Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Facts, philosophy: facts are that which corresponds to a true statement or - according to some authors - is identical with a true statement. Problems result from possible multiple counting of objects, e.g. when it is spoken of a situation and additionally by the fact that this situation exists. Therefore, some authors consider the assumption of facts as something superfluous. See also truths of reason, factual truths, facts, truth, statements, knowledge, certainty, thought objects._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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D. Lewis on Facts - Dictionary of Arguments
Schwarz I 158 Facts/colors researcher Mary/Lewis: you can learn special items and representations even if you get information in Russian, - but there are no particular facts for Russians. - Real progress in knowledge: acquisition of new skills. - Mary/Lewis: The main thing is that there are not recent (physical) possibilities excluded, that is not possible. - - - Explanation/(s): Example color researcher Mary/Frank Jackson: the color researcher Mary is in a closed room with a black and white monitor. She has any amount of literature about colors at her disposal. Question: is her knowledge sufficient to say that she knows everything about colors? >Color/Jackson, >Qualia/Jackson. - - - Schwarz I 139 Moore's facts/Schwarz: For example, absences are often causes and effects. Something that only philosophers think about denying. Schwarz I 11 Moore's Facts/Lewis: are more certain than the premises of any philosophical argument that could be used to refute them. Schwarz I 15 Analysis/language/fact/Schwarz: strictly speaking, only words and sentences can be analyzed, not facts. Fact/Schwarz: nothing but true sentences: For example "the fact that it is snowing" means nothing else than "it is snowing". For example, "facts about snow are necessarily determined by facts about precipitation": is equivalent to a long conjunction of sentences like "necessary if there is no precipitation, it does not snow either", etc. Schwarz I 62 Mathematics/actuality/fact/Lewis/black: as with possible worlds, there is no actual information: For example, that 34 is the root of 1156 tells us nothing about the world. Schwarz: For example that there is nobody who shaves those who do not shave themselves is analogously no information about the world. Schwarz I 133 Fact/Schwarz: if you understand them as classes of space-time regions, this is not an alternative at all, but only a terminological variant. Def Fact/Lewis/Schwarz: true propositions (1986f(1),189,Fn 15). I.e. classes of possible worlds. Then there are facts that unambiguously correspond with Lewis's classes of space-time regions, but one can no longer distinguish "right" causes and effects from wrong ones. Cause/Effect/Event/Event/Act/LewisVsBennett/Schwarz: Event as fact: Problem: To Distinguish "Right Causes": Similarity is not a solution here: Example Xanthippe's becoming a widow: here one cannot refer to similarity of regions. 1. David Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |