Dictionary of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute

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Disputed term/author/ism	Author	Entry	Reference
Assertions	Tugendhat	I 244 Assertion/Asymmetry/Tugendhat: the affirmation or negation both times refer to something on the part of the speaker, not on the part of the listener. Therefore, the situation does not correspond to the stimulus-reaction scheme. >Situations, >Stimuli, >Communication, >Negation. I 273 Game/Profit/Tugendhat: is important because it is about the motivation to take over one or the other side in the game - mixing of assertion and responsibility. >Scorekeeping, >Robert Brandom, >Attribution, >Predication, cf. >Game-theoretical semantics. I 279 Assertion/Object/Truth//Tugendhat: what is characteristic about the assertoric speech is that it is based on truth and therefore it is object-based - we can call these objects "facts" or "thoughts" or "propositions" - unlike Frege : not truth as an object >Meaning/Frege, >Judgments. I 281ff Assertion is a necessary part of meaning, because the truth conditions are part of the meaning. >assertion stroke, judgment stroke/Frege.	Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Causes	Bigelow	I 267 Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: a cause is neither sufficient nor necessary for an effect. Reason: there is a backup system that could have produced the same effect. I 268 If the updated system failed. E.g. you could have also eaten another slice of bread. Different food intake can have exactly the same effect. Blur/Imperfection/Bigelow/Pargetter: it is a characteristic feature of living systems. Nevertheless, this is not an intrinsic feature. >Effect, >Causation, >Causality, cf. >Anomalous monism. Cause/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: Lewis allows that a cause is not a necessary condition for the effect. Nevertheless, he explains causation by necessity. Namely, through chains of necessary conditions. (1973b⁽¹⁾, 1986d⁽²⁾, 1979⁽³⁾). >Necessity, >Conditions, >Sufficiency. Cause/Mackie/Bigelow/Pargetter: he arrives at similar results like Lewis, but with strict conditionals. >Cause/Mackie. Cause/INUS/Mackie: (Mackie 1965)⁽⁴⁾ Thesis: not a sufficient but necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition. Cause/Lewis/Mackie/Bigelow/Pargetter: both come from a chain of necessary conditions. They differ in how the links of the chain are to be connected. Lewis: through counterfactual conditioning Mackie: through strict conditionals. Their antecedents can be so complex that we cannot specify them in practice. Backup system/Bigelow/Pargetter: (see above) would cause a counterfactual conditional to fail. Nevertheless, Lewis records the cause as a cause because it contributes to the chain. Mackie: dito, because the deviant cause is part of a sufficient condition. BigelowVsLewis/BigelowVsMackie: both theories have disadvantages. >Counterfactual conditional. 1.Lewis, D.K. (1973). Causation. Journal of Philosophy 70. pp.556-67. 2. Lewis, D.K. (1986d). Philosophical Papers, Vol. II, New York: Oxford University Press. 3. Lewis, D. K. (1979). Counterfactual dependence and time's arrow, Nous 13 pp.455-76. 4. Mackie, J. L. (1965). Causes and Conditions. American Philosophical Quarterly 2, pp.245-255.	Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Causes	Fraassen	I 25 Principle of the Common Cause/P.C.C./Fraassen: eventually leads to postulating unobservable entities. - The principle of the common cause cannot be a general principle of science. >Unobservables, >Theoretical entities. I 28 Common Cause/C.C./Fraassen: to say that C is the common cause for the correlation between A and B is to say that relative to C there is no such correlation. C explains the correlation, because we only notice a correlation for as long as we do not consider C. FraassenVsReichenbach: the principle of the common cause does not rule the science of the 20th century, because it requires deterministic theories. I 114 Cause/Explanation/Theory: Def Cause/Mackie: non-sufficient but necessary part of a non-necessary but sufficient condition. >INUS/Mackie). FraassenVsMackie: restriction: otherwise e.g. growth-plus-death-plus-decay may be the cause of death. 1) Not every sufficient condition is a cause. - E.g. the existence of the knife is a necessary part. - 2) A cause must also not be necessary. >Causation, >Causality. It may be that there are no previous sufficient conditions at all. - E.g. radium causes Geiger counter to click. But atomic physics is compatible with that it does not click. Cause/Solution/Lewis: Counterfactual Conditional: if A had not existed, B would not have exited. >Counterfactual conditional. Fraassen: but not literally. - Wrong: that a counterfactual conditional was the same as a necessary condition. Solution/Fraassen: here, the "if/then" logic does not apply, because applies the law of attenuation there. Everyday language: there is no attenuation here. >Everyday language.	Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Causes	Mackie	Bigelow I 268 Cause/Mackie/Bigelow/Pargetter: he comes to similar results as Lewis, but with strict conditionals. C: is a conjunction of conditions c: cause e: effect. I 268 Counterfactual Conditional/Lewis: c would happen > e would happen c would not happen > e would not happen Mackie: strict conditionals: N(C applies and c happens > e happens) N(C applies and c does not happen > e does not happen). Cause/INUS/Mackie: (Mackie 1965)⁽¹⁾ Thesis: not sufficient but necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition. Cause/Lewis/Mackie/Bigelow/Pargetter: both assume a chain of necessary conditions. They differ in how the links of the chain are to be connected. Lewis: through counterfactual conditionals Mackie: through strict conditionals. Their antecedents can be so complex that we cannot specify them in practice. Backup System/Bigelow/Pargetter: (see above) would cause a counterfactual conditional to fail. Nevertheless, Lewis will treat the cause as the cause because it contributes to the chain. Mackie: ditto, because the deviating cause is part of a sufficient condition. >Cause/Lewis. BigelowVsLewis/BigelowVsMackie: both theories have disadvantages. 1. J. L. Mackie (1965). Causes and Conditions, American Philosophical Quarterly2, pp. 245-55, 261-64.	Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Concepts	Churchland	Lanz I 271 Mind/concepts/Patricia Churchland: the self-sufficient analysis of concepts alone is not enough to solve the problem. The empirical sciences are a necessary part of research.	Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993
Distributive Justice	Resource-based View (RBV)	Gaus I 226 Distributive Justice/Rawls/Resource-based view (RBV)/Lamont: Influenced by Rawls's natural arbitrariness argument, but even more sensitive than Rawls to what is and what is not a matter of luck, are the resource egalitarians. >Reflective equilibrium/Rawls). Since the rejection of slavery, feudalism, and aristocracy, one point of agreement among contemporary theorists has been that equality, in some sense, is a necessary part of any plausible theory of justice. Disagreements arise, however, in articulating the sense in which equality matters, or in specifying what is to be distributed equally (Sen, 1980)⁽¹⁾. In answer to this question, a number ofthinkers have promoted equality of resources, usually because they believe in both equality and in responsibility, seeking to hold individuals responsible for the choices they make in using their resources (Cohen, 1989⁽²⁾; Dworkin, 2000⁽³⁾; Sen, 1980⁽¹⁾). Institutions: By the same token, however, they believe that social institutions should be designed to prevent inequalities resulting from factors beyond individuals' control. They also recognize that an equal distribution of material goods does not achieve equality of resources, because people's unequal genetic endowments are also important resources. Thus, they tend to argue for some kind of compensation to individuals who are unlucky in the natural lottery, to achieve a genuinely equal distribution of resources (Roemer, 1985)⁽⁴⁾. >Inequalities/Dworkin, >Inequalities/Resource-based view (RBV), >Desert/Political philosophy, >Distributive Justice/Libertarianism. 1. Sen, Amartya (1980) 'Equality of what?' In Sterling M. McMurrin, ed., Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 195—220. 2. Cohen, G. A. (1989) 'On the currency of egalitarian justice'. Ethics, 99 906_44. 3. Dworkin, Ronald (2000) Soveæign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 4. Roemer, John (1985) 'Equality of talent'. Economics and Philosophy, 1: 151-86. Lamont, Julian, „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Essentialism	Simons	Chisholm II 173ff Mereological Essentialism/Simons: a thing must be founded in all its necessary parts. Part/whole relationship: the part-whole relationship is modal rigid (Chisholm pro). >Mereology, >Parts, >Wholes, >Part-of-relation. Vs: most things are in flux, e.g. people, water waves. Ens sukzessivum: for Chisholm any permanent thing ("continuant") obeys a particularly strict temporal version of mereological essentialism: if another permanent thing in any world at any time is part of it, this part has to be a part of it at all times and in all the worlds in which there exists the whole thing. Solution: entia sukzessiva: things in flux: are themselves not permanent but constituted from permanent things (continuants). >Continuants, >Ens successivum.	Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Explanation	Barrow	I 229 Explanation/computers/description/purpose/Barrow: A computer is only fully described, if the purpose of its program is set out. >Software, >Computers, >Computer programs, >Description. Forerunner of this view: Kant emphasized the role of deliberate action in the life of living beings as a necessary part of any complete description of their behavior. >Intentions, >Intentionality, >Actions, >Behavior.	B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001
