Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Rabbit-duck-head: Example of a form which can be perceived in different ways and thus allows different interpretations. According to Wittgenstein this leads to a distinction between the mental image that has the property of ambiguity and the physical image that does not have this property. (H. Putnam, Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, (German) Frankfurt 1993 p. 178f). See also ambiguity, perspective, seeing, seeing-as, knowledge, perception, sensations.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Lewis, David
Books on Amazon
Rabbit-Duck-Head V 274
Perception/view/match/Lewis: does not mean that in your mind or the soul the same is going on as is goning on before the eyes - rather it is about a informational content. - Visual experience: is best characterized by the typical causal role - the content is the content of belief, which tends to be caused by it. - Problem: the same visual experience can produce very different beliefs - but not the entire content can be characterized by belief. - Rabbit-Duck-Head: the belief can be characterized by the disjunction rabbit or duck, but then it results in the belief that there are ink and paper.

D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-29