Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Frege, Gottlob
 
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Content Berka I 85
Content/Frege: function of an argument - concept forming - subject: argument - predicate: function.
Berka I 86
Not every content can be assessed: E.g. the image house.
Berka I 87
Affirmation/Frege: refers to the whole of content and judgment.
I 88
Against: Negation/Denial: is part of the content, not to the judgment.
Berka I 87
Def Conceptual Content/Frege/(s): What is common to passive and active. - ((s) From which the same set of conclusions can be drawn. - This has nothing to do with the distinction function/argument.
Berka I 96
Content Identity/Frege: differs from the contingency (implication) in that it refers to names, not to contents. - Two names have the same content. - Problem: characters can sometimes stand for themselves, sometimes they stand for a content. - E.g. In geometry, the same point can have different meanings. - Therefore, you must use two different names first to show that later. - Different names are not a mere formality. - Spelling: Triple bar ≡ - refers to conceptual content. - Also content identity needs its own character, because the same content can be determined differently.
- - -
Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 47
Content/Frege: intension, way of givenness.
II 57ff
Content/Sentence/Frege: can be true or false.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Brk I
K. Berka/L. Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983

F III
R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz
Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-27