Extensionality	Simons	Chisholm II 185 Extensionality/Quine: we assume space time points instead of "durable goods". SimonsVsQuine: language without continuants (permanent object) cannot be learned. Chisholm: probably time and modality, but not temporal or modal components: either a) accept phenomena, refuse extensionality or b) reject phenomena, demand extensionality for real lasting objects. >Entia Sukzessiva. SimonsVsChisholm: it is better to accept Aristotle things with unnecessary parts: trees simply consist of matter. This is more evidence than Wittgenstein's atoms. --- Simons I 3 Extensionality/Simons: if extensionality is rejected, more than one object can have exactly the same parts and therefore more than one object can be at the same time in the same place. Then we are dealing with continuants. Continuant/Simons: everything which is not an event is a continuant (see below) or everything that can have mass. >Continuants, >Parts. I 11 Extensional Mereology/CEM/extensionality/Simons: a characteristic property of extensional mereology is the relationship "part-of-or-identical-with". This corresponds with "less-than-or-equal" relationship. Overlapping: overlapping can be used as the only fundamental concept. Limiting case: separateness and identity. I 105f Part/VsExtensional Mereology/Simons: 1. A whole is sometimes not one of its own parts. 2. Sometimes it is not transitive. 3. The existence of "sum-individuals" is not always guaranteed. That means, that the axioms, for individuals who obey any predicate, are wrong. 4. Identity criteria for individuals who have all parts in common, are wrong. I 106 5. Provides a materialist ontology of four-dimensional objects. Part/Simons: thesis: there is no uniform meaning of "part". I 117 Extensionality/Simons: extensionality is left with the rejection of the proper parts principle: I 28 Proper Parts Principle/strong/strong supporting principle: if x is not part of y, then there is a z which is part of x and which is separated from y. Solution for distinguishing sum (Tib + Tail) and whole (process) Tibbles (cat). >Tibbles-expample. Simons: the coincidence of individuals is temporarily indistinguishable (perceptually). >Superposition: superposition means being at the same time in the same place.	Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Factors of Production	Rothbard	Rothbard III 37 Factors of Production/Rothbard: Factors of production are valued in accordance with their anticipated contribution in the eventual production of consumers’ goods. Factors, however, differ in the degree of their specifity, i.e., the variety of consumers’ goods in the production of which they can be of service. Certain goods are completely specific - are useful in producing only one consumers’ good. Rothbard III 38 Just as a supply of consumers’ goods will go first toward satisfying the most urgent wants, then to the next most urgent wants, etc., so a supply of factors will be allocated by actors first to the most urgent uses in producing consumers’ goods, then to the next most urgent uses, etc. The loss of a unit of a supply of a factor will entail the loss of the least urgent of the presently satisfied uses. Convertibility: The less specific a factor [of production] is, the more convertible it is from one use to another. >Convertibility. Example: The mandrake weed lost its value because it could not be converted to other uses. Factors such as iron or wood, however, are convertible into a wide variety of uses. If one type of consumers’ good falls into disuse, iron output can be shifted from that to another line of production. On the other hand, once the iron ore has been transformed into a machine, it becomes less easily convertible and often completely specific to the product. Rothbard III 39 Value/production/good: Suppose, (…) that some time after cigars lose their value this commodity returns to public favor and regains its former value. The cigar machines, which had been rendered valueless, now recoup their great loss in value. On the other hand, the tobacco leaves, land, etc., which had shifted from cigars to other uses will reshift into the production of cigars. These factors will gain in value, but their gain, as was their previous loss, will be less than the gain of the completely specific factor. These are examples of a general law that a change in the value of the product causes a greater change in the value of the specific factors than in that of the relatively nonspecific factors. Rothbard III 40 Value/Convertibility: Convertible factors will be allocated among different lines of production according to the same principles as consumers’ goods are allocated among the ends they can serve. Each unit