Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Barrow, J.D. | Kanitscheider Vs Barrow, J.D. | II 105 KanitscheiderVsBarrow: the purpose of a measurement is the registration, i.e. leaving a permanent trace, not the subjective experience. II 107 KanitscheiderVsBarrow: realism is simply the most rational metaphysical assumption to understand the cognitive interaction between man and the world. II 108 KanitscheiderVsBarrow: phenomena, in biological terms, are also traces of the things that are formed via the information channel of a conscious animal. Therefore, evolutionary biology, when expanded to the cognitive process, leads the approach of the subjectivist constitution of the world by last observer in terms of quantum mechanics ad absurdum! KanitscheiderVsBarrow: one could possibly also consider a split interpretation of physics and biology such that the bioLogical realism only makes sense on this level of complexity, but cannot be sustained on the fundamental physical level of description. But then there is also a dilemma regarding the demarcation: between biology and QM there is still the molecular level of the chemical systems, the viruses, the DNA and the pharmacoLogical objects. A quasi-continuum of systems of all sizes. A split ontology would provoke the question, at which magnitude the philosophical interpretation of the status of the systems switches. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Carnap, R. | Carnap Vs Carnap, R. | VI VII Extensionality thesis/Carnap: (1928): all statements are extensional. Self-criticism CarnapVsCarnap: (1961) is not correct in this form. New: weaker form: not every extensional statement is translatable into a logically equivalent statement in an extensional language. Extensional method/Carnap: is basically just to use an extensional language for the whole Constitutional system. Self-criticism: (1961) that is not clear: the impression could arise that for the validity of the re-construction of the concept A through a term B it was already sufficient for that B to have the same scope as A. Vs: in reality, the stronger condition must be satisfied that scope equality is not just a coincidence, but a necessity! (Because of Logical rules or laws of nature). |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Carnap, R. | Verschiedene Vs Carnap, R. | Skirbekk I 16 Probation: correspondence between sentence and the reality NeurathVsCarnap: coherence rather than correspondence. Carnap VI 177 Attribution/Quality/Sensory Quality/Carnap: there is no sharp line between attributable and non-attributable sensory qualities. Organ sensations can hardly or not at all be attributed to certain world lines (i.e. visual things). Example "melancholic forest": This attribution is justified! VI 178 Because it arouses a sensation of corresponding quality. Like sugar the sweet one. (external) VsCarnap: "pathetic fallacy". VI 181 GoetheVsPositivism/GoetheVsEmpiricism/GoetheVsNewton/GoetheVsCarnap: (Theory of Colours): one should remain in the field of sensory perceptions themselves and determine the laws existing between them in the field of perceptions themselves. CarnapVsGoethe: so we would have to find the laws there (n of perception). But physical laws do not apply there, of course, but certain other laws do if the Constitution of the physical world is to be possible at all. But these laws are of a much more complicated form. VI 71 Characteristics/characteristic/definition/constitution/Carnap: Problem: e.g. foreign psychic: the behavior is not the same as the foreign psychic itself! Realism: the angry behavior is not the anger itself. Solution/Carnap: but one can transform all scientific (not metaphysical) statements about F into statements about K while keeping the Logical value (truth value). Then F and K are Logically identical. (s) But not vice versa: the concept of behavior is not the concept of anger. VI 72 A meaning for K that did not agree with F could not be given scientifically! (many authors VsCarnap). Carnap: this has to do with Leibniz's identity. VI 78/79 Foreign Psychic/Carnap: every psychological process, if it occurs as foreign psychic, is in principle recognizable (by behavior) or questionable. So every statement can be transformed into a statement about the corresponding characteristics. It follows from this that all psychoLogical objects can be traced back to physical objects (movements of expression, behaviour). (BergsonVsCarnap). |
Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Carnap, R. | Newen Vs Carnap, R. | New I 115 Science/Carnap/Newen: Thesis: is dealing only with relations ((s) extrinsic properties, no intrinsic ones). Scientific statements are purely structural statements. E.g. rail network (subway map, subway network): Structural Description/Carnap/Newen: does not use names for places. Solution: identification of places by number of connections, in case of same number, the connections of the nearest neighboring places, etc. This probably already allows clearly describing a very complex network by consideration of the immediate neighboring stations. I 116 If unexpectedly two nodes cannot be distinguished by the number of connections, they are also scientifically indistinguishable! VsCarnap/Newen: only relations with regard to a subject area ((s) parameter) are taken into account. Problem: then all structurally identical networks can scientifically be reflected one to one on each other. E.g. a rail network could happen to represent the bloodstream in an organism. Relevance/CarnapVsVs: scientific differences would manifest themselves in differences of the relevant relations. VsCarnap: there is no absolute concept of relevant relations. I 117 VCarnap: it is debatable whether the world can be described without irreducible intrinsic properties. Constitution System/Carnap/Newen: Example 1) statements about our own consciousness 2) statements about the world of physical objects 3) about the consciousness of others 4) about intellectual and cultural objects. Fundamental Experience/Carnap/Newen: is the total content of what is given to consciousness in a moment. I 118 The impressions of all senses together with memories, feelings, etc. Basic relationship of experiences: the similarity memory. Empirical Statements/Carnap: are ultimately very complex statements about similarity memories. Def Quasi Analysis/Carnap/Newen: is the way to appropriate definitions. Quasi objects are constituted from fundamental experiences. All everyday objects are conceived as quasi objects. Fundamental experiences (= node in the network). Relation: Similarity memory. E.g. colors: here, for example, 5 items are set in relationship on the basis of similarity in color. I 119 Def Color/Carnap/Newen: the greatest set of elementary experiences that are of the same color. Quasi Property/Carnap/Newen: what emerges from a quasi analysis, for example, the quasi property of having a particular color, e.g. being red. Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Newen: this systematic derivation of all knowledge from basic elements is not necessarily psychoLogically adequate. It's not about syntheses and formations, as they are present in the real process of cognition, but precisely about rational reconstruction. VsCarnap/Newen: Problem: There can be several quasi analysis on an equal footing in a distribution: I 120 (From Mormann Rudolf Carnap p.100): T: 1. A 2. ABC 3. C 4.ABD 5.BCE 6.D 7.DE 8.E T* 1. A 2. BC 3. C 4.AB*D 5.B*CE 6.D 7.DB*E 8.E Both series provide the same structural color relations, because B and B * play symmetrical roles. In addition, A and D as well as C and E are structurally interchangeable. I.e. if you exchange one of them, the fundamental experience 2 in T * is structurally concurrent with no. 7 in T, etc. Point: despite their structural equality T and T * are essentially different, because the fundamental experiences have different properties: according to theory T 2 has the colors A, B and C, according to T * it only has the colors A and C. Problem: Carnap neglected GoodmanVsCarnap: thus the quasi analysis fails principle. NewenVsGoodman: this is controversial. I 121 Carnap/Newen: his theory is solipsistic; it assumes a subject and its experiences (mental states). Consciousness/NewenVsCarnap: we can only represent consciousness without interaction and radical difference. The world of the other can only be considered as a part of my world. NewenVsCarnap: his theory can only succeed if a non-solipsistic approach is chosen. NS I 30 CarnapVsFrege/CarnapVsPlatonism: no platonic realm of thoughts. VsCarnap/VsPossible World Semantics/VsSemantics of Possible Worlds: two problems: 1) problem of empty names. a) how can they be integrated usefully in a sentence b) how can various empty names be distinguished? 