Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 90 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| A priori | Mill | Höffe I 346 A priori/Mill/Höffe: MillVsKant: According to Mill's empiricism, in contrast to Kant and German idealism, there is no such thing as a pre-empirical insight, but only an empirical, i.e. a posteriori insight. Even mathematics and logic should be based on experience and its inductive generalizations. However, because of the extraordinarily large amount of evidence for mathematical statements, the appearance of necessity is said to arise. >Mathematics, >Necessity, >Empiricism, >Evidence, Logic. Höffe I 347 A priori thinking also supports false doctrines and poor institutions. Practice/Theory: With this argument, Mill puts all theoretical philosophy, including the theory of science and epistemology, at the service of practice. One can speak here of epistemological liberalism. >Practise, >Liberalism. Politics: In any case, the uncompromising primacy of the empirical standpoint acquires a political meaning, the rejection of the a priori a therapeutic, or more precisely, preventive purpose. |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Mill Ja I James Mill Commerce Defended: An Answer to the Arguments by which Mr. Spence, Mr. Cobbett, and Others, Have Attempted to Prove that Commerce is Not a Source of National Wealth 1808 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Aesthetic Difference | Gadamer | I 90 Aesthetic Difference/Gadamer: [Gadamer speaks of aesthetic distinction, not of difference.] What we call a work of art and experience aesthetically is based (...) on an achievement of abstraction. By disregarding everything in which a work is rooted as its original context of life (all religious or profane functions in which it stood and in which it had its meaning), it becomes visible as the "pure work of art". The abstraction of the aesthetic consciousness achieves in this respect a positive achievement for itself. It lets us see and be for ourselves what the pure work of art is. I call this, its achievement, the "aesthetic difference". >Abstraction, >Distinctions, >Art, >Art works, >Aesthetics. I 95 In [the works of art], [the aesthetic difference] distinguishes the aesthetic from the non-aesthetic references in which it is placed, just as we can speak of someone behaving aesthetically outside the experience of art. The problem of aesthetics is thus restored to its full breadth and the transcendental question is restored, which had been abandoned by the standpoint of art and its separation of beautiful appearance and harsh reality. The aesthetic experience is indifferent to whether its object is real or not, whether the scene is the stage or life. I 92 The "aesthetic difference" which it operates as aesthetic consciousness also creates its own external existence. It proves its productivity by preparing its sites for simultaneity, the "universal library" in the field of literature, the museum, the theatre, the concert hall etc. I 93 Thus, through "aesthetic difference", the work loses its place and the world to which it belongs by becoming part of the aesthetic consciousness. This corresponds on the other hand to the fact that the artist also loses his or her place in the world. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Aesthetic Experience | Gadamer | I 75 Aesthetic Experience/Art Experience/Experience/Gadamer: The aesthetic experience is not just one kind of experience among others, but represents the essence of experience in general. Just as the work of art as such is a world of its own, so the aesthetic experience as an experience is removed from all contexts of reality. It seems to be the very purpose of the work of art to become an aesthetic experience (...). I 76 In the experience of art, a wealth of meaning is present that does not belong to this particular content or object alone, but rather represents the meaning of life as a whole. An aesthetic experience always contains the experience of an infinite whole. Its meaning is an infinite one precisely because it does not unite with others to form the unity of an open process of experience, but directly represents the whole. >Experience/Gadamer. On the limit of the art of experience: >Allegory/Gadamer. I 102 Aesthetic Experience/Gadamer: Insofar as we encounter the work of art in the world and the world in the individual work of art, this does not remain an alien universe which enchants us for time and moment. Rather, we learn to understand ourselves in it, and that means we eliminate the discontinuity and punctuality of the experience in the continuity of our existence. It is therefore necessary to take a standpoint on beauty and art that does not pretend to be immediate, but corresponds to the historical reality of the human being. I 103 The appeal to the immediacy, to the genius of the moment, to the significance cannot exist before the claim of human existence to continuity and unity of self-understanding. The experience of art must not be forced into the noncommittal nature of the aesthetic consciousness. Cf. >Erlebniskunst/Gadamer. This negative insight means something positive: art is insight and the experience of the work of art makes this insight part of it. I 105 The experience of art should not be falsified into a possession of aesthetic education and thus neutralized in its own claim. (...) therein [lies] a far-reaching hermeneutical consequence, insofar as all encounter with the language of art is an encounter with an unfinished event and itself a part of this event. This is what is to be accentuated against the aesthetic consciousness and its neutralization of the question of truth. >Aesthetic Consciousness, >Truth of Art/Gadamer. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Aesthetics | Fichte | Gadamer I 63 Aesthetics/Schlegel/Fichte/Gadamer: Kant's justification of aesthetics on the concept of taste cannot (...) be entirely satisfactory. It is far more obvious to use the concept of genius, which Kant developed as a transcendental principle for artistic beauty, as a universal aesthetic principle. Far better than the concept of taste, it fulfils the demand to be invariant to the changes of time. The Kantian phrase "beautiful art Gadamer I 64 is art of genius" becomes (...) the transcendental principle for aesthetics in general. In the end, aesthetics is only possible as a philosophy of art. Schlegel/Fichte/Gadamer: It was German idealism that drew this conclusion. Just as Fichte and Schelling otherwise followed Kant's doctrine of the transcendental imagination, they also made a new use of this term for aesthetics. In contrast to Kant, the standpoint of art as that of unconsciously ingenious production thus became all-embracing and also encompassed nature, which is understood as a product of the mind(1). But this has shifted the foundations of aesthetics. Like the concept of taste, the concept of natural beauty is devalued or understood differently. The moral interest in the beauty of nature, which Kant had described so enthusiastically, now takes second place to the self-encounter of man in the works of art. >Beauty of nature/Hegel. Gadamer I 65 Aesthetics/Fichte/Gadamer: (...) Kant's essential concern to provide an autonomous foundation of aesthetics, freed from the criterion of the concept, and not to pose the question of truth in the field of art at all, but to base the aesthetic judgement on the subjective a priori of the attitude to life, the harmony of our capacity for "knowledge in general", which constitutes the common essence of taste and genius, [came] to meet the irrationalism and the cult of genius of the 19th century. Genius/Fichte: Kant's doctrine of the "increase of the feeling of life" in aesthetic pleasure promoted the development of the term "genius" into a comprehensive concept of life, especially after Fichte raised the standpoint of genius and ingenious production to a universal transcendental standpoint. Thus it came about that Neo-Kantianism, in that it sought to derive all representational validity from transcendental subjectivity, used the term Gadamer I 66 experience as the actual fact of consciousness.(2) >Experience/Gadamer. 1. To what extent the change that occurred between Kant and his successors, which I try to characterize by the formula "standpoint of art", has obscured the universal phenomenon of the beautiful, can be taught by the first Schlegelfragment (Friedrich Schlegel, Fragmente, From the Lyceums 1797): "One calls many artists who are actually works of art of nature". This turn of phrase echoes Kant's justification of the concept of genius in terms of the favor of nature, but it is so little appreciated that it becomes, on the contrary, an objection against an artistic nature that is too little aware of itself. 2. It is the merit of Luigi Pareyson's 1952 book, L'estetica del idealismo tedesco, to have highlighted the importance of spruce for the idealist aesthetic. Accordingly, the secret influence of Fichte and Hegel could be recognized within the whole of the Neo-Kantianism. |
Fichte I Johann Gottlieb Fichte Zur Politik, Moral und Philosophie der Geschichte Berlin 1971 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Aesthetics | Schlegel | Gadamer I 63 Aesthetics/Schlegel/Fichte/Gadamer: Kant's justification of aesthetics on the concept of taste cannot (...) be entirely satisfactory. It is far more obvious to use the concept of genius, which Kant developed as a transcendental principle for artistic beauty, as a universal aesthetic principle. Far better than the concept of taste, it fulfils the demand to be invariant to the changes of time. The Kantian phrase "beautiful art Gadamer I 64 is art of genius" becomes (...) the transcendental principle for aesthetics in general. In the end, aesthetics is only possible as a philosophy of art. Schlegel/Fichte/Gadamer: It was German idealism that drew this conclusion. Just as Fichte and Schelling otherwise followed Kant's doctrine of the transcendental imagination, they also made a new use of this term for aesthetics. In contrast to Kant, the standpoint of art as that of unconsciously ingenious production thus became all-embracing and also encompassed nature, which is understood as a product of the mind(1). But this has shifted the foundations of aesthetics. Like the concept of taste, the concept of natural beauty is devalued or understood differently. The moral interest in the beauty of nature, which Kant had described so enthusiastically, now takes second place to the self-encounter of man in the works of art. >Natural Beauty/Hegel. 1. To what extent the change that occurred between Kant and his successors, which I try to characterize by the formula "standpoint of art", has obscured the universal phenomenon of the beautiful, can be taught by the first Schlegelfragment (Friedrich Schlegel, Fragmente, From the Lyceums 1797): "One calls many artists who are actually works of art of nature". This turn of phrase echoes Kant's justification of the concept of genius in terms of the favor of nature, but it is so little appreciated that it becomes, on the contrary, an objection against an artistic nature that is too little aware of itself. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Art | Schiller | Gadamer I 61 Art/Schiller/Gadamer: The grounding of aesthetic judgement on an a priori of subjectivity was to take on a whole new meaning when the meaning of transcendental philosophical reflection changed among Kant's successors. When the metaphysical background that justified Kant's preference for natural beauty and bound the concept of genius back to nature no longer exists, the problem of art arises in a new sense. >Subjectivity, >Aesthetics, >Aesthetic perception, >Aesthetic experience, >Aesthetic consciousness. Taste/Judgement/SchillerVsKant: The very way in which Schiller took up Kant's "Critique of Judgement" and used the full force of his moral-pedagogical temperament for the idea of an "aesthetic education" made the standpoint of art take precedence over the Kantian standpoint of taste and judgement. From the standpoint of art, the relationship between the Kantian concepts of taste and genius is now shifting from the ground up. The more comprehensive concept had to become that of genius - conversely, the phenomenon of taste had to devalue itself. >Genius/Kant, >Taste/Kant. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Artists | Gadamer | I 91 Artist/artistry/Gadamer: What we call a work of art and experience aesthetically is based (...) on a performance of abstraction. By disregarding everything in which a work is rooted as its original context of life, all religious or profane functions in which it stood and in which it had its meaning, it becomes visible as the "pure work of art". >Artworks, >Abstraction, >Aesthetic Consciousness, >Aesthetic Difference. I 92 The "aesthetic distinction" which it operates as aesthetic consciousness also creates its own external existence. It proves its productivity by preparing its sites for simultaneity, the "universal library" in the field of literature, the museum, the standing theatre, the concert hall etc. I 93 Thus, through "aesthetic distinction", the work loses its place and the world to which it belongs by becoming part of the aesthetic consciousness. This corresponds on the other hand to the fact that the artist also loses his/her place in the world. Commissioned art: This can be seen in the discrediting of what is called commissioned art. In the age of public consciousness dominated by the art of experience, it is necessary to remember explicitly that creation out of free inspiration without a commission, a given theme and opportunity was once the exception in artistic creation (...). The free artist creates without a commission. He/She seems to be distinguished by the complete independence of his/her creative work, and thus he/she acquires socially the characteristic features of an outsider whose way of life is not measured by the standards of public morality. At the same time, however, the artist who is as "free as a bird or a fish" is burdened with a vocation that makes him/her an ambiguous figure. For an educational society that has fallen out of its religious traditions immediately expects more from art than corresponds to the aesthetic consciousness on the "standpoint of art". The romantic demand of a new mythology, as expressed by F. Schlegel, Schelling, Hölderlin and the young Hegel(1) but also, for example, in the artistic experiments and reflections of the painter Runge, gives the artist and his/her task in the world the consciousness of a new consecration. >Aesthetics/Hegel. I 94 This claim has since determined the tragedy of the artist in the world. For the redemption that the claim finds is always only a particular one. But in reality this means its refutation. The experimental search for new symbols or a new "saga" that unites all may indeed gather an audience around itself and create a community. But since every artist finds his/her community in this way, the particularity of such community formation only testifies to the decay that has taken place. It is only the universal form of aesthetic education that unites everyone. The actual process of education, i.e. the elevation to the generality, has here as it were disintegrated into itself. >Aesthetic Consciousness/Gadamer, cf. >Truth of Art/Gadamer. I 98 Artists/Art/Gadamer: In order to do justice to art, aesthetics must go beyond itself and reveal the "purity" of the aesthetic. With Kant, the concept of genius possessed the transcendental function by which the concept of art was founded. >Genius/Kant. Problem: But is the concept of genius really suitable for this? Even the consciousness of the artist of today seems to contradict this. A kind of twilight of genius has arrived. The idea of the somnambulistic unconsciousness with which the genius creates (...) seems to us today a false romance. A poet such as Paul Valéry set it against the standards of an artist and engineer such as Leonardo da Vinci, in whose only genius craftsmanship, mechanical invention and artistic I 99 genius were still indistinguishable.(2) >Genius/Gadamer. 1. Cf. Fr. Rosenzweig, Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus, 1917, S. 7. (Cf. for this the newer editions by R. Bubner in the Hegel-Studies, Beiheft 9 (1973), S. 261—65 and C. Jamme and H. Schneider, Mythologie der Vernunft, Frankfurt 1984, S. 11-14.) 1. Paul Valéry, Introduction ä la méthode de Léonard de Vinci et son annotation marginale, Variété I. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Background | Habermas | IV 191 Background/Habermas: is a knowledge inventory of unproblematic beliefs that are shared and assumed to be guaranteed, from which the context of communication processes forms, in which the participants use proven situation definitions or negotiate new ones. >Conventions, >LIfeworld. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas. The participants of communication find the connection between objective, social and subjective world, which they are facing, already interpreted in terms of content. If they overwrite the horizon of a given situation, they could not step into the void; they immediately find themselves in another, now updated, but preinterpreted area of the culturally self-evident. New situations also emerge from a lifeworld built on an ever-trusted inventory of cultural knowledge. The actors cannot take an extramundane position in relation to this lifeworld, just as they cannot take an extramundane position in relation to language as the medium of the processes of communication through which the lifeworld is maintained. >Standpoint, >Observation, >Perspective. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Beauty | Gadamer | I 481 Beauty/Gadamer: Philosophy: The concept of the beautiful, which in the eighteenth century had to share the central position within the aesthetic problem with that of the sublime and which was to be completely eliminated in the course of the nineteenth century by the aesthetic criticism of classicism, was, as is well known, once a universal metaphysical concept and had a function within metaphysics, i.e. the general doctrine of being, that was by no means limited to the aesthetic in the narrower sense. >Metaphysics, >Aesthetics, >Being. Hermeneutics/Gadamer: It will be shown that this old concept of beauty can also serve a comprehensive hermeneutics, as it has grown for us from the criticism of the methodologism of the intellectual world. >Hermeneutics. Etymology: The Greek word for the German "schön" is kalon. Admittedly, there are no complete equivalents in German, even if we use the mediating pulchrum. But Greek thought has exercised a certain determination on the history of meaning of the German word, so that essential moments of meaning are common to both words. With the addition "beautiful" we distinguish from what we call technology, i.e. from "mechanical" arts that produce useful things. It is similar with word combinations such as: beautiful morality, beautiful literature, beautifully intellectual/belletristic (German: "schöngeistig") and so on. In all these uses, the word is in a similar contrast to the Greek kalon to the term chresimon. Everything that does not belong to the necessities of life, but the how of life that concerns eu zen, i.e. everything that the Greeks understood by Paideia, is called kalon. The beautiful things are those whose value for themselves is obvious. One cannot ask about the purpose they serve. I 483 Nature/Beauty/Gadamer: As one can see, such a determination of beauty is a universal ontological one. Nature and art do not form any kind of contrast here, which of course means that the primacy of nature is undisputed, especially with regard to beauty. Art may perceive within the "gestalt" whole of the natural order recessed possibilities of artistic design and in this way perfect the beautiful nature of the order of being. But that does not mean at all that "beauty" is primarily to be found in art. As long as the order of being is understood as being divine itself or as God's creation - and the latter is valid up to the 18th century - also the exceptional case of art can only be understood within the horizon of this order of being. (...) it is only with the 19th century that the aesthetic problem (...) is transferred to the standpoint of art (...). (...) this [is] based on a metaphysical process (...). Such a transfer to the standpoint of art ontologically presupposes a shapelessly conceived mass of being or a mass of being governed by mechanical laws. The human artistic spirit, which forms useful things from mechanical construction, will ultimately understand all that is beautiful from the work of its own spirit. I 484 Order/Measurement/Rationality/Aesthetics/KantVsSubjectivism: As unsatisfactory as the development towards subjectivism initiated by Kant seemed to us in the newer aesthetic, Kant has convincingly demonstrated the untenability of aesthetic rationalism. >Aesthetics/Kant. GadamerVsKant: It is just not right to base the metaphysics of beauty solely on the ontology of measure and the teleological order of being, on which the classical appearance of rationalist rule aesthetics ultimately refers to. The metaphysics of the beautiful does not actually coincide with such an application of aesthetic rationalism. Rather, the decline to Plato reveals a quite different side to the phenomenon of the beautiful, and it is this side that interests us in our hermeneutical questioning. >Beauty/Plato. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Behavior | Armstrong | Avramides I 151 Behavior/Armstrong/Avramides: Behavior first has to mean: physical behavior. - Otherwise the concept is circular. In contrast: "actual behavior"/Armstrong: actual behavior also refers to the mind. >Mind, >Thinking, >Thoughts, >Dispositions, >Intentionality. Avramides I 157 Actual behavior is interpreted behavior that can be seen only by a subject in other subjects. >Subjects, >Interpretation. Avramides: Interpreted behavior is a per third-person viewpoint. It is no God's standpoint or neurophysiology. I 159 Then the mind cannot be only contingently connected to behavior. A subject can never be separated from his experience. However, the mind is without significant reference to behavior. >Experience, >Reference. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Bounded Rationality | Jolls | Parisi I 60 Bounded rationality/Jolls: Many important questions in behavioral law and economics today turn on competing conceptions of bounded rationality. Cf. >Bounded rationality/Simon. Economic analysis: Normative analysis of legal policy tends to be more complex when nonoptimizing decision rules are added to Simon’s original model of nonomniscience. For instance, a legal rule such as New York City’s now-defunct “soda law,” which restricted the sale of sugary drinks in servings above sixteen ounces, might have been an attempt to address the reflexive ordering of supersized sugary drinks simply because they (say) offered reasonable “bang for the buck” on a per-ounce basis—but from a normative standpoint it is difficult to be certain that such reflexive purchasing is truly a “failing” in need of legal “correction.” Nonomniscience: A simple error in judgment about the caloric content of supersized sugary drinks, by contrast, is amenable both to empirical confirmation - do people entering an eating establishment know approximately how many calories a supersized sugary drink has? - and to legal responses designed simply to reduce the degree of nonomniscience (though of course the costs of any such response must also be considered). For purposes both of analytic clarity and of normative debate, distinguishing between the nonomniscience and nonoptimization aspects of Simon’s bounded rationality is tremendously valuable (...).* Parisi I 62 Nonoptimization: “Nonoptimization” (...) will refer to decision-making that is not in accordance with the optimizing behavior postulated by expected utility theory. „Satisficing“/Herbert Simon/example: As an (...) illustration of the Simonian notion of an individual “satisficing” rather than choosing the option that is “optimal,” imagine an individual assessing whether a price offered for property (...) is at or above a level considered to be “acceptable.” The individual, Simon writes, “may regard $15,000 as an ‘acceptable’ price, anything over this amount as ‘satisfactory,’ anything less as ‘unsatisfactory’ ” and, accordingly, may accept the first offer received at or above $15,000 regardless of whether such acceptance is “optimal” (Simon, 1955(4), p. 104). >Optimism/Bibas, >Loss aversion/Bibas, >Plea bargain/Bibas, >Non-omniscience/Jolls, >Availability heuristic/Economic theories, >Risk perception/Economic theories. *Behavioral Economics: Behavioral economics focuses on bounded willpower and bounded self- interest alongside bounded rationality (Thaler, 1996(1). Bounded rationality has been particularly prominent within behavioral law and economics, however (...). For description of behavioral law and economics work on bounded willpower and bounded self-interest, see Jolls (2007(2), 2011(3)). >Bounded rationality/Simon, >Bounded rationality/economic theories. 1. Thaler, Richard H. (1996). “Doing Economics Without Homo Economicus,” in Steven G. Medema and Warren J. Samuels, eds., Foundations of Research in Economics: How Do Economists Do Economics?, 227–237. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. 2. Jolls, Christine (2007). “Behavioral Law and Economics,” available at 3. Jolls, Christine (2011). Behavioral Economics and the Law. Boston, MA and Delft: now Publishers. 4. Simon, Herbert A. (1955). “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 69: 99–118. Jolls, Christine, „Bounded Rationality, Behavioral Economics, and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Business Failure | Schumpeter | Sobel I 11 Business Failure/Schumpeter/Sobel/Clemens: A growing, vibrant economy depends not only on entrepreneurs discovering, evaluating, and exploiting opportunities to create new goods and services, but also on the speed at which ideas are labeled as successes or failures by the profit-and-loss system. From an economic standpoint then, business failure has a positive side; it gets rid of bad combinations of resources, freeing up those resources to be used in other endeavours, and provides information and signals to other entrepreneurs about that losing combination. A vibrant economy will have both a large number of new business start-ups and a large number of business failures. In an economy where all entrepreneurs - even those with crazy ideas for new pizza combinations - can try them out in the marketplace, there will be a lot of mistakes. However, Schumpeter points out that this process is not one of entrepreneurs simply chasing a target created by a given set of consumer wants. Entrepreneurs also play an important role in anticipating and driving those wants. >Innovation/Schumpeter, >Entrepreneurship/Schumpeter. |
EconSchum I Joseph A. Schumpeter The Theory of Economic Development An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Cambridge/MA 1934 German Edition: Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Leipzig 1912 Sobel I Russell S. Sobel Jason Clemens The Essential Joseph Schumpeter Vancouver 2020 |
| Cartesianism | Avramides | I 107 ff Cartesianism/Asymmetry/Avramidis: the Cartesianism is an older tradition of deep epistemic asymmetry. >Terminology/Avramides. Mental objects are only accessible through first-person perspective. >First Person, >Priviledged acces. Other minds are only guessable through behavior. >Other minds. Then there is no superficial epistemic asymmetry. Important argument: ontological symmetry: the mental and the material are on the same level. >Levels/Order. This thesis is ot obliged to physicalism. >Physicalism. Variant of Cartesianism: one might even say the God standpoint could not recognize the intangible substance. Deep epistemic asymmetry/Avramides: if we could recognize the intangible substance, we could recognize foreign intentions without language. Cartesianism/Avramides: here: variant with divine access to the intangible. Cartesianism/Avramides:is not reductive! >Reduction, >Reductionism. I 110 AvramidesVsCartesianism: It is a mistake to proceed without observing behavior. >Behavior, >Understanding. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Cartesianism | Dilthey | Gadamer I 241 Cartesianism/Dilthey/Gadamer: [Dilthey was not able] to really record the consequence of his life-philosophical approach against the philosophy of reflection of idealism (...). Otherwise he would have had to recognize in the objection of relativism the one from which his own starting point of the immanence of knowledge in life just wanted to take away the basis. >Relativism/Dilthey, >Life/Dilthey, >Lebensphilosophie/Dilthey. This ambiguity has its final reason in an inner inconsistency of his thinking, the unresolved Cartesianism from which he takes his starting point. His epistemological reflections on the foundation of the humanities do not really coincide with his life-philosophical starting point. There is proof of this in his latest works. Dilthey demands from a philosophical foundation that it must extend to every area in which "consciousness has shaken off the authoritative and Gadamer I 242 seeks to arrive at valid knowledge through the standpoint of reflection and doubt"(1). Gadamer: Such a sentence seems to be a harmless statement about the nature of science and philosophy in modern times in general. The Cartesian echoes in it are not to be overheard. In truth, however, this sentence finds its application in a quite different sense, if Dilthey continues: "Everywhere life leads to reflections on what is set in it, reflection leads to doubt, and if life is to assert itself against this, then thinking can only end in valid knowledge"(2). Here it is no longer philosophical prejudices that should be overcome by an epistemological foundation in the style of Descartes, but here it is realities of life, the tradition of custom, religion and positive law, which are decomposed by reflection and need a new order. When Dilthey speaks here of knowledge and reflection, he does not mean the general immanence of knowledge in life, but a movement directed against life. 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften Vll, 6. 2. Ebenda. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Cinema | Flusser | I 189 Film/Cinema/Flusser: Films are manipulation of stories. This manipulation takes place during production. I 190 Cinemas are reminiscent of theatres, although they have a completely different structure: in the theatre there is a channel, in the cinema one of them falls onto the screen under numerous broadcast rays. The aspects that make the film so different from photography are not as much about sending as they are about receiving. They are illusions provoked by the sender to the receiver. The gesture of filming is different from that of the photographer. >Photography/Flusser. The photographer is constantly changing his location, while the historical ideologist defends his point of view. The core of the codification of the film is the processing with scissors and adhesive. >Code/Flusser. Unlike the camera, the film apparatus is designed to eliminate decisions. He describes circles, zooms, is the indecisive doubt coagulated to material. The operator does not suffer from his doubts, his doubt is a method of making the tape manipulable. >Doubt. The tape consists of a series of dubious points of view and the operator treats it to make a film, a story out of it. Strictly speaking, the standpoint of cinema is a "transhistorical" standpoint. What the operator has in front of him when he cuts and sticks is the "historical time". The film tape is the "pretext" which is recoded in the apparatus operator system. I 193 The operator can intervene in the event in a way that the transcendent God of Jews and Christians is not entitled to: he can reorganize the events. Cf. >Omnipotence, >God. In Aristotle's case, the God is still the motionless mover, the apparatus in which the operator stands above the story is a motionless narrator (the God of Kafka). >History, >Historiography, >Aristotle. I 194 There are two types of action in the film. The one of the actor supplying the raw material and the one of the operator handling this action. For him, the "actors" are not only actors but also illuminators, scriptwriters, etc. The essential thing about film codes is that they push the linear principle to its limits in order to let it get out of whack and show that linear time is a trompe l' oeuil. From the point of view of the new level of consciousness, the transformation of the acting mankind into marionettes seems to reveal the fact that acting people ("the committed ones") can be nothing more than marionettes, because "freedom" does not consist in acting within time, but in the interpretation of this action. >Action, >Time, >Past, >Present, >Future, >Decision. I 205 Film/Flusser: the cinema has a striking resemblance to Plato's cave. One of the very few places where we are still allowed to concentrate. That, and not the content, is what makes cinema the predominant "art" today: you can concentrate on the film. >Plato. I 206 The cinema is architecturally based on the Roman basilica and not on the theatre. In the present it has two heirs (avatars): the supermarket (profan) and the cinema (sacral). I 207 In the cinema, one sits on geometrically arranged and arithmetically numbered chairs (so Cartesian chairs). >Cartesianism. You do not go to the cinema to dream, but you buy the illusion of seeing tech pictures as if they were traditional pictures or texts. The receiver's playing along is semi-conscious, only mala fide it is believed in them. >Pictures, >Texts. |
Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 |
