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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Universal Grammar | Pinker | Deacon I 38 Universal Grammar/Pinker/Deacon: Pinker is a proponent of many of Chomsky's ideas about the uniqueness of human language. >Noam Chomsky, >Grammar, >Language. Language Instinct/Pinker(1)/Deacon: Thesis: innate grammatical knowledge is not incompatible with an adaptationist interpretation of its origin. This instinct may have evolved gradually in the course of natural selection. In this way, we avoid having to assume improbable coincidences. DeaconVsPinker: on the other hand, this does not yet provide us with a formal explanation of language competence and how it arose in selection. >Selection, >Adaption. DeaconVsPinker: Pinker's theory of language instinct merely repeats a description of the problem and gives it a new name. 1.St. Pinker (1995). The Language Instinct. New York: Harper. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Universal Grammar | Deacon | I 38 Universal Grammar/Pinker/Deacon: Pinker is a representative of many ideas of Chomsky about the uniqueness of human language. >St. Pinker, cf. >N. Chomsky. Language instinct/Pinker/Deacon: Thesis: innate grammatical knowledge is not incompatible with an adaptive interpretation of its origin. This instinct could have developed gradually in the course of natural selection. In this way, we avoid having to accept improbable coincidences(1). >Selection. Deacon: on the other hand, this does not yet provide us with a formal explanation of language competence and how it was created in the selection process. >Competence. DeaconVsPinker: Pinker's theory of linguistic instinct repeats only a description of the problem and gives it a new name. I 103 Universal grammar/Chomsky/Deacon: (Chomsky 1972(2);1980(3);1988(4)) Chomsky assumed three insights: 1. The logical structure of grammar is much more complex than previously assumed, but it does not pose a problem for speakers of a language. 2. Although languages have very different features on the surface, ... I 104 ...they have a common deep structure (depth logic). This, in turn, makes it difficult to discover these rules, which must first be made accessible indirectly. >Deep structure. 3. One can observe that children quickly learn a remarkable knowledge of the complex grammatical rules, without the trial and error procedure. Some authors have expanded this to the thesis that the abstract rules for a natural language could never be discovered. Other authors argued that one could never inductively infer the rules from texts if there was no prior knowledge of grammar. (See Chomsky and Miller, 1963(8) for a formal representation of this argument). DeaconVsUniversal Grammar: this cure is more radical than the suffering it is supposed to eliminate. Your assumptions about brains and evolution are far too strong. It turns children into super-intelligent learning subjects. I 105 Some authors VsUniversal Grammar: assume that straw men are build here: a limited model of language acquisition as an induction and the assertion that language experience takes place without feedback. I 138 Universal Grammar/DeaconVsUniversal Grammar/Deacon: Def Pidgin language/pidgin languages/Deacon: these are languages that have arisen from a collision of native languages of an area with immigrant languages. Pidgin languages are no one's mother tongue. They can disappear within a generation in favour of "Creole languages". Surprisingly, the syntactic structures of different Creole languages are similar. I 139 Among other things, Bickerton (1981(5), 1984(6), 1990(7)) takes this as evidence of innate grammatical patterns. DeaconVsBickerton/DeaconVsUniversal Grammar: We can explain the language learning skills differently than through an innate universal grammar: the children take many phrases as an unanalysed whole first, and then break them down later. I 140 Brains have developed in such a way that they can apply different learning strategies at different points in time. These strategies compete for neural resources. >Brain/Deacon, cf. >Neural networks. (1) Pinker, Steven (2000): The Language Instinct: How the Mind Creates Language. New York: Perennial Classics. (2) Chomsky, Noam (1972). Language and Mind. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. (3) Chomsky, Noam (1980) Rules and Representations. New York: Columbia University Press. (4) Chomsky, Noam (1988) Language and Problems of Knowledge: The Managua Lectures. Cambridge Ma: MIT PRess. (5) Bickerton, Derek (1981): Roots of language. Ann Arbor: Karoma Publishers, Inc., Pp. xiii + 351. (6) Bickerton, Derek (1984): The Language bioprogram hypothesis, June 1984, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7(02): 173 - 188. (7) Bickerton, Derek (1990): Language & Species. University of Chicago Press. (8) Chomsky, Noam & G. Miller (1963) Introduction to formal analysis of natural language. In Handbook of Mathematical Psychology, Vol 2, ed. R. D. Luce, R. Bush, and E. Galanter. New York: John Wiley. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Chomsky, N. | Harman Vs Chomsky, N. | I 306 Competence/Performance/ChomskyVsHarman: competence as "knowledge that language is described by the rules of grammar". And that "grammar specifies this competence". ChomskyVsHarman: I have not only never asserted this, but also repeatedly rejected it publicly. It would be absurd if the speaker had to know the rules explicitly. Knowledge/Language/Harman: a) knowing that b) knowing how. Since language is obviously not "knowing that", it must be "knowing how". The speaker knows "how he has to understand other speakers." Analogous to the ability of the cyclist. I 307 ChomskyVsHarman: he uses "competence" very different than me. I see no relation to the "ability of the cyclist", not a "set of habits," or something like that. I 308 HarmanVsChomsky: the internalized system (that limits the choice of grammars) must be represented in a more fundamental language, and the child must have understood the latter already, before it can apply this schematism a) this leads to a circle: If you said that the child mastered the "more fundamental language" "directly", without having learned it, then why do you not also say that it mastered the actual language "directly" without learning it. Or: b) Regress: If, however, you said that it has to learn the more fundamental language first, then the question is how this fundamental language is learned itself. ChomskyVsHarman: even if you assume that the schematism must be represented at an "innate language", it does not follow what Harman sees: the child may need to master the "more fundamental language", but it does not have to "speak and understand" it. We just have to assume that it can make use of it. ad a): the assumption that the child masters its native language without learning it is wrong. It is not born with perfect knowledge of German. On the other hand, nothing speaks against the assumption that it is born with perfect knowledge of a universal grammar. HarmanVsChomsky: in a model, conclusions from the given data on a grammar can only be made, if detailed information on a theory of performance is included in the model. Chomsky: interesting, but not necessary. I 310 Empiricism/Theory/HarmanVsChomsky: calls Chomsky’s strategy "inventive empiricism", a doctrine that uses "induction principles". Such "inventive empiricism" is certainly not to be refuted, "no matter how the linguistic data look". ChomskyVsHarman: empiricism is not so important. I’m interested in the question of whether there are "ideas and principles of various kinds" which "determine the form of the knowledge acquired in a largely defined and highly organized manner" (rationalist variant) or whether on the other hand "the structure of the appropriation mechanism is limited to simple and peripheral processing mechanisms..." (empiricist variant). It is historically justified and makes heuristic sense to distinguish that. |
Harman I G. Harman Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995 Harman II Gilbert Harman "Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Chomsky, N. | Maturana Vs Chomsky, N. | I 128 Syntax / Grammar: If recursion is possible, a closed area can be made of behavior: E.g. dance, human language. Within such a range, the syntactic or grammatical surface structure may be only the description of regularities. In principle, the surface structure can be arbitrary! Reason: its training is consensual coupling is dependent on the history and not a necessary result of any necessary physiology. I 129 Conversely, the "universal grammar" of linguists (MaturanaVsChomsky) is recursive only in the universality of the process of coupling structures. The causes of the ability to recursive structures coupling are not self-consensually. They are structurally and depend exclusively on the operations of the nervous system together as a closed neuronal network. |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
| Chomsky, N. | Putnam Vs Chomsky, N. | Chomsky I 293 PutnamVsChomsky: Putnam assumes for phonetics in the universal grammar, that it only has a single list of sounds. This did not require a sophisticated explanatory hypothesis. Only "memory span and powers of recollection". "No upright behaviorist would deny that these are innate properties." ChomskyVsPutnam: but there have been set up very strong empirical hypotheses about the selection of the universal distinctive features, none of which seems to be explained on the basis of restrictions of memory. Chomsky I 298 PutnamVsChomsky: Thesis: instead of an innate schematism, "general multipurpose strategies" could be assumed. This innate base would have to be the same for the acquisition of any knowledge, so that there is nothing special about language acquisition. Chomsky I 299 ChomskyVsPutnam: with that he is no longer entitled to assume something is innate. Furthermore, it only shifts the problem. PutnamVsChomsky: the evaluation functions proposed in the universal grammar "the kind of facts is constituted which tries to explain the theory of learning, but not the required explanation itself". ChomskyVsPutnam: E.g. no one would say that the genetic basis for the development of arms instead of wings was "the kind of fact that attempts to explain the theory of learning". Rather, they are the basis for an explanation of other facts of human behavior. Whether the evaluation function is learned or is the basis of learning, is an empirical question. PutnamVsChomsky: certain ambiguities can only be discovered by routine, therefore their postulated explanation by Chomsky's grammar is not very impressive. ChomskyVsPutnam: he misunderstands it, in fact that refers to competence and not to performance (actual practice). What the grammar explains is why e.g. in "criticism of students" "student" can be understood as subject or object, whereas e.g. "grain" in "the growing of the grain" can only be subject. The question of routine does not matter here. Chomsky I 300 Innate Ideas/ChomskyVsPutnam: the innate representation of universal grammar indeed solves the problem of learning (at least partly) if it is really true that this is the basis for language acquisition, which may very well be the case! Putnam III 87 Putnam/Chomsky: Putnam proposes: correctness in linguistics is what the currently available data best explain about the behavior of the speaker under a current interest. What is true today, will be false tomorrow. PutnamVsChomsky: I never said that what is right today, will be wrong tomorrow. Putnam: Chomsky's hidden main theses: 1) the we are free to choose our interests at will, 2) that interests themselves are not subject to normative criticism. E.g. Hans' heart attack lies in the defiance of medical recommendations. Other explanation: high blood pressure. It may be, in fact, that on one day one fact is more in the interests of the speaker, and the next day another one. III 88 PutnamVsChomsky: 1) we cannot just pick and choose our interests. 2) It sometimes happens that the relevance of a particular interest is disputed. How can it be, however, that some interests are more reasonable than others? Reasonableness is supposed to depend on different conditions in different contexts. There is no general answer. III 88/89 The assertion that a concept is interest relative does not come out at the same as the thesis, all interests are equally reasonable. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
| Chomsky, N. | Searle Vs Chomsky, N. | SearleVsChomsky: he went a step too far: he should deny that the speech organ has any structure that can be described as an automaton. So he became a victim of the analytical technique. Dennett I 555 Language/SearleVsChomsky: One can explain language acquisition this way: there is actually an innate language acquisition device. Bat that will ad nothing to the hardware explanation assuming deep unconscious universal grammatical rules. This does not increase the predictive value. There are naked, blind neurophysiological processes and there is consciousness. There is nothing else. ((s) otherwise regress through intermediaries). Searle I 273 SearleVsChomsky: for universal grammar there is a much simpler hypothesis: there is indeed a language acquisition device. Brings limitations, what types of languages can be learned by human being. And there is a functional level of explanation which language types a toddler can learn when applying this mechanism. By unconscious rules the explanatory value is not increased. IV 9 SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsRyle: there are neither alternative deep structures nor does is require specific conversations potulate. IV 204 Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: it is often said folllowing Chomsky, the language must finally obey many rules (for an infinite number of forms). IV 205 This is misleading, and was detrimental to the research. Better is this: the purpose of language is communication. Their unit is the illocutionary speech. It's about how we go from sounds to files. VIII 411 Grammar/language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's students (by Searle called "Young Turks") pursue Chomsky's approach more radically than Chomsky. (see below). Aspects of the theory of syntax/Chomsky: (mature work, 1965(1)) more ambitious targets than previously: Statement of all linguistic relations between the sound system and the system of meaning. VIII 412 For this, the grammar must consist of three parts: 1. syntactic component that describes the internal structure of the infinite number of propositions (the heart of the grammar) 2. phonological component: sound structure. (Purely interpretative) 3. semantic component. (Purely interpretive),. Also structuralism has phrase structure rules. VIII 414 It is not suggested that a speaker actually passes consciously or unconsciously for such a process of application of rules (for example, "Replace x by y"). This would be assumed a mix of competence and performance. SearleVsChomsky: main problem: it is not yet clear how the theory of construction of propositions supplied by grammarians accurately represents the ability of the speaker and in exactly what sense of "know" the speaker should know the rules. VIII 420 Language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's conception of language is eccentric! Contrary to common sense believes it will not serve to communicate! Instead, only a general function to express the thoughts of man. VIII 421 If language does have a function, there is still no significant correlation with its structure! Thesis: the syntactic structures are innate and have no significant relationship with communication, even though they are of course used for communication. The essence of language is its structure. E.g. the "language of the bees" is no language, because it does not have the correct structure. Point: if one day man would result in a communication with all other syntactic forms, he possessed no language but anything else! Generative semantics/Young TurksVsChomsky: one of the decisive factors in the formation of syntactic