Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Bennett, J.
Books on Amazon
Conventions I 155
Convention/Lewis: more than mere behavior regularity - no agreement necessary - not even implied agreement - 170 conventional meaning is more than the usual meaning, because it contains common knowledge about a regularity
I 167f
Convention/Lewis: mutual knowledge - Cargile: useful only up to fourth reflection - Lewis: only actions are coordinated - BennettVsLewis: do not imparting any action on a meaning
I 189
Searle: no "conventional meaning" instead: rules that apply for an expression
I 191
Convention/Meaning/Bennett: a speaker can only ever give an expression a conventional meaning if it already has a meaning - (>Lemon example) - Wittgenstein: I cannot say "hot" while I mean "cold" - SearleVsWittgenstein: the meaning exceeds the intention, it is sometimes also a matter of convention - Bennett: conventional meaning effective circumstance
Jonathan Bennett
I Bennett Die Strategie des Bedeutungs-Nominalismus aus Meggle (Hrsg) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Frankf/M 1979

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-30