| Cognitivism/ Noncognitivism | Wright | I 261 Morality/ethics/McDowellVsNon-cognitivism: proceeds from a messy construction of ethical fact and objectivity. (Scylla). As if the moral facts existed independently of the evaluative standpoint.> Scylla: see >Necessity/Wright. >Metaphysical realism, >Facts, >Ethics, cf. >Emotivism, >Morality. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Communication | Luhmann | Baraldi I 89 Communication/Luhmann/GLU: specific operation of social systems: 1) Communication 2) Information 3) Understanding the difference between communication and information. Communication is not the same as information, it only happens when information is understood - information is a selection between what is said and unsaid. Understanding is selection between communication and information. >Understanding/Luhmann, >Information/Luhmann. Reese-Schäfer II 47 Society/Communication/Luhmann/Reese-Schäfer: Special case: only society operates with communication. - There is no communication outside of society. - Therefore, it is necessary closed. - This is the only system for which this is true. - Then no observer can take an outside standpoint. >Society/Luhmann, >Observation/Luhmann. AU Cass 13 Communication/Language/Karl Bühler/Luhmann: instead of "transmission model": - unity of three components 1) Information, what it is about 2) Communication 3) Understanding Communication already existed in antiquity. LuhmannVsSpeech Act Theory: is the idea that this triad could be dismantled into acts. - Karl Bühler: all of them are only functions. ((s) Function/(s): Is not an act.) >Speech act theory/Luhmann. AU Cass 13 Communication/LuhmannVsHabermas: communication does not serve the creation of consensus. - If that does not work, it is simply declared the norm and claimed "it was supposed to be like that." But we should not turn an impossibility into a standard. >Communication/Habermas. SchelskyVsHabermas: Does communication stop when this goal is reached? Solution/Luhmann: communication is not an act which would have to be brought under a standard - only communicating is action. Communication is open when viewed without additions like truth. - We can also say "no". - On the other hand, we do not have the opportunity to start all over again. Without any authority it is impossible.. - "No" does not terminate communication. Communication could only be terminated by misunderstanding. Communication ensues when"yes" and "no" are not yet decided. AU Cass 12 Speech act Theory/Language/Communication/LuhmannVsSpeech Act Theory: Language use is not an act. - You always need understanding, so it goes on. Action: would only be a release without understanding. LuhmannVsHabermas: therefore, no theory of communicative action is possible. >Communicative action, >Communication theory. Speech: here the receiver is initially excluded. He comes only later as a disciplining moment in the theory. - And as a subject. >Language/Luhmann, >Subject/Luhmann. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Baraldi I C. Baraldi, G.Corsi. E. Esposito GLU: Glossar zu Luhmanns Theorie sozialer Systeme Frankfurt 1997 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 |
| Conditioning | Psychological Theories | Corr I 355 Conditioning/Psychological Theories: Even if we assume that Eysenck’s (1957)(1) theory were correct, classical conditioning cannot account for the known phenomena of neurosis. As discussed by Corr (2008a)(2), the classical conditioning theory of neurosis assumes assumes that, as a result of the conditioned stimulus (CS) (e.g., hairy animal) and unconditioned stimulus (UCS) (e.g., pain of dog bite) getting paired, the CS comes to take on the eliciting properties of the UCS, such that, after conditioning and when presented alone, the CS produces a response (i.e., the conditioned response (CR), e.g., fear, and its associated behaviours) that resembles the unconditioned response (UCR) (e.g., pain, and its associated behaviours) elicited by the UCS. Problem: The CR (e.g., fear) does not substitute for the UCR (e.g., pain). In some crucial respects, the CR does not even resemble the UCR. For example, a pain UCS will elicit a wide variety of reactions (e.g., vocalization and behavioural excitement – recall the last time an object hit you hard!); but these reactions are quite different – in fact, opposite to – a CS signalling pain, which consists of a different range of behaviours (e.g., quietness and behavioural inhibition). >Conditioning/Eysenck, >Conditioning/Gray. 1. Eysenck, H. J. 1957. The dynamics of anxiety and hysteria. New York: Preger 2. Corr, P. J. 2008a. Reinforcement sensitivity theory (RST): Introduction, in P. J. Corr (ed). The reinforcement sensitivity theory of personality, pp. 1–43. Cambridge University Press Philip J. Corr, „ The Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory of Personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press Slater I 28 Conditioning/psychological theories: in the years since 1920 (Watson’s and Rayners Experiment “Little Albert”, Watson and Rayner 1920)(1) classical conditioning has been shown to be a complex operation that depends on many procedural nuances (Bouton, 2002(2); Field, 2006a(3)) and subject characteristics that qualify its effects (Craske, 2003)(4). >Experiment/Watson. Two of the more important procedural issues center around two characteristics thought to be associated with classical conditioning: namely, equipotentiality and extinction. Equipotentiality refers to the notion that any stimulus is able to become a conditioned stimulus, if it is associated with an unconditioned stimulus. This notion, of course, has not stood the test of time. For the criticisms of Watson’s and Rayner’s 1920 experiment. >VsWatson, >Conditioning/Watson, >Experiment/Watson, >Conditioning/Craske. Slater I 29 VsWatson: some early attempts to replicate conditioned emotional reactions in young children by other investigators were rather mixed, with some being successful (e.g., Jones, 1931)(5) whereas others were not (e.g., Bregman, 1934(6); Valentine, 1946(7)). Clearly, from a conceptual and theoretical standpoint, Watson and Rayner’s depiction of classical conditioning was simplistic and, assuming conditioning was produced, it may also have been fortuitous! 1. Watson, J. B., & Rayner, R. (1920). Conditioned emotional responses. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 3, 1–14. 2. Bouton, M. E., (2002). Context, ambiguity, and unlearning: Sources of relapse after behavioral extinction. Biological Psychiatry, 52, 976–986. 3. Field, A. P. (2006a). Is conditioning a useful framework for understanding the development and treatment of phobias? Clinical Psychology Review, 26, 857–875. 4. Craske, M. G. (2003). Origins of phobias and anxiety disorders. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science. 5. Jones, H. E. (1931). The conditioning of overt emotional responses. Journal of Educational Psychology, 22, 127–130. 6. Bregman, E. (1932). An attempt to modify the emotional attitudes of infants by the conditioned response technique. Journal of Genetic Psychology 45: 169-196 7. Valentine, C. W. (1946). The psychology of early childhood (3rd edn). London: Meuthen. Thomas H. Ollendick, Thomas M. Sherman, Peter Muris, and Neville J. King, “Conditioned Emotional Reactions. Beyond Watson and Rayner’s Little Albert”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Consciousness | Kant | Strawson V 224 Mind/body/Kant: mind and body are dualistic and separated. Mind/StrawsonVsKant: the critical philosophy answers the question quite differently: there is no external standpoint to decide whether there are bodies at all. >Dualism, >Monism, >Mind body problem. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Consumer Goods | Rothbard | Rothbard III 57 Consumer goods/Rothbard: (…) in choosing between investing in one or the other of two consumers’ goods, the actor will, other things being equal, choose that good with the shorter period of production, (…). Any actor will continue to save and invest his resources in various expected future consumers’ goods as long as the utility, considered in the present, of the marginal product of each unit saved and invested is greater than the utility of present consumers’ goods which he could obtain by not performing that saving. The latter utility - of present consumers’ goods for-gone - is the “disutility of waiting.” Once the latter becomes greater than the utility of obtaining more goods in the future through saving, the actor will cease to save. Rothbard III 58 Measuring/Problem: How do actors know when their capital structure is being added to or consumed, when the types of capital goods and consumers’ goods are numerous? >Capital goods/Rothbard, >Production/Rothbard. Rothbard III 205 Consumtion: Every man must be a consumer, and therefore this analysis of consumer spending applies to all persons. Most people earn their income from the sale of their labor services. However, if we accept previously produced goods, because someone must have originally produced them, all other money incomes must derive from new production of capital goods or consumers’ goods. (This is apart from the sellers of land or its services, whose ownership must have originally derived from the finding and reshaping of unappropriated land.) Producers of capital goods and consumers’ goods are in a different position from sellers of labor service only. >Service/Rothbard. Rothbard III 299 Consumer goods/praxeology/catallactics/Rothbard: From the standpoint of praxeology proper - the complete formal analysis of human action in all its Aspects - it is inadmissible to call the good at its last retail sale to the consumer a "consumers' good." From the point of view of that subdivision of praxeology that covers traditional economics - that of catallactics, the science of monetary exchanges - however, it becomes convenient to call the good at the last retail Stage a "consumers' good." This is the last stage of the good in the monetary nexus - the last point, in most cases, at which it is open to producers to invest money in factors. To call the good at this final monetary Stage a "consumers' good" is permissible, provided we are always aware of the foregoing qualifications. We must always remember that without the final stages and the final allocation by consumers, there would be no raison d'étre for the whole monetary exchange process. Economics cannot afford to dismiss the ultimate consumption Stage simply because it has passed beyond the monetary nexus; it is the final goal and end of the monetary transactions by individuals in society. >Praxeology/Rothbard, >Action/Rothbard, >Market/Rothbard, >Exchange/Rothbard, >Money/Rothbard. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Continuum | Bernays | Thiel I 194 Continuum/Bernays/Thiel: Bernays represents here the classical standpoint (actuality): the representation of the continuum is first a geometrical idea. The criticism of the constructivists is "fundamentally opposed to the fact that the concept of the real number does not provide a complete arithmetic of the geometrical idea, but the question is whether it is actually required. >Real numbers. Bernays: It depends on the totality of the cuts, not on the individual definitions. The manifoldness of the individual definitions of cuts which are possible in a bounded framework is, indeed, not necessarily isomorphic to the continuum. The application of an intuitive term of a set should be regarded as something methodically complementary. >Dedekind cuts. I 195 It applies: Instead of making analysis arithmetic, the classical analysis is to be understood in the sense of a closer fusion of geometry and arithmetic. (Constructivists: separation). The opponents do not claim the negatives of these allegations, but they are of the opinion that the obligation to justify lies is with the person who represents an opinion. I 196 E.g. Sentence from the "upper limit": Old: any non-empty set, limited upwards, of real numbers has a real number as the upper limit. Constructive, new: Every non-empty set, limited upwards, of real numbers with a definite left class has a real number as the upper limit. Definition left class: a left class is a set of rational numbers r with r < x. The rewording is rather a clarification than a weakening and the objection of the "unprovableness" in constructive systems can no longer be regarded as valid. Again regarding the question "how many" real numbers there are: "Half" answer: there are as many real numbers as there are dual sequences. (I 183f). This suggests that there must be a certain number. Cf. >Continuum hypothesis. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Deceptions | Experimental Psychology | Parisi I 105 Deception/methods/Experimental psychology/Wilkinson-Ryan: Traditionally, psychological methods permitted deception. One of the canonical studies of how individuals relate to authority (surely a question with implications for law) was reported in Stanley Milgram’s 1963(1) paper on obedience. >Milgram experiment, >Conformity, >Obedience. Milgram brought a subject into his lab, purportedly for a study of memory, and instructed him or her to “teach” another participant (actually a confederate, who is an actor pretending to be a subject) by way of increasingly strong electric shocks. Milgram was, in fact, measuring how much voltage each subject was willing to inflict on the other. In this case, the deception was multilayered. The study was not a study of memory; the subject being administered shocks was a member of the research team and not another subject; and there were no real shocks. One of the effects of experimental economics on psychological study of legal questions has been a move away from the use of deception. Deception is often highly expedient from a financial and logistical standpoint, but it muddies interpretation of results. Whether or not Milgram’s subjects were behaving egregiously is a difficult question when we know that none of them in fact did any harm. Deception/experiment: More practically, Parisi I 106 subjects participating in an experiment in a laboratory that uses deception may behave differently than they would if they could, and should, trust the experimenter to be telling the truth. The methodological question in this area might be thought of informally as: What do the participants think is going on here? >Experiments, >Method. 1. Milgram, Stanley (1963). Behavioral Study of Obedience. In: Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. 67, pp. 371–378. Wilkinson-Ryan, Tess. „Experimental Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Egoism | Rawls | I 136 Egoism/Rawls: under the consideration of which principles should be applied in the initial situation of a society to be built, there are no principles for avoiding egoism. That is not necessary either, because no form of egoism is a serious candidate. This only confirms that, although egoism is logically consistent and not irrational in this sense, egoism is incompatible with what we intuitively consider a moral standpoint. Philosophically, egoism is not an alternative concept, but a challenge of any conception. >Principles/Rawls. In justice as fairness, this is reflected by the fact that we can interpret general egoism as an attitude of disagreement. It is what the parties are thrown back at if they cannot agree. >Fairness. I 147 The theory of justice as fairness/Rawls: one might think that this theory is just as egoistic in the sense that Schopenhauer believed Kant's theory to be egoistic(1). RawlsVs: our theory of justice as fairness is not egoistic,... I 148 ...because the assumed disinterest in the goals of others does not imply that one does not ignore the rights and claims of others. Precisely under the condition of the veil of ignorance, where the individual has no information about accidental peculiarities, it is not in a position to exploit them to its advantage. On the contrary, it must have the well-being of others in mind, since it does not know what position it will have in a society to be built. >Justice, >Society. 1. See for this: Schopenhauer, On the Basics of Ethics, New York 1965, pp. 89-92. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Enlightenment | MacIntyre | Brocker I 659 Enlightenment/Moral/Ethics/MacIntyre: For MacIntyre, Enlightenment represents a failed attempt to overcome post-medieval pluralism and eclecticism with the help of universal moral based on reason.(1) >Pluralism, >Universalism, >Morality. The Enlightenment had wanted to take "incoherent fragments of a once coherent system of thought and action"(2) as a basis. Problem: there are breaks between a de-teleologization of the moral system and a simultaneous dependence on a teleological framework. >Teleology. MacIntyreVsEnlightenment: the search for a moral standpoint that pretends to be independent of social order is an illusion. Obligations, rules and laws have replaced goods, traditions and social conditions. >Duty, >Laws, >Rules. MacIntyreVsKant: in his moral writings the "thought that moral is something other than following rules Brocker I 660 got almost, if not completely out of sight".(3) >I. Kant, >Morals/Kant, >Categorical Imperative, >Principles. 1. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, Notre Dame, Ind. 1981. Dt: Alasdair MacIntyre, Der Verlust der Tugend. Zur moralischen Krise der Gegenwart. Erweiterte Neuausgabe, Frankfurt/M. 2006 (zuerst 1987), S. 61. 2. Ibid. p. 80 3. Ibid. p. 313f. Jürgen Goldstein, „Alasdair MacIntyre, Der Verlust der Tugend“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Erlebniskunst | Gadamer | I 100 Erlebniskunst/Aesthetics/Art Experience/Aesthetic Experience/Gadamer: Initial problem: for Valéry(1), each encounter with the work has the rank and right of a new production. Gadamer: Problem: this seems to me an untenable hermeneutic nihilism. For now he transfers to the reader and interpreter the power of absolute creation, which he himself does not want to perform. >Hermeneutics, >Experience, >Aesthetics, >Aesthetic Experience. Aesthetic Experience/Gadamer: The same aporia results if one starts from the concept of aesthetic experience instead of the concept of genius. I 101 Lukacs(2): ascribes a Heraclitic structure to the aesthetic sphere and thus says: the unity of the aesthetic object is not a real given one. The work of art is only an empty form, the mere node in the possible majority of aesthetic experiences in which the aesthetic object alone is present. As can be seen, absolute discontinuity, i.e. the disintegration of the unity of the aesthetic object into the multiplicity of experiences, is the necessary consequence of the aesthetics of experience. Oskar Becker: Taking up the idea of Lukacs, Oskar Becker literally formulated: "Viewed temporally, the work is only a moment (i.e. now), it is "now" this work and it is "now" already no longer this work".(3) >Art works. Gadamer: That is indeed consistent. The foundation of aesthetics in experience leads to absolute punctuality, which suspends the unity of the work of art just as much as the identity of the artist with himself/herself and the identity of the understanding or enjoying person.(4) KierkegaardVsErlebniskunst/Gadamer: It seems to me that Kierkegaard already proved the untenability of this position by recognizing the destructive consequences of subjectivism and being the first to describe the self-destruction of aesthetic immediacy. His doctrine of the aesthetic stage of existence is conceived from the standpoint of the ethicist, who has absorbed the sanctity and untenability of existence in pure immediacy and discontinuity. I 102 Gadamer: The realization of the "frailty of beauty and the adventurousness of the Artist" is (...) in truth a constitution of being that is not distinguished outside the "hermeneutic phenomenology" of existence, but rather formulates the task, in view of such discontinuity of aesthetic being and aesthetic experience, of proving the hermeneutic continuity that constitutes our being. >Aesthetic Experience/Gadamer. >See more entries for Erlebniskunst. 1. P. Valéry, Variété Ill, Commentaires de Charmes: »Mes vers ont le sens qu'on leur prete«. 2. G. Lukács, „Die Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehung in der Ästhetik“, In: „Logos“, Bd. Vll., 1917/18. 3. Oskar Becker, Die Hinfälligkeit des Schönen und die Abenteuerlichkeit des Künstlers, Husserl-Festschrift, 1928, S. 51. Jetzt in O. Becker, Dasein und Dawesen. Pfullingen 1963, S. 11-401. 4. Schon bei K. Ph. Moritz, Von der bildenden Nachahmung des Schönen, 1788, S. 26 lesen wir: »Das Werk hat seinen höchsten Zweck in seiner Entstehung, in seinem Werden schon erreicht. « |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Ethics | Behaviorism | Slater I 30 Ethics/Behaviorism: VsWatson: From an ethical standpoint, several authors have questioned the conditioning of fears in children but perhaps more importantly the failure to remove the fears once they were conditioned. (Cf. Watson and Rayner 1920)(1); >Experiment/Watson. Ollendick/Sherman/Muris/King:: It seems to us that ethical questions such as these are important but not readily or easily resolved. In 1920 (>Experiment/Watson), little was known about how fears and phobias were acquired and one could argue that such research was extremely important and ethically defensible – so long as long-term harm did not occur to the participant. The part that seems questionable to us is why Watson and Rayner did not plan their research so they would have the time to remove the conditioned emotional responses before Albert and his mother left the hospital. Cf. Harris (1979)(2). >About Behaviorism. 1. Watson, J. B., & Rayner, R. (1920). Conditioned emotional responses. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 3, 1–14. 2. Harris, B. (1979). Whatever happened to Little Albert? American Psychologist, 34, 151–160. Thomas H. Ollendick, Thomas M. Sherman, Peter Muris, and Neville J. King, “Conditioned Emotional Reactions. Beyond Watson and Rayner’s Little Albert”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Excluded Middle | Heyting | I 67 Sentence of the excluded middle/VsIntuitionism: one does not accuse the intuitionist of accepting too little, as the representative of classical mathematics thinks, the intuitionist rather accepts too much. >Intuitionism, >VsIntuitionism. E.g.: is the principle of the excluded middle as evident to most people as is the one of complete induction? Why does he reject the one and agrees on the other? Intuitionism: in fact, intuitionist claims must appear dogmatic to those who regard them as assertions about facts, but they are not meant like this. They consist of mental constructions. Mathematical ideas belong to my highly private world of thought. E.g. "I've added 2 and 3 and then 4 and i and have determined that this leads to the same result". >Constructivism. I 68 This does not convey any knowledge about the external world, but about my thoughts. One must distinguish between the mere practice of mathematics and its assessment. The value always depends on our philosophical ideas. >Mathematics, >Description levels. If science really tends to formalize language, then intuitionist mathematics does not belong to science in the sense of the word. Rather, it is a phenomenon of life, a natural activity of the human being. The meta-mathematical considerations may be useful, but they cannot be integrated into intuitionist mathematics. >Discoveries, >Meta-mathematics. I 69 The mathematics, from the intuitionist standpoint, is the study of certain functions of the human mind. >Science. |
Heyting I Arend Heyting "Disputation", in: Intuitionism, Amsterdam 1956 German Edition: Streitgespräch In Kursbuch 8/1967, H. M. Enzensberger Frankfurt/M. 1967 Heyting II Arend Heyting Intuitionism: An Introduction (Study in Logic & Mathematics) 1971 |
| Existence | Quine | I 54 Existence: is from the standpoint of theory always a settlement. It can only be avoided by greater complexity. Arbitration: the method of arbitration: question of existence is question of evidence. I 300 Existence: the category is dependent on the point of view, but not on the existence of the objects E.g. time period. I 316 Existence: no claim of existence arises from the meaning of singular terms. >Singular Terms/Quine. I 402f Existence: does not arise from the dichotomy "single thing" - "universalia" - it does not matter whether they exist. "Equator", "North Pole" - Linking with stimuli is a weak argument for primacy of physical objects but it makes terms accessible for all positions. >Stimuli/Quine. I 412 QuineVsProperties: there is a fallacy of subtraction: deriving existence from "about" and "is about" - "round" and "dog" are terms for physical objects - but not also properties. "Round" and "dog" are general terms for objects and not singular terms for properties or classes. The same argument would be true for classes instead of properties: Generic term symbolizes as much its extension as its intension. >Classes/Quine, >Properties/Quine, >Singular Terms/Quine. II 173 Existence: "All x are y" controversy: does this imply the existence of "x"? In medieval logic it does but not in modern times (thus one gains symmetry and simplicity). VII (f) 110 Existence/Ontology/Quine: is only values of bound variables: not predicates "F", not statements "p", etc. because these are not the names of entities. VII (i) 167 Existence/Quine: we can do without "a exists" when singular terms are included in description after translation. VIII 31 Existence/Quine/(s): comes ultimately only from "The word appendicitis is a name" - but do names have to denote? >Denotation/Quine. IX 29 Existence/Ontology/Quine/(s): we cannot infer the quantity from the element. ((s) An existing thing may possibly belong to many quantities) - but the fact that we state the element implies its existence as a thing - then there is also {x: Fx} if it is to be an element of something. IX 33 Existence/Quine: must not be confused with the property of being a quantity - and virtual classes must not be confused with extreme classes. Existence of a means being an element of ϑ (universal class). The property of being a quantity means that a is an element of something. Important argument: the whole point is that you do not know if ϑ is a something. If we postulate the existence of ϑ, i.e. ϑ ε ϑ, then, in fact, all things become quantities. Existent would then be the property of being a quantity. But if there are extreme classes at all now, then ϑ is not real, ϑ ε ϑ. ((s) absurd.) IX 176 Definition/Existence/Quine: does not assume existence, but a description - Vs: even classes are not created by description. IX 218 Existence/Quine: is for NF (New Foundations) plus extreme classes: the property of being a quantity: IX 221 Existence/Quine: what was existence for NF (New Foundations), becomes only the property of being a quantity - i.e. where NF (New Foundations) said "{x: Fx} ε ϑ", we now have to say "^uFu ε Uϑ", and also limit all variables that can be hidden in the "F" to quantities (i.e. "Uϑ"). Lauener XI 128 Existence/Value of a bound variable/Quine/Lauener: since "exists" is not a predicate, we need quantification. Its logic is that of the existence quantifier. Quantifiers only receive meaning when the values of the variables are identifiable. Ideology: Part of the predicates - (as opposed to logical constants and quantifiers) - values of the variables are precisely the objects. Lauener XI 130 Everything to which a predicate applies is a value of a variable because a predicate is an open sentence. Predicate variables only exist freely. Everything that exists are objects, not e.g. properties. >Object/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Q XI H. Lauener Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982 |
| Experience | Neo-Kantianism | Gadamer I 65 Experience/"Erlebnis"/Art/Neo-Kantianism/Gadamer: Kant's doctrine of the "increase of the sense of life" in aesthetic pleasure promoted the development of the term "genius" into a comprehensive concept of life, especially after Fichte raised the standpoint of genius and ingenious production to a universal transcendental standpoint. Thus it came about that Neo-Kantianism, in that it sought to derive all representational validity from transcendental subjectivity, used the term Gadamer I 66 of the experience as the actual fact of consciousness(1). >Experience/Gadamer. 1. It is the merit of Luigi Pareyson's 1952 book, L'estetica del idealismo tedesco, to have highlighted the importance of spruce for the idealist aesthetic. Accordingly, the secret influence of Fichte and Hegel could be recognized within the whole of the New Kantian movement. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Factor Market | Rothbard | Rothbard III Factor Market/Rothbard: Every capitalist will attempt to employ a factor (or rather, the service of a factor) at the price that will be at least less than its discounted marginal value product. >Factors of production/Rothbard. The marginal value product is the monetary revenue that may be attributed, or “imputed,” to one service unit of the factor. >Marginal product/Rothbard. It is the “marginal” value product, because the supply of the factor is in discrete units. This MVP (marginal value product) is discounted by the social rate of time preference, i.e., by the going rate of interest. Suppose, for example, that a unit of a factor (say a day’s worth of a certain acre of land or a day’s worth of the effort of a certain laborer) will, imputably, produce for the firm a product one year from now that will be sold for 20 gold ounces. Marginal value product: The MVP of this factor is 20 ounces. But this is a future good. The present value of the future good, and it is this present value that is now being purchased, will be equal to the MVP discounted by the going rate of interest. If the rate of interest is 5 percent, then the discounted MVP will be equal to 19 ounces. To the employer (…) then, the maximum amount that the factor unit is now worth is 19 ounces. The capitalist will be willing to buy this factor at any price up to 19 ounces. Market: Now suppose that the capitalist owner or owners of one firm pay for this factor 15 ounces per unit. (…) this means that the capitalist earns a pure profit of four ounces per unit, since he reaps 19 ounces from the final sale. Rothbard III 457 (He obtains 20 ounces on final sale, but one ounce is the result of his time preference and waiting and is not pure profit; 19 ounces is the present value of his final sale.) But, seeing this happen, other entrepreneurs will leap into the breach to reap these profits. These capitalists will have to bid the factor away from the first capitalist and thus pay more than 15 ounces, say 17 ounces. Discounted marginal value product: This process continues until the factor earns its full DMVP (discounted marginal value product), and no pure profits remain. Evenly Rotating Economy: The result is that in the ERE every isolable factor will earn its DMVP, and this will be its price. >Evenly Rotating Economy. Pure profit: It is clear that if the marginal value of a specific unit of factor service can be isolated and determined, then the forces of competition on the market will result in making its price equal to its DMVP in the ERE. Any price higher than the discounted marginal value product of a factor service will not long be paid by a capitalist; any price lower will be raised by the competitive actions of entrepreneurs bidding away these factors through offers of higher prices. These actions will lead, in the former case to the disappearance of losses, in the latter, to the disappearance of pure profit, at which time the ERE is reached. Rothbard III 458 Factors: It is (…) the nonspecific factors that are directly isolable; a specific factor is isolable if it is the only specific factor in the combination, in which case its price is the difference between the price of the product and the sum of the prices of the nonspecific factors. But by what process does the market isolate and determine the share (the MVP of a certain unit of a factor) of income yielded from production? Let us refer back to the basic law of utility. >Utility/Rothbard. What will be the marginal value of a unit of any good? It will be equal to the individual’s valuation of the end that must remain unattained should this unit be removed. >Value/Rothbard. Rothbard III 463 Business: It is now clear why the temptation in factor-price analysis is for the firm to consider that factor prices are given externally to itself and that it simply varies its production in accordance with these prices. However, from an analytic standpoint, it should be evident that the array of MVPs as a whole is the determining factor, and the lowest-ranking process in terms of MVP will, through the medium of factor prices, transmit its message, so to speak, to the various firms, each of which will use the factor to such an extent that its DMVP will be brought into alignment with its price. But the ultimate determining factor is the DMVP schedule, not the factor price. In short, the prices of productive factors are determined as follows: Where a factor is isolable, its price will tend toward its discounted marginal value product and will equal its DMVP in the ERE. A factor will be isolable where it is nonspecific, i.e., is useful in more than one productive process, or where it is the only specific factor in a process. The nonspecific factor’s price will be set equal to its DMVP as determined by its general DMVP schedule: the full possible array of DMVPs, given various units of supply of the factor in the economy. >Marginal product/Rothbard, >Marginal utility/Rothbard. Rothbard III 560 Factor Market/Rothbard: What if the supply of capital remained the same, while the supply of labor or land factors changed? Thus, suppose that, with the same capital structure, population increases, thus expanding the total supply of labor factors. The result will be a general fall in the MVP (marginal value product) of labor and a rise in the MVP of land factors. This rise will cause formerly submarginal, no-rent lands to earn rent and to enter into cultivation by the new labor supply. Land/Ricardo: This is the process particularly emphasized by Ricardo: population pressing on the land supply. The tendency for the MVP of labor to drop, however, may well be offset by a rise in the MPP (marginal physical product) schedules of labor, since a rise in population will permit a greater utilization of the advantages of specialization and the division of labor. The constant supply of capital would have to be reoriented to the changed conditions, but the constant amount of money capital will then be more physically productive. Hence, there will be an offsetting tendency for the MVPs of labor to rise. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Fear | Watson | Slater I 24 Fear/Watson: Thesis: (Watson and Morgan 1979)(1) rage. Specific to fear, they suggested that only a few situations called out the fear response in infants: most notably (1) suddenly removing one’s support and letting the infant fall from one’s arms (to a safe place), and (2) exposing the infant to unexpected loud noises. As noted by Watson and Morgan, a variety of other situations failed to produce the fear response in nine-month-old infants, including a white rat, a rabbit, a dog, a monkey, a mask, cotton wool, and burning newspapers, among other stimuli and situations. In his book, Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, Watson (1919)(2) noted that the fear response initiated by sudden dropping of the infant or loud noises consisted of a “sudden catching of the breath, clutching randomly with the hands, sudden closing of the eyelids, puckering of the lips, then crying” (p. 200). He went on to state that “we can assert with some sureness that the above mentioned group of reactions appears at birth” (p. 200). >Emotion/Watson, >Experiment/Watson, >Conditioning/Watson. 