of event and meaning. Moreover, it may be said that this dialectic is made obvious and explicit by writing. II 26 Writing/Derrida: To hold - as Jacques Derrida⁽¹⁾ does - that writing has a root distinct from speech and that this foundation has been misunderstood due to our having paid excessive attention to speech, its voice, and its logos, is to overlook the grounding of both modes of the actualization of discourse in the dialectical constitution of discourse. RicoeurVsDerrida: I propose instead that we begin from the schema of communication described by Roman Jakobson in his famous artcle, "Linguistics and Poetics."⁽²⁾ Jakobson: To the six main "factors" of communicative discourse — the speaker, hearer, medium or channel, code, situation, and message—he relates six correlative "functions": the emotive, conative, phatic, meta-linguistic, referential, and poetic functions. Ricoeur: Taking this schema as a starting point, we may inquire into what alterations, transformations, or deformations affect the interplay of facts and functions when discourse is inscribed in writing. >Media/Ricoeur. II 28 (...) does the problematics ot fixation and inscription exhaust the problem of writing? In other words, is writing only a question of a change of medium, where the human voice, face, and gesture are replaced by material marks other than the speaker's own body? When we consider the range of social and political changes which can be related to the invention of writing, we may surmise that writing is much more than mere material fixation. [The] political implication of writing is just one of its consequences. To the fixation of rules for reckoning may be referred the birth of market relationships, therefore. the birth of economics. To the constitution of archives, history. To the fixation of law as a standard of decisions, independent from the opinion of the concrete judge, the birth of the justice and juridical codes, etc. Such an immense range of effects suggests that human discourse is not merely preserved from destruction by being fixed in writing, but that it is deeply affected in its communicative function. Literature: [When] is human thought directly brought to writing without the intermediary'stage of spoken language[,] [t]hen writing takes the place of speaking. A kind of short-cut occurs between the meaning of discourse and the material medium. II 29 The best way to measure the extent of this substitution is to look at the range of changes which occur among the other components of the communication process. The relation writing-reading is no longer a particular case of the relation speaking-hearing. With written discourse, (...) the author's intention and the meaning of the text cease to coincide. This dissociation of the verbal meaning of the text and the mental intention of the author gives to the concept of inscription its decisive significance, beyond the mere fixation of previous oral discourse. II 30 Meaning/intending: What the text means now matters more than what the author meant when he wrote it. >Intentional Fallacy/Wimsatt, >Literature/Ricoeur. 1. Jacques Derrida, La voix et le phénoméne (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967); L'écriture et la différence (Paris: Seuil, 1967); De la grammatologie (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1967); „La Mythologie blanche," Rhétorique et philosophie, Poétique, 5 (1955); reprinted in Marges de la philosophie (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1972), pp. 247-324. 2. R. Jakobson, „Linguistics and Poetics“. In: T. A. Sebeok (ed.), Style in Language (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1960), pp. 350-377.	Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976

The author or concept searched is found in the following 132 controversies.

Disputed term/author/ism	Author Vs Author	Entry	Reference
Analogy	Vollmer Vs Analogy	II 112 VsAnalogies/Vollmer: For example, it makes little sense to transfer the concept of the octave from the acoustic to the optical range. Although both are wave systems. E.g. Tones form intervals, but not colors! E.g. Triads of colors are not perceived as a "chord" but as a uniform color.	Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988
Anscombe, E.	Wittgenstein Vs Anscombe, E.	Hintikka I 163 ff Hintikka: The problem of color incompatibility is solvable. Color/color terms/color terms/logic/AnscombeVsWittgenstein: argues what is not accepted by WittgensteinVsAnscombe that, provided red and green are objects, we know which is their logical type. --- I 164 Color words/color terms/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: incompatible does not mean contradictory: (red/green). E.g. "This patch is red" and "This patch is green" are incompatible, but this incompatibility is not logical, in the sense that it is indicated by the notation (but: see below: 4). Also it does not reduce to a truth-functional contradiction. (Contradiction is for Wittgenstein a precisely defined term in the theory of truth functions (4:46)). "It is clear that the logical product of two elementary propositions can neither be a tautology nor a contradiction. The statement that a point in the visual field has two different colors at the same time, is a contradiction. Hintikka: but here it is not about the status of colors, but about the status of the color attribution. There is no reason to suppose that Wittgenstein has ever believed color attributions such as "This is red" would have subject predicate form. Wittgenstein: from the use of these forms (meant here are grammatical sentences) we cannot draw, at most vague, conclusions. --- I 165 Sentence/form/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: E.g. "This lecture is boring", "The weather is nice" are only seemingly sentences of the same form. They have nothing to do with each other. HintikkaVsAnscombe: their argument loses its strength with that: this is about someone who makes very different conditions. Hintikka: if you make other conditions, the situation is obviously quite different: Example: Assume that the general concept of color in the language not to be reproduced by a class of color predicates but by a function c which maps points of the visual space in a color space. The logical incompatibility would then be mirrored by the fact that the colors red and green are represented by different names. Then, the two sentences are logically incompatible! Due to their logical form a function cannot take two different values for the same argument. Wittgenstein claims even emphatically that attributions of different qualities of perception are essentially clear, that is, can be represented by real functions. --- I 165/166 Color/color words/neccessity/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the question of whether the colors incompatibility means a breach against Wittgenstein's notion that purely logical necessities are the only necessities, is now moved into a new light. It depends on what we think is the logical form of color terms. (Or the correct notation). Is a) every single color represented by a predicate, we get necessities that are not of a logical type. b) points in a color space: then the incompatibility of various colors cause no illogical necessities. (Wittgenstein is this alternative (but certainly strange to Anscombe). He constantly deals with the concept of the color space. However, this concept fails to satisfy if one interprets specific color words as undefined predicates --- I 341 ff Pain/private experiences/Cartesianism/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the most surprising thesis of this chapter is probably the thesis of Wittgenstein's metaphysical Cartesianism, so the assertion that there are really private internal event-like experiences like pain and other such sensations according to Wittgenstein. It is undisputed that the language must be based on a public language game, one is divided what must follow for the private feelings. Implies the neccessity of a public framework that these experiences themselves are now objects, events, or anything not private? That this follows, is represented by many philosophers. e.g. --- Hintikka I 342 Anscombe: "If a word stands for a private object, it must have a private ostensive definition." Since private ostensive definitions are impossible there can probably be no personal item acording to this view. HintikkaVsAnscombe: but this implication does not apply. Of course we cannot say that sensations and the like are private in our language according to Wittgenstein. But that is not what this is about, this is just one of the consequences of inexpressibility of semantics. Actual question: are the philosophers right who claim that there are no private events according to Wittgenstein? No. PU § 272 provides a counter-example: "The essence of the private experience is actually not that each has its own example, but that no one knows whether the other also has this or something else. So it would be possible, although not verifiable, that one part of humanity has a sensation of red and the other a different one."	W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Aristotle	Black Vs Aristotle	III 99 Humaneness/humanity/Morals/Ethics/Black: what is a behavior that is adequate for dealing with other human beings?. III 100 Adequacy/Black: is mostly understood in terms of a particular function, such as doctor, judge, etc. We are concerned here but human beings as such, the human "qua human." Human/Aristotle: Thesis: has its own function qua human. BlackVsAristotle: his only argument for this is that craftsmen also have a function. And it would be strange if the human had none. But in the absence of religious belief, it is not plausible that humans would be teleological entities with a particular purpose. III 101 In particular, no such entities like an organ such as the heart. Otherwise we would have to consider humans as parts of a supra-individual being. Humanity/Black: without religious implications: what is the correct behavior of a human towards other humans? E.g. representatives of several religions in a lifeboat: what obligations do they have towards one another, even if they are not related or of the same nationality?.	Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Avramides, A.	Cartesianism Vs Avramides, A.	Avra I 108 CartesianismVsAvramides: could protest against the assumption of a necessary divine position. Avramides: with that he would steal out of the necesity of deep epistemic asymmetry (EA). Cartesianism/Avramides: is, unlike Loar, not committed to any physicalism. For him it is not about future science. Divine Position/Cartesianism: (a variant of Cartesiansim) can even say that the divine position will not in principle be able to recognize the intangible substance within us. That commits him to a realism that evades an epistemic argument. Deep EA/Avramides: precisely to prevent this, I have formulated the deep EA: ((s) see above I 95 counterfactual conditional: if (per impossible) someone else's thoughts were knowable without language, then they would not be constitutive for language). This commits Cartesianism to the fact that if (per impossible) if we could reach this intangible realm, we could also grasp someone else's intentions without understanding the language of the stranger. Thus, the Cartesian, like the physicalist, is committed to deep EA between the semantic and the pychological.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Barcan, R.	Cresswell Vs Barcan, R.	Hughes I 150 Existence/Modality/Barcan formula/BF/Hughes/Cresswell: there are versions of T, S4 with and without BF (but not of S5). Question: Can we provide an analysis of the validity that matches the versions without BF, namely PK + T and PK + T S4? Barcan formula/Camps: VsBarcan: Prior (1957), Hintikka (1961), Myhill (1958) Defense: Barcan (1962) Barcan formula/BF/Hughes/Cresswell: for our purposes we best consider it in this form (x) Lfx > L(x)fx (notation: (x) L phi x > L(x) phi x). Everyday language translation/Hughes/Cresswell: if everything necessarily has a certain property phi, it is necessarily the case that everything has that property. ((s) i.e. not: "there is necessarily".) VsBarcan/Hughes/Cresswell: because of the fact that everything that exists is necessarily phi the possibility is not excluded that there might be things (or might have been) that are not phi, and in this case it would not be a necessary truth, that everything is phi. Hughes/Cresswell: This objection is based on the assumption that in different possible worlds ) objects may not only have properties that are different from those they have in the real world , but that there may even be objects that do not exist in the real world at all. Semantics of possible worlds/Semantics/Predicate calculus. Modality/Hughes/Cresswell: now it is at least plausible to assume that the semantics that we have given for the modal predicate calculus implicitly negates this condition, since we assumed in each model a single individuals range which is the same for all possible worlds the validity of the BF indeed depends on this property of the semantics. ((s)> LewisVsKripke, KripkeVsLewis). I 151 Then we can gain a semantic in which BF is invalid by allowing models where different possible worlds are assigned different ranges.	Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Hughes I G.E. Hughes Maxwell J. Cresswell Einführung in die Modallogik Berlin New York 1978
Behaviorism	Carnap Vs Behaviorism	VI 81 CarnapVsBehaviorism/Carnap: it is not certain whether the claim to reflect the cognitive relationship properly with this arrangement (with physical basis) is justified. VI 186 Behaviorism/Other Minds/Carnap: 1. The attribution of behavior happens in relation to the body, it is not attributed to the soul! 2. The ascribed states are states of the observer. Not experiences of the other! The whole series of experiences of the other person consists of nothing other than a rearrangement of my experiences and their components. VI 187 There is no other mind without a body. And there is one in which processes of expression occur that are similar to those of my body. VII 160 Intension/Robot/VsBehaviorism/Carnap: in the case of robots we can assume that we have much detailed knowledge of the internal structure. Therefore we can use structural analysis instead of the behavioristic method.	Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982
Burleigh	Geach Vs Burleigh	Klaus von Heusinger, donkey sentences and their horses feet Uni Konstanz Section linguistics Working Paper 64; 1994 Heusinger I 14 Donkey Sentence/Donkey Sentences/Burgleigh/Heusinger: (16) Any man who owns a donkey beats it. (16a) Any man, if he owns a donkey, beats it. (16b) (x)(y)[man (x) & donkey (y) & own (x,y)) > beat (x,y)]. (17) Some man who owns a donkey does not beat it. (17a) Some man owns a donkey and he does not beat it. (17b) (Ex)(Ey)[man (x) & donkey (y) & own (x,y)) > beat (x,y)]. Donkey Sentence/Burgleigh/Heusinger: (1328, 32f 1988,92f: E.g. Omnis homo habens asinum videt illum, E.g. Aliquis homo habens asinum non videt illum. The correct reading is controversial here, Schubert & Pelletier list 7 readings. GeachVsBurleigh/Heusinger: unlike Burleigh, Geach assumes that (16) and (17) can never be true together. Burleigh: E.g. If every farmer has two donkeys, of which he beats one and not the other, then both propositions are true. Strong Reading/Geach: is the one that makes this impossible. This is thus determined as the classical one by Geach for the modern discussion. Interestingly, he assumes a weak reading (EQu?) for "a donkey". Relative Pronouns/Geach: "who" is conceived in (16) as an abbreviation for "if he" and as "and he" in (17). Conditional: This describes the transition from the simple sentence to the conditional or to the conjunction. The logical forms each relate to both sentences!. Anaphora/Range/Geach/Heusinger: Geach gives diskurs anaphoras a wide range, which leads to problems with compositionality. Strong Reading/All-Quantification/Geach: he interprets every indefinite NP as universal. Problem of Proportion/Heusinger: is thus provoked. In the scholastic interpretation it cannot occur.	Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972
Carnap, R.	Quine Vs Carnap, R.	Carnap VII 151 Intensionalist Thesis of Pragmatics/CarnapVsQuine: determining the intention is an empirical hypothesis that can be checked by observing the linguistic habits. Extensionalist Thesis/QuineVsCarnap: determining the intention is ultimately a matter of taste, the linguist is free, because it can not be verified. But then the question of truth and falsehood does not arise. Quine: the completed lexicon is ex pede Herculem i.e. we risk an error if we start at the bottom. But we can gain an advantage from it! However, if in the case of the lexicon we delay a definition of synonymy no problem arises as nothing for lexicographers that would be true or false. Carnap VII 154 Intention/Carnap: essential task: to find out which variations of a given specimen in different ways (for example, size, shape, color) are allowed in the area of the predicate. Intention: can be defined as the range of the predicate. QuineVsCarnap: might answer that the man on the street would be unwilling to say anything about non-existent objects. Carnap VII 155 CarnapVsQuine: the tests concerning the intentions are independent of existential questions. The man on the street is very well able to understand questions related to assumed counterfactual situations. Lanz I 271 QuineVsCarnap: criticism of the distinction analytic/synthetic. This distinction was important for logical empiricism, because it allows an understanding of philosophy that assigns philosophy an independent task which is clearly distinct from that of empirical sciences! Quine undermines this assumption: the lot of concepts is not independent of their use in empirical theories! I 272 There are no conceptual truths that would be immune to the transformation of such theories. Philosophy and sciences are on one and the same continuum. --- Newen I 123 Quine/Newen: is like Carnap in the spirit of empiricism, but has modified it radically. I 124 Thought/Frege: irreducible. Thought/QuineVsFrege: seeks a reductive explanation of sentence content (like Carnap). Base/QuineVsCarnap: not individual sense data, but objectively describable stimuli. Sentence Meaning/Quine/Newen: is determined by two quantities: 1) the amount of stimuli leading to approval 2) the amount of the stimuli leading to rejection. This only applies for occasion sentences. I125 Def Cognitively Equivalent/Quine/Newen: = same meaning: two sentences if they trigger the same behavior of consent or reflection. For the entire language: if it applies to all speakers. QuineVsCarnap: sentences take precedence over words. Quine I 73 QuineVsCarnap: difference to Carnap's empirical semantics: Carnap proposes to explore meaning by asking the subject whether they would apply it under different, previously described circumstances. Advantage: opposites of terms such as "Goblin" and "Unicorn" are preserved, even if the world falls short of examples that could be so sharply distinct from each other in such a way. I 74 Quine: the stimulus meaning has the same advantage, because there are stimulus patterns that would cause consent to the question "unicorn?", but not for "Goblin?" QuineVsCarnap: Carnap's approach presumes decisions about which descriptions of imaginary states are permissible. So, e.g. "Unicorn", would be undesired in descriptions to explore the meaning of "Unicorn". Difference: Quine restricts the use of unfulfilled conditionals to the researchers, Carnap makes his researcher himself submit such judgments to the informant for evaluation. Stimulus meaning can be determined already in the first stages of radical translation, where Carnap's questionnaire is not even available yet. Quine: theory has primarily to do with records, Carnap: to do with terms. I 466 For a long time, Carnap advocated the view that the real problems of philosophy are linguistic ones. Pragmatic questions about our language behavior, not about objects. Why should this not apply to theoretical questions in general? I 467 This goes hand in hand with the analyticity concept. (§ 14) In the end, the theoretical sentences generally can only be justified pragmatically. QuineVsCarnap: How can Carnap draw a line there and claim that this does not apply for certain areas? However, we note that there is a transition from statements about objects to statements about words, for example, when we skip classes when moving from questions about the existence of unicorns to questions about the existence of points and kilometers. Through the much-used method of "semantic ascent": the transition from statements about kilometers to statements about "kilometers". From content-related to formal speech. It is the transition from speech in certain terms to talk about these concepts. It is precisely the transition of which Carnap said that it undressed philosophical questions of their deceptive appearance and made them step forward in their true form. QuineVsCarnap: this part, however, I do not accept. The semantic ascent of which I speak can be used anywhere. (Carnap: "content-related" can also be called "material".) Ex If it came down to it, the sentence "In Tasmania there are Wombats" could be paraphrased like this: ""Wombat" applies to some creatures in Tasmania." IV 404 Carnap/(Logical Particles): ("The logical structure of the world"): Thesis: it is possible in principle to reduce all concepts to the immediately given. QuineVsCarnap: that is too reductionist: Disposition concepts such as "soluble" cannot be defined like this. (Even later recognized by Carnap himself). IV 416 QuineVsCarnap: Why all these inventive reconstructions? Ultimately sense stimuli are the only thing we have. We have to determine how the image of the world is constructed from them. Why not be content with psychology? V 28 Disposition/Quine: Problem: the dependence on certain ceteris paribus clauses. Potential disturbances must be eliminated. Solution: some authors: (like Chomsky) retreat to probabilities. V 29 Carnap: instead of probability: reduction sentences seen as idealizations to which corrections are made. Carnap conceives these corrections as re-definitions, i.e. they lead to analytic sentences that are true from the meaning. QuineVsCarnap: I make no distinction between analytical and other sentences. V 30 Reflexes/Holt/Quine: those that are conditioned later are not fundamentally different from innate ones. They consist of nerve paths with reduced resistance. Quine: therefore, one can conceive disposition as this path itself! ((s) I.e. pratically physical. Precisely as physical state.) Disposition/GoodmanVsQuine: a disposition expression is a change to an eventually mechanical description and therefore circular. The mechanistic terms will ultimately be implicit disposition terms. QuineVsGoodman/QuineVsCarnap: I, unlike the two, am satisfied with a theoretical vocabulary, of which some fundamental physical predicates were initially learned with the help of dipositioned speech. (Heuristic role). VII (b) 40 But his work is still only a fragment of the whole program. His space-time-point quadruples presume a world with few movements ("laziest world"). Principle of least movement is to be the guide for the construction of a world from experience. QuineVsCarnap: he seemed not to notice that his treatment of physical objects lacked in reduction! The quadruples maximize and minimize certain overall features and with increasing experience the truth values are revised in the same sense. X 127 Logical Truth/Carnap: Thesis: only the language and not the structure of the world makes them true. Truth/Logical Truth/QuineVsCarnap: is not a purely linguistic matter. Logic/QuineVsCarnap: the two breakdowns that we have just seen are similar in form and effect: 1) The logic is true because of the language only insofar as it is trivially true because of everything. 2) The logic is inseparable from the translation only insofar as all evident is inseparable from the translation. Logic/Language/Quine: the semantic ascent seems to speak for linguistic theory. QuineVs: the predicate "true" (T predicate) already exists and helps precisely to separate logic from language by pointing to the world. Logic: While talks a lot about language, it is geared towards the world and not towards language. This is accomplished by the T predicate. X 133 We learn logic by learning language. VsCarnap: but that does not differentiate logic from other areas of everyday knowledge! XI 99 QuineVsProtocol Sentence/QuineVsCarnap/Lauener: describes private, non-public autopsychological experiences. XI 129 Intention/Carnap/Lauener: (Meaning and Necessity): attempts to introduce intentions without thereby entangling himself in metaphysics. QuineVsCarnap: you cannot take advantage of a theory without paying the ontological bill. Therefore, the assumed objects must be values of the variable. Another way would be to say that certain predicates must be true for the theory to be true. But that means that it is the objects that must be the values of variables. To every value applies a predicate or its negation. ((s) >continuous determination). XI 130 Conversely, everything to which a predicate applies is a value of a variable. Because a predicate is an open sentence. XI 138 Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: Ex "x is a thing": at a higher level of universality existence assumptions no longer refer to the world, but only to the choice of a suitable linguistic framework. QuineVsCarnap: this is merely a gradual difference. XI 142 Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: (temporarily represented): Thesis: philosophical questions are always questions about the use of language. Semantic Ascent/QuineVsCarnap: it must not be misused for evasive ontological maneuvers. XI 150 Thing/Object/Carnap/Lauener: to accept things only means choosing a certain language. It does not mean believing in these things. XI 151 CarnapVsQuine: his existence criterion (being the value of a bound variable) has no deeper meaning in as far as it only expresses a linguistic choice. QuineVsCarnap: language and theory cannot be separated like that. Science is the continuation of our daily practice. XII 69 QuineVsCarnap/QuineVsUniversal Words: it is not said what exactly is the feature for the scope. Ontological Relativity/QuineVsCarnap: cannot be enlightened by internal/external questions, universal words or universal predicates. It has nothing to do with universal predicates. The question about an absolute ontology is pointless. The fact that they make sense in terms of a framework is not because the background theory has a wider scope. Absolute Ontology/Quine: what makes it pointless, is not its universality but its circularity. Ex "What is an F?" can only be answered by recourse to another term: "An F is a G." XII 89 Epistemology/Scope/Validity/QuineVsCarnap: Hume's problem (general statements + statements about the future are uncertain if understood as about sense data or sensations) is still unsolved. Carnap/Quine: his structures would have allowed translating all sentences about the world in sense data or observation terms plus logic and set theory. XII 90 QuineVsCarnap: the mere fact that a sentence is expressed with logical, set-theoretical and observational terms does not mean that it could be proved by means of logic and set theory from observation statements. ((s) means of expression are not evidence. (inside/outside, plain, circles).) Epistemology/Quine: Important argument: wanting to equip the truths about nature with the full authority of direct experience is just as much sentenced to failure as the reduction of truths in mathematics to the potential intelligibility of elementary logic. XII 91 Carnap/QuineVsCarnap: If Carnap had successfully carried out its construction, how could he have known if it is the right one? The question would have been empty! Any one would have appeared satisfactory if only it had represented the physical contents properly. This is the rational reconstruction. Def Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Quine: construction of physicalistic statements from observation terms, logical and set-theoretical concepts. QuineVsCarnap: Problem: if that had been successful, there would have been many such constructions and each would have appeared equally satisfactory,if only it had represented the physicalistic statements properly. But each would have been a great achievement. XII 92 QuineVsCarnap: unfortunately, the "structure" provides no reduction qua translation that would make the physicalist concepts redundant. It would not even do that if his sketch was elaborated. Problem: the point where Carnap explains how points in physical space and time are attributed sensory qualities. But that does not provide a key for the translation of scientific sentences into such that are formed of logic, set-theoretical and observation concepts. CarnapVsCarnap: later: ("Testability and Meaning", 1936): reduction propositions instead of definitions. XII 94 Empiricism/QuineVsCarnap: empiricism has 1) abandoned the attempt to deduce the truth about nature from sensory experience. With that he has made a substantial concession. 2) He has abandoned rational reconstruction, i.e. attempt to translate these truths in observation terms and logical mathematical tools. QuineVsPeirce: Suppose we meant that the meaning of a statement consists in the difference that its truth makes for the experience. Could we then not formulate in a page-long sentence in observation language any differences that might account for the truth, and could we then not see this as a translation? Problem: this description could be infinitely long, but it could also be trapped in an infinitely long axiomatization. Important argument: thus the empiricist abandons the hope that the empirical meaning of typical statements about reality could be expressed. Quine: the problem is not too high a complexity for a finite axiomatization, but holism: XII 95 Meaning/QuineVsPeirce: what normally has experience implications ("difference in the experience") only refers to theories as a whole, not to individual experience sentences. QuineVsCarnap: also the "structure" would have to be one in which the texts, into which the logical mathematical observation terms are to be translated, are entire theories and not just terms or short sentences. Rational Reconstruction/QuineVsCarnap: would be a strange "translation": it would translate the whole (whole theories), but not the parts! Instead of "translation" we should just speak of observation bases of theories. pro Peirce: we can very well call this the meaning of empirical theories. ((s) Assigning whole theories to observations).	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Carnap, R.	Stroud Vs Carnap, R.	I 182 External/internal/Carnap/Quine/Stroud: Quine seems to interpret Carnap this way. That the distinction between "category questions" and "subsets questions" corresponds to the distinction. External/QuineVsCarnap: this is nothing more than two ways of formalizing the language. If we have only one kind of bound variable for all things, it will be an external question: "Is there such and such?" if the variable goes over the whole range. (This is a question of category). Internally: if there is a variable for every kind of thing, it will be a subset question. Then the question does not refer to all the things that can exist. I 183 Philosophy/QuineVsCarnap: differs from the sciences only in the range of its categories. (Quine, Word and Object, p. 275). External/internal/QuineVsCarnap: Category questions differ from internal questions only in their generality from subset questions. We can get to the generality by letting some kind of variable go over all things. I 191 StroudVsCarnap: this introduces a "we", and something that happens to us, called "experience". That we exist and have experience cannot simply be seen as an "internal" truth of the thing language. One cannot then see the meaning of experience as the common goal of all "real alternatives", because then it is assumed that there are external things. Problem: the question of the common goal of all genuine alternatives cannot be regarded as an external question of all reference systems either, because then it becomes meaningless. But if it were "internal", what would be the difference if one were to switch from one reference system to another that does not even contain this goal? Carnap does not answer that. I 192 This makes it difficult to grasp his positive approach. CarnapVsSkepticism: misunderstands the relation between linguistic frame of expression about external objects and the truths expressed within this system of reference. StroudVsCarnap: but what exactly is his own non-sceptical approach to this relation? 1. To which system does Carnap's thesis belong that assertions of existence in the language of things are neither true nor false? 2. What does the thesis express at all then? Knowledge/internal/Carnap: for example the geometer in Africa really comes to knowledge about the mountain. StroudVsCarnap: but what does it mean in addition to the fact that this is not a truth that is independent of a reference system? Suppose for some reason we did not have the thing language and could freely choose another language. Does it follow from this that, for example, the sentence about the mountain in Africa would no longer be true? Surely we would express something completely different in a completely different language without thing expressions. But would the sentence we can make now not be true in this other language? I 193 And could it never be true if we had never accidentally adopted the thing language. Existence/Language/Skepticism/StroudVsCarnap: that cannot be right and it leads to an extreme idealism that Carnap just rejects. It is absurd because we already know enough about mountains to see that they are not influenced by a chosen language. Language/object/Stroud: things were there long before language came into being in the world. And that again is something we know "internally" in the thing language. StroudVsCarnap: then his thesis, understood as "internal" to the language, is wrong. It contradicts what we already assume it as knowledge about ourselves and external things. Empirically speaking, it leads to idealism that contradicts the known facts. CarnapVsVs: would say that of course one must not understand his thesis "empirically" and not the thing language "internally". StroudVsCarnap: but within some reference system it must be internal, otherwise it is meaningless. Problem: but this is a statement about the relation between a chosen framework and the internal statements within that framework. And if that implies that these internal statements would have been neither true nor false, if a different frame of reference had been chosen, it is still idealism, whether empirical or non empirical idealism. Truth Value/tr.v./Convention/StroudVsCarnap: the truth value of the internal sentences would depend on the choice of language (of the reference system). I 194 StroudVsCarnap: it is important to see that if this did not follow, Carnap's thesis would not be different from traditional skepticism! There would then be room for the possibility that statements about things would remain true, even if we abandoned the thing language and truth would again be independent of language. Problem: that would again lead to our choice of a linguistic framework being necessary only to formulate or recognize something that would be true anyway ((s) > metaphysical realism) independently of that framework. Theoretically: according to Carnap this would then be a "theoretical" question about the acceptability of the thing language as a whole. But in terms of objectivity, which we then presuppose. CarnapVsTradition: it is precisely the incomprehensibility of such theoretical questions that is important in Carnap. Because Problem: then it could be that even if we carefully apply our best procedures (> Best explanation), things could still be different from what we think they are. This is equivalent to skepticism. "Conditional Correctness"/Skepticism/Carnap/Stroud: Carnap accepts what I have called the "conditional correctness" of skepticism: if the skeptic could ask a meaningful question, he would prevail. StroudVsCarnap: if he now would not deny that the "internal" sentences remain true or false when changing the reference system, his approach would be just as tolerant of skepticism as tradition. ((s) So both denial and non-denial would become a problem.) Kant/Stroud: he also accepts the "conditional correctness" of skepticism. If Descartes' description of experience and its relation to external things were correct, we could never know anything about these things. Carnap/Stroud: his thesis is a version of Kant's "Copernican Turn". And he obtains it for the same reasons as Kant: without it we would have no explanation, how is it possible that we know anything at all? Reference system/frame/StroudVsCarnap: a gap opens up between the frame and what is true independently of it. ((s) If a choice between different frames is to be possible). StroudVsCarnap: in this respect, Carnap's approach is entirely Kantian. I 196 And he also inherits all the obscurity and idealism of Kant. There are parallels everywhere: for both there can be a kind of distancing from our belief. We can do a philosophical study of everyday life (as far as the conditions of knowledge are concerned). I 197 Reference system/framework/StroudVsCarnap: to which framework does Carnap's thesis belong that no propositions about external objects are true or false regardless of the choice of a reference system (language)? And is this thesis - analytical or not - itself "internal" in any framework? And whether it is or not, is it not merely an expression of Kantian Transcendental Idealism? Skepticism/StroudVsCarnap: the basic mistake is to develop any competing theory at all to tradition. I 198 A purely negative approach or deflationary use of the verification principle would simply eliminate skepticism as pointless. If that were possible, scepticism would no longer need to be undermined. But: Verification Principle/StroudVsCarnap: Problem: the status of the verification principle itself, or its acceptability. We can only use it to refute Descartes if we have a good reason to accept it as necessary. But that depends on how it is introduced. It should serve to prevent the excesses of senseless philosophical speculation. StroudVsCarnap: 1. Then we can only watch and see how far the principle can lead to a distinction that we have already made before! The only test would be sentences, which we would have recognized as senseless before! 2. But even assuming that the principle would be adequately proven as extensional and descriptive, i.e. it would distinguish between meaningful and senseless, as we do, I 199 it would not allow us to eliminate something as senseless that we had not already recognized as senseless by other means. Verification Principle/StroudVsCarnap: was incorrectly introduced ((s) with the ulterior motive of producing a result that was already fully known). Early Carnap sketches show that general laws of nature were initially wrongly excluded. Verification principle/VP/StroudVsCarnap: a correct introduction would provide a strong destructive tool that Kant was already looking for: it would have to explain why the verfication principle is correct. This would probably be identical to an explanation of how knowledge of external things is possible. Verification Principle/Hempel/Carnap/Stroud: the early representatives had in mind that 1. a sentence is meaningful only if it expresses an "actual content", 2. that understanding a sentence means knowing what would happen if the sentence were true. Verificationism/Stroud: There is nothing particularly original about this approach. What gives it the verificationist twist is the idea that we cannot even understand anything that cannot be known as true or false, or weaker: at least to believe as more rational than its opposite. StroudVsCarnap: that failed, even as an attempt to extract empirically verifiable sentences. I 205 SkepticismVsVerificationism/StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap: even if verificationism is true, we still need an explanation of how and why traditional philosophical ((s) non-empirical) inquiry fails. ((s) should correspond here to skepticism). (>Why-question). I 207 StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap/StroudVsHempel: it is more plausible to reject the verification principle ((s) > empiricist sense criterion) than to claim that Descartes never said anything meaningful. StroudVsVerification Principle: it will remain implausible as long as it is not understood why the traditional distinction internal/external should not be correct. I 214 Formal manner of speaking: ""Wombat" applies to (is true of) some living beings in Tasmania". QuineVsCarnap: misunderstands the semantic ascent when he speaks of external issues. But this does not reject Carnap's pragmatic approach to simplicity and fertility of theories.	Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Charity Principle	Putnam Vs Charity Principle	I (b) 56 Charity Principle/N. L. Wilson: E.g. in a possible world electrons could be twice as heavy and neutral. These other particles would then be the electrons according to Wilson. I (b) 57 E.g. historians made a terrible mistake and not Caesar (who was actually a fictional character), but Pompey founded the Roman Empire and did all the other heroic deeds that were previously attributed to Caesar. According to Wilson, Smith then always refers to Pompey when he says "Caesar"! PutnamVsWilson: according to a "historical" conception of names this is wrong, of course. He does not refer to a real person when he says "Caesar" (because he is now a fictional character). We have a false causal chain. PutnamVsWilson: descriptively, his theory is wrong: E.g. Someone has heard about another Quine and falsely believes that he is the logician Quine. We would then not say he refered to the right one, because that would be the most charitable! Charity Principle/PutnamVsWilson: affects only real situations! Applying it to counterfactual situations would mean not to grasp the distinction between what we mean by our expressions (even if we speak about counterfactual situations!) and what we would mean if that were the real situation! It would miss what Kripke calls rigidity. Charity Principle/PutnamVsWilson: Second deficiency: too egalitarian: what makes my beliefs about elm trees true is unimportant for determining the denotation of "elm". Even for the denotation in my idiolect. I (b) 58 Charity Principle/PutnamVsWilson: too numerical! Truths range from extremely trivial to important. There are also many dimensions. Convictions cannot be counted! Reference/Possible World/Putnam: E.g. electron Bohr. Suppose there were particles that had the properties falsely imputed by Bohr ("selectrons") but they only existed in the other half of the universe. Then Bohr would still not have referred to "selectrons", but toour electrons. Reason: the primacy of the phenomena. His theory was to explain his phenomena, and they are also our phenomena. I (b) 58/59 Contribution of the Environment/Reference/Twin Earth/Putnam: from the fact that a liquid would be associated with the same stereotype and the same criteria on different planets would not follow that XYZ is water. It would only follow that it looks like water, tastes, etc. The reference depends on the true condition of the paradigms (?), not on our minds. Principle of Credit of Trust/Meaning/Knowledge/Idea/Putnam: I can know the meaning of "gold" without ever having a clear notion of it! The principle of credit of trust forbids us to assume that baptists must be experts! It also prohibits assuming omniscience.	Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Chisholm, R.M.	Davidson Vs Chisholm, R.M.	Frank I 651 Self-attribution/External attribution/Wittgenstein: External attribution: based on behavioral criteria, self-attribution: without the benefit of such assistance. DavidsonVsWittgenstein: this is not satisfactory in response to skepticism: 1) it is a strange idea that the absence of clues should be better! Fra I 652 2) one would normally say that what is considered a clue will help to define the appropriate concept. Now, if the criteria are different, the concepts must also be different! Externally mental/External attribution/Self-attribution/Language/Error/Deception/Davidson: We should allow that the necessarily public and interpersonal character of language guarantees that we often apply mental predicates correctly to others, and therefore in fact often know what others think. Then the question is, what are the reasons you have for knowing yourself what you think. DavidsonVsWittgenstein: his answer may solve the externally mental, but creates the problem of the self-mental. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58	Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Chomsky, N.	Luhmann Vs Chomsky, N.	AU Kass 5 Self-organization/Luhmann: a system can only operate with self-assembled structures. No import of structures! Strange: E.g. language learning: it is almost incomprehensible how fast children learn languages. LuhmannVsChomsky: its deep structures were never discovered. Instead: modern communication research: rather in the communication itself the language is learned through use, through assumption of understanding the habit to develop asigning sounds. This does not contradict the thesis of self-organization. Otherwise, one would think that the learner is trained in a specific sequence, instead of starting to speak by himself. E.g. dyslexia: the tendency to make mistakes, is extremely variable from person to person. This makes switching to self-organization unavoidable. That does not mean that an external observer might not notice that these are the same words as they appear in the dictionary. But that cannot be explained by structural import, but by structural coupling (s.u.).	AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997
Chomsky, N.	Maturana Vs Chomsky, N.	I 128 Syntax / Grammar: If recursion is possible, a closed area can be made of behavior: E.g. dance, human language. Within such a range, the syntactic or grammatical surface structure may be only the description of regularities. In principle, the surface structure can be arbitrary! Reason: its training is consensual coupling is dependent on the history and not a necessary result of any necessary physiology. I 129 Conversely, the "universal grammar" of linguists (MaturanaVsChomsky) is recursive only in the universality of the process of coupling structures. The causes of the ability to recursive structures coupling are not self-consensually. They are structurally and depend exclusively on the operations of the nervous system together as a closed neuronal network.	Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000
Chomsky, N.	Searle Vs Chomsky, N.	SearleVsChomsky: he went a step too far: he should deny that the speech organ has any structure that can be described as an automaton. So he became a victim of the analytical technique. Dennett I 555 Language/SearleVsChomsky: One can explain language acquisition this way: there is actually an innate language acquisition device. Bat that will ad nothing to the hardware explanation assuming deep unconscious universal grammatical rules. This does not increase the predictive value. There are naked, blind neurophysiological processes and there is consciousness. There is nothing else. ((s) otherwise regress through intermediaries). Searle I 273 SearleVsChomsky: for universal grammar there is a much simpler hypothesis: there is indeed a language acquisition device. Brings limitations, what types of languages can be learned by human being. And there is a functional level of explanation which language types a toddler can learn when applying this mechanism. By unconscious rules the explanatory value is not increased. IV 9 SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsRyle: there are neither alternative deep structures nor does is require specific conversations potulate. IV 204 Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: it is often said folllowing Chomsky, the language must finally obey many rules (for an infinite number of forms). IV 205 This is misleading, and was detrimental to the research. Better is this: the purpose of language is communication. Their unit is the illocutionary speech. It's about how we go from sounds to files. VIII 411 Grammar/language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's students (by Searle called "Young Turks") pursue Chomsky's approach more radically than Chomsky. (see below). Aspects of the theory of syntax/Chomsky: (mature work, 1965⁽¹⁾) more ambitious targets than previously: Statement of all linguistic relations between the sound system and the system of meaning. VIII 412 For this, the grammar must consist of three parts: 1. syntactic component that describes the internal structure of the infinite number of propositions (the heart of the grammar) 2. phonological component: sound structure. (Purely interpretative) 3. semantic component. (Purely interpretive),. Also structuralism has phrase structure rules. VIII 414 It is not suggested that a speaker actually passes consciously or unconsciously for such a process of application of rules (for example, "Replace x by y"). This would be assumed a mix of competence and performance. SearleVsChomsky: main problem: it is not yet clear how the theory of construction of propositions supplied by grammarians accurately represents the ability of the speaker and in exactly what sense of "know" the speaker should know the rules. VIII 420 Language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's conception of language is eccentric! Contrary to common sense believes it will not serve to communicate! Instead, only a general function to express the thoughts of man. VIII 421 If language does have a function, there is still no significant correlation with its structure! Thesis: the syntactic structures are innate and have no significant relationship with communication, even though they are of course used for communication. The essence of language is its structure. E.g. the "language of the bees" is no language, because it does not have the correct structure. Point: if one day man would result in a communication with all other syntactic forms, he possessed no language but anything else! Generative semantics/Young TurksVsChomsky: one of the decisive factors in the formation of syntactic structures is the semantics. Even terms such as "grammatically correct" or "well-formed sentence" require the introduction of semantic terms! E.g. "He called him a Republican and insulted him". ChomskyVsYoung Turks: Mock dispute, the critics have theorized only reformulated in a new terminology. VIII 422 Young Turks: Ross, Postal, Lakoff, McCawley, Fillmore. Thesis: grammar begins with a description of the meaning of a proposition. Searle: when the generative semantics is right and there is no syntactic deep structures, linguistics becomes all the more interesting, we then can systematically investigate how form and function are connected. (Chomsky: there is no connection!). VIII 426 Innate ideas/Descartes/SearleVsChomsky: Descartes has indeed considered the idea of a triangle or of perfection as innate, but of syntax of natural language he claimed nothing. He seems to have taken quite the contrary, that language is arbitrary: he assumed that we arbitrarily ascribe our ideas words! Concepts are innate for Descartes, language is not. Unconscious: is not allowed with Descartes! VIII 429 Meaning theory/m.th./SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsQuine: most meaning theories make the same fallacy: Dilemma: a) either the analysis of the meaning itself contains some key elements of the analyzed term, circular. ((s) > McDowell/PeacockeVs: Confusion >mention/>use). b) the analysis leads the subject back to smaller items, that do not have key features, then it is useless because it is inadequate! SearleVsChomsky: Chomsky's generative grammar commits the same fallacy: as one would expect from the syntactic component of the grammar that describes the syntactic competence of the speaker. The semantic component consists of a set of rules that determine the meanings of propositions, and certainly assumes that the meaning of a propositions depends on the meaning of its elements as well as on their syntactic combination. VIII 432 The same dilemma: a) In the various interpretations of ambiguous sentences it is merely paraphrases, then the analysis is circular. E.g. A theory that seeks to explain the competence, must not mention two paraphrases of "I went to the bank" because the ability to understand the paraphrases, just requires the expertise that will explain it! I cannot explain the general competence to speak German by translating a German proposition into another German proposition! b) The readings consist only of lists of items, then the analysis is inadequate: they cannot declare that the proposition expresses an assertion. VIII 433 ad a) VsVs: It is alleged that the paraphrases only have an illustrative purpose and are not really readings. SearleVs: but what may be the real readings? Example Suppose we could interpret the readings as heap of stones: none for a nonsense phrase, for an analytic proposition the arrangement of the predicate heap will be included in the subject heap, etc. Nothing in the formal properties of the semantic component could stop us, but rather a statement of the relationship between sound and meaning theory delivered an unexplained relationship between sounds and stones. VsVs: we could find the real readings expressed in a future universal semantic alphabet. The elements then stand for units of meaning in all languages. SearleVs: the same dilemma: a) Either the alphabet is a new kind of artificial language and the readings in turn paraphrases, only this time in Esperanto or b) The readings in the semantic alphabet are merely a list of characteristics of the language. The analysis is inadequate, because it replaces a speech through a list of elements. VIII 434 SearleVsChomsky: the semantic part of its grammar cannot explain, what the speaker actually recognizes when it detects one of the semantic properties. Dilemma: either sterile formalism or uninterpreted list. Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: Solution: Speech acts have two properties whose combination we dismiss out of the dilemma: they are regularly fed and intentional. Anyone who means a proposition literally, expresses it in accordance with certain semantic rules and with the intention of utterance are just to make it through the appeal to these rules for the execution of a particular speech act. VIII 436 Meaning/language/SearleVsChomsky: there is no way to explain the meaning of a proposition without considering its communicative role. VIII 437 Competence/performance/SearleVsChomsky: his distinction is missed: he apparently assumes that a theory of speech acts must be more a theory of performance than one of competence. He does not see that competence is ultimately performance skills. ChomskyVsSpeech act theory: Chomsky seems to suspect behaviorism behind the speech act. 1. Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge 1965	Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Chomsky, N.	Strawson Vs Chomsky, N.	VI 386 Transformational grammar: two kinds of formative: 1. lexical: correspond to names and general terms whose meaning is not somehow derived syntactically: e.g. "to sing", "to love", "red", "Mary". 2. non-lexical: heterogeneous group: e.g. the formative "pret" for the past tense. There is no mechanical process to find the deep structure. VI 389 Thesis: "Unconscious mastery" or "internal representation" is not enough to explain the linguistic abilities. The rules of transformational grammar provide the basis for the determination of those grammatical relations which are decisive for the semantic interpretation of sentences though not alone determining. VI 390 Grammar not circular, because it contains a lexicon. StrawsonVsChomsky: there is no general theory of the decisive class of compounds (of grammatical categories and formatives). VI 391 There is only the list of items in the dictionary without any representation of general principles of the allocation. But we should expect just such a theory if the grammar is to satisfy the conditions of transparency. Because we define with the grammatical categories the functions and relations of the sentence elements. That is what everyone understands without having explicitly learned grammar. We combine obvious semantic and syntactic considerations. VI 392 Explanation/Chomsky: this one admits that a "descriptively adequate" grammar must not be "explanation adequate". We need a theory of linguistic universals. In addition, it must be explained how our grammar was selected from other possible grammars. It must be explained: 1. Why do we understand infinitely many new propositions? (> See also the discussion "Is Language infinite?"). 2. The connection of semantics and syntax. VI 393 StrawsonVsChomsky: comments only expressly reserved on semantic considerations. Dictionary/Chomsky: is part of the base and contains far fewer entries than our ordinary dictionary. VI 395 Transformation grammar Vs traditional grammar: it was too unsystematic, no explanation of the traditional terms "verb", "noun", "object" possible. VI 396 PhilosophyVsGrammar/Strawson: is first freed from "empirical" requirements, does initially not need to cope with the actual formal requirements He has just like the grammarian a conception of meaning elements and a conception of semantically significant combination modes of these elements, to which the vocabulary is available in a transparent relationship. With these transparent relations he can consider possible formal arrangements by whom the combining functions could be dispensed. This is reminiscent of the construction of ideal languages. VI 397 Quine: (anywhere): "Do not show more structure than necessary". Grammar/Strawson: one must always distinguish between the actual (essential, crucial) and possible grammars. E.g. the essential grammar must show what elements belong to which, all combinations must be shown and be possible to distinguish. E.g. it must be possible to show when an element describes a non-symmetric relation. But the essential grammar determines in no way how these requirements are to be fulfilled. VI 398 We can choose one of several grammars. If it fulfills the requirements, we have a complete and totally transparent grammar. (Only idealized simplified, that is the price). Vocabulary/Strawson: we need a completely elaborate vocabulary or a set of related vocabularies. 1. Ontological vocabulary e.g. space, time, thing, gen. characteristics 2. Semantic V., for types and individual (abstract) elements, proper names for things, 3. Functional V. for combination or relation types. Deictic elements. 4. Vocabulary of the formal apparatus.	Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Constructivism	Verschiedene Vs Constructivism	Barrow I 65/66 Constructivism: Founder Leopold Kronecker: "The whole numbers were made by God, everything else is human work." The meaning of a mathematical formula lies only in the chain of operations with which it is constructed. Constructivism introduces a third status: undecided! A statement that cannot be decided in a finite number of steps comes into the junk chamber of undecidedness. I 67 VsConstructivism: before constructivism, mathematics had developed all possible methods of proof which are not feasible in a finite number of steps. Def Reductio ad absurdum/raa: evidence which assumes that something is wrong in order to prove its indispensability, in that a contradiction arises from the very assumption of falsity. I 68 BrouwerVsHilbert: (Einstein: the "war of frogs and mice" also >"frog mouse war") Hilbert prevailed: The board of editors of the joint newspaper "Mathematische Annalen" was dissolved and refounded without Brouwer. I 69 Constructivism: strange anthropocentrism: BarrowVsConstructivism: the idea of a universal human intuition of the natural numbers cannot be kept historically (see above). A constructivist cannot say whether the intuition of a human being is the same as that of another, nor whether such an intuition will develop further in the future.	B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001
Convergence Theory	Hacking Vs Convergence Theory	I 102 HackingVs convergence theory: maximum cumulative growth, no focus on convergence. The depth of understanding and also the range of explanations can even increase without convergence.	Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996
Correspondence Theory	Davidson Vs Correspondence Theory	I (e) 96 So we get rid of the correspondence theory of truth at the same time. It is the belief in it, which gives rise to relativistic thought. Representations are relative to a scheme. E.g. Something can be a map of Mexico, but only in relation to the Mercator projection, or just a different projection. Horwich I 443 Truth/Truth theory/tr.th./DavidsonVsCorrespondence theory: a truth theory presents no entities that could be compared with sentences. (A Coherence Theory of Thruth and Knowledge.): Thesis: "correspondence without confrontation." Davidson/Rorty: this is in line with his rejection of the "dualism of scheme and content". (= Thesis, that something like "mind" or "language" had a relation like "fit" or "organize" to the world). Rorty: such theories are a remnant of pragmatism. Pragmatism/Davidson/Rorty: because of the strong connection between Dewey Quine Davidson one can assume that Davidson is part of the tradition of American pragmatism. Nevertheless, Davidson explicitly denied that his break with empiricism made him a pragmatist. Def Pragmatism/Davidson/Rorty: Davidson thinks that pragmatism identifies truth with assertibility. Then DavidsonVsPragmatism. Truth/Davidson: should not be identified with anything. Truthmaker/Make true/DavidsonVsTruth makers: do not exist. Horwich I 553 Correspondence/Fulfillment/Tarski/truth theory/Davidson/Rorty: the correspondence that should be described in terms of "true of" and is supposedly revealed by "philosophical analysis" in a truth theory is not what is covered by Tarski’s fulfillment relation. The relation between words and objects, which is covered by fulfillment is irrelevant for this philosophical truth. ((s) of "Correspondence"). "true"/Explanation/Rorty: "true" does not provide material for analysis. Truth/Davidson: is nice and transparent as opposed to belief and coherence. Therefore, I take it as a basic concept. Horwich I 454 Truth/DavidsonVsTarski/Rorty: can therefore not be defined in terms of fulfillment or something else. We can only say that the truth of a statement depends on the meaning of the words and the arrangement of the world. DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory/Rorty: with that we get rid of them. Intermediate/Intermediary/Davidson/Rorty: ("tertium", "Tertia") E.g. "perspective", E.g. conceptual scheme, E.g. "point of view", E.g. language, E.g. cultural tradition. We do not need to worry about these things anymore if we drop correspondence (VsCorrespondence theory). DavidsonVsSkepticism: is triggered just by the assumption of such "tertia". "Less is more": we no longer need to worry about the details of the correspondence relation. Correspondence/Davidson/Rorty: we can regard it as trivial, without the need for an analysis. It has been reduced to a "stylistic variant" of "true". DavidsonVsSkepticism/Rorty: arises because of these intentionalist concepts that build imaginary barriers between you and the world. RortyVsDavidson: has still not shown how coherence yields correspondence. He has not really refuted the skeptics, but rather keeps them from the question. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 Quine II 56 DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory: the conception of the fact coincidence which corresponds to the whole of the experience adds nothing relevant to the simple concept of being true. No thing makes sentences and theories true, not experience, not surface irritation, not the world. (> make true).	Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Darwin, Ch.	Verschiedene Vs Darwin, Ch.	Gould II 101 CuvierVsEvolution: he concluded from his principle of interaction that evolution had to be excluded. II 136 VavilovVsDarwin: variation does not take place in all directions, but arranged in classes of chemistry and crystallography, which are analogous. Vavilov has underemphasized the creative role of the environment. II 328 The opponents of Darwin always bring the same litany: Darwin must have been wrong - the order cannot arise by chance (e.g. KoestlerVsDarwin). Pinker I 403 Mortimer AdlerVsDarwinism: (Philosopher) 1940: Evolution could not have taken place, because there was also no three-and-a-half-sided triangle. Darwin: It is quite possible that intermediate forms have occurred in the past. Natural Species/Darwin: is not an ideal type, but a population. Vollmer I 260 Selection/Vollmer: there is no serious argument that the selection principle is circular. VsDarwinism/Tautology: the argument against Darwinism that it is tautological is misguided: "Survival of the survivor": VollmerVsVs: Fitness is not determined by the survival of the individual, but by reproductive success, more food, more living space, more partners, more offspring, etc.	Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988
Davidson, D.	Searle Vs Davidson, D.	Brandom I 923 SearleVsDavidson/representation: content must be intrinsic. Content of beliefs and intentions must be understood before the analysis of the use occurs. According to this model, the content can not be transferred during use. >Representation, >intrinsic, >content. Davidson II 112 Only the following criterion is possible: (K2) x action is intentional under the description d only if -the actor has d a primary reason g for x to the description d and - g caused x in the right way. SearleVsDavidson: proposes two types of intentions can be distinguished: a) "prior intentions" and b) "intentions in action" Intentional act only when the first caused the second. Other condition: "predictable regulatrity" predictability depends on the rest of the convictions, and is therefore never fully explicable. To explain how it apparently despite the omnipresent possibility of differing causal chains manage to rationalize actions by specifying the strongest reason, Davidson is forced to a revision of the simple syllogistic reading of the explanation relation. Searle I 28/29 SearleVsDavidson: From the zeal to stick to the traditional categories, grows some strange terminology: >"anomalous monism" >"token identity" etc. ((s) Quotation marks by Searle.) Searle I 147 Once you realize that there are forms of causation running from bottom to top, there is nothing more to do for the notion of >supervenience in the philosophy of mind. And the analogy to ethics is just a source of confusion. (SearleVsDavidson). I 148 As Wittgenstein says: If you only wrap enough paper to various pieces of furniture, you can make them all look as if they have the same shape. Searle II 238 paratactic analysis/Davidson: E.g. Galileo said that the earth moves. Be equivalent to: The earth moves. Galilei said this. Searle: the subordinate clause of the first and the second proposition are entirely extensional. After Davidson Galilei and I become by my consent "Equal Sayer". SearleVsDavidson: we are not equal sayer, because I'm just saying that Galileo has said it. In addition, the subordinate clause is intensional.	Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Davidson, D.	Millikan Vs Davidson, D.	I 209 Quotation marks/quotation/Davidson/Millikan: (Davidson, 19XX) thesis: mentioning quotation marks are indexical or "demonstrative". Their filling is semantically outside the sentence. Ex when I point to a fish and say "I've caught this fish" the fish is outside the sentence. I 210 Mentioning quotation marks/Davidson: Ex "the expression with the form shown here." MillikanVsDavidson: suppose that quotation marks alone arrange the indexing. Then the indexical relation of adaptation is a relation to a type of filling ((S) the content does not matter). But if the filling is regarded as part of the sentence, then one wonders what the criterion is for where the sentence ends and where the environment of the sentence begins. Ex "I caught this fish today" is a complete sentence with and without a fish. By contrast, "___" has five letters" is not a complete sentence. ((S) The demonstrative therefore need not be met in the sentence, but may be supplemented by ostension. But the filling of quotation marks is indispensable in the sentence.) Quotation marks/Davidson/Millikan: Thesis: quotation marks refer to the form of the expression between them (filling). MillikanVsDavidson: that is inadequate because there is no clear concept of an expressive type. Expressions are never categorized by the shape. Millikan: thesis: a strength of my approach is that linguistic units can be grouped into types. But while it's never about shape, but about lowest types or genetic families. Millikan: when we say "he first drew this ... and then ..." we need demonstratives and ostension, not quotation marks. I 211 Introduction/novelty/new/Millikan: if we introduce a completely new expression with be mentioning quotation marks, we refer to a reproductively specified family. In addition, the new symbol should be at least partly from known elements or aspects. Otherwise, the token does not fall into any scheme of the same / different - which is necessary so that one could recognize the progeny of this expression (tokens of the same type). Articulateness/articulation/quotation marks/quotation/introduction/Millikan: some characters between quotation marks are articulated, others are not: Ex "The letter "c"": here, the "c" is completely inarticulate, like a name or Ex "red" in "The German word "red"". articulated: if something is presented as a token of one type, it has to be articulated ((S) have a structure). articulated: (between the quotation marks) Ex "The syllable "red"" Ex "The term "King of France"": articulated in the sense in which a sentence is articulate, or a complex denotation. MillikanVsDavison: if the filling between the quotation marks is without significant semantic structure, it can not be a singular term. It is a denotation if you will.	Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
De re	Wright, von Vs De re	Hughes I 162 Def de re/Hughes/Cresswell: a well formed formula (wff) a containing a modal operator expresses a modality de re if the range of a modal operator from a contains a free occurrence of an individual variable, otherwise a expresses a modality de dicto. WrightVsDe re/Hughes/Cresswell: (and other authors): wanted to eliminate de re in favor of de dicto. one should be able to construct a well formed formula (wff) a' to each well formed formula (wff) a, which does not contain a modality de re and whose equivalence with a can be proved. Hughes/CresswellVsWright: that does not even seem possible with propositional calculus + S5. But apparently nobody has proved that it is impossible. Wright's strategy can be called the "principle of predication" (the term does not come explicitly from him).	Hughes I G.E. Hughes Maxwell J. Cresswell Einführung in die Modallogik Berlin New York 1978
Decomposition	Cresswell Vs Decomposition	II 176 Lexical decomposition/Cresswell: Representatives: Katz (1972) in the disguise of the semantic feature theory. McCawley (1968 and 1971), Lakoff (1971), David Dowty (1979). But this is also about the range of quantifiers ((s) Which absorbs much of the criticism of Cresswell). VsDecomposition/Fodor: (1975, 124-156): there are few adequate definitions in natural language. CresswellVsDecomposition: (like Fodor): There are no adequate definitions in natural language, because most of it is learned through ostension. Emmon Bach: E.g. "beekeeper" and E.g. "unfalsifiable" are non-technical words, but they are learned by definition. CresswellVsBach: I’d rather regard them as a compositional words.	Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Derrida, J.	McDowell Vs Derrida, J.	I 123 Meaning/nature/McDowell: it s a good lesson of modernity, that the range of natural laws is of no importance. McDowellVsDerrida: we are not compelled to read the flight of the bird as text. The constitutive elements of the laws of nature are not conceptually connected, as it is in the space of reasons.	McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell
Derrida, J.	Rorty Vs Derrida, J.	III 222 Deconstruction/RortyVsDerrida: not a new procedure. One can learn deconstruction just as one can learn to discover sexual symbols, bourgeois ideology etc. in texts. Reading did not become easier or harder, just as cycling does not become easier or harder if one makes discoveries about the nature of energy during it. Recontextualisation/RortyVsDerrida: has existed for a long time: Socrates recontextualised Homer, Augustine the pagan virtues, Hegel Socrates and Augustine, Proust himself, and Derrida all. Why does it sound so frightening when Derrida does it as opposed to Hegel? Because Derrida uses the "accidental" material form of words while Hegel no longer wanted to abidy by the rule that the "opposition" relation applies only to sentences, and not to cconcepts, but nevertheless subjugated to the other rule that no weight has to be attached to the sound and form the words. Derrida: in communicating with other people one has to comply to these rules, of course, but not when communicating with other philosophers. IV 9 Metaphysics/RortyVsDerrida: too dramatic s presentation of the role played by metaphysics in our culture. He puts too much emphasis on the particular kind of centripetal thinking that ends in philosophizing that is oriented towards justification. IV 118 Scripture/Derrida/Rorty: we should "think about a writing without presence and without absence, without history, cause IV 119 arché telos which deranged the entire dialectic, theology and ontology (sic)." Such scripture would be literature, which no longer would be contradictory to philosophy. Scripture/Text/RortyVsDerrida: dilemma: either he can forget about philosophy IV 120 and the What of scripture would lose its wit, or he must accept the dependence of the text of philosophy on its edges. When Derrida recounts such tragicomedy he shows himself at his best. His weakest points are the ones where he begins to imitate what he hates and claims he would offer "rigorous analyses". IV 121 SearleVsDerrida/Rorty: his arguments are simply awful. Rorty: that's right! RortyVsSearle: underestimates Derrida; he does not even seek knowledge bases! RortyVsSearle: the idea that there were such a thing as an "intellectual content" measurable by general and ahistorical standards links him with Plato and Husserl, but separates him from Derrida. The weakness of his arguments Derrida is that he believes that he would be pursuing amateurish philosophy of language. He did not notice that Derrida poses metaphilosophical questions about the value of such a philosophy. IV 122 RortyVsDerrida: every new type of scripture that can do without arché and without telos is also left without object! IV 123 RortyVsDerrida: Dilemma: another meta vocabulary is a) either prudocing a further philosophical seclusiveness or b) more openness than we can handle. Derrida is aware of that. Therefore, he distances himself from Heidegger who has failed to write about philosophy unphilosophically. DerridaVsHeidegger: "there will be no unique name, even not of existence". IV 125 Heidegger never goes beyond a set of metaphors that he shares with Husserl. These metaphors suggest that deep down we all possess the "truth of being"! Calling and listening also do not escape the circle of mutually explicable concepts. (so.). IV 126 Scripture/dialectic/RortyVsDerrida: "primacy of scripture" not much more than a cricket: not more than the assertion that certain features of discourse are more evident in the case of writing, as in the spoken language. IV 127 This is no more than a stale dialectic of reversal that Hegel disproved already in his phenomenology and that Kierkegaard called "tricks of a dog". IV 129 RortyVsDerrida: the distinction between relationships contitioned by conclusion and associations not conditioned by conclusion is just as unclear and blurred as the one between word and sentence or between the metaphorical and the literal. IV 130 But Derrida has to do something with all these distinctions. He must ensure that they look distinct enough. He is concerned about being the first to turn to this issue, while all previous authors have done nothing more than to build the same old building again and again. IV 129 sentence/Rorty: the distinction between sentence and non-sentence is blurred. ((s) But supra. IV 49 World/Rorty: amount of non sentences. - This presupposes a clear distinction.). IV 131 Text/scripture/RortyVsDerrida: it is simply not true that the text sequence that makes up the canon of tradition is trapped in a metaphor that has remained unchanged since the Greeks. The procedure to speak multiple languages at the same time and to write several texts at the same time is exactly what all important, revolutionary, original thinkers have practiced. IV 135 Text/RortyVsDerrida: virtually all thinkers have written several texts simultaneously. Also "glass" is not new, but the realistic representation of a site on which we have lived for some time. IV 136/137 RortyVsDerrida: he can not perform an argumentative confrontation without turning into a metaphysician. Being/DerridaVsHeidegger: Being has always only had "meaning" as something hidden in the being. The "differance" is in a certain and very strange way "older" than the ontological difference or than the truth of being. IV 138 Trace/Derrida: neither a reason nor a justification nor an origin. (Claimed to have "proven" that. RortyVsDerrida: how can he prove it? IV 139 "Differance"/Derrida: "neither a word nor a concept". RortyVsDerrida: First of all it was a typo. That it is not anymore is because it has actually become a word. Also, any word that has a use refers to a concept. IV 140 Concept/Wittgenstein/Rorty: we have learned from Wittgenstein that every word is interwoven with others. RortyVsDerrida: Opposition: Derrida is trying to utilize the explanation of the language game of the concept of meaning and to grant some magic words privileges at the same time. RortyVsDerrida: does nothing more than to avoid simply neutralizing the binary oppositions of metaphysics. IV 142 RortyVsDerrida: that all does not mean that the word games are not funny, but only that the accompanying sound of urgency is inappropriate. VI 475 Order/Searle: a blurred distinction can still be useful. VsDerrida, who makes no distinctions in his opinion.) VI 476 Sign/RortyVsDerrida: should not depict concepts as quasi People. ((s) that bring concepts mischief). Sign/Derrida: would have given us transcendental pseudo-problems. E.g. how intentionality were possible in a world of atoms and of empty space. RortyVsDerrida: should not even ask the question "What is the Political?". Just as the "piety" of Euthyphro it presumes sime kind of being of which one would assume that it would only be of interest to Phallogozentristen! Concept/Derrida: wants to write without concepts as "agents". VI 477 RortyVsDerrida: one should not write about the adventures of concepts, but about the adventures of people. He should not argue frequently used words stood for incoherent concepts, because there is no better proof for the consistency than the use, that this language game is actually being played. Derrida is itself quite transcendental, while he criticized others for ot. VI 480 Shine/to seem/appearance/RortyVsDerrida: in accordance with Wittgenstein and Davidson we can do our work without even mentioning this dubious distinction (Being/appearance)! VI 500 Text/Concept/RortyVsDerrida: if there really is a world in which concepts live and weave and exist regardless of the language behavior of word users, namely that world which is the transcendental condition of the possibility of transcendental philosophy, the question arises: Why can it also be an empirical fact that a concept is nothing more than the use we miserable existing individuals make of a word. If the world in which a concept is nothing more than this use is real, the question is: How is it possible that that other world is also real?	Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Descartes, R.	Locke Vs Descartes, R.	I 27 Innate ideas/LockeVsScholastics/LockeVsDescartes: there are no innate ideas! Neither in speculative nor in practical (moral, theological) thinking, not even in the form of "maxims", i.e. immediately plausible principles. 1. Speculative principles: if they were innate, they would have to be demonstrable in people not yet spoiled by prejudices, as, for example, in children or mentally weak people, and they are not! 2. If truths were innate in the form of sentences, then these would also have to be the associated terms, even the conclusions from these sentences! Such assumptions, however, extend the range of innate concepts and sentences into the impossible. 3. Maxims: the spontaneous consent to them means that they were not known before! But innate must always be present. ChomskyVsLocke/(s): would object that grammar rules also come into consciousness first. This is about the ease of learning). Innate ideas/Curls: the assumption that thinking begins with the application of innate laws of thought or first principles that are more than mere instrumental thinking is a deception. I 45 Body/Stretch/res extensa/LockeVsDescartes: stretch and body are therefore not identical! It is also not at all clear that the mind must let them be distinguished from the body. (Risked the dangerous accusation of materialism). The idea of expansion and the idea of the body are different. Expansion: does not include strength or resistance to movement (>inertia). Space: cannot be divided, otherwise surfaces would come up! VsCartesians: they have to admit that they either think of bodies as infinite in view of the infinity of space, or they have to admit that space cannot be identified with bodies. I 52 Res cogitans/LockeVsDescartes: Descartes: to strictly separate the world of bodies from the world of thought. Locke: mentions to consider whether there could not be extended things, thus bodies that think, something flowing matter particles. In any case, it cannot be ruled out that God in his omnipotence "matter systems" may have I 53 given or "overturned" the power of perception and thought. Contemporary theologies felt provoked by this, especially his Kontrahend Stillingfleet. LockeVsDescartes: also leads to problems with human identity (see below). I 54 Identity/LockeVsDescartes: Problem: the relationship between substance and person when the ability to think is attributed solely to an immaterial substance. For example, it would be conceivable that someone could be convinced that he was the same person as Nestor. If one now presupposes the correctness of the Cartesian thesis, I 55 it is conceivable that a contemporary human being is actually the person Nestor. But he is not the human being Nestor, precisely because the idea of the human cannot be detached from his physical form. That is abstruse for us today. (> Person/Geach). Locke relativizes the thesis by saying that it is not the nature of the substance that matters to consciousness, which is why he wants to leave this question open - he conveys the impression that he is inclined towards the materialistic point of view. II 189 Clarity/LockeVsDesacrtes: no truth criterion, but further meaning: also in the area of merely probable knowledge. II 190 Clarity/LockeVsLeibniz/LockeVsDescartes: linked to its namability. Assumes the possibility of a unique designation. (>Language/Locke). II 195 Knowledge/Locke: according to Locke, intuitive and demonstrative knowledge form a complete disjunction of possible certain knowledge. VsDescartes: this does not consist in a recognition of given conceptual contents, which takes place in their perception, but constitutes itself only on the empirical basis of simple ideas in the activity of understanding.	Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
Description Theory	Verschiedene Vs Description Theory	Stalnaker I 211 Def Causal Descriptivism/Terminology/Stalnaker: a description theory of names that incorporates the causal chain into the description that is the content of the name. Thus it also incorporates a stiffening operator that ensures that the identifiers for which the names are an abbreviation (>Russell) have wide range. Counter Position/VsDescriptivism/VsDescription Theory: causal theory of the reference. VsCausal Descriptivism/Stalnaker: moves the meta semantic Black Peter from the names to the common terms. We need to know how their reference is established. Jackson: For example, suppose we have a language in which the reference definition of names is excluded. It would still have the expressiveness "to a certain extent to say how things are". Stalnaker: if there was such a thing, it would make sense to say that the reference definition is part of the descriptive content of names. Possible Languages/Stalnaker: we can make up any semantics we want.	Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Discourse Representation	Partee Vs Discourse Representation	Klaus von Heusinger, Eselssätze und ihre Pferdefüsse, Uni Konstanz Section Linguistics Working Paper 64; 1994 I 21 Discourse Representation/Discourse Representation Theories/DRT//File Change Semantics/FCS/Heim/Kamp/Heusinger: (Heim 1982, 1983, Kamp (1981, with Reyle: 1993): Thesis the analysis should go beyond the individual sentence. Anaphora/DRT/FCS/Heim/Kamp/Heusinger: should be able to go beyond the boundaries of sentences. NP: are not quantifier expressions, but precisely anaphorical. They can also refer to "virtual" objects. File/Terminology/Heim/Heusinger: the possibly virtual objects of discourse. Discourse Reference/Terminology/Karttunen: like Heim's files. I 22 Anaphora: anaphoric relations take place between files and certain operators can the bind files or give them a certain "lifetime". Discourse Representation/Heusinger: is displayed on a model only in the model-theoretic interpretation. Def Meaning/FCS/DRT/Heim/Kamp/Heusinger: is a dynamic concept here, it is not the truth condition of sentences, but the information-changing potential of sentences. (Therefore terminology: file change) NP: new: they are discourse references here (with possibly changing correspondences) and more referential than quantifying. Referential/Heusinger: referring to particular properties. Quantifying/Heusinger/(s): not referring to properties. I 23 Discourse Representation Theory/Heusinger: Solution: there is no anaphora paradox (because NP, like pronouns, are interpreted as a discourse reference) and the problem of the wide range of the existential quantifier is resolved. Problem/VsDiscourse Representation Theories: the problem of compositionality remains. Problem: the texts can then only obtain a truth value in their entirety. Chrysipp Sentences/Heusinger: New: the conditional is represented not as a material implication, but as unselective all-quantification over cases in the sense of Lewis (1975) Adverbs of Quantification. I 24 Proportion Paradox/Partee/ParteeVsHeim/ParteeVsDiscourse Representation Theory/Donkey Sentence/Heusinger:(Partee 1984): Problem (40) can only be represented as (40a), but that becomes incorrect if out of 6 farmers who each have a donkey, five beat theirs, while the sixth farmer has 10 donkeys, all of which he treats well. Problem: the quantification over cases only considers farmer-donkey pairs. I 25 Dynamic Logic/Groenendijk/Stokhof/Dekker/Heusinger: (Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991, Dekker 1993): VsDiscourse Representation Theory: departs from a dynamic concept of meaning, like this one, which is not incorporated in the representation, but is coded in a new interpretation of the well-known logical inventory. Sentence meaning: no longer truth conditions, but contribution to the change of the context or information. Relevant information: is that on the variable assignment. Sentence meaning: is then the relation between two variable assignments. Discourse references: do not exist here. Dynamic Logic/Heusinger: Inspired by computer languages. I 42 Epsilon AnalysisVsDiscourse Representation/VsHeim/VsKamp/Heusinger: here, NP are not introduced as discourse referents on the additional semantic level of the discourse representation structure, but directly refer to selected objects of the model according to the principle of selection.	Part I B. Partee Mathematical Methods in Linguistics (Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy) New York 1990
Disquotation	Brandom Vs Disquotation	I 800 Disquotation principle: "P" is to appear simultaneously inside and outside of quotation marks. When a speaker agrees to "p", he believes that p. I 801 BrandomVs: the combination of translation and disquotation (= type repetition) is not generally good as an analysis of the relation between the reported and the reporting tokening in indirect-speech attributions. I 803 Three types of exceptions! Ambiguities: E.g. Cicero, Roman orator, or "Cicero", spy during WW2. The arrangement corresponds to the Paderewski case, but the double use of "Cicero" does not allow any inconsistency and no paradox. Paderewski is co-referential, the two "Cicero" are not. But Kripke’s dilemma only occurs with strong adequacy conditions: the speaker must be able to distinguish his case through "pure logic" or "semantic introspection". Brandom: why should one not conclude rightly that proper names are sometimes used in a way that hte disquotation principle is not applicable, because of the dual use of not only the "Cicero" type, but also of the "Paderewski" type? An answer is impossible to find.	Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Dualism	Ryle Vs Dualism	Pauen I 82 Ryle/Pauen: it seems as if Ryle wanted to deny the existence of mental states, but this is a misunderstanding. He simply denies an autonomous mental substance. I 84 RyleVsDualism: Category Error: falsely assumes that we can speak of mental processes in the same context as of physical processes. As if mind and brain differed like Library and Lecture Hall. Therefore, it is pointless to speak of "concurrent" mental and physical events. Ryle I 226 ff Dualism/RyleVsDualism/Ryle: life is not a double series of events that take place in two different kinds of matters. It's only a chain of events of various genres whose differences are mainly in that logically different types of statements of law and law-like statements are applicable to them. I 228 We are not looking into a secret chamber. In reality, the problem is not of that kind. It is is rather about the methodological question of how we prove law-like statements about the silent demeanor of people and apply them. E.g. I find out that someone is a true master of chess by watching him. That a student is lazy by watching him for a longer while. The question is not the frame question: "How do I discover that we have a soul?", but: a whole series of special questions of the form: how do I discover that I am more selfless than you, that I do poorly in dividing, but better at solving differential equations? That you are suffering from anxiety or easily overlook certain kinds of facts? Apart from such purely dispositional questions, there is the whole range of execution and event questions of the form: how do I find out that I got the joke, but you did not? That your deed required more courage than mine? I 229 Questions of this kind are not a mystery! I 230 In short, it is part of the meaning of "he understands" that he could have done this and that and that he would have done it... and the test is a set of tasks. With a single success we would not entirely have been satisfied, but we were with twenty. (Whether a boy can divide). Wittgenstein VII 147 Philosophy/Nonsense/Logical Grammar/Tetens: the thesis that philosophy is based on a misunderstanding of the "logical grammar" of language, can neither be found in Carnap nor in the Tractatus, but in Ryle in his criticism RyleVsDualismus, VsDescartes (Ryle 1969).	Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Einstein, A.	Verschiedene Vs Einstein, A.	Esfeld I 283 Hidden Parameters/David Bohm/Esfeld: best elaborated theory of hidden parameters. But compatible with holism. Although Bohm does not take a deterministic view of the world, his alternative to conventional quantum mechanics (QM) is deterministic. Thesis: a quantum system (QS) always has a definite value of place. This value is the hidden parameter. Each quantum system therefore has a definite orbit that is causally determined. The behavior of the quantum system in the measurement is also causally determined. "Causal interpretation of quantum system". Apart from the location, all other observables are context-dependent. Regardless of the context of the measurement, the particle (Quantum System) has only a potential value of the observable. Measurement/Bohm: updates the properties. E.g. the spin is acquired. Properties/Quantum System/Bohm: should therefore be regarded as dispositional. (>Disposition). Independent of hidden parameters. I 284 Quantum Mechanics/Bohm: Thesis: there is a potential or quantum field. It determines the path of a quantum system causally. The quantum potential (QP) is non-local. BohmVsEinstein: in contrast to the classic potential, the quantum potential does not need to become smaller with the spatial distance! Bohm/Esfeld: violates the parameters independence (PI), while the conventional quantum mechanics violates the result independence (RI). Quantum Potential: is a new kind of interaction (force), non-local interaction. So a violation of the local effect. I 285 Bohm/Esfeld: is this a rich holism? The quantum potential cannot be described in terms of pre-existing relationships between particles. It is not determined by the locations of the particles alone. It is therefore not sufficient for a philosophical locality condition such as Hume's supervenience (Lewis, see below). on the other hand, Bohm identifies non-locality with indivisible wholeness and not separability. Bohm ignores the distinction between non-separability and violating the local effect. With the quantum potential, he introduces a new, non-local effect. However, non-local interaction is not holism! Holism/Bohm/Esfeld: in relation to holism, Bohm is at least ambiguous. Hennig Genz Gedankenexperimente, Weinheim 1999 VIII 176 Clock-Experiment/BohrVsEinstein: 1. No completely rigid arrangement can serve as a scale. In general, every measuring instrument must be able to react to changes in the measured variable. This makes it an object which itself is subject to the uncertainty relation quantum mechanics.(> Measuring). 2. Each weighing (measurement) takes time. The more accurate it should be, the more time is needed. N.B.: it is precisely the general relativity theory that Einstein refutes: the longer the measurement takes and the greater the variation in height of the system, the less precisely it determines the time at which the photon escaped.	Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Equilibrium Theory	Luhmann Vs Equilibrium Theory	AU Kass 6 LuhmannVsEquilibrium Theories: they have the concept of disturbance (even as a basic concept) in two directions, probability, artificiality of the equilibrium (17th century example a few French soldiers more and the Prussians already have to arm.) Further development: dynamic equilibrium, alternative realizations in different areas, establishment on a new level. Progress, functional equivalents. Actually, equilibrium is a metaphor. Equilibrium as a condition of stability. Structure preservation is tied to the equilibrium term. Today questionable: 1. From the natural sciences: it is the imbalances which are stable! 2. Also in the economy! A precise vote is too unstable! Socialist systems keep goods scarce, capitalist systems keep buyers scarce. And that is stable! Luhmann: but that becomes questionable if one uses equilibrium and imbalance as it were as a system term! Furthermore, disturbance has a different meaning today. Disturbance/ST/Luhmann: can best be understood as follows: the system has certain (very limited) structures and possibilities. A disturbance brings one or the other as current into the system. This can initiate a search or identification process. For example, fire or just burnt potatoes? However, the range is adjusted, so it is not assumed that the petrol has run out. The search can be handled operationally in the system itself or communicatively. Information processing process instead of equilibrium process. Disturbance: is only a disturbance within the system, not in the environment!	AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997
Evans, G.	Peacocke Vs Evans, G.	I 169/170 Demonstratives/Evans: perceptually demonstrative ways of givenness are possible, because these conditions are fulfilled: in a normal perception situation, there is an information link between subject and object, and also the subject knows or is able to find out where the object is. If the subject has the general ability to know what propositions makes of the form "π = p" true for any π (where π is an identification of a public place without index words (in a non-indexical frame of reference)) if p is the notion of a place in its egocentric space. If it is also able to locate the object in its egocentric space, we can say that it has an idea of the object. Idea/Notion/Evans/Terminology/Intension/Way of Givenness/Peacocke: Evans "Idea" (notion) corresponds to my way of givenness "mode of presentation". Idea/Evans: Thesis: we can conceive the idea of an object a as consisting in its knowledge of what it is to be true for an arbitrary sentence of the form "δ = a". Peacocke: where "δ" is the area of the basic ideas of an object. Fundamental Idea/Evans: is what you have if you think of an object as the possessor of the fundamental ground of difference that it actually has. Peacocke: i.e. what distinguishes an object from all others. I.e. for material objects type and location. PeacockeVsEvans: we have already seen cases where the thinker was unable to locate the object in his egocentric space: E.g. the craters on the moon. I 171 E.g. apple in the mirror cabinet. But it still seems possible to think about it, for example, wonder where it is! It is true that it is possible to at least provide a rough direction in egocentric space, but that is hardly sufficient for the knowledge condition of Evans. In the case of the memory image, it is clearer that no localization in the current egocentric space is needed. pro Evans: there must be additional imaginable evidence, e.g. experience or tools for localization (if necessary, even space travel!). If that were not imaginable, we would have to assume that the subject was not able to think of the object in public space! pro Evans: an information link is not sufficient to think demonstratively about the object. VsEvans: but that is less than to demand that the thinker can locate the object at present. Weaker Requirement: Instead, a general ability of the subject can locate the object, if necessary, is sufficient. Evans: if you cannot locate an object, you can still think of it in the mixed demonstrative descriptive way of givenness: "that which causes my experience". But in normal cases this is a wrong description! Peacocke: it also seems to be wrong in the examples of the lunar craters, the apple in the mirror cabinet. PeacockeVsEvans: trange asymmetry: Idea/Evans: an idea a of a place in a self-centered space is an adequate idea of a place in the public space. Holistic/Evans: if an arbitrarily fundamental identification of a location is possible, it is holistic. (Varieties of reference, p. 162). Peacocke: this knowledge is grounded in a general ability to put a cognitive map of the objective spatial world over our own egocentric space. I 172 E.g. in some cases this will not be possible, for example, when you are kidnapped, or ended up in an unknown area, etc. Point: even in such cases, you can still use the demonstrative pronoun "here" (in reference to objects). I.e. the thoughts are still thoughts about public space! ((s) and the self-centered space). Idea/Demonstrative Way of Givenness/PeacockeVsEvans: so his theory does not demand any ability to give a public, non-egocentric individuation our thoughts to have thoughts about a place in the public space at all. Analogy/Peacocke: exactly analogous objections can be made in the case of demonstrative ways of givenness: E.g. Suppose a subject perceives an object of type F in the manner H. Then F is the token way of givenness. Then we can introduce: [W, Fs] for the perceptual "this F". Then there is exactly one proposition of the form "p = localization of [W, Fs] now", which is true, and the subject knows what it is for it that it is true for it. PeacockeVsEvans: why should we demand here, but not in the earlier example, that the subject also knows which p (or which  in the earlier case) is mentioned in this one true proposition? This is particularly absurd in the case of the lost subject. PeacockeVsEvans: his theory allows that [W, Fs] is an adequate idea here, although the subject has no fundamental idea of the object. Peacocke: but if we insisted that it could have a fundamental idea if he had more evidence, then why is an analogous possibility not also sufficient for adequacy in terms of the egocentric space? I 173 There seem to be only two uniform positions: 1) Identification/Localization/Idea/Demonstratives/Liberal Position: sufficient for a genuine way of givenness or adequate ideas are the general ability of localization plus uniqueness of the current localization in the relevant space. 2) Strict position: this is neither sufficient for genuine ways of givenness nor for adequate ideas. PeacockeVs: this can hardly be represented as a unified theory: it means that, if you are lost, you cannot think about the objects that you see around you. That would also mean to preclude a priori that you as a kidnapped person can ask the question "Which city is this?". Demonstratives/Peacocke: Thesis: I represent the uniformly liberal position Demonstratives/Evans: Thesis: is liberal in terms of public space and strictly in terms of egocentric space! ad 1): does not deny the importance of fundamental ideas. If a subject is neither able to locate an object in the public nor in egocentric space ((s) E.g. he wakes up from anesthesia and hears a monaural sound), then it must still believe that this object has a fundamental identification. Otherwise it would have to assume that there is no object there. Anscombe: E.g. a subject sees two matchboxes through two holes which (are manipulated) so arranged that it sees only one box, then the subject does not know what it means for the sentence "this matchbox is F" to be true. The uniformly liberal view allows the subject to use demonstratives which depend on mental images, even if it has no idea where in the public space and when it has encountered the object. EvansVs: representatives of this position will say that the knowledge of the subject is at least partial, I 174 because this idea causally results from an encounter with the object. But that makes their position worse instead of better: for it completely twists the grammar and logic of the concept of knowing what it is for the subject that p is true. Ability/PeacockeVsEvans: but a capability can also consist in the experience of finding out the right causal chains in a given environment: the same goes for the localization of an object point seen in the mirror in egocentric space. PeacockeVsEvans: his distinction seems unreal: it may be simultaneously true that someone has a relation R to the object due to causal relations, and be true that the possibility of being in this relation R is a question of the abilities of the subject. E.g. (Evans) to recognize the ball: Peacocke: this is not a sensory motor skill, but rather the ability to draw certain conclusions, which however require an earlier encounter. This also applies to e.g. the cognitive map, which is placed over the egocentric space: PeacockeVsEvans: in both cases it does not follow that the presented object, remembered or perceived, is thought of explicitly in causal terms: the way of givenness is truly demonstrative. First Person/PeacockeVsEvans: the second major objection concerns thoughts of the first person: the different examples of immunity to misidentification, which contain the first person, roughly break down into two groups: a) here, immunity seems absolute: E.g. "I am in pain". I 175 b) Here, the immunity seems to depend on presuppositions about the world: if these assumptions are wrong, they open the possibility of picking out something wrong without stopping to use the word "I". These include: E.g. "I was on the ocean liner": memory image. E.g. "I sit at the desk": visual, kinesthetic, tactile perceptions. The distinction between a) and b) may be made by the constitutive role: "The person with these conscious states." Infallibility/Tradition/Evans: (absolutely immune judgments): the judgment to be a judgment of a specific content can be constituted by the fact that this judgement responds to this state. Peacocke pro. PeacockeVsEvans: Problem: can this infallibility be connected to the rest of Evans' theory? Because: I/Evans: Thesis: the reference of "I" may fail! Peacocke: how is that compatible with the absolute immunity of "I am in pain"? Conditionalisation: does not help: E.g. "if I exist, I am in pain" that cannot fulfill the purpose: the existence of the idea still needs the reference of "I". Similarly: E.g. "If my use of "I" refers, I am in pain": because "my use" must be explained in terms of the first person. Question: Can we use memory demonstratives which refer to previous use of first-person ways of givenness? E.g. "If those earlier uses of "I" speak, I am in pain." (Point: not "my uses"). PeacockeVs: that does not help: Descartes' evil demon could have suggested you the memories of someone else. (>Shoemaker: q-memories.) I 176 Constitutive Role/Brains in the Vat/BIV/EvansVsPeacocke: the constitutive role of [self] would not explain why the brains in the vat would be able to speak in a demonstrative way about their own experiences: Mental States/Evans: differ from all other states and objects in that they refer demonstratively to their owners. Pain is identified as an element of the objective order. Then someone can have no adequate idea of these mental states if he does not know to which person they happen. Peacocke: we can even concede thoughts about its pain to the brain in a vat, provided that it can give a fundamental identification of the person who has the pain. Peacocke: No, the nerves must be wired correctly. I.e. this is not true for the brains in the vat. So we can stick to the liberal point of view and at the constitutive role and the idea of a person. Also to the fact that the mental states are individuated on the person who has them. Individuation/Mental States/PeacockeVsEvans: not through localization (like with material objects), but through the person. I 177 E.g. Split-Brain Patient/Peacocke: here we can speak of different, but qualitatively equivalent experiences. From this could follow two centers of consciousness in a single brain. But: after the surgery we should not say that one of the two was the original and the other one was added later. E.g. olfactory sensation of the left and right nostril separate. Then there are actually separate causes for both experiences. ((s), but the same source.) Peacocke: it does not follow that in normal brains two consciousnesses work in harmony. Here, the sense of smell is caused by simultaneous input through both nostrils and is thus overdetermined.	Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Extensional Language	Prior Vs Extensional Language	I 96 Operator/Sentence Variable/Functor/Sentence Operator/Propositional Operator/Prior: "δ" in (E) forms sentences from sentences, "φ" in (D) forms sentences only from names it cannot have both sentences and names as an argument. "N" cannot have names as an argument. ((s) Russell: names or objects cannot be negated). PriorVsCohen: therefore, there is no possibility for our simplification of (F) in his system. I 96 PriorVsCohen/PriorVsExtensional Language: E.g. brown cow: in his axioms it is not essential that the pregnant animal should be a brown cow, it is not mentioned in the evidence. Paradox like in the foreword: no use is made here of the assumption that ψx, i.e. something in the book is wrong. I 97 Despite the large difference this makes, it could simply be omitted. The other constituents do all the work. I.e. it would make no difference for Cohen's theorem whether the thing in the book did not mean that something in the book is wrong, but that it meant that the sky is blue, for example. The only thing that is necessary is that the thing in the book should be true iff. something in the book is wrong and that it is not determined by ψx, but by the other component: ETx∑yKφyNTy. It is strange that the two components are indeed absolutely irrelevant for each other! For Cohen, it would be the same if we wrote: "For an x, x means that the sky is blue, and x is true iff. grass is green." Reason: "iff." is an extensional propositional function. PriorVsCohen/PriorVsExtensional Language/Extensionality: but it would be extremely strange if you wanted to say "the book says that grass is green." (If in fact you only mean that the book contains a true statement). But that is indeed the reason why this extra determination occurs in Cohen's symbolism. (ψx). PriorVsCohen: my theorems (A) through (G) apply no matter what statement functions we insert for δ, both extensional and intensional. E.g. if we leave "δ": "it is not the case that __" or "grass is green and __", we still have Cd∑pKδpNp∑pKδpNp. For all these theorems tell us that there could possibly only be extensional statement functions!	Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Extensionalism	Verschiedene Vs Extensionalism	Lewis IV 256 Lewis: I really do not know what the Intensionalist (I) Vs Extensionalism (E) should say! I know several unsatisfactory arguments. ("I" in the English text also for "I, Lewis") (in vain) Vs Extensionalism: 1. one could say that the extensionalism is more complicated. It needs two more categories and one more lexicon object. VsVs: this is bad for two reasons: a) Extensionality itself is generally regarded as an important dimension of simplicity. b) I agree with E that a complete approach must also take into account the speaker's pause  at the beginning of the sentence. E has already done this with its syntax and semantics! The intensionalist still has to find a place for it. (in vain) Vs Extensionalism: 2. One could object that it goes against our paradigm that extensions must be shared: Example "Boston" simply names Boston and not instead a function of indices. Problem: this paradigm applies to English, Polish, German, etc. but not necessarily to unexplored indigenous languages. Even if the intensionalist suspected that the language is very related to ours, one cannot expect E to agree that the paradigms are applicable! For E and I do not agree which language is theirs! Tarski's convention W: does not help here: because the native language does not correspond by the way not uncontroversially to our metalanguage of their language. Therefore the only versions of these principles that are applicable are stated in translations of these terms. Example E and I may agree that a meta-linguistic sentence of the form "_____ designates ___ in their language" or IV 256/257 "_____ is a name that has ____ as an extension in your language." should be true whenever the first blank space is filled with a name (in our language) with a name  of the native language and the second with a translation of  into our language. But that does not lead us anywhere, because we do not agree at all about names and what their correct translations are! (in vain) Vs Extensionalism: 3. I could try to argue that native language cannot be extensional because in it some inference patterns are invalid that are valid in any extensional language. For example, identity: inferences with Leibniz's identity (Leibniz' Law) or existential generalization lead from true premises to false conclusions in native language. Extensionalist/VsLewis: should agree that Leibniz's law receives truth in every extensional language and that it is not preserved in my counter-examples (which?). But he should not agree that such inferences are cases of Leibniz identity! Identity/Leibniz/Lewis: an inference with Leibniz' law needs an identity premise and how to identify it? Not by looking at three or four horizontal lines! Semantic: an expression with two gaps expresses identity, if and only if 1. the result of inserting names into the gaps is a sentence, 2. the sentence thus formed is true if the names are coextensive, otherwise false. Def Identity Premise: is a sentence thus formed. Problem: since E and I disagree on what the coextensive names are, they disagree on what the expressions are that express identity, which propositions are the identity premises, and which inferences are real instances of Leibniz's law. We are ignoring the difference of opinion here about whether a phrase S must be introduced by a  pause to be a sentence at all. To be precise, if ",/so " is a non truth-preserving inference in Li, then " ,/so " is a non truth-preserving inference in Le. The original version without  is no inference at all in Le, because its "premises" and "conclusions" are S names and not sentences. ((s) Extensional Language/(s): how is it possible at all, if no predicates (properties) are allowed - then is not the form subject predicate at all?) Vs: the form is then: a is an element of the set B. (in vain) VsExtensionalism: 4. I could argue ad hominem that E has not really escaped intentionality because the things he takes as extensions are intensional entities. Functions of indices to truth values are usually identified with propositions (especially if the indices consist of possible worlds and little more). And these functions are identified equally with individual terms. How can such intensional entities then be extensions? LewisVsVs: this is just a mix-up! Intension is relational! ((s) It depends on the consideration whether something is an intension or an extension). Intensions are things ((s) entities) that play a certain role in semantics and not things of a certain sort. E and I agree that in a suitable language the same thing that is the intention of one expression is also the extension of another. For example, when we speak technical English in a fragment that is suitable as the meta-meta-language of a smaller fragment, we agree that one and the same thing is both, the intention of expression in the object language "my hat" IV 258 and the extension of the metaphorical expression "intension of "my hat"". ((s) The same thing, not the same expression). Lewis: the thing itself is neither extension nor intension. It is true that some entities can only serve as extensions, while other functions of indices can serve as both. But there is no thing that would be unsuitable to be an extension. Ontology/(in vain) Vs Extensionalism: 5. one might think that the extensionalist attributes an extravagant ontology to the natives: For example, if the intensionalist says that a word of the natives designates a concrete material mountain, then E says he designates something more esoteric: a set-theoretical object, formed from a realm of individuals that includes unrealized possibilities. But also E and I believe in esoteric things if they do not want to contradict themselves. We have no doubt that we can name them. We agree that the natives have names for even more far-fetched things like gods (according to the Intensionalist) or functions of indices to such gods (according to the Extensionalist). Ontology/Vs Extensionalism: I should perhaps argue better that certain unesoteric things are missing! Ontology/Kripke: (conversational, 1972): it is wrong to attribute to someone an ontology that contains sets without elements or functions without arguments and values, etc. LewisVsVs: this is a plausible principle. But did E violate it by saying that the names of the natives are functions of indices and not names of concrete things? I do not think so. The ascribed ontology is not the same as the ascribed set of name carriers. For example, if our language is attributed an ontology, it contains all natural numbers, not just the small minority of them that actually bear names! It is not significant that the amount of name carriers violates Kripke's closure principle unless it can be shown that this is the totality of the attributed ontology. But it is difficult to say what ontology, if any, is attributed by the use of Le. One should look at the range of quantifiers, but Le has no quantifiers at all! Quantifiers: make sentences. But in Le only the predicate does that and that is not a quantifier. The transformation Lp of Parsons is different: it has a range. The set D, so that we get intended truth conditions for the propositions of Lp that transform the propositions of Li, then and only when D is included in the range of bound variables. (This assumes that the predicates of Lp have intended interpretations). The set D is the same as the set of extensions of expressions in Le. It violates Kripke's closing principle ((s) that no empty sets should be attributed, see above), so it cannot be attributed to anyone as ontology. ((s) because there are no bound variables in Le.). I.e. if an extensionalist claims that the native speaks Lp, veiled by transformations, we have a remedy against him. But E himself does not represent that! Perhaps one can show that if it is bad to attribute the use of Lp, IV 259 that it is also bad to attribute the use of Le? But I do not see that yet.	Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Feyerabend, P.	Goodman Vs Feyerabend, P.	IV 202 VsFeyerabend: The statement "Nothing goes" is just as feasible as the statement "anything goes". And just as feasible as the statement "something goes". The main objective of our proposal is not to avoid difficulty, but to develop a wider range and more sensitive instruments. First: what is wrong with some familiar core concepts?	G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997
Fictionalism	Schwarz Vs Fictionalism	Schwarz I 72 Fictionalism/Possible worlds/Poss.w./Lewis/Black: Thesis: propositions of possibilities and possible worlds function as propositions on absences, the average citizen or Holmes. That means they may be true, although the objects do not exist. Question: Can you rephrase propositions about possible world, so the modal words (MO) are eliminated? Yes: E.g. "possibly donkeys can speak": Problem: the modality here is still provided. Problem: much of what we want to know about possible worlds, cannot be translated in the language with rhombus and square: E.g. whether there are two worlds which differ only in that fundamental properties that play roles. Fictionalism: propositions about possible worlds analogue to propositions about Holmes: because Holmes is indeed a possible thing itself. (simple form: Rose, 1990⁽¹⁾, Sider 2002⁽²⁾ nested: Armstrong 1989a⁽³⁾, intermediate forms: Fine 1976⁽⁴⁾, 2003b⁽⁵⁾). Thesis: propositions of the form: there is a world in which ... "interpreted as "it is possible that there is a world ... "((s) Solves the quantification in favor of modal operators). Fiction/Rosen: then Lewis' tales of possible worlds along with a description of the actual world. Then there is "according to Lewis" a possible world in which donkeys can speak. ((s) but not: "The actual world is such that speaking donkey may exist in a possible world. That would be a property of the actual world and not the possible world, and the actual world may not have as many properties as they is at least in parts exclude themselves). Vs: Lewis provides no full description of all possible worlds. He consciously leaves many open. Pointe: after Rose then propositions, which Lewis does not specifically agree to, would be wrong!. Problem: because Lewis says nothing about 17 dimensional possible world, the proposition that there is at least one and the proposition that there is none are both wrong. Schwarz I 73 VsVs: you could try to assign more work the fiction operator "according to Lewis': from his texts it is clear that he believed that there possible worlds with 17 dimensions (he also says nothing about possible worlds with 17 cows). But the operator then becomes mysterious e.g. "From Lewis' texts follows logically ..." Vs: why should Lewis decide about possible world and not another author?. Fiction/Schwarz: it is better to idealize. That is then an only fiction of many possible worlds.. Then we should have a "lagadonical" language again. Then we could distinguish worlds with strange things and properties: E.g. fiction can say that a strange property A in a possible world 1 plays exactly the same role as another, B, in a possible world 2. (Sider 2002)⁽²⁾. Vs: Problem: the supposed modality remains ((s) And fictionalism and ersatzism were just going to replace it). Solution: the correct fiction would be one that accurately covers all possibilities. ((s) Vs: that would be meaningless, and would not make any distinctions, the distinctions have to be made within the fiction and would demand a meta-level). Vs Fictionalism: further problems: e.g. the use of possible worlds for analyzing information or meaning: Def information content of a proposition/SchwarzVsFictionalism: a class of possible worlds.. But not "in accordance with this and that fiction". Not even when the fiction in question contained a theory of information. We want our own theory, not the theory of a fiction!. VsFictionalism: should not leave too much to fiction. If all becomes fiction (e.g. all Abstracts) the concept loses contour. Possible world/Schwarz: you also have the obligation to possible worlds, when you talk in everyday language about possible options. But, as if you count your change, you do not need sophisticated metaphysics for this. (Jackson 1998a⁽⁶⁾,11). Schwarz I 93 Vs fictionalism: Problem: when properties are classes of possibilia, statements about properties must also be analyzed away in a fictional way. 1. Gideon Rosen [1990]: “Modal Fictionalism”. Mind, 99: 327–354 2. Theodore Sider [2002]: “The Ersatz Pluriverse”. Journal of Philosophy, 99: 279–315 3. D. M. Armstrong [1989a]: A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 4. Kit Fine [1975]: “Review of Lewis, Counterfactuals”. Mind, 84: 451–458 5. Kit Fine [2003b]: “The Problem of Possibilia”. In [Loux und Zimmerman 2003], 161–179 6. F. Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press	Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Field, H.	Putnam Vs Field, H.	Field IV 405 Internal realism/metaphysical/Putnam/Field: (ad Putnam: Reason, Truth, and History): FieldVsPutnam: the contrast between internal realism and metaphysical realism is not defined clearly enough. >Internal realism, >metaphysical realism. Metaphysical realism/Field: comprises three theses, which are not separated by Putnam. 1. metaphysical realism 1: thesis, the world is made up of a unity of mentally independent objects. 2. metaphysical realism 2: thesis, there is exactly one true and complete description (theory) of the world. Metaphysical realism 2/Field: is not a consequence of the metaphysical realism 1 ((s) is independent) and is not a theory that any metaphysical realist would represent at all. Description/world/FieldVsPutnam: how can there only be a single description of the world ((s) or of anything)? The terms that we use are never inevitable; Beings that are very different from us, could need predicates with other extensions, and these could be totally indefinable in our language. Field IV 406 Why should such a strange description be "the same description"? Perhaps there is a very abstract characterization that allows this, but we do not have this yet. wrong solution: one cannot say, there is a single description that uses our own terms. Our current terms might not be sufficient for a description of the "complete" physics (or "complete" psychology, etc.). One could at most represent that there is, at best, a true and complete description that uses our terms. However, this must be treated with caution because of the vagueness of our present terms. Theory/world/FieldVsPutnam: the metaphysical realism should not only be distinguished from his opponent, the internal realism, by the adoption of one true theory. 3. Metaphysical realism 3/Field: Thesis, truth involves a kind of correspondence theory between words and external things. VsMetaphysical Realism 3/VsCorrespondence Theory/Field: the correspondence theory is rejected by many people, even from representatives of the metaphysical realism 1 (mentally independent objects). Field IV 429 Metaphysical realism/mR/FieldVsPutnam: a metaphysical realist is someone who accepts all of the three theses: Metaphysical realism 1: the world consists of a fixed totality of mentally independent objects. Metaphysical realism 2: there is only one true and complete description of the world. Metaphysical realism 3: truth involves a form of correspondence theory. PutnamVsField: these three have no clear content, when they are separated. What does "object" or "fixed totality", "all objects", "mentally independent" mean outside certain philosophical discourses? However, I can understand metaphysical realism 2 when I accept metaphysical realism 3. I: is a definite set of individuals. Williams II 430 P: set of all properties and relations Ideal Language: Suppose we have an ideal language with a name for each element of I and a predicate for each element of P. This language will not be countable (unless we take properties as extensions) and then only countable if the number of individuals is finite. But it is unique up to isomorphism; (but not further, unique up to isomorphism). Theory of World/Putnam: the amount of true propositions in relation to each particular type (up to any definite type) will also be unique. Whole/totality/Putnam: conversely, if we assume that there is an ideal theory of the world, then the concept of a "fixed totality" is (of individuals and their properties and relations) of course explained by the totality of the individuals which are identified with the range of individual variables, and the totality of the properties and relations with the region of the predicate variables within the theory. PutnamVsField: if he was right and there is no objective justification, how can there be objectivity of interpretation then? Field/Putnam: could cover two positions: 1. He could say that there is a fact in regard to what good "rational reconstruction" of the speaker's intention is. And that treatment of "electron" as a rigid designator (of "what entity whatsoever", which is responsible for certain effects and obeys certain laws, but no objective fact of justification. Or. 2. He could say that interpretation is subjective, but that this does not mean that the reference is subjective. Ad 1.: here he must claim that a real "rational reconstruction" of the speaker's intention of "general recognition" is separated, and also of "inductive competence", etc. Problem: why should then the decision that something ("approximately") obeys certain laws or disobeys, (what then applies to Bohr's electrons of 1900 and 1934, but not for phlogiston) be completely different by nature (and be isolable) from decisions on rationality in general? Ad 2.: this would mean that we have a term of reference, which is independent of procedures and practices with which we decide whether different people in different situations with different background beliefs actually refer on the same things. That seems incomprehensible. Reference/theory change/Putnam: We assume, of course, that people who have spoken 200 years ago about plants, referred, on the whole, to the same as we do. If everything would be subjective, there would be no inter-theoretical, interlinguistic term of reference and truth. If the reference is, however, objective, then I would ask why the terms of translation and interpretation are in a better shape than the term of justification. --- Putnam III 208 Reference/PutnamVsField: there is nothing that would be in the nature of reference and that would make sure that the connection for two expressions would ever result in outcomes by "and". In short, we need a theory of "reference by description". --- Putnam V 70 Reference/FieldVsPutnam: recently different view: reference is a "physicalist relationship": complex causal relationships between words or mental representations and objects. It is a task of empirical science to find out which physicalistic relationship this is about. PutnamVsField: this is not without problems. Suppose that there is a possible physicalist definition of reference and we also assume: (1) x refers to y if and only if x stands in R to y. Where R is a relationship that is scientifically defined, without semantic terms (such as "refers to"). Then (1) is a sentence that is true even when accepting the theory that the reference is only determined by operational or theoretical preconditions. Sentence (1) would thus be a part of our "reflective equilibrium" theory (see above) in the world, or of our "ideal boundaries" theory of the world. V 71 Reference/Reference/PutnamVsOperationalism: is the reference, however, only determined by operational and theoretical preconditions, the reference of "x is available in R y" is, in turn, undetermined. Knowing that (1) is true, is not of any use. Each permissible model of our object language will correspond to one model in our meta-language, in which (1) applies, and the interpretation of "x is in R to y" will determine the interpretation of "x refers to y". However, this will only be in a relation in each admissible model and it will not contribute anything to reduce the number of allowable models. FieldVs: this is not, of course, what Field intends. He claims (a) that there is a certain unique relationship between words and things, and (b) that this is the relationship that must also be used when assigning a truth value to (1) as the reference relation. PutnamVsField: that cannot necessarily be expressed by simply pronouncing (1), and it is a mystery how we could learn to express what Field wans to say. Field: a certain definite relationship between words and objects is true. PutnamVsField: if it is so that (1) is true in this view by what is it then made true? What makes a particular correspondence R to be discarded? It appears, that the fact, that R is actually the reference, is a metaphysical inexplicable fact. (So magical theory of reference, as if referring to things is intrinsically adhered). (Not to be confused with Kripke's "metaphysically necessary" truth). ---- Putnam I (c) 93 PutnamVsField: truth and reference are not causally explanatory terms. Anyway, in a certain sense: even if Boyd's causal explanations of the success of science are wrong, we still need them to do formal logic.	Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Field, H.	Verschiedene Vs Field, H.	Field I 51 Infinity/Physics/Essay 4: even without "part of" relation we do not really need the finity operator for physics. VsField: many have accused me of needing every extension of 1st level logic. But this is not the case. I 52 I rather assume that the nominalization program has not yet been advanced far enough to be able to say what the best logical basis is. Ultimately, we are going to choose only a few natural means that go beyond the 1st level logic, preferably those that the Platonist would also need. But we can only experience this by trial and error. I 73 Indispensability Argument/Logic/VsField: if mE may be dispensable in science, they are not in logic! And we need logic in science. Logical Sequence Relation/Consequence/Field: is normally defined in terms of model theory: (Models are mE, semantic: a model is true or not true.) Even if one formulates them in a proven theoretical way ("there is a derivation", syntactically, or provable in a system) one needs mE or abstract objects: arbitrary sign sequences of symbol tokens and their arbitrary sequences. I 77 VsField: some have objected that only if we accept a Tarski Theory of truth do we need mE in mathematics. FieldVsVs: this led to the misunderstanding that without Tarskian truth mathematics would have no epistemic problems. Mathematics/Field: indeed implies mE itself, (only, we do not always need mathematics) without the help of the concept of truth, e.g. that there are prime numbers > 1000. I 138 Logic of Part-of-Relation/Field: has no complete evidence procedure. VsField: how can subsequent relations be useful then? Field: sure, the means by which we can know that something follows from something else are codifiable in an evidentiary procedure, and that seems to imply that no appeal to anything stronger than a proof can be of practical use. FieldVsVs: but you do not need to take any epistemic approach to more than a countable part of it. I 182 Field Theory/FT/Relationalism/Substantivalism/Some AuthorsVsField: justify the relevance of field theories for the dispute between S/R just the other way round: for them, FT make it easy to justify a relationalist view: (Putnam, 1981, Malament 1982): they postulate as a field with a single huge (because of the infinity of physical forces) and a corresponding part of it for each region. Variant: the field does not exist in all places! But all points in the field are not zero. FieldVsPutnam: I do not think you can do without regions. Field II 351 Indeterminacy/Undecidability/Set Theory/Number Theory/Field: Thesis: not only in the set theory but also in the number theory many undecidable sets do not have a certain truth value. Many VsField: 1. truth and reference are basically disquotational. Disquotational View/Field: is sometimes seen as eliminating indeterminacy for our present language. FieldVsVs: that is not the case :>Chapter 10 showed that. VsField: Even if there is indeterminacy in our current language also for disquotationalism, the arguments for it are less convincing from this perspective. For example, the question of the power of the continuum ((s)) is undecidable for us, but the answer could (from an objectivist point of view (FieldVs)) have a certain truth value. Uncertainty/Set Theory/Number Theory/Field: Recently some well-known philosophers have produced arguments for the impossibility of any kind of uncertainty in set theory and number theory that have nothing to do with disquotationalism: two variants: 1. Assuming that set theory and number theory are in full logic of the 2nd level (i.e. 2nd level logic, which is understood model theoretically, with the requirement that any legitimate interpretation) Def "full" in the sense that the 2nd level quantifiers go over all subsets of the 1st level quantifier range. 2. Let us assume that number theory and the set theory are formulated in a variant of the full logic of the 2nd level, which we could call "full schematic logic of level 1". II 354 Full schematic logic 1st Level/LavineVsField: denies that it is a partial theory of (non-schematic!) logic of the 2nd level. Field: we now better forget the 2nd level logic in favour of full schematic theories. We stay in the number theory to avoid complications. We assume that the certainty of the number theory is not in question, except for the use of full schemata.	Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Fodor, J.	Putnam Vs Fodor, J.	Pauen I 228 Meaning/VsFodor: it is not sure if Fodor has made here a sufficient condition for the emergence of meaning. Example, one could consider, according to Fodor, artificial chicken eggs as asymmetrically dependent on the production of real chicken eggs. Yet, one will not regard such eggs as a representation of chickens, although the latter represent the asymmetrical effective "causes" for the emergence of chicken eggs. --- I 229 Meaning/PutnamVsFodor/Pauen: it is also unclear whether the asymmetric dependence of references of a mental representation is necessary. E.g. Super-Billionaire: here, the meaning does not depend on the meeting with real specimens. E.g. Unicorn: can be no "original cause" of our thoughts. The relation is much more complex than it is assumed in Fodor with a quasi one to one opposition. It's about the whole language practice of our ancestors. Another problem: it has to be excluded that the original causations are from e.g. Lions children's books or television tubes. --- Putnam III 56ff Dependency/reference/Possible World/PutnamVsFodor: does the relationship really exist and is it asymmetrical? In the terminology of semantics of possible worlds this thought says that the "closest possible worlds" in which the cats do not trigger such remarks, are possible worlds, in which the word "cat" refers to something completely different (possible worlds not real worlds, but hypothetical situations). --- III 57 This would show that the dependency relationship does exist, and the law according to which the expressions of images are triggered is dependent on the law that cats trigger the expressions. But it is not enough to show that they are asymmetrical. For this, the evidence would have to be provided: if not images, then also not cats as a trigger. Fodor thinks this is obvious, but is it really? VsFodor: Would it not be reasonable to assume that the closest possible worlds, in which it is not a "law" that images are triggers, are possible worlds in which most people have no idea how cats look like at all!? If these are the closest possible worlds in which images do not trigger any, then it would be the case when images would not trigger any remarks, cats would also not trigger any, and then the dependency relationship would be symmetrical. FodorVsVs: possible answer: simply "intuitive" understanding. It could be about worlds in which people are blind. --- III 58 VsFodor: but this does not seem reasonable. He could better say that the signs would sometimes be triggered. Then it could be objected that the thesis is too weak. One would probably say that the sentence could be true, but it is not "law-like". "Law-like"/Fodor: is an undefined basic concept in Fodors metaphysics. Not a property of sentences, but a relationship between universals. In this way, he fends off the objection by the use of this term, an already intentional concept is introduced. (Putnam: is probably intentional). --- III 59 Fodor: even if the ordinary people there would have no idea, how cats look like, there would certainly be biologists and other specialists who would still know how cats look like. PutnamVs: at least for natural kinds it does not necessarily follow that it is possible for the theory to provide necessary and sufficient conditions of reference. The theory even fails completely when it comes to extensions by an analytical definition of necessary and sufficient conditions. --- III 60 E.g. "Super-billionaire" persons whose property is at least 100 billion Mark. It could be that there is not a single example of the triggering of such statements. Fodor could say, the characters would be triggered when the people would know about all the relevant facts. But what actually a relevant fact is, depends on the meaning of each considered word. The word is already interpreted. Omniscience is not only a non-real fact, but an impossible. FodorVsVs: could say that his theory does not apply to words that have analytical definitions. --- III 61 But especially Fodor's theory is anti-hermeneutic, he disputes the view that the reference of a word cannot be determined in isolation. Hermeneutics/PutnamVsFodor: according to the hermeneutic view, there can be no such thing as necessary and sufficient conditions for the reference of a word to individual x. The best we can hope for are the adequacy criteria of translation schemes. (FodorVs). FodorVsVs: in his view, this leads to the "meaning-holism" which, in turn, results in the "meaning-nihilism" and thus the denial of the possibility of a "special science" of linguistics. --- III 62 FodorVsVs: might reply, actually the theory should not apply to natural languages, but to his hypothetical innate thinking language "mentalese". PutnamVsFodor: definitely, Fodor's theory fails for other words: E.g. witch. Perhaps it is analytic that real witches possess magical powers and are women. But no necessary and sufficient conditions for witch. There are also good witches. --- III 63 A witch-law (see above) would be wrong. Indeed, there are no witches that can trigger remarks. --- III 67 ff Cause/causality/PutnamVsFodor: uses the concept of causation very informal. --- III 68 Putnam: the normal linguistic concept of cause is context-bound and interest-dependent. The concept of causality used by Fodor is not the relatively more context-independent concept of a contributing cause, but the context-sensitive and interest-relative concept of everyday language. According to Fodor the presence of a cat is then a contributing cause for remarks. --- III 69 PutnamVsFodor: now, then past behavior of past generations is (not to mention representatives of strong dialects) also a contributing factor. --- III 70 FodorVsPutnam: that is certainly not Fodor's causality. All his examples just want to take the colloquial term as an undefined basic concept as a basis. PutnamVsFodor: the strange thing is that this is interest-relative. How do we use it, depends on what alternatives we consider for all relevants. (Intentionality). --- III 71 Counterfactual conditionals/KoKo/Fodor: assumes, they had established truth values. PutnamVsFodor: counterfactual conditionals have no fixed truth values. --- III 73 Possible Worlds/Putnam: we can then call "closer" worlds the ones which we believe are more relevant when it comes to determining the truth value of the conditional clause. --- III 74 FodorVs: might reply that this physics would be given a special position compared to the specialized sciences. PutnamVsFodor: one might then reply, the laws of the special sciences are just as unproblematic as those of physics. FodorVsVs: but that does not really work: E.g. "coffee, sugar cubes": it could mean that this piece of sugar is somehow "not normal." --- III 78 Reductionism/PutnamVsFodor: Fodor fails in the scaling-down, because he fails to define the reference using these terms (law, counterfactual conditionals and causality). --- III 79/80 PutnamVsFodor: from the fact that a statement does not specifically deal with something mental, it does not follow that no requirement of this statement refers to our cognitive interests. Causality/Putnam: the concept of causality has a cognitive dimension, even if it is used on inanimate objects. --- Putnam I (k) 269 Meaning/PutnamVsFodor: actually makes the same mistake as Saussure and Derrida: that equality of meaning is, strictly speaking, only reasonable in the impossible case in which two languages or texts are isomorphic.	Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Frege, G.	Wittgenstein Vs Frege, G.	Brandom I 919 TractatusVsFrege: nothing can be considered an assertion, if not previously logical vocabulary is available, already the simplest assertion assumes the entire logic. --- Dummett I 32 Frege capturing of thought: psychic act - thought not the content of consciousness - consciousness subjective - thought objective - WittgensteinVs I 35 WittgensteinVsFrege: no personal objects (sensations), otherwise private language, unknowable for the subject itself. WittgensteinVsFrege: Understanding no psychic process, - real mental process: pain, melody (like Frege). Dummett I 62 Wittgenstein's criticism of the thought of a private ostensive definition states implicitly that color words can have no, corresponding with the Fregean assumption, subjective, incommunicable sense. (WittgensteinVsFrege, color words). But Frege represents anyway an objective sense of color words, provided that it is about understanding. Dummett I 158 WittgensteinVsDummett/WittgensteinVsFrege: rejects the view that the meaning of a statement must be indicated by description of their truth conditions. Wittgenstein: Understanding not abruptly, no inner experience, not the same consequences. --- Wolf II 344 Names/meaning/existence/WittgensteinVsFrege: E.g. "Nothung has a sharp blade" also has sense if Nothung is smashed. II 345 Name not referent: if Mr N.N. dies, the name is not dead. Otherwise it would make no sense to say "Mr. N.N. died". --- Simons I 342 Sentence/context/copula/tradition/Simons: the context of the sentence provided the copula according to the traditional view: Copula/VsTradition: only accours as a normal word like the others in the sentence, so it cannot explain the context. Solution/Frege: unsaturated phrases. Sentence/WittgensteinVsFrege/Simons: context only simply common standing-next-to-each-other of words (names). That is, there is not one part of the sentence, which establishes the connection. Unsaturation/Simons: this perfectly matches the ontological dependence (oA): a phrase cannot exist without certain others! --- Wittgenstein I 16 Semantics/Wittgenstein/Frege/Hintikka: 1. main thesis of this chapter: Wittgenstein's attitude to inexpressibility of semantics is very similar to that of Frege. Wittgenstein represents in his early work as well as in the late work a clear and sweeping view of the nature of the relationship between language and the world. As Frege he believes they cannot be expressed verbally. Earlier WittgensteinVsFrege: by indirect use this view could be communicated. According to the thesis of language as a universal medium (SUM) it cannot be expressed in particular, what would be the case if the semantic relationships between language and the world would be different from the given ones? Wittgenstein I 45 Term/Frege/WittgensteinVsFrege/Hintikka: that a concept is essentially predicative, cannot be expressed by Frege linguistically, because he claims that the expression 'the term X' does not refer to a concept, but to an object. I 46 Term/Frege/RussellVsFrege/Hintikka: that is enough to show that the Fregean theory cannot be true: The theory consists of sentences, which, according to their own theory cannot be sentences, and if they cannot be sentences, they also cannot be true ". (RussellVsFrege) WittgensteinVsFrege/late: return to Russell's stricter standards unlike Frege and early Wittgenstein himself. Wittgenstein late: greatly emphasizes the purely descriptive. In Tractatus he had not hesitated to go beyond the vernacular. I 65ff Saturated/unsaturated/Frege/Tractatus/WittgensteinVsFrege: in Frege's distinction lurks a hidden contradiction. Both recognize the context principle. (Always full sentence critical for meaning). I 66 Frege: unsaturated entities (functions) need supplementing. The context principle states, however, neither saturated nor unsaturated symbols have independent meaning outside of sentences. So both need to be supplemented, so the difference is idle. The usual equation of the objects of Tractatus with individuals (i.e. saturated entities) is not only missed, but diametrically wrong. It is less misleading, to regard them all as functions I 222 Example number/number attribution/WittgensteinVsFrege/Hintikka: Figures do not require that the counted entities belong to a general area of all quantifiers. "Not even a certain universality is essential to the specified number. E.g. 