Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Field, Hartry
Books on Amazon
Generalization II
Realism/Variant/Field: here: "there are sentences in our language that are true, but for which we shall never have a reason to believe them." - Then you need a truth-term to generalize (> infinite conjunction/disjunction).
Anti-Realism/Variant: here would be the opposite position: to identify truth with justifiability in the long run. - (> ideal justification).
II 120
Truth-predicate/generalization/truth/Field: For example, the desire to only express true sentences: "I only utter "p" if p."
II 121
E.g. "Not every (of infinitely many) axioms is true" - or, for example, they are contingent: "not every one needed to be true". - N.B.: this is only possible with purely disquotational truth.
II 205
Partial Denotation/generalization/Field/(s): partial denotation - This is a general case of denotation (not vice versa).
II 206
This makes a simple denotation (which is a special case) superfluous.
II 207
Partial match: generalization of consistency.
II 206
Generalization/Field: E.g. partial agreement is a generalization of agreement.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-30