1. Watson, J. B., & Morgan, J. J. B. (1917). Emotional reactions and psychological experimentation. American Journal of Psychology, 28, 163–174. 2. Watson, J. B. (1919). Psychology from the standpoint of a behaviorist. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company. Thomas H. Ollendick, Thomas M. Sherman, Peter Muris, and Neville J. King, “Conditioned Emotional Reactions. Beyond Watson and Rayner’s Little Albert”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Fixed Points | Gärdenfors | I 97 Fixed point/communication/Gärdenfors: a fixed point in a communication is reached when, for example, a person sees that the other person looks in the direction of the object they are referring to. --- I 99 There should also be a consistency between the mental representations for the consistency of word meanings. Communication is also possible without this: e.g. children often have fewer domains in the representation of their terms or the domains are differently weighted. Equilibrium: Communication can work restrictedly before the equilibrium of the partners (the same level of information) is reached. --- I 100 Signal game/Jäger/Rooij/Gärdenfors: (Jäger & van Rooij, 2007)(1): randomly selected color samples are ordered by a second person. The goal of the game is to achieve an equal division of the color space in regions. (Nash-equilibrium or fixed point). Gärdenfors: thesis: this is achieved if the conceptual spaces are convex and compact. --- I 101 Equilibrium/Fixed point/Gärdenfors: further experiments have shown that repeated interactions lead to a stable communication system. (E.g. Hurford, 1999,(2) Kirby, 1999,(3) Steels, 1999,(4) Kaplan, 2000,(5) Steels & Belpaeme, 2005(6)). --- I 102 Meanings: do not necessarily have to change when the composition of the communicators involved changes or new parties join or disappear. Fixed point/Dewey/Gärdenfors: (Dewey 1929, p. 178) (7): in order for V to understand A's moves, he must react to the thing from A's standpoint of view. So not I-centered and vice versa. Thus, something is literally made into a common. --- I 104 Fixed point theorem/Gärdenfors: in order to achieve fixed points, it is not necessary for the conceptual spaces of the participants to be identical, nor that they divide the spaces equally. ---- I 105 We assume that the rooms are convex and compact. The following theorem from Warglien & Gärdenfors (2013)(8) is a consequence of Brouwer's fixed point theorem (Brouwer 1910)(9): Theorem: every semantic reaction function, which is a continuous mapping of a convex compact set on itself, has at least one fixed point. That is, there will always be a fixed point representing a Meeting of Minds. Conceptual spaces: that they are assumed to be convex makes the communication flowing and memory performance efficient. --- I 106 Gärdenfors: I do not mean that convex spaces are a reliable representation of our world, but that, because they are effective, they will be widespread. Fixed points: the fixed point approach allows to consider a variety of types of communication such as color determinations and negotiations. The fixed-point theorem guarantees that the consciousness of the participants together (> Meeting of Minds) but it does not show how the semantic reaction function emerges from the communicative interaction. --- I 109 Fixed Point/Communication/Gärdenfors: how do we know if a fixed point (balance, agreement) has been reached? --- I 110 If the listener believes to understand, this is not a guarantee for a meeting of minds. 1. Jäger, G., & van Rooij, R. (2007). Language structure: Psychological and social constraints. Synthese, 159, 99–130. 2. Hurford, J. (1999). The evolution of language and languages. In R. Dunbar, C. Knight, & C. Power (Eds.), The evolution of culture (pp. 173–193). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 3. Kirby, S. (1999). Function, selection, and innateness: The emergence of language universals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 4. Steels, L. (1999). The talking heads experiment. Antwerp: Laboratorium. 5. Kaplan, F. (2000). L’émergence d’un lexique dans une population d’agents autonomes. Paris: Laboratoire d’Informatique de Paris 6. 6. Steels, L., & Belpaeme, T. (2005). Coordinating perceptually grounded categories through language: A case study for colour. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28, 469–489. 7. Dewey, J. (1929). Experience and nature. New York: Dover. 8. Gärdenfors, P., & Warglien, M. (2013). The development of semantic space for pointing and verbal communication. In J. Hudson, U. Magnusson, & C. Paradis (Eds.), Conceptual spaces and the construal of spatial meaning: Empirical evidence from human communication (pp. 29–42). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 9. Brouwer, L. E. J. (1910). Über ein eindeutige, stetige Transformation von Flächen in sich. Mathematische Annalen, 69, 176–180. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Forms of Thinking | Danto | I 33 Our distinctions are made within the experience and not between the totality of experience and something different. >Distinctions, >Experience. I 97 Apparently we can not take a position "beyond good and evil", outside of morality, and refer to the language of morality from the outside. >Inside/outside, >Circular reasoning, >Perspective, >Point of view. Therefore Aristotle says, we do not study ethics to our knowledge’s sake, but to be good ourselves. >Ethics/Aristotle. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Frame Problem | Norvig | Norvig I 279 Frame Problem/artificial intelligence/Norvig/Russell: The frame problem was first recognized by McCarthy and Hayes (1969)(1). Many researchers considered the problem unsolvable within first-order logic, and it spurred a great deal of research into non-monotonic logics. Philosophers from Dreyfus (1972)(2) to Crockett (1994)(3) have cited the frame problem as one symptom of the inevitable failure of the entire AI enterprise. The solution of the frame problem with successor-state axioms is due to Ray Reiter (1991)(4). Thielscher (1999)(5) identifies the inferential frame problem as a separate idea and provides a solution. In retrospect, one can see that Rosenschein’s (1985)(6) agents were using circuits that implemented successor-state axioms, but Rosenschein did not notice that the frame problem was thereby largely solved. Foo (2001)(7) explains why the discrete-event control theory models typically used by engineers do not have to explicitly deal with the frame problem: because they are dealing with prediction and control, not with explanation and reasoning about counterfactual situations. 1. McCarthy, J. and Hayes, P. J. (1969). Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of artificial intelligence. In Meltzer, B., Michie, D., and Swann, M. (Eds.), Machine Intelligence 4, pp. 463-502. Edinburgh University Press 2. Dreyfus, H. L. (1972). What Computers Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason. Harper and Row 3. Crockett, L. (1994). The Turing Test and the Frame Problem: AI’s Mistaken Understanding of Intelligence. Ablex 4. Reiter, R. (1991). The frame problem in the situation calculus: A simple solution (sometimes) and a completeness result for goal regression. In Lifschitz, V. (Ed.), Artificial Intelligence and Mathematical Theory of Computation: Papers in Honor of John McCarthy, pp. 359–380. Academic Press. 5. Thielscher, M. (1999). From situation calculus to fluent calculus: State update axioms as a solution to the inferential frame problem. AIJ, 111(1-2), 277-299. 6. Rosenschein, S. J. (1985). Formal theories of knowledge in AI and robotics. New Generation Computing, 3(4), 345-357. 7. Foo, N. (2001). Why engineering models do not have a frame problem. In Discrete event modeling and simulation technologies: a tapestry of systems and AI-based theories and methodologies. Springer-Verlag. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Frame Problem | Russell | Norvig I 279 Frame Problem/artificial intelligence/Norvig/Russell: The frame problem was first recognized by McCarthy and Hayes (1969)(1). Many researchers considered the problem unsolvable within first-order logic, and it spurred a great deal of research into non-monotonic logics. Philosophers from Dreyfus (1972)(2) to Crockett (1994)(3) have cited the frame problem as one symptom of the inevitable failure of the entire AI enterprise. The solution of the frame problem with successor-state axioms is due to Ray Reiter (1991)(4). Thielscher (1999)(5) identifies the inferential frame problem as a separate idea and provides a solution. In retrospect, one can see that Rosenschein’s (1985)(6) agents were using circuits that implemented successor-state axioms, but Rosenschein did not notice that the frame problem was thereby largely solved. Foo (2001)(7) explains why the discrete-event control theory models typically used by engineers do not have to explicitly deal with the frame problem: because they are dealing with prediction and control, not with explanation and reasoning about counterfactual situations. >Frames, >Frame theories, >Framing effect. 1. McCarthy, J. and Hayes, P. J. (1969). Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of artificial intelligence. In Meltzer, B., Michie, D., and Swann, M. (Eds.), Machine Intelligence 4, pp. 463-502. Edinburgh University Press 2. Dreyfus, H. L. (1972). What Computers Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason. Harper and Row 3. Crockett, L. (1994). The Turing Test and the Frame Problem: AI’s Mistaken Understanding of Intelligence. Ablex 4. Reiter, R. (1991). The frame problem in the situation calculus: A simple solution (sometimes) and a completeness result for goal regression. In Lifschitz, V. (Ed.), Artificial Intelligence and Mathematical Theory of Computation: Papers in Honor of John McCarthy, pp. 359–380. Academic Press. 5. Thielscher, M. (1999). From situation calculus to fluent calculus: State update axioms as a solution to the inferential frame problem. AIJ, 111(1-2), 277-299. 6. Rosenschein, S. J. (1985). Formal theories of knowledge in AI and robotics. New Generation Computing, 3(4), 345-357. 7. Foo, N. (2001). Why engineering models do not have a frame problem. In Discrete event modeling and simulation technologies: a tapestry of systems and AI-based theories and methodologies. Springer-Verlag. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Free Market | Economic Theories | Rothbard III 912 Free market/economic theories/Rothbard: There are many economists who regard the "free market" as only being free of triangular interference; such binary interference as taxation is not considered intervention in the purity of the "free market." For triangular interventions see >Price control/Rothbard, >Interventions/Rothbard. Chicago school/Knight/Rothbard: The economists of the Chicago School - headed by Frank H. Knight -- have been particularly adept at splitting man's economic activity and confining the "market" to a narrow compass. They can thus favor the "free market" (because they oppose such triangular interventions as price control), while advocating drastic binary interventions in taxes and subsidies to "redistribute" the income determined by that market. >Distribution/Rothbard, >Frank H. Knight, >Chicago School. RothbardVsChicago School: In short, the market is to be left "free" in one sphere, while being subject to perpetual harassment and reshuffling by outside coercion. This concept assumes that man is fragmented, that the "market man" is not concerned with what happens to himself as a "subject-to-government" man. Def Tax illusion/Rothbard: This is surely an impermissible myth, which we might call the "tax illusion" - the idea that people do not consider what they earn after taxes, but only before taxes. In short, if A earns $ 9,000 a year on the market, B $ 5,000, and C $ 1,000, and the government decides to keep redistributing the incomes so that each earns $ 5,000, the individuals, apprised of this, are not going to keep foolishly assuming that they are still earning what they did before. They are going to take the taxes and subsidies into account. >Government spending/Rothbard. Rothbard III 1035 Free market/Economic theories/Rothbard: There are two general lines of attack on the free market, using external benefits as the point of criticism. Taken together, these arguments against the market and for governmental intervention or enterprise cancel each other out, but each must, in all fairness, be examined separately. 1) The first type of criticism is to attack A for not doing enoughfor B. The benefactor is, in effect, denounced for taking his own selfish interests exclusively into account, and thereby neglecting the potential indirect recipient waiting silently in the wings.(1) 2) The second line of attack is to denounce B for accepting a benefit without payingA in return. The recipient is denounced as an ingrate and a virtual thief for accepting the free gift. The free market, then, is accused of injustice and distortion by both groups of attackers: a) the first believes that the selfishness of man is such that A will not act enough in ways to benefit B; b) the second that B will receive too much "unearned increment" without paying for it. Rothbard: Either way, the call is for remedial state action; on the one hand, to use violence in order to force or induce A to act more in ways which will aid B; on the other, to force B to pay A for his gift. Ethics/economics/Rothbard: Generally, these ethical views are clothed in the "scientific" opinion that, in these cases, free-market action is no longer optimal, but should be brought back into optimality by corrective State action. Such a view completely misconceives the way in which economic science asserts that free-market action is ever optimal. Rothbard III 1036 RothbardVsInterventions: It is optimal, not from the standpoint of the personal ethical views of an economist, but from the standpoint of the free, voluntary actions of all participants and in satisfying the freely expressed needs of the consumers. Government interference, therefore, will necessarily and always move away from such an optimum. Rothbard: It is amusing that while each line of attack is quite widespread, each can be rather successfully rebutted by using the essence of the other attack! RothbardVs 1): Take, for example, the first - the attack on the benefactor. To denounce the benefactor and implicitly call for state punishment for insuffcient good deeds is to advance a moral claim by the recipient upon the benefactor. We do not intend to argue ultimate values (…). But it should be clearly understood that to adopt this position is to say that B is entitled peremptorily to call on A to do something to benefit him, and for which B does not pay anything in return. We do not have to go all the way with the second line of attack (on the "free rider"), but we can say perhaps that it is presumptuous of the free rider to assert his right to a post of majesty and command. For what the first line of attack asserts is the moral right of B to exact gifts from A, by force if necessary. >Free rider. RothbardVs 2): The second line of attack is of the opposite form - a denunciation of the recipient of the "gift." The recipient is denounced as a "free rider," as a man who wickedly enjoys the "unearned increment" of the productive actions of others. This, too, is a curious line of attack. It is an argument which has cogency only when directed against the first line of attack, i.e., against the free rider Who wants compulsoryfree rides. But here we have a situation where A's actions, taken purely because they benefit himself, also have the happy effect of benefiting someone else. Are we to be indignant because happiness is being diffused throughout society? Are we to be critical because more than one person benefits from someone's actions? Free rider: After all, the free rider did not ask for his ride. He received it, unasked, as a boon because A benefits from his own action. To adopt the second line of attack is to call in the gendarmes to apply punishment because too many People in the society are happy. In short, am I to be taxed for enjoying the view of my neighbor's well-kept garden? Rothbard III 1037 Georgism/Henry George: One striking instance of this second line of attack is the nub of the Henry Georgist position: an attack on the "unearned increment" derived from a rise in the capital values of ground land. The argument of the Georgists is that the landowner is not morally responsible for this rise, which comes about from events external to his landholding; yet he reaps the benefit. The landowner is therefore a free rider, and his "unearned increment" rightfully belongs to "society." Setting aside the problem of the reality of society and whether "it" can own anything, we have here a moral attack on a free-rider situation. >Henry George, >Georgism/Rothbard. RothbardVs: The diffculty with this argument is that it proves far too much. For which one of us would earn anything like our present real income were it not for external benefits that we derive from the actions of others? Specifically, the great modern accumulation of capital goods is an inheritance from all the net savings of our ancestors. Without them, we would, regardless of the quality of our own moral character, be living in a primitive jungle. 1. For some unexplained reason, the benefits worried over are only the indirect ones, where B benefits inadvertently from A's action. Direct gifts, or charity, where A simply donates money to B, are not attacked under the category of external benefit. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Genius | Kant | Gadamer I 58 Genius/Art/Art/Kant/Gadamer: The irrationality of the genius (...) makes (...) a moment of productive rule creation known, which becomes equally relevant for the creator as well as for the enjoyer. There is no way to grasp the content of a work of fine art other than in the unique form of the work and in the mystery of its impression, which is never completely accessible by any language. The concept of genius therefore corresponds to what Kant regards as the decisive factor in aesthetic taste, namely the facilitated Gadamer I 59 play of emotions, the increase of the feeling for life, which is created by the combination of imagination and intellect and invites to stay in view of the beautiful. Genius is entirely a manifestation of this invigorating spirit. In contrast to the rigid regularity of the schoolmaster's office, genius proves free swing of invention and thus pattern-forming originality(1). Gadamer I 59 Taste/Genius: on the relationship between taste and genius: (...) basically taste is on the same footing as genius. The art of genius is to make the free play of the forces of knowledge communicable. The aesthetic ideas that he invents do this. The communicability of the state of mind, the pleasure, but also the aesthetic pleasure of taste. It is a faculty of judgement, that is, a taste of reflection, but what it reflects upon is only that state of mind of the stimulation of the powers of knowledge that is equally at home in the beauty of nature and in the beauty of art. The systematic meaning of the concept of genius, on the other hand, is limited to the special case of artistic beauty; the scope of the concept of taste is universal. Psychology/Genie/Kant/Gadamer: Kant makes the concept of genius completely at the service of his transcendental question and does not slide into empirical psychology. Gadamer I 60 Genie/Kant/Gadamer: The genius is a favorite of nature - similar to how natural beauty is considered a favor of nature. Beautiful art must be regarded as nature. Through the genius, nature gives the rule to art. In all these turns(2) the concept of nature is the unchallenged standard. >Aesthetic experience/Kant. Gadamer I 63 The Kantian phrase "beautiful art Gadamer I 64 is art of genius" becomes (...) the transcendental principle for aesthetics in general. In the end, aesthetics is only possible as a philosophy of art. Gadamer I 65 (...) Kant's essential concern to provide an autonomous foundation for aesthetics, freed from the criterion of the concept, and not to pose the question of truth in the field of art at all, but to base aesthetic judgement on the subjective a priori of the attitude to life, the harmony of our capacity for "knowledge in general", which constitutes the common essence of taste and genius, [came] to meet the irrationalism and the cult of genius of the 19th century. Kant's doctrine of the "increase of the sense of life" in aesthetic pleasure promoted the development of the term "genius" into a comprehensive concept of life, especially after Fichte had raised the standpoint of genius and ingenious production to a universal transcendental standpoint. (>Aesthetics/Fichte.) Thus it came about that Neo-Kantianism, in that it sought to derive all representational validity from transcendental subjectivity, used the term Gadamer I 66 of the experience as the actual fact of consciousness. >Experience/Gadamer. 1. Vgl. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft § 46. 2. Ebenda S. 181 |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Good | Moore | Stegmüller IV 181 Argument of the open question/good/definition/Moore: Assuming, someone said "good" can be defined as "promoting the joy of life". Then we could still understand the question: "admittedly, it promotes the joy of life, but is it also good?". Conclusion: "good" must mean a simple, non-analytic, non-natural quality. StegmüllerVsMoore: this can only refer to the moral goodness. Cf. >Good/Plato, >Definitions, >Definability. Stegmüller IV 182 We might still suspect that there are common meaning cores in moral and non-moral contexts. >Morals, >Ethics, >Cognitivism, >Norms, >Community, >Society, >Discourse. Stegmüller IV 186 "Good"/Moore/open question/Mackie/Stegmüller: the solution of Moore's problem: those requirements with regard to whether x is good are not identical with those for which we have already admitted that x satisfies them. Vs: some believe that only the assumption of objective values could resist the argument of the open question. Only from the standpoint of "overall reality" all requirements are taken into consideration. >Objectivity. MackieVs: it is a deceptive hope that there might be something that could satisfy all conceivable kinds of requirements. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Government Bonds | Rothbard | Rothbard III 1025 Government Bonds/Rothbard: The major source of government revenue is taxation. Another source is government borrowing. Government borrowing from the banking system is really a form of inflation: it creates new money-substitutes that go first to the government and then diffuse, with each step of spending, into the community. >Inflation/Rothbard, >Money-substitutes/Rothbard. Government bonds: This is a process entirely different from borrowing from the public, which is not inflationary, for the latter transfers saved funds from private to governmental hands rather than create new funds. Its economic effect is to divert savings from the channels most desired by the consumers and to shift them to the uses desired by government offcials. Savings: Hence, from the point of view of the consumers, borrowing from the public wastes savings. Capital structure/Society: The consequences of this waste are a Iowering of the capital structure of the society and a Iowering of the general standard of living in the present and the future. Interest rates: Diversion and waste of savings from investment causes interest rates to be higher than they otherwise would, since now private uses must compete With government demands. Public borrowing strikes at individual savings more effectively even than taxation, for it specifically lures away savings rather than taxing income in general. VsRothbard: It might be objected that lending to the government is voluntary and is therefore equivalent to any other voluntary contribution to the government; the "diversion" of funds is something desired by the consumers and hence by society.(1) VsGovernment Bonds/RothbardVsVs: Yet the process is "voluntary" only in a one-sided way. For we must not forget that the government enters the time market as a bearer of coercion and as a guarantor that it will use this coercion to obtain funds for repayment. The government is armed by coercion With a crucial power denied to all other People on the market; it is always assured of funds, whether by taxation or by inflation. Risks: (…) the risk component in the interest rate paid by the government will be Iower than that paid by any other borrowers.(2) Rothbard III 1026 Voluntariness: Lending to government, therefore, may be voluntary, but the process is hardly voluntary when considered as a whole. It is rather a voluntary participation in future confiscation to be committed by the government. In fact, lending to government twice involves diversion of private funds to the government: once when the Ioan is made, and private savings are diverted to government spending; and again when the government taxes or inflates (or borrows again) to obtain the money to repay the Ioan. Coercion: Then, once more, a coerced diversion takes place from private producers to the government, the proceeds of which, after payment of the bureaucracy for handling services, accrues to the government bondholders. The latter have thus become a part of the state apparatus and are engaging in a "relation of state" with the tax-paying producers.(3) „We“/society/state/Rothbard: The ingenious slogan that the public debt does not matter because "we owe it to ourselves" is clearly absurd. The crucial question is: Who is the "we" and who are the "ourselves"? Analysis of the world must be individualistic and not holistic. Certain people owe money to certain other people, and it is precisely this fact that makes the borrowing as well as the taxing process important. For we might just as well say that taxes are unimportant for the same reason.(4) Rothbard III 1027 RothbardVsRightists/RothbardVsRight-wing: Many "right-wing" opponents of public borrowing, on the other hand, have greatly exaggerated the dangers of the public debt (…). 1) It is obvious that the government cannot become "insolvent" like private individuals - for it can always obtain money by coercion, while private citizens cannot. 2) Further, the periodic agitation that the government "reduce the public debt" generally forgets that - short of outright repudiation -the debt can be reduced only by increasing, at least for a time, the tax and/or inflation in society. Social utility: Social utility can therefore not be enhanced by debt-reduction, except by the method of repudiation - the one way that the public debt can be Iowered without a concomitant increase in fiscal coercion. Repudiation: Repudiation would also have the further merit (from the standpoint of the free market) of casting a pall on all future government credit, so that the government could no longer so easily divert savings to government use. It is therefore one of the most curious and inconsistent features of the history of politico-economic thought that it is precisely the "right-wingers," the presumed champions of the free market, who attack repudiation most strongly and who insist on as swift a payment of the public debt as possible.(5) 1. A recent objection of this sort appears in James M. Buchanan, Public Principles of Public Debt (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1958), especially pp. 104-05. 2. It is incorrect, however, to say that government Ioans are "riskless" and therefore that the interest yield on government bonds may be taken to be the pure interest rate. Governments may always repudiate their obligations if they wish, or they may be overturned and their successors may refuse to honor the I.0.U.'s. 3. Hence, despite Buchanan's criticism, the classical economists such as Mill were right: the public debt is a double burden on the free market; in the present, because resources are withdrawn from private to unproduc- tive governmental employment; and in the future, when private citizens are taxed to pay the debt. Indeed, for Buchanan to be right, and the public debt to be no burden, two extreme conditions would have to be met: (1) the bondholder would have to tear up his bond, so that the Ioan would be a genuinely voluntary contribution to the government; and (2) the government would have to be a totally voluntary institution, subsisting on voluntary payments alone, not just for this particular debt, but for all in transactions with the rest of society. Cf. Buchanan, Public Principles of Public Debt. 4. In the same way, we would have to assert that the Jews killed by the Nazis during World War II really committed suicide: "They did it to themselves." 5. For the rare exception of a libertarian Who recognizes the merit of repudiation from a free-market point ofview, see Frank Chodorov, "Don't Buy Bonds," analysis, Vol. IV, No. 9 (July, 1948), pp. 1-2. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Hermeneutics | Dilthey | Gadamer I 180 Hermeneutics/Dilthey/Gadamer: [On the theological, especially Lutheran interpretation of the Bible]: (...) Reformation theology does not seem (...) to be consistent. By finally using the Protestant formulas of faith as a guideline for the understanding of the unity of the Bible, it too abolishes the principle of the Scriptures in favour of an albeit short-term Reformation tradition. Not only the Counter-Reformation theology has argued against this but also Dilthey(1). He mocks these contradictions of Protestant hermeneutics from the standpoint of full self-confidence of the historical humanities. Development of Dilthey's hermeneutics: First of all the hermeneutics had to break free from all dogmatic limitations and free itself, in order to ascend to the universal significance of a historical organon. This happened in the 18th century, when men like Semler and Ernesti realized that an adequate understanding of Scripture was the recognition of the diversity of their authors, thus presupposing the abandonment of the dogmatic unity of the canon. With this "liberation of interpretation from "dogma" (Dilthey), the collection of the Holy Scriptures of Christanity moved into the role of a collection of historical sources, which as written works had to be subjected not only to a grammatical but also to a historical interpretation(2). DiltheyVsTradition: The old principle of interpretation, to understand the individual from the whole, was now no longer related and limited to the dogmatic unity of the canon, but went to the comprehensiveness of the historical Gadamer I 181 reality, to the wholeness of which the individual historical document belongs. Gadamer: (...) just as there is now no longer any difference between the interpretation of sacred or profane scriptures and thus only hermeneutics exists, so in the end this hermeneutics is not only a propaedeutic function of all historiography as the art of the correct interpretation of written sources, but also overlaps the whole business of historiography itself. For what is true of the written sources, that every sentence in them can only be understood from the context, is also true of the contents they report. Their meaning is also not clear in itself. The world-historical context in which the individual objects of historical research, large and small, show themselves in their true relative importance, is itself a whole, from which all individual things are first fully understood in their sense and which, conversely, can only be fully understood from these details. Gadamer I 182 Tradition: In itself, the history of understanding has been accompanied by theoretical reflection since the days of ancient philology. But these reflections have the character of an "art doctrine", i.e. they want to serve the art of understanding, such as the rhetoric of oratory, the poetics of poetry and its evaluation. In this sense, the theological hermeneutics of patristics and that of the Reformation was also an art doctrine. DiltheyVsTradition/Gadamer: But now understanding is made as such. ((s) VsDilthey: Cf. >Hermeneutics/Schleiermacher.) Gadamer I 202 Hermeneutics/Dilthey/Gadamer: Historical interpretation can serve as a means of understanding a given text, even if it sees in it a mere source that is integrated into the whole of historical tradition. In clear methodological reflection, however, we find this expressed neither by Ranke nor by the sharp methodologist Droysen, but only by Dilthey, who consciously takes up Romantic hermeneutics and expands it into a historical methodology, indeed into an epistemology of the humanities. Ditlhey: Not only do the sources encounter as texts, but historical reality itself is a text to be understood. With this transfer of hermeneutics to history, however, Dilthey is only the interpreter of the historical school. He formulates what Ranke and Droysen basically think. Historical School/Dilthey/HegelVsHistorism/Gadamer: We will see that Hegel's philosophy of world history, against which the historical school rebelled (DiltheyVsHegel), recognized the importance of history for the being of the mind and the knowledge of truth incomparably deeper than the great historians, who did not want to admit their dependence on it. Gadamer I 245 Hermeneutics/Dilthey/Gadamer: As we saw with Schleiermacher, the model of his hermeneutics is the congenial understanding that can be achieved in the relationship between the I and the You. The author's opinion can be seen directly from his text. The interpreter is absolutely simultaneous with his or her author. This is the triumph of the philological method to grasp past spirit as present, foreign as familiar. Dilthey: Dilthey is completely imbued with this triumph. He bases on it the equality of the humanities. Just as scientific knowledge always questions the present through a discovery within it, so the scholar of humanities questions texts. In this way Dilthey believed he was fulfilling the task which he felt was his own, to justify the humanities epistemologically by conceiving of the historical world as a text to be deciphered. >Text/Dilthey. 