'three equally big circles at equal distances' It will certainly not be: (Ex, y, z)xe circular and red, ye circular and red, etc ..." The objects Wittgenstein observes here, are apparently phenomenological objects. His arguments tend to show here that they are not only unable to be reproduced in the logical notation, but also that they are not real objects of knowledge in reality. ((s) that is not VsFrege here). Wittgenstein: Of course, you could write like this: There are three circles, which have the property of being red. I 223 But here the difference comes to light between inauthentic objects: color spots in the visual field, tones, etc., and the actual objects: elements of knowledge. (> Improper/actual, >sense data, >phenomenology). --- II 73 Negation/WittgensteinVsFrege: his explanation only works if his symbols can be substituted by the words. The negation is more complicated than that negation character. --- Wittgenstein VI 119 WittgensteinVsFrege/Schulte: he has not seen what is authorized on formalism that the symbols of mathematics are not the characters, but have no meaning. Frege: alternative: either mere ink strokes or characters of something. Then what they represent, is their meaning. WittgensteinVsFrege: that this alternative is not correct, shows chess: here we are not dealing with the wooden figures, and yet the figures represent nothing, they have no Fregean meaning (reference). There is simply a third one: the characters can be used as in the game. Wittgenstein VI 172 Name/Wittgenstein/Schulte: meaning is not the referent. (VsFrege). --- Sentence/character/Tractatus 3.14 .. the punctuation is a fact,. 3.141 The sentence is not a mixture of words. 3.143 ... that the punctuation is a fact is concealed by the ordinary form of expression of writing. (WittgensteinVsFrege: so it was possible that Frege called the sentence a compound name). 3.1432 Not: "The complex character 'aRb' says that a stands in the relation R to b, but: that "a" is in a certain relation to "b", says aRb ((s) So conversely: reality leads to the use of characters). (quotes sic). --- Wittgenstein IV 28 Mention/use/character/symbol/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: their Begriffsschrift⁽¹⁾ does not yet exclude such errors. 3.326 In order to recognize the symbol through the character, you have to pay attention to the meaningful use. Wittgenstein IV 40 Sentence/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: the verb of the sentence is not "is true" or "is wrong", but the verb has already to include that, what is true. 4.064 The sentence must have a meaning. The affirmation does not give the sentence its meaning. IV 47 Formal concepts/Tractatus: (4.1272) E.g. "complex", "fact", "function", "number". WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell: they are presented in the Begriffsschrift by variables, not represented by functions or classes. E.g. Expressions like "1 is a number" or "there is only one zero" or E.g. "2 + 2 = 4 at three o'clock" are nonsensical. 4.12721 the formal concept is already given with an object, which falls under it. IV 47/48 So you cannot introduce objects of a formal concept and the formal concept itself, as basic concepts. WittgensteinVsRussell: you cannot introduce the concept of function and special functions as basic ideas, or e.g. the concept of number and definite numbers. Successor/Begriffsschrift/Wittgenstein/Tractatus: 4.1273 E.g. b is successor of a: aRb, (Ex): aRx.xRb, (Ex,y): aRx.xRy.yRb ... General/something general/general public/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell: the general term of a form-series can only be expressed by a variable, because the term "term of this form-series" is a formal term. Both have overlooked: the way, how they want to express general sentences, is circular. IV 49 Elementary proposition/atomism/Tractatus: 4.211 a character of an elementary proposition is that no elementary proposition can contradict it. The elementary proposition consists of names, it is a concatenation of names. WittgensteinVsFrege: it itself is not a name. IV 53 Truth conditions/truth/sentence/phrase/Tractatus: 4.431 of the sentence is an expression of its truth-conditions. (pro Frege). WittgensteinVsFrege: false explanation of the concept of truth: would "the truth" and "the false" really be objects and the arguments in ~p etc., then according to Frege the meaning of "~ p" is not at all determined. Punctuation/Tractatus: 4.44 the character that is created by the assignment of each mark "true" and the truth possibilities. Object/sentence/Tractatus: 4.441 it is clear that the complex of characters IV 54 Ttrue" and "false" do not correspond to an object. There are no "logical objects". Judgment line/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 4.442 the judgment line is logically quite meaningless. It indicates only that the authors in question consider the sentence to be true. Wittgenstein pro redundancy theory/Tractatus: (4.442), a sentence cannot say of itself that it is true. (VsFrege: VsJudgment stroke). IV 59 Meaning/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: (5.02) the confusion of argument and index is based on Frege's theory of meaning IV 60 of the sentences and functions. For Frege the sentences of logic were names, whose arguments the indices of these names. IV 62 Concluding/conclusion/result relation/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 5.132 the "Final Acts" that should justify the conclusions for the two, are senseless and would be superfluous. 5.133 All concluding happens a priori. 5.134 one cannot conclude an elementary proposition from another. ((s) Concluding: from sentences, not situations.) 5.135 In no way can be concluded from the existence of any situation to the existence of, IV 63 an entirely different situation. Causality: 5.136 a causal nexus which justifies such a conclusion, does not exist. 5.1361 The events of the future, cannot be concluded from the current. IV 70 Primitive signs/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.42 The possibility of crosswise definition of the logical "primitive signs" of Frege and Russell (e.g. >, v) already shows that these are no primitive signs, let alone that they signify any relations. IV 101 Evidence/criterion/logic/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.1271 strange that such an exact thinker like Frege appealed to the obviousness as a criterion of the logical sentence. IV 102 Identity/meaning/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.232 the essential of the equation is not that the sides have a different sense but the same meaning, but the essential is that the equation is not necessary to show that the two expressions, that are connected by the equal sign, have the same meaning, since this can be seen from the two expressions themselves. 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 --- Wittgenstein II 343 Intension/classes/quantities/Frege/Russell/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege: both believed they could deal with the classes intensionally because they thought they could turn a list into a property, a function. (WittgensteinVs). Why wanted both so much to define the number?	W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Frege, G.	Waismann Vs Frege, G.	Waismann I 77 Frege: Definition of the number in two steps a) when two sets are equal. b) Definition of the term "number": it is equal if each element of one set corresponds to one element of the other set. Unique relation. Under Def "Number of a Set"/Frege: he understands the set of all sets equal to it. Example: the number 5 is the totality of all classes of five in the world. VsFrege: how shall we determine that two sets are equal? Apparently by showing such a relation. For example, if you have to distribute spoons on cups, then the relation did not exist before. As long as the spoons were not on the cups, the sets were not equal. However, this does not correspond to the sense in which the word equal is used. So it is about whether you can put the spoons on the cups. But what does "can" mean? I 78 That the same number of copies are available. Not the assignment determines the equivalence, but vice versa. The proposed definition gives a necessary, but not sufficient condition for equal numbers and defines the expression "equal number" too narrowly. Class: List ("school class") logical or term (mammals) empirical. With two lists it is neither emopirical nor logical to say that they can be assigned to each other. Example 1. Are there as many people in this room as in the next room? An experiment provides the answer. 2. Are 3x4 cups equal to 12 spoons? You can answer this by drawing lines, which is not an experiment, but a process in a calculus. According to Frege, two sets are not equal if the relation is not established. You have defined something, but not the term "equal numbered". You can extend the definition by saying that they can be assigned. But again this is not correct. For if the two sets are given by their properties, it always makes sense to assert their "being-assignment", (but this has a different meaning, depending on the criterion by which one recognizes the possibility of assignment: that the two are equal, or that it should make sense to speak of an assignment! In fact, we use the word "equal" according to different criteria: of which Frege emphasizes only one and makes it a paradigm. Example 1. If there are 3 cups and 3 spoons on the table, you can see at a glance how they can be assigned. I 79 2. If the number cannot be overlooked, but it is arranged in a clear form, e.g. square or diamond, the equal numbers are obvious again. 3. The case is different, if we notice something of two pentagons, that they have the same number of diagonals. Here we no longer understand the grouping directly, it is rather a theorem of geometry. 4. Equal numbers with unambiguous assignability 5. The normal criterion of equality of numbers is counting (which must not be understood as the representation of two sets by a relation). WaismannVsFrege: Frege's definition does not reflect this different and flexible use. I 80 This leads to strange consequences: According to Frege, two sets must necessarily be equal or not for logical reasons. For example, suppose the starlit sky: Someone says: "I don't know how many I've seen, but it must have been a certain number". How do I distinguish this statement from "I have seen many stars"? (It is about the number of stars seen, not the number of stars present). If I could go back to the situation, I could recount it. But that is not possible. There is no way to determine the number, and thus the number loses its meaning. For example, you could also see things differently: you can still count a small number of stars, about 5. Here we have a new series of numbers: 1,2,3,4,5, many. This is a series that some primitive peoples really use. It is not at all incomplete, and we are not in possession of a more complete one, but only a more complicated one, beside which the primitive one rightly exists. You can also add and multiply in this row and do so with full rigor. Assuming that the things of the world would float like drops to us, then this series of numbers would be quite appropriate. For example, suppose we should count things that disappear again during counting or others emerge. Such experiences would steer our concept formation in completely different ways. Perhaps words such as "much", "little", etc. would take the place of our number words. I 80/81 VsFrege: his definition misses all that. According to it, two sets are logically necessary and equal in number, without knowledge, or they are not. In the same way, Einstein had argued that two events are simultaneous, independent of observation. But this is not the case, but the sense of a statement is exhausted in the way of its verification (also Dummett) Waismann: So you have to pay attention to the procedure for establishing equality in numbers, and that's much more complicated than Frege said. Frege: second part of the definition of numbers: Def Number/Frege: is a class of classes. ((s) Elsewhere: so not by Frege! FregeVs!). Example: the term "apple lying on the table comes to the number 3". Or: the class of apples lying on the table is an element of class 3. This has the great advantage of evidence: namely that the number is not expressed by things, but by the term. WaismannVsFrege: But does this do justice to the actual use of the number words? Example: in the command "3 apples!" the number word certainly has no other meaning, but after Frege this command can no longer be interpreted according to the same scheme. It does not mean that the class of apples to be fetched is an element of class 3. Because this is a statement, and our language does not know it. WaismannVsFrege: its definition ties the concept of numbers unnecessarily to the subject predicate form of our sentences. In fact, it results the meaning of the word "3" from the way it is used (Wittgenstein). RussellVsFrege: E.g. assuming there were exactly 9 individuals in the world. Then we could define the cardinal numbers from 0 to 9, but the 10, defined as 9+1, would be the zero class. Consequently, the 10 and all subsequent natural numbers will be identical, all = 0. To avoid this, an additional axiom would have to be introduced, the Def "infinity axiom"/Russell: means that there is a type to which infinitely many individuals belong. This is a statement about the world, and the structure of all arithmetic depends essentially on the truth of this axiom. Everyone will now be eager to know if the infinity axiom is true. We must reply: we do not know. It is constructed in a way that it eludes any examination. But then we must admit that its acceptance has no meaning. I 82 Nor does it help that one takes the "axiom of infinity" as a condition of mathematics, because in this way one does not win mathematics as it actually exists: The set of fractions is dense everywhere, but not: The set of fractions is dense everywhere if the infinity axiom applies. That would be an artificial reinterpretation, only conceived to uphold the doctrine that numbers are made up of real classes in the world (VsFrege: but only conditionally, because Frege does not speak of classes in the world). Waismann I 85 The error of logic was that it believed it had firmly underpinned arithmetic. Frege: "The foundation stones, fixed in an eternal ground, are floodable by our thinking, but not movable." WaismannVsFrege: only the expression "justify" the arithmetic gives us a wrong picture, I 86 as if its building were built on basic truths, while she is a calculus that proceeds only from certain determinations, free-floating, like the solar system that rests on nothing. We can only describe arithmetic, i.e. give its rules, not justify them. Waismann I 163 The individual numerical terms form a family. There are family similarities. Question: are they invented or discovered? We reject the notion that the rules follow from the meaning of the signs. Let us look at Frege's arguments. (WaismannVsFrege) II 164 1. Arithmetic can be seen as a game with signs, but then the real meaning of the whole is lost. If I set up calculation rules, did I then communicate the "sense" of the "="? Or just a mechanical instruction to use the sign? But probably the latter. But then the most important thing of arithmetic is lost, the meaning that is expressed in the signs. (VsHilbert) Waismann: Assuming this is the case, why do we not describe the mental process right away? But I will answer with an explanation of the signs and not with a description of my mental state, if one asks me what 1+1 = 2 means. If one says, I know what the sign of equality means, e.g. in addition, square equations, etc. then one has given several answers. The justified core of Frege's critique: if one considers only the formulaic side of arithmetic and disregards the application, one gets a mere game. But what is missing here is not the process of understanding, but interpretation! I 165 For example, if I teach a child not only the formulas but also the translations into the word-language, does it only make mechanical use? Certainly not. 2. Argument: So it is the application that distinguishes arithmetic from a mere game. Frege: "Without a content of thought an application will not be possible either. WaismannVsFrege: Suppose you found a game that looks exactly like arithmetic, but is for pleasure only. Would it not express a thought anymore? Why cannot one make use of a chess position? Because it does not express thoughts. WaismannVsFrege: Let us say you find a game that looks exactly like arithmetic, but is just for fun. Would it notexpress a thought anymore? Chess: it is premature to say that a chess position does not express thoughts. Waismann brings. For example figures stand for troops. But that could just mean that the pieces first have to be turned into signs of something. I 166 Only if one has proved that there is one and only one object of the property, one is entitled to occupy it with the proper name "zero". It is impossible to create zero. A >sign must designate something, otherwise it is only printer's ink. WaismannVsFrege: we do not want to deny or admit the latter. But what is the point of this assertion? It is clear that numbers are not the same as signs we write on paper. They only become what they are through use. But Frege rather means: that the numbers are already there somehow before, that the discovery of the imaginary numbers is similar to that of a distant continent. I 167 Meaning/Frege: in order not to be ink blotches, the characters must have a meaning. And this exists independently of the characters. WaismannVsFrege: the meaning is the use, and what we command.	Waismann I F. Waismann Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996 Waismann II F. Waismann Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976
Frege, G.	Meixner Vs Frege, G.	I 170 Numbers/Frege/Meixner: special properties, i.e. finite number of properties of properties (i.e. functions). Notation of Meixner: F0 (should be 0) is the abbreviation of "01[01 is different from 01]". Def Equivalence/Frege/Meixner: f is a property equal to the property g, = Def is valid for at least one two-digit relation R: 1. each entity which has f stands for exactly one entity which has g, in the relation R 2. are entities that have f different, then also entities with g 3. inversion of 1: any entity having g. Number/Meixner: one could therefore define non-circularly: x is a natural number = Def x is a finite number property. I 171 Number/MeixnerVsFrege: then you could simplify: the default property used for the definition of 1 λ01[01 is identical to F0] is definitorically the same as the property λ01[01 is identical with 0]. Then you can simplify (which is a sign that numbers do not stand on ontologically safe feet): x is a natural number = Def x is a standard property for determining finite numbers then: f is 0 = Def f is a property that is equal to the property 0. Meixner: this is simpler, but also has the strange consequence that each natural number is exemplified by all its predecessors. I 172 FregeVsMeixner: Numbers are (saturated) objects, not properties. Each number is exemplified by an infinite number of entities. Number/Meixner: understood as property, they are untyped functions, i.e. they cannot be placed in any box of the form []	Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004
Functionalism	Holism Vs Functionalism	Esfeld I 38 Holismus/Reduktionismus/Reduktion/Esfeld: um rein funktionale Definitionen (die für Holismus nicht hinreichend sind) auszuschließen, dürfen Überzeugungen auch nicht auf Gehirnzustände reduziert werden. HolismusVsFunktionalismus/Esfeld: das Material darf nicht Eigenschaften haben, die seine Konstituenten isoliert haben könnten und die dazu führen, daß das Material kausale Rollen ausübt, wenn ein geeignetes Arrangement geschaffen ist. (Bzw. wenn das zutrifft, gibt es eben keinen Holismus).	Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Geach, P.	Evans Vs Geach, P.	Klaus von Heusinger, donkey sentences and their horse feet Uni Konstanz Section Linguistics Working Paper 64; 1994 Heusinger I 5 Range/Quantifier/Conjunction/Geach/VsGeach/Heusinger: (4b) E.g. [man(x) & comes(x) & whistles(x)] VsGeach: Problem: the existential quantifier has a longer range than the "and", i.e. it is regarded as a text operator. Then compositionality is violated, because the first sentence is not independent of the second one. This has caused much criticism. EvansVsGeach: the plural shows that (4b) is still too strong and does not express the everyday language meaning: (ii) is too strong: - (ii) Some sheep are such that John owns them and Harry vaccinates them in spring. I 17 Anaphora/Variable/Labeling/Existential Quantification/E Type/E Type Pronoun/Evans/Heusinger: Thesis: Discourse anaphora not as bound variables, but as shortened (or disguised) descriptions. Representatives: Evans: semantic Cooper: pragmatic Neale: syntactic. Def E Type Pronoun/Evans/Heusinger: = specific descriptions: the pronoun denotes those objects that make the sentence true which contains the quantified antecedent ((s) antecedent of the anaphor). Anaphora/Pronoun/EvansVsGeach/Evans/Heusinger: Thesis: anaphoric pronouns must be interpreted as decriptions.	EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Goedel, K.	Dennett Vs Goedel, K.	I 603 Gödel number/Dennett: Goedel numbers make it possible to arrange all possible axiom systems in alphabetical order. Goedel/Turing: showed that this set belongs to a different set in the Library of Babel: the set of all possible computers. Each Turing machine in which happens that a consistent algorithm runs for proving mathematical truths is associated with a Godel s theorem - with an arithmetic truth that it can not prove. Dennett: So what? Mind/Goedel: it shows that the mind can not simply be like machines. People can do things which may not be performed by machines. DennettVs! DennettVsGödel: problem: how can you find out, whether a mathematician has proved a theorem, or has only made a noise like a parrot? (> Proofs).	Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Grice, P.H.	Quine Vs Grice, P.H.	Wright I 198 Disputational Supervenience/Wright: a discourse supervenes another one if disagreements in one depend on disagreements in the other. StrawsonVsQuine/GriceVsQuine: it is hopeless to deny that a discrimination exists when it is used not in a prearranged but in a mutually unifiable way within linguistic practice. QuineVsStrawson/QuineVsGrice: this is fully consistent with a cognitive psychology of the practical use of the distinction, which does not assume that we are responding to instantiations of distinctions. Strawson/Grice: E.g. our daily talk of analyticity is a sociological fact and therefore has enough discipline to be considered as minimally capable of truth. QuineVsGrice/QuineVsStrawson: this is far from proving that a sort of intuitive realism can be seen in it. Obstacle: it remains to be explained how modal judgments generally exert cognitive coercion.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Hare, R.M.	Mackie Vs Hare, R.M.	Stegmüller IV 171 HareVs Objectivist ethics: incomprehensible, what is even meant by "objectivity of values". MackieVsHare: relapse into positivism of the 30's. At that time the question of >other minds was called pointless, as was the one of the difference between the world of phenomenalists and the world of realists. IV 172 If Hare cannot imagine anything, he should not assume futility, but make arguments against objective values. Objectivity/ethics/Mackie: however, the question of generally recognized measures of value bears a certain level of objectivity. IV 173 This corresponds to a subjectivism of 2nd order. This is supported by: 1. Relativity argument: we encounter different moral regulatory systems in the world. Objectivism would have to consider all of them wrong but one. IV 175 2. peculiarity argument (Absonderlichkeitsargument): whoever believes in objective values and norms, must take this belief seriously. This leads to strange entities like "Should Be Done", "Should Be Refrained From" etc. Supporter: Moore: values are "non-natural qualities". They require a special ability of insight. (>Detectivism, >Euthyphro, >Intuitionism).	Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Heidegger, M.	Derrida Vs Heidegger, M.	I 29 DerridaVsHeidegger: La verité en peinture: VsHeidegger's Van Gogh interpretation. Heidegger: sees reliability in the strength and robustness of build shoes. Derrida wants to go further: he sees a cipher for the reliability of being. But he can only do this by thinking about the reliability of the farmer's wife at the same time. I 43 DerridaVsHeidegger: is not consistent on his way to leave metaphysics. He remains arrested because he demands of thinking to be cruel to the "voice of being". This seems to presuppose an instance that speaks. The Christian God is associated. On the other hand, for Heidegger the "voice of being" is naturally silent, silent and wordless. I 124 DerridaVsHeidegger: does not pay enough attention to the difference between man and animal. Heidegger emphasizes the hand as the organ of showing as the property of humans. Heidegger: "what is world ?": "1. the stone is worldless 2. the animal is world poor 3. the human is world forming". Rorty III 202 Language/Primordial Words/DerridaVsHeidegger: his litany is only his own, by no means that of Europe. There is also no "universal name". III 203 Vs Myth of a "hidden language". (Vs superpersonal power, the gives certain words power) III 207 DerridaVsHeidegger/Rorty: one can escape Heidegger's "we" and the trap into which he ran - when he wanted to lean on something greater than himself through affiliation - through avoiding by what Gasché (his biographer) calls "wild private thought games". III 208 Metaphysics/Heidegger/Rorty: degrades language to a language game, degrades wave to sign, thinking to metaphysics. DerridaVsHeidegger/Rorty: the problem is not to touch the essence of language without hurting it, but how to create one's own style that makes it impossible to compare oneself with one's predecessors. Language/DerridaVsHeidegger/Rorty: has as little a "nature" as a "human" or "being". III 213 Primordial Language/DerridaVsHeidegger: the day on which a most elementary word would be found, through which there would be only one possible reading of the "Map of Oxford", would be a tragedy! The end of the story! Rorty IV 124 DerridaVsHeidegger: "There will be no unique name, even that of being". IV 125 Heidegger never goes beyond a group of metaphors that he and Husserl have in common. These metaphors indicate that we all have the "truth of being" deep within us! Calling and listening do not escape the circle of mutually explicable concepts. IV 137 Being/DerridaVsHeidegger: being has always had only "meaning"; it is always thought only as hidden in being. The "differance" is in a certain and extremely strange way "older" than the ontological difference or as the truth of being.	Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Heim, Irene	Verschiedene Vs Heim, Irene	Klaus von Heusinger, Eselssätze und ihre Pferdefüsse Uni Konstanz Fachgruppe Sprachwissenschaft Arbeitspapier 64; 1994 Heusinger I 20 Def Skolem Function/Heim/Heusinger: (Heim 1990, Chiercha 1992, 159) (spelling f(x)) is interpreted in the meta-language as the function that assigns to each man a donkey that belongs to him. (33) Every man who has a donkey beats it. (33a) (x)[man (x) & (Ey)[donkey (y) & has (x,y)] > beat(x,f(x))]. VsSkolem Function/VsHeim/Heusinger: this pragmatic approach is more flexible than Neale's syntactic approach, but it overgenerates: Example (34) Every donkey1 –owner beats it1. Problem: for (34) there is no reading in which the anaphoric pronoun can refer to the NP donkey-owner. (?) ((s) wouldn't it also require that there be only one donkey1?). Solution/Chiercha/Heusinger. (Chiercha 1992, 159): Rule for limiting the value range of the skolem function with a syntactic rule: (35) In a configuration of the form NPi,...esi, if esi is interpreted as a function, the range of this function is the head (value) of NPi. Problem: Uniqueness condition: in the given interpretation one receives only the weak reading of donkey sentences, since the skolem function always assigns only one donkey to a farmer. I 21 Selection* function/Solution/Chiercha: must map each man to one of the (s) maybe several) donkeys he has. So this will be a selection function and a unique one. In this type of context, however, it will be a whole family of functions that are a priori all good candidates. VsChiercha/VsHeim/VsSkolem Function/Heusinger: the problem of ambiguity between strong and weak reading remains or is simply put into context.
Hilbert	Verschiedene Vs Hilbert	Berka I 414 Problem: the number of conclusions is completely incalculable. Solution/Hilbert: the process of following (logical inference) has to be formalized itself. This, however, removes all content from the closing process. Problem: now one can no longer say that a theory is about natural numbers, for example. Formalism/Schröter: after that mathematics is no longer about objects, which refer to a real or an ideal world, but only about certain signs, resp. their transformations, which are done according to certain rules. WeylVsHilbert: this makes a reinterpretation of the whole mathematics necessary. Klaus von Heusinger, Eselssätze und ihre Pferdefüsse Uni Konstanz Fachgruppe Sprachwissenschaft Arbeitspapier 64; 1994 Heusinger I 29 Donkey Sentences/Epsilon Analysis/Heusinger: Thesis: that certain and indefinite nominal phrases are context-dependent. I 30 The epsilon operator EO represents NP and anaphora as context-dependent selection functions - classic: by Hilbert. VsHilbert: too inflexible - modified: represents the progress of information - modified EO: selects a certain object in a certain situation. I 36 Modified Epsilon Operator/situation/Egli/Heusinger: (Egli 1991, Heusinger 1992,1993), Van der Does 1993) the epsilon operator receives a parameter for the situation. Selection function/VsHilbert/Heusinger: Problem: the selection principle does not say which element is selected. ((s) it means only afterwards: "the selected element"). Problem: with an ordered range like the numbers this can be the smallest. The linguistic range lacks such an order. Order/Language/Linguistic/Lewis: Solution: Def "Salience Hierarchy"/Lewis: (Lewis 1979) (s): contextual or situational outline of a given linguistic area. (salient. = outstanding). Selection function/Heusinger: so we have to assume a whole family of selection functions. I.e. not from a selection function defined by the model M. Salience Hierarchy/Epsilon operator/Egli/Heusinger: the salience hierarchy is represented by modified epsilon expressions. Index i/Spelling mode/Heusinger: represents the respective selection function here: For example, eix Fx refers to the most salient (outstanding) object in context i that has the property F. Unambiguity/Situation/Heusinger: the modified epsilon operator always specifies a certain object. Context/Sincerity/Heusinger: in changing contexts different objects can be selected. Solution/Heusinger: 1. the individual range of a model M must be extended by the range of indices I. The individual range of a model M must be extended by the range of indices I. 2. the function F is added to model M itself.	Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983
Hodgson, D.H.	Lewis Vs Hodgson, D.H.	V 340 Utilitarism/Veridicality/Decision Theory/d.th./D.H. Hodgson/Lewis: e.g. two highly rational utilitarian theorists are afflicted with a demon, "you" and "I". We are in separate rooms with both a red and a green button. The demon set this up that we cause something good to happen if we both push the red button or if we both push the green one. If we push different buttons are push red and green button at the same time or if we do not push any button, we cause something bad to happen. We both know all the facts, and we both know that we both know it, etc. You manage to pass a message to me: "I have pushed the red button." But strangely it is not helpful! The reason: You are a highly rational being. So you do what you think will have the best consequences without taking into account other deliberations. This is also true for the sending of messages. You send the message you believe will have the best consequences, i.e. veridicality is not taken into your deliberations. As such, I do not have any reason to believe the message, unless I have good reason to believe that you believe that veridicality have the best consequences. In this case, you need to know that veridicality will have the best consequences. V 341 only if I have reason to believe that you and I will act accordingly. If not, there is nothing to choose between the expected consequences of truth and non-truth. But I know that you will not think - since you are the rational being you are - that I do not have reason to believe you, unless I really have reason to do so. Do I? I cannot indicate that I have reason to believe you without firstly assuming what there would be to indicate (circular, petitio principii). Namely, that I have reason to believe you! By arguing like this, I randomly choose the green button. LewisVsHodgson: This is the non-operability of the "expected" utilitarism. The non-operability is not sufficiently compensated by the endeavors to maximize the utility and fulfill the expectation. Hodgson: Rationality has no reason to expect that the other is veridical, not even when the combination with the expectation of veridicality would bring along good consequences. Communication/LewisVsHodgson: as such, the complete communication is forfeited. Promises as well, e.g. message: "I will push the red button." >Utilitarianism. LewisVsHodson: But to tell myself that I would ignore your message "I pushed the red button" is absurd! Hodgson is generally wrong.[hat allgemein unrecht.] Where is the mistake in his argument? It went wrong when I tacitly assumed that I had no reason to believe you, unless I could show our situation, our utilitarism and our rationality. V 342 As well as our knowledge about it, and the knowledge about it of the other person, etc. in order to have a reason to believe. But the premise that you will be veridical is nevertheless accessible to me! At least provided that common sense prompts it. The only contrary argument is Hodgon's one. On the one hand, this is consistent with our rationality, our utilitarism and our knowledge of it. On the other hand, it is not implied by it because they were not systematically not veridical, and I expect this of you, and you expect from me that I expect this from you, etc. Then you have a good utilitarian reason to not be veridical. Language/Veridicality/Lewis: Naturally, I only speak about veridicality in English. I should mention that systematic non-veridicality in English is the same as systematic veridicality in anti-English if it is like English only with reversed truth conditions. This is why I should decide that I have reason to believe you message, based on the additional knowledge that goes beyond the situation and is completely consistent with the situation.	Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Hume, D.	Carnap Vs Hume, D.	Newen I 113 Constitution/constitutional system/Carnap/Newen: Thesis: our knowledge should be arranged step by step from a basis in a system. Basis: elementary experiences (appearances, impressions, feelings). Levels: Transition: through the constitutional relation. ((s) Impressions constitute objects at a higher level). I 114 Hume/Carnap/Newen: both accept phenomena of consciousness as a safe basis. CarnapVsHume: uses formal logic. Constitution/Newen: could still be maintained if the elementary experiences prove to be untenable. Constitution: e.g. from natural numbers as a basis rational and real numbers can be constituted. Constitution/Carnap: is ontologically neutral, i.e. in this way no decision has been made in favour of e.g. idealism or realism. Constitution/Carnap: is neither a creation nor a recognition of objects.	Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Hume, D.	Kant Vs Hume, D.	Kant I 27 KantVsHume: Causality: Limited to the range of experience. It does not apply to the domain of things themselves. Kant I 98 Hume: Imagination compounds are principally created by association. KantVsHume: Unity of apperception. I’m being conscious that all ideas are my ideas. Therefore, I stick to the unity of consciousness that accompany all my ideas. In addition, I need to bear in mind how I am adding an idea to another one, otherwise I will scatter myself. McDowell I 123 McDowell: Laws of nature/natural/understanding/KantVsHume: wins the intelligibility of natural laws again, but not the clarity of meaning. Nature is the realm of natural laws, and therefore of no importance. However, the empirical world is not outside the terms. Hume I 37 Moral/action/ethics/Hume: A in this way (avoiding wrong) created obligation is artificial however, contrary to the natural obligation arising from the natural interest as the driving force of every action. Moral obligation. It’s in my best interest to let the other have his property, provided that the other acts in the same vein towards me. (KantVsHume:> Categorical imperative). Hume I 122 KantVsHume: The latter erroneously presented mathematics as a system of analytic judgments. DeleuzeVsKant. Relation / HumeVsKant: Every relationship is external in its terms: the equality is not a property of the characters themselves, but only comes through comparison. Hume I 133 Associations / KantVsHume: Although it is merely an empirical law, according to which ideas, which often followed each other, thereby produce a link. This law of reproduction requires that the appearances themselves are indeed subjected to such a rule. Because without this our empirical imagination would never get to do something it is able to, so would lay like dead unknown wealth within us. If a word would be applied one time to this thing, another time to another one, no empirical synthesis of reproduction could happen. So there must be something that makes even this reproduction of phenomenons possible because it is the fact that it is the a priori reason of a necessary synthetic unity of itself. I 138 If we can now show that even our a priori purest intuitions do not provide knowledge, except if they contain such a connection that makes a continuous synthesis possible, this synthesis of imagination is also established on a priori principles prior to all experience. KantVsHume: His dualism forces him to understand the relationship between what is given and the subject as a match of the subject with nature. I 139 But if the given would not align itself and a priori, in accordance with those same principles, which the link of ideas also aligns itself, the subject would only notice this concordance by chance. Therefore, it must be reversed: The given is to refer to the subject, as a concordance of given and subject. Why? Because what is given is not a thing in itself, but an overall context of phenomena that can be only represented by an a priori synthesis.	I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell
Identity Theory	Searle Vs Identity Theory	I 52 SearleVsIdentity theory: a) common sense puts the identity theory in the following dilemma: Assuming that the theory is actually empirically true: then there must be logically independent from each other features of each concerned phenomen that clearly characterize this same phenomenon in two different ways: as that is identified on the left side of the identity statement, on the other hand, as it is identified on the right side (Stevenson 1960)⁽¹⁾. Then there must be two features: pain features and neurophysiological characteristics. We understand such a statement because we understand as follows: one and the same event has been identified with the help of two types of properties. Dilemma: either the pain features are subjective, mental, introspective features - if they are this, then we have not really gotten rid of the mind. We will still have to deal with a variety of dualism. Otherwise, if we understand the word "pain" in a way that it does not describe a subjective mental feature, then the meaning of the word remains completely mysterious and unexplained. I 53 As with behaviorism the mind is skipped here again. Either the identity-theoretical materialism merges the mind, or it does not ignore it; if it ignores it, it is wrong; if it does not ignore it, it is not materialism. Smart wanted to describe the so-called mental features in a "Topic-neutral" vocabulary that left the fact of its mindness unmentioned (Smart 1959)⁽²⁾. SearleVsSmart: but that one can talk about a phenomenon without mentioning it's essential characteristics, does not mean that this phenomenon exists, or does not have these essential characteristics. Technical objection VsIdentitätstheorie: it is unlikely that there is a for each type of mental state one and only one type of neurophysiological state. Yet it seems too much to ask for that anyone who believes that Denver is the capital of Colorado has a neurophysiologically seen identical configuration in his brain. (Putnam 1967⁽³⁾ and Block and Fodor 1972⁽⁴⁾). I 54 We do not rule out the possibility that in another species pain is perhaps identical to any other types of neurophysiological configuration. In short, it seems too much to ask for that each type of mental state is identical to a type of neurophysiological state. 3. Technical objection derives from Leibniz law. LeibnizVsIdentity theory: if two events are identical if they share all their properties, then mental states cannot be identical with physical states clearly, the mental states have certain characteristics, do not have the physical states. E.g. my pain is in the toe, while my corresponding neurophysiological state ranges from the toe to the brain. So where is the pain really? The identity theorists had not such a big problem with this. They stated that the analysis unit is in reality the experience of pain and that this experience (together with the experience of the whole body image) presumably takes place in the central nervous system. Searle: so you're right. 4. more radical technical objection: Kripke (1971)⁽⁵⁾: Modal argumentation: if it were really true that pain with C fiber stimulation is identical then it would have to be a necessary truth. 1. J. T. Stevenson, Sensations and Brain Processes: A Reply to J. J. C. Smart, Philosophical Review 69, 505-510 2. J. J. C. Smart, Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review 68, 1959: pp.141-56 3. H. Putnam, “The Mental Life of Some Machines” in: H. Castaneda (Ed) Intentionality, Minds, and Perception, Detroit MI 1967 4. N. Block and J. Fodor, What psychological states are not; Philosophical Review 81, 1972 5. S. A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Reprint: Cambridge 1980	Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Internalism	Putnam Vs Internalism	I (f) 160 PutnamVsInternalism: thus it will ultimately (metaphysically) be claimed that there are "self-identifying" objects and the world arranges itself. >Internalism/Putnam.	Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Inwagen, P. van	Lewis Vs Inwagen, P. van	V 195 Individuation/Redundant Causation/Peter van Inwagen: Thesis: An event, which actually happens as a product of several causes, could not have happened had if it had not been the product of these causes. The causes could also not have led to another event. Analogy to individuation of objects and humans because of their causal origins. LewisVsInwagen: 1. It would ruin my analysis to analyze causation in terms of counterfactual dependence. ((s) Any deviation would be a different event, not comparable, no counterfactual conditionals applicable.) 2. It is prima facie implausible: I am quite able to legitimately establish alternative hypotheses how an event (or an object or a human being) was caused. But then I postulate that it was one and the same event! Or that one and the same event could have had different effects. >Events/Lewis. (Even Inwagen postulates this.) Plan/LewisVsInwagen: implies even more impossibilities: Either all my plans or hypotheses are hidden impossibilities or they do not even deal with particular event. >Planning. V 296 Vs weak determinism/VsCompatibilism/van InwagenVsLewis: (against wD which I pretend to represent): e.g. Suppose of reductio that I could have lifted my left hand although determinism would be true. Then follows from four premises, which I cannot deny, that I could have created a wrong conjunction HL from a proposition H of a moment in time before my birth, and a certain proposition about a law L. Premise 5: If yes, I could have made L wrong. Premise 6: But I could not have made L wrong. (Contradiction.) LewisVInwagen: 5 and 6 are both not true. Which one of both is true depends on what Inwage calls "could have made wrong". However, not in everyday language, but in Inwagen's artificial language. But it does not matter as well what Inwagen means himself! What matters is whether we can actually give sense to it, which would make all premises valid without circularity. Inwagen: (oral) third meaning for "could have made wrong": only iff the actor could have arranged the things in such a way that both his action and the whole truth about the previous history would have implied the wrongness of the proposition. Then premise 6 states that I could not have arranged the things in such a way to make me predetermined to not arrange them. Lewis: But it is not instructive to see that compatibilism needs to reject premise 6 which is interpreted that way. V 297 Falsification/Action/Free Will/Lewis: provisory definition: An event falsifies a proposition only when it is necessary that the proposition is wrong when an event happens. But my action to throw a stone is not going to falsify the proposition that the window which is on the other end of the trajectory will not be broken. The truth is that my action creates a different event which would falsify the proposition. The action itself does not falsify a law. It would only falsify a conjunction of antecedent history and law. The truth is that my action precedes another action, the miracle, and the latter falsifies the law. feeble: let's say I could make a proposition wrong in a weak sense iff I do something. The proposition would be falsified (but not necessarily because of my action, and not necessarily because of an event which happened because of my action). (Lewis per "Weak Thesis". (Compatibilism)). strong: If the proposition is falsified, either because of my action or because of an event that was caused because of my action. Inwagen/Lewis: The first part of his thesis is strong, regardless of whether we advocate the strong or the weak thesis: Had I been able to lift my hand, although determinism is true and I have not done so, then it is both true - according to the weak and strong sense- that I could have made the conjunctions HL (propositions about the antecedent history and the laws of nature) wrong. But I could have made proposition L wrong in the weak sense, although I could not have done it wrong in the strong sense. Lewis: If we advocate the weak sense, I deny premise 6. If we advocate the strong sense, I deny premise 5. Inwagen: Advocates both position by contemplating analogous cases. LewisVsInwagen: I do believe that the cases are not analogous. They are cases in which the strong and the weak case do not diverge at all. Premise 6/Inwagen: He invites us to reject the idea that a physicist could accelerate a particle faster than light. LewisVsInwagen: But this does not contribute to support premise 6 in the weak sense. V 298 Since the rejected assumption is that the physicist could falsify a law of nature in the strong sense. Premise 5/Inwagen: We should reject the assumption here that a traveller could falsify a conjunction of propositions about the antecedent history and the history of his future travel differently than a falsification of the non-historic part. LewisVsInwagen: Reject the assumption as a whole if you would like to. It does not change anything: premise 5 is not supported in the strong sense. What would follow if a conjunction could be falsified in such a strong sense? Tht the non-historic part could be thus falsified in the strong sense? This is what would support premise 5 in the strong sense. Or would simply follow (what I believe) that the non-historic part can be rejected in the weak sense? The example of the traveller is not helpful here because a proposition of future travels can be falsified in both weak as strong sense. Schwarz I 28 Object/Lewis/Schwarz: Material things are accumulations or aggregates of such points. But not every collection of such points is a material object. Taken together they are neither constituting a cat nor any other object in the customary sense. e.g. The same is valid for the aggregate of parts of which I am constituted of, together with the parts which constituted Hubert Humphrey at the beginning of 1968. Thing: What is the difference between a thing in the normal sense and those aggregates? Sufficient conditions are difficult to find. Paradigmatic objects have no gaps, and holes are delimited from others, and fulfill a function. But not all things are of this nature, e.g. bikes have holes, bikinis and Saturn have disjointed parts. What we accept as a thing depends from our interests in our daily life. It depends on the context: e.g. whether we count the back wall or the stelae of the Holocaust Memorial or the screen or the keyboard as singly. But these things do also not disappear if we do not count them as singly! Object/Thing/van Inwagen: (1990b)⁽¹⁾ Thesis: Parts will constitute themselves to an object if the latter is a living being. So, there are humans, fishes, cats, but not computers, walls and bikinis. Object/Thing/Lewis: better answer: two questions: 1. Under what conditions parts will form themselves to a whole? Under all conditions! For random things there is always a thing which constitutes them. ((s) This is the definition of mereological Universalism). 2. Which of these aggregates do we call a singly thing in daily life? If certain aggregates are not viewed as daily things for us does not mean that they do not exist.(However, they go beyond the normal realms of our normal quantifiers.) But these restrictions vary from culture to culture. As such, it is not reality that is dependent on culture, but the respective observed part of reality (1986e⁽²⁾, 211 213, 1991⁽³⁾:79 81). LewisVsInwagen/Schwarz: If only living things can form objects, evolution could not have begun. ((s) But if it is not a problem to say that living beings originated from emergentism, it should also not be a problem to say "objects" instead.) LewisVsInwagen: no criteria for "living being" is so precise that it can clearly define. Schwarz I 30 Lewis: It is not a problem for him: Conventions of the German language do not determine with atomic precision for which aggregates "living being" is accurate. (1986e⁽²⁾, 212) LewisVsvan Inwagen: This explanation is not at his disposal: For him the distinction between living being and not a living being is the distinction between existence and non-existence. If the definition of living being is vague, the same is valid for existence as well. Existence/Van Inwagen: (1990b⁽¹⁾. Kap.19) Thesis: some things are borderline cases of existence. LewisVsvan Inwagen: (1991⁽³⁾,80f,1983e⁽²⁾,212f): If one already said "there is", then one has lost already: if one says that "something exists to a lesser degree". Def Existence/Lewis: Simply means to be one of the things that exist.h Schwarz I 34 Temporal Parts/van Inwagen: (1981)⁽⁴⁾ generally rejects temporal parts. SchwarzVsInwagen: Then he must strongly limit the mereological universalims or be a presentist. Schwarz I 227 Modality/LewisVsInwagen: There are no substantial modal facts: The existence of possibilities is not contingent. Information about this cannot be obtained. 1. Peter van Inwagen [1990b]: Material Beings. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press 2. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 3. D. Lewis [1991]: Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell 4. P. van Inwagen [1981]: “The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts”. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 62: 123–137.	Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Kant	Nagel Vs Kant	I 129 NagelVsKant: unrestricted judgments about astronomy belong to a worldview that, compared to the Kantian alternative, is quite durable! In a conflict with Kant both opinions would be in competition, as there is no independent position from which to assess them. I 137 NagelVsKant: but to defend ourselves against Kant's limiting of the reach of reason, we have to claim more than this. I 138 Kant admits that we cannot help but understand ourselves as part of an independently existing world, though. But his thesis is not a thesis about the phenomenal world, but one about the relation of the phenomenal world to the world itself. I 139 But since he claims that the normal scientific thinking only applies to the phenomenal world, he exempts himself from the usual conditions of evaluation. The thesis of transcendental idealism is itself not one of the synthetic judgments a priori whose validity it claims to explain, but a thesis, a priori it still is. If this is unimaginable or self-contradictory, the story ends here. It implies, as Kant says, thesis: that Berkeley's idealism is inevitable if we assume that the things themselves have spatial properties! Nagel: the whole idealism becomes a hypothesis. There is something wrong with insisting that we had a bare idea of our position in an consciousness-independent world, while arguing the logical possibility of something that goes beyond it. PutnamVsKant: (elsewhere) from the fact that we cannot recognize the world as such does not follow that it must be completely different from what we do recognize. I 146 NagelVsKant: we note that our unrepentant empirical and scientific thinking unabatedly prevails even against Kant's skepticism. Kant is implausible for empirical reasons and thus simply implausible. III 126 NagelVsKant: the step towards objectivity reveals how things are in themselves and not how they appear to be. If that is true, then the objective picture always omits something. II 54 Ethics/Law/Moral/God/Theology/Nagel: an act does not become wrong by the fact that God exists. Murder is wrong per se and thus prohibited by God. (>Eutyphro). Not even the fear of punishment provides the proper motives of morality. Only the knowledge that it is bad for the victim. NagelVsKant: categorical imperative: we could say that we should treat others considerately so that do likewise by us. That is nothing but good advice. It is only valid in as far as we believe that our treatment of others will have an impact on how they treat us. Nagel: as a basis of ethics, nothing else is in question than a direct interest in the other. II 55 Nagel: there is a general argument against inflicting damage on others which is accessible to anyone who understands German: "Would you like it if someone else did that to you?" II 56 If you admit that you had something against someone else doing to you what you just did to him, you admit that he had a reason not to do it to you. Question: what is this reason? It cannot be anchored in the particular person. II 57 It is simply a matter of consequence and consistency. We need a general point of view that any other person can understand. II 58 Problem: this must not mean that you always ask if the money for the movie ticket would bring more happiness into the world if it was given to someone else. Because then you should no longer care more for your friends and family than for any stranger. II 59 Question: are right and wrong the same for everyone? II 60 Right/Wrong/Ethics/Morality/Nagel: if actions depend on motives and motives can be radically different in humans, it looks as if there could be no universal right and wrong for each individual. The possible solutions, all of which are not very convincing: 1) you could say: Although the same things for everyone are wrong or right, not everyone has a reason to do what is right and not to do what is wrong. Only people with the "right moral motives" have a reason. Vs: it is unclear what it would mean that it was wrong for someone to kill, but that he has no reason not to do it. (Contradiction). 2) you could say that the reasons do not depend on the actual motives of the people. They are rather reasons that modify our motives if they are not the right ones. Vs: it is unclear what the reasons may consist in that do not depend on motives. Why not do something if no one desire prevents you from doing it? II 61 3) you could say that morality is not universal. I.e. that someone would only be bound by morality if he had a specific reason to act like this, with the reason generally depending on how strongly you care for others. Vs: while making a psychologically realistic impression this conflicts with the idea that moral rules apply for everyone.	NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982
Kant	Rorty Vs Kant	I 166 Synthesis/Synthesis/Kant/Rorty: an object, something that is true for multiple predicates, is always the result of synthesis. RortyVsKant: Kant's conception of cognition did not have perception as a model. Unfortunately, he still remained in a Cartesian frame of reference: he still formulated it in response to the question of how we can move from inner to the outer space. His paradoxical answer was that the outer space will constructed from the material of ideas. >Cartesianism, >dualism. I 169 Naturalism/Rorty: musing of psychologists about stimuli and responses. (This is not philosophical, because it does not look for causes.) (RortyVsKant: confuses cause and reason here). I 171 Kant/Rorty: accepted that you must not equate the individual judgment with "the individuality of a sensibly given". RortyVsKant: he would have had to proceed to conceive knowledge as a relation between persons and >propositions. Then he not would have needed the concept of synthesis. He could have considered the person as a black box. I 173 Concept/Rorty: we want to know if concepts are connectors. VsKant: the information that they cannot be if it were not for a number of synthesis waiting views, does not help us. RortyVsKant: either machinery (synthesis) and raw material (views) are noumenal or they are phenomenal. a) if the two are phenomenal, we can be aware of them (contrary to the conditions of deduction). If they are b) noumenal, we cannot know anything about them, not even the statements of deduction! I 174 Copernican Revolution/RortyVsKant: it is no longer attractive for us. Because the statement that knowledge of necessary truths is more understandable for manufactured than for found objects depends on the Cartesian assumption that we have privileged access to our activity of making. IV 117 Comprehensibility/Noumenon/Thing in Itself/Kant/RortyVsKant/Rorty: with him the concept of noumenon becomes incomprehensible in that he says, an expression is meaningful if it stands for a spiritual content which forms the synthesis of sensual perceptions through a concept. ((s) through the synthesis of the sensible to the spiritual). VI 256 Ethics/Morality/RortyVsKant: it will never be possible to justify his good suggestion for secularization of the Christian doctrine of the brotherhood of man with neutral criteria. VI 257 This is not because they are not reasonable enough, but because we live in a world in which it would simply be too risky, yes often insanely dangerous, to grasp the sense of the moral community to the point that it goes beyond the own family or tribe. It is useless to say by Kant "recognize the brother in the other": the people we are trying to convince will not understand. They would feel offended if we asked them to treat someone with whom they are not related like a brother or to treat an unbeliever like a believer. VI 263 Def "Supernaturalism"/Santayana: the confusion of ideals and power. RortyVsKant: that is the only reason behind Kant's thesis that it is not only more friendly but also more reasonable not to exclude strangers. RortyVsKant: Nietzsche is quite right in connecting Kant's insistence with resentment. VI 264 RortyVsNietzsche: he is absolutely wrong in regarding Christianity and democracy as a sign of degeneration. With Kant he has an idea of "purity" in common that Derrida calls "phallogocentrism". This also applies to Sartre: Sartre: the perfect synthesis of In itself and For itself can only succeed if we free ourselves from the slimy, sticky, humid, sentimental, effeminate.	Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Kant	Strawson Vs Kant	Rorty VI 359 StrawsonVskKant/Rorty: shows that thanks to the progress since Kant some concepts are no longer that attractive: e.g. "in the mind", "created by the mind" (Wittgenstein, Ryle have dissuaded us from this). --- Strawson V 9 StrawsonVsKant: appears to violate his own principles by attempting to set sense limits from a point which is outside of them, and that, if they are properly marked, cannot exist. --- V 16 Continuous determination/Kant/Strawson: everywhere through the mind guaranteed applicability of the concepts. StrawsonVsKant: seed for the disastrous model of determination of the whole universe. --- V 19 StrawsonVsKant: this one had unlimited confidence in a certain complicated and symmetrical scheme, which he freely adopted from the formal logic as he understood it, and forced upon this the whole extent of his material. --- V 23 StrawsonVsKant: this one is constantly trying to squeeze out more of the arguments in the analogies than there is. --- V 25 StrawsonVsKant: the whole deduction is logically incorrect. The connection to the analysis is thin and is, if at all, brought about by the concept of "synthesis". --- V 37 Dialectic/Kant: primary goal: exposing the metaphysical illusion. Instrument: the principle of sense. Certain ideas that do not have any empirical application, are sources of appearance, yet they can have a useful or even necessary function for the extension of empirical knowledge. E.g. we think of internal states of affair, as if they were states of affair of an immaterial substance. ("regulative ideas"). StrawsonVsKant: which is obviously quite implausible. But why did he represent it? --- V 29 StrawsonVsKant: It is not clear that there is no empirical mediation of antinomies. --- V 32 Kant: I really appear to myself in the time but I do not really appear to myself in time. StrawsonVsKant: incomprehensible what "to appear" means here. It is no defense of an incomprehensible doctrine to say that its incomprehensibility is guaranteed by a product obtained from its principle. --- V 33/34 Space/time/StrawsonVsKant: Kant: things themselves not in space and time. Strawson: thereby the whole doctrine becomes incomprehensible. --- V 35 Synthetically a priori/StrawsonVsKant: Kant himself has no clear conception of what he means with it. The whole theory is not necessary. Instead, we should focus on an exploration and refining of our knowledge and social forms. --- V 36 Limit/StrawsonVsKant: to set the coherent thinking limits it is not necessary to think from both sides of these limits as Kant tried despite his denials. --- V 49 Space/Kant: our idea of space is not recovered from the experience, because the experience already presupposes the space. StrawsonVsKant: that is simply tautological. If "to presuppose" means more than a simple tautology, then the argument is not enlightening. --- V 50 StrawsonVsKant: he himself admits that it is contradictory to represent a relational view of space and time and to deny its transcendental ideality at the same time. --- V 58 StrawsonVsKant: there are the old debates about "inherent" ideas of space and time. They are unclear. There is the argument that the acquisition of skills presupposes the ability to acquire skills. Experience/space/time/properties/Kant/Strawson: problem: the manifestation of the corresponding trait in experience, his appearance in the world, can be ascribed only to our cognitive abilities, the nature of our skills, not to the things themselves. StrawsonVsKant: problem: then these ideas must themselves be prior to all experience in us. --- V 66 Categories/Strawson: we have to understand them here in the way that to the forms of logic the thought of their application is added in judgments. StrawsonVsKant: his subdivision of the categories puts quite a bit on the same level, which certainly cannot be regarded as equivalent as e.g. affirmative, negative, infinite. --- V 73 StrawsonVsKant: he thinks it is due to the (failed) metaphysical deduction (see above) entitled to identify "pure" concepts. --- V 75 StrawsonVsKant: why should the objects of consciousness not be understood as realities that are distinguished from the experiences of consciousness existence, even if sequence and arrangement coincide point by point with the experiences of consciousness? --- V 83 StrawsonVsKant: unity of the different experiences requires experience of objects. Can his thesis withstand the challenge? Why should not objects (accusatives) form such a sequence that no differentiation between their order and the corresponding experiences has to be made? E.g. Such items may be sensory data: red, round spots, tickling, smells, lightning, rectangles. --- V 84 Why should the terms not simply be such sensory quality concepts? StrawsonVsKant: it is very easy to imagine that experience exactly has this sort of unrelated impressions as its content. Impressions that neither require nor permit, to become "united in the concept of an object". StrawsonVsKant: the problem with the objects of experience is that their ESSE is at the same time entirely their percipi how their percipi nothing but their ESSE. That is, there is no real reason for distinguishing between the two. --- V 106 Room/persistence/Kant: The space alone is persistent. Any time determination presupposes something persistent. StrawsonVsKant: unclear. For the concept of self-consciousness the internal temporal relations of the sequence are completely insufficient. We need at least the idea of a system of temporal relations, which includes more than these experiences themselves. But there is no access for the subject itself to this broader system than by its own experiences. --- V 107 StrawsonVsKant: there is no independent argument that the objective order must be a spatial order. --- V 116 Causality/StrawsonVsKant: its concept is too rough. Kant is under the impression that he is dealing with a single application of a single concept of "necessity", but he shifts in his application, the meaning of this concept. The required sequence of perceptions is a conceptual, but the necessary sequence of changes is a causal one. --- V 118 Analogies/StrawsonVsKant: fundamental problem: the conditions of the possibility of objective determination of time. Possible objects/Kant: Problem: whether there should be a "at the same time" or "not at the same time" of possible and actually perceived objects. If there is no "at the same time", there can be no distinction made between possible and real objects. --- V 124 Pure space/Kant: is itself not an object of empirical perception. StrawsonVsKant: element of deceptive logic: Kant seems to think that certain formal properties of the uniform spatiotemporal frame must have direct correlates in the objects themselves. --- V 128 StrawsonVsKant: its entire treatment of objectivity is under considerable restriction, he relies nowhere on the factor onto which, for example, Wittgenstein strongly insists: the social nature of our concepts. --- V 157 StrawsonVsKant: but assuming that the physical space is euclidic, the world could be finite in an otherwise infinite empty space. And that would be no meaningless question. --- V 163 Antinomies/StrawsonVsKant: from the fact that it seems to be the case that there are things which are ordered in time or space in a certain way, it does not follow that it either seems that all things appear as members of a limited series, neither that it seems that all things exist as members of an infinite series. In fact, neither of the two members of the disjunction is true. --- V 164 Antinomies/StrawsonVsKant: certainly the notion of a sequential order is justified, but it does not follow that the concept for the "whole series" of things must apply. --- V 178 Antinomies/StrawsonVsKant: he was mistaken that the antinomies are the field, on which the decisive battles are fought. --- V 184 Existence/Kant: "necessity of existence can only be recognized from the connection with what is perceived according to general laws of experience." StrawsonVsKant: this is a deviation from the critical resolution of antinomies and has to do with the interests of "pure practical reason": that is, with morality and the possibility of free action. --- V 194 StrawsonVsKant: we can draw the conclusion from the assertion that when a being of endless reality exists, it does not exists contingently, not reverse in that way that if something exists contingently, it is a character of endless reality. --- V 222 Transcendental idealism/Kant: claims, he is an empirical realism. Confidence must include an awareness of certain states of consciousness independent of objects. StrawsonVsKant: this is certainly a dualistic realism. This dualism questions the "our". --- V 249 StrawsonVsKant: to say that a physical object has the appearance, a kind of appearance of a physical character, means, trying to brighten an unclear term by another dubious, namely the one of the visual image.	Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Kripke, S. A.	Anscombe Vs Kripke, S. A.	Frank I 84 I/Descartes: not a kind of body. I could assume that I don’t have a body. I/Augustine: "the mind knows of itself, that it is thinking." "It knows its own substance." Kripke/Anscombe: K. tried to rehabilitate Descartes’ argument for his dualism. AnscombeVsKripke: he neglects his first person character by making it an argument for the non-identity of Descartes with his own body. I 85 According to this, Descartes would have had to doubt the existence of Descartes as a human being, and in any case the existence of this figure in the world of his time, of this Frenchman, christened René... Descartes/AnscombeVsKripke: "I am not Descartes" was for him like "I’m not a body!" Forcing the argument into the third person perspective by replacing "I" with "Descartes" means to neglect this. Descartes never thought, "Descartes is not Descartes" (which according to Anscombe is ascribed to him by Kripke). I 85/86 AnscombeVsKripke: this discussion is not about the usual reflexive pronoun, but about a strange reflexive which must be explained from the standpoint of the "I". Grammarians call it the "indirect reflexive". (In Greek it is a separate form.) E.g. "When John Smith spoke of James Robinson, he spoke of his brother, but he did not know that." So it is conceivable that someone does not know that the object of which he speaks is himself. Now, if "I" is compatible with ignorance, the reflexive pronoun cannot be used as usual. Now one may ask: was the person of which Smith intended to speak not Smith? Was the person not himself?. Answer: not in the relevant sense! Unless the reflexive pronoun is itself a sufficient proof of reference. And the usual reflexive pronoun cannot do that. I 96 I/Self/Logic/Anscombe: here, the "manner of givenness" is unimportant. Fra I 97 The logician understands that "I" in my mouth is just another name for "E.A.". His rule: if x makes assertions with "I" as the subject, then they are true iff the predicates of x are true. AnscombeVsLogic/AnscombeVsKripke: for this reason he makes the transition from "I" to "Descartes". But this is too superficial: If one is a speaker who says "I", then it is impossible to find out what it is that says "I". E.g. one does not look to see from which apparatus the noise comes. Thus, we have to compel our logician to assume a "guaranteed" reference of "I". Fra I 98 Problem: with a guaranteed reference there is no longer any difference between "I" and "A".	Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Kripke, S. A.	Burge Vs Kripke, S. A.	Cresswell II 150 Name/Range/Cresswell: usually, names have a longer range than modal operators. Cresswell: this is the "modal objection" (VsKripke). That is not always the way it has to be if counterfactual contexts are considerd as modal. Ziff: E.g. "If Harmon had been Gaskin, then ..." (Ziff 1977, 326). KripkeVsVs: (1972, 279). Description theory/Bach/Cresswell: (Bach 1981, 371) calls it "nominal description theory". Names/BurgeVsKripke: (1979, 412) he does not go into names in belief contexts. McGinnVsKripke: is right in terms of the modal state, but II 151 wrong in relation to the epistemic status of names.	Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Kripke, S. A.	Lewis Vs Kripke, S. A.	