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Inserting | Logic Texts | II 133 Insertion/substitution/identity/truth preservation: Logical equivalence is (...) a weakening of the identity of statements. Logically equivalent statements are not the same in all properties, but only in logical terms. If one statement is logically true, so is the other and vice versa. If a certain statement follows logically from one, then it follows logically from the other and vice versa. >Substitution, >Substitution (Insertion), >Equivalence, >Logical truth. Insertion Theorem: Let FA be a propositional logical formula which contains a partial form A. Let FB be a formula which results from FA when A is replaced by a propositional formula B, (not necessarily everywhere). If A is now ≡ B, then FA ≡ FB applies. II 134 Logically equivalent formulas have the same inference sets. Logically equivalent formulas can be inferred from the same prerequisites. Redundancy Theory/Hoyningen-Huene: therefore, in propositional logic one does not really have to distinguish between "A" and "It is true that A". (In propositional logic such properties are abstracted from). >Redundancy theory, >Propositional logic. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 |
Modalities | Field | I 185 Modality/Field: many people believe there can be a simple exchange between modality and ontology: one simply avoids an enrichment of the ontology by modal statements. >Ontology, >Modal logic. I 255 Modalization/Mathematics/Physics/Field: "Possible Mathematics": 1. Does not allow to preserve platonic physics 2. Advantage: This avoids the indispensability argument 3. False: "It is possible that mathematics is true" - but correct: Conservativity of modality. ((s) Mathematics does not change the content of physical statements). 4. For Platonic physics one still needs to use unmodalized mathematics. 5. Field: but we can formulate physics based neither on mathematics nor on modality: comparative predicates instead of numeric functors. - (257 +) >Platonism, >Mathematics, >Physics, >Conservativity. I 272f Modal translation/mathematics/Putnam/Field: the idea is that in the modal translation acceptable sentences become true modal statements and unacceptable sentences false modal statements. Field: then there are two ways of looking at the translations: 1st as true equivalences: then the modal translation shows the truth of the Platonic theorems. (Truth preservation). >Truth transfer. I 273 2nd we can regard the modal translation as true truths: then the Platonic propositions are literally false. ((s) symmetry/asymmetry). N.B.: It does not make any difference which view is accepted. They only differ verbally in the use of the word "true". >Truth. I 274 Truth/mathematical entities/mE/Field: if a modal translation is to be true, "true" must be considered non-disquotational in order to avoid mathematical entities. - True: can then only mean: it turns out to be disquotational true in the modal translation, otherwise the existence of mathematical entities would be implied. - ((s) "Non-disquotational": = "turns out as disquotational.") (No circle). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Numbers | Field | I 153 Numbers/Frege/Crispin Wright: Frege suggests that the fact that our arithmetical language has these qualities is sufficient to establish natural numbers as a sortal concept whose instances, if they have some, are the objects. WrightVsFrege: but the objects do not have to exist. Problem: Frege thus demands that empirical concerns are irrelevant. - Then there is also no possibility of an error. >Numbers/Frege, >Existence/Frege. II 214 Numbers/BenacerrafVsReduction/Benacerraf/Field: there may be several correlations so that one cannot speak of "the" referent of number words. >Paul Benacerraf. Solution/Field: we have to extend "partially denoted" also to sequences of terms. >Denotation, >Partial denotation, >Generalization/Field. Then "straight", "prim", etc. become base-dependent predicates whose basis is the sequence of the numbers. - Then one can get mathematical truth (> truth preservation, truth transfer). - E.g. "The number two is Caesar" is neither true nor false. (without truth value). >Senseless. II 326 Def Natural numbers/Zermelo/Benacerraf/Field: 0 is the empty set and every natural number > 0 is the set that is the only element which includes the set which is n-1. Def Natural numbers/von Neumann/Benacerraf/Field: Every natural number n is the set that has the sets as elements which are the predecessors of n as elements. Fact/Nonfactualism/Field: it is clear that there is no fact about whether Zermelos or von Neumann's approach "presents" the things "correctly" - there is no fact which decides whether numbers are sets. That is what I call the Definition Structural Insight: it makes no difference what the objects of a mathematical theory are, if they are only in a right relationship with each other. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Paratactic Analysis | Brandom | I 743 Paratactic analysis/Davidson: 1. focuses on tokenings, not on types. I 744 2. an exposed sentence tokening should stand in relation to the one that is attributed. I 745 3. essential relation of "equal speech". Problem: the substitution in the range of "that" does not preserve the truth value of the entire attribution. >Attribution, >Truth value, >Truth preservation. Solution: the sentence-tokening located within, is not part of the actual attribution. - BrandomVsDavidson: the relation between the two tokenings should be an anaphor and not demonstrative. - e.g. Galileo said (something in his mouth that commited him on that, what an assertive utterance of the following in my mouth would now commit me to). >Anaphora, >Demonstration. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
Slingshot Argument | Meixner | I 120f Slingshot Argument/Meixner: all true propositions supposedly express the same state of affairs - solution: the replacement of one name for another, that refers to the same, does not transfer the truth of the proposition. >Names of sentences, >Names of expressions, >Truth, >Truth preservation, >Truth value, >Truth value/Frege. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
Translation | Mates | I 93 Translation/formal language/Mates: a translation of everyday language in the artificial language is meaningless as long as the artificial language is not interpreted. >Interpretation, >Artificial language, >Formal language, >Formalization, >Natural language. "Minimum translation":a minimum translation translates true in true and false in false statements. >Truth preservation, >Truth transfer. I 102 Translation/meaning/sense/interpretation/Mates: to know whether something is a satisfactory translation (of a formal language), we need not only to know the meaning (reference), but also the sense - otherwise we can obtain various everyday language translations. Sense/Mates: cannot be stated in a list as meaning. >Sense. Meaning/Mates: meaning gives the non-logical constants truth conditions: E.g. 2 < 3 is true, if the smallest prime number is less than 3. >Meaning. Sense/Mates: sense provides the content: that the smallest ... is smaller. Reference/Mates: reference provides truth conditions: true, if ... >Truth conditions. Sense: content: that it is true. >Reference, >Content. I 110 Translation/variables/Mates: the translation is not affected by the substitution of the variables, but only by the substitution of the constants. >Variables, >Constants. I 111 Translation/summary/Mates: 1. meaningless without interpretation. (Assignment of objects to the individual constants) 2. If an interpretation is given, one can get a "standard translation" for every formal statement, and this by means of the definition of "true in interpretation I" - Problem: if the same interpretation is given in various ways (E.g. 2 = "smallest prime" or "sole even prime number") one can obtain several non-synonymous translations. >Way of givenness, >Intension. Two formal statements may be equivalent, without being equally good translations. >Equivalence. Conversely it is possible: that two statements are adequate but not equivalent - (only for ambiguity). >Adequacy, >Ambiguity. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
Truth | Field | III 29 Truth/truth preservation/Field: because all inferences that are thus obtained are correct every time, you should assume that you can say the theory of real numbers is true. Solution: instead of having to assume the truth of the theory of real numbers we can accept the preservation of truth (truth transfer): this is explained without truth by acceptance of conservativity. >Conservativity. Conservativity: here we also need to take only the limited version of conservativity, which follows from the consistency of set theory alone. >Conservativity/Field. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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Truth Preservation | Lewis, D. | Field II 262 truth/Lewis: we should regard the conclusions about e.g. Clinton / de Vito as truth preserving, despite the intuitive absurdity. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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