1. Cf. Dilthey II, 126 Anm. 3 the criticism of Flacius by Richard Simon. 2. Semler, who makes this demand, admittedly means with it still to serve the sense of salvation of the Bible, provided that the historically understanding "is now also able to speak of these objects in such a way now, as the changed time and other circumstances of the people beside us make it necessary" (quoted after G. Ebeling, RGG3 Hermeneutics), i.e. history in the service of the applicatio. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| History of Problems | Neo-Kantianism | Gadamer I 381 Problem History/Neo-Kantianism/Gadamer: The logic of question and answer that Collingwood develops puts an end to the talk of the permanent problem that underlies the relationship of the "Oxford Realists" to the classics of philosophy, and also to the concept of problem history that New Kantianism developed. >Question/Answer/Collingwood. GadamerVsNeo-Kantianism: The history of problems would only be truly history if it recognized the identity of the problem as an empty abstraction and admitted the change in the questions. A location outside history from which the identity of a problem in the course of its historical attempts to solve it does not really exist. It is true that all understanding of texts of philosophy requires >recognition of what is recognized in them. Without it, we would understand nothing at all. But by no means do we step out of the historical condition in which we stand and from which we understand. The problem that we recognize is in truth not simply the same, if it is to be understood in a genuine questioning execution. It is only because of our historical short-sightedness that we can consider it the same. The "more-than-a-standpoint" from which its true identity would be thought is a pure illusion. Cf. >Abstraction, >Problem/Gadamer. Problem Concept/Gadamer: It is significant that in the 19th century, with the collapse of the immediate tradition of philosophical questioning and the emergence of historism, the problem concept rose to universal validity - a sign that the direct relationship to the factual questions of philosophy no longer exists. Thus, the embarrassment of the philosophical consciousness in relation to historism is characterized by the fact that it took refuge in the abstraction of the problem concept and saw no problem in the way in which problems actually "are". The history of problems of Neo-Kantianism is a bastard of historism. The criticism of the concept of problem, which is carried out with the means of a logic of question and answer, must destroy the illusion that the problems exist like the stars in the sky. >Question/Gadamer, >Question/Answer/Collingwood. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| I, Ego, Self | Nagel | Frank I 506ff I/Nagel: identification of an objective person as myself; adds no fact to the world - therefore, such identity statements are not understandable for us! >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge, >Facts, >Nonfactualism. E.g. whether I imagine that my house burns down and I am present or not makes no difference to what one imagines as being the case. EvansVs: an identity statement does not need to make a difference for a spatiotemporal map of the world, but for the manner in which the immediate environment is considered. >Identity, >Statement, >Reality, >Mapping. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 Nagel III 31 I/objectivism/Nagel: there is a problem of a liberal realist worldview, everyone must admit to themselves that they are a person in a center-less world who is no one else but themselves. Cf. >Centererd worlds. III 33 Distinction I/person/Nagel: allows to ask: how can I be this specific person? - What kind of fact is that? >Person. Problem in the center-less world. Solution: "objective self" which we identify with the "I" - the "self" has the ability to form an idea about the person in the world. - In doing so, it refrains from the standpoint of "I am". - The real self excludes the contingent person Thomas Nagel and his perspective as content in its worldview. >Self. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Income | Rothbard | Rothbard III 208 Income/trade/exchange/Rothbard: (…) the consumer must have money in his cash balance in order to spend it on consumers’ goods, and, likewise, the producer must have the original money to invest in factors. Where does the consumer get the money? (…) in the last analysis he must have obtained it from the sale of some productive service. (…) laborers and landowners use the money thus obtained to buy the final products of the production system. The capitalist-producers also receive income at each stage of the production process. (…) the net incomes accruing to the owners of capital goods are not simply the result of the contribution to production by the capital goods, since these capital goods are in turn the products of other factors. Producers: Where, then, do the producers acquire their money for investment? Clearly, from the same sources only. From the income acquired in production, individuals can, in addition to buying consumers’ goods, purchase factors of production and engage in the productive process as producers of a good that is not simply their own labour service. Rothbard III 209 Investments: In order to obtain the money for investment, then, an individual must save money by restricting his possible consumption expenditures. >Loans/Rothbard, >Production/Rothbard, >Investments, >Factors of production/Rothbard, >Consumption. Rothbard III 300 Income/Rothbard: Everyone attempts to maximize the [psychic income], which includes on its value scale a vast range of all consumers’ goods, both exchangeable and nonexchangeable. Exchangeable goods: exchangeable goods are generally in the monetary nexus, and therefore can be purchased for money, whereas nonexchangeable goods are not. We have indicated some of the consequences of the fact that it is psychic and not monetary income that is being maximized, and how this introduces qualifications into the expenditure of effort or labor and in the investment in producers’ goods. >Action/Rothbard, >Allocation/Rothbard, >Exchange/Rothbard. Subjectivity: It is also true that psychic income, being purely subjective, cannot be measured. Utility/praxeology: Further, from the standpoint of praxeology, we cannot even ordinally compare the psychic income or utility of one person with that of another. We cannot say that A’s income or “utility” is greater than B’s. We can - at least, theoretically - measure monetary incomes by adding the amount of money income each person obtains, but this is by no means a measure of psychic income. Furthermore, it does not, as we perhaps might think, give any exact indication of the amount of services that each individual obtains purely from exchangeable consumers’ goods. An income of 50 ounces of gold in one year may not, and most likely will not, mean the same to him in terms of services from exchangeable goods as an income of 50 ounces in some other year. The purchasing power of money in terms of all other commodities is continually changing, and there is no way to measure such changes. Rothbard III 301 Purchasing power: Even if we confine ourselves to the same period, monetary incomes are not an infallible guide. There are, for example, many consumers’ goods that are obtainable both through monetary exchange and outside the money nexus. Psychic income: Neither can we measure psychic incomes if we confine ourselves to goods in the monetary nexus. Utility/marginal utility: It follows that the law of the diminishing marginal utility of money applies only to the valuations of each individual person. There can be no comparison of such utility between persons. Thus, we cannot, as some writers have done, assert that an extra dollar is enjoyed less by a Rockefeller than by a poor man. If Rockefeller were suddenly to become poor, each dollar would be worth more to him than it is now; similarly, if the poor man were to become rich, his value scales remaining the same, each dollar would be worth less than it is now. >Marginal utility of money/Rothbard, >Marginal utility/Rothbard. Rothbard III 533 Income/business/profit/Rothbard: Are “capital gains” - increases in capital value - income? If we fully realize that profits and capital gains, and losses and capital losses, are identical, the solution becomes clear. No one would exclude business profits from money income. The same should be true of capital gains. >Business/Rothbard, >Economy/Rothbard, >Production/Rothbard, >Production structure/Rothbard, >Profit/Rothbard, >Rate of profit/Rothbard, >Gain and Loss/Rothbard. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Intentionality | Dennett | Rorty VI 27 Rorty: "Intentional stance"/intentional position/Dennett: The "intentional stance" is made possible through the detection of a Davidsonian pattern. The pattern of this rationality is the same as that of the truth. Neither language without rationality, nor one of them without truth. >Rationality, >Language and Thought, >Truth/Davidson. Dennett I 316f SearleVsDennett: This is only an "as-if intentionality". Intentionality/DennettVsSearle: But you have to start somewhere (if you want to avoid metaphysics). The first step in the right direction is hardly recognizable as a step towards meaning. Def intentional stance/Dennett: An attempt to determine what the designer (or Mother Nature) had in mind. Dennett II 46 It often allows large jumps in the conclusions without the ignorance of the underlying physics disturbing them. E.g. Antikythera mechanism: The fact that it was a planetarium results from the fact that it was a good planetarium! E.g. Martians wonder why there is so much excess capacity in the computer: Reason: chips became so cheap. This is a historical explanation, but it emanates from the intentional stance. E.g. Could archaeopteryx fly? They are not sure, but found that his claws were ideal for sitting on tree branches! So how did it get up there ...? I 321 Def design standpoint/Dennett: e.g. an alarm clock is (as opposed to stone) a designed object and is accessible to a sophisticated kind of predictions. (According to the design standpoint). When I press the buttons, something will happen a few hours later. But I do not need to know the laws of physics for that. Intentional stance/Dennett: E.g. chess computer. Nothing in the laws of physics forces the chess computer to make the next move, but nothing in its design either. >Cf. >Chess programs. Brandom I 109 Intention/Intentionality/Dennett: stance-stance: asserts that one cannot distinguish whether something really is an intentional system and whether it is being treated as such appropriately. I 591ff E.g. freezing/Dennett: E.g. assuming you have yourself frozen in order to be unfrozen in the 25th century. Upon whom can you rely? The example imitates the whole evolution. Dennett I 592ff Intentionality/Real/Derived/Dennett: E.g. freezing: the robot that takes care of you must be able to act independently. - It must believe in reward, but develops self-interest. - Question: is this kind of intentionality still derived? - If so, then our own is also merely derived - but that s splitting hairs. Important Argument: we ourselves are only those survival machines for our genes. I 596 Intentionality/SearleVsDennett: No machine, no vending machine either has intentionality. Freezing/DennettVsSearle: At some point intentionality is no longer derived, but real! >As-if-intentionality/Searle. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Interest | Kant | Gadamer I 55 Interest/Art/Kant/Gadamer: When Kant asks about the interest that is not empirically, but a priori, given to the beautiful, this question of the interest in the beautiful as opposed to the fundamental determination of the disinterestedness of aesthetic pleasure is a new question and makes the transition from the standpoint of taste to the standpoint of genius. >Taste/Kant, >Genius/Kant. The interesting significance of beauty is the actually moving problem of the Kantian aesthetic. >Aesthetics/Kant, >Art/Kant. Gadamer I 56 This is where Kant's own personal ideas come into play(1). For it is by no means, as we would expect, the art for whose sake Kant goes beyond " uninterested pleasure" ["interesseloses Wohlgefallen"] and asks about the interest in beauty. Nature/Kant: While Kant, who was taught by Rousseau, rejects the general conclusion of the refinement of the taste for beauty at all to the moral feeling, it is a matter of its own with the sense of the beauty of nature according to Kant. That nature is beautiful awakens an interest only in him who has "previously already well-founded his interest in the moral good". The interest in the beautiful in nature is therefore "morally related". By noticing the unintentional conformity of nature to our pleasure independent of all interest, thus a wonderful expediency of nature for us, it points to us as the ultimate purpose of creation, our "moral destiny".(2) 1. F. Schiller, Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung, Werke ed. Güntter u. Witkowski, Leipzig 1910ff., Teil 17, S. 480. 2. K.d.U. § 42 |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Interpretation | Ball | Gaus I 18 Interpretation/Ball: (...)interpretation is not an option but a necessity for the meaning-seeking creatures that we are. (...) my own ‘pluralistic’ and ‘problem-driven’ approach to the interpretation of texts in political theory[:] I want throughout to emphasize two points in particular: that not all interpretations are equally valid or valuable; and that interpretations are rationally criticizable and corrigible. Interpretation comes with the territory of being human. It is an activity from which humans cannot escape. Gaus I 19 Nor is there a neutral standpoint or Archimedean point from which to interpret and appraise any text, classic or otherwise. All interpretation implies, and originates in, some vantage point or standpoint. >Perspective, >Absoluteness. Ball, Terence. 2004. „History and the Interpretation of Texts“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Interpretation | Weber | Habermas III 153 Interpretation/Action/Weber/Habermas: the interpreter of an action only needs to determine "how the action would have proceeded if all circumstances and intentions of the co-interested parties had been known and if the means had been chosen in a strictly procedural rational manner, based on what we consider to be valid experience.(1) >Contrafactual conditional/Weber. Habermas: the more clearly an action corresponds to the procedural rational course of events, the less further psychological considerations are needed to explain it. >Purpose rationality, >Observation, >Actions, >Rationality. Habermas III 154 An action can be interpreted as more or less instrumentally rational. By proposing a rational interpretation, the interpreter himself takes a standpoint on the claim with which procedural rational actions occur; he himself leaves the attitude of a third person in favour of the attitude of one involved, which examines and, if necessary, criticizes a problematic claim of validity. >Validity claims, >Critique. 1. M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Köln 1964, S. 5. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Interrelation | Dilthey | Gadamer I 228 Interrelation/Dilthey/Gadamer: The decisive step that Dilthey's epistemological foundation of the humanities has to take is (...) that from the construction of the interrelation in the life experience of the individual the transition to the historical context is found, which is no longer experienced by any individual. Here it becomes necessary - despite all criticism of speculation - to replace real subjects with "logical subjects". >Subject/Dilthey, >Experience/Dilthey. Dilthey is aware of this awkwardness. But he says to himself that this in itself cannot be inadmissible, as long as the togetherness of individuals - for example in the unity of a generation or a nation - represents a spiritual reality that must be recognized as such, precisely because one cannot go back behind it in an explanatory way. Certainly, these are not real subjects. This is already taught by the fluidity of their boundaries; also, the individual individuals are only ever present with a part of their essence. Yet, according to Dilthey, it is not a question that statements can be made about such subjects. The historian does so constantly when he speaks of the deeds and destinies of peoples(1). The question now is how such statements can be justified epistemologically. >Epistemology/Dilthey. (...) the problem of history is not how context can be experienced and recognized at all, but how such connections should be recognizable which nobody has experienced as such. After all, there can be no doubt how Dilthey conceived the clarification of this problem from the phenomenon of understanding. Understanding is understanding of expression. Gadamer I 229 The new methodological clarity that [Dilthey] gained from following Husserl is that he finally integrated the notion of meaning, which arises from the causal relationship and integrated it with Husserl's logical investigations. Dilthey's notion of the structured nature of the soul life corresponded to the doctrine of the intentionality of consciousness in so far as it too describes not only a psychological fact but also a definition of the essence of consciousness in a phenomenological way. Every consciousness is consciousness of something, every behaviour is behaviour towards something. >Meaning/Dilthey, >Lebensphilosophie/Dilthey. Gadamer I 235 The fact that a structural interrelation can be understood from its own centre (...) corresponded (...) to the old principle of hermeneutics and the demand of historical thought that one must understand a time from within itself and not measure it with the measures of a present foreign to it. According to this scheme - so Dilthey thought - the knowledge of ever further historical contexts could be thought of and extended to universal historical knowledge, just as a word can only be fully understood from the whole sentence, the sentence only in the context of the whole text, indeed of the entire literature handed down. GadamerVsDilthey: The application of this scheme admittedly presupposes that the historical observer's attachment to the location can be overcome. But exactly this is the claim of the >historical consciousness to have a truly historical standpoint on everything. Thus Dilthey himself felt to be the true "completer" of the historical world view, because he was the one who sought to legitimize Gadamer I 236 the consciousness to historical consciousness. What his epistemological reflection sought to justify was basically nothing more than the magnificent epic self-forgetfulness of Ranke. However, the aesthetic self-forgetfulness was replaced by the sovereignty of an all-round and infinite understanding. The foundation of history in a psychology of understanding, as Dilthey envisioned it, places the historian in precisely that ideal simultaneity with his object that we call aesthetic and admire in Ranke. 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften V Il, 282ff. Georg Simmel tries to solve the same problem through the dialectics of experiential subjectivity and factual context - i.e. in the end psychologically. Cf. Brücke und Tür, p. 82f. 2. Ges. Schriften V Il, 291 "As the letters of a word life and history make sense." |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Irrationality | Weber | Habermas III 259 Irrationality/Weber/Habermas: Weber is interested in the origin of that irrational element which lies in giving oneself to professional work in a way that is incomprehensible from the standpoint of self-interest and which is characteristic of capitalist culture.(1) >Interest, >Culture, >Capitalism, >Explanation. Habermas III 260 Inner world asceticism/Weber/Habermas: of the individual in dealing with his/her own subjective nature as with the interaction partners corresponds to the blindness of obedience to God's per se irrational decision. >Interaction, >Subjectivity, >Obedience. Habermas: when the life form has irrational features, and not just a cultural peculiarity III 261 then they are actually on the same level as rationality. This contradiction can only be resolved if one can prove the merely partial, i.e. incomplete character of this historical form of ethical rationalization. >Rationality, >Rationalization. 1.M.Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, Vol. I Tübingen, 1963, p. 259. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Justification | Rorty | I 250 Justification/Rorty: E.g. through sensual data. Explanation/Rorty: causal. >Explanation, >Sense data. I 275 Explanation: Hardware, private - Justification: subjects, public. III 127 Def Final vocabulary/Rorty: we use it to tell the story of our life, sometimes with hindsight, sometimes looking forwards - "Final": because there is no standpoint outside it from which it can be justified - only circular justification is possible. >Vocabulary/Rorty. V 26ff Justification/Rawls: "with a justification that the others cannot reasonably reject" Rorty: this is in line with the "constructivist" view of a specific historic colective justification. VI 38 Justification/belief/behavior/truth/Davidson/Rorty: the need to justify our beliefs to ourselves produces a pattern of behavior. - We must perceive this with others in order to attribute beliefs to them. - Truth is not necessary as an additional standard for this. VI 72f RortyVsfact. The majority can certainly be wrong. So that might turn out later that something was not true. But was it justified? >Truth, >Assertibility, >Facts, >States if affairs. VI 237 Justification/Rorty: there is a human activity called "justification of beliefs" that you can explore historically and sociologically, but this activity has no goal called "truth" and therefore no goal called "knowledge". The question whether we achieve this goal, therefore, does not arise. >Recognition, >Epistemology, >Knowledge, >Progress. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Language | Humboldt | Gadamer I 442 Language/Humboldt/Gadamer: Modern thinking about language since Herder and Humboldt (...) wants to study how the naturalness of human language - an insight laboriously wrested from rationalism and orthodoxy - unfolds in the breadth of experience of the diversity of human language construction. In recognizing an organism in every language, it seeks to study, in comparative reflection, the fullness of the means which the human spirit has used to exercise its capacity for language. Gadamer I 443 The normative interest under which [Humboldt] compares the language structure of human languages does not (...) cancel out (...) the recognition of individuality, and that means the relative perfection of each individual. It is well known that Gadamer I 444 Humboldt learned to understand each language as a separate view of the world by examining the inner form in which the primordial human process of language formation differentiates itself. Behind this thesis is not only the idealistic philosophy, which emphasizes the subject's part in grasping the world, but also the metaphysics of individuality first developed by Leibniz. Cf. >Sapir-Whorf thesis, >Relativism, >Cultural relativism. Gadamer I 445 Foreign Languages/Humboldt: (...) Humboldt once said that learning a foreign language must be the acquisition of a new point of view in the previous world view, and continues: "Just because one always, more or less, transfers one's own world view, yes, one's own language view, into a foreign language, the success is not felt purely and completely"(1). >Language Acquisition. Gadamer: What is claimed here to be a limitation and a shortcoming (and rightly so from the standpoint of the linguist who has his or her own path of knowledge in mind), is in fact the fullness of hermeneutic experience. Form/Hermeneutics/Gadamer: Linguistic form and traditional content cannot be separated in hermeneutic experience. Culture/World View/Foreign Languages/Humboldt: No matter how much you put yourself in a foreign state of mind, you do not forget your own world view, yes, your own language view. Rather, the other world that confronts us there is not only a foreign one, insofar as it is a relationally different one. It has not only its own truth in itself, but also its own truth for us. Gadamer I 446 [Humboldt] recognized the living execution of speech, the linguistic energeia as the essence of language, and thus broke the dogmatism of the grammarians. From the concept of force, which guides all his thinking about language, he has in particular also put into perspective the question of the origin of language, which was particularly burdened by theological considerations. Origin of language/Humboldt: [Humboldt] rightly emphasizes that language is human from its very beginning(2). World/Gadamer: For mankind the world as a I 447 world is there, as it has no other existence for any living thing in the world. But this existence of the world is linguistically written. This is the actual core of the sentence that Humboldt expresses with a completely different intention, that languages are world views(1). What Humboldt is trying to say with this is that language asserts a kind of independent existence vis-à-vis the individual who belongs to a linguistic community and, as he or she grows into it, simultaneously introduces him or her to a certain world relationship and world behaviour. More important, however, is what this statement is based on: that language, for its part, does not claim an independent existence in relation to the world that is expressed in it. Not only is the world only world, as far as it is expressed - language has its actual existence only in the fact that the world is represented in it. The original humanity of language thus means at the same time the original linguistic nature of the human "being-in the-world". 1. W. von Humboldt, „Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaus ..“ (zuerst gedruckt 1836),§9. 2. Ebenda, S. 60 |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Meaning Theory | Foster | I 4 Meaning Theory/m.th./Foster: the meaning theory does not say what is "meaning" but it reveals what conditions it must meet. - Analog: Science theory does not explain what is the concept of a natural law, but it covers the canon of scientific methods. I 6 Meaning Theory/Foster: the extension of "means that p" is not determined by the truth value or the extensional structure of the sentence , which is used for "p". - It is an error to presuppose an intensional idiom for "that means" (presupposes what we are looking for). - Solution: Extension instead of intension. I 7 Meaning Theory/ Foster: examined language L: is about (contingent) facts - metalanguage: uses essentially methodological vocabulary (not contingent) to establish the theorems. I 11 Meaning Theory/truth theory/FosterVsDavidson: the truth condition is determined to set out the specific truth value in all circumstances. - Problem : Tarski: the scheme would correspond to a counterfactual condition "would be true if ... " - but the schema is indicative. I 17 Meaning Theory/Foster: Problem: all T-sentences of the Tarski schema ("Snow is white" is true iff snwo is white) remain true if one uses just something that preserves the truth values and the right side is a translation of the left. - It provides no meaning, only a truth-definition. A meaning Theory can arise when one knows that the conditions are met - i.e. that the truth th. is a meaning theory. I 19 But only if the theory is formulated in the same language as the object language - Because the theory is not really interpreting. Solution/Foster: We need the facts and the knowledge that the facts are truth-theoretical. I 20 Then the meaning theory is a single sentence: q *: " a truth theory T in L represents that ... " - I 21 ... if we are aware, we can find out what determines each selected sentence. - This implies the ability to interpret each sentence due to its structure , because it implies to perceive what each element contributes. ( >Compositionality) Per: that is interpretive. Vs: Problem: "notes that" is still intensional! I 22 E.g. someone who does not know what U denotes, could know the facts that U says . - Problem: if the meaning theory is purely extensional, then it is no longer interpreting. Summary: Meaning theory/Foster: is a meaning theory for an object language L0 in the design of an appropriate range of possible worlds if it exhausts all possible facts that allows our philosophical standpoint. This together with a finite set of axioms true, which provides for each L0 - sentence S the relevant canonical reformulation of the T-conditional. This would consist of the scheme "(w) (x is true-of-w, if w, then it would be the case that p)" by inserting the structural description (sound, character) of S for "p." Instead of "part-of" relation "material-part-of" is between x and y: if y is a world and x is an ordered pair whose first element is the class of all material things, and whose second element is the class of all ordered pairs of all the tangible things that are in the part-whole relation. |
Foster I John A. Foster "Meaning and Truth Theory" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Metaphysics | Wright | I 255 Def quietism/Wright Crispin: Quietism is the view that a significant metaphysical debate is impossible. One version has it that realistic and anti-realistic tendencies pursue the confused desire to get out of their own skin. >Realism, >Anti-realism. This is a wrong "divine point of view", from which the claim the objectivity of a linguistic practice can be examined. (This thesis is attributed to Wittgenstein, but this attribution again is disputed). >Objectivity, >Divine standpoint, >Relativism, >L. Wittgenstein. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Method | Watson | Slater I 29 Method/VsWatson/Watson: from a methodological standpoint, Watson and Rayner (1920)(1) present us basically with an uncontrolled case demonstration, sometimes referred to as an A-B single case design (i.e., a baseline followed by an intervention). That is, they report the presumed evocation of fear in a single subject and do not provide us any experimental controls for that demonstration. By today’s standards, this report would not likely be published in any top-tier journal. >Method/Behaviorism. 1. Watson, J. B., & Rayner, R. (1920). Conditioned emotional responses. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 3, 1–14. Thomas H. Ollendick, Thomas M. Sherman, Peter Muris, and Neville J. King, “Conditioned Emotional Reactions. Beyond Watson and Rayner’s Little Albert”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Morals | Plato | Höffe I 23 Moral/Platon/Höffe: In Gorgias, Plato deals with a thesis, later made famous by Nietzsche, that morality is a conspiracy of the weak. Slave Morality/Nietzsche: Nietzsche will speak of slave morality and counter it with a master morality. Cf. >Morals/Nietzsche, >Customs/morality7Nietzsche, >Justice/Nietzsche, >Slavery/Nietzsche, >Superhuman/Nietzsche. Plato: on the other hand, represents the thesis of harmony: There is no conflict between morality and the well understood self-interest. He does not deny that immoral action can occasionally be advantageous, but he claims that the advantages gained from moral action outweigh the profit gained from immoral action. The justification for the motto "rather suffer injustice than do injustice" is therefore not "moralising", Höffe I 24 with reference to the unsurpassable dignity of morality, but from the standpoint of enlightened self-interest. >Polis/Plato, >Politics/Plato. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Morals | Rorty | V 58 Science/morals/appearance/Kant/Rorty: that modern science describes a world without morals, is so, according to Kant, because it only describes phenomena. >Morals/Kant. V 69/70 Morality/ethics/psychology/psychoanalysis/Rorty: what metaphysics does not make, also cannot be made by the psychology - also Freud has no explanation of "moral motives". >Morals/Freud. V 78 Morals/content/Hegel/Rorty: the moral standpoint has no content. >Principles. V 89 Morality/justice/universality/Rawls/Rorty: a general moral concept can not provide the basis for a public concept of justice - instead: conflicting and incommensurable concepts must be taken into account. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| National Economy | Marx | Höffe I 364 National Economy/Marx/Höffe: (...) Marx [seeks] to show how a national economy which is designed from the standpoint of the capitalists who own the means of production, among their own assumptions did not achieve its claimed goal. MarxVsSmith, Adam: While Smith, according to the title of his work, promises the "prosperity of nations"(2), in truth, according to Marx, the crass opposite takes place: an impoverishment, eventually impoverishment of the worker. Profit: The capital utilization aiming at profit increase favors on the one hand the large capital, because it destroys the small capital and seizes the property. Labor: On the other hand, it leads to an abundance of labor, which pushes the wage below the subsistence level. Impoverishment: Later, Marx abandoned the idea of absolute impoverishment. He only claims that the wage does not keep pace with the growing wealth of the capital owners (...). >Adam Smith. 1. K. Marx, Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte (1844) (Pariser Manuskripte) 2. A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 1776 |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Natural Beauty | Hegel | Gadamer I 64 Natural Beauty/Hegel/Gadamer: In contrast to Kant, [in German idealism] the standpoint of art as that of unconsciously ingenious production became all-encompassing and included nature, which is understood as a product of the mind.(1) >Aesthetics/Fichte. But with it the foundations of aesthetics have shifted. Like the concept of taste, the concept of natural beauty is devalued, or understood differently. The moral interest in the beauty of nature, which Kant had described so enthusiastically, now takes a back seat to the self-encounter of man in the works of art. Aesthetics/Hegel. Hegel/Gadamer: In Hegel's great aesthetics, the beauty of nature now only appears as a "reflex of the spirit". It is basically no longer an independent moment in the systematic whole of aesthetics(2). Obviously it is the indeterminacy with which beautiful nature presents itself to the interpreting and understanding mind that justifies saying with Hegel that it is "preserved in spirit according to its substance"(3). It is undeniable that the judgement about the beauty of a landscape depends on the artistic taste of an era. One thinks, for example, of the depiction of the ugliness of the Alpine landscape that we still encounter in the 18th century - obviously a reflex of the spirit of artificial symmetry that has dominated the century of Gadamer I 65 absolutism. Aesthetics/Hegel: Thus Hegel's aesthetics is entirely on the standpoint of art. In art, man meets himself, spirit meets spirit. >Art/Hegel. 1. To what extent the change that occurred between Kant and his successors, which I try to characterize by the formula "standpoint of art", has obscured the universal phenomenon of the beautiful, can be taught by the first Schlegelfragment (Friedrich Schlegel, Fragmente, From the Lyceums 1797): "One mentions many artists who are actually works of art of nature". This turn of phrase echoes Kant's justification of the concept of genius in terms of the favour of nature, but is so little appreciated that it becomes, on the contrary, an objection against an artistry that is too little aware of itself. 2.. Vgl. Hegel, Sämtl. Werke, ed. Lasson, Bd. Xa, 1. Halbband (Die Idee und das Ideal), S. Xllff. IVgl. 2. 3. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik, ed. Lasson. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Observation | Sraffa | Kurz I 72 Observation/Sraffa/Kurz: [Sraffa] introduces and compares different observers with specific analytical attitudes and investigates how these attitudes may be useful to or detrimental for grasping some specific aspects of the object under investigation. This procedure explains why Sraffa is particularly attentive in separating the elements which are part of the object under analysis and those which depend on the special theoretical lenses used by the observer: in our view Sraffa’s implicit assumption is that theoretical lenses are indeed required for the investigation to be carried out and therefore an effort is to be made in order to choose which are the best ones in the given situation. >Method/Sraffa. Kurz I 79 In the Preface to PC(1) Sraffa introduces one object of analysis, ‘the properties of an economic system’ which ‘do not depend on changes in the scale of production or in the proportions of factors’, and two observers of that object. The former observer is introduced as (i) ‘anyone accustomed to think in terms of the equilibrium of demand and supply’, the latter as (ii) the scholar adopting the ‘standpoint … of the old classical economists from Adam Smith to Ricardo’. According to Sraffa, observers (i) and (ii) adopt two different attitudes towards the object under investigation. Such differences have a direct bearing on the observer’s ability to comprehend it. Observer (i) ‘may be induced’ by the symmetrical theory of value to interpret a model in which demand conditions play no explicit analytical role in price determination as a model based on an implicit assumption of constant returns to scale. Observer (ii) appears to be better equipped than observer (i) to perform the task of studying the properties of the object under investigation: „In a system in which, day after day, production continued unchanged in those respects, the marginal product of a factor (or alternatively the marginal cost of a product) would not merely be hard to find - it just would not be there to be found.“ (Sraffa 1960: v) Kurz I 81 Surplus/Method/Sraffa: In Chapter II of PC(1) Sraffa introduces an economy which ‘produces more than the minimum necessary for replacement and there is a surplus to be Kurz I 82 distributed’ (p. 6). The observer-Sraffa remarks: ‘the system becomes selfcontradictory’. This ‘contradiction’, however, is not inherent in the object under observation. Thus Sraffa’s remark amounts to a warning concerning the observer and her theoretical schemes: the observer would fall into a contradiction if she analysed the object ‘production with a surplus’ by means of the same analytical tools used for the object ‘production for subsistence’. A different theoretical scheme is needed. Kurz: In our view Sraffa’s warning is justified by the fact that at least two substantive differences exist between the object of Chapter I and the object of Chapter II: the existence of a surplus, in fact, determines the necessity for the observer (i) to choose a rule for the distribution of the surplus; and (ii) to distinguish between basic commodities and non-basic commodities. 1. Sraffa, P. (1960). Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Salvadori, Neri and Signorino, Rodolfo. 2015. „Piero Sraffa: economic reality, the economist and economic theory. An interpretation.“ In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. |