2) Problem: Def Hyper-Intentionality/Newen/Schrenk: necessarily true propositions are true in exactly the same sets of possible worlds (i.e. in all). Therefore, they cannot be distinguished by the possible world semantics. Their different content cannot be grasped by the intention if the intention is equated with sets of possible worlds in which the sentence is true. NS I 101 Sense/Names/Frege: Thesis: the sense of a name is given by the description. This is the so-called description theory, a simple variant of the description theory. NS I 102 Reference/Names/Frege: also by reference to description: the description whose sense is the contribution of a name to the thought expressed also defines the object. Names/Carnap/Newen/Schrenk: like Frege. VsFrege/VsCarnap: both have the problem that it is not clear which individual concept is associated with a name. Various speakers could associate various descriptions with a name so that communication remains enigmatic. Solution: Searle: bundle theory. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Chisholm, R.M. | Simons Vs Chisholm, R.M. | Chisholm II 166 SimonsVsChisholm/SimonsVsBrentano: thesis: Chisholm inherited a mereological essentialism by Brentano with which I do not agree. But I will use these ideas to give a slightly different interpretation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Wittgenstein himself was not so clear with respect to facts as it seems. Self-Criticism: self-criticism is a mess of facts and complexes. There are worlds between the later Wittgenstein and Brentano, but there are contacts between Brentano and the Tractatus. --- Simons I 1 Extensional Mereology/Simons: extensional mereology is a classical theory. Spelling: CEM. Individuals Calculus/Leonard/Goodman: (40s): another name for the CEM is an individual calculus. This is intended to express that the objects of the part-whole relation belong to the lowest Logical type (so they are all individuals, both a whole and a part are individuals). VsCEM: 1. The CEM claims the existence of sums as individuals for whose existence we have no evidence beyond the theory. Vs: 2. The whole theory is not applicable to most things in our lives. Vs: 3. The Logic of the CEM has not the resources to deal with temporal and modal terms: e.g. temporal part, substantial part, etc. Simons: these are all external critiques but there is an internal critique: that comes from the extensional mereology. Extensional Mereology: thesis: objects with the same parts are identical (analogous to set theory). Problem: 1. Flux: e.g. people have different parts at different times. I 2 2. Modality/extensional mereology: problem: e.g. a man could have other parts than he actually has and still be the same person. (s) The extensionality would then demand together with the Leibniz identity that all parts are essential. This leads to mereoLogical essentialism. Chisholm/mereoLogical essentialism/Simons: Chisholm represents the mereoLogical essentialism. Thesis: no object can have different parts than it actually has. Vs: it is a problem to explain why normal objects are not modally rigid (all parts are essential). Solution/Chisholm: thesis: (appearing) things (appearances) ((s) everyday things) are Logical structures made of objects for which the mereoLogical essentialism applies. Flux/mereology/Simons: problem/(s): according to the CEM changing objects may not be regarded as identical with themselves. 1. Solution/Chisholm: thesis: the actual objects are mereologically constant and the appearances again logical constructions of unchanging objects. SimonsVsChisholm: the price is too high. 2. Common solution: the common solution is to replace the normal things (continuants) through processes that themselves have temporal parts. SimonsVs: hence, the extensionality cannot be maintained. Such four-dimensional objects fail on the modal argument. CEM/event/Simons: in the case of events the extensional mereology is applicable. It is also applicable in classes and masses. Classes/masses/Simons: these are non-singular objects for which the extensionality applies. Part/Simons: a part is ambiguous, depending on whether used in connection with individuals, classes or masses. Extensionality/mereology/Simons: if extensionality is rejected, we are dealing with continuants. I 3 Continuants/Simons: continuants may be in flux. Extensionality/Simons: if extensionality is rejected, more than one object can have exactly the same parts and therefore several different objects can be at the same time in the same place. I 175 Temporal Part/continuants/mereology/SimonsVsAll/SimonsVsChisholm: thesis: continuants can also have temporal parts! That means that they are not mereologically constant but mereologically variable. Continuants/Simons: thesis: continuants do not have to exist continuously. This provides us with a surprising solution to the problem of the Ship of Theseus. I 187 SimonsVsChisholm: if Chisholm is right, most everyday things, including our organism, are only logical constructions. I 188 Strict Connection/separateness/SimonsVsChisholm: the criterion for strict connection is unfortunately so that it implies that if x and y are strictly connected, but not in contact, they can be separated by the fact that a third object passes between them what per se is not a change, also not in their direct relations to each other. Problem: when this passing is only very short, the question is whether the separated sum of the two which was extinguished by the third object is the same that exists again when the third object has disappeared. If it is the same, we have a discontinued existing sum. Chisholm: Chisholm himself asks this question with the following example: a castle of toy bricks will be demolished and built again with the same bricks. I 189 Chisholm: thesis: it is a reason to be dissatisfied with the normal ontology, because it just allows such examples. SimonsVsChisholm: but Chisholm's own concepts just allowed us the previous example. Topology/Simons: yet there is no doubt that it is useful to add topoLogical concepts such as touching or to be inside of something to the mereology. I 192 Def succession/Chisholm: 1. x is a direct a-successor of y to t ' = Def (i) t does not start before t’ (ii) x is an a to t and y is a y to t’ (iii) there is a z so that z is part of x to t and a part of y to t’ and in every moment between t’ and t including, z is itself an a. Simons: while there will be in general several such parts. We always choose the largest. w: is the common part in it, e.g. in altering a table. SimonsVsChisholm: problem: w is not always a table. ChisholmVsVs: claims that w is indeed a table: if we cut away a small part of the table, what remains is still a table. Problem: but if the thing that remains is a table because it was already previously there then it was a table that was a real part of a table! I 193 SimonsVsChisholm: the argument is not valid! E.g.: Shakespeare, Henry IV, Act IV Scene V: Prince Hal considers: if the king dies, we will still have a king, (namely myself, the heir). But if that person is a king, then, because he had previously been there, then he was a king who was the eldest son of a king. ((s) This is a contradiction because then there would have been two kings simultaneously.) Simons: this point is not new and was already highlighted by Wiggins and Quine (not VsChisholm). I 194 Change/transformation/part/succession/SimonsVsChisholm: it seems, however, that they are not compatible with the simple case where a at the same time wins and loses parts. E.g. then a+b should be an A-predecessor of a+c and a+c an A-successor of a+b. But that is not allowed by the definition, unless we know that a is an A all the time, so that it connects a+b and a+c in a chain. But this will not usually be the case. And if it is not the case, a will never ever be an A! SimonsVsChisholm: so Chisholm's definitions only work if he assumes a wrong principle! Succession/entia successiva/SimonsVsChisholm: problem: that each of the things that shall "stand in" (for a constant ens per se to explain the transformation) should themselves be an a in the original sense (e.g. table, cat, etc.) is counterintuitive. Solution/Simons: the "is" is here an "is" of predication and not of Constitution (>Wiggins 1980, 30ff). MereoLogical Constancy/Simons: thesis: most things, of which we predict things like e.g. "is a man" or "is a table" are mereoLogically constant. The rest is easy loose speech and a play with identity. E.g. if we say that the man in front of us lost a lot of hair in the last year we use "man" very loosely. Chisholm: we should say, strictly speaking, that the man of today (stands for) who today stands for the same successive man has less hair than the man who stood for him last year. SimonsVsChisholm/WigginsVsChisholm: with that he is dangerously close to the four-dimensionalism. And especially because of the following thesis: I 195 To stand in for/stand for/entia successiva/Chisholm: thesis: "to stand in for" is not a relation of an aggregate to its parts. Sortal Concept/Simons: the question is whether sortal concepts that are subject to the conditions that determine what should count at one time or over time as a thing or several things of one kind are applicable rather to mereoLogically constant objects (Chisholm) or variable objects (Simons, Wiggins). SimonsVsChisholm: Chisholm's thesis has the consequence that most people mostly use their most used terms wrongly, if this is not always the case at all. I 208 Person/body/interrupted existence/identity/mereology/Chisholm/Simons: our theory is not so different in the end from Chisholm's, except that we do not accept matter-constancy as "strictly and philosophically" and oppose it to a everyday use of constancy. SimonsVsChisholm: advantage: we can show how the actual use of "ship" is related to hidden tendencies to use it in the sense of "matter-constant ship". Ship of Theseus/SimonsVsChisholm: we are not obligated to mereoLogical essentialism. A matter-constant ship is ultimately a ship! That means that it is ready for use! Interrupted Existence/substrate/Simons: there must be a substrate that allows the identification across the gap. I 274 SimonsVsChisholm: according to Chisholm's principle, there is no real object, which is a table, because it can constantly change its microstructure ((s) win or lose atoms). Chisholm/Simons: but by this not the slightest contradiction for Chisholm is demonstrated. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Descartes, R. | Leibniz Vs Descartes, R. | Leibniz I 35 "Clear and Distinct"/"Clare et Distincte"/LeibnizVsDescartes: Unsatisfactory, because not clearly determined. Perception: either dark or clear Def clear: either confused or distinct Def distinct: either adequate or inadequate Def adequate: either symbolic or intuitive Def Absolute Knowledge [Vollkommene Erkenntnis]: if it is both adequate and intuitive at the same time Def dark: is a term that is not sufficient for recognition Def clear: is a term if it is sufficient for recognition Def confused: if insufficient indicators can be enumerated separately. ((s) can still be clear, see above). Def distinct: e.g. the coin assayers' idea of gold I 36 Def symbolic: If we do not see the whole essence of a thing all at once, and use symbols there, then knowledge is symbolic. Def intuitive: Is knowledge if it is nevertheless possible to think of different terms constituting the object at the same time (constituting as in "the object shows its terms itself"). Important argument: They are all operationalistic definitions, which is sensible if the terms cannot be dissected further. I 43 Knowledge/Thinking/LeibnizVsDescartes: He needs a true God (who is not a fraud) so that the self-confidence does not remain imprisoned in a content-free "pure thinking in itself". Leibniz: instead: reasoning by truth of fact, e.g. about the ontoLogical status of the world. I 59 LeibnizVsDescartes: To refrain from falling into an irrational transcendental idealism, the rationality of facts must be proved. As such, Leibniz is definitely not a precursor of Kant! Construction/World/Experience/Rationality/Identity/Leibniz: The construction of Leibniz' ontology consist in two phases: 1. The possibility to deduce all meaningful, i.e. true and knowledge-contained sentences are shown by reducing them on identical sentences.(Deduction/Reduction). (Prädikative Evidenz). 2. The evidence of identity shall be proved itself as such in the world. The identity as the world's basis shall find its basis once again in the Constitution of the world's being. I 78 Proof of God/LeibnizVsDescartes/Holz: Is similar to Descartes' proof of God, but modified. There is a difference between accepting God as author for the exterior or for the totality of the whole (and as such for the interior as well). I 80 Particulars/Leibniz: Depicts the effects of the interrelationship in itself and obtains the whole. Dual Inclusion: Of the particular in the whole and the whole in the particular. Problem: circular argument Solution/Descartes: Justification by God. LeibnizVsDescartes: This is not possible because metaphysics are based on a complete conjunction. Solution/Leibniz: The function of sensory perception cannot be deceived. I 99 Force/Passivity/Leibniz: Force is also the ability to adapt your own state to the changes of other substances. Sufferance [Erleiden] The original force is twofold: vis activa and vis passiva. Leibniz calls these "force points" also "metaphysical points". I 100 The original force is blocked from all sides by the individual substances which cannot unfold freely. So the derived forces are only modifications of the original force. Force/LeibnizVsDescartes: A simple expansion is not sufficient! Therefore, force needs to be added. I 101 The merely expanded mass does not carry a principle of qualitative differentiation since expansion is purely quantitative. Only then motion and change can happen. Nature needs to be explained from its own definition! I 102 Matter/LeibnizVsDescartes: Impenetrability is not sufficient! For Descartes the body was immobile. Substantial being needs a carrier. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 |
| Doepke, F.C. | Simons Vs Doepke, F.C. | I 228 Composition/mereology/Doepke: e.g. the Ship of Theseus, but not the wood of the ship is composed of planks. Although each part of the collection of atoms of you is part you and each part of the wood is a part of the ship, you and the ship have additional parts that are not shared by the collection of atoms and of the wood. SimonsVsDoepke: if Cesar (C) and the collection of atoms or matter m to t coincide, that means that C t m then Cesar's heart h is part of m to t. ((s) that means that for every single moment it is no problem). Doepke: relies on intuition to deny it. Simons: we need good reasons to claim that the heart is not part of the matter. Pro CP: CP stands for simplicity but only at first glance. If coincidence is both necessary and sufficient for superposition,... I 229 ...then the relationship between mereological and spatial considerations are very direct. One can, for example, show that spatial extension is part of another, if one finds a continuant that occupied each one, so that the one continuant is part of the other (sic). Conversely, if s1 and s2 are regions, so that s1 < s2, then for every x, y, and t, so that s1 = rtx and s2 = rty: resulting sum x) does not tolerate the loss of a single part. It was a plural sum in the sense of SUM (see above). Problem: then it looks like that the wall may think in particular type changes, and therefore the wall would have to constitute the stones. This applies to everything that can lose parts without dying, e.g. snowball. Problem: then concepts such as "the stones that form the walls (compose) or "the snow that constituted the snowball" (sic) are time-variable designators. Constitution: we want to exclude reciprocal Constitution. Solution: Def Constitution/SimonsVsDoepke: :x constitutes y to t iff. x could be a substrate of y’s complete destruction. Complete destruction: what this means, however, varies with the context. I 240 Not every part has to be destroyed completely. Constitution/Simons: a constituted object can be destroyed completely by destroying a few components. This ensures the asymmetry of the Constitution. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Fodor, J. | Stalnaker Vs Fodor, J. | II 176 Def narrow content/Fodor/Stalnaker: is a generalization of Kaplan's character in the sense that the context considers any for the speaker external fact that is relevant to the determination of the wide content. Extensional identity criterion/narrow content/Fodor: (1987, 30 – 48)(1): C: be the condition that is fulfilled by the twin-me on twin-earth, C’: by myself in the actual world. Since there is no miracle it must be true that when an organism shares the neurophysioLogical Constitution of my twin and fulfills C it follows that his thoughts and my twin also share the truth conditions (tr.c.). So the extensional identity criterion is that two thought contents (mental content) are the same iff they cause the same mapping of thoughts and context on truth conditions. StalnakerVsFodor: problem: that tells us less than it appears about the mapping that is used here. Nor how the relevant function is determined by what is going on in the mind of the believer. II 177 StalnakerVsFodor: we consider the following parody of his argument: e.g. I have the property of being exactly three miles from a burning stable - my twin is located on twin earth at exactly the same place, but, however, has the property of being exactly three miles from a snowy henhouse. C: then there surely is a property for my twin due to which he is three miles from the henhouse while this property does not exist for me. We call this condition C. C’: is then the property that makes up for me that I am three miles from the burning stable which does not exist for my twin. Since there is no miracle, we know at least this much: both, my twin and I, would in our respective world be three miles from a snowy henhouse when condition C ruled and both three miles from a burning stable if C' ruled. StalnakerVsFodor: problem: which determines no function at all that makes the condition C' to the property