V 251/252 Event/Description/describe/naming/Lewis: is usually specified by accidental properties. Even though it's clear what it meant to specify by its nature. An event applies, for example, to a description, but could also have occurred without applying to the description. Def Event/Lewis: is a class consisting of a region of this world together with different regions of other possible worlds in which the event could have occurred. (because events are always contingent). What corresponds to the description in one region does not correspond to it in another region (another possible world). You can never reach a complete inventory of the possible descriptions of an event. 1. artificial description: e.g. "the event that exists in the Big Bang when Essendon wins the final, but the birth of Calvin Coolidge, if not". "p > q, otherwise r". 2. partly by cause or effect 3. by reference to the place in a system of conventions such as signing the check 4. mixing of essential and accidental elements: singing while Rome burns. Example triple property, time, individual, (see above). 5. specification by a point of time, although the event could have occurred sooner or later 6. although individuals can be significantly involved, accidentially associated individuals can be highlighted. 7. it may be that a rich being of an event consists of strolling, but a less fragile (description-dependent) event could only be an accidental strolling. (s) And it may remain unclear whether the event is now essentially characterized by strolls. 8. an event that involves one individual in a significant way may at the same time accidentally involve another: For example, a particular soldier who happens to belong to a particular army, the corresponding event cannot occur in regions where there is no counterpart to this soldier, but if there is a counterpart of the soldier, this belongs to another army. V 253 Then the army gets involved on an accidental basis through its soldier's way. 9. heat: non-rigid designator: (LewisVsKripke): Non-rigid: whatever this role has: whatever this or that manifestation brings forth. Example: heat could also have been something other than molecular movement. Lewis: in a possible world, where heat flow produces the corresponding manifestations, hot things are those that have a lot of heat flow. Schwarz I 55 Being/Context Dependency/LewisVsKripke/SchwarzVsKripke: in certain contexts we can certainly ask e.g. what it would be like if we had had other parents or belonged to another kind. Example statue/clay: assuming, statue and clay both exist exactly for the same time. Should we say that, despite their material nature, they always manage to be in the same place at the same time? Shall we say that both weigh the same, but together they don't double it? Problem: if you say that the two are identical, you get in trouble with the modal properties: For example, the piece of clay could have been shaped completely differently, but not the statue - vice versa: Schwarz I 56 For example, the statue could have been made of gold, but the clay could not have been made of gold. Counterpart theory/Identity: Solution: the relevant similarity relation depends on how we refer to the thing, as a statue or as clay. Counterpart relation: Can (other than identity) not only be vague and variable, but also asymmetric and intransitive. (1968⁽¹⁾,28f): this is the solution for Def Chisholm's Paradox/Schwarz: (Chisholm, 1967⁽²⁾): Suppose Kripke could not possibly be scrambled eggs. But surely it could be a little more scrambly if it were a little smaller and yellower! And if he were a little more like that, he could be more like that. And it would be strange if he couldn't be at least a little bit smaller and yellower in that possible world. Counterpart Theory/Solution: because the counterpart relation is intransitive, it does not follow at all that at the end Kripke is scrambled egg. A counterpart of a counterpart from Kripke does not have to be a counterpart of Kripke. (1986e⁽³⁾,246) I 57 KripkeVsCounterpart Theory/KripkeVsLewis: For example, if we say "Humphrey could have won the election", according to Lewis we are not talking about Humphrey, but about someone else. And nothing could be more indifferent to him ("he couldn't care less"). (Kripke 1980⁽⁴⁾: 44f). Counterpart/SchwarzVsKripke/SchwarzVsPlantinga: the two objections misunderstand Lewis: Lewis does not claim that Humphrey could not have won the election, on the contrary: "he could have won the election" stands for the very property that someone has if one of his counterparts wins the election. That's a trait Humphrey has, by virtue of his character. (1983d⁽⁵⁾,42). The real problem: how does Humphrey do it that he wins the election in this or that possible world? Plantinga: Humphrey would have won if the corresponding possible world (the facts) had the quality of existence. Lewis/Schwarz: this question has nothing to do with Kripke and Plantinga's intuitions. Schwarz I 223 Name/Description/Reference/Kripke/Putnam/Schwarz: (Kripke 1980⁽⁴⁾, Putnam 1975⁽⁶⁾): Thesis: for names and expressions for kinds there is no generally known description that determines what the expression refers to. Thesis: descriptions are completely irrelevant for the reference. Description theory/LewisVsKripke/LewisVsPutnam/Schwarz: this only disproves the naive description theory, according to which biographical acts are listed, which are to be given to the speaker necessarily. Solution/Lewis: his description theory of names allows that e.g. "Gödel" has only one central component: namely that Gödel is at the beginning of the causal chain. Thus, theory no longer contradicts the causal theory of the reference. (1984b⁽⁷⁾,59,1994b⁽⁸⁾,313,1997⁽⁹⁾c,353f,Fn22). ((s)Vs: but not the description "stands at the beginning of the causal chain", because that does not distinguish one name from any other. On the other hand: "at the beginning of the Gödel causal chain" would be meaningless. Reference/LewisVsMagic theory of reference: according to which reference is a primitive, irreducible relationship (cf. Kripke 1980⁽⁴⁾,88 Fn 38), so that even if we knew all non-semantic facts about ourselves and the world, we still do not know what our words refer to, according to which we would need special reference o meters to bring fundamental semantic facts to light. If the magic theory of reference is wrong, then semantic information is not sufficient in principle to tell us what we are referring to with e.g. "Gödel": "if things are this way and that way, "Gödel" refers to this and that". From this we can then construct a description from which we know a priori that it takes Gödel out. This description will often contain indexical or demonstrative elements, references to the real world. I 224 Reference/Theory/Name/Description/Description Theory/LewisVsPutnam/LewisVsKripke/Schwarz: For example, our banana theory does not say that bananas are sold at all times and in all possible worlds in the supermarket. For example, our Gödel theory does not say that Gödel in all possible worlds means Gödel. ((s) >Descriptivism). (KripkeVsLewis: but: names are rigid designators). LewisVsKripke: when evaluating names in the area of temporal and modal operators, you have to consider what fulfills the description in the utterance situation, not in the possible world or in the time that is currently under discussion. (1970c⁽¹²⁾,87,1984b⁽⁸⁾,59,1997c⁽⁹⁾,356f) I 225 A posteriori Necessity/Kripke/Schwarz: could it not be that truths about pain supervene on physically biological facts and thus necessarily follow from these, but that this relationship is not accessible to us a priori or through conceptual analysis? After all, the reduction of water to H₂O is not philosophical, but scientific. Schwarz: if this is true, Lewis makes his work unnecessarily difficult. As a physicist, he would only have to claim that phenomenal terms can be analyzed in non-phenomenal vocabulary. One could also save the analysis of natural laws and causality. He could simply claim these phenomena followed necessarily a posteriori from the distribution of local physical properties. A posteriori necessary/LewisVsKripke: this is incoherent: that a sentence is a posteriori means that one needs information about the current situation to find out if it is true. For example, that Blair is the actual prime minister (in fact an a posteriori necessity) one needs to know that he is prime minister in the current situation, Schwarz I 226 which is in turn a contingent fact. If we have enough information about the whole world, we could in principle a priori conclude that Blair is the real Prime Minister. A posteriori necessities follow a priori from contingent truths about the current situation. (1994b⁽⁸⁾,296f,2002b⁽¹⁰⁾, Jackson 1998a⁽¹¹⁾: 56 86), see above 8.2) 1. David Lewis [1968]: “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic”. Journal of Philosophy, 65: 113–126. 2. Roderick Chisholm [1967]: “Identity through Possible Worlds: Some Questions”. Noˆus, 1: 1–8 3. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 4. Saul A. Kripke [1980]: Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell 5. David Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 6. Hilary Putnam [1975]: “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’ ”. In [Gunderson 1975], 131–193 7. David Lewis [1984b]: “Putnam’s Paradox”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377 8. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (Hg.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431 9. David Lewis [1997c]: “Naming the Colours”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75: 325–342 10. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97 11. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 12. David Lewis [1970c]: “How to Define Theoretical Terms”. Journal of Philosophy, 67: 427–446.	Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Kripke, S. A.	Putnam Vs Kripke, S. A.	I (a) 35 Names/Kripke/Putnam: central point: you can use a proper name to refer to a thing or a person, without having true beliefs regarding X. I (a) 36 The use of the name includes the existence of a causal chain. PutnamVsKripke: right: knowledge of a speaker does not have to set the reference in his idiolect. The use of names is common. Now you might say that terms of physical quantities are also proper names, not of things but of quantities. ---- I (g) 189 Nature/essence/Kripke: E.g. Statue: The statue and the piece of clay are two items. The fact that the piece of clay has a modal property, namely, "to be a thing that might have been spherical", is missing to the statue. VsKripke: that sounds initially odd: E.g. when I put the statue on the scale, do I measure then two items? E.g. Equally strange is it to say, a human being is not identical with the aggregation of its molecules. Intrinsic properties/Putnam: E.g. Suppose there are "intrinsic connections" of my thoughts to external objects: then there is perhaps in my brain a spacetime region with set-theoretical connections with an abstract object which includes certain external objects. Then this spacetime region will have a similar set-theoretical connections with other abstract entities that contain other external objects. Then the materialist can certainly say that my "thoughts" include certain external objects intrinsically, by identifying these thoughts with a certain abstract entity. Problem: but if this identification should be a train of reality itself, then there must be in the world essences in a sense that cannot be explained by the set theory . Nature/essential properties/PutnamVsKripke: Kripke's ontology presupposes essentialism, it cannot serve to justify him. Modal properties are not part of the materialistic establishment of the world.. But Kripke individuates objects by their modal characteristics. Essential properties/Possible Worlds/Putnam: I, myself,(1975) spoke of "essential properties" but not in parallel worlds, but in other possible states of our world. Example: We can imagine another "possible world" (not parallel), in which a liquid other than water has the taste of water, but none, in which H2O is not water. This is insofar a kind of essentialism, as we have thus discovered the nature of water. We just say water should not be anything else. I (g) 192 And that was already our intention, when we did not know the composition of H₂O. Nature/essence/Putnam: is in this sense, however, the product of our use of the word. It is not "built into the world". Nature/Kripke/Putnam: so it is also justified by Kripke. Putnam: both our conception of "nature" does not help the materialists. This purely semantic interpretation presupposes the reference. It cannot support the reference as an "intrinsic correlation" between thought and thing". --- I (i) 246 Truth/legitimate assertibility/Kripke Wittgenstein: that would only be a matter of general agreement. PutnamVsKripke: then this would be a wrong description of the terms that we actually have. And a self-confuting attempt to take an "absolute perspective". --- Rorty VI 129/130 Causal theory of reference: PutnamVsKripke/Rorty, self-criticism, PutnamVsPutnam: the description of the causal relationships between a something and other things is nothing more than the description of characteristics that are neither in a greater nor lesser extent in a"intrinsic" or in an "extrinsic" relationship with it. So also the feature "to be described by a human being". PutnamVsSearle: Vs distinction "intrinsic"/"relational".	Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Kripke, S. A.	Place Vs Kripke, S. A.	Arm II 160 Classification/Knowledge/PlaceVsKripke: Martin's example of the old fisherman who classified whales as fish, although he had all the knowledge, shows that it cannot be about a mythical baptism of natural species in the sense of Kripke. Arm II 66 Place: causally spoken: to say that a situation contingently depends on another, is to say that the relation between them is causal or is not causal. Independence, causal: = Not contingency. PlaceVsKripke: he blends these two radically different forms of necessity so that the concept of contingency disappears. Necessary/Kripke: heat = molecular motion. (II 67 Skinner: intuitive judgments are "contingency shaped": E.g. If all tables were orange crates, then the two expressions would not be logically independent. (s) then it would be no question of intuition?) PlaceVsKripke: his equating of heat and molecular motion is wrong, because it does not differentiate between categorical and dispositional properties! a) categorical: the heat of body b) dispositional, modal: the possible heat transfer (heat transfer) to another body)	Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Kripke, S. A.	Hintikka Vs Kripke, S. A.	II XIII Possible Worlds/Semantics/Hintikka: the term is misleading. (Began in the late 50s). Kripke Semantics/HintikkaVsKripke: is not a viable model for the theory of logical rules (logical necessity and logical possibility). (Essay 1). Problem: the correct logic cannot be axiomatized. Solution: interpreting Kripke semantics as non-standard semantics, II XIV in the sense of Henkin’s non-standard interpretation of higher-level logic, while the correct semantics for logical modalities would be analogous to a standard interpretation. Possible Worlds/HintikkaVsQuine: we do not have to give them up entirely, but there will probably never be a complete theory. My theory is related to Kant. I call them "epistemology of logic". II XVI Cross World Identity/Hintikka: Quine: considers it a hopeless problem HintikkaVsKripke: he underestimates the problem and considers it as guaranteed. He cheats. World Line/Cross World Identity/Hintikka: 1) We need to allow that some objects in certain possible worlds do not only exist, but that their existence is unthinkable there! I.e. world lines can cease to exist - what is more: it may be that they are not defined in certain possible worlds. Problem: in the usual knowledge logic (logic of belief) this is not permitted. 2) world lines can be drawn in two ways: a) object-centered b) agent-centered. (Essay 8). Analogy: this can be related to Russell’s distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and by description. (Essay 11) II 2 Kripke Semantics/Modal Logic/Logical Possibility/Logical Necessity/HintikkaVsKripke/HintikkaVsKripke Semantics: Problem: if we interpreted the operators N, P so that they express logical modalities, they are inadequate: for logical possibility and necessity we need more than an arbitrary selection of possible worlds. We need truth in every logically possible world. But Kripke semantics does not require all such logically possible worlds to be included in the set of alternatives. ((s) I.e. there may be logically possible worlds that are not considered). (see below logical possibility forms the broadest category of options). Problem: Kripke semantics is therefore inadequate for logical modalities. Modal Logic/Hintikka: the historically earliest purpose for which it was developed was precisely dealing with logical modalities. This was the purpose for which the Lewis systems were developed. HintikkaVsKripke: does not only have a skeleton in the closet, but said skeleton haunts the entire house. Equivalence Relation/Hintikka: if R is required to be reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive, it does not provide the solution: it still does not guarantee that all logically possible worlds are contained in the set. It can (possibly together with with connectedness) only guarantee that w0 has a maximum number of sets as its alternatives that are, so to speak, already in SF. II 3 KripkeVsVs/Hintikka: It could be argued that this does not yet show that Kripke semantics is wrong. It just needs to be reinforced. E.g. Nino Cocchiarella: Cocchiarella: additional condition: all models (in the usual 1st order sense) with the same domain of individuals do (w0) must occur among the alternative possible worlds to w0. ((s) No new individuals may be added or removed with regard to the original possible world w0). Hintikka: technically it is of course possible. "Old": (= Kripke semantics): non-standard semantics. new: F must include all models that have the same individuals domain do(w0) of well-defined individuals as w0. Individual/Individuals/Modal/Hintikka: an individual must be well-defined, but it does not have to exist! ((s) I.e. it can be expressed then that it is missing, E.g. the hero has no sister in a possible world). Domain of Individuals: for each possible world is then a subset of the domain D. II 4 HintikkaVs: Problem: this is unrealistically interpretative: this flexible approach namely allows non-well-shaped individuals. Then there is no point in asking whether this individual exists or not. Fusion/Fission: a flexible semantics must also allow fission and fusion between one possible world and the another. Def Well-Defined/Individual/Hintikka: an individual is well-defined, if it can be singled out by name at a node of the world line. World Line: can link non-existent incarnations of individuals, as long as they are well-defined for all possible worlds in which a node of the world line can be located. Truth Conditions: are then simple: (Ex) p(x) is true iff there is an individual there, E.g. named z, so that p(z) is true in w. Modal Semantics/Hintikka. About a so defined (new) semantics a lot can be said: Kripke Semantics/Hintikka: corresponds to a non-standard semantics, while the "new" semantics (with a fixed domain of individuals) corresponds to a standard semantics. (For higher-order logic). Standard Semantics/higher level: we get this by demanding that the higher level quantifiers go over all extensionally possible entities of the appropriate logical type (higher than individuals) like quantifiers in the standard semantics for modal logic should go over all extensionally possible worlds. This is a parallelism that is even stronger than an analogy: Decision problem: for 2nd order logic this is reduced to the 1st order standard modal logic. Standard: does the same job in the latter sense as in the former sense. Quantified 1st Order Standard Modal Logic/Hintikka: all of this leads to this logic being very strong, comparable in strength with 2nd order logic. It follows that it is not axiomatizable. (see above HintikkaVsKripke). The stronger a logic, the less manageable it is. II 12 Kripke/Hintikka: has avoided epistemic logic and the logic of propositional attitudes and focuses on pure modalities. Therefore, it is strange that he uses non-standard logic. But somehow it seems to be clear to him that this is not possible for logical modalities. Metaphysical Possibility/Kripke/HintikkaVsKripke: has never explained what these mystical possibilities actually are. II 13 Worse: he has not shown that they are so restrictive that he can use his extremely liberal non-standard semantics. II 77 Object/Thing/Object/Kripke/Hintikka: Kripke Thesis: the existence of permanent (endurant) objects must simply be provided as a basic concept. HintikkaVsKripke: this requirement is not well founded. Maybe you have to presuppose the criteria of identification and identity only for traditional logic and logical semantics. But that also does not mean that the problem of identification was not an enduring problem for the philosophers. II 84 KIripkeVsHintikka: Problem: the solutions of these differential equations need not be analytic functions or features that allow an explicit definition of the objects. Hintikka: it seems that Kripke presupposes, however, that you always have to be able to define the relations embodied by the world lines. HintikkaVsKripke: that is too strict. World Line: we allow instead that they are implicitly defined by the solutions of the differential equations. II 86 HintikkaVsKripke: our model makes it possible that we do not necessarily have to presuppose objects as guaranteed like Kripke. ((s) it may be that a curve is not closed in a time section). II 116 Cross World identity/Rigidity/HintikkaVsKripke: it’s more about the way of identification (public/perspective, see above) than about rigidity or non-rigidity. The manner of identification decides what counts as one and the same individual. HitikkaVsKripke: his concept of rigidity is silently based on Russell’s concept of the logical proper name. But there is no outstanding class of rigid designation expressions. Proper Names/Names/HintikkaVsKripke: are not always rigid. E.g. it may be that I do not know to whom the name N.N. refers. Then I have different epistemic alternatives with different references. Therefore, it makes sense to ask "Who is N.N.?". Public/Perspective/Identification/Russell/Kripke/Hintikka: Russell: focuses on the perspective II 117 Kripke: on public identification. II 195 Identity/Individuals/Hintikka: it is much less clear how the identity for certain individuals can fail in the transition to another possible world. I.e. world lines can branch (fission). Separation/KripkeVsFission/SI/Hintikka: Kripke excludes fission, because for him the (SI) applies. A fission, according to him, would violate the transitivity of identity. After a fission, the individuals would by no means be identical, even if it should be after the transitivity. Therefore, for Kripke the (SI) is inviolable. HintikkaVsKripke: that is circular: Transitivity of Identity/Hintikka: can mean two things: a) transitivity within a possible world. b) between possible worlds. The plausibility of transitivity is part of the former, not the latter. To require transitivity of identity between possible worlds simply means to exclude fission. This is what is circular about Kripke’s argument. II 196 Possible World/Individuals Domain/HintikkaVsKripke: it should not be required that the individuals remain the same when changing from possible world to possible world. Talk about possible worlds is empty if there are no possible experiences that might distinguish them. ((s) is that not possible with a constant domain? Also properties could be partly (not completely) exchanged). Possible World/Hintikka: should best be determined as the associated possible totalities of experience. And then fission cannot be ruled out. II 209 Re-Identification/Hintikka: also with this problem situation semantics and possible worlds semantics are sitting in the same boat. Situation semantics: rather obscures the problem. In overlapping situations, E.g. it assumes that the overlapping part remains the same. Re-Identification/Quine/Hintikka: deems it hopeless, because it is impossible to explain how it works. Re-Identification/Kripke/Hintikka: Kripke ditto, but that’s why we should simply postulate it, at least for physical objects. HintikkaVsQuine/HintikkaVsKripke: that is either too pessimistic or too optimistic. But mistaking the problem would mean to neglect one of the greatest philosophical problems.	Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Kuhn, Th.	Davidson Vs Kuhn, Th.	I (e) 85 VsIncommensurability/DavidsonVsKuhn: The further assumption (incommensurability) requires us paradoxically to put ourselves in a position that is beyond our thinking ways. >Incommensurability. The idea of a really strange scheme is incomprehensible to us. >Conceptual scheme. Glüer II 133 If others are in a state that cannot be determined using our methods, then this can not be because the methods fail (with which we determine states of consciousness precisely) but that one does not refer to those states as states of consciousness. Incommensurability presupposes separation scheme/content (3.Dogma). >Scheme/content.	Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993
Leibniz, G.W.	Berkeley Vs Leibniz, G.W.	Ber I 228 BerkeleyVsInfinitesimal Calculation/BerkeleyVsLeibniz: consequence of his denial of divisibility beyond the perceptible. But Berkeley had to admit, that mathematics led to useful results. Solution/Berkeley: the mathematicians do not make only one mistake, but two, which cancel each other out by chance. The idea of error compensation was later taken up by Lagrange.	G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997
Leibniz, G.W.	Millikan Vs Leibniz, G.W.	I 261 VsLeibniz/VsLeibniz' law/principle/identity/indistinguishability/the indistinguishable/Millikan: the classic objection VsLeibniz is to point out the possibility that the universe might be perfectly symmetrical, in which case there would be a perfectly identical ((S) indistinguishable) individual at another place. ((S) That is, there would be something indistinguishable from x, which would still not be identical to x, against Leibniz principle). Variants: Ex a time-repetitive universe etc. Ex two identical drops of water, two identical billiard balls at various locations. Property/Leibniz: thesis: a reference to space and time leads to a property that is not purely qualitative. Millikan: if one disregards such "impure" properties ((S) does not make a reference to space and time), the two billiard balls have the same properties! VsLeibniz' principle/law/R. M. Adams/Millikan: thesis: the principle that is used when constructing such symmetrical worlds, is the principle that an individual can not be distinguished (separated) from themselves, therefore, the two halves of the world can not be one and the same half. Leibniz' law/VSVS/Hacking/Millikan: (recent defense of Hacking): The objections do not respond to the fact that there could be a curved space instead of a duplication. Curved space/Hacking/Millikan: here emerges one and the same thing again, there is no duplication as in Euclidean geometry. MillikanVsHacking: but that would not answer the question. I 262 But there are still two interesting options: Leibniz' law/principle/identity/ indistinguishability/Millikan: 1. symmetrical world: it could be argued that there is simply no fact here, which determines whether space is curved or doubled. ((s)> Nonfactualism). Pointe: this would imply that Leibniz's principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary, and that its validity is only a matter of convention. 2. Symmetrical world: one could say that the example does not offer a general solution, but rather the assumption of a certain given symmetrical world: here, there would very much be a fact, whether the space is curved or not. Because a certain given space can not be both! Pointe: then the Leibniz principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary. Pointe: but in this case this is then no matter of convention, but a real fact! MillikanVsAdams/MillikanVsArmstrong/Millikan: neither Adams nor Armstrong consider that. Curved space/Millikan: what is identical is then necessarily identical ((S) because it is only mirrored). Here the counterfactual conditional would apply: if one half would have been different, then the other one, too. Here space generally seems to be double. Duplication/Millikan: when the space is mirrored (in Euclidean geometry) the identity is random, not necessary. Here one half could change without the other half changing. ((S) No counterfactual conditional). Identity: is given when the objects are not indistinguishable because a law in situ applies, but a law of nature, a naturally necessary agreement. I 263 Then identity of causality applies in the second option. (X) (y) {[NN (F) ⇔ Fx Fy] ⇔ x = y} Natural necessity/notation: naturally necessary under naturally possible circumstances. MillikanVsVerifikationismus: if my theory is correct, it must be wrong. Truth/world/relationship/Millikan: thesis: ultimately, meaningfulness and truth lie in relations between thought and the world. I 264 Therefore, they can not be in the head, we can not internalize them. I 268 Properties/Millikan: thesis: Properties (of one or more parts) that fall into the same area, are properties that are opposites of each other. Certainly, an area can contain another area. Ex "red" includes "scarlet" instead of excluding it and Ex "being two centimeters plus minus 1 millimeter" includes "being 2.05 centimeters plus minus 1 millimeter" rather than excluding this property. The assumption that two properties may be the same only if the complete opposite regions from which they come coincide, implies that the identity of a property or property area is linked to the identity of a wider range from which it comes, and therefore is bound to the identity of their opposites. Now we compare Leibniz' view with that of Aristotle: Identity/Leibniz/Millikan: all single properties are intrinsically comparable. However, perhaps not comparable in nature, because God has just created the best of all possible worlds - but they would be metaphysically comparable. complex properties/Leibniz/Millikan: that would be properties that are not comparable. They also include absences or negations of properties. They have the general form "A and not B". ((S) Comparison/comparability/comparable/Millikan/(S): composite properties are not comparable Ex "A and not B".) Of course, it is incompatible with the property "A and B". Pointe: thus the metaphysical incompatibility rests on the logical incompatibility. That is, on the contradiction. I 269 Necessity/Leibniz/Millikan: then God has first created logical necessity and later natural necessity. ("In the beginning…"). opposite properties/opposite/property/Leibniz/Millikan: according to Leibniz opposite properties are of two kinds: 1. to attribute both contradictory properties to one thing then would be to contradict oneself ((S) logically) or 2. the contradiction between the properties would lie in their own nature. But that would not lie in their respective nature individually but would be established by God, which prevented the properties from ever coming together. MillikanVsLeibniz. Identity/Properties/Aristotle/Millikan: opposite properties: for Aristotle, they serve to explain that nothing can be created from nothing. Def opposite property/Aristotle: are those which defy each others foundation, make each other impossible. The prevention of another property is this property! Alteration/transformation/change/Aristotle/Millikan: when a change occurs, substances acquire new properties, which are the opposites of the previous properties. Opposite/Aristotle is the potentiality (possibility) of the other property. Then, these opposites are bound at the most fundamental level (in nature) to each other. Millikan pro Aristotle: he was right about the latter. In Aristotle there is no "beginning" as in Leibniz. Properties/Opposite/Leibniz/Millikan pro Leibniz: was right about the assertion that two opposite properties that apply to the same substance is a contradiction. But this is about an indefinite negation, not the assertion of a specific absence. Or: the absence is the existence of an inconsistency. Ex Zero/0/modern science/mathematics: is not the assertion of nothing: Ex zero acceleration, zero temperature, empty space, etc. Zero represents a quantity. Non-contradiction/law of non-contradiction/Millikan: then, is a template of an abstract world structure or something that is sufficient for such a template. Epistemology/epistemic/Leibniz/Aristotle/Millikan: the dispute between Leibniz and Aristotle appears again at the level of epistemology: I 270 Ex the assertion "x is red" is equivalent to the statement "x looks red for a standard observer under standard conditions". Problem: from "x is red" follows that "x does not look red for ... under ...". ontologically/ontology: equally: not-being-red would be an emptiness, an absence of red - rather than an opposite of red. But it is about "x is non-red" being equivalent to "x does not look red under standard conditions" is either empty or incorrect.	Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Leibniz, G.W.	Wessel Vs Leibniz, G.W.	I 221 Def Identity/Leibniz: match in all properties (traced back to Aristotle). Identity/WesselVsLeibniz: inappropriate because it suggests searching for two objects to compare and verify properties. In modern mathematics, the problem is circumvented by specifying a fixed range with precisely defined predicates. In an attempt to apply Leibniz's definition to empiricism, an attempt was made to establish the identity relation directly ontologically, without seeing its origin in the properties of language. Wrong approach: in the relative temporal stability of objects: Dilemma: from a = a results not much more than "Socrates is Socrates". Problem: one must then demand that Socrates must have had the same qualities at all times of his life. In fact, some authors have linked the negation of the possibility of change to it. I 228 Def Diversity/Leibniz: "which is not the same or where the substitution sometimes does not apply". Identity/Leibniz: substitutability salva veritate. x = y = def AP(P(x) ↔ P(y)). (s) All properties of one are also those of the other and vice versa). WesselVsLeibniz: the corresponding bisubjunction (= without def) is existentially loaded and therefore not logically true. Identity/PeirceVsLeibniz: "his principle is completely nonsense. No doubt all things are different from each other, but there is no logical necessity for that". Identity/Peirce: x = y ↔ AP(P(x) u P(y) v ~P(x) u ~P(y)) WesselVsPeirce: this is also existentially charged! Identity/Indistinguishability/Wessel: in literature there is a distinction between the principle of the identity of the indistinguishable. (x)(y)AP((P(x) ↔ P(y)) > x = y) (e) and the principle of indistinguishability of the identical (also substitution principle): (x)(y)(x = y > AP(P(x) ↔ P(y))) (n) Identity/Vagueness/WesselVsLeibniz: in vagueness the Leibniz's principle of the identity of the indistinguishable does not apply, since in non-traditional predication theory the formulae P(x) ↔ P(y) and -i P(x) ↔ -i P(y) are not equivalent. Additional demand (Wessel 1987; 1988): the same predicates must also be denied! strict identity: x = y =def AP((P(x) ↔ P(y)) u (-i P(x) ↔ -i P(y))). WesselVsWessel: but this cannot be maintained, because the corresponding bisubjunction is existentially loaded! I 229 In term theory, we will define identity with the help of the term relation.	Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999
Lewis, C.I.	Schwarz Vs Lewis, C.I.	Schwarz I 31 Personal identity/SchwarzVsLewis: his criterion is not accurate and provides in interesting cases no answer. E.g. continuity after brain surgery, etc. But Lewis does not want that. Our (vague) everyday term should only be made explicitly. Beaming/Teleportation/Doubling/Lewis: all this is allowed by his theory. Schwarz I 60 Identity/Lewis/Centered world/Possible world/Schwarz: my desire to be someone else, does not refer to the whole world, but only to my position in the world. E.g. Twin Earth/Schwarz: one of the two planets is blown tomorrow, the two options (that we are on the one or the other) do however not correspond to two possible worlds! Detailed knowledge would not help out where we are, because they are equal. ((s) so no "centered world"). Actually, we want to know where we ourselves are in the world. (1979a⁽¹⁾,1983b(2),1986e⁽³⁾:231 233). SchwarzVsLewis: says too little about these perspective possibilities. It is not enough here to allow multiple counterparts (c.p.) in a world. It should not just be possible that Humphrey is exactly as the actual Nixon, he should also to be allowed to be different. Humphrey may not be a GS of himself. (> Irreflexive counterpart relation,> see below Section 9.2. "Doxastic counterparts". Similarity relation. No matter what aspects you emphasize: Nixon will never be more similar to Humphrey than to himself. Schwarz I 100 Fundamental properties/SchwarzVsLewis: this seems to waver whether he should form the fE to the conceptual basis for the reduction of all predicates and ultimately all truths, or only a metaphysical basis, on which all truths supervene. (>Supervenience, >Reduction). Schwarz I 102 Naturalness/Natural/Property/Content/Lewis: the actual content is then the most natural candidate that matches the behavior. "Toxic" is not a perfectly natural property (p.n.p.), but more natural than "more than 3.78 light years away" and healthy and less removed and toxic". Naturalness/Degree/Lewis: (1986e⁽³⁾:, 61,63,67 1984b⁽⁴⁾:66): the naturalness of a property is determined by the complexity or length of their definition by perfectly natural properties. PnE: are always intrinsically and all their Boolean combinations remain there. Problem: extrinsic own sheep threaten to look unnatural. Also would e.g. "Red or breakfast" be much more complicated to explain than e.g. "has charge -1 or a mass, whose value is a prime number in kg. (Although it seems to be unnatural by definition). Naturalness/Property/Lewis: (1983c⁽⁵⁾, 49): a property is, the more natural the more it belongs to surrounding things. Vs: then e.g. "cloud" less natural than e.g. "table in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant or clock showing 7:23". Schw I 103 Naturalness/Properties/Lewis: (1983c⁽⁵⁾: 13f): naturalness could be attributed to similarity between characteristics: E.g. a class is more natural, the more the properties of its elements resemble each other. Similarity: Lewis refers to Armstrong: similarity between universals 1978b⁽⁶⁾,§16.2,§21, 1989b⁽⁷⁾: §5.111997 §4.1). Ultimately LewisVs. Naturalness/Lewis/Schwarz: (2001a⁽⁸⁾:§4,§6): proposing test for naturalness, based on similarity between individual things: coordinate system: "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" axis. A property is then the more natural, the more dense and more compact the appropriate region is. Problem: 1. that presupposes gradual similarity and therefore cannot be well used to define gradual naturalness. 2. the pnE come out quite unnatural, because the instances often do not strongly resemble each other. E.g. if a certain mass property is perfect, of course, then all things with this mass build a perfectly natural class, no matter how dissimilar they are today. SchwarzVsLewis: it shows distinctions between natural and less natural properties in different areas, but does not show that the distinction is always the same. Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: could also depend on interests and biological expression. And yet, can in various ways the different types of natural - be determined by perfect naturalness. That is not much, because at Lewis all, by definition, by the distribution of p.n.p. is determined. ((s)>Mosaic). Schwarz I 122 Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: not reasonable to assume that it was objectively, regardless of how naturally it appears to us. Lewis introduced objective naturalness as a metaphysical basis for qualitative, intrinsic similarity and difference, as some things resemble each other like eggs and others do not. (see above 5.2). Intrinsic Similarity: also qualitative character and duplication: these terms are intended to be our familiar terms by Lewis. SchwarzVsLewis: but if objective naturalness is to explain the distinction of our opinions about similarity, one cannot ask with sense the question whether the distinction serves exactly this. So although there are possible beings (or worlds) whose predicates express relatively unnatural properties and therefore are wrong about natural laws, without being able to discover the error. But we can be sure a priori that we do not belong to them. Problem: the other beings may themselves believe a priori to be sure that their physical predicates are relatively natural. Solution: but they (and not we) were subject to this mistake, provided "natural" means in their mouth the same as with us. ((s) but we also could just believe that they are not subject to error. Respectively, we do not know whether we are "we" or "they"). Schwarz: here is a tension in our concept of natural law (NL): a) on the one hand it is clear that we can recognize them empirically. b) on the other hand they should be objective in a strong sense, regardless of our standards and terms. Problem: Being with other standards can come up with the same empirical data to all other judgments of NL. Schwarz I 134 Event/SchwarzVsLewis: perhaps better: events but as the regions themselves or the things in the regions: then we can distinguish e.g. the flight from the rotation of the ball. Lewis appears to be later also inclined to this. (2004d)⁽⁹⁾. Lewis: E.g. the death of a man who is thrown into a completely empty space is not caused by something that happens in this room, because there is nothing. But when events are classes of RZ regions, an event could also include an empty region. Def Qua thing/Lewis/Schwarz: later theory: “Qua-things” (2003)⁽¹⁰⁾: E.g. „Russell qua Philosoph“: (1986d^(9a),247): classes of counterpieces – versus: LewisVsLewis: (2003)⁽¹⁰⁾ Russell qua Philosoph and Russell qua Politician and Russell are identical. Then the difference in counterfactual contexts is due to the determined by the respective description counterpart relation. These are then intensional contexts. (Similar to 1971⁽¹¹⁾). counterfactual asymmetry/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis' analysis assumes similarity between possible worlds. HorwichVsLewis: (1987⁽¹⁵⁾,172) should explain why he is interested in this baroque dependence. Problem/SchwarzVsLewis: so far, the analysis still delivers incorrect results E.g. causation later by earlier events. Schwarz I 139 Conjunctive events/SchwarzVsLewis: he does not see that the same is true for conjunctive events. Examples A, B, C, D are arbitrary events, so that A caused B and C caused D. If there is an event B&C, which exactly occurs when both B and C happen, then A is the cause of D: without A, B would not have happened, neither B&C. Likewise D would not have happened without B&C. Because causation is transitive, thus any cause causes any effect. Note: according to requirement D would not happen without C, but maybe the next possible world, in which B&C are missing, is one in which C is still taking place? According to Lewis the next possible world should however be one where the lack of cause is completely extinguished. Schwarz: you cannot exclude any conjunctive events safely. E.g. a conversation or e.g. a war is made up of many events and may still be as a whole a cause or effect. Lewis (2000a⁽¹³⁾, 193) even used quite unnatural conjunctions of events in order to avoid objections: E.g. conjunction from the state of brain of a person and a decision of another person. Absence/Lewis/Schwarz: because Lewis finds no harmless entities that are in line as absences, he denies their existence: they are no events, they are nothing at all, since there is nothing relevant. (200a, 195). SchwarzVsLewis: But how does that fit together with the Moore's facts? How can a relationship be instantiated whose referents do not exist?. Moore's facts/Schwarz: E.g. that absences often are causes and effects. Something to deny that only philosopher comes to mind. I 142 Influence/SchwarzVsLewis: Problem: influence of past events by future. Example had I drunk from the cup already half a minute ago, then now a little less tea would be in the cup, and depending on how much tea I had drunk half a minute ago, how warm the tea was then, where I then had put the cup, depending on it the current situation would be a little different. After Lewis' analysis my future tea drinking is therefore a cause of how the tea now stands before me. (? Because Ai and Bi?). Since the drinking incidents are each likely to be similar, the impact is greater. But he is not the cause, in contrast to the moon. Schwarz I 160 Know how/SchwarzVsLewis: it is not entirely correct, that the phenomenal character must be causal effect if the Mary and Zombie pass arguments. For causal efficacy, it is sufficient if Mary would react differently to a phenomenally different experience ((s) >Counterfactual conditional). Dualism/Schwarz: which can be accepted as a dualist. Then you can understand phenomenal properties like fundamental physical properties. That it then (as above Example charge 1 and charge 1 switch roles in possible worlds: is possible that in different possible worlds the phenomenal properties have their roles changed, does not mean that they are causally irrelevant! On the contrary, a particle with exchanged charge would behave differently. Solution: because a possible world, in which the particle has a different charge and this charge plays a different role, is very unlike to our real world! Because there prevail other laws of nature. ((s) is essential here that besides the amended charge also additionally the roles were reversed? See above: >Quidditism). SchwarzVsLewis: this must only accept that differences in fundamental characteristics do not always find themselves in causal differences. More one must not also accept to concede Mary the acquisition of new information. Schwarz I 178 Content/Individuation/Solution/LewisVsStalnaker: (1983b⁽²⁾, 375, Fn2, 1986e⁽³⁾, 34f), a person may sometimes have several different opinion systems! E.g. split brain patients: For an explanation of hand movements to an object which the patient denies to see. Then you can understand arithmetic and logical inference as merging separate conviction fragments. Knowledge/Belief/Necessary truth/Omniscience/SchwarzVsLewis/SchwarzVsFragmentation: Problem: even within Lewis' theory fragmentation is not so easy to get, because the folk psychology does not prefer it. Schwarz I 179 E.g. at inconsequent behavior or lie we do not accept a fragmented system of beliefs. We assume rather that someone changes his beliefs or someone wants to mislead intentionally. E.g. if someone does not make their best move, it must not be the result of fragmentation. One would assume real ignorance contingent truths instead of seeming ignorance of necessary truths. Fragmentation does not help with mathematical truths that must be true in each fragment: Frieda learns nothing new when she finally finds out that 34 is the root of the 1156. That they denied the corresponding proposition previously, was due to a limitation of their cognitive architecture. Knowledge/Schwarz: in whatever way our brain works, whether in the form of cards, records or neural networks - it sometimes requires some extra effort to retrieve the stored information. Omniscience/Vs possible world/Content/VsLewis/Schwarz: the objection of logical omniscience is the most common objection to the modeling mental and linguistic content by possible worlds or possible situations. SchwarzVsVs: here only a problem arises particularly, applicable to all other approaches as well. Schwarz I 186 Value/Moral/Ethics/VsLewis/Schwarz: The biggest disadvantage of his theory: its latent relativism. What people want in circumstances is contingent. There are possible beings who do not want happiness. Many authors have the intuition that value judgments should be more objective. Solution/Lewis: not only we, but all sorts of people should value under ideal conditions the same. E.g. then if anyone approves of slavery, it should be because the matter is not really clear in mind. Moral disagreements would then in principle be always solvable. ((s)>Cognitive deficiency/Wright). LewisVsLewis: that meets our intuitions better, but unfortunately there is no such defined values. People with other dispositions are possible. Analogy with the situation at objective probability (see above 6.5): There is nothing that meets all of our assumptions about real values, but there is something close to that, and that's good enough. (1989b⁽⁷⁾, 90 94). Value/Actual world/Act.wrld./Lewis: it is completely unclear whether there are people in the actual world with completely different value are dispositions. But that does not mean that we could not convince them. Relativism/Values/Morals/Ethics/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis however welcomes a different kind of relativism: desired content can be in perspective. The fate of my neighbor can be more important to me than the fate of a strangers. (1989b⁽¹⁴⁾, 73f). Schwarz I 232 Truthmaker principle/SchwarzVsLewis: here is something rotten, the truth maker principle has a syntax error from the outset: we do not want "the world as it is", as truth-makers, because that is not an explanation, we want to explain how the world makes the truth such as the present makes propositions about the past true. Schwarz I 233 Explanation/Schwarz: should distinguish necessary implication and analysis. For reductive metaphysics necessary implication is of limited interest. SchwarzVsLewis: he overlooks this when he wrote: "A supervenience thesis is in the broader sense reductionist". (1983,29). Elsewhere he sees the difference: E.g. LewisVsArmstrong: this has an unusual concept of analysis: for him it is not looking for definitions, but for truth-makers ". 1. David Lewis [1979a]: “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se”. Philosophical Review, 88: 513–543. 2. David Lewis [1983b]: “Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation”. Philosophical Review, 92: 3–32. 3. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 4. David Lewis [1984b]: “Putnam’s Paradox”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377 5. David Lewis [1983c]: “New Work for a Theory of Universals”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377. 6. David M. Armstrong [1978b]: Universals and Scientific Realism II: A Theory of Universals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 7. David M. Armstrong [1989b]: Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder: Westview Press 8. David Lewis [2001a]: “Redefining ‘Intrinsic’ ”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63: 381-398 9. David Lewis [2004d]: “Void and Object”. In [Collins et al. 2004], 277–291 9a. David Lewis [1986d]: “Events”. In [Lewis 1986f]: 241–269 10. David Lewis [2003]: “Things qua Truthmakers”. Mit einem Postscript von David Lewis und Gideon Rosen. In Hallvard Lillehammer und Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (Hg.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D.H. Mellor, London: Routledge, 25–38. 11. David Lewis [1971]: “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies”. Journal of Philosophy, 68: 203–211. 12. David Lewis [1987]: “The Punishment that Leaves Something to Chance”. Proceedings of the Russellian Society, 12: 81–97. 13. David Lewis [2000a]: “Causation as Influence”. Journal of Philosophy, 97: 182–197. Gekürzte Fassung von [Lewis 2004a] 14. David Lewis [1989b]: “Dispositional Theories of Value”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 63: 113-137. 15. Paul Horwich [1987]: Asymmetries in Time. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press	Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Lewis, D.	Kripke Vs Lewis, D.	I 55 Possible Worlds/Kripke: If someone demands that any world must be described in a purely qualitative manner, we cannot say "suppose Nixon had lost the election"; we must rather apply a prescription: "suppose a man who looks like an incarnation of David Frye and who has a dog named Checkers is located in a specific possible world and loses the election." An example of this Counterpart Theory is David Lewis. Possible world/Lewis: Counterparts, not the same people - Kripke: Then it is not about identification but similarity relation. KripkeVsLewis: His possible worlds are like foreign countries. Strictly speaking, his view is not a conception of "identification of possible worlds". He is rather of the opinion that the similarities between possible worlds determine a counterpart relation that is neither symmetric nor transitive. The counterpart is never identical to the object. When we say "Humphrey could have won the election if he had done something else" then we do not talk about something that could have happened to Humphrey. We are talking about something, a "counterpart" that could have happened to somebody. KripkeVsLewis: his conception seems to be even more bizarre than the usual terms of the identification in possible worlds to me. I 90/91 Counterpart/Lewis: Representatives of the theories that a possible world is given to us only qualitatively ("Counterpart Theory", David Lewis) argue that Aristotle or his counterparts can be "identified in other possible worlds" with the things who resemble the most to Aristotle’s most important characteristics. KripkeVsLewis: Aristotle’s main characteristics are in his works, Hitler in his murderous political role. But both could have lived without having had these characteristics at all. There is no logical destiny hanging over them which would make it inevitable that they would possess the characteristics which are important for them in our opinion. Important characteristics do not need to be essential. I 181 Counterpart (Lewis) is qualitatively defined - KripkeVs: Possible world is not qualitatively defined but determined. V XIII KripkeVsLewis: E.g. a round plate of homogeneous material. The question whether this plate rotates or not is a characteristic of the world which does not supervene on the arrangement of qualities(AoQ)! We could have two possible worlds, one with a rotating and the other with a rotating plate, and the arrangement of qualities would be exactly the same.	Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984
Mackie, J. L.	Nagel Vs Mackie, J. L.	III 61 Ethics/Objectivity/Nagel: assumption of objective values and reasons can be challenged if a subjective opinion is more plausible. Not even the assumption of a radical falsity of our ethics is contradictory. Realism then helps, however, to consider certain alternatives more plausible than others. Realism/Ethics/Nagel: I believe that, in principle, the possibility of realism cannot be proven by anything. We can only refute arguments for its impossibility. III 62 ArgumentsVsRealism: 1) VsRealism/Ethics/Mackie: petitio principii: if values are something real, they must be real objects of an ontologically fundamentally different kind. Mackie: Thesis: values are not a part of the fabric of the world. If they were, they would be "beings, qualities or relations of a very strange kind that would be quite different from all other things in the world". (Position). NagelVsMackie: he is obviously in possession of a very particular image of the world (e.g. without the "non-natural qualities" of Moore). But the assumption is not correct! The aspect of being bad in the impersonal sense is not a mysterious additional property of pain. The recognition of values does not mean that they are something occult, but that they are real values! That means in consequence that our statements about reasons related to these values can be true or false! III 63 MackieVsNagel: he had shown him in the wrong light: his doubts did not refer to strange entities, but to the reasons themselves. And precisely those reasons are not needed to explain something that happens. Therefore, there is no reason to believe in their existence. NagelVsMackie: this raises the problem at another level again: petitio principii: the assumption that utility is a criterion for existence. NagelVsMackie: the thesis that there are special reasons, is a normative thesis and not a statement about the best explanation! Best Explanation/BE/Nagel: if we presume that only that is real which needs to occur in the best explanation of the world, we assume that there are no irreducible normative truths.	NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982
Mackie, J. L.	Putnam Vs Mackie, J. L.	V 276 Ethics/Mackie thesis: the good is ontologically "strange": one cannot know that something is good, without having a "Pro" attitude with regard to this something. This boils down to that one presupposes the emotivism to prove it. It also presupposes that there is ONE TRUE THEORY. PutnamVsMackie: but that does not mean that the linguistic use is not correct, there are also cases of conscious infringement. Philippa Foot: you may even intend to be a bad person. V 277 The difference between prescriptive and descriptive use is not a bad feature of the vocabulary. From the fact that "good" is used for recommendations, it does not follow that it is not a property. V 278 Properties/Mackie: thesis: there is no property like "to be justified", but only "justification settings". PutnamVsMackie: thus we fall into total relativism. For the "dedicated physicalists" there is even the problem that the reference (reference) is "ontologically strange". There are simply too many "candidates" (relations) for this post. Namely endlessly many. Nature/Putnam: a priority would really be strange because we have built a certain neutrality, a certain blankness into our concept of nature. Nature should neither have interests nor intentions, nor a position. Would a physicalist property be identical with moral correctness, that would be really weird. As if nature itself had intentions of reference. V 279 Insofar, Moore was right. But that does not schow that the good, the right, etc. do not exist. It only shows that the monistic naturalism (or "physicalism") represents an inadequate theory. --- I (g) 201 Causality/Mackie: is something epistemic and nothing at all in the world. However, there can be "mechanical causality" next to it in the world. (> G. Vollmer: nowadays causality is traced back to energy transfer,). I (g) 202 PutnamVsMackie: but this is difficult to see without counterfactual sentences. E.g. Putnam: then my practical frictionless operation of a switch does not represent a "mechanical cause". PutnamVsMackie/PutnamVsVollmer: such a narrow term may be physically useful, but it is not useful for explaining reference. On the other hand, when the circuit is mechanical causality, how do we characterizes it then without the counterfactual sentence: "The current would not have flown through the wire if the switch had not been moved"?	Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Maturana, H.	Luhmann Vs Maturana, H.	Kass. 5 Component/"component"/Maturana/LuhmannVsMaturana: strange English: covers too much and leaves open whether the operations or the structures are meant. This may be sufficient for biology, because it does not start out so strongly from events and attributes elemental character to the chemical states and state character to the elements. Even if with a short period of time. Kass. 5 Event/System Theory/Luhmann: in the investigation of consciousness and communication the concept of event imposes itself! (Non-resolvable events). A sentence is said on a certain occasion and not again. Perception is only there in a certain moment. No "components" are necessary. Kass. 6 Structural Coupling/Maturana/Luhmann: I will vary his term a little. Maturana's concept is not precise enough with regard to the causal relationship S/U. System/Maturana: assumes that one can make two statements about a system: 1. it has an autopoietic organization. LuhmannVsMaturana: the concept of organization is unusable for us! It should be enough to say: autopoietic reproduction with great scope. 2. specific structures, depending on the type of creature (mammals, fish, etc.). Kass. 7 Observation/Maturana: life must function biologically. LuhmannVsMaturana: but in biological terms it is more difficult to see which limitations constitute the selection. There are obvious possibilities for expanding complexity. Parallel to sociology: self-fullfilling prophecies: are given into society qua communication and the society that knows how to forecast itself reacts to it.	AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997
Maxwell, G.	Quine Vs Maxwell, G.	II 212ff Maxwell thesis: that our knowledge of the outside world exists in a commonality of structure. Quine: important truth. Definition structure is what we retain when we encode information. --- II 213 The speech about material objects has no qualitative similarities between the objects and the inner state of the speaker, but only one type of coding and of course, causal relations. Maxwell has a theory of relative accessibility of the foreign-psychological with which I agree in a strange way. Quine: difference: I assume that between the knowledge of two individuals with regard to the same things exists a more substantial similarity, than between knowledge and things. But to that, to which our most secure knowledge relates to, is not the knowledge of other people, but publicly perceptible bodies. --- II 213 Knowledge/Quine: between knowledge of two people more substantive similarity than between person and thing (language, observation term has consensus inclination). --- II 213 Properties/Quine: can be emergent: (water) table smooth, brown, but not atoms, similar to "swarm" and "waging war": only for masses because of that not unreal or subjective. Observation Termini have consensus inclination, because they are learned through ostension. --- II 214 Therefore, I share not Maxwell's theoretical belief that "The outside world is not observable." Quine: On the contrary, as an observation scene, the outside world has had little competition. Maxwell denies the colors of the bodies, since they would be accumulations of submicroscopic particles. QuineVsMaxwell: water remains liter for liter of water, even if sub-microscopic particles are rather oxygen and hydrogen. And that has nothing paradoxical. As little paradoxical as that a table remains smooth and brown square inch for square inch, although its submicroscopic particles are discrete, swinging and colorless,. (> Emergence). Qualities: Quine: the qualities of wateriness, of the smoothness and the "being brown" are similar to the properties of swarming and of waging war. They correspond exclusively to masses as properties. Thus they are not getting unreal or subjective. It is not necessary that a predicate is true for each part of the things to which it applies. Finally, not even a figure predicate would stand the test. That specifically wateriness, smoothness and "being brown" are similar in this regard to "being square" (one corner alone is not square) and to the swarming. This is a modern knowledge, it is not a contradiction. QuineVsMaxwell: he reified without questioning the sense data, Humean sensations, floating spots of color. If one attaches the color to a subjective "curtain", there is nothing else than to leave the bodies colorless. Quine pro Maxwell: We agree that bodies and our knowledge of them are not linked by common properties with each other, but only structurally and causally. --- II 214 Knowledge: structurally and causally related to the object, not by similarity. The curtain comes from the time when the philosophy wanted to be closer to the objects than the natural science, and when it claimed, to just pull those curtains aside. --- II 215 Quine: this and not behaviorism is the exaggerated empiricism which must be expelled. Neurath: Philosophy and Science are in the same boat.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
McGee, V.	Field Vs McGee, V.	II 351 Second Order Number Theory/2nd Order Logic/HOL/2nd Order Theory/Field: Thesis (i) full 2nd stage N.TH. is - unlike 1st stage N.TH. - categorical. I.e. it has only one interpretation up to isomorphism. II 352 in which the N.TH. comes out as true. Def Categorical Theory/Field: has only one interpretation up to isomorphism in which it comes out as true. E.g. second order number theory. (ii) Thesis: This shows that there can be no indeterminacy for it. Set Theory/S.th.: This is a bit more complicated: full 2nd order set theory is not quite categorical (if there are unreachable cardinal numbers) but only quasi-categorical. That means, for all interpretations in which it is true, they are either isomorphic or isomorphic to a fragment of the other, which was obtained by restriction to a less unreachable cardinal number. Important argument: even the quasi-categorical 2nd order theory is still sufficient to give most questions on the cardinality of the continuum counterfactual conditional the same truth value in all interpretations, so that the assumptions of indeterminacy in ML are almost eliminated. McGee: (1997) shows that we can get a full second order set theory by adding an axiom. This axiom limits it to interpretations in which 1st order quantifiers go above absolutely everything. Then we get full categoricity. Problem: This does not work if the 2nd order quantifiers go above all subsets of the range of the 1st order quantifiers. (Paradoxes) But in McGee (as Boolos 1984) the 2nd order quantifiers do not literally go above classes as special entities, but as "plural quantifiers". (>plural quantification). Indeterminacy/2nd Order Logic/FieldVsMcGee: (see above chapter I): Vs the attempt to escape indeterminacy with 2nd order logic: it is questionable whether the indeterminacy argument is at all applicable to the determination of the 2nd order logic as it is applicable to the concept of quantity. If you say that sentences about the counterfactual conditional have no specific truth value, this leads to an argument that the concept "all subsets" is indeterminate, and therefore that it is indeterminate which counts as "full" interpretation. Plural Quantification: it can also be indeterminate: Question: over which multiplicities should plural quantifiers go?. "Full" Interpretation: is still (despite it being relative to a concept of "fullness") quasi-unambiguous. But that does not diminish the indeterminacy. McGeeVsField: (1997): he asserts that this criticism is based on the fact that 2nd order logic is not considered part of the real logic, but rather a set theory in disguise. FieldVsMcGee: this is wrong: whether 2nd order logic is part of the logic, is a question of terminology. Even if it is a part of logic, the 2nd order quantifiers could be indeterminate, and that undermines that 2nd order categoricity implies determinacy. "Absolutely Everything"/Quantification/FieldVsMcGee: that one is only interested in those models where the 1st. order quantifiers go over absolutely everything, only manages then to eliminate the indeterminacy of the 1st order quantification if the use of "absolutely everything" is determined!. Important argument: this demand will only work when it is superfluous: that is, only when quantification over absolutely everything is possible without this requirement!. All-Quantification/(s): "on everything": undetermined, because no predicate specified, (as usual E.g. (x)Fx). "Everything" is not a predicate. Inflationism/Field: representatives of inflationist semantics must explain how it happened that properties of our practice (usage) determine that our quantifiers go above absolutely everything. II 353 McGee: (2000) tries to do just that: () We have to exclude the hypothesis that the apparently unrestricted quantifiers of a person go only above entities of type F, if the person has an idea of F. ((s) i.e. you should be able to quantify over something indeterminate or unknown). Field: McGee says that this precludes the normal attempts to demonstrate the vagueness of all-quantification. FieldVsMcGee: does not succeed. E.g. Suppose we assume that our own quantifiers determinedly run above everything. Then it seems natural to assume that the quantifiers of another person are governed by the same rules and therefore also determinedly run above everything. Then they could only have a more limited area if the person has a more restricted concept. FieldVs: the real question is whether the quantifiers have a determinate range at all, even our own! And if so, how is it that our use (practices) define this area ? In this context it is not even clear what it means to have the concept of a restricted area! Because if all-quantification is indeterminate, then surely also the concepts that are needed for a restriction of the range. Range/Quantification/Field: for every candidate X for the range of unrestricted quantifiers, we automatically have a concept of at least one candidate for the picking out of objects in X: namely, the concept of self-identity! ((s) I.e. all-quantification. Everything is identical with itself). FieldVsMcGee: Even thoguh () is acceptable in the case where our own quantifiers can be indeterminate, it has no teeth here. FieldVsSemantic Change or VsInduction!!!. II 355 Schematic 1st Stage Arithmetic/McGee: (1997, p.57): seems to argue that it is much stronger than normal 1st stage arithmetic. G. is a Godel sentence PA: "Primitive Arithmetic". Based on the normal basic concepts. McGee: seems to assert that G is provable in schematic PA ((s) so it is not true). We just have to add the T predicate and apply inductions about it. FieldVsMcGee: that’s wrong. We get stronger results if we also add a certain compositional T Theory (McGee also says that at the end). Problem: This goes beyond schematic arithmetics. McGee: his approach is, however, more model theoretical: i.e. schematic 1st stage N.TH. fixes the extensions of number theory concepts clearly. Def Indeterminacy: "having non-standard models". McGee: Suppose our arithmetic language is indeterminate, i.e. It allows for unintended models. But there is a possible extension of the language with a new predicate "standard natural number". Solution: induction on this new predicate will exclude non-standard models. FieldVsMcGee: I believe that this is cheating (although some recognized logicians represent it). Suppose we only have Peano arithmetic here, with Scheme/Field: here understood as having instances only in the current language. Suppose that we have not managed to pick out a uniform structure up to isomorphism. (Field: this assumption is wrong). FieldVsMcGee: if that’s the case, then the mere addition of new vocabulary will not help, and additional new axioms for the new vocabulary would help no better than if we introduce new axioms simply without the new vocabulary! Especially for E.g. "standard natural number". Scheme/FieldVsMcGee: how can his rich perspective of schemes help to secure determinacy? It only allows to add a new instance of induction if I introduce new vocabulary. For McGee, the required relevant concept does not seem to be "standard natural number", and we have already seen that this does not help. Predicate/Determinacy/Indeterminacy/Field: sure if I had a new predicate with a certain "magical" ability to determine its extension. II 356 Then we would have singled out genuine natural numbers. But this is a tautology and has nothing to do with whether I extend the induction scheme on this magical predicate. FieldVsMysticism/VsMysticism/Magic: Problem: If you think that you might have magical aids available in the future, then you might also think that you already have it now and this in turn would not depend on the schematic induction. Then the only possible relevance of the induction according to the scheme is to allow the transfer of the postulated future magical abilities to the present. And future magic is no less mysterious than contemporary magic. FieldVsMcGee: it is cheating to describe the expansion of the language in terms of its extensions. The cheating consists in assuming that the new predicates in the expansion have certain extensions. And they do not have them if the indeterminist is right regarding the N.Th. (Field: I do not believe that indeterminism is right in terms of N.Th.; but we assume it here). Expansion/Extenstion/Language/Theory/FieldVsMcGee: 2)Vs: he thinks that the necessary new predicates could be such for which it is psychological impossible to add them at all, because of their complexity. Nevertheless, our language rules would not forbid her addition. FieldVsMcGee: In this case, can it really be determined that the language rules allow us something that is psychologically impossible? That seems to be rather a good example of indeterminacy. FieldVsMcGee: the most important thing is, however, that we do not simply add new predicates with certain extensions.	Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
McGinn, C.	Verschiedene Vs McGinn, C.	Metz II 74 consciousness / puzzle / Bieri: we have no idea of what would count as a solution, as understanding. But it would be very strange if it were a special relationship here that exists nowhere else. (BieriVsMcGinn) If there were a being who shows us this strange relationship, we would not understand, we could not understand.
Meinong, A.	Lewis Vs Meinong, A.	IV 262 Fiction/Quantification/Meinong/Lewis: Meinong's supporters should not say that the quantifiers of descriptions of fictional characters go above everything he thinks exists, fictional and non-fictional. But it is also not easy for him to say how limited the range is. Example comparison of fictional persons: a) with other fictitious persons, 1. within the story. 2. between stories b) with non-fictitious persons. For example "Holmes was smarter than Poirot" "Holmes was smarter than any other person", "Holmes was smarter than Watson". Lewis: one could compare Holmes more with Darwin or Newton than with Conan Doyle or Ramsey. For example "smarter than anyone else in the world" this "world partly encompasses the fictional Meinong world, partly the non-fictional world, but both are not exhausted. ((s) However, the term "intelligence" comes from the real world, otherwise it can mean anything). LewisVsMeinong: finally has to explain how the truths from the fictions are sometimes, but not always, excluded from conclusions they should imply. Example it is said that the only building in 221B Baker Street has always been and still is a bank. It doesn't follow, nor is it true, that Holmes lived in a bank. >Fictions/Lewis.	Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Meinong, A.	Read Vs Meinong, A.	Re III 161 Read: Where I say "there might have been a winged horse," Russell and Meinong say: "There is a winged horse, but it does not exist". Read: you can also say: "Consider a situation (an" impossible world ") in which Pegasus is a horse that is not a horse." By that I do not admit that there is such an impossible horse. The difference lies in the value range of the quantifiers.	Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Mereology	Verschiedene Vs Mereology	Schwarz I 34 Temporal Parts/Mereology/Schwarz: but if you accept aggregates from Socrates and the Eiffel Tower, you could still deny that Socrates itself has temporal parts. Lewis: does not even claim that necessarily everything that exists over time consists of temporal parts (1986f⁽¹⁾,x,1986e⁽²⁾,205,1994⁽³⁾ §1) VsStowe: temporal parts should not provide an analysis of temporal existence. Lewis: (1083d⁽⁴⁾,76,similar to Armstrong 1980(5),76): Example: one child, Frieda₁ suddenly disappears, while another child, Frieda₂ suddenly appears. This may contradict the laws of nature, but it is logically possible. Schw I 35 Maybe nobody notices anything. And there would be nothing to notice. Vs: that is not convincing. Endurantism Vs: cannot accept the premises at all. van InwagenVs: Frieda₁ and Frieda₂ cannot exist in such a row and yet remain different. (2000⁽⁶⁾,398) Schwarz I 36 Thing/EndurantismVsLewis/VsMereology: the objects are not the mereological sum of their parts, because the sum and the parts exist even if the things themselves do not exist (e.g. if they are disassembled or broken). Vs: then the term "part" is not used exactly. The scattered parts are then no longer parts, because the (disassembled) bicycle does not exist at that time. Solution/Lewis: Part of the bicycle is only a past temporal part of the gearshift. Personal identity, temporal identity: we too are not identical with any aggregate of molecules, because we constantly exchange many of them with the metabolism. (1988b⁽⁷⁾, 195). 1. David Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 3. David Lewis [1994a]: “Humean Supervenience Debugged”. Mind, 103: 473–490. 4. David Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 5. David Armstrong [1980]: “Identity Through Time”. In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause, Dordrecht: Reidel 6. Peter van Inwagen [2000]: “Temporal Parts and Identity across Time”. The Monist , 83: 437–459. 7. David Lewis [1988b]: “Rearrangement of Particles: Reply to Lowe”. Analysis, 48: 65–72	Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Mill, J. St.	Burks Vs Mill, J. St.	Wolf II 139 Description/Meaning/Burks: most people do not have complete knowledge and yet use the signs correctly. Name/Meaning/Burks: since names generally have several meanings (objects), there is no essential predicate. Some predicates may be causally more important than others. In any case, a possibly essential property does not consist in a conjunction of properties! Any given designated has more properties than those referred to by its proper name (or description). II 140 Description/Meaning/Burks: for example, "this brown table was red yesterday" is not a contradiction: the description is not complete anyway. Name/Meaning/Mill: the property on the basis of which a name is assigned is not part of the meaning. Otherwise we would abolish the name if the thing loses the property. Name/Token/BurksVsMill: different occurrences of the same name type often have different meanings, but always denote the same thing. II 141 Name/Existence/Meaning/Burks: a description could have a meaning and still not designate anything. II 142 Of course one could say that an expression is a name only if it really has something designated, but then the question depends on empirical facts and not on purely linguistic considerations. Burks: "name" should be a purely grammatical category. Abbreviation/Burks: strange: for "this time" there is an abbreviation: "now", but not for "this hat".	Burks I Arthur W. Burks "A Theory of Proper Names", in: Philosophical Studies 2 (1951) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Burks II A. W. Burks Chance, Cause, Reason 1977 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Modal Realism	Verschiedene Vs Modal Realism	Schwarz I 61 VsModal Realism/VsLewis/Ontology/Schwarz: (many authors: he mistakes the essence of modality, creates a basis for skepticism, nihilism and moral decay.) Real existence of all these "parallel universes" is completely implausible. LewisVsVs: the problem with common sense is to be taken seriously, but the methodological advantages of theory prevail. (1986e⁽¹⁾: vii) Solution/Lewis: Limitation of quantifiers: because we limit ourselves to our world, it is right to say that there are no talking donkeys. VsLewis: his possible worlds (poss. w.) are epistemically inaccessible. How do we know they exist? In principle, we could never learn anything about them! LewisVsVs: the objection presupposes that knowledge is acquired causally (causal theory of knowledge) ((s) that possible worlds are not researched logically). If that were correct, we would have no mathematical knowledge either. (1986e⁽¹⁾:109). Schw I 62 VsLewis: this applies only to mathematical Platonism (Group: Lewis: mathematical Platonist - FieldVsLewis). Sv I 64 Modal Realism/Possible World/VsLewis/Schwarz: some: Lewis' possible world should be part of reality, because "world" and "reality" are synonymous expressions for the totality of all things. (Plantinga 1976⁽²⁾, 256f Lycan 1979⁽³⁾, 290): the idea of real things outside the world is simply inconsistent. Reality/World/LewisVsVs: Lewis distinguishes between world and reality: "real world" refers only to a small part of all things (reality includes world, world only part of reality). Thus the contradictions dissolve. Schwarz: this is a neutral formulation of modal realism. Question: what should the reality of maximum objects in space-time have to do with modality? Modality/van InwagenVsLewis/Schwarz: this is about what our world could have been like, not about what any of our isolated things are like. (1885⁽⁴⁾, 119,1986⁽⁵⁾, 226, Plantinga 1987⁽⁶⁾). LewisVsVs: Modal operators are quantifiers about such things. Van InwagenVsLewis: the objection goes deeper: For example, suppose there are exactly 183 spatiotemporal maximum objects. This is not analytically wrong. There is also no rigid designator. Schw I 65 So it might be true or it might not. Lewis seems to claim that there can be as many space-time maximum items as there are sets. VsLewis: with it the whole of the worlds has become contingent! Contingency/Lewis/Schwarz: he has to avoid this, because he wants to analyze contingency over possible worlds. ((s) i.e. contingency means that there are deviating possible worlds, i.e. not first the set of the Possible World (= maximum objects in space-time) and then say that this is the contingency, because then the contingency is not contingent, because it would be a non-contingent limit, if there are only 183 possible worlds. (van InwagenVsLewis/PlantingaVsLewis). ((s) if it were contingent, one could not simply say "there are 183 possible worlds". In other words: "how many possibilities there are depends on the possibilities": circular - but: e.g. "how long it takes depends on the possibilities: e.g. how many attempts you make. Different and also correct: e.g. how many possibilities there are, depends (not on the possibilities) but on the properties, e.g. how wearable the object is. (Lewis ditto). Contingency/Schwarz: means that there are different possible worlds. But the totality of all possible worlds does not exist in single worlds. Therefore the totality itself cannot be different than it is! (s) The totality is not the object of consideration in a possible world.) Totality/Modal Logic/Lewis/Schwarz: unrestricted statements about possible worlds are unrestricted modal statements ((s) shift of the range then not possible! see above). Schwarz: as such, they elude the influence of modal operators: Example: "There is a possible world in which donkeys can speak" is equivalent to "there is a possible world in which donkeys can speak": "N There is a possible world in which donkeys can speak". And with "M There is a possible world in which donkeys can speak." (s) Logical form: Mp > NMp. (S5). Mp > MMp. (neither T nor S4, reduction law, > Hughes/Cresswell⁽⁷⁾ p. 34)). Modal Realism/VsLewis/Schwarz: Problem: how the non-contingency of the possible world fits with its characterization as parallel universes. Contingency/Lewis/Schwarz: either we talk about the totality of reality: then the number of the possible worlds is not contingent - or we talk about reality ((s) Real World), then there is necessarily only one universe (because in every world there is only one, the world itself). Contingency/Schwarz: empirical problem: according to the relativity theory, two universes could be connected by a wormhole. But it is contingent whether this occurs. LewisVs: that is absolutely impossible! ((s) Problem: one would have to claim before the wormhole that there are two universes that can be connected, and that would be a statement about (further) reality and not about (narrower) reality (=Real World) (in which there can only be one universe). (1986e⁽¹⁾:71f) Note: this is the "island universe" (Richards 1975⁽⁸⁾,107f, Bigelow/Pargetter 1987⁽⁹⁾). Island Universes/Bricker: (2001⁽¹⁰⁾,35 39): (completely different version: recombination principle: there is a possible world w, which contains a duplicate of the mereological sum of Hume and Lewis and nothing else - also no space-time between the Hume duplicate and the Lewis duplicate. Consequently, w contains two spatially isolated parts. SchwarzVsBricker: this assumes that space-time relations necessarily require substantial space-time. ((s) >Substantivalism). Solution/Lewis/Schwarz: (1986e,72) Replacement Possibility: his theory allows worlds in which several four-dimensional universes are connected only along an additional fifth dimension, but are isolated in the four normal dimensions. If this is not possible, we must loosen the criterion of spatio-temporal connectedness. Schwarz I 66 Two alternatives: (1986f⁽¹¹⁾, 74f) a) Worlds are connected by relations analog to space-time relations. b) The inhabitants of a possible world stand in any perfectly natural external relation to each other. Schwarz: However, the spatial-temporal distance is the only clear example of this. SchwarzVsLewis: that does not solve the general problem: that things (totality of the possible worlds) could also be different. Schwarz I 68 VsModal Realism/Schwarz: ontological overload. Alternatives: a) "ersatz worlds" - b) fictionalism. Def ersatz world/Ersatzism/Terminology/Lewis: tries to replace possible worlds with sentence sets or facts. Def Fictionalism/VsModal Realism/Schwarz: here no special entities come into play when interpreting sentences about (possible worlds). 1. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 2. Alvin Plantinga 1976]: “Actualism and Possible Worlds”. Theoria, 42: 139–160. In [Loux 1979] 3. William G. Lycan [1979]: “The Trouble with Possible Worlds”. In [Loux 1979]: 274-316 4. Peter van Inwagen 1985]: “Plantinga on Trans-World Identity”. In James Tomberlin und Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Alvin Plantinga: A Profile, Dordrecht: Reidel 5. Peter van Inwagen [1986]: “Two Concepts of Possible Worlds”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 9. In [van Inwagen 2001] 6. Alvin Plantinga [1987]: “Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism”. Philosophical Perspectives, 1: 189–231 7. Hughes, G. E., and M. J. Cresswell. (1996) A New Introduction to Modal Logic. New York, NY: Routledge. 8. Tom Richards [1975]: “The Worlds of David Lewis”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 53: 105–118 9. John Bigelow und Robert Pargetter [1987]: “Beyond the Blank Stare”. Theoria, 53: 97–114 10. Phillip Bricker [2001]: “Island Universes and the Analysis of Modality”. In [Preyer und Siebelt 2001], 27–55 11. David Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press	Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Montague, R.	Verschiedene Vs Montague, R.	Klaus von Heusinger, Eselssätze und ihre Pferdefüsse Uni Konstanz Fachgruppe Sprachwissenschaft Arbeitspapier 64; 1994 Heusinger I 33 Quantifier-free/logical form/everyday language/Hilbert/Epsilon operator/Epsilon analysis/Heusinger: Epsilon expressions: make quantifiers superfluous: instead (complex) epsilon terms. Raise/VsMontague/Heusinger: the general increase of all NP as with Montague can then be dispensed with! (Hintikka 1976). Functor/Argument/Operator/Heusinger: the functor-argument structure can also be found in the grammatical structure. Range/Heusinger: also the dependence on expressions does not have to be represented by interaction of the range.
Montague, R.	Hintikka Vs Montague, R.	II 97 Quantifier/Natural Language/HintikkaVsMontague: his theory is not appropriate because of his treatment of quantifiers. Terminology: "PTQ": Montague: "The Proper Treatment of Quantification in Ordinary English". Montague: Theses: (i) Meaning entities are functions of possible worlds on extensions. (ii) Semantic objects ((s) words) are connected to meaningful expressions by rules that correspond on a one-to-one basis to the syntactic rules by which the expressions are composed. I.e. the semantic rules work from inside out. (iii) Quantifiers: E.g. "a girl", E.g. "every man". II 98 Behave semantically like singular terms. I.e. E.g. "John is happy" and "Every man is happy" are on the same level. Hintikka: ad (i) is the basis of the possible worlds semantics. (It is a generalization of Carnap’s approach). ad (ii) is a form of Frege’s principle (compositionality). ad (iii) has been anticipated by Russell in Principia Mathematica⁽¹⁾. Individuals Domain/Possible World/Montague/Hintikka: Thesis: Montague assumes a constant domain of individuals. HintikkaVsMontague: this is precisely what leads to problems. In particular, in belief contexts. Individual/Montague: individuals are the range of functions that operate as a sense of a singular term. Belief Context/Opaque Context/Belief/Propositional Attitudes/HintikkaVsMontague: Problem: Montague dedicates no special treatment to contexts with propositional attitudes (attitude contexts). E.g. "knowing who", E.g. "remembering where," E.g. "seeing what". This is a deficiency, because Montague had admitted his interest in propositional attitudes. W-Questions/Who/What/Where/Hintikka: Thesis: are nothing more than quantified phrases. II 99 logical form: (1) John knows who the prime minister of Norway is analyzed as a that-construction: (2) (e.g.) John knows that (the Prime Minister of Norway = x) (= de dicto) Problem: you have to specify the individuals domain over which the variable "x" goes ((s) quotation marks from Hintikka). de re: (de re interpretation of (1)): (3) (Ex) (x = Prime Minister of Norway & (Ey) John knows that (x = y)) De Re/De Dicto/Hintikka: de re does not entail de dicto, i.e. (3) does not entail (2). ((s) Because otherwise omniscience would follow again). Knowledge/Hintikka: we do not need to analyze it here as the relation to the alternatives, which singles out one and the same individual in each possible world compatible with the knowledge. HintikkaVsMontague: problem: all this does not work in the context of Montague. Problem: in the natural extension of Montague semantics, which we are considering here, the following sentences are all valid: (4) ((x)(Ey)(x = y) > (Ey)(y = x & (Ez) John knows that y = z))) II 100 Everyday Language Translation/Hintikka: John knows of every currently existing individual who that is (de re). (5) (x)(Ey)(John knows that (x = y)) > (Ey)(y = x & (Ez) Bill knows that (y = z))) Everyday Language Translation/Hintikka: Bill knows of every individual whose identity is known to John who this individual is (again de re). Problem: both are blatantly false. Non-Existence/Hintikka: However, that is not a problem as long as we do not need to consider the possible non-existence of individuals in epistemically possible worlds. Hintikka: Problem: but that does not change the problem. Possible Non-Existence/Hintikka: we do not allow it here, i.e. every individual is somehow linked to one or another individual in every possible world. Terminology/Kaplan/Hintikka: "TWA" "Transworld Heir Line" ((s) same pronunciation) world line that links an individual between possible worlds. Individual: it follows that every individual is well-defined in all possible worlds. This means that the sentences (4) and (5) are valid in our extension of Montague semantics. TWA/World Line//Hintikka: therefore, we must also allow the world lines to break off somewhere and not to be continued ad libitum. Non-Existence/Intensional Logic/Montague: according to Montague’s thesis we need not worry about possible non-existence. For one and the same individual occurs in every possible world as a possible denotation of the same name (name phrase). ((s) Because the individuals domain remains constant). HintikkaVsMontague: that is precisely why our criticism applies to Montague. Non-Existence/Montague Semantics/Hintikka: how can his semantics be modified to allow for possible non-existence in some possible worlds?. II 101 Important argument: Knowing-Who/Knowledge/Hintikka: for John to be able to know who Homer was, it is not necessary that his knowledge excludes all possible worlds in which Homer does not exist. Quantification/Opaque Context/Belief Context/Hintikka: therefor,e we need not assume with the quantification in intensional contexts that a world line exists that connects an existing individual in all knowledge worlds accessible to John. Solution: All we need is that we can say for each of these possible worlds whether the individual exists there or not. ((s) I.e. we do not allow any possible worlds in which the question of the existence or non-existence is meaningless.) E.g. I.e. in this example we only have to exclude those worlds for John, in which it is unclear whether Homer exists or not. World Line/Hintikka: this shows that world lines are independent of the question of the possible non-existence. Quantification/Intensional Contexts/Epistemic/Hintikka: i.e. an existence theorem with quantification in an epistemic (opaque) context E.g. (6) (e.g.) John knows that F(x) can be true, even if there is no world line that singles out an existing individual x in any knowledge world of John. Important argument: but it must always make sense to ask whether the individual exists in a possible world or not. Non-Existence/Hintikka: So there are two possible ways of failure of existence: a) non-existence b) Non-well-definedness (i.e. it does no longer make sense to ask whether an individual exists). World Line: breaks off in both cases, but there is a difference. TWA: can only be drawn if there is comparability between possible worlds, and that is no longer the case in b). II 102 Comparability/Hintikka: always needs regularity (continuity). E.g. spatiotemporal continuity. HintikkaVsMontague: with this distinction we move away from his oversimplified semantics with constant individuals domain. W-Questions/Non-Existence/Hintikka: Variant: Problem: (7) John knows that Homer did not exist. I.e. in every epistemically possible world of John Homer does not exist. This implies that it makes sense to ask about the existence. Uniqueness/Existence/Hintikka: i.e. we must distinguish between existence and uniqueness (determinacy) of an individual. Non-Existence/Hintikka: non-existence does not make the identity of the individual unknown. ((s) otherwise the question would not make sense). II 103 Non-Existence/Not Well Defined/HintikkaVsMontague: Montague semantics does not allow the question of the existence or non-existence to be pointless, because an individual in a possible world is not well defined. ((s) Because the individuals domain is assumed to be consistent in Montague). Individuals Domain/Solution/Hintikka: we have to allow the domain of individuals to be inconsistent. But problem: Quantification/Belief Context/Existence/Truth/Hintikka: In the following example, we must presuppose existence, so that the sentence can be true: (11) John is looking for a unicorn and Mary is, too. ((s) the same unicorn). ((s) numbering sic, then continue with (8)) Range/Quantifier/Hintikka: in the only natural interpretation of (11) it must be assumed that the range of the implicit quantifier is such that "a unicorn" has a longer range than "is looking for". ((s) I.e. both are looking for the same unicorn. Problem: how can you know whether both subjects believe in the same individual or have it in their heads?) ((s) >Geach E.g. „Hob, Cob, Nob, Hob/Cob/Nob E.g. (Geach 1967, 628) Cresswell. II 142 (Needs quantifier that is simultaneoulsy inside and outside the range of the attitude verb). Hob/Conb/Nob-E.g./Geach/(s): ~Hob believes that a witch killed his sow and Nob believes that it is the same witch who bewitched Cob’s horse: problem: the sentence must be true in order to preserve the ordinary language meaning of "believe". On the other hand, it must be wrong, because there are no witches, exacerbation: "the same witch" poses an additional condition to the truth of the sentence. The demanded identity makes it harder to simply say that the three believe something wrong). II 103 Existence/W-Question/Unicorn/Hintikka: nevertheless, example (11) shows that the reading should not oblige us to assume the existence of unicorns. Non-Existence/Epistemic Context/Intensional/Belief/Hintikka: it is obviously possible that two people can seek the same thing, even if it does not exist. Solution: We allow that well-defined individuals do not exist in some possible worlds. For this purpose, only a slight modification is necessary. Problem: in more complex sentence, all the problems resurface: II 104 E.g. John does not know if unicorns exist, yet he is looking for a unicorn, because Mary is looking for one. Problem: here John must be able to recognize a particular unicorn. (because otherwise the sentence that uses "it" would not be true) although he is considering possible non-existence. World Line/Hintikka: to expand the Montague semantics we have to allow more or less unnatural world lines. HintikkaVsMontague: according to his semantics all sentences of the following form would be valid: (8) John knows that (Ex) (x = a) > (Ex) John knows that 0 (x = a) ((s) i.e. conclusion from de dicto to de re.) Everyday Language Translation/Hintikka: John knows the reference of a name immediately if he knows that the name is not empty. That is, of course, often wrong. World Line/Hintikka: therefore, the world lines cannot be identical with lines that connect names with their references. ((s) Otherwise again a kind of omniscience would follow. Moreover, it implies that names are non-rigid.) Species/Common Noun/Hintikka: the same applies to common names (generic names): They cannot identify the same individuals in all possible worlds, otherwise sentences like the following could not be analyze in the possible worlds semantics: E.g. (9) John holds this bush for a bear. Perception Concepts/Perception/Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsMontague: here there are further problems: E.g. all sentences of the following form become contradictory accoridng to Montague semantics: (10) (Ex)(Ey)(x = y & it appears to John visually that x is right of y). I 105 SIolution: It may well be that John sees an object as two. World Line: can split or merge. But according to Montague semantics they are not allowed to! World Line/Possible Worlds/Semantics/Hintikka: a typical case would be if there were two sets of world-lines for one set of possible worlds, these also connected every individual with an individual in another possible world, but the two sets differed in which individual is connected with which. Perception: we need such a possibility for perception verbs ((s) because it may be that you confuse one object with another. Elegance/Theory/Cantor/Hintikka: elegance is something for taylors, not for mathematicians. II 106 Quantification/Quantifiers/Ambiguity/Any/HintikkaVsMontague: All in all, the Montague semantics shows how ambiguity is caused by the interaction of quantifiers and intensional expressions. E.g. (12) A woman loves every man (13) John is looking for a dog. HintikkaVsMontague: only explains why certain expressions may be ambiguous, but not which of them actually are. In general, he predicts too many ambiguities. Because he does not consider the grammatical principles that often resolve ambiguities with quantifiers. Range/Hintikka: determines the logical sequence. Quantifier/Quantification/Each/He/Montague/Hintikka: E.g. (14) If he exerts himself, he will be happy (15) If everyone exerts themselves, they will be happy. Problem: in English "if" has precedence over "every" so that "everyone" in (15) cannot precede "he" as a pronoun ("pronominalize"). II 107 HintikkaVsMontague: So we need additional rules for the order of the application of rules. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.	Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Montague, R.	Stechow Vs Montague, R.	I 44 Types/Stechow: Definition/Linguistics/Stechow: Example for definition of a definition using the semantic ranges defined by types: e.g. for an adjective and a prepositional phrase: "in". Logical Type/Linguistics/Stechow: is a semantic feature of a category symbol. Montague/Stechow: acts as if each syntactic category has exactly one logical type and therefore writes only the categories. He has made this popular. StechowVsMontague: but this is not possible, because a syntactic category does not only correspond to a logical type. Problem: for example, the nomina Fritz, student, father these probably have different meanings: Fritz: designates something of type e, student: type ep, father: Tap e(ep). Then there must also be three different noun categories for Montague. Since we only accept one noun category, we must already write the types in the lexicon. I 104 Intensional Functional Application/IFA/Intensor/Heim/KratzerVsMontague: the intensor can be replaced by the composition principle of the intesional functional application. (Intensional Functional Application): in the metalanguage it does what the interpretation of the intensor does. This makes the calculations simpler: for example Since Montague places a node before each argument, this saves a lot of money. 105 Extensional Functional Application/FA/Montague: with him you first have to dismantle the Intensor and then the FA Intensional Functional Application/Heim/Kratzer: merges both steps. 150 Lambda Abstraction/Stechow: can already be found in Frege (1884)! 151 Quantifying in/Montague/Stechow: Example Each rule consists of a syntactic and a semantic operation. Syntactic operation/Stechow: has always been very simple: just write side by side. Montagues syntactic operation f14,2 is much more complicated: take the first argument of the function (here "every linguist") and replace the first occurrence of the pronoun "him" in the second argument by this expression. The semantics of this rule is of course exactly the semantics of our quantifier relation. I.e. we apply the meaning of the quantifier to the meaning of the λ-abstract that we form from the second expression. VsMontague: Problem: there are infinitely many rules of quantifying in, one for each natural number. This is because we can choose any index for a pronoun. Lambda Calculus/Stechow: you can do almost anything with it. The original work does not contain semantics. (Lit: Lambek, 1958). 152 Type/Not/Stechow: cannot have the type (st)t, then it is a sentence adverb. Or (s(et)(et), then it is a VP modifier. ((s) > narrow range/>wide range).	A. von Stechow I Arnim von Stechow Schritte zur Satzsemantik www.sfs.uniï·"tuebingen.de/~astechow/Aufsaetze/Schritte.pdf (26.06.2006)
Nagel, Th.	Stalnaker Vs Nagel, Th.	I 20 Objective Self/Nagel/Stalnaker: Nagel begins with the expression of a general sense of confusion about one's place in an impersonal world. I: if somebody says "I am RS" it seems that the person expresses a fact. I 21 Important argument: it is an objective fact whether such a statement is true or false, regardless of what the speaker thinks. Problem: our concept of the objective world seems to leave no place for such a fact! A full representation of the world as it is in itself will not pick out any particular person as me. (single out). It will not tell me who I am. Semantic diagnosis: attempts a representation of index words or self-localization as a solution. NagelVsSemantic diagnosis: that does not get to the heart of the matter. StalnakerVsNagel: a particular variant can solve our particular problem here but many others remain with regard to the relation between a person and the world they inhabited, namely what exactly the subjective facts about the experience tell us how the world in itself is Self-identification/Self-localisation/belief/Stalnaker: nothing could be easier: if EA says on June 5, 1953 "I am a philosopher" then that is true iff EA is a philosopher on June 5, 1953. Problem: what is the content of the statement? Content/truth conditions/tr.cond./Self-identification/I/Stalnaker: the content, the information is not recognized through tr.cond. if the tr.cond. are made timeless and impersonal. ((s) The truth conditions for self-identification or self-localization are not homophonic! That means they are not the repetition of "I'm sick" but they need to be complemented by place, date and information about the person so that they are timeless and capable of truth. Problem/Stalnaker: the speaker could have believed what he said, without even knowing the date and place at all or his audience could understand the statement without knowing the date, etc.. Solution: semantic diagnosis needs a representation of subjective or contextual content. Nagel: is in any case certain that he rejects the reverse solution: an ontological perspective that objectifies the self-.properties. Stalnaker: that would be something like the assertion that each of us has a certain irreducible self-property with which he is known. ((s) >bug example, Wittgenstein dito), tentatively I suppose that that could be exemplified in the objectification of the phenomenal character of experience. I 253 Self/Thomas Nagel/Stalnaker: Nagel finds it surprising that he of all people must be from all Thomas Nagel. Self/subjective/objective/Stalnaker: general problem: to accommodate the position of a person in a non-centered idea of an objective world. It is not clear how to represent this relation. Self/I/Nagel/Stalnaker: e.g. "I am TN". Problem: it is not clear why our world has space for such facts. Dilemma: a) such facts must exist because otherwise things would be incomplete b) they cannot exist because the way things are they do not contain such facts. (Nagel 1986, 57). Self/semantic diagnosis/Nagel/Stalnaker: NagelVsSemantic diagnosis: unsatisfactory: NagelVsOntological solution: wants to enrich the objective, centerless world in a wrong way. Nagel: center position thesis: There is an objective self. StalnakerVsNagel: this is difficult to grasp and neither necessary nor helpful. I 254 Semantic diagnosis/StalnakerVsNagel: has more potential than Nagel assumes. My plan is: 1. semantic diagnosis 2. sketch of a metaphysical solution 3. objective self is a mistake 4. general problem of subjective viewpoints 5. context-dependent or subjective information - simple solution for qualitative experiences. Self/subjective/objective/semantic diagnosis/Nagel/Stalnaker: (in Stalnaker's version): This does not include that "I am TN" is supposedly without content. StalnakerVsNagel: the identity of the first person is not "automatically and therefore uninteresting". semantic diagnosis: starts with the tr.cond. WB: "I am F" expressed by XY is true iff XY is F. What information is transmitted with it? I 255 Content/information/self/identity/Stalnaker: a solution: if the following is true: Belief/conviction/Stalnaker: are sets of non-centered poss.w. Content/self-ascription/Stalnaker: is then a set of centered poss.w. E.g. I am TN is true iff it is expressed by TN, Content: is represented by the set of centered poss.w. that have TN as their marked object. Content/conviction/Lewis/Stalnaker: with Lewis belief contents can also be regarded as properties. (Lewis 1979). I 257 Semantic diagnosis/NagelVsSemantic diagnosis/Stalnaker: "It does not make the problem go away". Stalnaker: What is the problem then? Problem/Nagel: an appropriate solution would have to bring the subjective and objective concepts into harmony. I 258 StalnakerVsNagel: for that you would have to better articulate the problem's sources than Nagel does. Analogy. E.g. suppose a far too simple skeptic says: "Knowledge implies truth so you can only know necessary truths". Vs: which is a confusion of different ranges of modality. VsVs: the skeptic might then reply "This diagnosis is not satisfactory because it does not make the problem go away". Problem/Stalnaker: general: a problem may turn out to be more sophisticated, but even then it can only be a linguistic trick. Illusion/explanation/problem/Stalnaker: it is not enough to realize that an illusion is at the root of the problem. Some illusions are persistent, we feel their existence even after they are explained. But that again does not imply that it is a problem. I 259 Why-questions/Stalnaker: e.g. "Why should it be possible that..." (e.g. that physical brain states cause qualia). Such questions only make sense if it is more likely that the underlying is not possible. I 260 Self-deception/memory loss/self/error/Stalnaker: e.g. suppose TN is mistaken about who he is, then he does not know that TN itself has the property to be TN even though he knows that TN has the self-property of TN! (He does not know that he himself is TN.) He does not know that he has the property which he calls "to be me". ((s) "to be me" is to refer here only to TN not to any speaker). objective/non-centered world/self/Stalnaker: this is a fact about the objective, non-centered world and if he knows it he knows who he is. Thus the representative of the ontological perspective says. Ontological perspective/StalnakerVsNagel/StalnakerVsVs: the strategy is interesting: first, the self is objectified - by transforming self-localizing properties into characteristics of the non-centered world. Then you try to keep the essential subjective character by the subjective ability of detecting. I 263 Nagel: thesis: because the objective representation has a subject there is also its possible presence in the world and that allows me to bring together the subjective and objective view. StalnakerVsNagel: I do not see how that is concluded from it. Why should from the fact that I can think of a possible situation be concluded that I could be in it? Fiction: here there are both, participating narrator and the narrator from outside, omniscient or not. I 264 Semantic diagnosis/Stalnaker: may be sufficient for normal self-localization. But Nagel wants more: a philosophical thought. StalnakerVsNagel: I do not think there is more to a philosophical thought here than to the normal. Perhaps there is a different attitude (approach) but that requires no difference in the content! Subjective content/Stalnaker: (as it is identified by the semantic diagnosis) seems to be a plausible candidate to me.	Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Objectivity	Chisholm Vs Objectivity	II 105f Referring/Reference/Brandl: through signs or speaker? Through speaker. Strawson ditto: i.e.use of the sign refers, not the sign itself. Problem: intentionality would have to explain the sign - BrandlVsChisholm: Thesis: pointless to decide whether the language or the mental aspects (intentionality) should prevail. Directedness incomprehensible if designation of words not yet introduced. Separation of the areas would either lead to total behaviorism or psychologism. II 107 "Unit" would not explain anything either! Again question of primacy: either "thinking of" or "talking about" objects Solution: Distinguishing various types of singular terms for various types of reference, but only one type of intentionality. II 120 Objective reference/Chisholm: depends on "epistemic proximity". Possibility of identification. E.g. Suppose Tom were the smallest spy: we could not infer that every reasonable person thinks Tom is a spy. He cannot make a de-re attribution yet. So we do not need to classify this belief attitude as de-re in the strict sense. II 120/121 Suppose e.g. the smallest spy was also the richest coffee trader: then I can give two relationships in which I am exclusively to the smallest spy. If I knew, moreover, that it is the same person, I would have to be "epistemically familiar" with him or her. I might as well already be, even if I only have one source of information, without being acquainted with the person. de-re: I cannot believe anything about the smallest spy de-re, before I know him personally. VsChisholm: we do not learn from him what this closer relationship of "knowing" is to consist in. This again makes it unclear what the mechanism of indirect attribution is supposed to contribute. II 123 Reference/Acquaintance/Description/BrandlVsChisholm: Problem: two types of uniqueness relation correspond to the problem that in addition to the referential one also attributive reference in the game. II 124 Danger of simplification: there is no clear distinction referential/Attributive: we must always ask what role one or the other form of reference has in a particular case. There is a range of possibilities that cannot be explained by the dichotomy ref/att. Own experiences and information from others affect the mechanism of reference. II 125 VsChisholm: only in very special cases, namely the purely referential ones, this succeeds only thanks to "epistemic intimacy". II 126 Question: what could act as such a link between and X? Wittgenstein: two candidates: 1) an image that is more similar to the object than any other 2) an utterance of the presenter which only denotes X. ChisholmVsWittgenstein: The relationship between an utterance (sentence) and an object could not be more "fundamental" than that between V and X. II 128 BrandlVsChisholm: vice versa: Wittgenstein asks a trick question here. If we argue reductionistically, we will never find an end point. We always need more intermediaries as links.	Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Observation Language	Fraassen Vs Observation Language	I 56 Empirical Content/Theory/Fraassen: we have seen that we cannot isolate the empirical content of a theory in the interpretation by saying that language consists of two parts (observation language, theoretical terms). That should not surprise us. Phenomenon/Fraassen: the phenomena are preserved if they are proven to be fragments of a larger unit. FraassenVsObservation Language: it would be very strange if the theories described the phenomena, the observable, in other terms than the rest of the world they describe. A conceptual distinction between the observable and the unobservable is always too easy.	Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Plantinga, A.	Mackie Vs Plantinga, A.	Stegmüller IV 367 Proof of the existence of God/Plantinga: new concept: "Maximal excellence": omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection. "Unsurpassable greatness": maximal excellence in every possible world. Argument: "There is a possible world in which unsurpassable greatnessis exemplified." What is necessary or impossible, cannot vary between worlds. This is based on the system S5 of modal logic. Def S5/modal logic/Stegmüller: is distinguished in that it allows for consecutive (iterated) modalities in statements. However, they always coincide with a single modality, namely the last member of this sequence. Ex. MNNMp: Mp. MackieVsPlantinga: 1. works with "world marked" properties ((s)> world-indexed;> R. Stalnaker, Ways a world may be, Oxford 2003). Thereby, a world becomes dependent on another world. That is, the different possible worlds are no longer independent. IV 368 Thus his system no longer covers the full range of logical possibilities! Therefore, one must not say: system S5 is the appropriate logic for logical possibilities and necessities, even if appropriate for worlds with "world marked" properties. But Plantinga has to make use of a fact that is only valid in S5: that in a sequence of modal operators all may be eliminated but the last one. 2. As Plantinga noted himself, a counterargument by the name of "non-maximality" can be formulated : the property that there is no maximally great being. ((s) So, a property of a world, not of a being.). Argument: there is a possible world that exemplifies non-maximality (thus, maximal greatness is non-nichtexemplified). But if maximal greatness is not exemplified in each world, it is not exemplified at all, it is then impossible. The two premises: "maximality is possibly exemplified" and "non-maximality ....." can not simultaneously be true. 3. We have no reason to prefer the first premise. 4. Plantinga's decision for the first one does not even resemble the flip of a coin! Because we have the third option, to suspend from judgment entirely! 5. Due to the principle of Ockham we should then prefer the simpler one (non-maximality). Stegmüller IV 478 Theodicy/evil/possible worlds/Plantinga: "cross world depravity": every being that commits at least one reprehensible act in each possible world suffers from this property. IV 479 If it is possible that each created and free being suffers from this severe form of depravity, even God could not have created a world which didn't contain anything morally bad. MackieVsPlantinga: this option would only exist if God had to pick from a limited number of people. But earlier we saw the logical possibility of people freely choosing the good. The restriction of a selection of possible persons adopted by Plantinga is thus logically contingent. But how could there be logically contingent facts before the creation and existence of any creatures with freewill that an almighty God would have to accept? His omnipotence is indeed only limited by the logically impossible.	Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Presentism	Lewis Vs Presentism	Schwarz I 19 Past/Future/LewisVsPresentism: it is common sense that the last moon landing was in 1972 and that certain species are long extinct. Presentism: but also refers to common sense and claims that these things are no longer real. To be past means to no longer exist. There will also be future species only when they are there. There is only what exists now (give/exist/"there is"). LewisVsPresentism: "there is": Lewis does not claim that "dinosaurs exist now". But they do exist (although not today). They only exist in the past. But the presentist also accepts this. Then what is the point of contention? Schwarz I 20 Solution: has to do with the area of quantification. Quantification/Area/Schwarz: unlimited quantifiers are rare and are part of metaphysics. Example "there is no God" refers to the whole universe. Example: "There is no beer": refers to the refrigerator. Existence/Lewis/Schwarz: so there are different "ways of existence". Numbers exist in a different way than tables. Existence/Presentism: his statements about what exists are absolutely unlimited. Four-dimensionalism/Existence: statements about what exist ignore from his point of view past and future. When we say that there are no dinosaurs ((s) then we (wrongly) extend the present into the past.) Schwarz: through the present tense we indicate that we are not talking about absolutely everything, but only about the present. Quantification/Schwarz: can also be neutral in the present. But it doesn't depend on grammar. Schwarz I 21 Solution: make true: what makes the sentences true, e.g. that Socrates drank the cup of hemlock? Four-dimensionalism truthmakers: the events in the past part of reality. Presentism: does not believe in past parts of reality. But then the truthmaker must be a characteristic of the present! VsPresentism: Problem: the present is logically not dependent on the past. It is possible that the world was only created five minutes ago. Reality/Presentism: (some representatives) one does not grasp reality by just determining what things are present. That Socrates existed is not true because there are certain things now, but because they existed then. Statements about what has existed and will exist express basic facts that cannot be reduced to statements about what is. Then the sentence operators "it was a case that," and "it will be the case" are primitive and unanalytic. (Prior, 1969⁽¹⁾). Properties/LewisVsPrior/LewisVsPresentism: Vs these primitive operators: All truths must be based on what kind of things with what qualities there are. The two operators above would not be sufficient. Example "Socrates is still admired today" ((s) This does not distinguish the present from the past as desired here. Example "There were several English kings named Charles": Problem: there was no time when there were several. Then, among other things, plural past quantifiers must also be accepted. Four dimensionalism/Lewis: Solution: Temporal operators simply move the range of quantifieres. Example "...1642" is like "...in Australia". Then: with "there were several English kings named Charles" we quantify about a larger part of the past, perhaps about all past things together. Presentism: (some representatives) try to acquire it without sharing the metaphysics: Reference to "Socrates" or "1642" is then somehow abstract and of a completely different kind than that to concrete things (Bigelow 1996). Perhaps past times are linguistic fictions, sentences and their inhabitants contained in them (descriptions). Then, for example, "cup of hemlock" would not require that there is someone of flesh and blood who does anything. (!) It is enough if a fiction tells about it ((s) >Fiction/Field). Schwarz I 22 Other solution/presentism: such sentences about past things as set-theoretical constructions of present things: the Socrates of the year 399 is then a set of now existing qualities, among them also the characteristic to drink the hemlock cup. VsPresentism: not all things that ever existed can be described in our language or constructed from current events. Besides, there are many fictions that have nothing to do with them. What distinguishes the "real" from the "false"? Four dimensionalism: "Surrogate V" ("Replacement V"): interprets other times and their inhabitants as metaphysically fundamental entities. Example "Socrates" refers to an irreducible entity ("being") that is somehow linked to the qualities we assume from Socrates. (LewisVs) Problem: the link must not be that the entity has these properties! Because that would be the true four dimensionalism. LewisVs "ersatz world": no theory of substitute Socrats can be developed where these are really "abstract". PresentismVsFour-dimensionalism: sweeps essential aspects of reality under the carpet: what will become of the flow of time, the change of things and the peculiarity of the present? The four-dimensional block universe never changes. His time dimension "does not flow". E.g. then I can't be happy that the visit to the dentist is over, because it is still just as real. Four-dimensionalismVsPresentism: e.g. visit to the dentist: I am glad that it is no longer there, not that it has been erased from reality. Just as I'm glad the attack didn't happen here, but elsewhere. 1. Arthur N. Prior [1969]: Past, Present and Future. Oxford: Oxford University Press	Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Putnam, H.	Verschiedene Vs Putnam, H.	Davidson II 196 GlüerVsPutnam: Davidson should not adopt Putnam's own interpretation (due to his scientistic essentialism). The beliefs in question play identical inferential roles in their belief systems, since neither the one nor the other by definition have chemical knowledge. The radical interpreter should be skeptical of Putnam's idea of the essence of a natural species, also and especially of a species yet to be discovered scientifically. Putnam's assumptions also collide with the authority of the first person. Yet Davidson's argumentation lives on Putnam's assumption that the mental type of an event is not determined by its physical type. Putnam V 42 Example Twin Earth: (Water: H20/ Twin Earth Water: XYZ,1750): different reference but no essentially different state of mind. The reference is different, because the material is different! VsPutnam: some philosophers: one should say: "there are two kinds of water", and not that our word "water" does not refer to the liquid of twin earths. According to these authors, we have simply falsified the statement that all water is H2O. PutnamVsVs: the example can be changed without difficulty so that it is not affected by this argument: For example, let's assume that the water on the twin earth is actually a mixture of 20 % ethyl alcohol and 80 % water. Putnam V 60 Löwenheim-Skolem/Putnam/VsPutnam (Example): one could argue that the above definitions refer to things that are different from the objects in question (e.g. cherries on trees and cats on mats), extrinsic properties. In the real world, every cherry is a cat, but if there was no cherry on a tree, it wouldn't be a cat either, even if its intrinsic properties were exactly the same! Whether something is a cat or not, on the other hand, depends only on its intrinsic properties. PutnamVsVs: the difficulty of this proposal is a certain symmetry in the relationship of "cat" and "mat" to "cat" and "mat". Example: as above, only trees* should now be photons in case (c). Strangely enough these cases are exactly our old cases (a),(b),(c) under a new description.(+ V 60,61) in all three cases cats turn out to be cats! V 61 Analogously varied example with quark* as mat (in c)), then mats turn out to be mats in all three cases.	Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Pythagoras	Quine Vs Pythagoras	XII 75 Löwenheim/Skolem/Strong Form/Axiom of Choice/Ontology/Reduction/Ontological Relativity/Quine: (early form): Thesis: if a theory is true and has a hyper-countable object range, then everything except for a countable section is superfluous, in the sense that it can be eliminated from the range of the variables, without any sentence becoming false. I.e. all acceptable theories can be reduced to countable ontologies. And these, in turn, to a specific ontology of natural numbers. For that you take the list, as far as it is explicitly known, as SF. And even if the list is not known, it exists. Accordingly, we can interpret all our objects as natural numbers, even though the list number ((s) the name) is not always known. Ontology: could we not establish a Pythagorean multi-purpose ontology once and for all? Pythagorean Ontology/Terminology/Quine: consists either only of numbers or only of bodies, or of sets, etc. Problem: Suppose we had such an ontology and somebody offered us something that would have appeared as an ontological reduction prior to our decision for the Pythagorean ontology, namely a method by which all things of a certain type A are superfluous in future theories, while the remaining portion would still be infinite. XII 76 In the new Pythagorean framework his discovery would still retain its essential content, even though it could no longer be called a reduction; it would be only a maneuver in which some numbers - we do not even know which - would lose a number property corresponding to A. VsPythagoreism: it shows that an all-engulfing Pythagoreanism is not attractive, because it only offers new and more obscure versions of old methods and problems. Solution: Ontological relativity, relativistic theory. It's simply pointless to speak of the ontology of a theory in absolute terms. ((s) i.e. in this case to assert that everything is a number.) (>inside/outside). The relevant predicates, e.g. "number", "set", "body" or whatever, would be distinguishable in the frame theory, however, by the roles they play in the laws of this theory. Quine: an ontological reduction is only interesting if we can specify an SF. If we have the axiom of choice and even a sign for a general selection operator, can we then specify an SF that concretizes the Löwenheim theorem? 1) We divide the object range into a countable number of equivalence classes, each with indistinguishable objects. (Indistinguishability Classes). We can dispense with all members of every equivalence class, except one. 2) Then we'll make use of the axiom of choice to pick out a survivor from each equivalence class. XII 77 Quine: if this were possible, we could write down a representative function with Hilbert's selection operator. Löwenheim/Quine: but the proof of the theorem has a different structure: it does not seem to justify the assumption that a representative function could be formulated in any theory that maps a hyper-countable range in a countable one. At first glance, such an SF is of course impossible: it would have to be reversibly unique to provide different real numbers with different function values. And this contradicts the mapping of a hyper-countable into a countable range, because it cannot be reversibly unambiguous. ((s) Because it has to assign the same value to two arguments somehow.) Framework Theory/Stronger/Weaker/Theory/Ontology/Quine: there are three strength levels of requirements regarding what is said about the ontology of the object theory within the framework theory. 1) weakest requirement to the framework theory: is sufficient if we do not want any reduction, but only explain about what things the theory is. I.e. we translate the object theory into the framework theory. I.e. we make translation proposals, with which, however, the inscrutability of reference still is to be taken into account. The two theories may even be identical, e.g. if some terms are explained by definitions by other terms of the same language. XII 78 2) stronger: in case of reduction by an SF, here the frame theory must assume the non-reduced range. (see above, analogy to raa, reductio ad absurdum). 3) strongest requirements: in case of reductions according to Löwenheim: i.e. from a hyper-countable to a countable range: here, the SF must be from a truly stronger frame theory. I.e. we can no longer accept it in the spirit of the raa. Conclusion: this thwarts an argument from the Löwenheim theorem in favor of Pythagoreanism. Ontological Relativity/Finite Range/Quine: in a finite range, ontological relativity is trivial. Since instead of quantification you can assume finite conjunctions or disjunctions, the variables and thus also the question of their value range also disappear. Even the distinction between names and other signs is eliminated. Therefore, an ontology for a finite theory about named objects is pointless. That we have just talked about it is because we were moving in a broader context. Names/Quine: are distinguished by the fact that they may be used for variables.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Quine, W.V.O.	Davidson Vs Quine, W.V.O.	I (c) 41 Quine connects meaning and content with the firing of sensory nerves (compromise proposal) This makes his epistemology naturalistic. - DavidsonVsQuine: Quine should drop this (keep naturalism) but what remains of empiricism after deducting the first two dogmas. - DavidsonVsQuine: names: "Third Dogma" (> Quine, Theories and Things, Answer) dualism of scheme and content. Davidson: Scheme: Language including the ontology and world theory contained in it; I 42 - Content: the morphological firing of the neurons. Argument: something like the concept of uninterpreted content is necessary to make the concept relativism comprehensible. In Quine neurological replacement for sensory data as the basis for concept relativism. Davidson: Quine separation of scheme and content, however, becomes clear at one point: (Word and Object). Quine: "... by subtracting these indications from the worldview of people, we get the difference of what he contributes to this worldview. This difference highlights the extent of the conceptual sovereignty of the human, the area where he can revise his theories without changing anything in the data." (Word and Object, beginning) I 43 - Referring to QuineVsStroud: "everything could be different": we would not notice... -DavidsonVsQuine: Is that even right? According to the proximal theory, it could be assumed: one sees a rabbit, someone else sees a warthog and both say: Gavagai! (Something similar could occur with blind, deaf, bats or even with low-level astigmatism. The brains in the tank may be wrong even to the extent that Stroud feared. But everyone has a theory that preserves the structure of their sensations. I (c) 55 So it is easy to understand Cresswell when he says CreswellVsQuine: he has an empire of reified experiences or phenomena which confronts an inscrutable reality. QuineVsCresswell> Quine III) - I (c) 64 DavidsonVsQuine: he should openly advocate the distal theory and recognize the active role of the interpreter. The speaker must then refer to the causes in the world that both speak and which are obvious for both sides. I (d) 66 DavidsonVsQuine: His attempt is based on the first person, and thus Cartesian. Nor do I think we could do without some at least tacitly agreed standards. ProQuine: his courageous access to epistemology presented in the third person. I (e) 93 Quine: ontology only physical objects and classes - action not an object - DavidsonVsQuine: action: event and reference object. Explicating this ontology is a matter of semantics. Which entities must we assume in order to understand a natural language? McDowell I 165 McDowell: World/Thinking/Davidson: (according to McDowell): general enemy to the question of how we come into contact with the empirical world. There is no mystery at all. No interaction of spontaneity and receptivity. (DavidsonVsQuine) Scheme/Content/Davidson: (Third Dogma): Scheme: Language in Quine - Content: "empirical meaning" in Quine. (I 165) Conceptual sovereignty/Quine: can go as far as giving rise to incommensurable worldviews. DavidsonVsQuine: experience cannot form a basis of knowledge beyond our opinions. It would otherwise have to be simultaneously inside and outside the space of reason. Fodor/Lepore IV 225 Note 13.> IV 72 Radical Inerpretation/RI/Quine: his version is a first step to show that the concept of linguistic meaning is not scientifically useful and that there is a "large range" in which the application can be varied without empirical limitation. (W + O, p. 26> conceptual sovereignty). DavidsonVsQuine: in contrast to this: RI is a basis for denying that it would make sense to claim that individuals or cultures had different conceptual schemes.	Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell
Quine, W.V.O.	Quine Vs Quine, W.V.O.	II 131 Def Unfounded/Quine: is a class if it contains an element that contains an element.... ad infinitum without ever reaching firm ground. QuineVsQuine: self-criticism: my "New Foundations" and "Mathematical Logic" both contain unfounded classes. I could argue that there is no principle of individuation for such classes. They are identical as long as their elements are identical, and they are identical as long as their elements are identical ..., without stopping. Our study shed light on a strange comparison between three degrees of stringency. a) table, b) with Russell's definition we can define the identity of properties, however, c) the individuation of properties is still not okay. This suggests that a) specification makes the most stringent demands, b) individuation is less strict, and c) the mere definition of identity is even more undemanding.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Quine, W.V.O.	Verschiedene Vs Quine, W.V.O.	Davidson I 55 CreswellVsQuine: he had a realm of reified experiences or phenomena facing an unexplored reality. Davidson pro - - QuineVsCresswell >Quine III) Kanitscheider II 23 Ontology/language/human/Kanitschneider: the linguistic products of the organism are in no way separated from its producer by an ontological gap. Ideas are certain neuronal patterns in the organism. KanitscheiderVsQuine: Weak point: his empiricism. One must therefore view his epistemology more as a research programme. Quine VI 36 VsQuine: I've been told that the question "What is there?" is always a question of fact and not just a linguistic problem. That is correct. QuineVsVs: but saying or assuming what there is remains a linguistic matter and here the bound variables are in place. VI 51 Meaning/Quine: the search for it should start with the whole sentences. VsQuine: the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation leads directly to behaviorism. Others: it leads to a reductio ad absurdum of Quine's own behaviorism. VI 52 Translation Indeterminacy/Quine: it actually leads to behaviorism, which there is no way around. Behaviorism/Quine: in psychology one still has the choice whether one wants to be a behaviorist, in linguistics one is forced to be one. One acquires language through the behavior of others, which is evaluated in the light of a common situation. It literally does not matter what other kind psychological life is! Semantics/Quine: therefore no more will be able to enter into the semantic meaning than what can also be inferred from perceptible behaviour in observable situations Quine XI 146 Deputy function/Quine/Lauener: does not have to be unambiguous at all. E.g. characterisation of persons on the basis of their income: here different values are assigned to an argument. For this we need a background theory: We map the universe U in V so that both the objects of U and their substitutes are included in V. If V forms a subset of U, U itself can be represented as background theory within which their own ontological reduction is described. XI 147 VsQuine: this is no reduction at all, because then the objects must exist. QuineVsVs: this is comparable to a reductio ad absurdum: if we want to show that a part of U is superfluous, we can assume U for the duration of the argument. (>Ontology/Reduction). Lauener: this brings us to ontological relativity. Löwenheim/Ontology/Reduction/Quine/Lauener: if a theory of its own requires an overcountable range, we can no longer present a proxy function that would allow a reduction to a countable range. For this one needed a much stronger frame theory, which then could no longer be discussed away as reductio ad absurdum according to Quine's proposal. Quine X 83 Logical Truth/Validity/Quine: our insertion definitions (sentences instead of sets) use a concept of truth and fulfillment that goes beyond the framework of object language. This dependence on the concept of ((s) simple) truth, by the way, would also concern the model definition of validity and logical truth. Therefore we have reason to look at a 3rd possibility of the definition of validity and logical truth: it gets by without the concepts of truth and fulfillment: we need the completeness theorem ((s) >provability). Solution: we can simply define the steps that form a complete method of proof and then: Def Valid Schema/Quine: is one that can be proven with such steps. Def Logically True/Quine: as before: a sentence resulting from a valid schema by inserting it instead of its simple sentences. Proof Procedure/Evidence Method/Quine: some complete ones do not necessarily refer to schemata, but can also be applied directly to the propositions, X 84 namely those that emerge from the scheme by insertion. Such methods generate true sentences directly from other true sentences. Then we can leave aside schemata and validity and define logical truth as the sentence generated by these proofs. 1st VsQuine: this tends to trigger protest: the property "to be provable by a certain method of evidence" is uninteresting in itself. It is interesting only because of the completeness theorem, which allows to equate provability with logical truth! 2. VsQuine: if one defines logical truth indirectly by referring to a suitable method of proof, one deprives the completeness theorem of its ground. It becomes empty of content. QuineVsVs: the danger does not exist at all: The sentence of completeness in the formulation (B) does not depend on how we define logical truth, because it is not mentioned at all! Part of its meaning, however, is that it shows that we can define logical truth by merely describing the method of proof, without losing anything of what makes logical truth interesting in the first place. Equivalence/Quine: important are theorems, which state an equivalence between quite different formulations of a concept - here the logical truth. Which formulation is then called the official definition is less important. But even mere terms can be better or worse. Validity/logical truth/definition/Quine: the elementary definition has the advantage that it is relevant for more neighboring problems. 3. VsQuine: with the great arbitrariness of the choice of the evidence procedure it cannot be excluded that the essence of the logical truth is not grasped. QuineVsVs: how arbitrary is the choice actually? It describes the procedure and talks about strings of characters. In this respect it corresponds to the sentence. Insertion definition: it moves effectively at the level of the elementary number theory. And it stays at the level, while the other definition uses the concept of truth. That is a big difference.	Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Quine, W.V.O.	Millikan Vs Quine, W.V.O.	I 215 descriptive/referential/denotation/classification/Millikan: you can force a descriptive denotation to work referentially, Ex "He said that the winner was the loser." Ex (Russell) "I thought your yacht was larger than it is." I 216 Solution: "the winner" and "larger than your Yacht" must be regarded as classified according to the adjusted (adapted) sense. On the other hand: "The loser" probably has only descriptive of meaning. "Your Yacht" is classified by both: by adjusted and by relational sense, only "your" is purely referential. Quine: (classic example) Ex "Phillip believes that the capital of Honduras is in Nicaragua." MillikanVsQuine: according to Quine that's not obviously wrong. It can be read as true if "capital of Honduras" has relational sense in that context. referential/descriptive/attribution of belief/intentional/Millikan: there are exceptions, where the expressions do not work descriptively, nor purely referential, but also by relational sense or intension. Ex "the man who us drove home" is someone the speaker and hearer know very well. Then the hearer must assume that someone else is meant because the name is not used. Rule: here the second half of the rule for intentional contexts is violated, "use whichever expression that preserves the reference". This is often a sign that the first half is violated, "a sign has not only reference but also sense or intension, which must be preserved. Why else use such a complicated designation ("the man who drove us home"), instead of the name? Ortcutt/Ralph/spy/Quine/Millikan: Ex there is a man with a brown hat that Ralph has caught a glimpse of. Ralph assumes he is a spy. a) Ralph believes that the man he has caught a glimpse of is a spy. I 217 b) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is a spy. Millikan: The underlined parts are considered relational, b) is more questionable than a) because it is not clear whether Ralph has explicitly perceived him as wearing a brown hat. Quine: In addition, there is a gray-haired man that Ralph vaguely knows as a pillar of society, and that he is unaware of having seen, except once at the beach. c) Ralph believes that the man he saw on the beach is a spy. Millikan: that's for sure relational. As such, it will not follow from a) or b). Quine: adds only now that Ralph does not know this, but the two men are one and the same. d) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is not a spy. Now this is just wrong. Question: but what about e) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy. f) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy. Quine: only now Quine tells us the man's name (which Ralph is unaware of). Millikan: Ex Jennifer, an acquaintance of Samuel Clemens, does not know that he is Mark Twain. I 218 She says: "I would love to meet Mark Twain" and not "I'd love to meet Samuel Clemens". language-dependent: here, "Mark Twain" is classified dependent on language. So also language bound intensions are not always irrelevant for intentional contexts. It had o be language-bound here to make it clear that the name itself is substantial, and also that it is futile to assume that she would have said she wanted to meet Samuel Clemens. Ralph/Quine/Millikan: Quine assumes that Ralph has not only two internal names for Ortcutt, but only one of them is linked to the external name Ortcutt. Millikan: Description: Ex you and I are watching Ralph, who is suspiciously observing Ortcutt standing behind a bush with a camera (surely he just wants to photograph cobwebs). Ralph did not recognize Ortcutt and you think: Goodness, Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy ". Pointe: in this context, the sentence is true! ((S) Because the name "Ortcutt" was given by us, not by Ralph). referential/Millikan: Solution: "Ortcutt" is classified here as referential. referential/Millikan. Ex "Last Halloween Susi actually thought, Robert (her brother) was a ghost." ((S) She did not think of Robert, nor of her brother, that he was a ghost, but that she had a ghost in front of her). MillikanVsQuine: as long as no one has explicitly asked or denied that Tom knows that Cicero is Tullius, the two attributions of belief "Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline" and "... Tullius ..." are equivalent! Language-bound intension/Millikan: is obtained only if the context makes it clear what words were used, or which public words the believer has as implicit intentions. Fully-developed (language-independent) intension/Millikan: for them the same applies if they are kept intentionally: I 219 Ex "The natives believe that Hesperus is a God and Phosphorus is a devil." But: Pointe: It is important that the intrinsic function of a sentence must be maintained when one passes to intentional contexts. That is the reason that in attribution of belief one cannot simply replace "Cicero is Tullius" by "Cicero is Cicero". ((S) trivial/non-trivial identity). Stabilizing function/statement of identity/Millikan: the stabilizing function is that the listener translates "A" and "B" into the same internal term. Therefore, the intrinsic function of "Cicero is Cicero" is different from that of "Cicero is Tullius". Since the intrinsic function is different one can not be used for the other in intentional contexts. Eigenfunction: Ex "Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy": has the Eigenfunkion to be translated into an internal sentence that has a subject and two predicates. No record of this form can be found in Ralph's head. Therefore one can not say that Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy you. I 299 Non-contradiction/Millikan: the test is also a test of our ability to identify something and whether our concepts represent what they are supposed to project. MillikanVsQuine: but this is not about establishing "conditions for identity". And also not about "shared reference" ("the same apple again"). This is part of the problem of uniformity, not identity. It is not the problem to decide how an exclusive class should be split up. I 300 Ex deciding when red ends and orange begins. Instead, it's about learning to recognize Ex red under different circumstances. Truth/accuracy/criterion/Quine/Millikan: for Quine a criterion for right thinking seems to be that the relationship to a stimulus can be predicted. MillikanVsQuine: but how does learning to speak in unison facilitate the prediction? Agreement/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both are not aware of what agreement in judgments really is: it is not to speak in unison. If you do not say the same, that does not mean that one does not agree. Solution/Millikan: agreement is to say the same about the same. Mismatch: can arise only if sentences have subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted. One-word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine goes so far as to allow "Ouch!" as a sentence. He thinks the difference between word and sentence in the end only concernes the printer. Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proven by lack of evidence, but by positive facts (supra). Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree to a sentence and its negation simultaneously lies in nature (natural necessity). I 309 Thesis: lack of Contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world. agreement/MillikanVsWittgenstein/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: both do not see the importance of the subject-predicate structure with negation. Therefore, they fail to recognize the importance of the agreement in the judgment. agreement: this is not about two people getting together, but that they get together with the world. agreement/mismatch/Millikan: are not two equally likely possibilities ((s) > inegalitarian theory/Nozick.) There are many more possibilities for a sentence to be wrong, than for the same sentence to be true. Now, if an entire pattern (system) of coinciding judgments appears that represent the same area (for example color) the probability that each participant reflects an area in the world outside is stupendous. ((s) yes - but not that they mean the same thing). Ex only because my judgments about the passage of time almost always matches with those of others, I have reason to believe that I have the ability to classify my memories correctly in the passage of time. Objectivity/time/perspective/mediuma/communication/Millikan: thesis: the medium that other people form by their remarks is the most accessible perspective for me that I can have in terms of time. I 312 Concept/law/theory/test/verification/Millikan: when a concept appears in a law, it is necessary I 313 to test it along with other concepts. These concepts are linked according to certain rules of inference. Concept/Millikan: because concepts consist of intensions, it is the intensions that have to be tested. Test: does not mean, however, that the occurrence of sensual data would be predicted. (MillikanVsQuine). Theory of sensual data/today/Millikan: the prevailing view seems to be, thesis: that neither an internal nor an external language actually describes sensual data, except that the language depends on the previous concepts of external things that usually causes the sensual data. I 314 Forecast/prediction/to predict/prognosis/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: we project the world to inhabit it, not to predict it. If predictions are useful, at least not from experiences in our nerve endings. Confirmation/prediction/Millikan: A perceptual judgment implies mainly itself Ex if I want to verify that this container holds one liter, I don't have to be able to predict that the individual edges have a certain length.That is I need not be able to predict any particular sensual data. I 317 Theory/Verification/Test/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: is it really true that all concepts must be tested together? Tradition says that not just a few, but most of our concepts are not of things that we observe directly, but of other things. Test/logical form/Millikan: if there is one thing A, which is identified by observing effects on B and C, isn't then the validity of the concepts of B and C tested together with the theory that ascribes the observed effects onto the influence of A, tested together with the concept of A? Millikan. No! From the fact that my intension of A goes back to intensions of B and C does not follow that the validity of the concepts, that govern B and C, is tested when the concept that governs A is tested and vice versa. Namely, it does not follow, if A is a specific denotation Ex "the first President of the United States" and it also does not follow, if the explicit intention of A represents something causally dependent. Ex "the mercury in the thermometer rose to mark 70" as intension of "the temperature was 70 degrees." I 318 Concept/Millikan: concepts are abilities - namely the ability to recognize something as self-identical. Test/Verification: the verifications of the validity of my concepts are quite independent of each other: Ex my ability to make a good cake is completely independent of my ability to break up eggs, even if I have to break up eggs to make the cake. Objectivity/objective reality/world/method/knowledge/Millikan: we obtain a knowledge of the outside world by applying different methods to obtain a result. Ex different methods of temperature measurement: So we come to the conclusion that temperature is something real. I 321 Knowledge/context/holism/Quine/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: doesn't all knowledge depend on "collateral information", as Quine calls it? If all perception is interwoven with general theories, how can we test individual concepts independently from the rest? Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan. Thesis: ~ "Our findings about the outside world do not stand individually before the tribunal of experience, but only as a body." Therefore: no single conviction is immune to correction. Test/Verification/MillikanVsHolismus/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: most of our beliefs never stand before the tribunal of experience. I 322 Therefore, it is unlikely that such a conviction is ever supported or refuted by other beliefs. Confirmation: single confirmation: by my ability to recognize objects that appear in my attitudes. From convictions being related does not follow that the concepts must be related as well. Identity/identification/Millikan: epistemology of identity is a matter of priority before the epistemology of judgments.	Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Radical Interpretation	Newen Vs Radical Interpretation	NI 63 Radical Interpretation/RI/Newen/Schrenk: Basic requirement: that the community has a coherent, rational system of beliefs that is respectful of our logic. Davidson: If this is violated, the foreign language cannot be a language and the strangers can be no thinking beings. VsDavidson: Many argue that this is too strong.	New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Reliability Theory	Goodman Vs Reliability Theory	IV 184 The reliability theory concludes - correctly, as it seems - that Watson knows nothing: because he would believe that he drinks Bordeaux, even if he were drinking Muscatel. The problem is that Holmes is apparently not improving. IV 185 But the class of relevant alternatives could be even more narrow. It could be limited it to those wines which Holmes is most likely to encounter. The requirements of the reliability theoretician are variable with the range defined as relevant classes. GoodmanVsReliability Theory: apparently any true belief can be constituted as knowledge by reducing the alternatives. The epistemic status of a true conviction therefore depends on the selection of such a range. In this situation, the smarter man has at least an epistemic advantage, because he requires less stringent constraints. IV 187 Problem: the more distinctions a category system allows, the less difference is there between adjacent categories. With the refinement of our conceptual schemes we also increase our chances of being mistaken. Causal theories seem to work better here, because they are indifferent to the unreal conditional sentences which refute the reliability theoretician. The problem is that Holmes is not a dummy! He is fully aware of the circumstances that may mislead him. Because, even though he strongly suspects that he is drinking a Margaux, he doesn’t succeed in being completely convinced of it. And without belief there is no knowledge!	G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997
Rey, G.	Fodor Vs Rey, G.	IV 219 Sentence/formula/Fodor/Lepore: Georges Rey reads Quine in a way that he reconstructs sentences as formulas, but without semantic holism (SH): 1) Sentence means formula! 2) Peirce’s thesis identified sentence meaning with empirical meaning (not with confirmation!) i.e. the set of observation sentences that confirm them. Def Empirical Meaning/(s): (according to Fodor/Lepore IV 219): empirical meaning corresponds to a set of observation sentences that confirm one sentence. Important argument: an observation sentence is a formula that is conditioned/confirmed by proximal stimuli. 3) The Quine-Duhem thesis (QDT) applies. Then it follows that no formula has any meaning outside of the overall theory! Fodor/LeporeVsRey: this is a very strange kind of semantics: because the meaning of each sentence consists in the observation consequences of the overall theory in which they are embedded, it follows that every sentence in a theory has the same meaning as any other sentence in that same theory! Def sentence meaning/Rey/Fodor/Lepore: sentence meaning consists in the observation consequences of the embedding overall theory. This implies, in turn, that no theory can contain a contingent conditional (hypothetical) in such that, if a disjunctive sentence is true (false), then both disjuncts are true or false, etc. IV 219 Furthermore, every sentence in a theory translates each sentence from an empirically equivalent theory and there are no relations between sentences from not empirically equivalent theories at all. A Quinean could accept all that and say: "so much the worse for those who insist on a semantics for individual sentences". Fodor/Lepore: that may be true, but in any case the Quine-Duhem thesis is trivialized: the only thing you have to hold on to when changing theory is the pronunciation!	F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
Russell, B.	Quine Vs Russell, B.	Chisholm II 75 Predicates/Denote/Russell: denoting expressions: proper names stand for individual things and general expressions for universals. (Probleme d. Phil. p. 82f). In every sentence, at least one word refers to a universal. QuineVsRussell: confusion! II 108 Theory of Descriptions/VsRussell/Brandl: thus the whole theory is suspected of neglecting the fact that material objects can never be part of propositions. QuineVsRussell: confusion of mention and use. Quine II 97 Pricipia mathematica, 1903: Here, Russell's ontology is rampant: every word refers to something. If a word is a proper name, then its object is a thing, otherwise it is a concept. He limits the term "existence" to things, but has a liberal conception of things which even includes times and points in empty space! Then there are, beyond the existent things, other entities: "numbers, the gods of Homer, relationships, fantasies, and four-dimensional space". The word "concept", used by Russell in this manner, has the connotation of "merely a concept". Caution: Gods and fantasies are as real as numbers for Russell! QuineVsRussell: this is an intolerably indiscriminate ontology. Example: Take impossible numbers, e.g. prime numbers that are divisible by 6. It must be wrong in a certain sense that they exist, and that is in a sense in which it is right that there are prime numbers! Do fantasies exist in this sense? II 101 Russell has a preference for the term "propositional function" against "class concept". In P.M. both expressions appear. Here: Def "Propositional Function": especially based on forms of notation, e.g. open sentences, while concepts are decidedly independent of notation. However, according to Meinong Russell's confidence is in concepts was diminished, and he prefers the more nominalistic sound of the expression "propositional function" which is now carries twice the load (later than Principia Mathematica.) Use/Mention/Quine: if we now tried to deal with the difference between use and mention as carelessly as Russell has managed to do sixty years ago, we can see how he might have felt that his theory of propositional functions was notation based, while a theory of types of real classes would be ontological. Quine: we who pay attention to use and mention can specify when Russell's so-called propositional functions as terms (more specific than properties and relations) must be construed as concepts, and when they may be construed as a mere open sentences or predicates: a) when he quantifies about them, he (unknowingly) reifies them as concepts. For this reason, nothing more be presumed for his elimination of classes than I have stated above: a derivation of the classes from properties or concepts by means of a context definition that is formulated such that it provides the missing extensionality. QuineVsRussell: thinks wrongly that his theory has eliminated classes more thoroughly from the world than in terms of a reduction to properties. II 102 RussellVsFrege: "~ the entire distinction between meaning and designating is wrong. The relationship between "C" and C remains completely mysterious, and where are we to find the designating complex which supposedly designates C?" QuineVsRussell: Russell's position sometimes seems to stem from a confusion of the expression with its meaning, sometimes from the confusion of the expression with its mention. II 103/104 In other papers Russel used meaning usually in the sense of "referencing" (would correspond to Frege): "Napoleon" particular individual, "human" whole class of such individual things that have proper names. Russell rarely seems to look for an existing entity under any heading that would be such that we could call it the meaning that goes beyond the existing referent. Russell tends to let this entity melt into the expression itself, a tendency he has in general when it comes to existing entities. QuineVsRussell: for my taste, Russell is too wasteful with existing entities. Precisely because he does not differentiate enough, he lets insignificance and missed reference commingle. Theory of Descriptions: He cannot get rid of the "King of France" without first inventing the description theory: being meaningful would mean: have a meaning and the meaning is the reference. I.e. "King of France" without meaning, and "The King of France is bald" only had a meaning, because it is the short form of a sentence that does not contain the expression "King of France". Quine: actually unnecessary, but enlightening. Russell tends commingle existing entities and expressions. Also on the occasion of his remarks on Propositions: (P.M.): propositions are always expressions, but then he speaks in a manner that does not match this attitude of the "unity of the propositions" (p.50) and of the impossibility of infinite propositions (p.145) II 105 Russell: The proposition is nothing more than a symbol, even later, instead: Apparently, propositions are nothing..." the assumption that there are a huge number of false propositions running around in the real, natural world is outrageous." Quine: this revocation is astounding. What is now being offered to us instead of existence is nothingness. Basically Russell has ceased to speak of existence. What had once been regarded as existing is now accommodated in one of three ways a) equated with the expression, b) utterly rejected c) elevated to the status of proper existence. II 107 Russell/later: "All there is in the world I call a fact." QuineVsRussell: Russell's preference for an ontology of facts depends on his confusion of meaning with reference. Otherwise he would probably have finished the facts off quickly. What the reader of "Philosophy of logical atomism" notices would have deterred Russell himself, namely how much the analysis of facts is based on the analysis of language. Russell does not recognize the facts as fundamental in any case. Atomic facts are as atomic as facts can be. Atomic Facts/Quine: but they are composite objects! Russell's atoms are not atomic facts, but sense data! II 183 ff Russell: Pure mathematics is the class of all sentences of the form "p implies q" where p and q are sentences with one or more variables, and in both sets the same. "We never know what is being discussed, nor if what we say is true." II 184 This misinterpretation of mathematics was a response to non-Euclidean geometry. Numbers: how about elementary arithmetic? Pure numbers, etc. should be regarded as uninterpreted. Then the application to apples is an accumulation. Numbers/QuineVsRussell: I find this attitude completely wrong. The words "five" and "twelve" are nowhere uninterpreted, they are as much essential components of our interpreted language as apples. >Numbers. They denote two intangible objects, numbers that are the sizes of quantities of apples and the like. The "plus" in addition is also interpreted from start to finish, but it has nothing to do with the accumulation of things. Five plus twelve is: how many apples there are in two separate piles. However, without pouring them together. The numbers "five" and "twelve" differ from apples in that they do not denote a body, that has nothing to do with misinterpretation. The same could be said of "nation" or "species". The ordinary interpreted scientific speech is determined to abstract objects as it is determined to apples and bodies. All these things appear in our world system as values of variables. II 185 It even has nothing to do with purity (e.g. of the set theory). Purity is something other than uninterpretedness. XII 60 Expression/Numbers/Knowledge/Explication/Explanation/Quine: our knowledge of expressions is alone in their laws of interlinking. Therefore, every structure that fulfills these laws can be an explication. XII 61 Knowledge of numbers: consists alone in the laws of arithmetic. Then any lawful construction is an explication of the numbers. RussellVs: (early): Thesis: arithmetic laws are not sufficient for understanding numbers. We also need to know applications (use) or their embedding in the talk about other things. Number/Russell: is the key concept here: "there are n such and suches". Number/Definition/QuineVsRussell: we can define "there are n such and suches" without ever deciding what numbers are beyond their fulfillment of arithmetic addition. Application/Use/QuineVsRussell: wherever there is structure, the applications set in. E.g. expressions and Gödel numbers: even the mention of an inscription was no definitive proof that we are talking about expressions and not about Gödel numbers. We can always say that our ostension was shifted. VII (e) 80 Principia Mathematica⁽¹⁾/PM/Russell/Whitehead/Quine: shows that the whole of mathematics can be translated into logic. Only three concepts need to be clarified: Mathematics, translation and logic. VII (e) 81 QuineVsRussell: the concept of the propositional function is unclear and obscures the entire PM. VII (e) 93 QuineVsRussell: PM must be complemented by the axiom of infinity if certain mathematical principles are to be derived. VII (e) 93/94 Axiom of infinity: ensures the existence of a class with infinitely many elements. Quine: New Foundations instead makes do with the universal class: θ or x^ (x = x). 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. VII (f) 122 Propositional Functions/QuineVsRussell: ambiguous: a) open sentences b) properties. Russell no classes theory uses propositional functions as properties as value-bound variables. IX 15 QuineVsRussell: inexact terminology. "Propositional function", he used this expression both when referring to attributes (real properties) and when referring to statements or predicates. In truth, he only reduced the theory of classes to an unreduced theory of attributes. IX 93 Rational Numbers/QuineVsRussell: I differ in one point: for me, rational numbers are themselves real numbers, not so for Russell and Whitehead. Russell: rational numbers are pairwise disjoint for them like those of Peano. (See Chapter 17), while their real numbers are nested. ((s) pairwise disjoint, contrast: nested) Natural Numbers/Quine: for me as for most authors: no rational integers. Rational Numbers/Russell: accordingly, no rational real numbers. They are only "imitated" by the rational real numbers. Rational Numbers/QuineVsRussell: for me, however, the rational numbers are real numbers. This is because I have constructed the real numbers according to Russell's version b) without using the name and the designation of rational numbers. Therefore, I was able to retain name and designation for the rational real numbers IX 181 Type Theory/TT/QuineVsRussell: in the present form our theory is too weak to prove some sentences of classical mathematics. E.g. proof that every limited class of real numbers has a least upper boundary (LUB). IX 182 Suppose the real numbers were developed in Russell's theory similar to Section VI, however, attributes were now to take the place of classes and the alocation to attributes replaces the element relation to classes. LUB: (Capters 18, 19) of a limited class of real numbers: the class Uz or {x:Ey(x ε y ε z)}. Attribute: in parallel, we might thus expect that the LUB of a limited attribute φ of real numbers in Russell's system is equal to the Attribute Eψ(φψ u ψ^x). Problem: under Russell's order doctrine is this LUB ψ is of a higher order than that of the real numbers ψ which fall under the attribute φ whose LUB is sought. Boundary/LUB/QuineVsRussell: You need LUB for the entire classic technique of calculus, which is based on continuity. However, LUB have no value for these purposes if they are not available as values of the same variables whose value range already includes those numbers whose upper boundary is wanted. An upper boundary (i.e. LUB) of higher order cannot be the value of such variables, and thus misses its purpose. Solution/Russell: Axiom of Reducibility: Def Axiom of Reducibility/RA/Russell/Quine: every propositional function has the same extension as a certain predicative one. I.e. Ey∀x(ψ!x φx), Eψ∀x∀y[ψ!(x,y) φ(x,y)], etc. IX 184 VsConstruktivism/Construction/QuineVsRussell: we have seen Russell's constructivist approach to the real numbers fail (LUB, see above). He gave up on constructivism and took refuge in the RA. IX 184/185 The way he gave it up had something perverse to it: Axiom of Reducibility/QuineVsRussell: the RA implies that all the distinctions that gave rise to its creation are superfluous! (... + ...) IX 185 Propositional Function/PF/Attribute/Predicate/TT/QuineVsRussell: overlooked the following difference and its analogs: a) "propositional functions": as attributes (or intentional relations) and b) proposition functions: as expressions, i.e. predicates (and open statements: e.g. "x is mortal") Accordingly: a) attributes b) open statements As expressions they differ visibly in the order if the order is to be assessed on the basis of the indices of bound variables within the expression. For Russell everything is "AF". Since Russell failed to distinguish between formula and object (word/object, mention/use), he did not remember the trick of allowing that an expression of higher order refers straight to an attribute or a relation of lower order. X 95 Context Definition/Properties/Stage 2 Logic/Quine: if you prefer properties as sets, you can introduce quantification over properties, and then introduce quantification over sets through a schematic context definition. Russell: has taken this path. Quine: but the definition has to ensure that the principle of extensionality applies to sets, but not to properties. That is precisely the difference. Russell/QuineVsRussell: why did he want properties? X 96 He did not notice at which point the unproblematic talk of predicates capsized to speaking about properties. ((s) object language/meta language/mention/use). Propositional Function/PF: Russell took it over from Frege. QuineVsRussell: he sometimes used PF to refer to predicates, sometimes to properties.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Russell, B.	Read Vs Russell, B.	Read III 31 + VsReductionism: would have to explain the truth of a negative statement like "Ruby didn't kill Kennedy" as the result of the truth of another statement that would be incompatible with "Ruby killed Kennedy". RussellVsVs: objected to such argumentation that recourse is imminent: "B is incompatible with A" is itself a negative statement. To explain its truth, we would need a third statement, C, which would be incompatible with "C is compatible with A", and so on. ReadVsRussell: this is a strange objection, because it would also apply against every conjunction. And then truth conditions for conjunctive and disjunctive statements must not be subjunctive or disjunctive. III 156 VsRussell: his theory cannot be right because it leads to false truth values: it says (wrongly) that any statement about non-existent objects is false. It is, however, an improvement on traditional theory, which says that all such statements are meaningless.	Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Russell, B.	Wittgenstein Vs Russell, B.	Carnap VI 58 Intensional logic/Russell: is not bound to certain statement forms. All of their statements are not translatable into statements about extensions. WittgensteinVsRussell. Later Russell, Carnap pro Wittgenstein. (Russell, PM 72ff, e.g. for seemingly intensional statements). E.g. (Carnap) "x is human" and "x mortal": both can be converted into an extensional statement (class statement). "The class of humans is included in the class of mortals". --- Tugendhat I 453 Definition sortal: something demarcated that does not permit any arbitrary distribution . E.g. Cat. Contrast: mass terminus. E.g. water. I 470 Sortal: in some way a rediscovery of the Aristotelian concept of the substance predicate. Aristotle: Hierarchy: low: material predicates: water, higher: countability. Locke: had forgotten the Aristotelian insight and therefore introduced a term for the substrate that, itself not perceivable, should be based on a bunch of perceptible qualities. Hume: this allowed Hume to reject the whole. Russell and others: bunch of properties. (KripkeVsRussell, WittgensteinVsRussell, led to the rediscovery of Sortals). E.g. sortal: already Aristotle: we call something a chair or a cat, not because it has a certain shape, but because it fulfills a specific function. --- Wittgenstein I 80 Acquaintance/WittgensteinVsRussell/Hintikka: eliminates Russell's second class (logical forms), in particular Russell's free-floating forms, which can be expressed by entirely general propositions. So Wittgenstein can say now that we do not need any experience in the logic. This means that the task that was previously done by Russell's second class, now has to be done by the regular objects of the first class. This is an explanation of the most fundamental and strangest theses of the Tractatus: the logical forms are not only accepted, but there are considered very important. Furthermore, the objects are not only substance of the world but also constitutive for the shape of the world. I 81 1. the complex logical propositions are all determined by the logical forms of the atomic sentences, and 2. The shapes of the atomic sentences by the shapes of the objects. N.B.: Wittgenstein refuses in the Tractatus to recognize the complex logical forms as independent objects. Their task must be fulfilled by something else: I 82 The shapes of simple objects (type 1): they determine the way in which the objects can be linked together. The shape of the object is what is considered a priori of it. The position moves towards Wittgenstein, it has a fixed base in Frege's famous principle of composite character (the principle of functionality, called Frege principle by Davidson (s)> compositionality). I 86 Logical Form/Russell/Hintikka: thinks, we should be familiar with the logical form of each to understand sentence. WittgensteinVsRussell: disputes this. To capture all logical forms nothing more is needed than to capture the objects. With these, however, we still have to be familiar with. This experience, however, becomes improper that it relates to the existence of objects. I 94ff This/logical proper name/Russell: "This" is a (logical) proper name. WittgensteinVsRussell/PU: The ostensive "This" can never be without referent, but that does not turn it into a name "(§ 45). I 95 According to Russell's earlier theory, there are only two logical proper names in our language for particularistic objects other than the I, namely "this" and "that". One introduces them by pointing to it. Hintikka: of these concrete Russellian objects applies in the true sense of the word, that they are not pronounced, but can only be called. (> Mention/>use). I 107 Meaning data/Russell: (Mysticism and Logic): sense data are something "Physical". Thus, "the existence of the sense datum is not logically dependent on the existence of the subject." WittgensteinVsRussell: of course this cannot be accepted by Wittgenstein. Not because he had serious doubts, but because he needs the objects for semantic purposes that go far beyond Russell's building blocks of our real world. They need to be building blocks of all logical forms and the substance of all possible situations. Therefore, he cannot be satisfied with Russell's construction of our own and single outside world of sensory data. I 108 For the same reason he refused the commitment to a particular view about the metaphysical status of his objects. Also: Subject/WittgensteinVsRussell: "The subject does not belong to the objects of the world". I 114 Language/sense data/Wittgenstein/contemporary/Waismann: "The purpose of Wittgenstein's language is, contrary to our ordinary language, to reflect the logical structure of the phenomena." I 115 Experience/existence/Wittgenstein/Ramsey: "Wittgenstein says it is nonsense to believe something that is not given by the experience, because belonging to me, to be given in experience, is the formal characteristics of a real entity." Sense data/WittgensteinVsRussell/Ramsey: are logical constructions. Because nothing of what we know involves it. They simplify the general laws, but they are as less necessary for them as material objects." Later Wittgenstein: (note § 498) equates sense date with "private object that stands before my soul". I 143 Logical form/Russell/Hintikka: both forms of atomic sentences and complex sentences. Linguistically defined there through characters (connectives, quantifiers, etc.). WittgensteinVsRussell: only simple forms. "If I know an object, I also know all the possibilities of its occurrence in facts. Every such possibility must lie in the nature of the object." I 144 Logical constants/Wittgenstein: disappear from the last and final logical representation of each meaningful sentence. I 286 Comparison/WittgensteinVsRussell/Hintikka: comparing is what is not found in Russell's theory. I 287 And comparing is not to experience a phenomenon in the confrontation. Here you can see: from a certain point of time Wittgenstein sees sentences no more as finished pictures, but as rules for the production of images. --- Wittgenstein II 35 Application/use/WittgensteinVsRussell: he overlooked that logical types say nothing about the use of the language. E.g. Johnson says red differed in a way from green, in which red does not differ from chalk. But how do you know that? Johnson: It is verified formally, not experimentally. WittgensteinVsJohnson: but that is nonsense: it is as if you would only look at the portrait, to judge whether it corresponds to the original. --- Wittgenstein II 74 Implication/WittgensteinVsRussell: Paradox for two reasons: 1. we confuse the implication with drawing the conclusions. 2. in everyday life we never use "if ... then" in this sense. There are always hypotheses in which we use that expression. Most of the things of which we speak in everyday life, are in reality always hypotheses. E.g.: "all humans are mortal." Just as Russell uses it, it remains true even if there is nothing that corresponds to the description f(x). II 75 But we do not mean that all huamns are mortal even if there are no humans. II 79 Logic/Notation/WittgensteinVsRussell: his notation does not make the internal relationships clear. From his notation does not follow that pvq follows from p.q while the Sheffer-stroke makes the internal relationship clear. II 80 WittgensteinVsRussell: "assertion sign": it is misleading and suggests a kind of mental process. However, we mean only one sentence. ((s) Also WittgensteinVsFrege). > Assertion stroke. II 100 Skepticism/Russell: E.g. we could only exist, for five minutes, including our memories. WittgensteinVsRussell: then he uses the words in a new meaning. II 123 Calculus/WittgensteinVsRussell: jealousy as an example of a calculus with three binary relations does not add an additional substance to the thing. He applied a calculus on jealousy. II 137 Implication/paradox/material/existence/WittgensteinVsRussell: II 137 + applicable in Russell's notation, too: "All S are P" and "No S is P", is true when there is no S. Because the implications are also verified by ~ fx. In reality this fx is both times independent. All S are P: (x) gx > .fx No S is P: (x) gx > ~ fx This independent fx is irrelevant, it is an idle wheel. Example: If there are unicorns, then they bite, but there are no unicorns = there are no unicorns. II 152 WittgensteinVsRussell: his writing presupposes that there are names for every general sentence, which can be given for the answer to the question "what?" (in contrast to "what kind?"). E.g. "what people live on this island?" one may ask, but not: "which circle is in the square?". We have no names "a", "b", and so on for circles. WittgensteinVsRussell: in his notation it says "there is one thing which is a circle in the square." Wittgenstein: what is this thing? The spot, to which I point? But how should we write then "there are three spots"? II 157 Particular/atom/atoms/Wittgenstein: Russell and I, we both expected to get through to the basic elements ("individuals") by logical analysis. Russell believed, in the end there would be subject predicate sentences and binary relations. WittgensteinVsRussell: this is a mistaken notion of logical analysis: like a chemical analysis. WittgensteinVsAtomism. Wittgenstein II 306 Logic/WittgensteinVsRussell: Russell notes: "I met a man": there is an x such that I met x. x is a man. Who would say: "Socrates is a man"? I criticize this not because it does not matter in practical life; I criticize that the logicians do not make these examples alive. Russell uses "man" as a predicate, even though we almost never use it as such. II 307 We could use "man" as a predicate, if we would look at the difference, if someone who is dressed as a woman, is a man or a woman. Thus, we have invented an environment for this word, a game, in which its use represents a move. If "man" is used as a predicate, the subject is a proper noun, the proper name of a man. Properties/predicate/Wittgenstein: if the term "man" is used as a predicate, it can be attributed or denied meaningfully to/of certain things. This is an "external" property, and in this respect the predicate "red" behaves like this as well. However, note the distinction between red and man as properties. A table could be the owner of the property red, but in the case of "man" the matter is different. (A man could not take this property). II 308 WittgensteinVsRussell: E.g. "in this room is no man". Russell's notation: "~ (Ex)x is a man in this room." This notation suggests that one has gone through the things in the room, and has determined that no men were among them. That is, the notation is constructed according to the model by which x is a word like "Box" or else a common name. The word "thing", however, is not a common name. II 309 What would it mean, then, that there is an x, which is not a spot in the square? II 311 Arithmetics/mathematics/WittgensteinVsRussell: the arithmetic is not taught in the Russellean way, and this is not an inaccuracy. We do not go into the arithmetic, as we learn about sentences and functions, nor do we start with the definition of the number.	W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Russell, B.	Hintikka Vs Russell, B.	II 165 On Denoting/Russell/Hintikka: (Russell 1905) Problem: with phrases that stand for genuine constituents of propositions. Problem/Frege: failure of substitutivity of identity (SI) in intensional contexts. Informative Identity/Frege: the fact that identity can even sometimes be informative is connected to this. EG/Existential Generalization/Russell: it, too, may fail in in intensional contexts, (problem of empty terms). HintikkaVsRussell: he does not recognize the depth of the problem and rather circumvents the problems of denoting terms. E.g. The bald king of France/Russell: Problem: we cannot prove by existential generalization that there is a present king of France. HintikkaVsRussell: But there are also other problems. (see below for ambiguity of cross world identificaiton). Description/Russell/Hintikka: Def Primary Description: the substitutivity of identity applies to them (SI) Def secondary description: for them, substitutivity of identity (SI) fails. II 166 Existential Generalization/Russell: two readings: (1) George IV did not know whether Scott was the author of Waverley. Description/Logical Form/Russell/Hintikka: "the author of Waverley": (ix)A(x) primarily: the description has the following power: (2) (Ex)[A(x) & (y) A(y) > y = x) & ~ George IV knew that (Scott = x)]. ((s) notation: quantifier here always normal existential quantifier, mirrored E). I.e. the quantifier has the maximum range in the primary identification. The second reading is more likely, however: Secondary: (3) ~George IV knew that (Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x & (Scott = x)]. ((s) narrow range): Range/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not know that there is also a third option for the range of a quantifier ((s) >"medium range"/Kripke). (4) ~(Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x ) & George IV knew that (Scott = x)]. II 166 Existential Generalization/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not see that there was a reason for the failure of the existential generalization, which is not caused by the non-existence of the object. E.g. (5) George IV knew that the author of Waverley is the author of Waverley. a) trivial interpretation: I 167 (6) George IV knew that (Ex)(A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x)) everyday language translation: he knew that one and only one person wrote Waverley. I 166 b) non-trivial interpretation: (7) (Ex)(A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x) & George IV knew that (A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x))). ((s) no quantifier after "knew that everyday language translation: George knew of the only person who actually wrote Waverley, that they did. Because knowledge implies truth, (7) is equivalent to (8) (Ex) George IV knew that (Ez)(A(z) & (y)(A(y) > y = z) & x = z). this is equivalent to. (9) (Ex) George IV knew that (the author of Waverley = x) Here, the description has secondary (narrow) range. Everyday language translation: George knew who the author of Waverley is. I 167 Knowledge/Who/What/Where/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell cannot explicitly analyze structures of the form knows + W-sentence. General: (10) a knows, who (Ex x) is so that A(x) becomes (11) (Ex) a knows that A(x). Hintikka: this is only possible if we modify Russell’s approach: Problem: the existential generalization now collapses in a way that cannot be attributed to non-existence, and which cannot be analyzed by Russell’s Theory of Descriptions (ThoD). Problem: for every person, there are a lot of people whose names they know and of whose existence they know, but of who they do not know who they are. II 168 E.g. Charles Dodgson was for Queen Victoria someone of whom she had heard, but whom she did not know. Problem: if we assume that (11) is the correct analysis of (10), the following applies. (12) ~(Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x) But that’s trivially false, even according to Russell. Because the following is certainly true: (13) Victoria knew that Dodgson = Dodgson) Existential Generalization/EG: then yields (14) (Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x) So exactly the negation of (12) contradiction. II 168 Descriptions/Hintikka: are not involved here. Therefore, Russell’s description theory cannot help here, either. E.g. we can also assume that Victoria knew of the existence of Dodgson. Empty Terms/Empty Names: are therefore not the problem, either. Ontology/Hintikka: so our problem gets an ontological aspect. Existential Generalization/EG/Being/Quine/Ontology/Hintikka: the question of whether existential generalization may be applied on a singular term "b", E.g. in a context "F(b)", is the same as whether b may be value of a bound variable. Existential Generalization/Hintikka: does not fail here because of non-existence. II 169 We are dealing with the following problems here: Manifestation used by a) no SI Frege, Russell b) no EG (i) due to non-existence Russell (ii) because of ambiguity Hintikka Ambiguity/Solution/Hintikka: possible worlds semantics. E.g. (12) - (14) the problem is not that Dodgson did not exist in the actual world or not in one of Victoria’s worlds of knowledge, but that the name Dodgson singles out different individuals in different possible worlds. Hence (14) does not follow from (13). II 170 Existential Generalization/EG/Ambiguity/Clarity/Russell/Hintikka: Which way would have been open to Russell?. Knowing-Who/Russell/Hintikka: Russell himself very often speaks of the equivalence of knowledge, who did something with the existence of another individual, which is known to have done... + ... II 173 Denotation/Russell/Hintikka: Important argument: an ingenious feature of Russell’s theory of denotation from 1905 is that it is the quantifiers that denote! Theory of Denotation/Russell: (end of "On Denoting") includes the reduction of descriptions to objects of acquaintance. II 174 Hintikka: this relation is amazing, it also seems to be circular to allow only objects of acquaintance. Solution: We need to see what successfully denoting expressions (phrases) actually denote: they precisely denote objects of acquaintance. Ambiguity/Clarity/Hintikka: it is precisely ambiguity that leads to the failure of the existential generalization. Existential Generalization/Waverley/Russell/Hintikka: his own example shows that only objects of acquaintance are allowed: "the author of Waverley" in (1) is in fact a primary incident i.e. his example (2). "Whether"/Russell/Hintikka: only difference: wanted to know "if" instead of "did not know". (secondary?). Secondary Description/Russell: can also be expressed like this: that George wanted to know of the man who actually wrote Waverley whether he was Scott. II 175 That would be the case if George IV had seen Scott (in the distance) and had asked "Is that Scott?". HintikkaVsRussell: why does Russell select an example with a perceptually known individual? Do we not usually deal with beings of flesh and blood whose identity is known to us, instead of only with objects of perception?. Knowing Who/Knowing What/Perception Object/Russell/Hintikka: precisely with perception objects it seems as if the kind of clarity that we need for a knowing-who, is not just given. Identifcation/Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: in my approach Dodgson is a bona fide individual iff. he is one and the same individual in all worlds of knowledge of Victoria. I.e. identifiable iff. (15) (E.g.) in all relevant possible worlds it is true that (Dodgson = x). Problem: What are the relevant possible worlds?. II 178 Quantifier/Quantification/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell systematically confuses two types of quantifiers. (a) of acquaintance, b) of description). Problem: Russell has not realized that the difference cannot be defined solely in terms of the actual world!. Solution/Hintikka: we need a relativization to sets of possible worlds that change with the different propositional attitudes. II 179 RussellVsHintikka: he would not have accepted my representation of his position like this. HintikkaVsRussell: but the reason for this merely lies in a further error of Russell’s: I have not attributed to him what he believed, but what he should have believed. Quantification/Russell/Hintikka: he should have reduced to objects of acquaintance. Russell believed, however, it was sufficient to eliminate expressions that seemingly denote objects that are not such of acquaintance. Important argument: in that his quantifiers do not enter any ontological commitment. Only denoting expressions do that. Variable/Russell/Hintikka: are only notational patterns in Russell. Ontological Commitment/Quine/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell did not recognize the ontological commitment that 1st order languages bring with them. Being/Ontology/Quine: "Being means being value of a bound variable". HintikkaVsRussell: he has realized that. II 180 Elimination/Eliminability/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: in order to eliminate merely seemingly denoting descriptions one must assume that the quantifiers and bound variables go over individuals that are identified by way of description. ((s) Object of the >Description). Otherwise, the real Bismarck would not be a permissible value of the variables with which we express that there is an individual of a certain species. Problem: then these quantifiers may not be constituents of propositions, because their value ranges do not only consist of objects of acquaintance. Therefore, Russell’s mistake was twofold. Quantifier/Variable/Russell/Hintikka, 1905, he had already stopped thinking that quantifiers and bound variables are real constituents of propositions. Def Pseudo Variable/Russell/Hintikka: = bound variable. Acquaintance/Russell: values of the variable should only be objects of acquaintance. (HintikkaVsRussell). Quantifiers/HintikkaVsRussell: now we can see why Russell did not differentiate between different quantifiers (acquaintance/description): For him quantifiers were only notational patterns, and for them the range of possible interpretations need not be determined, therefore it makes no difference if the rage changes!. Quantification/Russell: for him, it was implicitly objectional (referential), and in any event not substitutional. Peacocke I 190 Possible Worlds/Quantification/HintikkaVsRussell: R. is unable to explain the cases in which we quantify in belief contexts (!) where (according to Hintikka) the quantifier over "publicly descriptively identified" particulars is sufficient. Hintikka: compares with a "roman à clef". Peacocke: it is not clear that (whether) this could not be explained by Russell as cases of general ideas, so that the person with such and such characteristics is so and so. Universals/Acquaintance/Russell/Peacocke: we are familiar with universals and they are constituents of our thoughts. HintikkaVsRussell: this is a desperate remedy to save the principle of acquaintance. PeacockeVsRussell: his arguments are also very weak. Russell: E.g. we cannot understand the transitivity of "before" if we are not acquainted with "before", and even less what it means that one thing is before another. While the judgment depends on a consciousness of a complex, whose analysis we do not understand if we do not understand the terms used. I 191 PeacockeVsRussell: what kind of relationship should exist between subject and universal?. Solution: the reformulated PB: Here we can see to which conditions a term is subject, similar to the principle of sensitivity in relational givenness. I 192 HintikkaVsRussell: ("On denoting what?", 1981, p.167 ff): the elimination of objects with which the subject is not familiar from the singular term position is not sufficient for the irreducibility of acquaintance that Russell had in mind. Quantification/Hintikka: the quantifiers will still reach over objects with which the subject is not familiar. But such quantifiers cannot be constituents of propositions, if that is to be compatible with the PB. Because they would certainly occur through their value range Occur and these do not consist of particulars with which one is familiar.	Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Russell, B.	Donnellan Vs Russell, B.	I 18/19 DonnellanVsRussell: has not grasped the referential use, but placed it in a strange construct of "logically proper names". DonnellanVsStrawson: does not see the difference ref/att correctly and mixes the two. Referential/Attributive/Donnellan: varies even when it comes to the importance of the distinction: 1) Text: only pragmatic distinction, 2) later: "semantic significance". KripkeVsDonnellan: denies semantic ambiguity of the use of descriptions. Both can be grasped with the Russell’s analysis: sentences of the form "The F which is G is H" have the same truth conditions, they are true, if the only F that fulfils G is actually H. I 193 DonnellanVsRussell: his strict implication works at most with attributive use. (But he does note make the distinction). I 194 Def Description/Russell: affects an entity which only it fulfills. Donnellan: that is certainly applicable to both uses(!). Ref/Att/Donnellan: if both are not distinguished, the danger is that it must be assumed that the speaker would have to refer to something without knowing it. E.g. "Presidential candidate": we had no idea that it would be Goldwater. Nevertheless, "presidential candidate" would absurdly refer to Goldwater. Solution: DonnellanVsRussell: attributive use. I 205 Logical Proper Names/"This"/Russell: refer to something without attributing properties! (Donnellan pro) Donnellan: It could eb said that they refer to the thing itself, not to the thing under the condition that it has any special properties. DonnellanVsRussell: he believed that this is something that a description cannot do. But it does work with referential use. I 275 Theory of Descriptions/Reference/Existence/Russell/Donnellan: Attributed to himself as a merit to explain the reference to non-existent things without the need to bring the idea of non-existent references of singular terms into play. His fully developed theory of singular terms extended this to the of proper names. Philosophy of logical atomism: names as covert descriptions. I 275/276 Here, the theory "proper names in the strict logical sense" was introduced, which is rarely found in everyday speech. ((s) logical proper names: "this", etc.) DonnellanVsRussell: we want to try to make Russell’s attempt at a solution (which has not failed) redundant with the "historic explanation". (> like ZinK). I 281 Logical Proper Names/DonellanVsRussell: have no place in a correct theory of reference. Proper Names/Historical Explanation/DonnellanVsRussell: Russell’s view is incorrect in terms of common singular terms: it is not true that common proper names always have a descriptive content. Question: does this mean that ordinary singular terms might be able to fulfill the function which according to Russell only logical proper names can have?. I 283 Descriptions/DonellanVsRussell: it seems absurd to deny that in E.g. Waverley that what is described by the description, i.e. Scott, is not "part" of the expressed proposition. Russell: was of the opinion that such statements are not really statements about the described or the reference of the name, that they do not really name the described thing! Only logical proper names could accomplish the feat of actually mentioning a certain particular. "About"/Reference/DonnellanVsRussell: Putting great emphasis on concepts such as "about" would lead us into marshy terrain. We should require no definition of "about"!. It would be a delicate task to show that such a statement is either not a statement in any sense of "about" about the described thing or that there is a clear sense of "about" by it being not. I 285/286 DonnellanVsRussell: For his theory he paid the price of giving up the natural use of singular terms. RussellVsVs: but with the "natural conception" we end up at the Meinong population explosion. Proper Names/Historical Explanation/DonnellanVsRussell: according to my theory names are no hidden descriptions. E.g. "Homer" is not an abbreviation for "The author of the Homeric poems". I 209 DonnellanVsRussell/Kripke: Question: Does he refute Russell? No, in itself not! For methodological considerations, Russell’s theory is better than many thought. Nevertheless, it will probably fail in the end. I 222 Statement/Donnellan/VsRussell/Kripke: It’s not so clear that Donnellan refutes Russell. E.g. "Her husband is kind to her": had Donnellan flatly asserted that this is true iff. the lover is nice, without regard to the niceness of the husband (is perhaps also nice), he would have started a dispute with Russell. But he does not assert this! If we now asked "Is the statement is true?", Donnellan would elude us. Because if description is used referentially, it is unclear what is meant by "statement". If the statement is to be that the husband is nice, the problem is: to decide whether ref. or att. Referential: in this case, we would repeat the speech act wrongly, Attributive: we ourselves would be referring to someone, and we can only do that if we ourselves believe that it is the husband. I 232 DonnellanVsRussell/Kripke: Are the two really conflicting? I propose a test: Test: if you consider whether a particular linguistic phenomenon in English is a counterexample to an analysis, you should consider a hypothetical language that is similar to English, except that here the analysis is assumed to be correct. If the phenomenon in question also appears in the corresponding (hypothetical) community, the fact that it occurs in English cannot refute the hypothesis that the analysis for English is correct!. DonnellanVsRussell/Kripke: Test: would the phenomenon ref/att occur in different languages?. I 234 E.g. Sparkling Wine: speakers of the weaker and middle languages think (albeit erroneously) that the truth conditions are fulfilled. Weak: here, the apparatus seems to be entirely adequate. The semantic reference is the only object. Our intuitions are fully explained. Strong: Here, the phenomenon may occur as well. Even ironic use may be clear if the affected person drinks soda. I 235 These uses would become more common in the strong language (which is not English, of course), because the definite article is prohibited. This leads to an expansion of the speaker reference: If the speaker thinks an item to be fulfilling (Ex)(φ x u ψx), it is the speaker reference, then it may indeed be fulfilling or not. Middle: if speaker reference is applicable in the strong one, it is just as easily transferred to the middle one, because the speaker reference of "ψ(ixφ(x)" is then the thing that the speaker has in mind, which is the only one to fulfill φ(x) and about which he wants to announce that it ψ-s. Conclusion: because the phenomenon occurs in all languages, the fact that it occurs in English can be no argument that English is not a Russell language. Newen/Schrenk I 95 Def Attributive/Donnellan/Newen/Schrenk: E.g. "The murderer of Schmidt is insane" in the view of the body of Schmidt ((s) In the absence of the person in question, no matter whether it is them or not, "Whoever ...".). Def referential/Donnellan/Newen/Schrenk: E.g. "The murderer of Schmidt is insane" in the face of a wild rampaging man at court - while Schmidt comes through the door - ((s) in view of the man in question, no matter whether it’s him or not. "This one, whatever he did...").	Donnellan I Keith S. Donnellan "Reference and Definite Descriptions", in: Philosophical Review 75 (1966), S. 281-304 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Sciama, D.	Kanitscheider Vs Sciama, D.	Kanitscheider I 376 Mach's Principle/Sciama: it is impossible to separate gravic and inertial forces, because, equal in essence, they have the same origin. Therefore only stars can be considered as sources of inertial forces in non-inertial systems. By the way, an accelerated star has a different gravitational effect than a resting star. (Newton does not consider this yet). I 377 Due to the decrease of gravity, which is caused by the acceleration of the stars, the amount of the distant masses is much stronger with 1/r than with a r -2 law, although the total amount is weakened by the expansion. (+ I 377) Thus, 80 % of the total force comes from masses beyond the range of the 200-inch telescope of Mt Palomar. The total force now depends on the gravitational mass density rhoG G, the expansion rate tau , which determines the gravitational Doppler effect, and on the heavy mass mG of the body itself. The value of the force results in rho G rho²mG (G²mG) x acceleration of the stars and should be equal to the inertial mass mi x acceleration of the stars (special character). I 378 According to this mi should be = G²mG. This is correct, since the newly defined mi has all the properties of an inert mass and the known proportionality of heavy and inert mass appears here as a derived theorem. Now a relation to the gravitational constant G can be established. Def Gravitational Constant: shows the strength of the gravitational interaction of two inert masses. Mach's Principle/Gravitational Constant/Sciama: if in the above formula the gravitational density G is replaced by the inertia density i, and mG/mi = G, the relationship Gi² = 1 is obtained. It is important because it expresses a high degree of connection of the universe. Gravitational constant: this quantification also explains the apparent irrelevance of the properties of stars for the inertia of matter: the universe manifests itself in both phenomena precisely where Newton's theory contains arbitrary elements: in the choice of inertial systems and gravitational constants. Theory/Sciama: should describe everything that occurs and should not allow to be possible what does not actually happen. I 380 KanitscheiderVsSciama: but cosmological applications can also be derived from any local gravitational theory. E.g. Scalar tensor theory by Jordan. Dirac: also his hypothesis of large numbers led to a new cosmological model. Almost all combinations of cosmic parameters from variable gravitational constants to different mechanisms of origin and annihilation of matter as well as a temporal variation of particle masses are conceivable!	Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Sense Data	Sellars Vs Sense Data	I 9 SellarsVsSense Data Theory: mistake: as with the naturalistic fallacy: to consider the reality as a fact that requires no learning! It looks indeed strange that one would have to learn a sensation of pain or sensation of color. But if the sensation is not learned, then the theorists cannot perform any analysis that assumes the acquired skills. But a classificatory distinction does not work without learning and without conceptualization, or even without the use of symbols. I 10 SellarsVsSense Data Theory: three assumptions are contrary to each other: A. The proposition X perceives a red sense content s stating that X in a non-inferential way knows that s is red. B. The ability to feel the meaning content is not learned. C. The ability to know facts of the form x is φ is learned. A and B together contain non-C; B and C contain non-A; A and C contain non-B. ((s) ratio of three propositions that in pairs respectively exclude the third.). Three possibilities: (1) you can drop A. Then the sensation becomes a noncognitive fact. This can, of course, build a necessary condition, even a logically necessary condition for a non-inferential knowledge. I 11 (2) One can drop B. Thus the concept of the sense data is detached from our everyday speech on sensations, feelings, itching. (3) to drop C would, however, be contrary to the nominalistic trends that were prevalent within the empiricist tradition. Sense data/Sellars: the concept of the sense data seems to be a hybrid of two ideas: 1. the idea that there are certain inner episodes as red sensations, without a process of learning or conceptualization would have preceded. Without these inner episodes one could in some way not see! 2. the idea that there are certain inner episodes that are non-inferential content of knowledge. These episodes are necessary conditions of empirical knowledge as evidence base ("evidence") for all other empirical claims. I 12 Right now, it does not follow that the sensation of a red triangle is a cognitive or epistemic fact. You are of course tempted to equate "To have the sensation of a red triangle" with the "Thinking of a heavenly city", then the former is epistemic and intentional, the latter only intentional. But this temptation can be resisted. Because you can claim that the sensation is a fact sui generis that is neither epistemic nor physically and that has its own logical grammar! Unfortunately, that was often associated with a false reasoning: False: we might describe "seeing that a facing side of a physical object is red and is triangular," as "apparent act of seeing" of which some are not reliable. From a subjective perspective there is no indicator which ensures that any such information is reliable! By more precise information on the circumstances a class some more reliable observations can be created. But no complete reliability. I 13 Sellars: that confuses a lot: we remember that the sensations of red triangles have exactly those advantages that they are missing the apparent acts of seeing physical surfaces. From the analogy of sensations with the "thinking of a heavenly city", one might think that sensations were in the same category as thoughts. So that both are cognitive facts. Then you will find that sensations are much closer to mental processes than external physical objects. Mistake: to overlook the fact that one can only describe an experience as reliable when it is also useful to refer to it as unreliable. I 24 To appear/to seem/theory of the appearance/Sellars: VsSense data theory: assume that the facts of the form "x seems to be φ for S" are atomically and irreducible and that you need sense data neither for its analysis nor for an explanation of these facts. (Sellars pro). The proposition that something seems to be red for someone who has the idea that he is in any relationship with something that is red, not as part of its meaning! Sellars: to seem prima facie = to be.	Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977