structures is the semantics. Even terms such as "grammatically correct" or "well-formed sentence" require the introduction of semantic terms! E.g. "He called him a Republican and insulted him". ChomskyVsYoung Turks: Mock dispute, the critics have theorized only reformulated in a new terminology. VIII 422 Young Turks: Ross, Postal, Lakoff, McCawley, Fillmore. Thesis: grammar begins with a description of the meaning of a proposition. Searle: when the generative semantics is right and there is no syntactic deep structures, linguistics becomes all the more interesting, we then can systematically investigate how form and function are connected. (Chomsky: there is no connection!). VIII 426 Innate ideas/Descartes/SearleVsChomsky: Descartes has indeed considered the idea of a triangle or of perfection as innate, but of syntax of natural language he claimed nothing. He seems to have taken quite the contrary, that language is arbitrary: he assumed that we arbitrarily ascribe our ideas words! Concepts are innate for Descartes, language is not. Unconscious: is not allowed with Descartes! VIII 429 Meaning theory/m.th./SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsQuine: most meaning theories make the same fallacy: Dilemma: a) either the analysis of the meaning itself contains some key elements of the analyzed term, circular. ((s) > McDowell/PeacockeVs: Confusion >mention/>use). b) the analysis leads the subject back to smaller items, that do not have key features, then it is useless because it is inadequate! SearleVsChomsky: Chomsky's generative grammar commits the same fallacy: as one would expect from the syntactic component of the grammar that describes the syntactic competence of the speaker. The semantic component consists of a set of rules that determine the meanings of propositions, and certainly assumes that the meaning of a propositions depends on the meaning of its elements as well as on their syntactic combination. VIII 432 The same dilemma: a) In the various interpretations of ambiguous sentences it is merely paraphrases, then the analysis is circular. E.g. A theory that seeks to explain the competence, must not mention two paraphrases of "I went to the bank" because the ability to understand the paraphrases, just requires the expertise that will explain it! I cannot explain the general competence to speak German by translating a German proposition into another German proposition! b) The readings consist only of lists of items, then the analysis is inadequate: they cannot declare that the proposition expresses an assertion. VIII 433 ad a) VsVs: It is alleged that the paraphrases only have an illustrative purpose and are not really readings. SearleVs: but what may be the real readings? Example Suppose we could interpret the readings as heap of stones: none for a nonsense phrase, for an analytic proposition the arrangement of the predicate heap will be included in the subject heap, etc. Nothing in the formal properties of the semantic component could stop us, but rather a statement of the relationship between sound and meaning theory delivered an unexplained relationship between sounds and stones. VsVs: we could find the real readings expressed in a future universal semantic alphabet. The elements then stand for units of meaning in all languages. SearleVs: the same dilemma: a) Either the alphabet is a new kind of artificial language and the readings in turn paraphrases, only this time in Esperanto or b) The readings in the semantic alphabet are merely a list of characteristics of the language. The analysis is inadequate, because it replaces a speech through a list of elements. VIII 434 SearleVsChomsky: the semantic part of its grammar cannot explain, what the speaker actually recognizes when it detects one of the semantic properties. Dilemma: either sterile formalism or uninterpreted list. Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: Solution: Speech acts have two properties whose combination we dismiss out of the dilemma: they are regularly fed and intentional. Anyone who means a proposition literally, expresses it in accordance with certain semantic rules and with the intention of utterance are just to make it through the appeal to these rules for the execution of a particular speech act. VIII 436 Meaning/language/SearleVsChomsky: there is no way to explain the meaning of a proposition without considering its communicative role. VIII 437 Competence/performance/SearleVsChomsky: his distinction is missed: he apparently assumes that a theory of speech acts must be more a theory of performance than one of competence. He does not see that competence is ultimately performance skills. ChomskyVsSpeech act theory: Chomsky seems to suspect behaviorism behind the speech act. 1. Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge 1965 |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Cognition Theory | Searle Vs Cognition Theory | I 8 SearleVsCognition Psychology: Black Box, the cognitive scientists repeat the worst mistake of the behaviorists: they insisted to examine only objectively observable phenomena. So they left the essential characteristics of the mind aside. In the big black box they only found a lot of small black boxes. I 217 cognition theory: Here it is claimed, we would have drawn a conclusion, when we look at a tree from one and then know that he has a back. SearleVsCognition theory: On the contrary, what we do is simply this: we see a tree as a real tree. The background is not a control system. I 222 SearleVs Cognitive Science/VsCognition: the basic assumptions of cognitive science are wrong. Cognitive Science: neither the examination of the brain nor the study of consciousness is of interest or value. Although the cognitive mechanisms are actually in the brain, and some of them refer to the awareness a superficial expression, but we are interested in the intermediate level, where actual cognitive processes happen, which are inaccessible to the consciousness. These processes are not only factually special principle unconsciously. Typical representatives: Chomsky, Marr, Fodor. I 256 Explanation/SearleVsCognitivism: Thesis: many of our cognitive science explanations do not have the explanatory power, we attach to them. To save them, we will have to make a reversal of its logical structure: as it took place during the transition from pre-Darwin biology to the biology à la Darwin. I 256/257 The brain produces states of consciousness, and that is all. As for the mind, this is already the whole story. There are the blind neurophysiological processes and there is consciousness, otherwise however there is nothing. No rule-following, no mental information processing, no unconscious inferences, no mental models, no original drafts, no two and a half dimensional images, no language of the mind, and no universal grammar. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Goodman, N. | Chomsky Vs Goodman, N. | I 287 Language learning/language acquisition/Goodman: Second language is not problematic because the acquisition of the first language is the acquisition of a "secondary symbolic system". ChomskyVsGoodman: that could have some weight if it could be shown. (For example, for the distinction of surface structure and depth structure). But we have no empirical evidence. --- I 288 ChomskyVsGoodman: Acquisition of first and second language: Fallacy: If we learn the second language easier by means of explanations from the first language, we would have had to acquire a language before the first language in order to acquire the first language (which is particularly easy). (Regress). Goodman: Acquisition of the first language is acquisition of a "secondary symbolic system" and therefore corresponds to the acquisition of the second language. Chomsky's: the primary symbolic systems that he has in mind are rudimentary and cannot be used in the same way as a first language in acquiring the second language. GoodmanVsChomsky: his theses cannot be checked because we do not have examples of "bad languages". --- I 289 ChomskyVsGoodman: There are dozens of books in which features of a universal grammar are formulated and their empirical consequences are examined, whereby each such property specifies "bad" languages. --- I 290 Grue/ChomskyVsGoodman: affects more of a border problem. The initial question is too vague. You can easily find a property, even a fairly general one, of the language "grue bleen", which is not the property of a "language like German". E.g. Chomsky: the predicate "be equal" (Structure of Appearance) applies only to objects instead of to Qualia. Now the language grue bleen has the peculiar property: "If an object A before t and an object B after t are examined, and if both are determined to be grue (or bleen), then we know that they are not like each other. But there is no such t that we could predict of these objects that they will not be equal. They could just as well be equal if both are grue (or bleen). Chomsky: it is undoubtedly a general property of natural languages that they behave more like German than "gruebleen". Thus, there is no difficulty in establishing a distinction between such languages as grue bleen and such as German. This would not suffice Goodman, of course, because one could still construct more refined examples. As long as it is only about vague terms like "like German" or "like Gruebleen", Goodman's requirement is impossible to fulfill. --- I 291 ChomskyVsGoodman: It may be relevant to induction, but not to linguistics, just as little as for any other science, such for the question of why embryos get arms and no wings within a given framework of conditions. ((s) is irrelevant because once conceptual, once empirical.) Chomsky: with this we cannot explain at all why the learner does not acquire grue as a generalization basis. Undoubtedly this follows from certain properties of the sensory system. Congenital ideas/ChomskyVsGoodman: it does not seem incomprehensible to me that any aspect of the "final state" of an organism or automaton is also an aspect of its "initial state". And this before any interaction with his environment! --- I 292 Innate ideas/ChomskyVsGoodman: in his essay, Goodman at least once admits that the mind contains ideas in some sense. Then it is obviously not incomprehensible that some of these ideas are "implanted as an original equipment" to the mind. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Theory | Chomsky, N. | I 303 Theory / Chomsky. the universal grammar is not a "theory of language acquisition" but one element of such a theory. My thesis is an "all-at-once-proposal" and does not attempt to capture the interplay between tentative hypotheses constructed by the child and new interpreted data. |
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