to be three miles from a snowy henhouse and at the same time condition C to the property to be three miles from a burning stable - a function that allegedly makes the contribution of the location of the subject to a specific relational property. StalnakerVsFodor: there are such functions and there is no need to identify one of them with the contribution of my intrinsic localization with the special relational property. My twin cannot sensibly say: "I did my part, as I - if condition C had ruled, .... Each localization is in the way that for any external conditions if those conditions rule something in this localizations is three miles away from a burning stable. narrow content/Stalnaker: question: does my cousin have the same narrow content as my conviction that salt is soluble in water but not in something else? StalnakerVsFodor: his theory gives no indication as to how an answer to this question was to be found! Note: however for me it is not about an uncertainty at all, this is also true for wide content but that we do not know at all how to identify narrow content. II 180 Belief/Mentalese/Fodor/Stalnaker: his image of faith is decisively motivated by his approach that there is an internal language (Mentalese) which is saved in the internal Belief/Fodor: are saved inner propositions. ((s) not propositions). They are convictions by virtue of their internal functional role. They are also identifiable independent of the environment of the subject. Semantic properties/Fodor: however partly depend on what happens in the environment around it but the way how they depend on it is determined by purely internal states of the subject! StalnakerVsFodor: here strong empirical presuppositions are in play. Def narrow content/Mentalese/Fodor/Stalnaker: function of context (in a very wide sense) on truth conditional content. StalnakerVsFodor: this is attractive for his intentions but it does not explain how it ever comes to that. And how to identify any narrow content. Narrow content/Stalnaker: is there any way at all to identify narrow content that is not based on Mentalese? Yes, by Dennett (…+…) II 188 Def individualism/Fodor: is the thesis that psychological states in terms of their causal powers are individuated. Science/Fodor: it is a scientific principle that in a taxonomy individuals are individuated because of their causal powers. This can be justified a priori metaphysically. Important argument: thus it is not excluded that mental states are individuated due to relational properties. Relational properties/Fodor: are taxonomically when they consider causal powers. E.g. "to be a planet" is relational par excellence StalnakerVsFodor: a) stronger: to individuate a thing by causal powers b) weaker: to individuate the thing by something that considers the causal powers. But the facts of the environment do not constitute the causal powers. Therefore Fodor represents only the weaker thesis. Burge/Stalnaker: represents the stronger. StalnakerVsFodor: his defense of the negative approach of revisionism (FodorVsExternalism) builds on a mixture of the strong with the weak thesis. Stalnaker: to exclude that psychoLogical states are individuated by normal wide content you need a stronger thesis. But the defense of individualism often only goes against the weaker thesis. E.g. Fodor: Individualism/Fodor/Stalnaker: Fodor defends his version of individualism with an example of a causal irrelevant relational property: e.g. h-particle: we call a particle when a coin lands with heads up, II 189 t-particle: we call that way the same particle if the coin shows tails. Fodor: no reasonable theory will use this distinction to explain the behavior of the particle. StalnakerVsFodor: but from this it does not follow that psychoLogical states must be purely internal (intrinsic). (1) Fodor, J. A. (1987): Explorations in cognitive science, No. 2.Psychosemantics: The problem of meaning in the philosophy of mind. British PsychoLogical Society; The MIT Press. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Folk Psychology | Dennett Vs Folk Psychology | Lanz I 300 Dennett: functional explanations make an optimality condition. (The machine uses its energy to carry on their tasks). Similarly, intentional explanations: the agent is rational: he has goals that he should have due to its Constitution and its place in the world. Likewise, the opinions that he should have. Thus, only the physicalist, causal explanation remains. So one asks, what are the causally relevant factors for the behavior that can be explained functionally or intentionally depending on the interest and complexity of behavior, then only the physical explanation of the information remains. It follows that it is an illusion to believe that intentional states are in turn causes of further mental states and causes of actions. PsychoLogical characterizations are merely heuristic and no naturalistic descriptions. (DennettVsFolk Psychology). Pauen I 135 Psycho Functionalism/Pauen: responds to the shortcomings of everyday language in the determination of mental states. Because the binding to everyday language is not necessary it can be abandoned. On the other hand, the functional description can go arbitrarily far, practically down to the individual neuron. All properties can be considered, depending on the objective. V 137 Measuring instruments can be used as well. Problem: to recognize simulation: is in principle not impossible. Representatives: Dennett. (DennettVsEveryday Psychology: simulation impossible to include) V 138 Dennett: in cases of conflict neuroscientific data prevail over self-attribution of the first person! We do not have direct access to our mental states (unlike as semantic functionalism and eliminative materialism). |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Horwich, P. | Field Vs Horwich, P. | I 175 Relationism/Field: Advantage: good technical conditions for the formulation of field theories and to avoid long-distance effect. Also: "Problem of Quantities": >acceleration. (see below) Def Monadicism/Horwich/Field: (Horwich, 1978): Thesis: denies just like Relationism that there is spacetime (sp.t.). ((s) empty, self-relying sp.t.). Sp.t. only Logical construction! VsRelationalism: no aggregates of matter or relations between them. Instead: primitive monadic properties of sp.t. places. ((s) as the fundamental concept). SubstantivalismVsMonadicism/Field: according to substantivalism such monadic local properties are not primitive: they are gained from the two-digit relation "occupied", with an argument being instantiated with a sp.t. point. MonadicismVs: denies sp.t. in general. Instead, a piece of matter can either have or not have these primitive properties. FieldVsMonadicism/FieldVsHorwich: this is mainly based on a confusion of the "predicate interpretation" and the "interpretation of a higher level": Reduction/Field: when we say that we want to reduce the ontology by a stock of primitive properties, I 176 we mostly think in reality that we expand our stock of primitive predicates. This can often be very important in order to gain simplicity. Monadicism/M/Horwich: Substantivalism and M acknowledge a lot of properties that can be expressed by predicates of the form "appears at time t". Only difference: Substantivalism/S: double-digit predicates such as "Brother of John" or place occupied by a name or description of a moment. Monadicism: purely monadic predicates. FieldVsMonadicism/FieldVsHorwich: the "predicate monadicism" does not look attractive: it is unclear what analogues it has to the sp.t. points of S. Talk about regions or points cannot simply be replaced by talk about properties, because: M does not quantify at all on local properties, but it uses predicates. ((s) no existence assumptions). Then we have to assume a supply of uncountably many semantically primitive predicates. II 71 Def Fallacy of the Constitution/Horwich/Field: the (false) assumption that what constitutes relational facts would itself be relational. Representation/Horwich: instead we would have to find a monadic physical property that constitutes "believing that snow is white", etc. for each and every belief. E.g. that Pius X was the brother of Malcolm X!. These individual properties would not need to have anything in common. Important argument: above all, they do not need to involve a physical relation. Deflationism: Horwich pro, he needs his thesis for that. Field pro Deflationism. FieldVsHorwich: his resources are not fit for deflationism: because the "Fallacy of the Constitution" is not indeed a fallacy. His demands to a physicalist approach are too weak. E.g. a physical relation like "has the same temperature as". Surely you will not say that "having the same temperature as b" constituted another monadic property in the case of object b2, etc. through a monadic property in the case of b1, with these properties having nothing in common. II 72 If other requirements are to apply to the physical relation between people and propositions than for other physical relations, then you have