Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Compositionality | Schiffer Vs Compositionality | I 220 SchifferVsCompositionality: my rejection is based all the time on the rejection of the theory of relations for belief. Here it is difficult to speculate about what kind of conditional sentences for "believes" would require a meaning theory that would not be a truth-theoretic semantics. How could such m.th. look like at all?. E.g. Conceptual Role Semantics: (Schiffer Vs: see section 4.3). Bsp Game Theoretical Semantics/game theory/Hintikka/Schiffer: (Hintikka 1982): this is not an alternative to the conventional theory. PeacockeVsHintikka: (1978) has shown that game theoretical rules provide corresponding truth-theoretical or model theoretical axioms. I XV SchifferVsCompositionality/SchifferVsFrege: natural languages do not have any compositional meaning theories (m.th.). I 137 Paul and Elmer/SchifferVsQuine: Quine: there are no countable belief objects. E.g. if John believes that snow is white, and Mary believes that snow is white, there must be something that both believe. Schiffer: this conditional is false: I 138 Either that or the alleged quantification through belief objects is not what it appears to be the Quine eye. I 144 SchifferVsQuine: harmless apparent quantification. SchifferVsCompositionality: we can now conclude that no natural language has a compositional truth-theoretic semantics (comp.tr.th.Sem.). Otherwise the theory of relations would be correct. In addition, it also has no compositional m.th. because then it has to be a compositional semantics. Understanding/SchifferVsFrege: So compositional semantics are not required to explain speech understanding! I 182 SchifferVsCompositional Semantics: it is false, even regardless of the falsity of the theory of relations of belief. ((s) Compositional Semantics/(s): does not consider the truth conditions but speaks only of the contributions of the meaning of words for the meaning of the proposition.) Schiffer. 1. t is not plausible that languages have a compositional truth-theoretic semantics unless it follows from the stronger assertion that they have compositional truth theories, which themselves are truth-theoretic. (> stronger/weaker; >Strength of Theories). I 192 SchifferVsCompositionality/public language/Mentalese/Schiffer: if I'm right, that no public language has a compositional semantics, I have to find a mistake in (U). It is not my goal to show that speech comprehension does not imply that the natural languages have compositional semantics, the explanation of our understanding would be an empirical task. I rather want to give a counter-E.g. VsCompositionality. E.g. (1) Harvey understands an indefinite number of new propositions of a language E1, which itself contains infinitely many propositions. (2) an explanation of his capabilities does not require compositional semantics. E1: is not a fully-developed natural language. I 193 Harvey: is in this considered possible world an information-processing machine that thinks in machine language: "M": Belief/conviction: Harvey has it if it is in a certain computational relation to an embodied (tokened) proposition of M. ((s) Mentalese: so there is still an internal relation to one's own thought language). B: is a box in Harveys head in which a proposition of M (tokened) exists exactly then when a token from the proposition occurs in B. (Assuming, Harvey has only a finite number of convictions). Belief: for each there is exactly one proposition in Mentalese whose Occurrence in B realizes it. µ: is a formula in M so that Harvey believes that snow is white. Realisation/"meaning"/Schiffer: as propositions of M (machine language, Mentalese) realize belief, they also have ipso facto semantic or representational properties. Then it is fair to say that μ "means" that snow is white. And also, that a component of μ references as inner counterpart of the word to snow in the public language. I 195 Speech comprehension/Understanding/Schiffer: without compositionality: E.g. (Continuation: E1: spoken language (without ambiguity and indices) M: Mentalese for Harvey conceptual role: to explain the transition from (1) to (2). (and any others that correspond to it). Propositions in internal code: (or representations thereof: (3) Nemrac derettu "sum"-"sno"-"iz"-"pör-pol" ((s) English backward, [phonetic language], metalanguage (ML) and object language (OL) mixed) (4) Nemrac dias taht emons wons si elprup ((s) English backward, but explicit language, ML) and (5) Nemrac ecnarettu si eurt ffi emos wons si elprup ((s) ML and OL! "true" and "iff" in machine language, but without everyday linguistic meaning or "eurt" does not have to mean "true"! Conceptual role instead of meaning). I 196 Conceptual Role/c.r./SchifferVsCompositionality: we hereby show that "dias taht" and "eurt" can have conceptual roles that a) do not require any compositional semantics, b) explain the transition from one Occurrence of (3) in Harveys B-Box to an occurence of (4) and (5) We do not need to specify the full meaning role! I simply assume that (4) and (5) have a role ("whichever"), which by virtue of their formula in Harvey triggers this belief. And none of this makes a compositional semantics necessary: Justification: E.g. you could just have a mapping relation for propositions between two different languages, with which a person who does not understand the other language, knows when a proposition of the other language is true. (…+…) I 200, 202f, 208. