Lexicon of Arguments

 

Dennett I 557
Function/Searle (according to Dennett): only products that were produced by a real human consciousness, have a function (> objet ambigu, P. Valéry).
DennettVsSearle: therefore the wings of the aircraft serve to fly, but not the wings of the eagle.
- - -
Searle I 19
SearleVsFunctionalism (SearleVsPutnam): relationships between mind states are not only causal. Otherwise stones would have the same mind states like us with the right causal relations. Cf. >Functions.
I 59 ff
VsFunctionalism: functionalism eliminates qualia - imitation of a functional organization does not result in pain sensation.
>Qualia, >Simulation.
I 233f
A machine is defined by effects and cannot be recreated from cheese. A computer is syntactically defined and can be rebuild by anything (cats, mice, cheese). Syntax is always relative to the observer but not intrinsical.

However, the heart is an intrinsical pump. Also, water can be described as intelligent (lowest resistance).
I 266f
Intentional phenomena: rule consequences: are genuine causal phenomena. Functional explanations: are only bare physical facts. Causality only exists through interest-oriented description here.
>Description dependence.
Rules are no cause for action.
>Rules.
I 266
Function/Searle: a function has no separate layer.
>Description level, >Levels(Order).
I 269
Pattern: a pattern plays a causal role in functional terms, but does not guarantee unconscious representation. (Intentionality)
>Causality/Searle.
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III 24
SearleVsMillikan: a function is always relative to the observer (only "flow" immanent). Millikan: the function arose evolutionary.
>Ruth Millikan.