to say why. FieldVsHorwich: it would not help him to say that other reduction standards apply if one of the sides is abstract. Because we also have this in the case of assigning numbers to objects, which preserves the relational character. But that may not be just transferred to intentional relations, as we have seen. ((s) FieldVsDavidson?). But as long as we cannot specify a reason for weaker standards, it is not shown that we do not need a genuinely relational approach, only that it is more difficult here. 2) On the other hand: some of the mental relations for which Horwich tries to avoid a relational approach exist between physical entities: E.g. "x has a belief about the person p". II 243 Nonfactualism/Value/Assessment/Ethics/Evaluative/Horwich/Field: (Horwich 1990): the deflationism that is attached to the ENT (Horwich pro) can still make sense of emotivism. Emotivism/Horwich: ...can say that the meaning of "x is good" sometimes is given by the rule that a person is in the position to express it if he is aware that he assesses X as good... (p. 88). FieldVsHorwich: this is the same problem as with Horwichs handling of vagueness: it boils down to him denying vagueness! Vagueness/Horwich/Field: he says that we cannot know if Jones is bald, because we can only know his physical description and baldness is not determinable from it. Assessment/Horwich/Field: here his remarks are compatible with the fact that "good" denotes a completely factual (evidence-based) property, but one with the special characteristic that our own assessment gives us the evidence that a thing instantiates this property - ((s) circularly) - and/or that our belief that something has this property, somehow to brings us to evaluate it ((s) just as circularl Unlike >Euthyphro). FieldVsHorwich: it is completely unclear now what nonfactualism actually is. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Hume, D. | Carnap Vs Hume, D. | Newen I 113 Constitution/constitutional system/Carnap/Newen: Thesis: our knowledge should be arranged step by step from a basis in a system. Basis: elementary experiences (appearances, impressions, feelings). Levels: Transition: through the Constitutional relation. ((s) Impressions constitute objects at a higher level). I 114 Hume/Carnap/Newen: both accept phenomena of consciousness as a safe basis. CarnapVsHume: uses formal Logic. Constitution/Newen: could still be maintained if the elementary experiences prove to be untenable. Constitution: e.g. from natural numbers as a basis rational and real numbers can be constituted. Constitution/Carnap: is ontoLogically neutral, i.e. in this way no decision has been made in favour of e.g. idealism or realism. Constitution/Carnap: is neither a creation nor a recognition of objects. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Husserl, E. | Heidegger Vs Husserl, E. | Habermas I 171 Human/Husserl: for the unity of the person a substantially different constitution is required than for natural things. It exists only in the execution of intentional acts. Psychic being therefore has nothing to do with being a person. HeideggerVsHusserl: is not satisfied with this: "but what is the ontoLogical meaning of "to accomplish"? But he sticks to the transcendental attitude of a reflexive enlightenment of the conditions of the possibility of being a person as its being in the world. Otherwise it could sink into the de-differentiating pull of life philosophical conceptual pulp. The philosophy of the subject is to be overcome by the equally sharp and systematic, but profound terminology of a transcendental existential ontology. In an original way, Heidegger brings together theoretical approaches that were previously incompatible. Def Phenomenon/Husserl: everything that shows itself to be itself. Phenomenon/Heidegger: comes only indirectly to the appearance (from the concealment). Habermas I 172 Def ontic phenomena/Heidegger: do not show themselves as what they are by themselves. Phenomenology/Heidegger: differs from the sciences in that it does not deal with a special kind of phenomena, but with the explication of what is hidden in all phenomena. The field of phenomenology is the being disguised by the existing. The model for the effort of explication, however, is not intuition, as in Husserl's case, but the interpretation of a text. Being is revealed not by intuition, but by the hermeneutic understanding of a complex context of meaning. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Kant | Verschiedene Vs Kant | Kanitscheider I 434 KantVsNewton: Infinite unimaginable! NewtonVsKant: unimaginable, but conceptually comprehensible! Kanitscheider I 441 EllisVsKant: (antinomies): the expressions "earlier" and "later" can be related to states before a fixed time t0, without assuming that all these states really existed. Just as one can speak of a temperature of 0 K, even if one knows that this temperature cannot be reached. Kant I 28 VsKant/Causality: Of course, he does not adhere to this himself! His critique of reason is about more than possible experience (namely about metaphysics through freedom and thus about the absolute value of our existence). Here Kant's concept of causality shows itself to be completely unaffected by Hume. - Intelligent Cause. I 47 Mind: has its own causality: "spontaneity of concepts". (VsKant: untouched by Hume). Antinomy of Freedom: VsKant: a bluff: we cannot do it with objects, "it will only be possible with concepts and principles that we accept a priori." I 49 Freedom Antinomy: solution: third cosmological antinomy: theme: the third constitution of the world as a whole: event context. - VsKant: Imposition: the "acting subject", i.e. I, should take myself as an "example" for things! It is not in itself subject to the condition of time. Spontaneous beginning of events. I 53 Freedom/Kant: The freedom of the other would be uncertain. VsKant: A freedom that could be both mine and that of the other cannot be thought of in this way. - VsKant: he misappropriates the problem of identification with the other. (> intersubjectivity, subject/object). I 52 For Kant this was not a problem: for him the rescue was not in the world of appearances. Concept: Predicates only have to be consistent. I 66 SchulteVsKant: this only applies to objects for which it can always be decided, not to chaotic diversity. I 67 Predicate/Kant: Kant simply omits the negative predicates. I 68 I 69 MarxVsKant: Dissertation from 1841: Kant's reference to the worthlessness of imaginary thalers: the value of money itself consists only of imagination! On the contrary, Kant's example could have confirmed the ontological proof! Real thalers have the same existence as imagined gods". I 104 Only through this idea does reason a priori agree with nature at all. This prerequisite is the "expediency of nature" for our cognitive faculty. > Merely logical connection. - VsKant: actually relapse into "thinking in agreement". Die ZEIT 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink: Rawls) RawlsVsKant: religiously influenced Manichaeism. Because the "good ego" that lives in the intelligent world of understanding is threatened by the "evil ego" of the natural world of the senses, moral action must be anchored in the belief that it is God's will to realize the "supreme good" of existence in accordance with the ideal realm of purposes. Moral/HegelVsKant: in a well-ordered state with a functioning legal system, the individual does not have to be committed to morality, but acts voluntarily in accordance with the moral Constitution of bourgeois society. Menne I 28 Kant: transcendental reasoning of logic. It must apply a priori. Kant: analytical judgement: so narrowly defined that even the largest part of mathematics and logic falls within the realm of synthetic judgement. MenneVsKant: if he wanted to justify logic from the twelve categories, this would be a circular conclusion. Vaihinger I 333 Thing in itself/F.A. LangeVsKant/Vaihinger: If the thing itself is fictitious, then also its distinction from the apparitions. ((s)Vs: the distinction is only mental, not empirical). Vollmer I XIV World View/Konrad LorenzVsKant: in no organism do we encounter a world view that would contradict what we humans believe from the outside world. Limit/Lorence: The comparison of the world views of different species helps us to expect and recognize the limitations of our own world view apparatus. |
Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 Me I A. Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1997 Vaihinger I H. Vaihinger Die Philosophie des Als Ob Leipzig 1924 |
| Psychologism | Dennett Vs Psychologism | Lanz I300 Dennett: functional explanations make an optimality condition. (The machine uses its energy to fulfil its tasks). Similarly intentional explanations: the actor is rational: he has goals that he should have because of his constitution and his place in the world. Likewise, he has opinions that he should have. So only the physicalist, causal explanation remains. If it is asked which causally relevant factors are for which educated is the behavior which can be explained functionally or intentionally, depending on the interest and complexity of the behavior, then only the physical explanation provides information! It follows: it is an illusion to believe that intentional states are in turn causes of other mental states and causes of actions! Psychological characterizations are merely heuristic and no naturalistic descriptions. (DennettVsFolk Psychology). |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Rawls, J. | Newen Vs Rawls, J. | New I 157 Def Just/Basic Order/Rawls/Newen: just is a basic order if the participants themselves have agreed on it under fair conditions. Original State/Society/Rawls/Newen. Precursor: Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau. Rawls: 1) The contract parties make a final choice of a basic order 2) They choose the order from a list of historical influential candidates that they can modify 3) the contract parties think rationally 4) they have the three higher-ranking regulatory interests. 5) they have general economic and psychoLogical knowledge 6) they make their choice behind the veil of ignorance: they do not know their place in society. I 158 Veil of Ignorance/Rawls/Newen: Point: leads to an endorsement of the Maximin principle. Principles/Rawls/Newen: the two principles would be supported by someone if their enemy can assign them a place. (Rawls ThdG 233). Newen: with that, Rawls builds on Kant. I 159 Veil of Ignorance/Rawls/Newen: is released gradually, each with reference to decisions already taken on a level. Justice/Justice Theory/Rawls/Pogge/Newen: a conception of justice that people with different worldviews obey together neither needs to affirm nor deny its own capacity for truth. Justification/Pogge: it is enough for it to distinguish it as the most sensible or appropriate for our political culture. (Pogge, John Rawls, p 173). I 160 VsRawls/Newen: people are more influenced by emotion than Rawls believes. Should people heavily influenced by emotion be excluded from the order? I 161 VsRawls: he is at risk of falling behind the procedural fairness of the Enlightenment which ensures that all people can participate in the constitution-making process on an equal footing, regardless of race, opinion, and education. VsRawls: this leaves open the possibility of a "justice expertocracy". UntilitarianismVsRawls/EnlightenmentVsRawls: they consider the political autonomy also of non-experts a priority. VsRawls: cannot submit a concept for the (inhomogeneous) world population. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Reductionism | Verschiedene Vs Reductionism | Metzinger II 471 VsReductionism: if a macro-phenomenon may be the result of more than one mechanism (organization and dynamics of components), then it cannot be identified with one of these mechanisms, the reduction of macro-phenomenon to a single micro-phenomenon is impossible then. ("multiple realizability"). ChurchlandVsVs: Statement/Churchland: Explanations and thus reductions are area-specific. Simons I 214 Reductionist view of Superposition/Chisholm: Thesis: only the final constituents are real. Everything else is only a logical construction from it. SimonsVs: this contains a considerable revisionary element: it eliminates all terms and predicates that are true of such constructions that are familiar to us. ((s) Example: machines do not exist then.) Pro: emphasizes the importance of the material Constitution. Vs: overlooks the fact that parts are not always ontoLogically superior to their whole! For example, the whole is ontoLogically subordinate: a heap of pre-existing stones that only remains because it is not destroyed. Example: Whole ontoLogically predominant: Organism: possesses properties and operates according to laws that are relatively independent of the respective material constituents. I 215 An organism survives many replacements of parts. (>Flux). DoepkeVsReductionism: the existence of the constituted objects, which retain their properties across the flux, makes it superfluous to explain why precisely these successive chemicals assume certain properties. Wright I 202 "Natural Thought"/Realism/Natural Sciences: nothing that constitutes an intuitive scientific realism requires semantic realism. I 203 1. VsReductionism: the theoretical vocabulary of natural science is not a dispensable substitute for a more basic vocabulary. 2. Statements formulated with theoretical vocabulary can be true or false in a meaningful sense, because they have to do with the representation of objective facts. |
Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Sententialism | Schiffer Vs Sententialism | I 120 Def classic sententialism/Schiffer: after him the meaning or the contents determine, which proposition one believes. I 120 And that is also the problem: DavidsonVsclassisc sententialism, VsSententionalism/VsSententialism/Schiffer: Problem: Ambiguity in one language and in several languages. 1. E.g. [Empedokles liept]: in English: he leaped (leaped, (in the Etna), in German: he loves). (Davidson 1968, 98). 2. E.g. Field: "visiting relatives can be boring". Problem: the truth conditions of belief are after the unrefined sententialism the same as those of the believed proposition. In ambiguous propositions this would then be several truth-conditions!. E.g. if there was a language in which "love is cruel" means that kangaroos are flying, then Henri must believe both!. I 123 DavidsonVsSententialism: 1.a) with a proposition as a reference object of the that-proposition, there would be a fixation on only one language. b) Because of the ambiguity then there could be several truth conditions in the same language. (1975, 165f). 2. (alsoVsFrege): A very different semantic role than normal is ascribed to the proposition: Frege and sententionalism construct "the earth moves" as a major part of a singular term, namely "that the earth moves." They both do that because of the lack of substitutability in intensional contexts. I 137 Meaning/Propositional attitude/Belief/SchifferVsSententialism: there can therefore exist no correct sententialistic theory of propositional attitude Because no man knows the content-determining characteristics. Therefore, it also no proper access to extensionalistic compositional semantics for natural languages can exist. Previously we had already seen that failed as a non-sententialistic theory. I 157 Belief/Belief systems/Quine/Schiffer: for Quine belief systems never are true, although he concedes Quine pro Brentano: ~ you cannot break out of the intentional vocabulary. But: QuineVsBrentano: ~ no propositional attitudes belong in the canonical scheme, only physical Constitution and behavior of organisms. (W+O 1960, p 221). Vssententialist dualism/SD/Schiffer: 1. QuineVs: If we accept the sD, we need to acknowledge with Brentano the "importance of an autonomous science of intention". Problem: this commonsense theory would then be cut off from the rest of science. And: Isolation/Science/Wright: (Wright 1984): to be isolated from the scientific means to be discredited. Theory/Quine: if it is discredited, their theoretical terms cannot be true of something and propositions such as "I think some dogs have fleas" cannot be true. Sententialist Dualism/Field: pro: (1972, 357): Physicalism is a successful hypothesis ... that would only force a large number of experiments to be ad. I 158 We bring Quine and Field as follows together: (1) "Believes", "wishes", "means" and so on are theoretical terms (TT) of a common sense psychoLogical theory. (2) The justification for methodoLogical physicalism (what Field wants) and the nature of the commonsense theory require that - should the theoretical terms physicalistically be irreducible - the folk psychology must be wrong. That means the terms are true of nothing (Quine). (3) Therefore, the sD must be wrong: belief systems cannot be both: true and irreducible. SchifferVs: is not convincing. I doubt both premises. Ad (2): there is no legitimate empirical hypothesis that requires that theoretical facts on physical facts are reducible. That would only be plausible if the TT would be defined by the theory itself that it introduces. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Tradition | Millikan Vs Tradition | I 13 classical realism: thought and knowledge are separated and intentionality is transparent. Intentionality/about/aboutness/MillikanVsTradition: intentionality is not transparent: many processes which are "about" something, are not done consciously. Ex von Frisch knew what a bee dance is, but bees do not know. Bees merely react adequately to bee dances. Thought: requires that the reference is identified. Inference: involves acts of identification of what the thoughts are. That's why they are representations. Ontology/Millikan: we are interested in what general structure the world has to have so that subject-predicate sentences, negation, etc. can be projected onto it. Realism/Millikan: properly understood realism does not require that the world must be "allocated correctly" for that. I 17 Eigenfunction/Millikan: Ex heart has something to do with the fact that it pumps blood. But what kind of connection to the blood pump must be given? Some hearts are malformed and can not pump, others, Ex water pumps could perfectly pump blood, but they are not hearts. Ex artificial hearts: do not belong to the bioLogical category. So it's not the actual Constitution, the actual forces, dispositions etc that make something an element of a bioLogical category. Eigenfunction/Millikan: causes to submit something into a bioLogical category. It has nothing to do with forces and dispositions, but with history. Having an intrinsic function means to be "slated for something", "to want" something ("supposed to", designed to "). We must now examine in a naturalistic, non-normative way. Language/propositional attitude/Millikan: So we have to ask, "what are they good for." Sentence/Millikan: Just as a heart sometimes may be deformed, a sentence can also not be well-formed. Other sentences are simply wrong. Tradition/falsehood/Millikan: the tradition was obliged to accept that false beliefs are beliefs. Then we also have to have the forces to influence our dispositions. MillikanVsTradition: but a broken kidney does not have the power to fulfill its function. I 18 And wrong and confused thoughts also do not have such forces. Tradition: here has more to do with input-output relations. Millikan: thesis: we are dealing with the bioLogical functions, the functions that "something thought for". Millikan: thesis: by focusing on the intrinsic function (bioLogical function), we are free to find the defining characteristics between true convictions and the world outside. Eigenfunction/Millikan: 1. direct eigenfunction: the first part of the theory relates only to the functions of things that are members of families that are similar to each other Ex hearts, or are similar to an archetype Ex sentences, words, Ex shaking hands. 2. derived eigenfunction: here we have to show that new things can have eigenfunction: Ex new behavior, new bee dances, new convictions. I 133 Intension/tradition/Millikan: always has to do with the application criteria. 1. set of properties or characters that are associated in the mind. 2. this criterion defines what the term is applied to - the extension! Extension/intension/tradition: the two are connected in spirit. Intension/MillikanVsTradition/Millikan: instead, it is the evolution that defines the connection between intention and extension. Sense/Millikan: results from the combination of term and reference, how the term "is intended to project". We still need the concept of testing. I 157 Rationalism/rationalist/tradition/Millikan: (similar argument): what a term means in one idiolect must be known to the speaker of this idioleckt a priori. But all that can be known a priori is whether two expressions in the idiolect have the same intension. If a term now has more than one intension, one can not know a priori whether the intensions will converge in the application. Therefore, each unambiguous term must have only one intension. meaning/sense/MillikanVsTradition: importance of Frege'ian sense, not intension. Then emptiness is the primary type of insignificance and neither ambiguity nor synonymy are determined by reasoning that is purely a priori. Intension/Millikan: is only the secondary meaning. I 158 They can be meaningful only insofar as these intentions are explicit and have meaning themselves. I 171 Error/delusion/to show/indexical word/Millikan: Ex there are two items on the table, an ashtray, which I do not consider an ashtray and a thing that is not an ashtray but I think it is and say "This is a nice Ashtray". Question: have I thereby said that the ashtray is nice, although I meant the other object? Ex I hold up a book and say, "This belonged to my grandfather." However, I am mistaken and am holding up the wrong book. I 172 What I have said, of course, is wrong. What is not so clear is whether what I meant is something other than what I said. Millikan: thesis: here it is not the case that I and my token of "this" have meant different things. Solution: "this" is ambiguous with respect to Frege's sense. MillikanVsTradition: philosophers have so often ignored that. Solution/Millikan: perception can lead us to temporary concepts. temporary concepts/intensions/Millikan: intensions are then linked to our ability to pursue things and to re-identify them. preliminary concept: Ex this coffee mug for me is totally indistinguishable from a dozen others, but at the moment it's my cup. I 173 Question: whether that even counts as a concept. Ability to track the object leads to an interior concept. This leads to the distinction between perception and thought. Thinking/Millikan: if thinking is not mediated by perception the objects one thinks of are not indexed. Perception: here the objects are provided with an index. I 174 Error/delusion/indexical word/perception/misidentification/Millikan: Ex Suppose I'm wrong when I identify a recurring object. Then my inner concept has two senses, it has an ambiguous Fregean sense. 1. derived meaning from the ability to track the object. 2. inner concept I already had previously. "This" is therefore ambiguous. I 270 Standard conditions/content/Millikan: 1. in order to give them a content a "standard observer" must mean more than "observers to whom red things appear red under standard conditions". And accordingly for "standard conditions". Solution: standard conditions for red must be spelled out. Problem: no one has any idea how that could work. Problem: if you have every reason to believe that to be a standard observer, there are circumstances in which an object seems to have a different color than it has. But one would not conclude that the thing would not be red. Problem: if sameness of a thing is defined by its opposite properties, an observer must be able to identify these opposite characteristics, also. And it may be that these never come to light! Problem: how can my experience testify to the oppositeness of red and green? Many authors: think that one could never argue that red and green could even be in the same place at the same time. I 271 MillikanVsTradition: but that is not true, in fact there are many ways, Ex strabismus. Complementary colors/perception/seeing/certitude/Millikan: our trust in the fact that red and green are opposites (perhaps incorporated into nature) is an empirical certainty. And this is exactly the objective validity of these concepts, of the fact that red and green are properties - and not just hallucinations. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Williams, B. | Nozick Vs Williams, B. | II 29 Self/Person/Self-Identity/Identity/B.Williams: E.g. two stories that put together present us with a mystery: Case 1: a person enters a new body, or rather two persons exchange their bodies. Two persons, A and B enter a machine A body person: (now connected to the body A): has all the memories, all the knowledge, values, behaviors, etc. of the (former, complete) person B. In the body A is now the "vector product" of this B material with the physical boundaries of body A. Similarly, all the other way round for B. The situation is symmetrical. II 29/30 If A were to decide (after substitutions) now, which severe pain should be inflicted by the two bodies, then A would select the A body for it! Because he believes that he himself inhabits the B body. Case 2: Imagine someone tells them that they are to endure terrible pain. That frightens them. Next, they get the information that they will undergo an enormous change in their psychoLogical Constitution, perhaps to the extent that they will have exactly the same character, the memories and behaviors of someone else, who is currently alive. That will scare them even more. They do not want to lose their identity and suffer pain afterwards. Williams: question: why had person A not exactly the same concerns when she heard the first story, as in Case 2? What makes the first story a story about the transfer of a person to a different body and not a story about something that happens to a person who remains who they are? How can the difference consist in that in the first case, in addition to what happens to body A, II 31 also A's memories and mind end or are newly created in body B? Problem: what happens anywhere else can have no effect on whether A continues to live in body A. If this happens to a body, it is a psychoLogical task and the acquisition of a new psyche. Question: how can two tasks and the acquisition of new memories and values result in the exchange of two bodies? Body A / B Body 1) Situation acquires memories + character of B/acquires memories + character of A 2) Situation acquires memories + character of B/keeps memories + character or perhaps entirely new Two principles should explain this: Principle 1/Williams: If x at t1 is the same individual as y after t2, then this can only depend on facts about x, y and the relations between them. No facts