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Davidson, D. | Schiffer Vs Davidson, D. | Avramides I 115 Davidson: our psychological concepts can not be instantiated without the semantic, because we simply cannot capture the semantic without the psychological. SchifferVsDavidson: ditto: they cannot be instantiated, but they can still be captured independently! Thinking without language/Reduction/Avramides: if all that is true, then the mere intuition, that thinking without language cannot exist, cannot be sufficient for a antireductionism. Schiffer I 125 paratactic analysis/Davidson/Schiffer: problem: quantification into that-propositions. The theory must be refined for this, because otherwise it cannot represent the following: E.g. Galileo said of a particular person that he makes great lasagna. Ambiguity: E.g. Galileo said that his mother makes great lasagna. Problem: to say de re. (We do not elaborate this further here). Foreign language/paratactic analysis/SchifferVsDavidson: the following does not work: (1’) Galilei a dit que la terre bouge. Galileo a dit que!. false solution: to understand "that" as orthographic part of the semantically primitive verb "to say that": vs: then there is no term in (1) that brings the reference to the statement. I 126 A. First problem paratactic analysis/say/belief/propositional attitude/SchifferVsDavidson: his analysis can only be applied to "say" and not be extended to belief. (3) Galileo believed that the earth moves First, there are similarities: 1. The logical form of representation may initially be the same. Galileo believed this. The earth moves. 2. "This" is also in this case demonstrative 3. "Believe" is a two-figure relation. Problem: it cannot be a relation to the actual statement. And then it can also not be a correct two-figure relation. B(x,u) With an actual statement. E.g. Galileo said something If this is true, then (Eu) S(Galileo,u) I 127 But this does not work with Galileo believed something (Eu) B(Galileo, u) LoarVsDavidson/LoarVsparatactic analysis/belief: it might have been another than this particular statement that gives belief its contents. Therefore it cannot be a relatum in this relation. Schiffer I 131 3. Belief/Schiffer: unfortunately you cannot just say that belief is a relation to a statement type: you have to say to what kind of type! Vs(4): the statement "the earth moves" has many types. possible solution: The earth moves Galileo believed a statement type to which the statement belongs, if it has the same content as my last statement. SchifferVs: this does also not yet work, because "content" is here an artificial term, because we do not know yet what in (3) (Galileo believed that the earth moves) is referenced as a relatum when we do not yet have the content determined properties. Pointe: this is about the old (bad!) objection VsDavidson that he relies on an unexplained concept of content equality. Because he does not rely on such concept! Content/SchifferVsDavidson: problem: the role of "content" in Davidson's theory cannot be trivialized as desired by us when we revise his theory as we want it. Because here the "this" can still reference to an actual statement, but not to a primary Occurrence, but as secondary within the singular term "the type statement, which has the same content as this". Problem: we will not know the reference if we do not know which term of content is intended here. B. Second problem paratactic analysis/SayLoarVsDavidson/SchifferVsDavidson: (Loar verbally): his analysis of "say" is in conflict with a certain correct principle: I 132 Def primary occurence/singular term/Loar/Schiffer: a singular term occurs primarily iff it is properly contained in the occurence of another singular term. E.g. primary: "George's car" in "George's car is blue" – E.g. secondary: here : „George“. singular term/content proposition/principle/Loar: (P) If the occurence of a singular term t in [speaker S said that ..t... ] is primary and references to x, then this proposition is only true if S referenced to x. E.g. assumed I say: Ralph said that she was driving the car. Where I reference to a particular car and a certain woman. Then my statement is only true if Ralph referenced to the same things. Alternative: Ralph said that she was driving George's car. Here Ralph somehow had to reference to George's car but not to George! SchifferVsDavidson: now there is a problem for Davidson: (5) Laplace said that Galileo said that the earth moves. From Davidson's theory follows that the second Occurrence of "that" is the primary. As a consequence SchifferVsDavidson: 1. principle (P) 2. if Davidson's theory is correct, then the second occurrence of "that" in (5) is a primary, with the speakers "the earth moves." I 133 3. problem: but (5) may be correct, even if Laplace is not referring to this statement at all! 4. Ergo Davidson's theory is not correct. C. Third problem paratactic analysis/belief/propositional attitude/SchifferVsDavidson: (this is the really urgent problem): Davidson's presentation of (a) Sam PA, that flounders snore ("PA": any propositional attitude) as (b) Sam PA that. flounders snore cannot be correct because (1) we cannot know the made assertion and its truth by (a) without knowing the content of the propositional attitude of Sam (2) but you can know the made statement by (b) without knowing the content of the propositional attitude. Schiffer: (1) seems correct. Problem: if Davidson acknowledges (2) he is forced to say that either it is possible to know the truth, without even knowing what Sam said. Or that the knowledge ((s) of the truth value) brings no knowledge of the content with it. I 134 Schiffer: Ad (2): is certainly correct as well! E.g. Pierre: La neige est blanche Donald: Tarski said this. Schiffer: according to Davidson you may