of supply will be allocated to satisfy the most urgent of the not yet satisfied wants, i.e., where the value of its marginal product is the highest. A loss of a unit of the factor will deprive the actor of only the least important of the presently satisfied uses, i.e., that use in which the value of the marginal product is the lowest. This choice is analogous to that involved in previous examples comparing the marginal utility of one good with the marginal utility of another. Rothbard III 41 The value of a unit of a convertible factor is set, not by the conditions of its employment in one type of product, but by the value of its marginal product when all its uses are taken into consideration. >Productive forces, >Production/Rothbard, >Capital goods/Rothbard, >Labour/Rothbard. Rothbard III 319 Factors of production/Rothbard: In the technical combination of factors of production to yield a product, as one factor varies and the others remain constant, there is an optimum point - a point of maximum average product produced by the factor. This is the law of returns. It is based on the very fact of the existence of human action. Rothbard III 328 Factors of Production/Rothbard: Crucial to understanding the process of production is the question of the specificity of factors (…) A specific factor is one suitable to the production of only one product. A purely nonspecific factor would be one equally suited to the production of all possible products. (…) we have seen that human action implies more than one existing factor. Even the existence of one purely nonspecific factor is inconceivable if we properly consider “suitability in production” in value terms rather than in technological terms.⁽¹⁾ In fact,(…) there is no sense in saying that a factor is “equally suitable” in purely technological terms, since there is no way of comparing the physical quantities of one product with those of another. If X can help to produce three units of A or two units of B, there is no way by which we can compare these units. Only the valuation of consumers establishes a hierarchy of valued goods, their interaction setting the prices of the consumers’ goods. (Relatively) nonspecific factors, then, are allocated to those products that the consumers have valued most highly. It is difficult to conceive of any good that would be purely nonspecific and equally valuable in all processes of production. Rothbard III 329 Now let us for a time consider a world where every good is produced only by several specific factors. In this world, a world that is conceivable, though highly unlikely, every person, every piece of land, every capital good, would necessarily be irrevocably committed to the production of one particular product. There would be no alternative uses of any good from one line of production to another. Rothbard III 330 (…) all factors are purely specific, [when] no good is used at different stages of the process or for different goods. >Production/Rothbard, >Production theory/Rothbard. Rothbard III 331 Income from production: Now (…) we must trace the direction of monetary income. This is a reverse one, from the consumers back to the producers. The consumers purchase the stock of a consumers' good at a price determined on the market, yielding the producers a certain income. Two of the crucial problems of production theory are the method by which the monetary income is allocated and the corollary problem of the pricing of the factors of production. First, let us consider only the "Iowest" stage of production, the stage that brings about thefinal product. In that Stage, numerous factors, all now assumed to be specific, co-operate in producing the consumers' good. There are three types of such factors: labor, original nature, and produced capital goods.⁽²⁾ Rothbard III 366 Costs of production/Rothbard: It must be understood that “factors of production” include every service that advances the product toward the stage of consumption. Thus, such services as “marketing costs,” advertising, etc., are just as legitimately productive services as any other factors.⁽³⁾ Rothbard III 332 Incom from production: (…) it is clear that, since only factors of production may obtain income from the consumer, the price of the consumers' good - i.e., the income from the consumers' good, equals the sum of the prices accruingto the producing factors, i.e., the income accruing to the factors. Capital good: It is clear that, conceptually, no one, in the last analysis, receives a return as the owner of a capital good. Since every capital good analytically resolves itself into original nature-given and labor factors, it is evident that no money could accrue to the owner of a capital good. Rothbard III 336 Income: (…) the income from sale of a capital good equals the income accruing to the factors of its production. Rothbard III 337 Time: It is obvious that the production process takes time, and the more complex