about any other existing thing are relevant. That entails: Principle 2/Williams: if y at t2 (is part of the same continuous particular like) x at t1, by virtue of a relation R to x at t1, then there could be another additional thing z at t2 that also (together with y) stands in R to x at t1. If this additional thing z at t2 exists, then neither z nor y would be identical to x. If this z could potentially exist now, although it does currently not exist, then y at t2 is not identical with y at t1, at least not by virtue of relation R! ((s) If there is a relation R that allows identity at a later time, then several things can "benefit" from that and then the identity (which must be unique) would be destroyed. This is true even if the existence of a second thing is merely possible.) II 32 Self/Identity/Person/Williams: Williams had formulated these two principles in three earlier publications to support his thesis: Physical identity is a necessary condition of personal identity. Otherwise it would be possible to imagine that e.g. a person enters a machine, disappears and appears again in another machine at a distance without having crossed the space between them. Or: E.g. There could be a third machine on the other side from which an also (qualitatively) different identical being emerges. Neither would be the original person who had entered the machine in the middle. Now, if in this case of double materialization the original person is not identical with either of the two later persons, so not even in the first case, where only one person appears in a different place. Williams: the mere possibility that someone appears intermittently in another place is sufficient to show that he himself cannot be the same person without doubling. 1) Principle: Identity of something cannot depend on whether there is another thing of some sort. 2) Principle: if it is possible that there was another thing that prevented identity, then there is no identity, even if this other thing did not exist! ((s) The first follows from the second here). NozickVsWilliams: both principles are wrong. 1) (without personal identity): E.g. the Vienna Circle was expelled from Vienna by the Nazis, one member, Reichenbach, came to Istanbul. Suppose there were 20 members of the circle, three of which went to Istanbul and continued to meet. In 1943, they hear that the others are dead. Now they are the Vienna Circle which meets in Istanbul. ((s) ArmstrongVs/ChisholmVs: a local property is not a property.) In 1945, they learn that 9 other members continued to meet in America and further developed the same philosophical program. Nozick: then the group in America is the Vienna Circle, the one in Istanbul is just the offshoot. Nozick: how is that possible? Either the group in Istanbul is the Vienna Circle or it is not. How can this be influenced by something that takes place elsewhere? ((s) Because subsets play a role here, which do not play a role, e.g. in personal identity. Analogue would have been to assume that some of the psychoLogical characteristics are kept during the body changes). II 33 Nozick: E.g. would it not be clear that if the 9 others had survived living underground in Vienna, this would show that the Istanbul group is not the Vienna Circle? So the First Principle (Williams) cannot be applied here: it is not plausible to say that if the group of three in Istanbul is the same entity as the original Vienna Circle, that this can only depend on relations between the two ... Nozick: ...and not on whether anything else exists. Def "Next Successor"/Closest Continuer/Nozick: Solution: The Istanbul group is the next successor. Namely so if no other group exists. But if the group in America exists, it is the next successor. Which one constitutes the Vienna Circle depends (unlike Williams) on the existence of other things. Being something later means being the next successor. ((s) and being able to be called later then depends on the amount of shared properties). E.g. How many other groups of the Vienna Circle are there in exile? ("Scheme"). Identity in Time:/Nozick: it is no problem for something to replace its parts and to keep the identity. E.g. Ship of Theseus/Nozick: 2nd ship made of collection of discarded parts from the old ship: two originals? (Was already known in this form in antiquity). Next Successor: helps to structure the problem, but not solve it. Because the scheme does not say of itself, which dimension of weighted sum of dimensions determine the proximity. Two possibilities: a) spatio-temporal continuity b) continuity of the parts. If both are weighted equally, there is a stalemate. II 34 Neither of them is the next successor. And therefore none is the original. But even if one originally existed without the other, it would be the original as next successor. Perhaps the situation is not a stalemate, but an unclear weighting, the concepts may not be sharp enough to rank all possible combinations. Personal Identity/Nozick: this is different, especially when it comes to ourselves: here we are not ready, that it is a question of decision of the stipulation. Ship of Theseus/NozickVsWilliams: external facts about external things do matter: when we first hear the story, we are not in doubt, only once the variant with the second, reconstructed ship comes into play. Next Successor/Nozick: necessary condition for identity: something at t2 is not the same entity as x at t1 if it is not x's next successor. If two things are equally close, none of them is the next successor. Something can be the next successor of x without being close enough to x to be x itself! If the view of the next successor is correct, then our judgments about identity reflect weights of dimensions. Form of thought: reversal: we can conversely use these judgments to discover these dimensions. II 35 A property may be a factor for identity without being a necessary condition for it. Physical identity can also be an important factor. If something is the next successor, it does not mean that his properties are qualitatively the same as those of x, or are similar to them! Rather, they arise from the properties of x. They are definitely causally caused! Spatio-Temporal Continuity/Nozick: cannot be explained merely as a film without gaps. Counter-example: The replacement with another thing would not destroy the continuity of the film! Causal Relation/Next Successor: the causal relation does not need to involve temporal continuity! E.g. every single thing only possessed a flickering existence (like messages through the telephone). If this applies to all things, it is the best kind of continuity. NozickVsWilliams: but if you find that some things are not subject to the flickering of their existence, then you will no longer talk of other things as the best realizations of continuously existing things. Dependency of identity on other things! Theology/God/Identity/Nozick: Problem: if the causal component is required, and suppose God keeps everything in continuous existence, closing all causal connections in the process: how does God then distinguish the preservation of an old thing in continuity from the production of a new, qualitatively identical thing without interrupting a "movie"? II 36 Temporal Continuity/NozickVsWilliams: how much temporal continuity is necessary for a continuous object depends on how closely things are continuously related elsewhere. Psychology/Continuity/Identity/Nozick: experiments with objects which emerge (again) more or less changed after a time behind a screen. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
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| Dissimilarity | Simons, P. | I 213 "Relative Identity"/Geach: ("Theory R"), ("Sortal Theory"): thesis: for Sortals F and G it is possible to find two objects a and b, so that a and b are both Fs and Gs, a is the same F as b, but not the same G. Against it: b) Grice/George Myro: (both unpublished): VsWiggins-™ Thesis that things that are ever different are always different. c) diachronic view of superposition: thesis: superposed objects do not have to exist at the same time. For example, gold forms into a ring. When the ring is melted, it is "replaced" by the gold. I.e. they exist at different times. Change/Diachronic view: thesis: is always a replacement of one object by another. SimonsVsDiachronic view: does not explain why so many properties are transferred from the original to the later object. Solution: an (assumed) substrate would explain this. Ad (4) reductionist view of superposition/Chisholm: thesis: only the final constituents are real. Everything else is only a Logical construction from it. SimonsVs: this contains a considerable revisionary element: it eliminates all terms and predicates that are true of such constructions that are familiar to us. ((s) Example machines do not exist then.) Pro: emphasizes the importance of the material Constitution. Vs: overlooks the fact that parts are not always ontoLogically superior to their whole! |
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