Sraffa I Piero Sraffa Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Cambridge 1960 Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 |
| Optimism Bias | Experimental Psychology | Parisi I 104 Optimism/Experimental psychology/Ryan-Wilkinson: (...) the well-known finding that humans are overly optimistic or overconfident on various dimensions (e.g., Weinstein 1980(1), 1989(2)) (...) is a true cognitive error, in the sense that we know that people are getting certain answers objectively wrong. For example, in Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1977)(3), participants gave estimates and answers to difficult Parisi I 105 questions and had to quantify their confidence; they were, objectively speaking, much too sure that they had answered correctly. What makes this an interesting question from a normative standpoint, though, is that even in the case of a clear bias, a phenomenon that results in wrong answers, there is extensive evidence that the bias is overall helpful and quite adaptive. Positive illusions are associated with better adjustment and coping skills (e.g., Taylor and Armor, 1996)(4); indeed, failure to show this bias has been associated with clinical depression (e.g., Allan, Siegel, and Hannah, 2007)(5). >Cognitive biases, >Problem solving. 1. Weinstein, Neil D. (1980). “Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 39: 806–820. 2. Weinstein, Neil D. (1989). “Optimistic Biases About Personal Risks.” Science 246: 1232–1233. 3. Fischhoff, Baruch, Paul Slovic, and Sarah Lichtenstein (1977). “Knowing with Certainty: The Appropriateness of Extreme Confidence.” Journal of Experimental Psychology 3: 552–564. 4. Taylor, Shelley E. and David A. Armor (1996). “Positive Illusions and Coping with Adversity.” Journal of Personality 64: 873–898. 5. Allan, Lorraine G., Shepard Siegel, and Samuel Hannah (2007). “The Sad Truth About Depressive Realism.” Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 60: 482–495. Wilkinson-Ryan, Tess. „Experimental Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Personality Traits | Allport | Corr II 29 Trait-names/personality traits/lexicon/study background/ Allport/Odbert/Saucier: The essence of [Allport’s and Odbert’s article ‘Trait-names: A psycho-lexical study’] was a classification of (…) English ‘trait-name’ words (terms distinguishing the behavior of one human being from another) into four categories. (…) from a scientific standpoint, some of the most basic personality attributes might be discovered from studying conceptions implicit in use of the natural language. If a distinction is highly represented in the lexicon – and found in any dictionary – it can be presumed to have practical importance. This is because the degree of representation of an attribute in language has some correspondence with the general importance of the attribute in real-world transactions. Therefore, when a scientist identifies personality attributes that are strongly represented in the natural language, that scientist is simultaneously identifying what may be the most important attributes. >H.S. Odbert, >G. Allport. II 30 Study Design/Allport/Odbert: Allport and Odbert turned to Webster’s New International Dictionary (1925)(1), a compendium of approximately 400,000 separate terms. Combining judgments of three investigators (themselves plus a person designated only as ‘AL’, (…)), they built a list of 17,953 trait-names in the English language that drew on the following criterion for inclusion: ‘the capacity of any term to distinguish the behavior of one human being from that of another’ (p. 24) (1). Allport and Odbert went further and differentiated terms into four categories or columns. The (…) terms in Column I were ‘neutral terms designating possible II 31 personal traits’ (p. 38)(1), more specifically defined as ‘generalized and personalized determining tendencies – consistent and stable modes of an individual’s adjustment’ to his/her environment (p. 26)(1). The (…) terms in Column II were ‘terms primarily descriptive of temporary moods or activities’ (…). The (…) terms in Column III were ‘weighted terms conveying social and characterial judgments of personal conduct, or designated influence on others’ (p. 27)(1) (…).The other (…) terms fell into the miscellaneous category in Column IV, labeled as ‘metaphorical and doubtful terms’ (p. 38)(1). This last grab-bag category included terms describing physical characteristics and various abilities (…). II 33 Findings/Allport/Odbert: 1. Allport and Odbert cogently argue that, basically, normal human life cannot proceed without some reference to personality dispositions. There is no better argument than their trenchant words from the monograph: “Even the psychologist who inveighs against traits, and denies that their symbolic existence conforms to ‘real existence’ will nevertheless write a convincing letter of recommendation to prove that one of his favorite students is ‘trustworthy, self-reliant, and keenly critical’” (pp. 4–5)(1). 2. Allport and Odbert indicate that the dispositions to which trait-names refer are more than conversational artifact, a form of everyday error (though in part they may be that). They are to some degree useful for understanding and prediction, as confirmed by later research (Roberts et al., 2007)(3). [The follow-on assertion constitutes that] the degree of representation of an attribute in language has some correspondence with the general importance of the attribute in real-world transactions. II 34 3. (…) science can lean on and build on the body of commonsense concepts in language. Rather than relying exclusively on the top-down gambits of theorists, there is opportunity for a generative bottom-up approach. II 35 4. (…) Allport and Odbert recognized a difficulty inherent in personality language: trait-names mean different things to different people. To a degree, these meanings are contingent on one’s ‘habits of thought’ (p. 4)(1). One reason builds on the polysemy (multiple distinct meanings) that many words have. 5. Within science, the difficulty might be even further resolved by explicit communication and consensus. For Allport and Odbert, this meant naming traits in a careful and logical way, and not merely codifying but also ‘purifying’ natural-language terminology (p. vi)(1). II 36 6. Allport and Odbert’s prime interest was in tendencies that are ‘consistent and stable modes of an individual’s adjustment to his environment’ rather than ‘merely temporary and specific behavior’ (p. 26)(1). 7. (…) trait-names reflect a combination of the biophysical influences and something more cultural (perhaps historically varying). (…) characterizations of human qualities are determined partly by ‘standards and interests peculiar to the times’ (p. 2)(1) in a particular social epoch. [In this way] culture, trait-names are partly ‘invented in accordance with cultural demands’ (p. 3)(1). II 37 VsAllport/VsOdbert: 1. (…) they ignore and give short-shrift to culture, both with regard to issues of cross-cultural generalizability and of how traits themselves may reflect culture-relevant contents. 2. According to their distinctive ‘trait hypothesis’ (p. 12), no two persons ‘possess precisely the same trait’ (p. 14)(1) and each ‘individual differs in every one of his traits from every other individual’ (p. 18)(1). The problem is not that individualism is wrong; rather, it may be ethnocentric to impose an individualistic filter throughout personality psychology, and in fact such idiothetic approaches are outside the mainstream of current and recent personality psychology. II 38 3. Another aspect of the thinking (…) that might appear odd, in retrospect, is the notion of a single, cardinal trait that provides determining tendencies in an individual life. (…) a particular attribute becomes so pervasive in a person that it becomes a distinct focus of organization. Seventy years later, there seems still to be a lack of evidence for cardinal traits that perform a more or less hostile take-over, coming to determine and structure the remainder of the personality system. II 39 4. Allport and Odbert argue for the desirability of neutral terminology in science. Unfortunately, it appears that they extend the desire for unweighted emotion-free vocabulary into the very attribute-contents evident in the trait-names in language, with confusing consequences. On this view, the trait-names in language that are judgmental and ‘emotionally toned’ (p. v)(1), having affective polarity, are suspect and less worthy of study than the neutral ones. But affectively toned concepts like evil and virtue are particularly worthy of study particularly because of their extreme affective tone (…). II 40 5. (…) the numerically largest category of trait-names was social evaluation. However, they offer no account for why the third column – reflecting social judgments likely unconnected with biophysical traits – would be the biggest component in person perception. 6. (…) the notion that censorial and moral terms – and virtues, II 41 vices, whatever is associated with blame or praise, not to mention social effects – have no use for a psychologist seems now obsolete. 7. To accept at face value the particular Allport and Odbert classification of trait-names into four categories is to take on the assumptions of a specialized theory of traits, whose main propositions can be construed based on the classification itself. (…) attention to emotions and morality would distract us from the central aspects of personality which reflect enduring consistencies operating intrinsically in the person, and outside the influence of society (…). 1. Webster’s new international dictionary of the English language (1925). Springfield, MA: Merriam. 2. Allport, G. W., & Odbert, H. S. (1936). Trait-names: A psycho-lexical study. Psychological Monographs, 47 (1, Whole No. 211). 3. Roberts, B. W., Kuncel, N. R., Shiner, R., Caspi, A., & Goldberg, L. R. (2007). The power of personality: The comparative validity of personality traits, socioeconomic status, and cognitive ability for predicting important life outcomes. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2, 313–345. Saucier, Gerard: “Classification of Trait-Names Revisiting Allport and Odbert (1936)”, In: Philip Corr (Ed.), 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, pp. 29-45. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Personality Traits | Odbert | Corr II 29 Trait-names/personality traits/lexicon/study background/ Allport/Odbert/Saucier: The essence of [Allport’s and Odbert’s article ‘Trait-names: A psycho-lexical study’] was a classification of (…) English ‘trait-name’ words (terms distinguishing the behavior of one human being from another) into four categories. >Lexical hypothesis, >Lexical studies. (…) from a scientific standpoint, some of the most basic personality attributes might be discovered from studying conceptions implicit in use of the natural language. >Everyday language, >Concepts, >Language use, >Language community, >Personality, >Character traits. If a distinction is highly represented in the lexicon – and found in any dictionary – it can be presumed to have practical importance. This is because the degree of representation of an attribute in language has some correspondence with the general importance of the attribute in real-world transactions. Therefore, when a scientist identifies personality attributes that are strongly represented in the natural language, that scientist is simultaneously identifying what may be the most important attributes. >Relevance. II 30 Study Design/Allport/Odbert: Allport and Odbert turned to Webster’s New International Dictionary (1925)(1), a compendium of approximately 400,000 separate terms. Combining judgments of three investigators (themselves plus a person designated only as ‘AL’, (…)), they built a list of 17,953 trait-names in the English language that drew on the following criterion for inclusion: ‘the capacity of any term to distinguish the behavior of one human being from that of another’ (p. 24) (1). Allport and Odbert went further and differentiated terms into four categories or columns. The (…) terms in Column I were ‘neutral terms designating possible II 31 personal traits’ (p. 38)(1), more specifically defined as ‘generalized and personalized determining tendencies – consistent and stable modes of an individual’s adjustment’ to his/her environment (p. 26)(1). The (…) terms in Column II were ‘terms primarily descriptive of temporary moods or activities’ (…). The (…) terms in Column III were ‘weighted terms conveying social and characterial judgments of personal conduct, or designated influence on others’ (p. 27)(1) (…).The other (…) terms fell into the miscellaneous category in Column IV, labeled as ‘metaphorical and doubtful terms’ (p. 38)(1). This last grab-bag category included terms describing physical characteristics and various abilities (…). II 33 Findings/Allport/Odbert: 1. Allport and Odbert cogently argue that, basically, normal human life cannot proceed without some reference to personality dispositions. There is no better argument than their trenchant words from the monograph: “Even the psychologist who inveighs against traits, and denies that their symbolic existence conforms to ‘real existence’ will nevertheless write a convincing letter of recommendation to prove that one of his favorite students is ‘trustworthy, self-reliant, and keenly critical’” (pp. 4–5)(1). 2. Allport and Odbert indicate that the dispositions to which trait-names refer are more than conversational artifact, a form of everyday error (though in part they may be that). They are to some degree useful for understanding and prediction, as confirmed by later research (Roberts et al., 2007)(3). [The follow-on assertion constitutes that] the degree of representation of an attribute in language has some correspondence with the general importance of the attribute in real-world transactions. >Dispositions, >Representation. II 34 3. (…) science can lean on and build on the body of commonsense concepts in language. Rather than relying exclusively on the top-down gambits of theorists, there is opportunity for a generative bottom-up approach. II 35 4. (…) Allport and Odbert recognized a difficulty inherent in personality language: trait-names mean different things to different people. To a degree, these meanings are contingent on one’s ‘habits of thought’ (p. 4)(1). One reason builds on the polysemy (multiple distinct meanings) that many words have. >Conventions, >Language use, >Language community, >Meaning, >Reference. 5. Within science, the difficulty might be even further resolved by explicit communication and consensus. For Allport and Odbert, this meant naming traits in a careful and logical way, and not merely codifying but also ‘purifying’ natural-language terminology (p. vi)(1). II 36 6. Allport and Odbert’s prime interest was in tendencies that are ‘consistent and stable modes of an individual’s adjustment to his environment’ rather than ‘merely temporary and specific behavior’ (p. 26)(1). 7. (…) trait-names reflect a combination of the biophysical influences and something more cultural (perhaps historically varying). (…) characterizations of human qualities are determined partly by ‘standards and interests peculiar to the times’ (p. 2)(1) in a particular social epoch. [In this way] culture, trait-names are partly ‘invented in accordance with cultural demands’ (p. 3)(1). II 37 VsAllport/VsOdbert: 1. (…) they ignore and give short-shrift to culture, both with regard to issues of cross-cultural generalizability and of how traits themselves may reflect culture-relevant contents. 2. According to their distinctive ‘trait hypothesis’ (p. 12), no two persons ‘possess precisely the same trait’ (p. 14)(1) and each ‘individual differs in every one of his traits from every other individual’ (p. 18)(1). The problem is not that individualism is wrong; rather, it may be ethnocentric to impose an individualistic filter throughout personality psychology, and in fact such idiothetic approaches are outside the mainstream of current and recent personality psychology. II 38 3. Another aspect of the thinking (…) that might appear odd, in retrospect, is the notion of a single, cardinal trait that provides determining tendencies in an individual life. (…) a particular attribute becomes so pervasive in a person that it becomes a distinct focus of organization. Seventy years later, there seems still to be a lack of evidence for cardinal traits that perform a more or less hostile take-over, coming to determine and structure the remainder of the personality system. II 39 4. Allport and Odbert argue for the desirability of neutral terminology in science. Unfortunately, it appears that they extend the desire for unweighted emotion-free vocabulary into the very attribute-contents evident in the trait-names in language, with confusing consequences. On this view, the trait-names in language that are judgmental and ‘emotionally toned’ (p. v)(1), having affective polarity, are suspect and less worthy of study than the neutral ones. But affectively toned concepts like evil and virtue are particularly worthy of study particularly because of their extreme affective tone (…). II 40 5. (…) the numerically largest category of trait-names was social evaluation. However, they offer no account for why the third column – reflecting social judgments likely unconnected with biophysical traits – would be the biggest component in person perception. 6. (…) the notion that censorial and moral terms – and virtues, II 41 vices, whatever is associated with blame or praise, not to mention social effects – have no use for a psychologist seems now obsolete. 7. To accept at face value the particular Allport and Odbert classification of trait-names into four categories is to take on the assumptions of a specialized theory of traits, whose main propositions can be construed based on the classification itself. (…) attention to emotions and morality would distract us from the central aspects of personality which reflect enduring consistencies operating intrinsically in the person, and outside the influence of society (…). 1. Webster’s new international dictionary of the English language (1925). Springfield, MA: Merriam. 2. Allport, G. W., & Odbert, H. S. (1936). Trait-names: A psycho-lexical study. Psychological Monographs, 47 (1, Whole No. 211). 3. Roberts, B. W., Kuncel, N. R., Shiner, R., Caspi, A., & Goldberg, L. R. (2007). The power of personality: The comparative validity of personality traits, socioeconomic status, and cognitive ability for predicting important life outcomes. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2, 313–345. Saucier, Gerard: “Classification of Trait-Names Revisiting Allport and Odbert (1936)”, In: Philip Corr (Ed.), 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, pp. 29-45. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Perspective | Nozick | II 22 Perspective/Nozick: it is true of all perspectives that each perspective is particular. These relational facts are about one perspective but they are independent of each perspective. Cf. >Objectivity/Nagel. One can identify a point of view quite different from the way the world looks from it. >Point of view, >Truth, >Facts, >Relations, cf. >Way of givenness. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Postmodernism | Ball | Gaus I 25 Postmodernism/Ball: The interpretive standpoint or perspective of postmodernism arises out of ‘the postmodern condition’ of fragmentation and the failure of systematic philosophies or ‘grand metanarratives’ such as Hegelianism and Marxism that emerged from the European Enlightenment (Lyotard, 1984)(1). Postmodernism is not a single, unified perspective; nor, still less, is it a systematic philosophy shared by all who call themselves postmodernists. This diffuse group includes Mikhail Bakhtin, Paul de Man, Roland Barthes, Jean-François Lyotard and Jacques Derrida (literary critics and semioticians), Michel Foucault (social historian and genealogist), Jacques Lacan (psychoanalyst), Gaston Bachelard (historian of science), Jean Baudrillard (cultural theorist and critic), Richard Rorty (philosopher), and William E. Connolly (political theorist), among many others. All respond, in different ways, to the postmodern condition of fragmentation, discontinuity, disillusionment, and contingency. History: The world is not as coherent, continuous and comprehensible as earlier (and especially Enlightenment) thinkers believed. Even our most basic beliefs are historically contingent (Rorty, 1989)(2). Pace Hegel and Marx, history has no larger point or ‘meaning’ discernible via an overarching philosophy of history or ‘grand narrative’ (Lyotard, 1984)(1). Progress: Nor is there progress in human affairs. What is called progress is more often than not an advance in some dominant group’s power to oppress another. Advances in technology – in communications technology, say – increase the opportunity for surveillance and suppression (Foucault), and mass media promote one-dimensional views of truth, beauty, normality, and morality that perpetuate and legitimize the modern consumer society and those who profit from it (Baudrillard). >Deconstruction/Derrida, >Truth/Postmodernism. 1. Lyotard, J.F. 1984. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 2. Rorty, R. 1989. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ball, Terence. 2004. „History and the Interpretation of Texts“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Prejudice | Schleiermacher | Gadamer I 283 Prejudice/Schleiermacher/Gadamer: Schleiermacher [writes] that he distinguishes between bias and haste as causes of misunderstanding(1). Cf. >Prejudice/Enlightenment, >Prejudice/Gadamer. [Schleiermacher] puts the permanent prejudices of bias next to the current misjudgements of haste (>Prejudice/Descartes). But only the former are interested in the scientific methodology. GadamerVsSchleiermacher: The fact that among the prejudices that fill those in authority, there can also be those who have truth - and this was inherent in the concept of authority - does not even occur to Schleiermacher. His modification of the traditional classification of prejudices documents the completion of the Enlightenment. Bias now only means an individual barrier to understanding: "The one-sided preference for what is close to the individual circle of ideas"(1). Gadamer: In truth, however, the decisive question is hidden under the concept of bias. The fact that the prejudices that determine me originate from my bias is itself already judged from the standpoint of its dissolution and enlightenment and applies only to unjustified prejudices. Even if there are also justified prejudices that are productive for knowledge, the problem of authority returns for us. The radical consequences of the Enlightenment, which are also contained in Schleiermacher's methodological beliefs, are not tenable in this way. 1. Schleiermacher Werke I, 7, S. 31 |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Procedural Rationality | Weber | Habermas III 152 Procedural Rationality/Max Weber/Habermas: Weber subjectively refers to a purpose-oriented action, "which is exclusively oriented towards (subjectively) as appropriately presented means for (subjectively) unambiguously conceived purposes." (1) Habermas III 154 An action can be interpreted as more or less procedural rational. By proposing a rational interpretation, the interpreter himself takes a standpoint on the claim with which procedural rational actions occur; he himself leaves the attitude of a third person in favour of the attitude of one involved, which examines and, if necessary, criticizes a problematic claim of validity. >Validity claims, >Interpretation, >Observation. Habermas III 245 Weber calls actions that satisfy the conditions of the rationality of means and choice 'procedural rational' and actions that satisfy the conditions of normative rationality are called 'value-rational'. Both aspects can vary independently of each other. Progress in the dimension of procedural rationality can be made at the expense of value-rational actions. (2) >Value rationality. 1.M Weber, Methodologische Schriften, Frankfurt/M. 1968, p. 170. 2.M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, (Ed.) J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964, p. 22. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Properties | Chisholm | I 20 Properties/Chhisholm: Problem: E.g. ""french" is not applicable to itself": here one cannot say that it has the property, not to itself ... otherwise paradox. >Grelling's paradox/heterology. Solution: "... has not the property ... "- not every predicate is a property - so not every sentence expresses a proposition. >Sentences, >Propositions, >Predication. I 24 Properties/Chisholm: no conjunctions: E.g. "wise and bigger than this man" is not a property - "living opposite" is not a property. I 170 Properties/Chisholm: "greater than" is no property, not even "greater than z", etc. - No predicative expression containing free variables has a property as meaning. --- II 67 Properties/Chisholm: is not a conjunctive property: E.g. e(thinking and (non-thinking or thinking) would not be a conjunctive property of the partial properties of e(thinking) - Involving: a involves b iff b is a partial property of a. II 75 Synthetic apriori/SauerVsChisholm: from the standpoint of property inclusion, there seems to be no synthetic apriori - under the one of property existence no analytic apriori - since aprioricity implies necessity, because the equivalence between necessity and existence exists in all possible worlds, there can be no Chisholm-apriori. Sauer, W. Über das Analytische und das synthetische Apriori bei Chisholm. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 --- Frank I 362 Properties/Chisholm: the non-comparative form is basic: one thinks that something is red before one thinks two things are the same red. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Psychological Development | Psychological Theories | Upton I 5 Psychological Development/Psychological theories/Upton: Complete theories of development are rare in contemporary psychology, according to Miller 2002(1) who defines a theory as a set of interconnected statements including definitions, axioms, postulates, hypothetical constructs, laws and testable hypotheses, which describe unobservable structures, mechanisms or processes and relate them to observable events. Developmental theories serve as frames of reference for examining change in specific aspects of mind or behaviour, such as cognition or emotional functioning. Upton I 6 The most significant approaches from a developmental standpoint include psychodynamic, learning, constructivist and social constructivist perspectives. >Stages of development, >Developmental psychology, >Socialization, >Adolescence, >Adulthood, >Aging, >Early childhood. 1. Miller, P H. (2002). Theories of Developmental Psychology (4th edition). New York: Worth Publishers. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Quietism | Wright | I 255 Def quietism/Wright Crispin: Quietism is the view that a significant metaphysical debate is impossible. >Metaphysics. One version has it that realistic and anti-realistic tendencies pursue the confused desire to get out of their own skin. >Realism, >Anti-realism. This is a wrong "divine point of view", from which the claim the objectivity of a linguistic practice can be examined. (This thesis is attributed to Wittgenstein, but this attribution again is disputed). >Objectivity, >Divine standpoint, >Relativism, >L. Wittgenstein. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Realism | Searle | II 87 Realism, naive/SearleVs: naive realism is right that the material objects and experiences are the typical objects of perception. But the realism overlooks the fact that they can only be it because perception has an intentional content. II 199 Realism/Searle: realism has no hypothesis or belief, realism belongs to the background. >Terminology/Searle. I am set to the background. Realism is a prerequisite for hypotheses and being determined to realism itself is not a hypothesis. III 160f External Realism/Searle: external realism must still differ between representation-independent (e.g. stars) and mind-independent (also stars), e.g. pain is representation-independent but not mind-independent. Cf. >Internal realism. III 165 Realism/Searle: thesis: realism says that there is an independent reality, not about how it is designed, no theory of language, no theory of representation, but ontological. III 163f Realism/Searle: realism should not be confused with the correspondence theory, it is no theory of truth but a condition for our hypotheses. It is compatible with any truth theory because it is a theory of ontology and not the meaning of "true". There is no semantic theory. Putnam understands realism epistemically: the realism asserts that it would be reasonable to assume a divine standpoint. SearleVsPutnam: accepting a mistake that reality determines itself what vocabulary is appropriate. III 165 Searle: realism is not a theory of language. VsTradition: N.B.: realism is not a theory about how the world "really" is. Reason: we could be wrong about all the details, and the realism can nevertheless be true. Definition realism/Searle: the view that there is a way of being of the things that is logically independent of all representations, it does not say how things are. III 166 Realism/Searle: arguments against the existence of things are claims about the external reality like any other. They presuppose the realism just as others do. The non-existence of things ((s) "out there") would be a property of that representation-independent reality. III 191 External Realism/Searle: external realism is a condition for understanding other hypotheses. III 193 ff Realism: thesis: realism has no hypothesis, but conditions for any hypotheses. Realism is part of the background. >Background/Searle. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Reality | Seel | Seel III 161 Reality/Seel: the fact that reality cannot be spoken of independently of its accessibility does not mean that there is no independent reality. If everything were only a function of our thinking and speaking, there would be no comprehensible thinking and speaking. We would have no sense of perspective. Therefore, there is no "disappearance of reality". That would only be possible if reality existed as something independent. VsMedia Theory. >Realism, >Metaphysical Realism, >Perspective, >Standpoint, >Media theory, >Media, >Understanding, >World/thinking, >World. |