Skepticism	Danto Vs Skepticism	I 235 Vsskepticism: we are separated so little from the world as from ourselves. It needs no further argument to explain that there really is a fire. It is the nature of fire to be perceived warm, orange and flame-shaped.	Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Skepticism	Field Vs Skepticism	IV 418 Epistemic Relativism/Field: here, equally good proof systems may differ in their evaluation of convictions. Perhaps there is no best proof system. There are three main tasks: 1) a spectrum of variation must be demonstrated by proof systems, 2) a variation range of intuitively desirable goals 3) (most importantly): ER must evaluate how different proof systems can fulfill different goals. This cannot be done from a neutral point of view. Important argument: the assertion that one proof system is better than another is a factual assertion, and in that, of course, we use the proof system that we normally use. This has led some people to a skepticism that no assertion is ever really justified. Relativism: for him, the question of a "real" justification does not make sense anyway. IV 419 Relativism/FieldVsSkepticism: precisely relativism provides a refutation of skepticism! PutnamVsEpistemic Relativism/Field: three arguments: 1) (p 136): (premise): there are no facts that are independent of values. And that is only of interest if we are VsMetaphysical Realism before. 2) (p 119f): it seems inconsistent to simultaneously represent one point and another that seems to be equally good. FieldVsPutnam: a relativist who is not simultaneously a Protagorean (>Protagoras) should not assume that all points of view are equally good! Some are true, some are false, some are reliable, others are not, etc. 3) (Putnam p 121f): (refers to the inability to distinguish relativism of justification from that of the truth: If statements of the form "X is true (justified) relative to person P" themselves are absolutely true or justified, then this is ultimately an absolute concept of truth (justification). FieldVsPutnam: but precisely that does not apply to justification: the above only shows that statements about justification relative to a system are absolutely true or false, and since truth is factual, not evaluative, for the metaphys.r., this is unproblematic for the MR. FieldVsPutnam: his attempt to refute epistemic relativism fails.	Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Skepticism	Nozick Vs Skepticism	II 197 Skepticism/Nozick: we do not try to refute the skeptic. VsSkepticism: other authors: 1) when he argues against knowledge, he already presupposes that it exists. 2) to accept it would be unreasonable, because it is more likely that his extreme conclusions are wrong than that all its premises are true. NozickVs. We do not have to convince the skeptic. We want to explain how knowledge is possible, therefore it is good to find hypotheses which we ourselves find acceptable! II 198 Skepticism/Nozick: Common Variant: claims that someone could believe something even though it is wrong. Perhaps caused by a demon or because he is dreaming or because he is a brain in a vat. But how do these possibilities adopted by the skeptic show that I do not know p? (3) if p were false, S would not believe that p (as above). If (3) is a necessary condition for knowledge that shows the possibility of the skeptic that there is no knowledge. Strong variant: R: Even if p were false, S would still believe that p II 199 This conditional with the same antecedent as (3) and contradictory consequent is incompatible with (3). If (3) is true, R is false. But R is stronger than skepticism requires. Because if (3) were wrong, S could still believe that p. The following conditional is weaker than R, it is merely the negation of (3): T: Not (not p > not (S believes that p)). ((s) >Range: weaker: negation of the entire conditional stronger: the same antecedent, opposite of the consequent ((s) not necessarily negation of consequent) Here: stronger: ".... would have to believe ..." - weaker.. "... could ...") Nozick: While R does not simply deny (3), it asserts its own conditional instead. The truth of (3) is not incompatible with a possible situation (here not possible world) where the person believes p, although p is false. (3) does not cover all possibilities: (3) not p > not (S believes p) That does not mean that in all situations where not p is true, S does not believe that p. Asserting this would mean to say that not p entails not (S believes p) (or logical implication) ((s) >Entailment). But subjunction (conditional) differs from entailment: So the existence of a possible situation in which p is wrong and S still believes p does not show that (3) is false. (? LL). (3) can be true even if there is a possible situation where not p and S believes that p. (3) speaks of the situation in which p is false. Not every possible situation where p is false is the situation that would prevail if p were false. Possible World: (3) speaks of the ~p world closest to our actual world. It speaks of the non-p neighborhood. Skepticism/SK/Terminology/Nozick: SK stands for the "possibilities of the skeptic": II 200 We could dream of being misled by an evil demon or being brains in a vat. These are attempts to refute (3): (3) if p were false, S would not believe that p. But these only attempts succeed if one of these possibilities(dream, vat, demon) prevails when p is false. I.e. only in the next non-p worlds. Even if we were in the vat, (3) could be true, i.e. although - as described by skeptics - p is false and S believes p. ((s) E.g. p: "I am in the Café": false, if I'm in the vat. But I would not believe to be the vat. That is what the skeptic means. If I do not believe the truth (that I am in the vat) and do not know, then my belief is wrong. But then p means "I'm not in the vat."). NozickVsSkepticism: when the skeptic describes a situation SK that would not prevail (sic), even if p were wrong, then this situation SK (vat) does not show that (3) is wrong and does not undermine our knowledge. (see below) ((s) i.e. from the perspective VsSkepticism: the skeptic asserts that all beliefs are wrong, but that is not yet the situation that we are all in the tank). This is just the preliminary consideration, the expected one follows in the next paragraph). Condition C: to exclude skeptical hypothesis: C: not-p > SK (vat situation) does not exist ((s) That is what the skeptic denies!). That excludes every skeptical situation that fulfills C. ((s) it is only about n-p cases). Skepticism: for a vat situation to show that we do not know that p, it must be a situation that could exist if p did not exist, and thus satisfies the negation of C: Negation of C: -not (not p > SK (vat situation) does not exist) Although the vat situations of the skeptic seem to show that (3) is wrong, they do not show it: they satisfy condition C and are therefore excluded! SkepticismVs: could ask why we know that if p were wrong, SK (vat) would not exist. But usually it asks something stronger: do we know that the vat situation does not exist? And if we do not know that, how can we know that p? ((s) reverse order). This brings us to the second way in which the vat situatios could show that we do not know that p: Skeptical results Knowledge/Nozick: according to our approach, S knows that the vat situation does not exist iff II 201 (1) vat situation does not exist (2) S believes that vat situation does not exist (3) If the vat situation existed, then S would not believe that the vat situation did not(!) exist. (4) If the vat situation did not exist, then S would believe that it does not exist. (3) is the necessary condition for knowledge! It follows from it that we do not know that we are not in the vat! Skepticism/Nozick: that is what the skeptic says. But is it not what we say ourselves? It is actually a feature of our approach that it provides this result! Vat/Demon/Descartes/Nozick: Descartes would say that proof of the existence of a good God would not allow us to be in the vat. Literature then focused on whether Descartes would succeed to obtain such evidence. II 202 Nozick: could a good God not have reasons to deceive us? According to Descartes his motives are unknowable for us. Cogito/Nozick: can "I think" only be produced by something existing? Not perhaps also by Hamlet, could we not be dreamed by someone who inspires "I think" in us? Descartes asked how we knew that we were not dreaming, he could also have asked whether we were dreamed about by someone. Def Doxastically Identical/Terminology/Nozick: is a possible situation for S with the current situation, if S believed exactly the same things (Doxa) in the situation. II 203 Skepticism: describes doxastically identical situations where nearly all the believed things are wrong. (Vat). Such possible worlds are possible, because we possess our knowledge through mediation, not directly. It's amazing how different doxastically identical worlds can be. What else could the skeptic hope for? Nozick pro skepticism: we agree that we do not know that "not-vat". II 204 But that does not keep me from knowing that I'm writing this! It is true, I believe it and I would not believe it if it were not true, and if it were true, I would believe it. I.e. our approach does not lead to general skepticism. However, we must ensure that it seems that the skeptic is right and that we do not know that we are not in the vat. VsSkepticism: we must examine its "short step" to the conclusion that we do not know these things, because either this step is wrong or our approach is incoherent. Not seclusion II 204 Completed/Incompleteness/Knowledge/Nozick: Skepticism: (wrongly) assumes that our knowledge is complete under known logical implication: if we progress from something known to something entailed, we allegedly do not leave the realm of knowledge. The skeptic tries the other way around, of course: if you do not know that q, and you know that p entails q, then it should follow that you do not know that p. E.g. ((s) If you do not know that you are not in the vat, and sitting here implies not being in the vat, then you do not know that you're sitting here, if you know that the implication exists. (contraposition).) Terminology: Contraposition: knowledge that p >>: entails Then the (skeptical) principle of closure under known implication is: P: K(p >> q) & Kp > Kq. II 205 Nozick: E.g. if you know that two sentences are incompatible, and you know that the first one is true, then you know that the negation of the second one is true. Contraposition: because you do not know the second one, you do not know the first. (FN 48) Vs: you could pick on the details and come to an iteration: the person might have forgotten inferences etc. Finally you would come to KK(p >> q) & KKp Kq: amplifies the antecedent and is therefore not favorable for the skeptics. II 206 NozickVsSkepticism: the whole principle P is false. Not only in detail. Knowledge is not closed under known logical implication. (FN 49) S knows that p if it has a true belief and fulfills (3) and (4). (3) and (4) are themselves not closed under known implication. (3) if p were false, S would not believe that p. If S knows that p, then the belief is that p contingent on the truth of p. And that is described by (3). Now it may be that p implies q (and S knows that), that he also believes that q, but this belief that q is not subjunktivically dependent on the truth of q. Then he does not fulfill (3') if q were wrong, S would not believe q. The situation where q is wrong could be quite different from the one where p is wrong. E.g. the fact that they were born in a certain city implies that they were born on the earth, but not vice versa. II 207 And pondering the respective situations would also be very different. Thus the belief would also be very different. Stronger/Weaker: if p implies q (and not vice versa), then not-q (negation of consequent) is much stronger than not-p (negation of the antecedent). Assuming various strengths there is no reason to assume that the belief would be the same in both situations. (Doxastically identical). Not even would the beliefs in one be a proper subset of the other! E.g. p = I'm awake and sitting on a chair in Jerusalem q = I'm not in the vat. The first entails the second. p entails q. And I know that. If p were wrong, I could be standing or lying in the same city or in a nearby one. ((s) There are more ways you can be outside of a vat than there are ways you can be inside). If q were wrong, I would have to be in a vat. These are clearly two different situations, which should make a big difference in what I believe. If p were wrong, I would not believe that p. If q were wrong, I would nevertheless still believe that q! Even though I know that p implies q. The reason is that (3) is not closed under known implication. It may be that (3) is true of one statement, but not of another, which is implied by it. If p entails q and we truthfully believe that p, then we do not have a false belief that q. II 208 Knowledge: if you know something, you cannot a have false belief about it. Nevertheless, although p implies q, we can have a false belief that q (not in vat)! "Would not falsely believe that" is in fact not completed under known implication either. If knowledge were merely true belief, it would be closed under implication. (Assuming that both statements are believed). Because knowledge is more than belief, we need additional conditions of which at least one must be open (not completed) under implication. Knowledge: a belief is only knowledge when it covaries with the fact. (see above). Problem: This does not yet ensure the correct type of connection. Anyway, it depends on what happens in situations where p is false. Truth: is what remains under implication. But a condition that does not mention the possible falseness, does not provide us covariance. Belief: a belief that covaries with the facts is not complete. II 209 Knowledge: and because knowledge involves such a belief, it is not completed, either. NozickVsSkepticism: he cannot simply deny this, because his argument that we do not know that we are not in the vat uses the fact that knowledge needs the covariance. But he is in contradiction, because another part of his argument uses the assumption that there is no covariance! According to this second part he concludes that you know nothing at all if you do not know that they are not in the vat. But this completion can only exist if the variation (covariance) does not exist. Knowledge/Nozick: is an actual relation that includes a connection (tracking, traceable track). And the track to p is different from that to q! Even if p implies q. NozickVsSkepticism: skepticism is right in that we have no connections to some certain truths (we are not in the vat), but he is wrong in that we are not in the correct relation to many other facts (truths). Including such that imply the former (unconnected) truth that we believe, but do not know. Skepticism/Nozick: many skeptics profess that they cannot maintain their position, except in situations where they rationally infer. E.g. Hume: II 210 Hume: after having spent three or four hours with my friends, my studies appear to me cold and ridiculous. Skepticism/Nozick: the arguments of the skeptic show (but they also show only) that we do not know that we are not in the vat. He is right in that we are not in connection with a fact here. NozickVsSkepticism: it does not show that we do not know other facts (including those that imply "not vat"). II 211 We have a connection to these other facts (e.g. I'm sittin here, reading). II 224f Method/Knowledge/Covariance/Nozick: I do not live in a world where pain behavior e is given and must be kept constant! - I.e. I can know h on the basis of e, which is variable! - And because it does not vary, it shows me that h ("he is in pain") is true. VsSkepticism: in reality it is not a question that is h not known, but "not (e and not h)" II 247 NozickVsSkepticism: there is a limit for the iteration of the knowledge operator K. "knowing knowledge" is sometimes interpreted as certainly knowing, but that is not meant here. Point: Suppose a person knows exactly that they are located on the 3rd level of knowledge: K³p (= KKKp), but not k4p. Suppose also that the person knows that they are not located on the 4th level. KK³p & not k4p. But KK³p is precisely k4p which has already been presumed as wrong! Therefore, it should be expected that if we are on a finite level Knp, we do not know exactly at what level we are.	No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994
Skyrms, B.	Armstrong Vs Skyrms, B.	Arm III 36 Regularity theory/Armstrong: If we vary the accompanying circumstances now, then the limit value of the relative frequency in each class of circumstances is maintained. (Truth conditions/tr.cond./law statements/Resilience: But the resilience throws no light on the truth conditions for law statements, as the text might suggest). Description dependence/Resilience/ArmstrongVsSkyrms/ArmstrongVsMackie: this introduces a considerable element of arbitrariness or convention. The law statement ascribes a precise probability to Fs for being Gs. It conceals that it depends on the decision how the facts are described. Mackie and Skyrms are honest enough not to conceal that: Coincidence/physical coincidence/Skyrms: is not absolute! (Facts are description dependent). Standards for resilience evolve along with physical theories. Resilience/Armstrong: the term is useful when we want to develop objective tests. Laws of Nature/LoN//ArmstrongVsSkyrms: one should never ask more of laws than this: they should be potentially resilient. Fs have the probability of being a G always under all nomically possible circumstances. III 37 But the fact that these circumstances exist is contingent! We expect that some never occur. Skyrms: Follows the reg. th. Arm III 65 Resiliency/Laws of nature/Regularity/Armstrong: E.g. it is assumed to be a Humean Regularity that Fs are Gs. Which additional condition would turn this into a law? We want the Fs to resilientyl be Gs, i.e. under every nomically possible circumstance. Of course, this cannot absolutely be fulfilled. But relative resilience: E.g. there may be Fs that are Hs that are Js that are Ks ... where the class of factors {H, K, J ...} covers a wide range of appropriate circumstances. Then and only then the reg. is a law. How broad must the range be to ensure that the factors are suitable? Intuitively, so that if there are many factors, it is nomically possible in the test to produce an F which is a ~G. E.g. Smith’s Garden (see above). The generalization is highly resilient here, because there is a broad range of circumstances that could falsify it if it is falsifiable. VsResiliency/VsSkyrms: why should there not be laws that are non-resilient?. Law: if it is a law that the Fs are Gs, then s is potentially resilient by definition. It is physically not possible for an F, which is a K, not to be a G. But why should nature be so accommodating as to provide us with reasons to assume that there is no such K? Why should there be Fs which are accompanied by factors that are plausible candidates for Ks, but happen to be not?. E.g. why should Smith’s Garden not exist somewhere, but without fruits, and yet be it a law that it contains nothing but apples? Only a vulgar positivism could prohibit that. ArmstrongVsResilience/ArmstrongVsSkyrms: that is the reason why the refinement of reg.th. must be rejected by resilience. This requires an urgent systematic solution. How can the resilience theorists specify the real factors for a test?. III 66 Only by filtering out the nomically significant factors. He needs a coherent system. Therefore, problems of the systematic approach are also problems of the resilience approach.	Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Stalnaker, R.	Lewis Vs Stalnaker, R.	Read III 101/102 Stalnaker equates the probability of the conditional clauses with the conditional probability. LewisVsStalnaker: there is no statement whose probability is measured by the conditional probability! (+ III 102) According to Lewis, based on Stalnaker's assumption, the odds of drawing cards are independent. But this is obviously wrong (as opposed to throwing dice). Thus, the probability of the conditional clause cannot be measured by the conditional probability. III 108 Example from Lewis If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet would be Italian. and If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet wouldn't be Italian. Stalnaker: one or the other must be true. Lewis: both are wrong. (Because only subjunctive conditional sentences are not truth functional). The indicative pieces would be entirely acceptable to those who do not know their nationality. Lewis IV 149 Action/Rationality/Stalnaker: Propositions are the suitable objects of settings here. LewisVsStalnaker: it turns out that he actually needs a theory of attitudes de se. Stalnaker: the rationally acting is someone who accepts various possible rational futures. The function of the wish is simple to subdivide these different event progressions into the desired and the rejected ones. Or to provide an order or measure of alternative possibilities in terms of desirability. Belief/Stalnaker: its function is simple to determine which the relevant alternative situations may be, or to arrange them in terms of their probability under different conditions. Objects of attitude/Objects of belief/Stalnaker: are identical if and only if they are functionally equivalent, and they are only if they do not differ in any alternative possible situation. Lewis: if these alternative situations are always alternative possible worlds, as Stalnaker assumes, then this is indeed an argument for propositions. ((s) Differentiation Situation/Possible world). Situation/Possible world/Possibility/LewisVsStalnaker: I think there can also be alternatives within a single possible world! For example, Lingens now knows almost enough to identify himself. He's reduced his options to two: a) he's on the 6th floor of the Stanford Library, then he'll have to go downstairs, or b) he is in the basement of the Widener College library and must go upstairs. The books tell him that there is exactly one person with memory loss in each of these places. And he found out that he must be one of them. His consideration provides 8 possibilities: The eight cases are spread over only four types of worlds! For example, 1 and 3 do not belong to different worlds but are 3000 miles away in the same world. In order to distinguish these you need qualities again, ((s) the propositions apply equally to both memory artists.) V 145 Conditionals/Probability/Stalnaker: (1968)⁽¹⁾ Notation: ">" (pointed, not horseshoe!) Def Stalnaker Conditional: a conditional A > C is true if and only if the least possible change that makes A true, also makes C true. (Revision). Stalnaker: assumes that P(A > C) and P(C I A) are adjusted if A is positive. The sentences, which are true however under Stalnaker's conditions, are then exactly those that have positive probabilities under his hypothesis about probabilities of conditionals. LewisVsStalnaker: this is probably true mostly, but not in certain modal contexts, where different interpretations of a language evaluate the same sentences differently. V 148 Conditional/Stalnaker: to decide whether to believe a conditional: 1. add the antecedent to your set of beliefs, 2. make the necessary corrections for the consistency 3. decide if the consequence is true. Lewis: that's right for a Stalnaker conditional if the fake revision is done by mapping. V 148/149 LewisVsStalnaker: the passage suggests that one should pretend the kind of revision that would take place if the antecedens were actually added to the belief attitudes. But that is wrong: then conditionalisation was needed. Schwarz I 60 Counterpart/c.p./counterpart theory/c.p.th./counterpart relation/c.p.r./StalnakerVsLewis: if you allow almost arbitrary relations as counterpart relations anyway, you could not use qualitative relations. (Stalnaker 1987a)⁽²⁾: then you can reconcile counterpart with Haecceitism: if you come across the fact that Lewis (x)(y)(x = y > N(x = y) is wrong, (Lewis pro contingent identity, see above) you can also determine that a thing always has only one counter part per world. Stalnaker/Schwarz: this is not possible with qualitative counterpart relations, since it is always conceivable that several things - for example in a completely symmetrical world - are exactly the same as a third thing in another possible world. LewisVsStalnaker: VsNon qualitative counter part relation: all truths including modal truths should be based on what things exist (in the real world and possible worlds) and what (qualitative) properties they have (>"mosaic": >Humean World). Schwarz I 62 Mathematics/Truthmaking/Fact/Lewis/Schwarz: as with possible worlds, there is no real information: for example, that 34 is the root of 1156, tells us nothing about the world. ((s) That it applies in every possible world. Rules are not truthmakers). Schwarz: For example, that there is no one who shaves those who do not shave themselves is analogously no information about the world. ((s) So not that the world is qualitatively structured). Schwarz: maybe we'll learn more about sentences here. But it is a contingent truth (!) that sentences like "there is someone who shaves those who do not shave themselves" are inconsistent. Solution/Schwarz: the sentence could have meant something else and thus be consistent. Schwarz I 63 Seemingly analytical truth/Lewis/Schwarz: e.g. what do we learn when we learn that ophthalmologists are eye specialists? We already knew that ophthalmologists are ophthalmologists. We have experienced a contingent semantic fact. Modal logic/Modality/Modal knowledge/Stalnaker/Schwarz: Thesis: Modal knowledge could always be understood as semantic knowledge. For example, when we ask if cats are necessary animals, we ask how the terms "cat" and "animal" are to be used. (Stalnaker 1991⁽³⁾,1996⁽⁴⁾, Lewis 1986e⁽⁵⁾:36). Knowledge/SchwarzVsStalnaker: that's not enough: to acquire contingent information, you always have to examine the world. (Contingent/Schwarz: empirical, non-semantic knowledge). Modal Truth/Schwarz: the joke about logical, mathematical and modal truths is that they can be known without contact with the world. Here we do not acquire any information. ((s) >making true: no empirical fact "in the world" makes that 2+2 = 4; Cf. >Nonfactualism; >Truthmakers). Schwarz I 207 "Secondary truth conditions"/truth conditions/tr.cond./semantic value/Lewis/Schwarz: contributing to the confusion is that the simple (see above, context-dependent, ((s) "indexical") and variable functions of worlds on truth values are often not only called "semantic values" but also as truth conditions. Important: these truth conditions (tr.cond.) must be distinguished from the normal truth conditions. Lewis: use truth conditions like this. 1986e⁽⁵⁾,42 48: for primary, 1969⁽⁶⁾, Chapter V: for secondary). Def Primary truth conditions/Schwarz: the conditions under which the sentence should be pronounced according to the conventions of the respective language community. Truth Conditions/Lewis/Schwarz: are the link between language use and formal semantics, their purpose is the purpose of grammar. Note: Def Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, i.e. by using world parameters for the world of the respective situation (correspondingly as time parameter the point of time of the situation etc.). Def "diagonal proposition"/Terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978⁽⁷⁾): primary truth conditions Def horizontal proposition/Lewis: secondary truth condition (1980a⁽⁸⁾,38, 1994b⁽⁹⁾,296f). Newer terminology: Def A-Intension/Primary Intension/1-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: for primary truth conditions Def C-Intension/Secondary Intension/2-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: for secondary truth conditions Def A-Proposition/1-Proposition/C-Proposition/2-Propsition/Terminology/Schwarz: correspondingly. (Jackson 1998a⁽¹⁰⁾,2004⁽¹¹⁾, Lewis 2002b⁽¹²⁾,Chalmers 1996b⁽¹³⁾, 56,65) Def meaning₁/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975⁽¹⁴⁾,173): secondary truth conditions. Def meaning₂/Lewis/Schwarz: complex function of situations and worlds on truth values, "two-dimensional intention". Schwarz: Problem: this means very different things: Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: in Lewis not determined by meta-linguistic diagonalization like Stalnaker's diagonal proposition. Not even about a priori implication as with Chalmer's primary propositions. Schwarz I 227 A posteriori necessity/Metaphysics/Lewis/Schwarz: normal cases are not cases of strong necessity. One can find out for example that Blair is premier or e.g. evening star = morning star. LewisVsInwagen/LewisVsStalnaker: there are no other cases (which cannot be empirically determined). LewisVs Strong Need: has no place in its modal logic. LewisVs telescope theory: possible worlds are not like distant planets where you can find out which ones exist. 1. Robert C. Stalnaker [1968]: “A Theory of Conditionals”. In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, 98–112 2.Robert C. Stalnaker [1987a]: “Counterparts and Identity”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11: 121–140. In [Stalnaker 2003] 3. Robert C. Stalnaker [1991]: “The Problem of Logical Omniscience I”. Synthese, 89. In [Stalnaker 1999a] 4. Robert C. Stalnaker — [1996]: “On What Possible Worlds Could Not Be”. In Adam Morton und Stephen P. Stich (Hg.) Benacerraf and his Critics, Cambridge (Mass.): Blackwell. In [Stalnaker 2003] 5. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 6. David Lewis[1969a]: Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press 7. Robert C. Stalnaker [1978]: “Assertion”. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9, New York: Academic Press, 315–332, und in [Stalnaker 1999a] 8. David Lewis [1980a]: “Index, Context, and Content”. In S. Kanger und S. ¨Ohmann (ed.), Philosophy and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, und in [Lewis 1998a] 9. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, und in [Lewis 1999a] 10. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 11. Frank Jackson [2004]: “Why We Need A-Intensions”. Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277 12. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97 13. David Chalmers [1996b]: The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford University Press 14. David Lewis [1975]: “Languages and Language”. In [Gunderson 1975], 3–35. And in [Lewis 1983d]	Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Stalnaker, R.	Williamson Vs Stalnaker, R.	I 159 Identity/Indistinguishability/Timothy WilliamsonVsStalnaker: (1996): Actuality Operator/@/Williamson: if we add it to K, we can prove the necessity of diversity from the necessary identity. I.e. actual different things are then necessarily different: Logical form: I- @ (∀x)(∀y)(x ≠ y > Nx ≠ y). I 160 Stalnaker: my independence argument above for necessary diversity was based on two assumptions 1. the extensional logic of identity is the same as the logic of indistinguishability, but 2. in a modal semantics without symmetry condition for the accessibility relation, individuals can be distinguishable in a possible world while they are not in another possible world. If one cannot "look back", the information about the distinction may be lost. Actuality Operator/Williamson: preserves the information because you can always look back to the actual world. General: the information about every possible world accessible from the actual world is reflected in the actual world and thus also in every other possible world in the model. Williamson: general thesis: I- Ni (x ≠ y > Nj x ≠ y) In our classical system, the universal generalization is invalid and unprovable with this (∀x)(∀y)(Ni (x ≠ y > Nj x ≠ y) because the predication implies existence and thus the negation of an identity statement can be true, not because the expressions refer to different things, but because these do not exist at all. But: the version with the quantifiers within the necessity operator Ni (∀x)(∀y) (x ≠ y > Nj x ≠ y) Will be valid even if the equal sign is defined as indistinguishable. But it will not be provable. Reason: K + @ is an incomplete quantified modal logic. Actuality Operator/Stalnaker: Problem: the semantic limitations for its interpretation have consequences that are not reflected in the propositional logic for this operator, consequences that occur when the range may change from possible worlds to possible worlds. There are propositions without identity which are valid but not provable, e.g. I- @ N (∀x)(Fx > @MFx) Counterpart Semantics/counterpart theory/necessity diversity/Stalnaker: the absence of the need of diversity in the counterpart theory. I 161 Is not connected with the limits of the expressiveness of modal logic (it is even missing in S5). The necessary identity is valid and provable here. Rather, the necessary difference cannot be proven with or without the actuality operator. StalnakerVsWilliamson: therefore I think that his argument does not threaten the thesis, Thesis: the necessity (or essentiality) of identity is more central in identity logic than the necessity of diversity.	EconWillO Oliver E. Williamson Peak-load pricing and optimal capacity under indivisibility constraints 1966
Steady State Theory	Verschiedene Vs Steady State Theory	Kanitscheider I 359 Steady State Theory/SST/Bondi/Kanitscheider: Thesis: Priority of cosmology over local physics. Bondi's Thesis: the unclear complexity of the phenomenon world is only one property of the mesocosm. I 360 VsSST: incompatible with our empiricism: a static universe has long been in thermodynamic equilibrium. All development would already have reached its final state. It would no longer be possible to determine the direction of the time flow. Of the two types of motion allowed by Perfect Cosmological Principle, expansion and contraction, contraction is already eliminated because the necessary excess of radiation in relation to matter is lacking. For expansion, however, the steady state theory now needs the assumption of constant additional generation of matter. But this overrides the important principle of hydrodynamic continuity! I 361 However, at the current values for density and recession constant (distance movement of galaxies from each other), the origin of matter would only be one H atom per litre every 5x10 exp 11 years. Conservation of Matter/BondiVsVs: he even believes he can save the conservation of matter. He says that in a certain, observable area, seen globally, the observable amount of matter does not change, i.e. that in a constant eigenvolume matter is preserved, in contrast to the relativistic models, where the conservation applies rather to the coordinate volume. The Def Eigenvolume is the part of space that is fixed by a fixed distance from the observer, while the Def coordinate volume is given by the constancy of the com mobile coordinates. I 362 Steady State Theory/SST: here there is always the same amount of matter within the range of a certain telescope, while here the relativity theory assumes a dilution, i.e. the matter remains the same in the expanding volume. At the SST, the new formation ensures that the total amount of all observable matter remains the same. Observer/SST: when investigating motion, each observer can perceive a preferred direction of motion apart from local deviations, whereby he determines the constant relationship between velocity and distance completely symmetrically within a small range. In relativistic cosmology this was the starting point for the Weyl principle. Def Weyl-Principle: Postulate: the particles of a substrate (galaxies) lie in spacetime on a bundle of geodesists that start from a point in the past (Big Bang) and never intersect except at this point. From this follows the existence of a family of hyperplanes (t = const) orthogonal to these geodesists and the only parameters possessing cosmic time. I 362/363 Bondi/SST/Steady State Theory: doubts now that in view of the scattering of the fog movement these hyperplanes exist secured. Because of its stationary character, SST does not need Weyl's postulate and can define homogeneity without cosmic time. Thermodynamic imbalance/universe/SST: Explanation: a photon emanating from a star has a very long free path and reaches areas with strongly changed local motion. This shifts its frequency to red. However, the thermal energy it gives off on its way to the surrounding matter is only a very small part of that lost by its original star. Thus the universe represents a kind of cosmic sink for radiant energy. According to the Perfect Cosmological Principle, sources must exist that make up for the loss. Perfect Cosmological Principle: is logically compatible with three types of universes: 1. Static, without new creation of matter, 2. Expanding, with new development I 364 3. Collapsing, with destruction of matter SST/Bondi: believes in the strict relationship between distance and speed R'(t)/R(t) = 1/T. This results in R as an exponential function and the metric of the SST takes the form of the line element of de Sitter. (see above). Already the self-similarity of the scale function shows the basic metric properties of this model. It is not possible for us to recognize at which point of the curve R = et/T we are. The universe has no beginning and no end. I 365 Age/Universe/SST: Advantage over relativistic theories where the inverse Hubble constant led to a too low age. Metric/SST: while the de Sitter metric is unusable in Einstein's representation because it can only be reconciled with vanishing matter, this problem does not occur in the SST: here there is no necessary connection between physical geometry and matter content of space! According to the de Sitter structure, the world has an event horizon, i.e. every clock on a distant galaxy follows in such a way that there is a point in its history after which the emitted light can no longer reach a distant observer. If, however, a particle has formed within the range that can in principle be reached with ideal instruments, then it can never disappear from its field of view. I 367 Perfect Cosmological Principle: Problem: lies in the statistical character, which applies strictly on a cosmic scale, but not locally, whereby the local environment only ends beyond the galaxy clusters. Steady State Theory/SST/Hoyle: starts from the classical field equations, but changes them so strongly that all Bondi and Gold results that they have drawn from the Perfect Cosmological Principle remain valid. Hoyle/SST: Thesis: In nature a class of preferred directions can obviously be observed in the large-scale movements, which makes a covariant treatment impossible! Only a preferred class of observers sees the universe in the same way. I 368 Weyl Principle/Postulate: defines a unique relationship of each event P to the origin O. It cannot be a strict law of nature, since it is constantly violated in the local area by its own movements! Hoyle: (formula, tensors, + I 368). Through multiple differentiation symmetric tensor field, energy conservation does not apply, matter must constantly arise anew. Matter emergence/SST/Hoyle: there is an interpretation of matter origin caused by negative pressure in the universe. It should then be interpreted as work that this pressure does during expansion! VsSST: the synchronisation of expansion and origin is just as incomprehensible from theory as the fact that it is always matter and not antimatter that arises. (...+ formula, other choice of the coupling constant I 371/72). I 373 Negative Energy: it has been shown to cause the formation rate of particle pairs to "run away": infinite number in finite region. VsSST/Empiricism: many data spoke against the SST: excess of distant and thus early radio sources, redshift of the quasars indicating a slowdown of expansion, background radiation.	Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Subject Philosophy	Habermas Vs Subject Philosophy	I 119 Philosophy of the Subject: (HabermasVs, NietzscheVs,) ... the nihilistic domination of subject-centered reason is conceived as result and expression of a perverseness of the will to power. I 180 ...the existence is justified out of itself. Thus, Heidegger conceives the world as a process again only from the subjectivity of the will self-assertion. This is the dead-end of the philosophy of the subject. It does not matter whether primacy is given to epistemological questions or the question of being. The monological execution of intentions, i.e. purpose activity is considered as the primary form of action. (VsCommunication). The objective world remains the point of reference. (Model of the cognitive relation). I 309 HabermasVsSubject Philosophy: the attempt to escape the unfortunate alternatives always ends in the entanglements of self-deifying subject consuming itself in acts of futile self-transcendence. Since Kant, the I simultaneously takes the position of an empirical subject in the world where it finds itself as an object among others. In the position of a transcendental subject it faces is a world as a whole which its constitutes itself as the totality of the objects of possible experiences. The attempts to understand these irreconcilable alternatives as self-generation of the mind or of the genus range from Hegel to Merleau-Ponty. HabermasVsHegel: because these hybrid undertakings pursue the utopia of complete self-knowledge, they keep turning into positivism. (Today: the body-soul problem). I 435 LuhmannVsSubject Philosophy: "Simple minds want to counter this with ethics." (Habermas: not without scorn.). HabermasVsSubject Philosophy: overall social awareness as a superordinate subject, it creates a zero-sum game in which the room for maneuver of individuals cannot be accommodated properly. ((s) Every social conflict would appear as schizophrenia.) Habermas: Solution: alternative concept strategy: public communities can be understood as a higher-level intersubjectivities. In this aggregated public there is also an overall social consciousness. This no longer needs to fulfill the precision requirements of the philosophy of the subject to the self-consciousness! Luhmann II 136 Subject Philosophy/Habermas: Problem: in philosophical discussions, ideological criticism not even survives the simplest self-application. At most, it can explain why someone is wrong, but it cannot show that there is a mistake.	Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997
Subjectivism	Verschiedene Vs Subjectivism	Stegmüller IV 177 VsSubjectivism/Ethics/Stegmüller: he has a hard time where most people consider norms and values to be objectively anchored, so that beliefs have already found their way into the meaning of moral words. IV 178 VsVs: that would be a "metaethical fallacy": the conclusion of beliefs about their correctness. IV 216 Def Moral in the broad sense/Mackie/Stegmüller: consists of an attitude to life and a system of rules of conduct that someone makes his own. Can vary from person to person. Def Moral in the narrower sense/Mackie/Stegmüller: limitation of the self-interests of the doers. Not flexible, as it must contain everything that is required to maintain cooperation. Core piece: "Minimal Morality". Reasonable. VsSubjectivism/Ethics/Stegmüller: two negative cornerstones: 1. Hierarchy of objective norms 2. The impossible changeability of human nature. IV 242 ObjectivismVsSubjectivism/Ethics/Stegmüller: one could say that subjectivism degrades norms to a "bundle of conventions". VsVs: but this is not the case: SubjectivismVsObjectivism/Ethics/Mackie/Stegmüller: the objectivists make things too easy for themselves if they regard the norms as objective, predetermined principles. The subjectivist is faced with something like a miracle: he has to explain how such systems can develop at all! 1. What human considerations and abilities explain the emergence of those artificial conventions? 2. How are they maintained? IV 304 VsSubjectivism/Moral: anyone could object that subjectivism would not prevent the extinction of a minority! There is no danger of being killed by a member of the minority! (VsRawls). IV 305 VsVs: 1. Every person is a member of some minority. 2. Minimal morality only presupposes that all are rational egoists. Morality/Ethics/Sympathy/Mackie: through the mass media, the "close range" of the human, within which he/she is capable of compassion, expands. IV 306 Minority Problem/Mackie/Stegmüller: when it comes to empiricism, one could argue that all arguments against people of a certain skin colour are based on false empirical premises. Now there is no guarantee against genocide, it has taken place! Cultural achievements can be destroyed within a very short time. IV 307 Moral Reason/Stegmüller: Motifs are Janus-faced: Seen from the inside, they are explanations, from the outside they are causes. Nor can the justification we have achieved be applied to all the principles of morality in the narrow sense. But this is not a shortcoming of the concept of justification itself. The network of standards is only intended to provide something like a framework.	Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Swinburne, R.	Mackie Vs Swinburne, R.	Stegmüller IV 405 Proof for the existence of God/confirmation/MackieVsSwinburne: 1. How can we assert an output probability indicating that there is a God, if no such universe existed? The data have to be taken from background knowledge. IV 406 Then the background knowledge only contains logical and mathematical truths. How should they make the God hypothesis more likely? Swinburne: seemingly only compares two competing hypotheses: a) That there is no specific cause and no further explanation for the complex universe b) That there is a God. Both hypothesis assume that there is the universe. Background knowledge/Swinburne: our background knowledge includes all the knowledge about the world, but not religious assumptions. Then it is more likely that God exists than not. proof of the existence of God/confirmation/MackieVsSwinburne: 2. The fact that the uncaused universe cannot be explained further, does not justify Swinburne's notion that it is "strange and surprising" or "very unlikely". A hypothesis involving a divine creation is, on the other hand, quite unlikely! If there were a God in the sense of traditional theism, it would certainly be very likely; but this is about the existence and not to the actions of an existing God. IV 407 proof of the existence of God/Swinburne/Stegmüller: leans on considerations of simplicity: to accept omnipotence, infinite knowledge and infinite goodness means as much as "to assume the simplest kind of person"! MackieVs: contradictions between theists. greatness (Anselm) Vs simplicity. MackieVsSwinburne: 1. The simplicity is achieved through the adoption of a series of actual infinities. 2. The peculiarity is not eliminated, but merely covered: why had God the preference, to create exactly this world? 3. A disembodied spirit is very unlikely. (And especially Swinburne workes with his scientific background and probabilities). IV 408 4. If one wants to explain the order of the natural world by a divine plan, one has to explain the order in the divine plan! MackieVsSwinburne: doesn't call for complete explicability and universal intelligibility of the world (as did Leibniz). But he still demands explicability. He attempts to reduce the inexplicable part. Hew ants to do so without relying on a "sufficient reason" or "essential existence". Unfortunately, it turns out that then he has nothing to justify that by adding God we explain something more. IV 425/426 Explanation/MackieVsSwinburne: we as philosophers do not have the right to, first, mentally isolate and/or idealise that simple relation that interests us and is known to us from a truly very complicated procedure, and second to use this as a familiar model. (Argument). SwinburneVsMackie: might reply that it could belong to God's abilities to elicit the appropriate intentions in us. Stegmüller: but that is highly mysterious. Explanation/Theism/MackieVsSwinburne: the personal explanation is not even a competitor but a special case of causal explanation! 1. It is just as fantastic and unlikely as the evolutionary explanation. 2. If each body soul relationship were to be explained, that would be a relapse into occasionalism 3. Locke: if divine omnipotence gave humans the ability to think, then why not also the stones? (> Thinking stones).	Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Synonymy	Quine Vs Synonymy	II 65 Stimulus situations in which I would use the word would constitute the meaning the word has for me now. The range of the relevant sentences and stimulus situations, however, is frighteningly comprehensive and disorderly. Synonymy: The behavioral theory of meaning does not mind. What it claims to clarify is synonymy itself. It says: synonymy is nothing other than the equality of use. QuineVsSynonymy: The method is convenient, but limited. It only explains a small minority of the entries in a dictionary. Lexicon: The lexicographer will often rely on a so-called "sense distinction": he will name several partial synonyms, some of which fit into partial contexts, others in others. The contexts then must be distinguished with reference to the subject matter. Use can be also determined by other methods: by paraphrase, if all words are known in a sentence except for one, a sentence must be found in which all the words are known, and which corresponds to the first sentence. II 66 More important is therefore the relationship of the semantic equivalence of whole sentences. And when are two considered equivalent? Common Answer: when their use is the same! Or, if the stimulus situations are the same. However, apparently it does not work like that! The two sentences cannot be expressed at the same time. The utterance of one must exclude that of the other! Furthermore, at every opportunity where one of the two possible sentences was expressed there must be an ever so trivial reason for the utterance of one instead of the other! We are obviously asking too much when we demand that the stimuli in question should all be identical. In any case, a criterion would be illusory in practice if it demanded that the stimulus conditions are indeed compared. Because all in all, expressions are practically unpredictable. The motives for the utterance of a sentence may vary inscrutably: comfort, instruct, bridge silence, deceive, impress... Def cognitive: without regard to the circumstances III 257 Meaning/Reference/Quine: most words have a meaning without designating anything: e.g. "and", "sake", etc. Meaning: of words: must not be confused with the designated thing ((s) other authors: in case of names: meaning = carrier). E.g. Gaurisankar/Mt. Everest/Quine: the discovery that both are the same took place in the world, not in the minds. The object is the same, but that does not mean that Gaurisankar and Everest are synonyms. (QuineVsSynonymy Quine pro Putnam: meaning not in the mind, e.g. Evening Star/Morning Star: natural science, not investigation of meaning). Meaning/Quine: unsolved problem of semantics. Perhaps the meaning of a word is best summarized as the associated idea, but in a still unexplained sense of "idea". Upper as a system of implicit rules ((s) >use theory), Quine: but then we still need criteria for rules. III 258 In any case, meanings are not entities.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Taylor, Ch.	Rorty Vs Taylor, Ch.	VI 126 World/Knowledge/Reality/Existence/Taylor/Rorty: Taylor: Thesis: nobody is seriously prepared to deny that there are no chairs in this room, and that this is true or false because of the nature of reality. RortyVsTaylor: I do deny this, however! There are two ways to interpret the phrase "due to the sochness of things": 1) as an abbreviation: "due to the uses of our current descriptions and causal interactions. 2) "Because of the suchness of things, regardless of how we describe these things." (Rorty: this is simply pointless). VI 127 Correspondence/Rorty: with the absence of the thing in itself, the notion of correspondence has also disappeared from the scene. RortyVsTaylor: tries to retain one concept while he renounces the other. That's doomed. VI130 Truth/Taylor: Thesis: "Internal frame": a concept of truth, which is given by our non-representational handling of what is at hand. ((s) >practice, practical use). Rorty/RortyVsTaylor: (with Sellars): according to psychological nominalism (everything is linguistic) "non-representational handling" of anything is suspicious. RortyVsSellars: also, language represents nothing! (Sellars per representation (!)). RortyVsTaylor: our handling of things at most gives us a sense of the causal independence of things, but not a concept of truth of conformity. VI 131 Taylor: distinguishes "internal frame" truth (correspondence) and "understanding yourself". Because we ourselves are to a great extent constituted by our acts of self-understanding, we can interpret them as if they were in the same manner as our object descriptions about an independent object. VI 133 Reality/Knowledge/World/RortyVsTaylor: it is not good to say. "The solar system was there, waiting for Kepler". Re-Description/Rorty: difference between a new description of the solar system and of myself: the solar system is not changed by that, and I can make true statements about it at the time before that. For myself, in some cases, I even do not use them to make true statements about my past self. But there are no scientific re-descriptions the solar system à la Sartre! (Sartre/Rorty: e.g. "He recognized himself as a coward and thereby lost his cowardice"). TaylorVsRorty/TaylorVsPutnam/TaylorVsGoodman: those authors who say there is no description independent suchness of the world are still tempted to use form/material metaphors. They are tempted to say there were no objects before language had formed the raw material. Wrong causal relationship: as if the word "dinosaur" caused their emergence. Taylor: We should stop saying something general about the relationship between language and reality or the "essence of reference" at all. (Only statements about the specific linguistic behavior of certain persons are permitted, which also allows for predictions). World/Language/Davidson/Rorty: there is certainly a very specific relationship between the word "Kilimanjaro" and a particular speaker, but we are unable to say even the slightest about it if we are not very well informed on the role of this word in sentences! Referencing/Reference/Davidson/Rorty: no hope of explaingin the reference directly in non-language-related terminology (regardless of sentence)! Language/Davidson/Rorty: "something like a language does not exist." (Nice Derangement of Epitaphs): there is no set of conventions that you would have to learn when you learn to speak. No abstract entity that would have to be internalized. VI 134 Taylor/Rorty: distinguishes between things "that can be decided by means of reason" and things where that is not possible. RortyVsTaylor: at most pragmatic distinction between useful for us and not useful for us. VI 137 Taylor: once you escaped epistemology, you come to an "uncompromising realism". RortyVsTaylor: only at a trivial and uninteresting realism. VI 139 Representation/Knowledge/Taylor Rorty: the epistemological interpretation of knowledge as mental images is inappropriate. We can draw a line between my image and the object, but not between my handling of the object and the object itself. The notion that our understanding is based in our handling of the world rejects representations in general. VI 140 Taylor: Heidegger ( "handiness") and Merleau-Ponty (thesis: action and corporeality) show a way out. RortyVsTaylor: precisely these two authors are holding on to images and representations, and no matter how mediated. Representation/Taylor/Rorty: Thesis: handling the world more original than representation. VI 141 Rorty: no break between the non-verbal and the verbal interactions between organisms (and machines) and the world. Object/Representation:/RortyVsTaylor: we cannot - in contrast to Taylor - draw any line between the object and our image of the object, because the "image" is also merely a form of handling.	Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Tradition	Castaneda Vs Tradition	Frank I 342 Proposition/Tradition/Castaneda: its strength: that all of these entities which this theory equates must somehow converge. If language is to be an efficient means of thinking, then meaning and thought content must coincide. I 343 Belief/Intention/Tradition: their contents should coincide. Frege: what can be believed can also be demanded, commanded, required, requested, etc. CastanedaVs: that seems to be synchronically successful, but it lacks dynamism. The discrepancies between the different entities involved in proposition ((i) - (vii) emerge when we consider the diachronic river, where one undergoes changing experiences about a constantly changing world. In particular, we must have direct contact with the world in order to locate ourselves in it. This is precisely the role of the indexical reference. Propositions/CastanedaVsTradition: classical propositionality theory fails with indexical reference when it encounters experiences with "here", "now", "I", "he", etc. I 345 Thinking/Language/Proposition/CastanedaVsTradition: we seem to have assumed that thinking is embodied by symbolic activity. While thinking one somehow produces an illustrative token; since it happens both when thinking aloud and in silence, there has to be some brain pattern. I 346 The distinction between episodes of production of sentences and episodes of thinking is already made in the theory itself: therefore it postulates the convergence of sentence meaning and thought content. The propositionality theory does not have to identify a thinking episode ,that p, with an event in the brain or in the entire body. It is not about the body-soul problem. Vs: the required application of this distinction breaks the elegant arrangement of the coincident units: the distinction between a symbolic system and its application! This is Saussure’s distinction between langue/parole. This accomodates the dynamics of language and is itself not dangerous for the propositionality theory. But: Problem: the distinction between knowing the meaning and correct use exists! This is not a problem in most cases, but: I 347 E.g. "I have 30 grams of nitrogen compounds in my liver": we may understand the sentence, but we do not know whether someone expresses a truth or falsity with it. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986	Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Tradition	Wessel Vs Tradition	I 16 Universality/WesselVsTradition: according to the traditional view there are individual domains in which the logical rules supposedly do not apply: e.g. states of change. In modern intuitionist mathematics, double negation is not equated with position. Wessel's Question: why do we regard these logical laws as universal and not others? Where is the boundary between universal and nonuniversal laws? Here one should not expect reasonable answers. Logical laws, by their very nature, do not allow for exceptions, I 17 and they do not depend on any peculiarities of an area. The only thing that depends on the range is which of the known laws are used. I 329 Definition/Wessel: it is always about the introduction of a new term for an already known (introduced) term. ta ‹_›def tb or a ‹_›def b. I 330 Tradition: a more general term is always restricted. (>genus, differentia specifica). Example electron: light, negative elementary particle. ta '_'def t(b lv P u Q) (b lv P u Q: "b with the property P u Q"). WesselVsTradition: a definition can also have a completely different form: ta '_' t(a1 v ...van) (e.g. "fruit", enumeration).	Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999
