Books on Amazon
Carnap Sentence/Carnap conditional/Lewis: states that in case of realization of the theory T the theoretical terms name the elements of a realization of T: (Note: Carnap has cases in mind where the A terms belong to an observation language). E.g. T(x)>T(t) - Ramsey sentence: has the same content as the theory in traditional terminology.
Schw I 220
Theory/Lewis/Schwarz: in order to refute the Carnap conditional one would have to find that there are things that fulfil the theory, but that these are not electrons - this cannot turn out to be true - e.g. that it was not Homer who wrote the Odyssey, but another Greek man of the same name - ((s) yes, but not: "not the author of the Iliad") - no discovery about DNA, causal chains, prototypes or usage may rebut the Carnap conditional - but Carnap conditional is not suitable for definitions, because it specifies only sufficient conditions.
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989
Konventionen Berlin 1975
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991