the production process the more time must be taken. During this time, all the factors have had to work without earning any remuneration; they have had to work only in expectation offuture income. Their income is received only at a much later date. Secification: The income that would be earned by the factors, in a world of purely specific factors, depends entirely on consumer demand for the particular final product. >Costs/Rothbard, >Costs of production/Rothbard. Rothbard III 365 Cumulation: Suppose, for example, that a certain machine, containing two necessary parts, can be used in several fields of production. The two parts, however, must always be combined in use in a certain fixed proportion. Suppose that two (or more) individuals owned these two parts, i.e., two different individuals produced the different parts by their labor and land. The combined machine will be sold to, or used in, that line of production where it will yield the highest monetary income. But the price that will be established for that machine will necessarily be a cumulative price so far as the two factors - the two parts – are concerned. The price of each part and the allocation of the income to the two owners must be decided by a process of bargaining. Economics cannot here determine separate prices. This is true because the proportions between the two are always the same, even though the combined product can be used in several different ways.⁽⁴⁾ Rothbard III 373 Capital: It is already clear that the old classical trinity of “land, labor, and capital” earning “wages, rents, and interest” must be drastically modified. It is not true that capital is an independent productive factor or that it earns interest for its owner, in the same way that land and labor earn income for their owners. Land/labour: land and labor are not homogeneous factors within themselves, but simply categories of types of uniquely varying factors. Each land and each labor factor, then, has its own physical features, its own power to serve in production; each, therefore, receives its own income from production (…). Rothbard III 474 Factors of production: A factor will always be employed in a production process in such a way that it is in a region of declining APP (average physical product) and declining but positive MPP (marginal physical product). >Returns to scale/Rothbard, >Factor market/Rothbard, >Marginal product/Rothbard. Rothbard III 483 Factors of production/production structure/land/Frank H. Knight/Rothbard: If we base our approach on the present, must we not follow the Knightians in scrapping the production-structure analysis? A particular point of contention is the dividing line between land and capital goods. The Knightians, in scoffing at the idea of tracing periods of production back through the centuries, scrap the land concept altogether and include land as simply a part of capital goods. This change, of course, completely alters production theory. KnightVsBöhm-Bawerk/Rothbard: The Knightians point correctly, for example, to the fact that present-day land has many varieties and amounts of past labor “mixed” with it: canals have been dug, forests cleared, basic improvements have been made in the soil, etc. They assert that practically nothing is pure “land” anymore and therefore that the concept has become an empty one. RothbardVsKnight/MisesVsKnight: As Mises has shown, however, we can revise Böhm-Bawerk’s theory and still retain the vital distinction between land and capital goods. We do not have to throw out, as do the Knightians, the land baby with the average-period-of-production bathwater. We can, instead, reformulate the concept of “land.” >Land/Mises. 1. The literature in economics has been immeasurably confused by writers on production theory who deal with problems in terms oftechnology rather than valuation. For an excellent article on this problem, cf. Lionel Robbins, "Remarks upon Certain Aspects of the Theory of Costs," Economic Journal, March, 1934, pp. 1 - 18. 2. (…) this does not signify adoption of the old classical fallacy that treated each of these groups of factors as homogeneous. Clearly, they are heterogeneous and for pricing purposes and in human action are treated as such. Only the same good, homogeneous for human valuation, is treated as a common "factor," and all factors are treated alike - for their contribution to revenue - by producers. The categories "land, labor, and capital goods" are essential, however, for a deeper analysis of production problems, in particular the analysis ofvarious income returns and of the relation of time to production. 3. The fallacy in the spurious distinction between “production costs” and “selling costs” has been definitely demonstrated by Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. p. 319. 4. See Mises, Human Action, p. 336.	Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Labour	Welfare Economics	Gaus I 218 Labour/work/welfare state/Welfare economics/Moon: the argument about the necessity for effective functioning, as opposed simply to having access to resources, has been most heated in the area of work. Cf. >Welfare state/Welfare economics, >Welfare state/Political philosophy. If democratic citizenship requires that all be enabled to participate fully in society, then people must have not only certain resources, but also certain capacities, skills, and dispositions. Gaus I 219 One can acknowledge that people rely upon 'welfare' because their options are so limited, and so their condition represents an indictment of the society rather than the individuals concerned, but the fact remains that receipt of social assistance does not enable one to attain full citizenship or membership in society. It simply sustains one in a marginalized condition. Social inclusion requires more than receiving benefits. Lawrence Mead: this line of argument has been advanced by a number of 'conservative' critics of the welfare state. Lawrence Mead (1992)⁽¹⁾, for example, argues that the character of poverty at least in America has changed in the past several decades, and that the social exclusion represented by poverty reflects the inability of poor people to act as rational agents in pursuit even of their own interests.* >Labour/Lawrence Mead. Nikolas Rose: Nikolas Rose has pointed out that the emphasis on paid employment is not a monopoly of the right: 'From the "social democratic left", too, work [is] now seen as the [principal] mode of inclusion, and absence from the labour market the most potent source of exclusion' (1999⁽²⁾, 163). David Harris: In some solidaristic accounts, the emphasis on work invokes an older language of duties. In Harris's account, for example, the duties correlative to our welfare rights are 'strict obligations' and may be enforced by 'coercion' (1987⁽³⁾: 161). Marshall: In this, [Harris] echoes Marshall, who looked beyond the social rights of citizenship to consider the duties of the enriched and inclusive model of citizenship he advocated, including 'the duty to work', which he thought was of 'paramount importance'. Gotmann/Thompson: Similarly, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson offer a justification for enforcing work obligations that draws on the idea of citizenship, arguing that 'work should be seen as a necessary part of citizenship' (1996⁽⁴⁾: 293), because it is 'essential to social dignity'. Since 'earning is not only a means of making a living but also a mark of equal citizenship', paid employment has a 'political dimension' that 'provides a further justification for the obligation to work' (1996⁽⁴⁾: 302). Giddens: But this obligation to work is not, or is not merely, a demand to be made on the individual, one which he might reasonably wish to resist, for ultimately it is rooted in an ideal of social inclusion and active citizenship through which the individual's own interests and needs can be realized. Anthony Giddens sounds this theme in his call for 'the positive welfare society', in which 'the contract between individual and government shifts, since autonomy and the development of self - the medium of expanding individual responsibility become the prime focus' (1998⁽⁵⁾: 128). Nikolas Rose: (...) the contemporary 'organization of freedom' views individuals as best able to 'fulfil their political obligations in relation to the wealth, health and happiness of the nation not when they are bound into relations of dependency and obligation, but when they seek to fulfil themselves as free individuals', which depends 'upon the activation of the powers of the citizen' (1999⁽²⁾: 166). * It should be noted that Mead would reject the charactenzation of his position as 'conservative', arguing that at least in America the conservative position shares the liberal assumption that the poor are 'competent', and believes that the problem of poverty is caused by the way in which welfare programmes distort the incentives poor people face. The solution, then, is not to reform the poor, but to abolish welfare programmes. No doubt this view reflects the thinking of some conservatives, but other self-identified conservatives do view the issue in terms similar to Mead's. 1. Mead, Lawrence M. (1992) The New Politics of Poverty. New York: Basic. 2. Rose, Nikolas (1999) Powers of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge Umversity Press. 3. Harris, David (1987) Justifying State Welfare. Oxford: Blackwell. 4. Gutmann, Amy and Dennis Thompson (1996) Democracy and Disagreement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 5. Giddens, Anthony (1998) The Third way: The Renewal of Social Democracy. Cambridge: Polity. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Mereology	Simons	I 23 Mereology/Simons: mereology has operators instead of quantifiers (of PL). Operators take a Term N and form a new term N (a noun), e.g "ov" overlapper of "pt" "part-of", "ex" outsider of-complex terms: e.g. instead PL: "binary product of () and ()", the following is easier: "(Bpr (,))". Mereology: "Sm" "sum-of", "Pr": "Product-of". Plural Designation/mereology: "Sum of the squares" instead PL: "Sum of x such that x is a square. >Parts, >Part-of-relation. I 176f Mereological Consistency: e.g. wine in a specific bottle stops being this when poured. Mereological variability: e.g. water in the river Salzach: is "the same water with differences in its entirety". Mass Terms: mass terms tend to consistency because we are referring with terms of constancy to change. Material things are mereological variable: they can gain and lose parts. Pro: Aristotle, Locke, >Aristotle, >J. Locke, Vs: Leibniz, Hume, Reid, Chisholm. >Th. Reid, >G.W. Leibniz, >D. Hume, >R. Chisholm. >Essentialism, >Essence. I 190 Mereological Consistency/succession/Chisholm: mereological variable objects are only logical structures made of mereological constant objects (entia per se). The relation of succession depends on the type of object (e.g. table or cat). I 209 Continuity/Simons: continuity is stricter than mereological consistency: the hair must exist continuously, so that the old hairstyle can be restored. >Continuity, >Consistency. I 278 Mereology/science/practice/Simons: most of the objects of the natural sciences e.g. stars, planets, organisms or volcanoes are such that they are both: natural objects or whole and at the same time mereological variable. This corresponds to a middle path between essentialism and arbitrary or conventional parts. >Essentialism, >Conventions, >Necessary part.	Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Modalities	Simons	I 253 Mereology/modal/modality/Simons: we need modality in the mereology. We also need a definition of "necessary part" and a modal definition of "sum" (because it is less intuitive than "organism"). Dependence: a) ontological dependence: an object cannot exist without another existing, b) functional dependence: functional dependence consists between characteristics of objects which form a whole. >Functional dependence, >Ontological dependence, >Dependence. I 264 Modal Part/Simons: e.g. a class of counterparts might be considered a whole with different modal components. >Counterparts. Modal Parts: modal parts are possible in various possible worlds. >Parts, >Cross world identity. I 268 Modality/metaphysics/metaphysical/nature/necessity/Simons: a given atom could not have other particles. They are essential parts (components). On the other hand: the given particles could have belonged to another atom. It is not essential for them to be part of this atom, i.e. to be "given". >Essential parts.	Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Ontological Dependence	Simons	Chisholm II 172 Ontological Dependence/Simons: if a part cannot exist without the other (weak foundation): everything is necessarily strongly founded in itself and each necessarily existing entity. Each necessary nonexistent is a strong foundation in everything. Instead: foundation: in addition: a does not equal b and b is not necessarily exisiting. II 173 Strong foundation: if a is a moment of b: a and b may not be identical, b is then not necessary, e.g. border. Moment: e.g. events are moments of the objects they involve: e.g. handshake of persons (not without them, but not vice versa). II 174 Complexes are not moments of their atoms (which are their necessary parts). Complexes themselves are moments of nothing (because of their strong independence). >Foundation/Simons, >Complex/Simons, >Dependence/Simons.	Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Sufficiency	Mackie	Schurz I 121 Cause/Causality/INUS Thesis/Mackie/Schurz: (Mackie 1975)⁽¹⁾ Def Sufficiency/Mackie: Ax is called (nomologically) sufficient condition for Bx, gdw. (x)(Ax > Bx) is a true law-like proposition. I 122 Def Cause/INUS/Mackie: Cause is a necessary but not (necessarily) sufficient conjunctive part of a sufficient but not (necessarily) necessary condition for effect. INUS: insufficient but necessary part of an unnecressary but sufficient condition. Causal relation/Mackie: for its characterization, however, INUS alone is not sufficient. >Causality, >Causal relation. 1. Mackie, J. L. (1975). "Causes and Conditions", In: Sosa, E. (ed.):Causation and Conditionals, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 15-38.	Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006
