Lexicon of Arguments

 

I 72f
Veritative being/Tugendhat: "it is the case that p". - VsObject Theory (>objet theory):
States of affairs are taken as objects.
Conceptualism: concepts are taken as objects.
Immaterial - but also VsImagination.
Instead: Language as a basic constitution (yes/no structure).
TugendhatVsMiddle Ages: verum as "transcendental" determination of ens next to unum and aliquid - had Aristotle referred to the veritative existence, he could have created a semantics of assertion.
>Aristotle, >Being.
I 91
VsHeidegger: existence of facts instead of "all being is being of beings".
I 184f
Def Conceptualism/Tugendhat: the theory that predicate = concept (conceptus). The predicate stands for something, otherwise the use of the predicate would have no objective basis.
>Predicates, >Reference.
I 185
Nominalism: denies that we actually always imagine something when we use a predicate sensibly. We can also understand the sentence about the red castle without having a concrete imagination.
>Nominalism, >Universals.
ConceptualismVsNominalism: misunderstanding: the imagination does not have to be sensual.
NominalismVsConceptualism: there are no "general images" - or images of something general - characterization only exists since Wittgsteins Philosophical Inveistigations.
>Generality, >Ludwig Wittgenstein.
I 189
VsConceptualism: object dispensable.
>Conceptualism/Quine.
Nominalism:
1) linguistic sign belongs to the intersubjective understanding-each-other - then intra-subjective understanding superfluous?
2) results in positive explanation for inter-subjective meaning.
I 204
Conceptualism/Tugendhat: must postulate nonsensual imagination, because no sensual imagination corresponds to "every color".
>Imagination, >Colour.