Seel I M. Seel Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997 Seel II M. Seel Ästhetik des Erscheinens München 2000 Seel III M. Seel Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001 |
| Reference | Evans | I 314ff To mean/reference/divine standpoint/Wittgenstein/Evans: for example, someone is in love with one of two identical twins - God, if he could look into his/her head, could not tell with which of them the person is in love, if the person itself does not know in a moment. ((s) Because no additional information could be found in the mental state and in the twin.)- Evans: the (description-) theory of the mind cannot explain why erroneous descriptions cannot give the impetus. I 325 Reference/Evans: Reference is also possible if the description is not fulfilled, but not designation. I 328 Reference/Names/Evans: in general, we refer to the thing that is the source of the prevailing information. I 333ff Reference/Evans: reference is defined by information sets, not by fitting. --- Frank I 22 Evans: between Frege and Perry: saves Fregean sense, but meaning = reference! I 24ff Meaning unequal Reference/Evans: e.g. "today": the meaning remains, the speaker changes. > "Fido"-Fido-Theory/Evans: equals the meaning and the reference: > I/Evans. Frank I 503 EvansVsGeach/EvansVsStrawson: one aspect of the reference is to make your audience do something. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Reflection | Gadamer | I 347 Reflection/History of Effects/Hermeneutics/Gadamer: Our whole presentation about horizon formation and horizon fusion should (...) describe the full extent of the consciousness of the history of effects. >History of Effect/Gadamer, >Hermeneutics/Gadamer, >Understanding/Gadamer. But what kind of consciousness is this? Here lies the crucial problem. No matter how much one emphasizes that the consciousness of the history of effects is, as it were, inserted into the effect itself. As consciousness it seems to be essentially in the possibility to rise above what it is consciousness of. The structure of reflexivity is basically given with all consciousness. It must therefore also apply to the awareness of the history of effects. Doesn't this force us to agree with Hegel, and doesn't the absolute mediation of history and truth, as Hegel thinks, appear to be the foundation of hermeneutics? Ultimately, it is Hegel's position that legitimizes [19th century historism], even if the historians who were inspired by the pathos of experience preferred to refer to Schleiermacher and Wilhelm von Humboldt instead. GadamerVsSchleiermacher/GadamerVsHumboldt: Neither Schleiermacher nor Humboldt have really thought their position through. They may emphasize the individuality, the barrier of strangeness that our understanding has to overcome, but in the end only in an infinite consciousness the understanding finds its completion and the thought of individuality its justification. Hegel/Gadamer: It is the pantheistic enclosure of all individuality in the Absolute that makes the miracle of understanding possible. Thus, here too, being and knowledge permeate each other in I 348 the Absolute. Neither Schleiermacher's nor Humboldt's Kantianism is thus an independent systematic affirmation of the speculative completion of idealism in Hegel's absolute dialectic. The criticism of the philosophy of reflection(1) that Hegel meets, meets with them. VsHegel/Gadamer: For us it is about thinking of the historical consciousness of the effect in such a way that in the consciousness of the effect the immediacy and superiority of the work does not dissolve again into a mere reflexion reality, thus to think of a reality where the omnipotence of reflection is limited. This was precisely the point against which the criticism of Hegel was directed, and at which in truth the principle of the philosophy of reflection proved to be superior to all his critics. >Reflection/Hegel. I 350 VsReflection Philosophy/Gadamer: [The] question arises how far the dialectical superiority of reflection philosophy corresponds to a factual truth and how far it merely creates a formal appearance. The fact that the criticism of speculative thinking, which is practiced from the standpoint of finite human consciousness, contains something true, cannot be obscured by the argumentation of the philosophy of reflection in the end. >Young Hegelians/Gadamer. Examples for reflection/Gadamer: That the thesis of scepticism or relativism wants to be true itself and in this respect cancels itself out is an irrefutable argument. But does it achieve anything? The argument of reflection, which proves to be so victorious, rather strikes back at the arguing party by making the truth value of reflection appear suspicious. It is not the reality of skepticism or relativism that is affected by this, but the truth claim of formal argumentation in general. 1. The expression philosophy of reflection has been coined by Hegel against Jacobi, Kant and Fichte. Already in the title of "Glauben und Wissen" but as a "philosophy of reflection of subjectivity". Hegel himself counters it with the reflection of reason. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Rigidity | Kamp | Cresswell II 154 Making rigid/description/Kripke/Cresswell: (Kripke 1977, 259f)(1): Normal description/Logical Form/Cresswell: "The F is G" is true in any possible world w iff. the thing that is (unambiguously) F in w is also G in w. Rigid description/logical form: here is this true in w iff. the thing that is in the actual world F is G in w, whether or not it is F there in w. Current world: which world is the actual one, is again relative to the standpoint: every world is for itself the actual one. Rigid description/logical form: the rigid description must therefore involve two worlds: for we must say "The F is G" is true in w2 as seen from w1, iff. the thing that is F in w1 is G in w2. Double indexing/multiple indexing/terminology/Cresswell: it is called like this in Kamp (1971)(2), but it is almost not quite used in Lewis (1970. 185f)(3). Explicitly in Stalnaker (1978, 320)(4) as the formalization of Kripke's approach about names. It seems to be accepted in Kaplan (1979)(5). >Descriptions, >Names, >Possible world, >Semantics of possible worlds. (1) Kripke, S. (1977): Speaker’s reference and semantic reference. In: Midwest Studies In Philosophy, Vol. 2(1), pp. 255 - 276. (2) Kamp, H. (1971): To the memory of Arthur Prior Formal properties of ‘now’. In: Theoria, Vol. 37(3), pp. 227-273. (3) (4) Stalnaker, R. (1978): Assertion. In: Syntax and Semantics (New York Academic Press), Vol. 9, pp. 315-332. (5) Kaplan, D. (1979): On the Logic of Demonstratives, Journal of Philosophical Logic, VIII 1978: 81–98; and reprinted in French et al. (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979): 401–412. |
Kamp I Kamp From Discourse to Logic: Introduction to Modeltheoretic Semantics of Natural Language, Formal Logic and Discourse Representation Theory (Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy) Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Roles | Rawls | I 96 Roles/social positions/society/Rawls: the roles in a community to be established will necessarily result in unequal opportunities for shaping. We use our two principles to prevent injustice: I 61 1. everyone must have the right to fundamental freedom 2. inequalities must be managed in such a way that they are to everyone's advantage, different positions must in principle be capable of being held by everyone. I 96 Positions: in most cases: 1. equal civil rights, 2. the position defined by income and prosperity. Representative members are then those who represent different levels of prosperity. I 97 Roles: the > I 99 In cases of conflict, the interests of a more general viewpoint outweigh the interests of a more individual position. This also applies, for example, when the advantages and disadvantages of free trade are weighed against protectionism. --- I 100 The relevant social positions then specify the general standpoint from which the two principles of justice are judged on the basic structure ((s) the initial state of a society to be established, in which the roles are not yet distributed according to Rawls). The principles ensure that no one benefits from natural coincidences except for the benefit of others. (1) See M. J. Bowman about the Fuchs criterion in "Poverty in an Affluent Socienty", in: Contemporary Economic Issues, ed. N. W. Chamberlain, Homewood, Illinois, 1969. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Rule Following | Kripke | Wright: Rule sequences/Kripke: Wittgenstein's "skeptical paradox" negates any possibility of rules and meanings containing real limitations. At the end remains the attempt to keep afloat with the Charybdis. Wright I 264 McDowellVsKripke: it is false to understand the destruction of the Scylla (Platonism, divine standpoint) as the logical core of the dispute over rules. In reality, the destruction is merely a logical sentence. >Divine standpoint, >Platonism. McDowell: Wittgenstein’s concern was to show that both horns are based on an inflated conception of fact and objectivity. Wright I 264 ff Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Wright: "Skeptical Paradox": Step 1: debate on any apparent assertion, e.g. that I formally meant addition when I said "+" in the past. Then I have defended this against a skeptic. Now one should conclude that even if I lost this fight, no conclusion about the reality of meanings, rules, and so on would be foreseeable. So the epistemology of assertions about meaning would be no more understandable under the pressure of skepticism than the epistemology of the past or of the material world or the minds of others. >Quaddition. But that would be a mistake! E.g. in attempting to justify that I meant addition with "+" in the past, I am granted a complete reproduction of all aspects of my mental life. All relevant facts would have to show in my behavior and my mental life, and therefore be graspable by me. Now if I lose anyway, it becomes apparent that there are no such facts. Wright: in the argument, no over-objectification of the nature appears as a premise! The only assumption: that facts about my previous meanings must have appeared in my behavior. Wright I 264 ff WrightVsKripke: but that is vulnerable. However, it is not a mistake of sublimation of the rules (raise to a higher level). If anything is unprotected against the skeptical paradox, then a humanized Platonism is no less than the over-objectified version. Quietism/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Wright: Kripke's Wittgenstein is definitely obliged to quietism: because realism (that there are no facts regarding any rules) must be inflated to a comprehensive irrealism. An irrealism of the meaning must therefore trigger an irrealism of the truth. Global Minimalism/WrightVs: that is deceptive simplicity! Properly considered, the result of the irrealism based on Kripke’s skeptical paradox is that the discourse on rules is minimally capable of being true, at most. Wright I 264 ff. Kripke’s Wittgenstein: no behavior allows conclusions on internal rules (in the past) about addition, therefore these are also no rules about meaning, not even in the present, therefore also not on truth as well! >Kripke's Wittgenstein. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Rules | McDowell | Rorty I 59 ~ McDowell’s Wittgenstein: the bewildering variety of rules makes it impossible from the standpoint of representationality or non-representationality to draw an interesting border between the discourses. >Kripke's Wittgenstein, >McDowell's Wittgenstein, >Rule following, >Representation/Rorty. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Social Capital | Putnam | Gaus I 59 Social trust/social capital/Robert Putnam/Forbes: [Robert] Putnam maintains that ‘social trust’ (which he also calls social capital) is the variable connecting associational density to democratic performance. Trust is vitally important for a society, he says, because it helps to overcome ‘dilemmas of collective action’ and thus ‘to solve the fundamental Hobbesian dilemma of public order’ (1993)(1). Trusting and trustworthy citizens are more able to... Gaus I 60 ...co-operate with each other, on the basis of voluntary agreements, than are those who lack trust in each other and cannot make credible commitments. A dense (and closed) network of civic engagements sustains generalized trust because it threatens naturally self-interested individuals with realistic punishments for defecting from their commitments (Coleman, 1988(2); 1990(3)). In looser, more open social networks, individualism or narrow self-interest (opportunism, free riding, etc.) is more likely to flourish, so that all must forgo many opportunities for mutual gain. Trust, and the norm of reciprocity associated with it, serve to reconcile self-interest and solidarity. They ‘lubricate’ co-operation, not just in politics, but also in economics. In short, ‘good government in Italy is a by-product of singing groups and soccer clubs’ (Putnam, 1993(4). VsPutnam, Robert: since its publication, Putnam’s remarkably suggestive analysis has been exposed to a great deal of critical scrutiny. Some have objected to his depiction of Italian society and politics; others have challenged the application of his theory to other countries, particularly the United States. Putnam, for example, may not have paid sufficient attention to the role that the Communist Party of Italy played in creating good government (operationalized as pollution controls, daycare centres, responsive bureaucrats, etc.) in those regions where it was strong (Tarrow, 1996)(5). Could the crucial independent variable have been, not singing groups and soccer clubs, but communist cells? And how many regions are there really, from a statistician’s standpoint, in Italy? Are there 20 that are distinguished in law and that are the basis for Putnam’s statistics, or are there really just two distinct regions, North and South? The weight of the statistical evidence must evidently depend on the answer to this question. Similar problems appear when the theory is applied to other countries. Pro Putnam, Robert: Some support for its general applicability has been found in studies of the American states, even though the relevant correlations are distinctly weaker (Putnam, 2000(6); Rice and Sumberg, 1997(7); Rice and Arnett, 2001(8)). Cf. >Positive Political Theory/Forbes, >Good government/Putnam. 1. Putnam, Robert D. (1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. p. 112. 2. Coleman, James S. (1988) ‘Social capital in the creation of human capital’. American Journal of Sociology, 94: S 95–120. 3. Coleman, James S. (1990) Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 4. Putnam ibid. p.176. 5. Tarrow, Sidney (1996) ‘Making social science work across space and time: a critical reflection on Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work’. American Political Science Review, 90: 389–97. 6. Putnam, Robert D. (2000) Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster. 7. Rice, Tom W. and Alexander F. Sumberg (1997) ‘Civic culture and government performance in the American states’. Publius, 27: 99–114. 8. Rice, Tom W. and Marshall Arnett (2001) ‘Civic culture and socioeconomic development in the United States: a view from the states, 1880s–1990s’. Social Science Journal, 38: 39–51. Forbes, H. Donald 2004. „Positive Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Symbolic Interactionism | Mead | Upton I 83 Symbolic Interactionism/Mead/Upton: According to symbolic interactionist theory, the self and the social world are inextricably bound together (Mead, 1934)(1). The self is essentially a social structure that can arise only through social experiences. Mead believed that children begin to assume the perceptions that others have of them through their use of language, their games and their play. It is through doing this that they become capable of reflecting on themselves. >Self, >World. Evidence to support this view comes from cases of extreme social deprivation early in life, for example so-called feral children or children such as Genie, a girl who was kept locked in a room for several years by her abusive father (Rymer, 1993)(2). These children have been shown to have poor communication skills and only a limited understanding of self. >Psychological theories of development stages, >Developmental psychology. 1. Mead, G.H. (1934) Mind, Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviourist. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 2. Rymer, R (1993) Genie: Escape from a silent childhood. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. |
Mead I George Herbert Mead Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Works of George Herbert Mead, Vol. 1), Chicago 1967 German Edition: Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus Frankfurt 1973 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Taste | Gadamer | I 41 Taste/Gadamer: The history of the concept of taste follows (...) the history of absolutism from Spain (>Taste/Gracian) to France and England and coincides with the prehistory of the third estate. Taste is not only the ideal that sets up a new society, but for the first time this ideal of "good taste" is what has been called "good society" ever since. It no longer recognizes itself and legitimates itself by birth and rank, but basically by nothing more than the commonality of its judgments or, better, by the fact that it knows how to claim to be able to judge by the narrow-mindedness of its interests and the privacy of its preferences. Thus, the concept of taste undoubtedly refers to a mode of knowledge. It is under the sign of good taste that one is capable of distancing oneself from oneself and one's private preferences. Taste is therefore by its very nature not something private, but a social phenomenon of the first order. Cf. >Taste/Kant. I 42 The decisiveness of the taste judgement includes its validity. Good taste is always certain of its judgement, i.e. it is by its very nature a sure taste, an acceptance and rejection that knows no wavering, squinting at others and no searching for reasons. So the taste is more like a sense. It does not have prior knowledge for reasons. >Fashion/Gadamer, >Style/Gadamer. I 44 Thus taste is by no means limited to the beauty of nature and art, judging it by its decorative quality, but encompasses the whole range of morals and decency. Even the concepts of custom are never given as a whole or clearly defined in a normative sense. Rather, the arrangement of life by the rules of law and morals is an incomplete one, in need of productive supplementation. It requires the power of judgement to assess the concrete cases correctly. I 62 Taste/Art/Gadamer: It is (...) obvious that the concept of taste loses its meaning when the phenomenon of art comes to the fore. The standpoint of taste is secondary to that of the work of art. The sensitivity of choice that makes it up often has a levelling function in relation to the originality of the ingenious work of art. The taste avoids the unusual and monstrous. It is a superficial sense, it does not get involved in the original of an artistic production. Already the rise of the concept of genius in the 18th century shows a polemical point against the concept of taste. >Genius/Kant. I 90 Taste/Gadamer: (...) the unity of an ideal of taste that distinguishes and unites a society [is] characteristically different from what constitutes the figure of aesthetic education. Taste still follows a standard of content. What is valid for a society, what taste prevails in it is what determines the commonality of social life. Such a society chooses and knows what belongs to it and what does not. Even the possession of artistic interests is not arbitrary and universal for them, but what artists create and what society values belongs together in the unity of a lifestyle and an ideal of taste. Aesthetic education: The idea of aesthetic education, on the other hand - as we derive it from Schiller (>Aesthetics/Schiller) - consists precisely in no longer allowing a standard of content and in dissolving the unity of a work of art's belonging to its world. The expression of this is the universal expansion of the possessions that the aesthetically educated consciousness claims for itself. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Terminology | Bowlby | Corr I 230 Terminology/Bowlby/Shaver/Mikulincer: attachment figure: a person tends automatically to turn for protection and comfort to supportive others (whom Bowlby called attachment figures), and to maintain proximity to these ‘stronger and wiser’ figures until a state of protection and security is attained.(1) Corr I 238 Working models: cognitive structures provide increasingly stable knowledge about the self, relationship partners and close relationships, just as increased experience in any domain contributes to the formation of mental schemas related to those domains. Bowlby (1982/1969(1), 1973(2)) called these cognitive structures working models. From a social cognition standpoint, the concept of working model is similar to such concepts as ‘script’ and ‘social schema’. Like those concepts, working models are viewed as being stored in an associative memory network, as having excitatory and inhibitory connections with other mental representations, and as possessing a certain level of accessibility determined by past experiences and current context (e.g., Collins and Read 1994(3); Mikulincer and Shaver 2007(4); Shaver, Collins and Clark 1996(5)). 1. Bowlby, J. 1982. Attachment and loss, vol. I, Attachment, 2nd edn. New York: Basic Books (original edn 1969) 2. Collins, N. L. and Read, S. J. 1994. Cognitive representations of attachment: the structure and function of working models, in K. Bartholomew and D. Perlman (eds.), Advances in personal relationships: attachment processes in adulthood, vol. V, pp. 53–92. London: Jessica Kingsley 3.Bowlby, J. 1973. Attachment and loss, vol. II, Separation: anxiety and anger. New York: Basic Books 4. Mikulincer, M. and Shaver, P. R. 2007. Attachment in adulthood: structure, dynamics, and change. New York: Guilford Press 5.Collins, N. L. 1996. Working models of attachment: implications for explanation, emotion and behaviour, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71: 810–32 Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Theories | Mill | Höffe I 346 Theory/Mill/Höffe: MillVsKant: According to Mill's empiricism, in contrast to Kant and German Idealism, there is no pre-empirical knowledge at all, but only an empirical, i.e. aposterior knowledge. >a priori, >Knowledge, >Empiricism, >Idealism. Even mathematics and logic are said to be based on experience and its inductive generalizations. However, because of the extraordinary amount of evidence for mathematical statements, the appearance of necessity arises. >Experience. Höffe I 347 Cognition/Mill: According to Mill, not only scientific-theoretical reasons speak against the possibility of strictly experience-free statements, but additionally the epistemological, at the same time ideology-critical interest to free thinking from the blinders of a dogmatic metaphysics. Aprioristic thinking also supports false doctrines and bad institutions. >Ideology. Practice/Theory: With this argument Mill puts all theoretical philosophy, including science and epistemology, in the service of practice. One can speak here of an epistemological liberalism. >Practice. Politics: In any case, the uncompromising primacy of the empiricist standpoint acquires a political meaning, the rejection of the a priori a therapeutic, or more precisely, a preventive purpose. |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Mill Ja I James Mill Commerce Defended: An Answer to the Arguments by which Mr. Spence, Mr. Cobbett, and Others, Have Attempted to Prove that Commerce is Not a Source of National Wealth 1808 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Totality | Totality, philosophy: an entity that can be described by specifying the characteristics, properties, rules, possible states, the possible actions, possible changes etc.. Impossible are statements about Totalities if it is required that the standpoint for these statements would have to be localized both inside and outside of this totality. See also paradoxes, wholes, set theory, universal class, universal set, mereological sum, systems, exterior/interior. |
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| Triangulation | Davidson | I 12 Learning/Language Acquisition/Davidson: we now have three classes of events or items instead of two: The child finds tables similar in a relevant way. We also find tables similar, and we find each of the child's reactions to tables similar. Form of triangulation: a line from child to table, one of us to the table, one of us to the table. The attraction is where the line from child to table intersects with the line from us to the table. So far nothing in this picture proves that anyone has the concept of lenses. >Language acquisition, >Similarity, >Causal theory of knowledge, >Relevance. Triangulation has not proved the concept, but it has proven the need for there to be an answer at all, which is conceptually captured by the concepts of this living being. I 50 Both the child and the educator must see red, and he must also see that the other also sees it. (Basis for triangulation). I 81 Triangulation/Language learning/Davidson: By triangulation I do not mean that one or the other being is endowed with the concept of objectivity. Only communication can provide this term. This requires an awareness that we share our thoughts and our world with others. This is the reason why we cannot look at the question of the content of mental states from the standpoint of a single being. I 116 Externalism/Language learning/DavidsonVsPutnam, DavidsonVsBurge: that with triangulation he puts the everyday situation so strongly in the foreground distinguishes him from the externalism of Putnam and Burges. >Externalism. II 131 Triangulation/Davidson/Glüer: two of the sides of the triangle, consisting of causal hypotheses, are epistemologically irrelevant, i.e. even if we have to presuppose a world, nobody can invoke its causal genesis to justify his conviction. II 171 Triangulation/Self/Davidson: the triangulation scenario makes it clear that one can have neither the idea of one's own self nor of anything else until one has the idea of other subjects and a common world. So the perspective is fundamental. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Truth of Art | Gadamer | I 47 Truth of Art/GadamerVsKant/Gadamer: The transcendental function that Kant assigns to aesthetic judgement is capable of distinguishing it from conceptual knowledge and in this respect to satisfy the definition of the phenomena of beauty and art. >Judgements/Kant, >Judgements/Gadamer, >Taste/Kant, >Aesthetics/Kant. But is it possible to reserve the concept of truth for conceptual knowledge? Must one not also acknowledge that the work of art has truth? I 87 Is the aesthetic behaviour at all an appropriate attitude towards the work of art? Or is what we call "aesthetic consciousness" an abstraction? In any case, there can be no doubt that the great times in the history of art were those in which people surrounded themselves without any aesthetic consciousness at all and without surrounding our concept with designs whose religious or profane function of life was understandable to everyone and not just aesthetically pleasurable for anyone. Can the concept of aesthetic experience be applied to them at all without shortening their true being? The turning point seems to lie with Schiller, who transformed the transcendental idea of taste into a moral demand and formulated it as an imperative: Behave aesthetically!(1) In his aesthetic writings, Schiller transformed the radical subjectivation from a methodological into a substantive precondition by which Kant transcendently justified the judgement of taste and its claim to universal validity. >Truth of Art/Schiller. I 88 If (...) the contrast between reality and appearance characterizes the concept of art, the comprehensive framework that nature forms is beyond the scope of art. Art becomes a standpoint in its own right and establishes its own autonomous claim to power. I 103 Truth of Art/Gadamer: The appeal to immediacy, to the genius of the moment, to the significance cannot exist before the claim of human existence to continuity and unity of self-understanding. The experience of art must not be forced into the noncommittal nature of aesthetic consciousness. Cf. >Erlebniskunst/Gadamer. This negative insight means something positive: art is insight and the experience of the work of art makes this insight part of it. Problem: it [was] a methodical abstraction for the purpose of a very specific, transcendental effort to justify (...), which induced Kant to relate the aesthetic power of judgement entirely to the condition of the subject. If this aesthetic abstraction can subsequently be understood in terms of content and transformed into the demand to understand art "purely aesthetically", we now see how this demand for abstraction becomes an irresolvable contradiction to the real experience of art. 1. Thus one can summarize what was said in the letters "On aesthetic education of man", for example in the 15th letter, it is justified: "there should be a community between form drive and material drive, i.e. a play drive". |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Truth of Art | Idealism | Gadamer I 105 Truth of Art/idealism/Gadamer: if speculative idealism sought to overcome aesthetic subjectivism and agnosticism based on Kant by raising itself to the standpoint of infinite knowledge, then (...) such a gnostic self-redemption of finiteness implied the suspension of art into philosophy. >Art, >Artworks, >Aesthetics. GadamerVsIdealism: instead, we will have to fix the standpoint of the finite. >Subjectivism/Heidegger, >Truth of Art/Gadamer. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Ultimate Justification | Waismann | I 50 Ultimate justification/foundation/Mathematics/Waismann: The question of the last anchorage has not been solved with these researches, but merely pushed back further. A justification is unsuitable with the help of arithmetic; we have already reached the last clues of the arithmetic deduction. But such a possibility seems to arise when one looks beyond arithmetic: this leads to the third standpoint. >Foundation. Arithmetic/Waismann: is based on logic. In doing so, one makes strong use of terms of the set theory, or the class calculus. The assertion that mathematics is only a >"part of logic" includes two theses, which are not always clearly separated: A) The basic concepts of arithmetic can be traced back to purely logical ones by definition B) The principles of arithmetic can be deduced from evidence from purely logical propositions. >Logic, >Proof, >Empiricism. I 51 It looks like the sets of logic are tautologies. (Wittgenstein in 1921 introduced the concept of tautology). >Tautology. WaismannVsFrege: Frege was completely lacking the insight that the whole logic becomes meaningless, because he did not understand the nature of logic at all. In Frege's opinion, logic should be a descriptive science, such as mechanics. And to the question of what it describes, he replied: the relations between ideal objects, such as "and", "or", "if", etc. Platonic conception of a realm of uncreated structures. >Platonism, >G. Frege. |
Waismann I F. Waismann Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996 Waismann II F. Waismann Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976 |
| Understanding | Ranke | Gadamer I 215 Understanding/Ranke/Historism/Gadamer: Ranke, Thesis: The last result of historical science is "compassion, complicity of the universe"(1). Rankes' famous twist to erase himself is based on this pantheistic background. DiltheyVsRanke: Of course, such self-extinction is in truth, as Dilthey(2) has objected, the expansion of the self into an inner universe. RankeVsDilthey: For Ranke, self-extinction is still a form of real participation. One must not understand the concept of participation in psychological-subjective terms, but must think of it from the standpoint of the concept of life that underlies it. Because all historical phenomena are manifestations of All-Life (German: "All-Leben"), participation in them is participation in life. Gadamer: From there the expression of understanding gains its almost religious sound. Understanding is direct participation in life, without the mental mediation through the concept. It is precisely this point that the historian is concerned not to relate reality to concepts, but to reach the point where "life thinks and thought lives". The phenomena of historical life are grasped in understanding as the manifestations of All-Life, the divinity. Such an understanding penetration of the same means in fact more than a human cognitive achievement of an inner universe, as Dilthey reformulated the historian's ideal against Ranke. It is a metaphysical statement that puts Ranke in the greatest proximity to Fichte and Hegel when he says: "The clear, full, lived insight, that is the marrow of being (German: "Seyns") has become transparent and sees through itself"(3). In such a phrase it is quite noticeable how close Ranke remains to German idealism. The full self-transparency of being, which Hegel thought of in the absolute knowledge of philosophy, legitimizes even Ranke's self-confidence as a historian, no matter how much he rejects the claim of speculative philosophy. Gadamer I 216 Gadamer: The pure devotion to the vision of things, the epic attitude of one who seeks the fairy tale of world history(4) may indeed be called poetic, provided that for the historian God is present in everything not in the form of the concept but in the form of the "external imagination". Indeed, one cannot better describe Ranke's self-image than by these terms of Hegel. The historian, as Ranke understands him, belongs to the figure of the absolute mind, which Hegel described as that of the >Kunstreligion. DroysenVsRanke/Gadamer: For a sharper-thinking historian, the problem of such a self-conception had to become visible. The philosophical significance of Droysen's historiography lies precisely in the fact that he seeks to detach the concept of understanding from the indeterminacy of aesthetic-pantheistic communion that he has with Ranke and formulates his conceptual premises. The first of these preconditions is the concept of expression(5). Understanding is understanding of expression. >History, >History/Ranke, >Historiography, >World History, >Universal history. 1. Ranke (ed. Rothacker). S. 52. 2. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften V, 281. 3. Lutherfragment 13. 4. Ebenda S. 1 5. Vgl. auch unten S. 341 f. , 471 f. und Bd. 2 der Ges. Werke, Exkurs VI, S. 384ff. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Vocabulary | Rorty | III 60ff Nietzsche - Rorty - Derrida: we must be able to decide autonomously about our vocabulary and our speaking. >Nietzsche, >Derrida. III 127 Def final vocabulary/Rorty: we use it to tell our life story, sometimes with hindsight, sometimes looking forward - "Final": because there is no standpoint outside of it from which it can be justified - only circular justification possible - III 135 Def "dialectics"/Hegel/Rorty: attempt to play vocabularies against one another, rather than merely derive sentences from each other. >Dialectic/Hegel, >Hegel. RortyVsHegel: constantly changed his vocabulary and changed the subject while doing so - he did not criticize his predecessors as misguided, but for using an outdated language. VI 125 Vocabulary/correspondence/reality/world/language/Rorty: the assertion that some vocabularies work better than others is perfectly fine - but not that they represent reality more adequately. - ((s)> detatching language from reality.) >Correspondence, >Correspondence theory, >>World/thinking. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Wittgenstein | Eco | I 227 Wittgenstein/Eco: Eco connects Wittgenstein with Zen (saying/showing, mute). He is refusing to leave the world. >Perspective, >Point of view, >Inside/Outside, >Pointing. |
Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Boyd, R. | Putnam Vs Boyd, R. | Williams II 492 Scientific Realism/Richard Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd's defense of scientific realism is much more complex than what we have considered so far: Williams II 493 Is a substantial (explanatory) truth concept necessary? Boyd: more indirect approach than Putnam: the (approximate) truth of our theories explains the instrumental reliability of our methods. Method/Boyd: is not theory neutral! On the contrary, because they are formed by our theories, it is their truth that explains the success of the methods. Boyd/M. Williams: thus it turns a well-known argument on its head: BoydVsPositivism. Positivism/Theory: Thesis: the observing language must be theory neutral. The methodological principles likewise. IdealismVsPositivism: VsTheory Neutrality. E.g. Kuhn: the scientific community determines the "facts". Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd turns the >theory ladenness of our methodological judgments very cleverly into the base of his realism. Thesis: Methods that are as theory-laden as ours would not work if the corresponding theories were not "approximately true in a relevant way". Point: thus he cannot be blamed of making an unacceptably rigid separation between theory and observation. Ad. 1) Vs: this invalidates the first objection Ad. 2) Vs: Boyd: it would be a miracle if our theory-laden methods functioned even though the theories proved to be false. For scientific realism, there is nothing to explain here. Ad. 3) Vs: Williams II 494 M. Williams: this is not VsScientific Realism, but VsPutnam: PutnamVsBoyd: arguments like that of Boyd do not establish a causal explanatory role for the truth concept. BoydVsPutnam: they don't do that: "true" is only a conventional expression which adds no explanatory power to the scientific realism. Truth/Explanation/Realism/Boyd/M. Williams: explaining the success of our methods with the truth of our theories boils down to saying that the methods by which we examine particles work, because the world is composed of such particles that are more or less the way we think. Conclusion: but it makes no difference whether we explain this success (of our methods) by the truth of the theories or by the theories themselves! M. Williams pro Deflationism: so we do not need a substantial truth concept. Putnam I (c) 80 Convergence/Putnam: there is something to the convergence of scientific knowledge! Science/Theory/Richard Boyd: Thesis: from the usual positivist philosophy of science merely follows that later theories imply many observation sentences of earlier ones, but not that later theories must imply the approximate truth of the earlier ones! (1976). Science/Boyd: (1) terms of a mature science typically refer (2) The laws of a theory that belongs to a mature science are typically approximately true. (Boyd needs more premises). I (c) 81 Boyd/Putnam: the most important thing about these findings is that the concepts of "truth" and "reference" play a causally explanatory role in epistemology. When replacing them in Boyd with operationalist concept, for example, "is simple and leads to true predictions", the explanation is not maintained. Truth/Theory/Putnam: I do not only want to have theories that are "approximately true", but those that have the chance to be true. Then the later theories must contain the laws of the earlier ones as a borderline case. PutnamVsBoyd: according to him, I only know that T2 should imply most of my observation sentences that T1 implies. It does not follow that it must imply the truth of the laws of T1! I (c) 82 Then there is also no reason why T2 should have the property that we can assign reference objects to the terms of T1 from the position of T2. E.g. Yet it is a fact that from the standpoint of the RT we can assign a reference object to the concept "gravity" in the Newtonian theory, but not to others: for example, phlogiston or ether. With concepts such as "is easy" or "leads to true predictions" no analogue is given to the demand of reference. I (c) 85/86 Truth/Boyd: what about truth if none of the expressions or predicates refers? Then the concept "truth value" becomes uninteresting for sentences containing theoretical concepts. So truth will also collapse. PutnamVsBoyd: this is perhaps not quite what would happen, but for that we need a detour via the following considerations: I (c) 86 Intuitionism/Logic/Connectives/Putnam: the meaning of the classical connectives is reinterpreted in intuitionism: statements: p p is asserted p is asserted to be provable "~p" it is provable that a proof of p would imply the provability of 1 = 0. "~p" states the absurdity of the provability of p (and not the typical "falsity" of p). "p u q" there is proof for p and there is proof for q "p > q" there is a method that applied to any proof of p produces proof of q (and proof that this method does this). I (c) 87 Special contrast to classical logic: "p v ~p" classical: means decidability of every statement. Intuitionistically: there is no theorem here at all. We now want to reinterpret the classical connectives intuitionistically: ~(classical) is identical with ~(intuitionist) u (classical) is identified with u (intuitionist) p v q (classical) is identified with ~(~p u ~q)(intuitionist) p > q (classical) is identified with ~(p u ~q) (intuitionist) So this is a translation of one calculus into the other, but not in the sense that the classical meanings of the connectives were presented using the intuitionistic concepts, but in the sense that the classical theorems are generated. ((s) Not translation, but generation.) The meanings of the connectives are still not classical, because these meanings are explained by means of provability and not of truth or falsity (according to the reinterpretation)). E.g. Classical means p v ~p: every statement is true or false. Intuitionistically formulated: ~(~p u ~~p) means: it is absurd that a statement and its negation are both absurd. (Nothing of true or false!). |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 EconWilliams I Walter E. Williams Race & Economics: How Much Can Be Blamed on Discrimination? (Hoover Institution Press Publication) Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press 2011 WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Carnap, R. | Hempel. Vs Carnap, R. | II 139 Isolated Statements/Hempel: we could establish a criterion for the elimination of isolated statements: Def (4.1) a theoretical system is cognitively significant iff. it is partially interpreted up to at least the degree that none of its primitive statements is an isolated statement. Vs: but that can wrongly exclude well-supported statements. E.g. a system contains the primitive statement (S1) (S1) (x)(P1x > (Qx P2x) wherein P1 and P2 are observation predicates while "Q" is supposed to be a theoretical construction (see above). Now S1 is not a truth or falsity of formal logic. And if further S1 is excluded from the set of primitive statements of T, then the system T’, which is thus obtained, has exactly the same systematic i.e. the same explanatory power as T. The method may be too strict. S1 is an E.g. for what Carnap calls analytical statements! (Of course, it is not a truth of formal logic). Reason: all their consequences are truths of formal logic. II 140 HempelVsCarnap: E.g. Suppose our system T contained the additional statement (S2) (x) (P3x> (Qx P4x)) wherein P3 and P4 are additional observation predicates. From the standpoint that "any bilateral reduction statement is analytical" (Carnap), S2 would then be as analytical as S1. Still, the two statements taken together contain non-analytical consequences that are expressible solely in terms of observation predicates: (O) (x)(~(P1x u P2x u P3x u ~P4x) u ~(P1x u ~P2x u P3x u P4x)). We would hardly want to alow the consequence that the conjunction of two analytical statements may be synthetic. Analyticity/HempelVsCarnap: if the concept can be applied to statements of interpreted deductive systems at all, then it must be relativized with respect to the present theoretical context. It must also be put into perspective with view to the rules of the language at hand. II 141 Isolated Statement/Hempel: if we apply the other strategy and discard S1 as isolated statements, we arrive at an analogous conclusion. Whether a statement is isolated or not depends on the linguistic frame and theoretical context. |
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| Causal Theory | Searle Vs Causal Theory | II 303 SearleVsCausal Theory: the causal chain is simply a characterization of parasitic cases from the outside standpoint. II 304 The descriptivist Theory allows a baptism at the beginning. Kripke's theory is merely a variant of descriptivist. The causal chain does not matter at all! The only chain that matters, is the passing of the intentional content! E.g. chain having ten members. No additional intentions, omniscient observer. But what he observed, are not the features that secure the reference! II 305 Reference is for Kripke only and solely secured by descriptive content! E.g. Miss 7 decides a change, consequently 8 9 and 10 do not speak about a mountain, but about a poodle. II 308 Causal theory: intentionality transmission in the chain is the very essential. Descriptivism: merely casual act. II 309 E.g. Suppose I only knew roughly about what "Structuralism" is, yet I could ask: "Are there any structuralists in France?", "Is Pierre structuralist?" Descriptivism: finds it implausible that only thing that will be passed in the communication chain, was the intention to speak on the same subject. In real life much more is passed on, among other things the type of a particular thing. II 310 Whether something is a mountain or a man, is even in the parasitic cases connected to the name. SearleVsKripke: E.g. I talk about Socrates' philosophy of mathematics, but bring everything up and think Socrates is the name of a number. "I believe that Socrates is not a prime number, but can be divided by 17". That meets Kripke causal theory, but I do not succeed to talk about Socrates. SearleVsKripke: its view has the absurd consequence that it does not contain any restrictions on what may turn out to be the name reference. E.g. Aristotle could be a bar stool in Joe's Pizza Place, 11957 in Hoboken. Even if it is a metaphysical de re necessity that Aristotle had these parents, this tells us nothing about how the name refers to these people and not to a bar stool. II 311 Descriptivism: adheres to the intentional content first stage, and considers the parasitic cases as less important. Causal theory: emphasizes the parasitic cases, especially if we are not directly aware of the objects. Cf. >causal theory of names, >causal theory of reference, >causal theory of knowledge. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Cultural Relativism | Quine Vs Cultural Relativism | II 45 Suppose all categorical observation sentences were indeed true, although even that is not known. Other conditions for the truth of one or the other theory can certainly not be made. Question: are they both true? Quine: I say yes. But even they can be logically incompatible, despite their empirical equivalence, which evokes the scare of >cultural relativism. Because each is apparently true only from its standpoint. QuineVsCultural Relativism: The scare can be easily dispelled: with a step that is as trivial as the interchange of "electron" and "molecule": As the two theoretical formulations are incompatible, they must evaluate a particular sentence oppositely. Since they are nevertheless empirically equivalent, this sentence must contain terms that are not sufficiently determined by observation criteria. Then we might as well pick out one of these terms and treat it as if they were two independent words, one belonging to one theory, the other to the other one. II 46 We could characterize this by the notation. By consistently maintaining this notation we could settle any conflict of these theories. Both could thenceforth be allowed as terminologically different true descriptions of the same world. The threat of truth relativism is averted. Observation sentences correspond with the theory holophrastically (as whole sentence) regardless of their internal structure except for the possible content of the logical implikation links between formulations and categorical observation sentences. The language needs to be neither divalent nor realistic, it does not even need anything that is clearly recognizable as terms or reference or contain any identifiable ontology. XI 121 QuineVsCultural Relativism/Lauener: self-contradictory. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Fodor, J. | Schiffer Vs Fodor, J. | I 80 SchifferVsFodor: his theory implies that everyone is omniscient and infallible under optimal conditions. omniscient: because if any situation exists (and yourself are working perfectly) you believe it and probably know it. infallible: because under ideal conditions nobody believes anything wrong. Optimality condition/Optimum/Schiffer: whatever Fodor's optimality condition is, it is clear 1. that they will never be fulfilled 2. that we have no idea what they should be 3. if they are to serve the strong thesis of the language of thought, it must be shown without reference to semantic or intentional vocabulary 4. it is compliable, even though it will never be fulfilled. Otherwise (a) would incoherent. (…+…) I 81 SchifferVsFodor: 1. his performance is not the best solution for finding naturalistic truth conditions for Mentalese. 2. Problem: reliability theory: each reliability theory for mental content must take into account that we ourselves are only reliable indicators in terms of some of our beliefs. E.g. Ralph sees a dog: Then the chances are good that he believes it is a dog. But: E.g. when Ralph Jesus sees how high are the chances that he thinks he's divine! E.g. I have exactly 11 dollars in my pocket: what are the chances that Ralph believes that?. Truth conditions/Mentalese/SchifferVsFodor: So we must not individually proceed belief for belief!. I 82 Reliability/truth conditions/Mentalese/SchifferVsFodor: the reliability considerations extend transversely through the systematic links that exist between the expressions in Mentalese. And again we should better look from the standpoint of thought language as a whole and not, as Fodor, for each mental representation individually. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Goodman, N. | Verschiedene Vs Goodman, N. | Introduction Putnam II IV Some PhilosophersVsGooodman: they do not appreciate his dependence on the actual history of past inductive projections in culture. They say: a valid inductive derivation must not contain disjunctive predicates. PutnamVs: this does not work: being disjunctive, from the standpoint of logic, is a relational attribute of predicates. Whether a predicate is disjunctive depends on the truth of a language. Sainsbury V 129 Grue/SainsburyVsGoodman: To complain about a lack of anchoring would be too strong a blockade on future scientific innovation! Intuitively, the strongest lack of the predicate "grue" is that it is only true by virtue of the fact that the objects are already examined. Anne-Kathrin Reulecke (Hg) Fälschungen Frankfurt 2006 I 358 Perfect Forgery/Goodman: (Spr. d. KU, 105).): Thesis: that later I might be able to see a difference that I do not perceive yet, now states a significant aesthetic difference for me. It cannot be concluded that the original is better than the copy, but it is aesthetically valued higher. ((s) The original also contains the inventive achievement. But the copy could be more successful from a design point of view.) I 359 Römer: The investigation of forgeries should therefore not begin with the question of the relationship to the original, but with the representation that we produce according to Goodman (i.e. we do not copy a construct or an interpretation). Def genuine scientific fiction/Vaihinger: 1. contradiction to reality up to self-contradiction 2. provisional nature 3. without claim to factuality 4. expediency. RömerVsGoodman: his "scientific fiction" of a perfect forgery does not eliminate the hierarchy original/forgery. Nor does he draw any consequence from the aesthetic difference on the representation system. When a perfect forgery appears in the context of originals, its authenticity is rather confirmed. I 360 Then the forgery is a product of the representation system just like the original, only that it violates the prevailing morality. Forgery/Klaus Döhmer: (late 70s): Thesis: Forgery makes use of legitimate artistic methods while changing its objective, thus it is not an objective-material, but a subjective-intentional category. (Zur Soz. d. Knst- Fälschung, Zeitschr. f. Ästh. .u. allg. Kunst-Wiss 21/1 (1978),S 76-95). Römer: this is tantamount to a paradigm shift: forgery as a methodical problem. Anne-Kathrin Reulecke (Hg) Fälschungen Frankfurt 2006 I 406ff Def Forgery/Bolz: Forgery: deliberately represent something unreal for real. Question: Who will be harmed? Directly the collector/museum director, indirectly the art historian. Perfect Forgery/BolzVsGoodman: he does not succeed in making it clear that the concept of the original does not include any superiority over the forgery. It is not about real quality but about authenticity shaped by the history of production. 407 Aura/Bolz: in order to explain why this is important for aesthetic enjoyment, Goodman would have to resort to Benjamin's concept of aura. (Bolz pro Aura). Aura/Bolz: does not lead to the opposition original/forgery, but to uniqueness/technical reproducibility. Putnam I 256 Israel ShefflerVsGoodman: asks: "Does Goodman's philosophy result in us creating the stars?" Goodman/Putnam: G. answers: not like the brick is burning, but in a way they are already created by us. We did not create the big bear, but we made a constellation out of it. |
Sai I R.M. Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 German Edition: Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Habermas, J. | Luhmann Vs Habermas, J. | Reese-Schäfer II 109 Ethics/Habermas: Cognitive ethics, with the dimension right/wrong. LuhmannVs. Reese-Schäfer II 112 LuhmannVsHabermas: "political moralist" (in Luhmann's eyes sharp criticism.) Ethics should rather ask whether morality can be regarded as good without circumstance. It should not pursue morality itself, but perform translation in both directions. Reese-Schäfer II 140 LuhmannVsHabermas: studies on marital conflicts show that these conflicts cannot be solved colloquially, because the colloquial language provides positive and negative expressions. There is no law that communication leads to consensus. One should therefore understand and analyse discussions themselves as systems. Discussions in particular offer little chance of bringing in one's own subjectivity. The language symbols like God, reform, justice, love, truth, democracy etc. are moralized in the discussions. This limits the possibility of connecting. This means that those who use counterarguments must defend themselves. Reese-Schäfer II 141 LuhmannVsHabermas: there is no logical hierarchy of reasons. Therefore there is no hope for an end to the discussion. At some point it just stops. There must be social, not logical or semantic rules for its termination. Cass 8 VsHabermas: Problem: the term should actually be the same on both sides, because why do we speak of rationality when both are rationality? What is the common component? HabermasVsLuhmann: in Luhmann only the system has rationality but the system is not everything! LuhmannVsHabermas: but that applies also to Habermas' "communication rationality", because if one communicated, there are also still things, over which one did not communicate yet and humans, with whom one did not communicate yet and the conditions change faster than the readiness to communicate again. So the realm of the afterlife plays a role in every model. But the system rationality is better equipped to deal with it. For Habermas, by the way, this afterlife is not the lifeworld. Cass 11 System/Society/Individual/Luhmann: the system is not an object, but a difference (S/U). For example, for the body the consciousness operations belong to the environment! ((s) No border crossing). Luhmann: that is not so frightening at all: for example, I myself feel more comfortable in the "environment" of my society than I would feel "in the society", where others think my thoughts or cause my chemical reactions. LuhmannVsHabermas: systems theory therefore allows us to think of a radical individualism that would not be possible if we were to adopt the humanist standpoint of the human as part of society. HabermasVsLuhmann: radical individualism is not aspired to at all. Society/LuhmannVsHabermas: it would be a mistake to claim that society must run towards a "human goal"! LuhmannVsHabermas: Understanding is already contained in communication - otherwise one needs the receiver, a disciplining instance. If one leaves understanding in communication, one gets a theory relieved of norms and rationality demands. Cass 13 Communication: Tradition like Habermas: Searching for consensus. Luhmann: what do you do when the consensus is reached, then there is no more communication? Habermas: there are enough conflicts. Luhmann: what is then the demand for consensus supposed to do? Then we turn an impossibility into a norm! The result of communication must already be open! Why do we have the "No" in the language? |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 |
| Ideas | Quine Vs Ideas | III 254 Singular Term/Existence/Quine: can designate an object, or not, but in any case it has a meaning. E.g. "Cerberus" ((s) >Unicorn example). Derivation: our techniques of QL (precisely with free variables) are very favorable for conclusions in which singular terms occur. III 255 But only if we are sure that the objects really exist! Existence/Ontology/Quine: the question of existence therefore moves (for reasons of logical deduction) into the focus. a) narrow view: existence as concrete presence in space and time. I.e. "exists" is equated with "is". Advantage: then no difference needs to be placed in "being", when it is about e.g. the Parthenon or the number 7. This is at most a difference in the type of object (concrete/abstract), but certainly not in the sense of "to be". Unicorn/Quine: E.g. there is nothing the word "Cerberus" denotes, neither in the past nor in the present nor in the future. III 256 But this is not about a "shadowy existence" for fear the word might lose its meaning. Unicorn/Meaning/Quine: if the word were without meaning, not only the poets would suffer; it would also be impossible, e.g., to express the simple fact of the non-existence of Cerberus. ((s) difference reference/meaning - Terminology/Quine: speaks of designating instead of reference). Idea/QuineVsIdea: false solution: speaking of Cerberus as an "idea": that would be doubling the existence: one in Athens and one in imagination. Or one in mythology, and one in the world. QuineVs: there is only one world) Solution/Quine: Parthenon "refers to the Parthenon and only the Parthenon, while" Parthenon idea" refers to Parthenon idea and only Parthenon idea. "Cerberus idea" does not denote Cerberus! Idea/Psychology/Quine: from the standpoint of practical psychology an idea could perhaps be explained as a tendency to certain reaction schemes to words. We can be as generous as we want with that. But to equate "Parthenon" with "Parthenon idea" would simply mean confusing one thing with another. And wanting to secure the existence of a thing like Cerberus through identification with an idea would be the same confusion. IV 399 QuineVsIdeas: the idea of the idea is of evil, because its use (just like a virtus dormitiva in Moliere) creates the illusion to have explained something. IV 400 Explanation/Sense: ideas neurophysiology is in charge of the explanations. Our mentalistic concepts can likewise not gain importance by the fact that they "ultimately refer" to neural states. We learned this vocabulary on the basis of behavior, and to know something of neurological issues. You can master it completely and simultaneously have a wrong or no opinions about the brain! Brain Condition/Predicates: with our predicates (folk psychology) things can be classified together that, seen neuro-physiologically, may be worlds apart! IV 401 QuineVsIdeas: reliance on the "ideas" has other drawbacks: 1) It leads to a mistaken image of communication as a transport of ideas from one mind to another. IV 402 2) It leads to a false theory of language acquisition, according to which it would simply obtained to link words with previously existing ideas at some point. Questions of learning are degraded to idle questions about the causal connection of ideas. 3) The wrong tendency to handle the different parts of speech as semantically identical is reinforced. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Anscombe Vs Kripke, S. A. | Frank I 84 I/Descartes: not a kind of body. I could assume that I don’t have a body. I/Augustine: "the mind knows of itself, that it is thinking." "It knows its own substance." Kripke/Anscombe: K. tried to rehabilitate Descartes’ argument for his dualism. AnscombeVsKripke: he neglects his first person character by making it an argument for the non-identity of Descartes with his own body. I 85 According to this, Descartes would have had to doubt the existence of Descartes as a human being, and in any case the existence of this figure in the world of his time, of this Frenchman, christened René... Descartes/AnscombeVsKripke: "I am not Descartes" was for him like "I’m not a body!" Forcing the argument into the third person perspective by replacing "I" with "Descartes" means to neglect this. Descartes never thought, "Descartes is not Descartes" (which according to Anscombe is ascribed to him by Kripke). I 85/86 AnscombeVsKripke: this discussion is not about the usual reflexive pronoun, but about a strange reflexive which must be explained from the standpoint of the "I". Grammarians call it the "indirect reflexive". (In Greek it is a separate form.) E.g. "When John Smith spoke of James Robinson, he spoke of his brother, but he did not know that." So it is conceivable that someone does not know that the object of which he speaks is himself. Now, if "I" is compatible with ignorance, the reflexive pronoun cannot be used as usual. Now one may ask: was the person of which Smith intended to speak not Smith? Was the person not himself?. Answer: not in the relevant sense! Unless the reflexive pronoun is itself a sufficient proof of reference. And the usual reflexive pronoun cannot do that. I 96 I/Self/Logic/Anscombe: here, the "manner of givenness" is unimportant. Fra I 97 The logician understands that "I" in my mouth is just another name for "E.A.". His rule: if x makes assertions with "I" as the subject, then they are true iff the predicates of x are true. AnscombeVsLogic/AnscombeVsKripke: for this reason he makes the transition from "I" to "Descartes". But this is too superficial: If one is a speaker who says "I", then it is impossible to find out what it is that says "I". E.g. one does not look to see from which apparatus the noise comes. Thus, we have to compel our logician to assume a "guaranteed" reference of "I". Fra I 98 Problem: with a guaranteed reference there is no longer any difference between "I" and "A". |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Kripke, S. A. | McDowell Vs Kripke, S. A. | I 119 Meaning / McDowell: we must not construct it in a "social-pragmatic" or "communitarian" way. (Wittgenstein has not). Otherwise it is not autonomous. Here, unbridled Platonism would be a penchant for the occult. Wittgenstein has not alleged that meaning would be nothing but as approval or rejection by the community. I 120 Kripke's Wittgenstein/McDowellVsKripke: concludes that there is nothing that constituted susceptibility to the claim the meaning poses; instead we need to understand the role of thought in our lives through our participation in the community. Quietism/Wittgenstein /McDowellVsKripke: doesn't notice Wittgenstein's quietism: attitude to accept problems as unsolvable. Rejection of a constructive or doctrinaire ambition. Wright I 264 McDowell's Wittgenstein: intends to open up an escape route out of the debate. Consequences of rules/Kripke: Wittgenstein: "Skeptical Paradox": negates any possibility that rules and meanings comprised real limitations. Wright: In the end remains only the attempt to stay above the water with Charybdis. McDowellVsKripke: error to understand the destruction of Scylla (Platonism, divine standpoint) as the logical core of the dispute over rules. In reality, the destruction is just a logical set. McDowell: Wittgenstein's concern was to show that both horns are based on an inflated conception of fact and objectivity. Kripke's Wittgenstein/Wright: McDowell does not do Kripke justice in every way. I 265 It is not clear whether the skeptical argument can be limited to the destruction of Scylla (divine standpoint, overstatement of rules). "Skeptical Paradox": Step 1: debate on any ostensive assertion. Ex that in the past with "+" I formally meant addition. Then I have the defend that against a skeptic. One should conclude that even if I lose this dispute, no conclusion about the reality of meanings, rules etc. would be so foreseeable. So the epistemology of assertions about meaning under the pressure of skepticism would not be more intelligible than the epistemology of the past or the material world or other minds (Fremdpsychisches) still are. But that would be a mistake! Tradition: insists on the fundamental inaccessibility of other minds (Fremdpsychisches). Hence the examination of Kripke's skeptic must take place under the conditions of cognitive idealization. Ex in the attempt to justify that with "+" I meant addition in the past, I am conceded the perfect playback of all aspects of my mental life. All the relevant facts would indeed be visible in my behavior and mental life, and therefore be tangible for me. If I still lose, that only shows that there are no such facts. It is then concluded that there are no facts with respect to what I mean in the present! And what anybody thinks in the present! And therefore no facts with respect to what any one expression means! (> Meaning/McDowell). I 266 Wright: In the argument no over-objectification of the essence of the rules occurs as a premise! The only assumption: that facts about my previous meanings must have occurred in my behavior. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Kuhn, Th. | Putnam Vs Kuhn, Th. | V 155 VsKuhn/Putnam: his smart aleck readers have accused him that he had claimed such a thing that rational justification would not exist in science, only shape change and conversions. Kuhn has rejected this interpretation and introduced a new term: "non-paradigmatic rationality". Putnam: possibly the same as the above-mentioned "criterial rationality". --- I (c) 84 PutnamVsKuhn: E.g. electron: there are entities, that we call now "electrons", that behave in many ways like Bohr's "electrons". We should only say that we have a different theory of the same entity. So Bohr's term referred. I (c) 85 Reference/theory/semantic change/PutnamVsKuhn: we can only say that because the current theory asserts the existence of entities that satisfy many of the roles that should satisfy Bohr's "electrons". Question: What if we accept a theory that sees electrons as something like phlogiston? Then we would have to say that electrons do not exist. Question: What if all the entities do not exist from the standpoint of the later theory? We need to concede trust to secure reference at all. But this must not be unreasonable confidence: We cannot concede phlogiston. If Boyd's two assumptions would be wrong trust would always turn out to be unreasonable and reference would collapse. |
SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Kuhn, Th. | Verschiedene Vs Kuhn, Th. | I 186 VsKuhn: it is argued that he makes a subjective and irrational business from science. He greatly appreciates the unanimity of the scholars in their binding to a paradigm. Other authors doubt that the revolutions really are preced by crises and the awareness that something was wrong. II 506 VsKuhn: it is very well conceivable that phenomena that are anomalies relative to the original paradigm, only then can ever be revealed when at the same time research is being conducted from the standpoint of an alternative paradigm. |