know what Donald claimed without knowing the content of Pierres statement! And so without knowing the content of Tarski's statement! (…+…). Schiffer I 135 SchifferVsDavidson: problem: according to Davidson you would have to know a content determining property φ which, however, no one knows! I 136 (9) Sam said the type of statements that are φ like this. Flounders snore. Conclusion/SchifferVsDavidson: to escape the objections, he would have to find the token φ and put it in to individuate the statements. But such a token would have to be known to all the normal people! Even if there were this token it does not go into the propositional knowledge. I 137 If there ever was an extensional theory of meaning for a language out there that finds explicitly something whose knowledge for interpretation of statements is sufficient, then no one knows what it is that determines this theory. |
Stephen Schiffer I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge (MIT) 1987 |
| Mill, J. St. | Burks Vs Mill, J. St. | Wolf II 139 Description/Meaning/Burks: most people do not have complete knowledge and yet use the signs correctly. Name/Meaning/Burks: since names generally have several meanings (objects), there is no essential predicate. Some predicates may be causally more important than others. In any case, a possibly essential property does not consist in a conjunction of properties! Any given designated has more properties than those referred to by its proper name (or description). II 140 Description/Meaning/Burks: for example, "this brown table was red yesterday" is not a contradiction: the description is not complete anyway. Name/Meaning/Mill: the property on the basis of which a name is assigned is not part of the meaning. Otherwise we would abolish the name if the thing loses the property. Name/token/BurksVsMill: different Occurrences of the same name type often have different meanings, but always denote the same thing. II 141 Name/Existence/Meaning/Burks: a description could have a meaning and still not designate anything. II 142 Of course one could say that an expression is a name only if it really has something designated, but then the question depends on empirical facts and not on purely linguistic considerations. Burks: "name" should be a purely grammatical category. Abbreviation/Burks: strange: for "this time" there is an abbreviation: "now", but not for "this hat". |
Burks I Arthur W. Burks "A Theory of Proper Names", in: Philosophical Studies 2 (1951) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Burks II A. W. Burks Chance, Cause, Reason 1977 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Russell, B. | Peacocke Vs Russell, B. | I 131 Acquaintance/Russell: objects of acquaintance: E.g. sense data. They are obvious to the subject. Sense Data/Russell: correspond to the positions of singular terms in a sentence. They are at the same time real constituents of the sentence. And without givenness at that! (Without intension). Purely extensional Occurrence of objects in the sentence. PeacockeVsRussell: 1) that may mollify FregeVsRussell's criticism of his concept of proposition. But it does not justify Russell: because he did not refer to obviousness for the thinker. 2) physical objects that, according to Russell, "cause the sense data" are therefore demonstrative and descriptive in a mix. PeacockeVs: our approach, on the other hand, assumes that demonstrative ways of givenness are not descriptive. But Russell's mixed approach is not entirely irrelevant: if we replace "sense data" by "experience": PeacockeVsRussell: he confused a plausible determination of the the constitutive role with "content". I 180 Acquaintance/Russell: (B. Russell, Problems of Philosophy, 1973, p. 32) "Each understandable sentence must be composed of constituents with which we are familiar." PeacockeVs: that got bad press. Problem: Excessive proximity to Humean empiricism. SainsburyVs: Russells ideas should be defended without the principle of acquaintance if possible. Peacocke: but if you free the principle of non-essential epistemological attachments, it is a correct and fundamental condition for the attribution of contents. Acquaintance/Russell: we are familiar with the sense data, some objects of immediate memory and with universals and complexes. Earlier: the thinker is also familiar with himself. Later: Vs. Complex/Russell: aRb. Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: he had a correct basic notion of acquaintance, but a false one of its extension (from the things that fall under it). The salient feature is the idea of relation. One is dealing with the object itself and not its deputy. I 182 Def Principle of Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: Thesis: Reconstruction, reformulated principle of acquaintance: The thinker is familiar with an object if there is a way of givenness (within its repertoire of concepts) that is ruled by the principle of sensitivity and he is in an appropriate current mental state, which he needs to think of the object under this way of givenness. For this, we need a three-digit relation between subject, object and type of the way of givenness The type of the way of givenness (as visual or aural perception) singles out the object. "Singling out" here is neutral in terms of whether the object is to be a "constituent of thoughts" or not. This preserves two features of Russell's concept: 1) acquaintance enables the subject to think about the object in a certain way because of the relationship that it has with it. 2) The concept of the mental state may preserve what Russell meant when he spoke of acquaintance as a relation of presentation. Constituent/Thoughts/Russell: he thought that objects occurred downright as parts of the thought. PeacockeVsRussell: we will interpret this as an object that indicates a type of a way of givenness (indexing). We do not allow an object to occur as part of a thought, just because it is the only component of the thought that corresponds to a singular term position in a sentence that expresses a thought. I 183 This is a Neo-Fregean theory, because an object can only exist as part of the thought by the particular way of its givenness (intension). (VsRussell: not literally part of the thought or sentence). I 195 Colors/Explanation/Peacocke: to avoid circularity, colors themselves are not included in the explanation of a response action, but only their physical bases. Different: E.g. 