Welfare State	Welfare Economics	Gaus I 218 Welfare state/Welfare economics/Moon: In spite of the importance of functioning as opposed to possessing, most evaluations of welfare state performance focus on what people have, rather than on what they can do. Rothstein: One common measure, for example, is 'percentage of poor households lifted out of poverty as a result of taxes and transfers', where poverty is defined as having an income below 50 percent of adjusted median household income of the country in which one lives (Rothstein, 1998(1): 183—4). But if the objective of the welfare state is to enable citizens to participate effectively, this measure is problematic because income, or income alone, does not provide the capability to achieve many of the most important functionings. Susan Mayer: In a recent study aptly titled What Money Can Buy (1997⁽²⁾), Susan Mayer has examined the 'functionings' of children, adolescents, and young adults, and correlated them with family income. Work: The argument about the necessity for effective functioning, as opposed simply to having access to resources, has been most heated in the area of work. If democratic citizenship requires that all be enabled to participate fully in society, then people must have not only certain resources, but also certain capacities, skills, and dispositions. Gaus I 219 One can acknowledge that people rely upon 'welfare' because their options are so limited, and so their condition represents an indictment of the society rather than the individuals concerned, but the fact remains that receipt of social assistance does not enable one to attain full citizenship or membership in society. It simply sustains one in a marginalized condition. Social inclusion requires more than receiving benefits. Lawrence Mead: this line of argument has been advanced by a number of 'conservative' critics of the welfare state. Lawrence Mead (1992)⁽³⁾, for example, argues that the character of poverty at least in America has changed in the past several decades, and that the social exclusion represented by poverty reflects the inability of poor people to act as rational agents in pursuit even of their own interests. * >Labour/Lawrence Mead. Nikolas Rose: Nikolas Rose has pointed out that the emphasis on paid employment is not a monopoly of the right: 'From the "social democratic left", too, work [is] now seen as the [principal] mode of inclusion, and absence from the labour market the most potent source of exclusion' (1999⁽⁴⁾, 163). David Harris: In some solidaristic accounts, the emphasis on work invokes an older language of duties. In Harris's account, for example, the duties correlative to our welfare rights are 'strict obligations' and may be enforced by 'coercion' (198⁷⁽⁵⁾: 161). Marshall: In this, [Harris] echoes Marshall, who looked beyond the social rights of citizenship to consider the duties of the enriched and inclusive model of citizenship he advocated, including 'the duty to work', which he thought was of 'paramount importance'. Gotmann/Thompson: Similarly, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson offer a justification for enforcing work obligations that draws on the idea of citizenship, arguing that 'work should be seen as a necessary part of citizenship' (1996⁽⁶⁾: 293), because it is 'essential to social dignity'. Since 'earning is not only a means of making a living but also a mark of equal citizenship', paid employment has a 'political dimension' that 'provides a further justification for the obligation to work' (1996⁽⁶⁾: 302). * It should be noted that Mead would reject the charactenzation of his position as 'conservative', arguing that at least in America the conservative position shares the liberal assumption that the poor are 'competent', and believes that the problem of poverty is caused by the way in which welfare programmes distort the incentives poor people face. The solution, then, is not to reform the poor, but to abolish welfare programmes. No doubt this view reflects the thinking of some conservatives, but other self-identified conservatives do view the issue in terms similar to Mead's. 1. Rothstein, Bo (1998) Just Institutions Matter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Mayer, Susan (1997) What Money Can 't Buy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 3. Mead, Lawrence M. (1992) The New Politics of Poverty. New York: Basic. 4. Rose, Nikolas (1999) Powers of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge Umversity Press. 5. Harris, David (1987) Justifying State Welfare. Oxford: Blackwell. 6. Gutmann, Amy and Dennis Thompson (1996) Democracy and Disagreement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.

Disputed term/author/ism	Author	Entry	Reference
cause	Mackie, J.L.	Schurz I 121 Ursache/Kausalität/INUS-Thesis/Mackie/Schurz: (Mackie 1975) Def hinreichend/Mackie: Ax heißt (nomologisch) hinreichende Bedingung für Bx, iff (x)(Ax > Bx) ein wahrer gesetzesartiger Satz ist. I 122 Def Ursache/INUS/Mackie: ist ein notwendiger aber nicht (unbedingt) hinreichender konjunktiver Teil einer hinreichenden aber nicht (unbedingt) notwendigen Bedingung für die Wirkung. INUS: insufficient but necessary part of an unnecressary but sufficient condition). Kausalbeziehung/Mackie: zu ihrer Charakterisierung ist INUS allein allerdings noch nicht hinreichend.	Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006