Type Theory	Quine Vs Type Theory	III 315 Type Theory/TT/Quine: U1, U2 ... etc. logical types. Meaningless are expressions like "x e x", etc. "e2 may only stand between variables of successive type." III 316 With that we avoid confusion of constants. Example: we do not identify the number 12, which contains the class A of the Apostles, with the number 12, which contains a certain class  consisting of a dozen classes. Because one is of the type U2, the other of type U3. Every type has a new number 12. ((s) Elsewhere: therefore VsType Theory: infinitely many numbers 1,2,3, etc.). Number/Existence/Ontology/Quine: that there are these numbers no longer depends on whether there are so many individuals. Type Theory/TT/Russell/Quine: Reason: we can derive an incorrect sentence without the separation of types: by simplifying the scheme (A) to (A'): (A’) (Ey)(x)(x ε y . ↔ Fx) If we then introduce the predicate «[1] ε [1]» for "F": we get the Russell antinomy/Russell paradoxy/logical form: (1) (Ey)(x)[x ε y . ↔ ~x ε x)] (2) (x)(x ε y . ↔ ~(x ε x)] (1) y (3) y ε y . ↔ ~(y ε y) (2) (4) (Ey)[y ε y . ↔ ~y ε y)]. Solution/Zermelo/VsType Theory/Quine: simpler: some predicates have classes as extension, others don't. (A') is thus considered as valid for some, but not all sentences. E.g. the predicate "[1] ε [1]" has no class as an extension. Zermelo: here (A') is assumed for the case in which the sentence has the form of a conjunction "x ε z. Gx" instead of "Fx". Then (A') becomes: (Ey)(x)( x ε y . ↔ . x ε z . Gx). Zermelo calls this the Def axiom schema of specification. To any given class z this law supplies other classes that are all sub-classes of z. But by itself it supplies at first no non-empty classes z. (...) III 318 Layers/Layered/Zermelo: (...) Sets/Classes/von Neumann/Quine: (...) Classes are not sets... III 319 Axioms/Stronger/Weaker/Quine: (...) you can seek strength or weakness. VII (e) 91 QuineVsType Theory: unnatural and uncomfortable disadvantages: 1) Universal class: because the TT only allows uniform types as members of a class, the universal class V leads to an infinite series of quasi universal classes, each for one type. 2) Negation: ~x ceases to comprise all non-elements of x, and only comprises those non-elements that do not belong to the next lower level! VII (e) 92 3) Zero class: even that accordingly leads to an infinite number of zero classes. ((s) for each level its own zero class). ((s) Absurd: we cannot distinguish different zero classes.) 4) Boolean class algebra: is no longer applicable to classes in general, but is reproduced at each level. 5) Relational calculus: accordingly. to be re-established at each level. 6) Arithmetic: the numbers cease to be uniform! at each level (type) appears a new 0, new 1, new 2, and so on! Quine: instead counterproposal: QuineVsType Theory: Solution: Instead: variables with unlimited range, the concept of hierarchical formulas only survives in one point where we write numbers for variables and, without any reference to type theory, we replace R3 by the weaker: R3' If φ is stratified and does not contain "x", then (Ex)(y) ((y ε x) ↔ φ) is a theorem. Negation: ~x then contains everything that is not part of x. Zero class: there is only one zero class. Universal class: there is similarly only one universal class that contains absolutely everything, including itself. Relation, arithmetic, numbers: everything works out again comes in this way. VII (e) 93 Only difference between R3 and R3': R3' lacks a guarantee for the existence of such classes as: y^ (y ε y), y^~(y ε y), etc. In the case of some non-hierarchical formulas the existence of appropriate classes is still to be demonstrated through absurd consequences: R3' results in: (Ex)(y) ((y ε x) ↔ ((z ε y) l (y ε w))) and by inserting this results in subsitution inference (1) (Ex)(y) ((y ε x) ↔ ((z ε y) l (y ε z))) through the other rules What asserts the existence of a class y^ ((z ε y) l (y ε z)) whose generating formula is not hierarchical. But probably we cannot prove its existence. (From these follows inter alia Russell's paradox). Within a system, we can explicitly use such contradictions to take their existence ad absurdum. That (1) can be demonstrated, in turn, shows that the derivation strength of our system "NF" (New Foundations, Quine) exceeds the Principia Mathematica⁽¹⁾. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Unger, P.	Lewis Vs Unger, P.	IV 244 Sorites/Truth Value/Vagueness/Lewis: For example Fred is a borderline case of baldness, then the sentence "Fred is bald" is perhaps without truth values. Nothing in our language makes such descriptions (delineations) right and others wrong. We can't find a limit once and for all. If a sentence is true over the entire range, it is simply true. But we treat a sentence as more or less "simply true" even if it goes beyond an area of its vagueness that is large enough. So if it is "true enough". We can usually cope with this, but not always, as the paradoxes testify: Problem: truth-preserving arguments do not always have the quality of being "true enough"! "true enough": when is one sentence true enough? It's a matter of vagueness in itself. IV 245 More importantly, it depends on the context. In other circumstances, something may not be true enough. Austin: "France is hexagonal". Standards can be loosened or tightened. Interestingly, tightening is easier than loosening: For example, if the standards were high and something is said that is true enough only under relaxed standards, and nobody contradicts, then the standards are lowered. But what is said under lowered standards may still seem imperfectly acceptable. For example, tightening standards: always manages to appear recommendable, even if it disturbs the purposes of conversation. Absolute/relative: e.g. (Peter Unger): one could say that there is actually nothing that is really level! The sidewalk is level, but the desk is more level! And so there is surely also something that is more level than the desk. One can always think of something that is even more level, etc. Problem: "level" should actually be taken as an absolute term. Then how could one deny that the table is level VsUnger: one could deny that "level" is absolute. But Unger is right about that. What he calls inconsistent really sounds that way. So I assume that in no description of the relative vagueness of "level" and "more level" it is true that something is more level than something that is level. LewisVsUnger: the correct answer is that he is changing her account. (He is changing the score on you). He's transferring the account to you. What he says is only acceptable under tightened standards of precision. IV 246 Because what he says is only acceptable under tighter standards, it is no longer true that the sidewalk is level. But that does not change the fact that it was true in the original context. Unger has not shown that the new context is somehow more legitimate than the old one. "Safe"/Unger: in an analogous way, Unger (correctly) observed that "safe" is an absolute term. Therefore, nobody is actually safe in any matter! In fact, the approximation rule allows Unger to create a context in which everything he says is true, but that doesn't show that anything we do in more everyday contexts is wrong.	Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Use Theory	McGinn Vs Use Theory	I 106 To mean sth./meaning/language/object/usage/McGinn: whoever masters the meaning of a word has never seen the vast majority of the corresponding objects. In addition, the potential use of words is greater than could be explored in the life of a speaker. But in every single situation of the application of the word its intended meaning includes all these objects. That is, there is a property exemplified by the speaker, by virtue of which s_he captures this spacious yet exclusive meaning. The semantic ability thus contains a kind of universality that construes a relationship between the speaker and things that is far beyond the range of personal experience. I 120 Wittgenstein: If meaning is simply the usage, there is no sense to speak of fitting. Detecting the meaning happens all at once and certainly something other than the time-extended use." To mean sth./Theory of Utility/McGinn:. Kripke elaborates how problematic this is for meaning sth. McGinn. there must, for example, be a constitutive connection between intentioned meaning and usage, but a simple equation leads to fundamental problems (Kripke) ((S) Ex all the time you can have meant something else by addition than I have, and have the same numbers.) "relation of order." if two creatures match in all non-semantic descriptions (behavior, interior, relation to other things), they must think and mean the same. Nevertheless, the basis of this relation of order contains nothing that could be handled by the nature of being of semantic features in the handle detected by FIN-features (FIN - fruitfulness, invulnerability, normativity). I 125 theory of usage/Kripke/McGinn: The reference to the usage of language in the sense of units of characters over time and changing situations gives us no CALM theory, because exactly in this sense, the theory of character can be problematic! (CALM: combinatoric atomism with lawlike mappings). We can not somehow represented the meaning meant as the sum of uses, otherwise the FIN-characteristics were lost. ((S), if characters could mean something else from time to time (and the "sum" form a kind of average should) there could be e.g. no normativity since also the average would change constantly with the sum.) theory of usage/McGinn: meaning is nothing like the link between situations of usage. Precisely for this reason it is so difficult to articulate the relationships, because the FIN-features are not results of CALM.	McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001
Various Authors	Fraassen Vs Various Authors	Hacking I 93 Best explanation/Fraassen: should be rejected, even if one accepted theories! Theories can clarify something and explain it, but they are not literally true. Hacking I 95 Def best explanation/Peirce: "conclusion to the best explanation". Method of hypothesis or abduction. When there is an explanation that makes otherwise unintelligible things understandable, this should probably be right. Peirce later took refrain. Fraassen I 110 Explanation/James Greeno/Fraassen: makes a proposal in relation to statistical theories: A universal explanation is less problematic and more relevant than an assessment of knowledge with respect to individual cases (individual events). (FN 17). Greeno/Fraassen: adopts as a model of a theory one that assumes a single probability space Q as correct plus two partitions (or ranges of variables) of which one is the explanandum and the other is the explanans. I 111 E.g. sociology cannot explain why a particular rich kid stole a car in San Francisco, but it can claim factors such as income and residential area as explanatory factors. Explanatory force: its level is measured brilliantly in Greeno: I: measures the information that the theory supplies for M: variable for the explanandum on the basis of S: the explanans. Maximum: (of explanatory power) is reached when all related probabilities P (Mi I Sj) are 0 or 1 (the deductive nomological case) and Minimum: is reached if the related probabilities are 0, namely, when S and M are statistically independent of each other. FraassenVsGreeno: that encounters the same old problems: E.g. Suppose S and M describe the behavior of barometers and storms: Suppose the probability that the barometer falls (M1) is equal to the probability that there will be a storm (S1). Namely 0.2 and the probability that there will be a storm, given that the barometer falls is equal to the probability that the barometer falls, given that there will be a storm, namely = 1! In this case, the variable I (information) is at its maximum. Problem: it is also there if we swap storm and barometer!. Explanation: we have none for either case.	Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996
Various Authors	Hofstadter Vs Various Authors	II 108 Arthur Koestler: VsKoestler: "Koestler's Fallacy": general inability to see that unusual events is likely in the long run. Reason: 1. Because we do not notice non-events, we misjudge the basis. 2. We are weak in the assessment of event combinations. 3. We overlook the principle of equivalence of curious coincidences: for one theory of the supernatural, one chance is as good as another. II 482 Sapir-Whorf-Thesis: Language controls thinking. A programmer in the language X can only think in terms offered by the language. (HofstadterVsWhorf) VsWhorf: the power of a great literary work does not come from the language into which the author was accidentally born, otherwise all Russians would have to be great writers. It also stems from the history of his experiences and his ability to make experiences. II 486 Language/Hofstadter: Question: Why is there not a single word for the phrase "Come and have a look" after so many thousand years, e.g. "Kamhuseda"? Also novels have not become shorter in the last 200 years! Reason: The ideas have another dimension. II 688 Artificial Intelligence: Avon Barr: "information-processing cognition model". "Everything interesting about cognition happens above the 100 millisecond level, the time it takes to recognize your mother. VsBarr: just as well you can say:" everything above this level..., the time you need to recognize your mother." II 701 VsBarr: confusion of levels: "cognition as arithmetic process": even if the neurons cope with sums in an analogous way, this does not mean that the epiphenomena themselves also do arithmetic. Example: if taxis stop at red, this does not mean that traffic jams stop at red. II 701 Simon: (Artificial Intelligence pioneer): Common ground between the brain and information-processing processes is obvious. VsSimon: How can he believe that? Computers still do not have subcognitive actions in the most elementary sense. There is no common sense program. ((s) See Hofstadter II 696) Def Intelligence/Simon/Newell: mind, bound in any matter that can be arranged into patterns. II 703 Symbol/HofstadterVsSimon/Nevell: for me has more to do with representative expressiveness (representation). To represent something else, something must be immensely rich. HofstadterVsSymbol Manipulation, "symbol processing": the manipulation of meaningless signs is not enough to generate understanding, although it is enough to enrich them with meaning in a limited sense of the word. (Gödel, Escher, Bach, Chapters II to VI). II 704 Computer/Artificial Intelligence/AI/Consciousness/HofstadterVsSimon/Newell: Problem: they see the computer as lifeless, passive objects and also the symbols as passive. Denotation /Hofstadter: does not happen at all on the level of symbols! Also the single ant is not "symbolic". II 720 Thinking/Boole: believed he could grasp the "laws of thinking" through rules for manipulating claims. II 723 Cognition/VsSimon/Newell: Thesis: In every truly cognitive system there must be several levels that allow a rigid syntax at the lowest level to develop into a fluid semantics at the highest level. Symbolic events are reversed into non-symbolic events. II 724 Symbol/Newell: a physical symbol is actually identical to a Lisp Atom with an attached list. ("property list"). HofstadterVs. Symbol/Bits/Hofstadter: Bits are not symbols. Meaning/Lisp/Hofstadter: The logic of Lisp does not rise from a lower level. It is fully present in the written program, even when there is no computer.	Hofstadter I Douglas Hofstadter Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid German Edition: Gödel, Escher, Bach - ein Endloses Geflochtenes Band Stuttgart 2017 Hofstadter II Douglas Hofstadter Metamagical Themas: Questing for the Essence of Mind and Pattern German Edition: Metamagicum München 1994
Various Authors	Mayr Vs Various Authors	V 15 Types, typological thinking: MayrVs.: goes back to Plato, is unsuitable for evolutionary and population biology: here we are not dealing with classes, but with mixtures of unique individuals: populations. So there is no "essence" either (VsEssentialism) V 38 Vitalism: a peculiar phenomenon: among the physicists of the 20th century. There were vitalistic ideas. Bohr: certain laws could work in organisms that are not found in inanimate matter. Bohr looked in biology for evidence of its complementarity and used some desperate analogies. MayrVsBohr: there is really nothing to consider. (Blur only in the subatomic range). V 43 Evolution: Unit of evolution is the population (or species) and not the gene or individual. (MayrVsDawkins).	Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998
Various Authors	Bigelow Vs Various Authors	I 222 Ceteris paribus/BigelowVsCeteris paribus assumption/Qualification/Qualified law/Exceptions/Bigelow/Pargetter: Variant: "if there are no other disturbances": 1) Problem: this threatens to let a law become a tautology, which ultimately reads: "Things move in this and that way, unless they do not." 2) Problem: The range of a "qualified" law threatens to become so narrow that nothing is included by it anymore. On the other hand it will be said that a law has no positive instances at all if one interprets it strictly. ((s)> Cartwright). Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: the mystery can be solved by understanding how laws contain modalities. Def Laws/law/Bigelow/Pargetter: are truths about possibilia. I 204 Property theory/World properties/Terminology/Bigelow/Pargetter: contradictory predicates: do not correspond to any properties. E.g. round and square. I 210 Accessibility: such possible worlds are then not accessible for one another. One is nomically impossible from the standpoint of the other. VsProperty theory/VsWorld-properties/Bigelow/Pargetter: this theory is faced with the accusation of circularity, but we hope to resolve the objection. I 53 Determinables/Determinates/Johnson: stand in close logical relations: having a D-ate (determinate) entails having the corresponding D-able (determinable). I 54 But not vice versa! Having a D-able does not require possession of a certain D-ate! But it does require possession of some D-ate from the area. BigelowVsJohnson, World properties: but this could not explain the asymmetry. Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: 2nd order properties. Problem: our theory is still incomplete!. Problem: explaining why quantities are gradual. And this is not about whether objects are the same and different at the same time. New: The problem that we can also still say exactly E.g. how much they differ. Or E.g. that two masses are more similar than two others. Plato: Plato solves this with participation. Bigelow/Pargetter: we try a different solution. Bigelow I 234 Natural necessity/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Bigelow/Pargetter: Dramatic turn Vs Natural necessity! Also later Wittgenstein.	Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Various Authors	Peacocke Vs Various Authors	I 59 Representational Content/Peacocke: the acoustic experience itself could have a representational content, ((s) namely, the that-sentence that a sound comes from the left.) weaker: in conjunction with the other attitudes of the subject. But for that the subject needs spatial concepts. Bower: his problem is, what it means to have spatial concepts. Stimulus-Response Scheme/S-R System/SR Psychology/Peacocke: a distinction is made between mental states with content and those that can only be explained by the stimulus-response scheme. But stimulus-response systems have complex internal information processing. Nor os it about the distinction conscious/unconscious. A stimulus-response psychology can reduce reactions not only to physical stimuli, but also to sensations! And these can also have a primitive form of consciousness. This is about the problem of the attribution of propositional content. Not all sensations do indeed have representational content. Bower: appropriate spatial response confirms the attribution of spatial content. Peacocke: is that correct? Causality/Psychology: Problem: There are several levels of incoming causal chains and also several levels of outgoing causal chains (input/output). I 60 Some of these levels, apart from the external objects, have the ability to involve objects that can play a role in both inbound and outbound in causal chains. E.g. the retina. Proposition/Propositional Content/SR System/Peacocke: we must first assume propositional attitudes about objects and places in the vicinity of the subject, which do not yet constitute an stimulus-response scheme, and motor instructions that actually consist in spatial reactions acting over a distance to be able to ascribe spatial terms. PeacockeVsBower: of course it goes without saying that if the child intentionally puts out its hand, it then there sees the object. The problem is what constitutes the intention with the content: "reach out to the object"? A spatial response that is supposed to be caused by the spatial properties of the object is not an explanation for an intention. Nor is it an explanation for the intention that the subject is disappointed if the object is not located there. (!) Whether there are innate, half-wired or acquired connections, you just need not assume any spatial concepts to explain the disappointment . I 61 Content/Attribution/PeacockeVsBower: if you want to attribute content, you should always ask: could a stimulus-response system do that as well? If so, we do not need content. Or the conditions are not sufficient to attribute content. Def Registering/Bennett/Peacocke: ("Linguistic Behavior", Cambridge, 1976): Def "a registers that p": if a is in an environment that is similar in relevant respects with an environment where p is clearly the case, then a registers that p. Def Relevantly Similar: an environment that does not differ in any respect in which a is sensitive (of an environment in which p is present). There is also room for learning and curiosity: Trainable: such an organism will respond quickly. Curious: such an organism will try many different reactions. Perspective/Peacocke: there are also complementary characteristics to investigate in perspective sensitivity: E.g. when the subject as is familiar, e.g. with the types of objects in its environment, it requires less efferent information. Def Efferent: from inside, from the central nervous system. In our oversimplified model here we assume subjects with perfect memory and a single goal. I 70 But there is independent evidence for memory errors and assumed obstacles or multiple goals. Such assumptions do not empty the thesis of perspective sensitivity. Perspective sensitivity is necessary to attribute attitudes in the basic case. But that is a weaker necessity than we need. E.g. (see above) the animal that eats fruits: the food could be covered and after a period of training the animal manages to solve this problem. Namely, by the shortest route, regardless of the angle at which it had originally perceived the food. That would be a case of perspective sensitivity. Nevertheless, it is possible that this is merely a stimulus-response system! Therefore, we do not know fully what the requirement of perspective sensitivity is. We cannot exclude this possibility by referring to past experiences or beliefs of the subject. Proposal: that the behavior of the animal is not causally sensitive to past spatial experiences that are currently not perceived, Vs: but this condition would also be met if the animal turned its head on its way to the food without interrupting its way. So this cannot be the crucial difference for the attribution of spatial Concepts. I 71 We would like to say that a person's behavior with attitudes about objects depends on how these objects are arranged around him. PeacockeVsBower: but we have already seen above that this leads to nothing. I 76 Mental Map/Perspective/Peacocke: initially it is harmless to attribute spatial behavior to the existence of an "internal map". But from this do not follow two stronger assumptions that want to derive perspective sensitivity from this: 1) Ulrich Neisser: every living being that can anticipate an environment has cognitive maps. PeacockeVsNeisser: it is not plausible that "cognitive maps" should be a particular type of image. 2) even if someone has a real, physical, external map, it cannot be a general explanation of the perspective sensitivity of his behavior. To use the map, you have to be able to trace the trail of your own movements. But then you already have the perspective sensitivity that should be explained first. (Circular).	Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Various Authors	Kanitscheider Vs Various Authors	Kanitscheider I 433 Infinity/Material Existence/Physics: some models require physical infinity: the hyperbolic world of general relativity theory (AR), the steady astate theory (SST). Infinity/Mathematics/Physics: Gauss: is skeptical about actual infinite quantities. LucretiusVsArchimedes: is infinity mere possibility of an object to traverse new space-time points? (remains a discussion until today). Bolzano: the objective existence of infinite sets cannot fail due to the impossibility of imagining every single object. I 434 NewtonVsDescartes: not "indefinite" but actual infinite space! KantVsNewton: the infinite is unimaginable! NewtonVsKant: not imaginable, but conceptually comprehensible! Riemann: Differentiation infinite/unlimited (new!). Solution for the problem of the "beyond space". Three-ball (S³) conceptually analytically easy to handle. I 435 Sets/infinity: here the sentence: "The whole is larger than the parts" is no longer applicable. (But extensional determination is also not necessary, intensional is enough). Space: Question: Can an open infinite space contain more than Aleph ₀ objects of finite size? Solution: "densest packing" of spatially convex cells: this set cannot be larger than countable. Thus no a priori obstacle that the number of galaxies in an unlimited Riemann space of non-ending volume is the smallest transfinite cardinal number. II 102 Measurement/Consciousness/Observer/Quantum Mechanics/QM: Psychological Interpretation: Fritz London and Edmund Bauer, 1939 >New Age Movement. II 103 Thesis: the observer constitutes the new physical objectivity through his consciousness, namely the rotation of the vector in the Hilbert space. 1. KanitscheiderVsBauer: Problem: then there is no definite single state of matter without the intervention of a psyche. 2. KanitscheiderVsBauer: on the one hand consciousness is included in the quantum-mechanical laws, on the other hand it should possess special properties within the observer, namely those which transfer the combined system of object, apparatus and observer without external impulse from the hybrid superposition state into the single state in which the partial elements are decoupled. 3. KanitscheiderVsBauer: strange that the Schrödinger equation, the most fundamental law of quantum mechanics, should not be applicable to consciousness. 4. KanitscheiderVsBauer: also doubt whether the consciousness can really be in the superposition of different completely equal soul states. (Bauer had adopted his thesis from Erich Becher's interactionalistic body soul dualism II 104). I 423 Space Curvature/Empirical Measurement/Schwarzschild/Kanitscheider: Schwarzschild: Distortion of the triangle formed by the Earth's orbit parallax. Although the curvature factors are not known, one can conclude that if the space is hyperbolic (K < 0), the parallax of very distant stars must be positive. I 424 If you now observe stars with a vanishing parallax, the measurement accuracy provides an upper limit for the value of negative curvature. If the space is spherical - the parallax must be negative. Schwarzschild: in the hyperbolic case, the radius of curvature should be at least 64 light years, in the elliptical at least 1600 light-years. KanitscheiderVsSchwarzschild: such theory-independent experiments are today rightly regarded as hopeless. I 296 Time Travels/Kanitscheider: VsTime Machine/VsWells: H.G. Wells makes the mistake that he lets the traveler ascend and descend the world line of the earth on the same earthly space point. Exactly this leads to the conceptual impossibility of forward and backward movement in time. Time Travel/General Relativity Theory/Kanitscheider: this changes when matter comes into play.	Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Wittgenstein	Brandom Vs Wittgenstein	Brandom I 92 Wittgenstein: the fact that there is a conception of a rule is not the interpretation, it manifests itself from time to time what we call "following the rules" and what we call "acting against it". That means there must be something like practice-implicit standards. I 94 BrandomVsWittgenstein: worrying that the normative attribution here requires a range of regularities of behavior and dispositions. Moreover, that the existence of these regularities is not part of what is asserted by such attributions. An analogy to length measurement assumes the rigidity of the world. But we learn practically immediately to apply new concepts. I 820 BrandomVsWittgenstein: W. had insisted that explicit standards are intelligible only before a background of practice-implicit standards. (see above regress - prevention). II 26/27 Brandom: He was wrong to say that this principle is incompatible with understanding the discursive practice in a way that it involves interpretation at every level (in his sense), including the most basic one. Double score keeping: an assertion is seen in the face of further determinations assigned by the score keeper as well as the stipulations entered into by himself. BrandomVsWittgenstein: the inferential identification asserts that the language has a center. Assertions are not just things that can be done with language. Rather, they are that by which thinking and intellectual ability are made possible at all.	Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Wright, Cr.	Rorty Vs Wright, Cr.	VI 40 WrightVsTarski/Rorty: he has not succeeded to specify a standard. Wright: two standards: legitimate assertibility and truth. Difference: the pursuit of one is necessarily also the pursuit of the other, but success with one is not necessarily a success with the other. Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: "metaphysical activism". Wants to keep correspondence and representation alive. RortyVsWright: from the fact that beliefs can be justified without being true (admittedly) it does not follow that two standards are followed. Nor that we have two obligations. 1) to justify actions, and 2) another obligation to do the right thing. It simply shows that what is justified with one audience is not necessarily so in front of another. Disquotation/Deflationism/Wright: the deflationist thinks that by the disquotation principle the content of the truth predicate is completely fixed. Wright: There is a "biconditional connection between the claim a proposition is true, and the appropriate use of this sentence produced by the disquotation principle, which serves and the purpose of explanation." VI 41 "Any genuine assertion practice is just the same as it would be if truth were the goal consciously set." Rorty: Wright believes that two choices can be distinguished by asking whether they are "de facto" not "guided" by one but by other consideration. RortyVsWright: is it sufficient for the actual existence of such a power, however, if the player believes the relevant fact is given? E.g. I believe I fulfill the will of the gods by a certain behavior. My critic - Atheist - says there is no will of the gods, so it could not be my standard. VI 42 I reply that this is reductionist and that my own belief of what standard I fulfill makes the difference. RortyVsWright: he should not be happy about this defense strategy of atheists. An imaginative player will always have more and more control systems in function than you can tell apart. VI 42/43 Wright: must either admit that his goal is then normative in a descriptive sense when the player believes this, or specify another criterion (recourse). Wright: the thesis that possession of truth consists in the "fulfillment of a normative condition distinct from the claim authorization" is equal to the thesis that "truth is a real property". Truth/Wright: thesis: truth is an independent standard. (Sic, VI 42/43) WrightVsDeflationism, Wright pro type of minimalism with truth as an independent standard in addition to a mere property of sentences. VI 45 Representation/Convergence/RortyVsWright: but his example is highly revealing: he thinks, e.g. what the "intuitive" linking of representationality with convergence is based on is the following "truism" about "convergence/representation": "If two devices for representation fulfill the same function, a different output is generated in favorable conditions when there is a different input." VI 46 Wright: must distinguish here between different discourses (for example, about physics or the comical), in which the cognitive is appropriate or not. The humor (the "base") could be different, although people could not be blamed for that. Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: such questions can only be decided a priori. Namely: e.g. the question of the cognitive status of a discourse! VI 46/47 Crispin Wright/RortyVsWright: he defines a cognitive commandment according to which a speaker is to function like a well oiled representation machine. This follows the pattern of all epistemologists by whom prejudice and superstition are like sand in the gears. Ultimately, for them humans are machines! Rorty: right Input/Output function is fulfilled by countless functions in an uninteresting manner. What Wright needs: we should recognize a priori: What are the proper functions (through knowledge of the content). VI 48 PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: Pragmatism doubts that cognitivity is more than a historically contingent consensus about the appropriate rationale. VI 48/49 Content/RortyVsWright: he believes philosophers could consider the "content" of a discourse and then say whether it complied with the cognitive commandment. Representation/RortyVsWright: fundamentally different outputs can be considered a representation of the same inputs. Basically anything can be a representation of anything. You only have to previously agree on it. Cognitivity/Rorty: the content is of minor importance when it comes to the determination of cognitivity. It is almost exclusively about approval of conventions. Therefore, it is a historical sociological term. VI 50 WrightVsWittgenstein/Rorty: (Following a rule) "in metaphysic perspective a killjoy" (Evans also). Only concession to the "Qietisten": that truth and falsehood are even possible where realism is not up for debate. (Comedy, morality). Two varieties of Wittgenstein's spoilsport: Kripke and McDowell. McDowellVsNoncognitivism/Rorty: the moral non-cognitivist is "driven by an erroneous interpretation of ethical facts and ethical objectivity". The same applies for him as for his Platonic opponents, the moral realists: VI 51 struggles with the quest for an independent position. That is impossible. (McDowellVsRealism of moral). Wright/Rorty: Wright is against this attempt "to undermine the debate between realism and anti-realism in general". Advantage of his concept of the cognitive commandment: does not include an overly objectified fact concept" (as would be criticized by Wittgenstein and McDowell). We refer to what we can understand as the range of possible causes of these differences of opinion. Representation/Relevance/Cognition/Function/RortyVsWright: this is not enough to rebut McDowell: to arrive at a concept of the range of possible causes we must first specify an Input Output function, otherwise we cannot distinguish the smooth functioning of a representative machine from a malfunction. Wittgenstein has shown that the "relevant object area" is never in the relevant sense "there". Therefore question: whether there is a way to isolate the input without reference to the "evaluative standpoint". World/Thinking/Davidson/DeweyVs: we do not have the ability to separate the contribution by "the world" to the process of judgment from our own contribution. VI 52 True Making/Wright/Rorty: does not doubt the existence of isolated "truth-makers". (WrightVsDavidson). VI 56 PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: here there are only historical sociologically variable differences between patterns of justifications. These patterns should not be introduced into the concept of truth.	Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.

Disputed term/author/ism	Pro/Versus	Entry	Reference
Connectionism	Versus	Pinker I 144f Connectionism / Rumelhart: mind large neural network - rats have only a few networks - PinkerVs connectionism: networks alone are not sufficient for handling of symbols - the networks must be arranged in structured programs - already past tense overwhelmes a network. Precursor: "Association of Ideas": Locke / Hume / Berkeley / Hartley / Mill.	Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998
Logic, empirical	Pro	Quine2 XI 64 Quine: Per empirical logic - but QuineVsMill: arithmetic truth is not due to spatial arrangement.	Link to abbreviations/authors

The author or concept searched is found in the following 25 theses of the more related field of specialization.

Disputed term/author/ism	Author	Entry	Reference
Causal Theory	Cresswell, M.J.	II 149 Causal Theory/Names/Cresswell: Main point: that the meaning of a name is simply its bearer. II 150 "Hard line": (Representative: Tye, 1978): thesis: to know that Hesperus is Hesperus; is synonymous with knowing that Hesperus is Phosphorus. Cresswell: this seems difficult to maintain to me, however, if one uses "says" instead. Hard line: is always available when you have a long range. And that is what makes them seem less conclusive. For although it is often the case that a thought about Hesperus is one about Phosphorus, it is difficult to argue that no interpretation could make a difference.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Holism	Esfeld, M.	I 2 Thesis: Holism in the philosophy of mind (HPG) and in quantum mechanics (HQM) have a common conceptual content. I 16 Holismus/Esfeld: Question: What kind of dependency exists between the parts of a holistic system? Thesis: within a holistic system there is a generic ontological dependence. This does not refer to the existence of the parts as such (isolated), but to the extent that they have certain properties. Parts/Properties/Holism/Esfeld: Thesis: for each constituent part of a holistic system (constituent) there is a family of non-disjunctive, qualitative properties that make something a constituent, given a suitable arrangement with other things. I 200 Holism/ontological/epistemic/Esfeld: the proposed social holism and persuasion holism implies the epistemological thesis that even if one has complete physical knowledge about a possible world, one cannot know whether there are beings in the world concerned who follow the rules and which rules these beings follow.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Humean Superven.	Esfeld, M.	I 296 Humean Supervenience/Lewis: Thesis: that everything that exists in the world is a large mosaic of local states of single things (single facts), simply a single thing and then another...Geometry exists: simply a system of external relations of space-time distances between single things. Maybe also space-time itself. At the points we have local properties, perfect intrinsic properties, which do not need more than one point to instantiate themselves. In short: an arrangement of properties. That is all. There is no difference without a distinction in the arrangement of properties. Everything else supervenes on it. I 297 Esfeld: this is a rich basis for supervenience. Esfeld: the intrinsic properties are the non-supervenient ones. ((s) non-dependent). There are spatiotemporal relations between the points. These supervene on the distribution of non-relational properties ((s) e.g. mass, size, form).	Link to abbreviations/authors
Imagination	Evans, G.	Fra I 493 Imagination/Evans: Thesis: its fundamental reason for differentiation also plays an essential role for non-fundamental ideas of an object. Peacock I 170 Imagination/Logical Form/Evans: Thesis: We can perceive the idea of an object, a, as existing in its knowledge of what it is for any proposition of the form "d = a" to be true. (Dummett, >Wittgenstein). Peacocke: where "d" is the range of the basic ideas of an object.	Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
propos Quantific.	Grover, D.	II 58 Propositional Variables/Quantification/Suppes/Heidelberger: (Heidelberger 1968, S 214): Thesis: propositional variables must take either names of propositions, that-sentences or names of sentences. HeidelbergerVsRamsey: (ad Ramsey: "Facts and propositions".) Ramsey: Example "He's always right." Paraphrase: (p)(if he claims p then p). ((s) without "that"!) HeidelbergerVsRamsey: It is not clear whether the last occurrence of "p" falls within or outside the range of the universal quantifier. II 146 Propositional Quantification/pQ/Grover: Thesis: They exist in everyday language (English). Prior: (1967) ditto. StrawsonVsPrior/StrawsonVsGrover: They do not exist in everyday language.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Variables	Grover, D.	II 57 Grover: Thesis: the grammar of the variables in the "philosophical English" is determined by that of the variables in the formal language. II 58 Propositional Variables/Quantification/Suppes/Heidelberger: (Heidelberger 1968, S 214): Thesis: propositional variables must take either names of propositions, that-sentences, or names of sentences. HeidelbergerVsRamsey: (ad Ramsey: "facts and propositions") Ramsey: Example He's always right: Paraphrase: (p)(if he claims p then p). (s) without "that"!) HeidelbergerVsRamsey: it is not clear whether the last occurrence of "p" falls within or outside the range of the universal quantifier.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Intensional Logic	Lewis, D.	V 348 "Intensional Logics without Iterative Axioms" (1974) intensional logic / Lewis can be axiomatized that no intensional operator in the range of another ... + ... "Adverbs of Quantification" - (1975) Quantification / adverb / Lewis: e.g. "always", "sometimes", "often", "never", "usually", "often" are quantifiers, but they do not quantify over times but they are "non-selective" and bind all variables within their reach. Different sets can then be regarded as converted when-phrases.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Natural Laws	Lewis, D.	V XII Natural Laws/Lewis: I contradict the "un-Humean lawmakers" (e.g. Armstrong): they cannot carry out their own project. Def Natural Laws/Armstrong: thesis: N is a "lawmaker relation", then it is a contingent fact, and one that does not supervene on the Arrangement of Qualities, which universals are in this relation N. But it is nevertheless somehow necessary that if N(F,G) there must be a regularity, that all F"s are G"s. V 11 Thesis: then the natural laws are generalizations of what we consider particularly important - then conformity with natural laws should be important for the similarity relation between possible worlds - (> similarity metrics).	Link to abbreviations/authors
Ethics	Mackie, J.L.	Put V 276 Ethics/Mackie thesis: The good is ontologically "strange": you cannot know that something is good without having a "pro attitude" towards that something. This amounts to assuming emotivism in order to prove it. It also presupposes that there is A TRUE THEORY. PutnamVsMackie: but that does not mean that the linguistic use is incorrect, there are also cases of deliberate contravention. Philippa Foot: You can even aim to be a bad person. V 277 The difference between prescriptive and descriptive use is not a bad function of vocabulary! The fact that "good" is used to recommend does not mean that it is not a property! Stegm IV 266 Moral/Ethics/Mackie: Thesis: Primacy of rights over duties and goals. IV 286 Moral/Ethics/Mackie: Problem: Exceptions for animals, sick, disabled, old. IV 287 Thesis: Here we have to develop a humane attitude that makes us wish that people and animals are well. (Disposition). IV 287 Moral/Ethics/Mackie: neither teleological nor deontological: rather methodological! Without reference to mythical entities such as "objective values", obligations and "transcendental necessities". IV 288 Self-love is a positive value for Mackie. IV 288/289 He hopes that "utilitarianism", "law" and "egoism" will result in one and the same thing. ">Convergence optimism.	Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Values	Mackie, J.L.	Nagel III 62 Mackie: Thesis: values are not part of the fabric of the world. If they were, they would be "entities, qualities, or relationships of a very strange kind that would be quite different from all other things in the world. (Position). III 63 NagelVsMackie: the thesis that there are special reasons is a normative thesis and not a statement about the best explanation! Bridge IV 169 Ethics/Mackie: thesis: there are no objective values. IV 170 Stegmüller: this is ontological, not linguistically analytical.	NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982
Naturalism, Transc.	McGinn, C.	I 11 McGinn Thesis: not because philosophical questions concern deeply problematic, strange entities or facts, philosophical confusion arises, but because our cognitive faculty has certain inherent limits. I 15 Def immanent naturalism/McGinn: thesis: all real questions correspond to answers in the field of the theories accessible to the subject. In addition they are through and through naturalistic. Def immanent Non-Naturalism/McGinn: thesis: accepts an ontological separation between the natural and the unnatural, but both sides are understandable for the subject. Def transcendental Non-Naturalism/McGinn: thesis: some questions claim facts that are both supernatural and beyond the subject's conceptual capacity. Def Transcendental Naturalism/McGinn: thesis: does not make an ontological division into the natural and the non-natural, but is satisfied with an epistemological separation into the answerable and the non-answerable.	Link to abbreviations/authors
VsWhorf	Pinker, St.	I 451 PinkerVsWhorf: the English have no word for schadenfreude, but they know exactly what is meant - all the strange feeling words are open to understanding.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Vs Counterpart-Th.	Plantinga, A.	Staln I 118 PlantingaVsCounterpart theory/Nathan SalmonVsCounterpart theory/Stalnaker: Counterpart theory/ Plantinga/Salmon: can be divided into two doctrines: 1st Metaphysical thesis that the ranges of various worlds do not overlap ((s)> Lewis: "Nothing is in two worlds"). 2nd Semantic thesis that modal predicates in terms of counterparts should be interpreted instead in terms of the individuals themselves.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Ontol. Relativity	Quine, W.V.O.	XII 75f Löwenheim/Skolem/strong form/axiom of choice/Ontology/Reduction/Ontological Relativity/Quine: (early form): Thesis: if a theory is true and has an overcountable object range, then everything is superfluous except for a countable part, in the sense that it can be eliminated from the range of variables without any proposition becoming false. This means that all acceptable theories can be reduced to countable ontologies. And these in turn can be reduced to a special ontology of natural numbers. For this, one takes the enumeration, as far as it is explicitly known, as a strong form. And even if the enumeration is not known, it exists. Accordingly, we can regard all our objects as natural numbers, even if the enumeration number ((s) the name) is not always known. Ontology: could we not then define a Pythagorean all-purpose ontology once and for all? Pythagorean Ontology/Terminology/Quine: consists either only of numbers, or only of bodies, or only of quantities, etc. XII 76 VsPythagoreism: this shows that an all-embracing Pythagoreism is not attractive, because it offers only new and opaque versions of old methods and problems. Solution: ontological relativity, relativistic theory.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Analytical Hypothesis	Quine, W.V.O.	Chomsky I 326 Analytical Hypothesis/Quine: is fundamental to all knowledge. They go beyond the data material. Thesis: the accuracy of analytical hypotheses in the case of normal language and common-sense knowledge is not an objective matter about which one can be "right or wrong". They go beyond everything that is included in the disposition. Qui I 60 Thesis: Manuals of translation from one language into another can be so differently arranged that they are in harmony with the totality of the disposition of speech and yet are incompatible with each other.	Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006
narrow/wide	Russell, B.	Cresswell II 140 Descriptions/Theory of Descriptions/Russell/Cresswell: Thesis: a certain description is in the same syntactic category as a quantifier such as "someone". - Problem: "Someone does not come" does not mean the same as "It is not the case that someone comes". Solution/Russell: different ranges in modal and doxastic contexts: a) (close range) "The person next door lives next door" is logically equivalent to "exactly one person lives next door" and therefore it is necessarily true in a sense. b) (wide range) It is true that the person next door could have lived somewhere else (so it is contingent).	Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Vs Counterpart-Th.	Salmon, N.	I 118 PlantingaVs counterpart theory / Nathan SalmonVs CT / Stalnaker: CT / Plantinga / Salmon: can be divided into two doctrines: 1st metaphysical thesis that the ranges of various worlds do not overlap ((s)> Lewis: "Nothing is in two worlds"). 2nd semantic thesis that modal predicates should be interpretatd in terms of counterparts instead in terms of the individuals themselves.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Vs Physicalism	Schiffer, St.	I 144 SchifferVsPhysikalismus: er muß falsch sein, denn These wenn es wahre Zuschreibungen von Glauben gibt, können sie nicht ohne mentalistisches oder intentionales Vokabular dargestellt werden. I 142 Def ontologischer Physikalismus/oP/Schiffer: These es gibt keine äußersprachlichen irreduzibel psychologischen Entitäten. Def sententialistischer Physikalismus/Schiffer: These es gibt keine irreduzibel psychologischen Sätze. (Ist mit dem ontologischen Physikalismus unvereinbar). (Er ist auch falsch (s.o. die vorangegangenen Kapitel).	Link to abbreviations/authors
Intentionality	Searle, J.R.	I 154 Thesis: only one living being, which could have conscious intentional states, could have intentional states at all, and every unconscious intentional state is at least potentially conscious. II 268 Searle Thesis: there are forms of intentionality that are not conceptual, but also not de re. VII 96 Intention/Searle: thesis: the strangeness or deviation which is a condition for the utterance "X was done intentionally", at the same time provides a reason for the truth of the utterance of "X was not done on purpose."	Link to abbreviations/authors
Supervenience	Stalnaker, R.	I 87 Supervenience/Stalnaker: two types: a) Supervenience as a reductionist thesis, b) as a non-reductionist thesis. 1. Meteorology and geology supervene on physical processes. There are no cold fronts and tectonic plates beyond the physical conditions. 2. Example colours: it is controversial what they are - how they relate to physical properties of light, surfaces, physiology and perception. But it is not controversial that they supervene on some or all of these properties. There are no "other facts" about colors. Supervenience/Materialism/Stalnaker: can also be seen as a materialistic thesis beyond reductionism. Supervenience/Kim: Variant: can also be regarded as an irreducibility thesis, consistent with the irreducibility of supervenient properties to their basic properties. (1993, 140) Kim/Stalnaker: but he also argues against non-reductive materialism. Supervenience/non-reductive/Stalnaker: is then understood as metaphysical, not semantic theory: a relation between sets of properties or facts, not between theories. Thesis: each property of one set is determined by a property of the other set. I 91 Def Supervenience/Tradition/Stalnaker: it is always about two sets of properties A and B, all terms are modal, and a concept of necessity is assumed, respectively a set of all possible worlds. Rough idea: A supervenes on B if A necessarily depends on B. Def Weak Supervenience/Tradition/Stalnaker: individuals within any possible world can only differ with respect to an A property if they also differ with respect to a B property. Def Strong Supervenience/Tradition/Stalnaker: individuals within or in different possible worlds can only differ with respect to an A property if they also differ with respect to a B property. Def Global Supervenience/Tradition/Stalnaker: two possible worlds as a whole can only differ in the distribution of A properties of individuals if they I 92 also differ in the distribution of B properties. Def Strong Supervenience/Paull/Sider/Stalnaker: (1992, 834) ...iff for any two possible worlds w and z, for any two objects x and y, if x in w has the same B properties as y in z, then x in w has the same A properties as y in z. Def Weak Supervenience/Paull/Sider/Stalnaker: (1992, 834) ...iff for each ((s) single) possible world w and any individuals x and y in the range of w, if x has, in w has the same B properties as y in w, then x in w has the same A properties as y in w. Def Global Supervenience/Paull/Sider/Stalnaker: (1992, 834) ...iff any two possible worlds which are B indistinguishable, they are also A indistinguishable. I 104 Supervenience/Stalnaker: N.B.: with this they have separated semantic from metaphysical questions. Their argument is purely semantic: because supervenience assertion is the thesis that the facts about momentary states are all facts, the rest is a question of how to talk about these facts. I 10 Supervenience/Stalnaker: is a conceptual tool for the separation of the purely metaphysical part of a reductionist thesis. A set of facts or properties supervenes on another if possible worlds or possible individuals who are exactly the same in relation to one property are necessarily the same in relation to another property. I 11 Supervenience: should separate semantic from metaphysical questions. Property Space/Stalnaker: a most basic property space seems to have to be assumed. But if it is there, it is ultimately an empirical question as to what these properties and relations are.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Non-Existence	Stalnaker, R.	I 124 Non-existence/Predication/Predication statements/Stalnaker: Problem: if the object does not exist. Thesis: I prefer a modal semantics which requires that the extension of a predicate is a subset of the (object) range of the respective possible world. Then x = x is wrong if the value attributed to x does not exist (or has no counterparts). On the other hand: If you drop this condition (which is unusual), you allow non-existent objects to have properties and be in relations.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Frequency	Suppes, P.	Fraassen I 184 relative frequency / Suppes: the range of r.f. in the long run is not at field. (FN 20).	Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
de re must	Wiggins, D.	EMD II 293 Must de re/Wiggins: thesis: in order to keep (4) (x)(y) [(x = y) > N(y = x)] away from opaque contexts, we must assume de re: For example "the number of planets that is 9 must be greater than 7" - if we apply this to the relation of identity (lx)(ly)(x = y), we get necessary[(lx)(ly)(x = y)] - or the relation that all r and all s have, if they are necessarily identical - then variant of (4): (4l) (x)(y)(y)(x = y) > (y has (lz)[[necessary[(lr)(ls)[s = r]]],[x,z]])) - the contingency theory needs this: then the Def of "is necessarily identical with" no longer depends on the possible world - problem: this may not even exist in English. EMD II 303 This is just as wrong as N(Ex)(Human x). Wiggins: Thesis: we should best distinguish de re/de dicto by the range of "necessary" itself. Necessary de re/Wiggins: Example: "necessarily Cicero is a human being" that is in harmless essentialism. Necessary de dicto: it is simply wrong. ((s) "it is a necessary fact that Cicero is a human being".) Example necessarily (x)(x = Cicero) > (x is a human being) de dicto: is it true? If so, we get the wrong one: necessarily (Ez)(x)(x = z > (x is a human being). (Bracket: open after "z").	EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Existence Predicate	Woods, M.	EMD II 250 Theorem of Existence/Atomic Sentence/Existence/Universal Quantification/Woods: for individual theorems of existence, the consequence of treating E as "true of all" is less obvious: Some things depend on how we treat names and singular terms. Woods: Thesis: but there is hardly any reason why the predicate of existence E should not be treated as PeS (predicate of the first level), just like "self-identical". But this does not have to be taken as a primitive predicate! If the range of quantifiers is defined so that it only runs over existing objects, then the predicate can be defined with the help of quantification and identity.	EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977
Minimalism	Wright, Cr.	Read Logik III 49 Minimalist Theory of Truth/Minimalism: Wright, et al. Wright Thesis: the assertion that truth is not a substantial property cannot explain essential features of the concept of truth, especially that it differs from justified assertiveness. Wright: Thesis: truth goes beyond assertiveness in that it is stable (once true, always true) and absolute (without degrees of justification). III 243 Def Minimalism: if it is possible in any form, it shows that this thought is confused. He attributes objective truth values without assuming an additional range of objects. (Minimalism is the thesis that there is nothing more to say about truth than what is contained in the truth scheme.) (>Wright) Rorty/Truth/Wright: Thesis: truth is an independent norm. (sic, VI 42/43) WrightVsDeflationism, Wright pro variant of minimalism with truth as an independent norm alongside a mere property of sentences.	Link to abbreviations/authors