'John's favorite color': which objects have it, depends on what concepts φ are such that φ judges the subject, 'John's favorite color is φ' together with thoughts of the form 't is φ'. Analog: defined description: E.g. the 'richest man'. He is identified by the relational way of givenness in context with additional information: Complex/Acquaintance/Russell/Peacocke: E.g. a subject has an experience token with two properties: 1) It may have been mentioned in the context with sensitivity for a specific demonstrative way of givenness of an object (e.g. audible tone). 2) At the same time it may be an experience token of a certain type. Then, to be recognized the two must coincide in the context I 196 with a sensitivity for a specific concept φ in the repertoire of the subject. VsAcquaintance/VsRussell/Peacocke: one can argue: E.g. Cicero died long ago E.g. arthritis is painful. We can attribute such beliefs when the subject understands the meanings of the concepts. Nevertheless, the readiness to judge that Cicero died long ago depends on a mental state, with regard to which there must be an evidence. What kind of a mental state should that be? It need not remember the occasion when it first heard the name 'Cicero'. But neither: 'F died long ago', where 'F' is a defined description. Name/Peacocke: semantic function: simply singling out a particular object. Understanding: if you can identify the reference of the name in one way or another. There is no specific way in which you have to think of the Roman orator to understand the name. VsAcquaintance/VsPeacocke: that may even endanger the reformulated principle: if the name only singles out the object, then the subject must have a relation to a thought which contains the object as a constituent. PeacockeVs: I dispute the last conditional. We must distinguish sharply between a) beliefs, where the that-sentence contains a name, and b) the presence of the reference of a name as constituent of a Neo-Fregean thought. The latter corresponds to the relation 'Bel'. I 196/197 Def Relation 'Bel'/Terminology/Belief/Propositional Attitudes/Peacocke: a belief which contains the reference of a name as constituent of a Neo-Fregean thought: E.g. not only 'NN died a long time ago', but propositional attitude. ((s) not only belief about someone or something, but about a particular object.) Relation Bel/Belief/Peacocke: three reasons for distinguishing beliefs: a) we want to exclude that someone can acquire a new belief simply by introducing a new name. (Only a description could do that). E.g. if we wanted to call the inventor of the wheel 'Helle': Trivialization: 1) it would be trivial that such a stipulation should be enough for the reference in a community. 2) Nor is it a question of us being able to give outsiders a theoretical description of the community language. You cannot bring about a relation Bel by linguistic stipulation. I 198 b) Pierre Example/Kripke/Peacocke: this type of problem arises in cases where the language is too poor for a theory of beliefs in this sense: if someone understands a sentence, it is not clear what thoughts he expresses with it. (>Understanding/Peacocke). Because the semantics only singles out the object, not the way of thinking about the object (intension). This is different with pure index words and certain descriptions. E.g. a person who says 'I'm hot now' expresses the thought: ^[self x]^[now t]. But that involves nothing that would be 'thinking of something under a name'! Pierre Example/Kripke/Solution: a complete description of Pierre's situation is possible (for outsiders) without embedding 'London' in belief contexts. Peacocke: at the level of 'Bel' (where the speaker himself is part of the belief) beliefs can be formulated so that proper names are used: 'He believes that NN is so and so'. c) Perception/Demonstratives/Way of Givenness/Peacocke: here, the way of givenness seems to have a wealth that does not need to be grasped completely, if someone uses demonstratives. The wealth of experience is covered by the relation Bel, however. But this way we are not making certain commitments: E.g. we do not need to regarded 'Cicero died long ago' as metalinguistic, but rather as meant quite literally. I 201 Logical Operators/Quantification/Logic/Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: our reconstructed principle of acquaintance implicitly includes the obligation to recognize entities that can only be preserved inferentially: E.g. uniqueness operators, other quantifiers, connections, also derived ones. This can even apply to logical constants and some truth functions and not only for ways of givenness of these functions. RussellVs: the principle of acquaintance is not applicable to logical constituents of thoughts. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
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