Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Reference, in philosophy: relation of a linguistic expression or action to a real object. Reference presupposes the existence of this object. An expression, which corresponds to no object, has no reference, however, may have a meaning. See also unicorn, Pegasus.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Strawson, Peter F.
 
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Reference Meggle I 297
According to Hungerland:
Strawson: reference rules - rules of presupposition of expressions such as e.g. "the President of the United States is ... years old".
Meggle I 297
Strawson: Lies are no correct use of language.
Meggle I 310f
Reference rules/Strawson:
1. To refer does not mean that you say you refer to something.
2. The thing must stand in a certain relation to the speaker.
3. The correct reference is not part of the utterance, in the sense in which a proper description is part of what is asserted by the utterance.
E.g. "This is black and that is white." Here is the fact that "this" is closer to me than "that" not part of the statement!, Not part of what I said about the two objects.
- - -
Meggle I 311
Reference/Strawson: not saying that one "refers to something" - R is not part of the utterance as the correct description of the statement is.
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I 312
Hungry country, "this" is closer to me than "that", but not part of the statement - "S" does not require that there is only one, but that I am only referring to one.
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Strawson III 436
Reference/Strawson: a) clearly referring expressions: the fulfillment of the conditions is not stated but implied - b) descriptive terms: here the fulfillment of the conditions is also stated by the use.
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IV 68
Reference/Strawson: on particular without reference to properties possible.
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VII 124
Identification/reference/Strawson: E.g. "That man there has crossed the channel twice in swimming through it" - it has the (wrong) appearance, that one "refers twice", a) once by stating nothing and consequently making no statement, or b) identifying the person with oneself and finding a trivial identity. StrawsonVs: this is the same mistake as to believe that the object would be the meaning of the expression - E.g. "Scott is Scott".

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik M√ľnchen 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Grice: > Meg I
G. Meggle (Hg)
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1979


> Counter arguments against Strawson
> Counter arguments in relation to Reference



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-25