Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Fodor: Signal language of the brain for internal processing - PutnamVs. Mentalese explains nothing, shifts the problem. SearleVs. Regress of homunculi. - Rorty's solution is a hierarchy of dumber homunculi.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Peacocke, Christopher
Books on Amazon
Mentalese I 206
Mentalese/belief/Field/Peacocke: Field Thesis: systems that are sufficiently complex for belief terms, have systems of internal representations in which the sentence-analogues have significant grammatical structure.
I 209
Mentalese/Peacocke: a model that works without the assumption of a language of thought would have to explain two things:
1. How can one ascribe propositional content, without referring to syntactic structures? - That means, relatively complex content must be attributed to syntactically unstructured (psychic) states.
2. It must be shown, how these states interact with perception and behavior.
I 215
A simple model (relation instead of language) does not seem to require the instrumentalist conception of a rational actor. - On the contrary, if someone meets the relational model, a realism regarding mechanisms of rational belief-desire psychology would be justified.

Pea I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-26