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| Nagel, Th. | Evans Vs Nagel, Th. | Frank I 507 Self-Identification/Understanding/EvansVsNagel: I have already explained implicitly what it means to understand such an identity statement (generality clause). Persons are distinguished from others like ordinary material objects from other material objects. An identity statement does not necessarily make a difference for a spatiotemporal map of the world, but for the way in which the immediate environment is considered. EvansVsNagel: he looked for an impact at the wrong place. It is true that we cannot determine in a non-indexical identity statement whether it is true or not. But why should we assume that everything that is true could be represented in this way? Objectivity/Self-Identification/Nagel: a proposition like [I am t] is not objectively true from the standpoint of eternity. Evans: pro! Such a proposition can indeed only be made by the person himself. ((s) And he does not exist in eternity). But EvansVsNagel: that does not mean that we do not understand what it means that we are identical with the same spatio-temporal objects. Fra I 507/508 Otherwise our thinking about ourselves could not be subject to the generality clause. Evans: We would have to assume then that we had an idealistic conception of the self. Or demand just like Anscombe "I" refers to nothing. I/Self-Identification/Objectivity/EvansVsNagel: conversely, one could say just like our thoughts about ourselves demand that this connection with the world that is considered to be "objective" is understood, our "objective" thinking about the world also requires that this connection is understandable. Because nobody can be attributed an "objective" model of the world if he does not understand that he designs a model of the world in which he lives! Therefore, I believe that Nagel’s "gap" between the objective and the subjective only seems to exist. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Nagel, Th. | Peacocke Vs Nagel, Th. | I 167 Nagel/Peacocke: (first Tanner Lecture, 1980) E.g. "I am TN" seems to express a real fact on the one hand, which cannot be described from a certain perspective of the world, ((s) to be more true than from another perspective.) I 168 on the other hand it seems to be impossible that irreducible facts of the first person exist. Nagel:~ "TN, like the rest of you, it turns out, not only as a single creature with a special perspective on the world from the position in its interior. Every other human being contains a very special kind of subject in the same way. The "additional fact" that I am TN is the fact that this impersonal conception of the world can close over itself? Through localization of the subject that forms it in a certain point of the world by perceiving it. This fact is linked to the perspective of TN. And because it is not an irreducible fact of the first person, it can be part of the real world! " PeacockeVsNagel: does he really state a fact of the real world here? There is an implicit indexicality in the sentence "locate the subject that forms it (the world)". It comes out more clearly here: Nagel: ~"when I have the philosophical thought: "I am TN", then I realize that the objective individual self, which is the subject of this centerless idea of a world, is located in the TN and at the same time sees the world through the perspective of TN. Idea/PeacockeVsNagel: ideas can be a) public types that can be shared by different people. Or they may b) correspond to the principle of "one thinker, one idea" (token), even if the same idea can come up on several occasions. Nagel: must use the latter concept, because nothing that could correspond to a subject is in the sense of the type. Peacocke: but in the sense of the token it seems to be true that the content is indexical. Namely, the person with this particular idea of TN (Peacocke: constitutive role). Admittedly, this is not a thought of the first person. Peacocke: but the motivation of Nagel that there can be no irreducible thoughts of the first person in the world seems to apply to all demonstrative ways of givenness. I 169 E.g. Suppose Nagel contemplates his objective idea of the world at a moment about and thinks "I am TN" Peacocke: that is potentially informative if it is epistemically possible that the person who is thinking is not TN. Nagel: the problem with "I'm TN" is not a pseudo-problem associated with a misunderstanding of the logic of index words. Def Character/Kaplan: ("On the Logic of Demonstratives"): the character of an expression is a function of contexts on contents and these include no indexical ways of givenness. PeacockeVsNagel: if we take this as the basis, it is not so surprising that the way of givenness of a fact - in contrast to the fact itself - should be irreducibly indexical. Nagel's point that we are able to step back from our standpoint and to form a more objective idea in which the position in turn is located, is of great philosophical interest. Nevertheless, it should be formulated with reference to the different ways in which we think about ourselves when we make such a separation. So if we rather have a different way of giveness than a different type of object, then we can give up the question: "Is this objective self mine?" For Nagel this question is only meaningless if were a mere facon de parler for "the person with this objective idea". |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Prior, A. | Lewis Vs Prior, A. | IV 19 Perspective/Index/Indexicality/Time/Lewis: when we take a timeless viewpoint and neglect our own localization in time, the great difference between the present and other times disappears. Cf. >Perspective. However, this is not because we then regard all times as equal, but because we IV 20 lose the possibility to use indexical time words we "currently"! Possible world/perspective: just the same, if we take an a priori standpoint and neglect our localization in the worlds, then we lose the distinction between the worlds. This is not because we consider all worlds to be the same, but because we could no longer use index words like "actual". Prior: the word "aktual" can then no longer be used to classify a world that is more real than others!° LewisVsPrior: he fell for it himself: "real" can no longer be used as an index word. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Putnam, H. | Rorty Vs Putnam, H. | McDowell I 175 Coherence Theory/Rorty pro Davidson: Beliefs: can a) be seen from the outside, perspective of the field researcher, causal interactions with the surroundings - b) from the inside, from the perspective of the natives, as rules of action. The inside view is normative, in the space of reasons. RortyVsPutnam: he attempts to somehow think this together. >Exterior/interior, Coherence Theory. McDowell I 178 RortyVsPutnam: By an "explanation of X" Putnam still understands a synopsis, the synthesis of external and internal position. Representatives of >disquotation believe that people could only be described in a behavioral manner. But why should it be impossible to consider supplements by normative representations? (Putnam's philosophy was ultimately traditional). Causality/Putnam: the desire to tell a story about the causal relationships of human pronouncements and environment does not rule out that a story is invented according to which the speakers express thoughts and make assertions, and try not to make mistakes. But these stories may then be indistinguishable! (PutnamVsRorty) Rorty Thesis: from a causal standpoint we cannot subdue our beliefs to standards of investigation. >Causality/Putnam, >Causality/Rorty. Rorty I 304 RortyVsPutnam: he provokes a pseudo-controversy between an "idealistic" and realistic theory of meaning. I 307 Putnam/Rorty: follows 3 thoughts: 1) against the construction of 'true' as synonymous with 'justified assertibility' (or any other "soft" concept to do with justification). This is to show that only a theory of the relationship between words and the world can give a satisfactory meaning of the concept of truth. 2) a certain type of sociological facts requires explanation: the reliability of normal methods of scientific research, the usefulness of our language as a means, and that these facts can be explained only on the basis of realism. 3) only the realist can avoid the inference from "many of the terms of the past did not refer" to "it is very likely that none of the terms used today refers". >Reference/Putnam. I 308 RortyVsPutnam: that is similar to the arguments of Moore against all attempts to define "good": "true, but not assertible" with reason" makes just as much sense as "good, but not conducive to the greatest happiness". I 312 Theoretical Terms/TT/Reference/Putnam/Rorty. We must prevent the disastrous consequence that no theoretical term refers to anything (argument 3), see above). What if we accepted a theory according to which electrons are like phlogiston? We would have to say that electrons do not exist in reality. What if this happened all the time? Of course, such a conclusion must be blocked. Granted desideratum of reference theory. I 313 RortyVsPutnam: puzzling for two reasons: 1) unclear from which philosophical standpoint it could be shown that the revolutionary transformation of science has come to an end. 2) even if there were such a standpoint, it remains unclear how the theory of reference could ever provide it. I 314 In a pre-theoretical sense we know very well that they have referred to such things. They all tried to cope with the same universe. I 315 Rorty: We should perhaps rather regard the function of an expression as "picking of entities" than as "description of reality". We could just represent things from the winning perspective in a way that even the most primitive animists talked about the movement of molecules and genes. This does not appease the skeptic who thinks that perhaps there are no molecules, but on the other hand it will also be unable to make a discovery about the relations between words and the world. Reference/Rorty: Dilemma: either we a) need the theory of reference as a guarantor of the success of today's science, or b) the reference theory is nothing more than a decision about how to write the history of science (rather than supplying its foundation.) I 319 Reference/RortyVsPutnam/RortyVsKripke: if the concept of "really talking about" is confused with the concept of reference, we can, like Kripke and Putnam, easily get the idea that we have "intuitions" about the reference. Rorty: in my opinion, the problem does not arise. The only question of fact that exists here, relates to the existence or non-existence of certain entities that are being talked about. I 320 Fiction/Reference/RortyVsKripke/RortyVsPutnam: of course there can be no reference to fictions. This corresponds to the technical and scientific use. But then "reference" has basically nothing to do with "talking about", and only comes into play after the choice between different strategies is made. Reference is a technical term, and therefore we have no intuitions about it! Real existence issues are also not affected by the criterion of Searle and Strawson! What then is the right criterion? Rorty: there is none at all! We cannot talk about non-existent entities, but we can also find out that we have actually talked about them! Talking about X in reality and talking about a real X is not the same thing. I 324 Realism/PutnamVsPutnam/Self-Criticism/Rorty: metaphysical realism collapses at the point where it claims to be different from Peirce's realism. I.e. the assertion that there is an ideal theory. I 326 Internal Realism/Putnam/Rorty: position according to which we can explain the "mundane" fact that the use of language contributes to achieving our goals, to our satisfaction, etc. by the fact that "not language, but the speakers reflect the world, insofar as they produce a symbolic representation of their environment. (Putnam). By means of our conventions we simply represent the universe better than ever. RortyVsPutnam: that means nothing more than that we congratulate ourselves to having invented the term lithium, so that lithium stands for something for which nothing has stood all the time. I 327 The fact that based on our insights we are quite capable of dealing with the world, is true but trivial. That we reasonably reflect it is "just an image". Rorty V 21 Analytic/Synthetic/Culture/Quine/Rorty: the same arguments can also be used to finish off the anthropological distinction between the intercultural and the intra-cultural. So we also manage without the concept of a universal transcultural rationality that Putnam cites against relativists. V 22 Truth/Putnam: "the very fact that we speak of our different conceptions of rationality sets a conceptual limit, a conceptual limit of the ideal truth." RortyVsPutnam: but what can such a limit do? Except for introducing a God standpoint after all? Rorty VI 75 Idealization/Ideal/Confirmation RortyVsPutnam: I cannot see what "idealized rational acceptability" can mean other than "acceptability for an ideal community". I.e. of tolerant and educated liberals. (>Peirce: "community of researchers at the ideal end of the research"). VI 76 Peirce/Terminology: "CSP" "Conceptual System Peirce" (so called by Sellars). Idealization/Ideal/Confirmation/RortyVsPutnam: since forbids himself to reproduce the step of Williams back to approaching a single correct result, he has no way to go this step a la Peirce! VI 79 Human/Society/Good/Bad/Rorty: "we ourselves with our standards" does not mean "we, whether we are Nazis or not", but something like "language users who, by our knowledge, are improved remakes of ourselves." We have gone through a development process that we accept as rational persuasion. VI 80 This includes the prevention of brainwashing and friendly toleration of troublemakers à la Socrates and rogues à la Feyerabend. Does that mean we should keep the possibility of persuasion by Nazis open? Yes, it does, but it is no more dangerous than the possibility to return to the Ptolemaic worldview! PutnamVsRorty: "cope better" is not a concept according to which there are better or worse standards, ... it is an internal property of our image of justification, that a justification is independent of the majority ... (Rorty: I cannot remember having ever said that justification depends on a majority.) RortyVsPutnam: "better" in terms of "us at our best" less problematic than in terms of "idealized rational acceptability". Let's try a few new ways of thinking. VI 82 Putnam: what is "bad" supposed to mean here, except in regard to a failed metaphysical image? VI 87 Truth/Putnam: we cannot get around the fact that there is some sort of truth, some kind of accuracy, that has substance, and not merely owes to "disquotation"! This means that the normative cannot be eliminated. Putnam: this accuracy cannot apply only for a time and a place (RortyVsPutnam). VI 90 Ratio/Putnam: the ratio cannot be naturalized. RortyVsPutnam: this is ambiguous: on the one hand trivial, on the other hand, it is wrong to say that the Darwinian view leaves a gap in the causal fabric. Ratio/Putnam: it is both transcendent and immanent. (Rorty pro, but different sense of "transcendent": going beyond our practice today). RortyVsPutnam: confuses the possibility that the future transcends the present, with the need for eternity to transcend time. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Rorty, R. | Putnam Vs Rorty, R. | McDowell I 178 Rorty: from the causal point of view we can not submit our beliefs to the standards of investigation. PutnamVsRorty: then it remains a mystery how there may be something as beliefs at all. A second point then does not help further if we do not allow into take account the causal interactions between people with beliefs and the object of their beliefs. Because then it remains a mystery how this second standpoint is to supply the standards. Putnam I (a) 21 Theory/Meaning/Putnam: there will always be different theorie but that does not matter as long as they use different terms. If they are empirically equivalent they make no difference to us. Representation/illustration/Rorty: the whole problem is misguided, a sham debate. PutnamVsRorty: this is precisely the attempt to take the position of God. Putnam I (h) 204/205 PutnamVsRorty: if there is such a thing as "a notion being worth it", then inevitably there is the question about the nature of this "correctness". Putnam: what makes speech more than a mere expression of our present subjectivity, is that it can be evaluated for the presence or absence of these features, whether one wants to call them "truth" or "correctness" or "being worth it" or whatever. Even if it is a property that is culturally relative. But that does not indemnify us of the responsibility to say which property is! Putnam I (i) 239 Metaphysics/Philosophy/Rorty/Putnam: for Rorty and the French whom he admired two notions seem to be thrilling: 1. The failure of our philosophical "foundations" is a failure of our whole culture, therefore we have to be philosophical revisionists. I (i) 240. Typical Rorty: he rejects the "realism/anti-realism debate" and the "emotion/cognition debate" by ridiculing the debate. PutnamVsRorty: when a controversy is "futile", it does not mean that the competing images are unimportant. I (i) 242 justified assertibility/PutnamVsRorty: is independent of the opinion of the majority, but that is not a fact of transcendent reality, but it's a feature of the concept of legitimacy. The majority can agree or disagree with legitimacy. By their practice relativists themselves have demonstrated that this is the case! RelativismusVs: could argue that was just a "bad feature of the ordinary concept of "legitimcy"". PutnamVsVs: what can be called "bad", if not in relation to a metaphysical notion behind? I (i) 242/243 A philosopher who refers to that (those exist), could claim that his own convictions are true, but not justified - such a philosopher would not refute her*himself. However, it is a pragmatic inconsistency of her*his position: PutnamVsRelativismus/PutnamVsRealismus: both claim they can be simultaneously inside and outside of language! Realism does not immediately refute itself since it adopts a "perspective of God" anyway. But relativism refutes itself. Norms/values/Rorty: (1985) the improvements are not better with respect to a previously known state, but only better in the sense that now they clearly appear better than their predecessors. Norms/values/PutnamVsRorty: this is not a clarification of the concept of "improvement". I (i) 243/244 As Rorty normally speaks of Western cultural community, it could be that those gain the upper hand, who think that we "cope best" with Holcaust. ((s) "Coping better" does not seem to have been used by Rorty himself.) PutnamVsRorty: "coping better" is a question of how something appears to us and is not at all the notion of better and worse norms and standards. But standards and their image are logically independent! Therefore, it makes sense to say that what most consider to be an improvement, is in fact not. Discourse/Rorty: (Mirror of Nature) distinguishes between "normal" and "hermeneutic" discourse. normal: in compliance with the relevant standards and norms of a culture. hermeneutic: will attempt to bridge a gap of paradigms in case of unsolvable disagreements. I (i) 244/245 PutnamVsRorty: uses "true" and "reasonable" in an emotional way. This is rhetoric. Why? As is known, Mussolini was pro pragmatism: supports thoughtless activism. R.B. Perry, 1936). If tolerance and an open society are our goal, would it not be better to argue directly for them, than to hope they were byproducts of a change of the metaphysical image? PutnamVsRorty: probably he thinks that metaphysical realism is wrong. But he can not say it! Behind this disguise there is the attempt to say from the perspective of God that there is no perspective of God. Rorty VI 79 Human/society/good/bad/Rorty: "we ourselves with our standards" does not mean "we, whether we are Nazis or not", but something like "language users, who by our knowledge became improved remakes of ourselves." We have gone through a development process that we accept as rational persuasion. VI 80 This includes the prevention of brainwashing and friendly toleration of troublemakers à la Socrates and rogues à la Feyerabend. Does that mean we should keep open the possibility of persuasion by Nazis? Yes, it is, but is no more dangerous than the possibility of returning to the Ptolemaic worldview! PutnamVsRorty: "coping better" is not a concept, according to which there are better or worse norms, ... it is an internal property of our notion of justification, that justification be independent of the majority ... (Rorty: I can not remember having ever said justification is dependent on a majority.) RortyVsPutnam: "better" in relation to "us at its best" less problematic than in relation to "idealized rational acceptability". Let's try a few new ways of thinking. VI 82 Putnam: what is "bad" supposed to mean here. Except in regard to a mistaken metaphysical image? |
SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Skepticism | Nagel Vs Skepticism | I 92 Skepticism/NagelVsSkepticism/Nagel: if you wanted to say: "an evil demon might mess up everything so that I say "perhaps it's just my confused brain that advises me" therefore it is impossible to concede any hierarchy of my thoughts objective validity." However, it is not possible to argue like that, because this argumentation itself belongs to those it purports to subvert. There is no place for skepticism. I 94 Logical Skepticism/NagelVsSkepticism/Nagel: here, we can never reach a point where there are two options, which are compatible with all "evidence". - I cannot conceive that I am in a similar knowledge situation where 2 + 2 = 5, but my brain was confused, because I cannot imagine that 2 + 2 = 5. The logic-skeptic has no level of reason to offer - there is no standpoint from which to verify the logic without presupposing it - not everything can be revised - something needs to be retained to verify that the revision is justified. II 14 VsSkepticism/Nagel: very different perspective of criticism: you can say that a radical skepticism was pointless, since the notion of an external world which in principle nobody is ever capable of discovering does not make sense. Nagel: the concept of dream also includes that you can wake up from it. II 15 Or rather, the dream from which you do not wake up, is your the reality. This is also our notion of what we can observe. >Verificationism. Without the possibility of correct conception the idea, our impressions were untrue becomes irrelevant. It cannot be true that the world does not exist, unless someone can find out that it does not exist. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Stroud, B. | Quine Vs Stroud, B. | Barry Stroud: it might be true that the world in its general form is completely different from the way in which we imagine it because of its effect on the senses. Davidson I 53 QuineVsStroud this difference would make no difference. Reason: since observation sentences are holophrastically (complete sentences) conditioned to stimulation, all connections between sentences and observation evidence will remain unchanged. From the standpoint of the subject nothing that could be done identified happened. Keep the structure, and you'll keep everything. I 53 |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Utilitarianism | Nagel Vs Utilitarianism | III 109 Ethics/Nagel: dispute between consequentialist conceptions (among others, utilitarianism: thesis: the consequences an action ultimately has in the world are important, not what it is like for the actor) and on the other hand the question of: "what to do". VsUtilitarianism/Nagel: criticism of the external standpoint (what is best for the state of the world) wants to give the individual a certain margin, to lead their own life (Nagel's internal position from which alone we can lead our lives). Common good as only justification for action does not leave any own desires unaccounted for. III 110 ((s) consequentialism/(s): ethical position which takes into account only the consequences (for the "world state", not for the actor)). NagelVs: it is about the permission to lead our own lives! III 110 /! 11 NagelVsUtilitarianism/Objectivity: we are not only dealing with a conflict between inter-personal and individual values, but: Someone who does not accept the consequentialist commandments, because they claim dominance over his own internal standpoint, will naturally transfer this objection to others as well. So this takes you more to an alternative ethics than to the rejection of ethics in general! |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Various Authors | Bigelow Vs Various Authors | I 222 Ceteris paribus/BigelowVsCeteris paribus assumption/Qualification/Qualified law/Exceptions/Bigelow/Pargetter: Variant: "if there are no other disturbances": 1) Problem: this threatens to let a law become a tautology, which ultimately reads: "Things move in this and that way, unless they do not." 2) Problem: The range of a "qualified" law threatens to become so narrow that nothing is included by it anymore. On the other hand it will be said that a law has no positive instances at all if one interprets it strictly. ((s)> Cartwright). Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: the mystery can be solved by understanding how laws contain modalities. Def Laws/law/Bigelow/Pargetter: are truths about possibilia. I 204 Property theory/World properties/Terminology/Bigelow/Pargetter: contradictory predicates: do not correspond to any properties. E.g. round and square. I 210 Accessibility: such possible worlds are then not accessible for one another. One is nomically impossible from the standpoint of the other. VsProperty theory/VsWorld-properties/Bigelow/Pargetter: this theory is faced with the accusation of circularity, but we hope to resolve the objection. I 53 Determinables/Determinates/Johnson: stand in close logical relations: having a D-ate (determinate) entails having the corresponding D-able (determinable). I 54 But not vice versa! Having a D-able does not require possession of a certain D-ate! But it does require possession of some D-ate from the area. BigelowVsJohnson, World properties: but this could not explain the asymmetry. Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: 2nd order properties. Problem: our theory is still incomplete!. Problem: explaining why quantities are gradual. And this is not about whether objects are the same and different at the same time. New: The problem that we can also still say exactly E.g. how much they differ. Or E.g. that two masses are more similar than two others. Plato: Plato solves this with participation. Bigelow/Pargetter: we try a different solution. Bigelow I 234 Natural necessity/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Bigelow/Pargetter: Dramatic turn Vs Natural necessity! Also later Wittgenstein. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Wright, Cr. | Rorty Vs Wright, Cr. | VI 40 WrightVsTarski/Rorty: he has not succeeded to specify a standard. Wright: two standards: legitimate assertibility and truth. Difference: the pursuit of one is necessarily also the pursuit of the other, but success with one is not necessarily a success with the other. Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: "metaphysical activism". Wants to keep correspondence and representation alive. RortyVsWright: from the fact that beliefs can be justified without being true (admittedly) it does not follow that two standards are followed. Nor that we have two obligations. 1) to justify actions, and 2) another obligation to do the right thing. It simply shows that what is justified with one audience is not necessarily so in front of another. Disquotation/Deflationism/Wright: the deflationist thinks that by the disquotation principle the content of the truth predicate is completely fixed. Wright: There is a "biconditional connection between the claim a proposition is true, and the appropriate use of this sentence produced by the disquotation principle, which serves and the purpose of explanation." VI 41 "Any genuine assertion practice is just the same as it would be if truth were the goal consciously set." Rorty: Wright believes that two choices can be distinguished by asking whether they are "de facto" not "guided" by one but by other consideration. RortyVsWright: is it sufficient for the actual existence of such a power, however, if the player believes the relevant fact is given? E.g. I believe I fulfill the will of the gods by a certain behavior. My critic - Atheist - says there is no will of the gods, so it could not be my standard. VI 42 I reply that this is reductionist and that my own belief of what standard I fulfill makes the difference. RortyVsWright: he should not be happy about this defense strategy of atheists. An imaginative player will always have more and more control systems in function than you can tell apart. VI 42/43 Wright: must either admit that his goal is then normative in a descriptive sense when the player believes this, or specify another criterion (recourse). Wright: the thesis that possession of truth consists in the "fulfillment of a normative condition distinct from the claim authorization" is equal to the thesis that "truth is a real property". Truth/Wright: thesis: truth is an independent standard. (Sic, VI 42/43) WrightVsDeflationism, Wright pro type of minimalism with truth as an independent standard in addition to a mere property of sentences. VI 45 Representation/Convergence/RortyVsWright: but his example is highly revealing: he thinks, e.g. what the "intuitive" linking of representationality with convergence is based on is the following "truism" about "convergence/representation": "If two devices for representation fulfill the same function, a different output is generated in favorable conditions when there is a different input." VI 46 Wright: must distinguish here between different discourses (for example, about physics or the comical), in which the cognitive is appropriate or not. The humor (the "base") could be different, although people could not be blamed for that. Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: such questions can only be decided a priori. Namely: e.g. the question of the cognitive status of a discourse! VI 46/47 Crispin Wright/RortyVsWright: he defines a cognitive commandment according to which a speaker is to function like a well oiled representation machine. This follows the pattern of all epistemologists by whom prejudice and superstition are like sand in the gears. Ultimately, for them humans are machines! Rorty: right Input/Output function is fulfilled by countless functions in an uninteresting manner. What Wright needs: we should recognize a priori: What are the proper functions (through knowledge of the content). VI 48 PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: Pragmatism doubts that cognitivity is more than a historically contingent consensus about the appropriate rationale. VI 48/49 Content/RortyVsWright: he believes philosophers could consider the "content" of a discourse and then say whether it complied with the cognitive commandment. Representation/RortyVsWright: fundamentally different outputs can be considered a representation of the same inputs. Basically anything can be a representation of anything. You only have to previously agree on it. Cognitivity/Rorty: the content is of minor importance when it comes to the determination of cognitivity. It is almost exclusively about approval of conventions. Therefore, it is a historical sociological term. VI 50 WrightVsWittgenstein/Rorty: (Following a rule) "in metaphysic perspective a killjoy" (Evans also). Only concession to the "Qietisten": that truth and falsehood are even possible where realism is not up for debate. (Comedy, morality). Two varieties of Wittgenstein's spoilsport: Kripke and McDowell. McDowellVsNoncognitivism/Rorty: the moral non-cognitivist is "driven by an erroneous interpretation of ethical facts and ethical objectivity". The same applies for him as for his Platonic opponents, the moral realists: VI 51 struggles with the quest for an independent position. That is impossible. (McDowellVsRealism of moral). Wright/Rorty: Wright is against this attempt "to undermine the debate between realism and anti-realism in general". Advantage of his concept of the cognitive commandment: does not include an overly objectified fact concept" (as would be criticized by Wittgenstein and McDowell). We refer to what we can understand as the range of possible causes of these differences of opinion. Representation/Relevance/Cognition/Function/RortyVsWright: this is not enough to rebut McDowell: to arrive at a concept of the range of possible causes we must first specify an Input Output function, otherwise we cannot distinguish the smooth functioning of a representative machine from a malfunction. Wittgenstein has shown that the "relevant object area" is never in the relevant sense "there". Therefore question: whether there is a way to isolate the input without reference to the "evaluative standpoint". World/Thinking/Davidson/DeweyVs: we do not have the ability to separate the contribution by "the world" to the process of judgment from our own contribution. VI 52 True Making/Wright/Rorty: does not doubt the existence of isolated "truth-makers". (WrightVsDavidson). VI 56 PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: here there are only historical sociologically variable differences between patterns of justifications. These patterns should not be introduced into the concept of truth. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Antirealism | Fine, A. | Rorty IV 19 Arthur Fine / Rorty: Thesis: wants to have a standpoint point beyond realism and anti-realism . (VsDummett). (Also A. FineVs truth makers). |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 |
| Standpoint | Rorty, R. | I passim Rorty Thesis: Today there is no fundamental standpoint or all-encompassing framework conceivable from which or within which a totality of insights could be justified or questioned. II 42 Rorty Thesis: Men and women of all times and countries have no other common core than their vulnerability to pain and humiliation. II 152 Rorty Thesis: there is no neutral ground, there is no Archimedean point in philosophy from which one could view and discuss the whole thing. You cannot go outside the whole. |
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