Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fodor, J. | Ramsey Vs Fodor, J. | Schurz I 215 Carnap-Sentence/Carnap-Conditional/CS/CK/strengthening/strengthened/Lewis/Schurz: (Lewis 1970, 83 85): Suggestion to strengthen the Carnap-Sentence: by assuming that the theory implicitly postulates that the reference of its theoretical terms (TT) in the actual world is unambiguously determined. N.B.: the analytical content of a theory is thus represented by the following local "definitions" with the help of certain descriptions of theoretical terms: Identification as Definition/Lewis: Example τi designates the i-th term of the unambiguous n-tuple of entities, which fulfils the claim T(X1,...Xn) in the actual world. (1970.87f) PapineauVsLewis: his thesis that scientific theories go hand in hand with existence and claims of uniqueness for the reference of the theoretical terms is doubtful even if it is interpreted realistically. Instrumentalistic: it is untenable. (Papineau, 1996, 6,Fn 5). Definition/SchurzVsLewis: Definition by description (description, designation) are not full-fledged, but only partial, because they determine the extension of theoretical terms only in those possible worlds in which the underlying existence or uniqueness assumption is fulfilled. I 216 Theoretical Terms/FodorVsHolism: Vs semantic theory holism: the determination of the meaning of theoretical terms is circular. Def semantic theories holism/abstract: Thesis: the meaning of theoretical terms is determined by the meaning of the theory. Solution/Ramsey-Sentence/RS/Carnap-Sentence/CS/Schurz: Ramsey-Sentence/Carnap-Sentence/Holism/Meaning/Circle/Schurz: the Method of conjunction of Ramsey-Sentences and Carnap-Sentences is the solution for the accusation of circularity of FodorVsHolism. a) On the one hand: because of compositionality, the meaning of T(t1,...tn) is determined by the meaning of theoretical terms (in addition to the meaning of the other concepts of T), b) On the other hand: it follows from semantic theories holism that the meaning of theoretical terms is determined by the meaning of the theory. FodorVs: that is a circle RamseyVsFodor/CarnapVsFodor: Solution: the Ramsey-Sentence R(T) can be understood without assuming an independent knowledge of the meaning of theoretical terms, and the Carnap-Sentence or Lewis definitions add that the meaning of theoretical terms lies in designating those entities which fulfil the assertion of the theory. ((s) Carnap-Sentence/Schurz/(s): states that the meaning of theoretical terms lies in the designation of the entities which satisfy the theory. |
Ramsey I F. P. Ramsey The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013 Ramsey II Frank P. Ramsey A contribution to the theory of taxation 1927 Ramsey III Frank P. Ramsey "The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Hilbert | Frege Vs Hilbert | Berka I 294 Consistency/Geometry/Hilbert: Proof through analogous relations between numbers. Concepts: if properties contradict each other, the concept does not exist. FregeVsHilbert: there is just nothing that falls under it. Real Numbers/Hilbert: here, the proof of consistency for the axioms is also the proof of existence of the continuum.(1) 1. D. Hilbert, „Mathematische Probleme“ in: Ders. Gesammelte Abhandlungen (1935) Bd. III S. 290-329 (gekürzter Nachdruck v. S 299-301) Thiel I 279 Hilbert: Used concepts like point, line, plane, "between", etc. in his Foundations of Geometry in 1899, but understood their sense in a hitherto unfamiliar way. They should not only enable the derivation of the usual sentences, but rather, in its entirety, specify the meaning of the concepts used in it in the first place! Thiel I 280 Later this was called a "definition by postulates", "implicit definition" >Definition. The designations point, line, etc. were to be nothing more than a convenient aid for mathematical considerations. FregeVsHilbert: clarifies the letter correspondence that his axioms are not statements, but rather statement forms. >Statement Form. He denied that by their interaction the concepts occurring in them might be given a meaning. It was rather a (in Frege’s terminology) "second stage concept" that was defined, today we would say a "structure". HilbertVsFrege: the point of the Hilbert’s proceeding is just that the meaning of "point", "line", etc. is left open. Frege and Hilbert might well have been able to agree on this, but they did not. Frege: Axiom should be in the classical sense a simple, sense-wise completely clear statement at the beginning of a system. Hilbert: statement forms that combined define a discipline. From this the "sloppy" figure of speech developed E.g. "straight" in spherical geometry was then a great circle. Thiel I 343 Formalism: 1) "older" formalism: second half of the 19th century, creators Hankel, Heine, Thomae, Stolz. "Formal arithmetic", "formal algebra". "Object of arithmetic are the signs on the paper itself, so that the existence of these numbers is not in question" (naive). Def "Permanence Principle": it had become customary to introduce new signs for numbers that had been added and to postulate then that the rules that applied to the numbers of the original are should also be valid for the extended area. Vs: that would have to be regarded as illegitimate as long as the consistency is not shown. Otherwise, you could introduce a new number, and E.g. simply postulate § + 1 = 2 und § + 2 = 1. This contradiction would show that these "new numbers" did not really exist. This explains Heine’s formulation that "existence is not in question". (> "tonk"). Thiel I 343/344 Thomae treated the problem as "rules of the game" in a somewhat more differentiated way. FregeVsThomae: he had not even precisely specified the basic rules of his game, namely the correlation to the rules, pieces and positions. This criticism of Frege was already a precursor of Hilbert’S proof theory, in which also mere character strings are considered without regard their possible content for their production and transformation according to the given rules. Thiel I 345 HilbertVsVs: Hilbert critics often overlook that, at least for Hilbert himself, the "finite core" should remain content-wise interpreted and only the "ideal", not finitely interpretable parts have no directly provable content. This important argument is of a methodical, not a philosophical nature. "Formalism" is the most commonly used expression for Hilbert’s program. Beyond that, the conception of formalism is also possible in a third sense: i.e. the conception of mathematics and logic as a system of action schemes for dealing with figures that are free of any content. HilbertVsFrege and Dedekind: the objects of the number theory are the signs themselves. Motto: "In the beginning was the sign." Thiel I 346 The designation formalism did not come from Hilbert or his school. Brouwer had hyped up the contrasts between his intuitionism and the formalism of Hilbert’s school to a landmark decision. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Kant | Vollmer Vs Kant | I 25 VollmerVsKant: today people no longer believe that its categories are necessary. Also the laws of nature do not have the general and necessary validity! I 84 Theory/Vollmer: goes further than our mesocosm: But many philosophers do not understand that: VsKant, VsAnalytic Philosphy: Everyday language VsPositivism VsPhenomenalism: e.g. Mach: Sensory perception is everything. VsOperationalism: every term must be defined in mesocosmic operational terms. Vollmer: nevertheless, we cannot avoid connecting every object, every structure of empirical science with human (i.e. mesocosmic) experiences. I 103 Causality/KantVsHume: Instincts can fail, the causal law does not seem to fail. Causality/VollmerVsKant: what Kant describes is at best a normal adult cultural person. Evolutionary epistemology: Biology instead of synthetic a priori - is only mesocosmically appropriate. I 173 Epistemology/VollmerVsKant: he does not see that the field of his traditional epistemology is much too narrow. He does not notice the difference between mesocosmic and theoretical knowledge. He cannot answer the following questions: How are our categories created? Why do we have these forms of viewing and categories? Why are we bound to these a priori judgements and not to others? Kant gives wrong solutions for the following problems: Should we accept the idea of organismic evolution? Why can we understand each other? How is intersubjective knowledge possible? Can the categories be proved complete? (Vollmer: No!) Can they be scientifically justified? I 193 Synthetic judgments a priori/VollmerVsKant: up to today, nobody has supplied a single copy of such judgments. Although they seem logically possible. I 196 Deduction/Categories/Kant/Vollmer: one has to realize that Kant's "deduction" is not even intended to give a justification for special categories. He only shows how they are used. Categories/Kant/Vollmer: as terms they cannot be true or false (true/false). For each category, however, there is a principle of mind which, due to its transcendental character, provides a law of nature. Therefore, a discussion (and possible justification) of the categories can be replaced by one of the corresponding laws. I 197 Principles of the pure mind/Kant/Vollmer: four groups: 1. Axioms of View - applicability of Euclidean geometry to a. Objects, b. states, and c. Processes. 2. Anticipations of Perception a. Consistency of space, b. Consistency of time, c. Consistency of physical processes 3. Analogies of Experience a. Persistence of the substance, b. universal causality, c. universal interaction of the substances. 4. Postulates of empirical thinking at all (here not principles, but definitions). I 199 VollmerVsKant: he does not show anywhere that its reconstruction is the only possible one. His representation of Newton's physics is probably not appropriate. Physics/Kant/VollmerVsKant/Vollmer: Matter: he considers matter infinitely divisible (NewtonVs). Principle of inertia: he did not understand it, he mistakenly thinks that every change of state requires an external cause. Uniform motion, however, needs no cause! Mistakenly thought, bullets only reached their highest speed some time after leaving the barrel. (Principle of inertia Vs). Has never mastered infinitesimal calculation. Never fully understood the nature of the experimental Method and underestimated the role of experience. I 202 Intersubjectivity/Kant/Vollmer: with animals intersubjectivity should be impossible. It should be impossible to communicate with chimpanzees. Worse still: we should not understand each other. Because according to Kant, there is no reason why the cognitive structures of other people should be identical to mine. Reason: For Kant, recognition and knowledge are bound to and limited to the transcendental cognitive structures of each individual. Therefore, it could also be completely idiosyncratic. Intersubjectivity/Vollmer: fortunately they exist on Earth. The transcendental philosopher can register this as a fact. He cannot explain them. VollmerVsKant: For Kant, the origin of intersubjectivity remains mysterious, inexplicable, a surprising empirical fact. Vollmer: Intersubjectivity is of course explained by the EE. EE/Vollmer: Our view of space is three-dimensional because space is. It is temporally directed because it is real processes. (PutnamVs). I 208 Knowledge/VollmerVsKant: obviously we have to distinguish between two levels of knowledge: 1. Perception and experience are oriented towards evolutionary success and therefore sufficiently correct. 2. Scientific knowledge is not oriented towards evolutionary success. Kant does not make this distinction. I 210 VollmerVsKant: from the fact that every factual finding is tested with mesocosmic means, he erroneously concludes that it is also limited to the mesocosm. I 304 Thing in itself/measuring/Vollmer: we measure the length of a body with some scale, but we still speak of the length of the body. (sic: reference to "thing in itself" by Vollmer). I 305 Knowledge/VollmerVsKant: although our knowledge is never absolutely certain, it differs considerably from knowledge about phenomena. I 306 Although many things may be unknown, there is no motive to postulate an unrecognisable reality behind the world. I 307 VollmerVsKant: the "naked reality" cannot be seen by us, but it can be recognized! II 48 Def Nature/Kant: the existence of things, if it is determined according to general laws. Nature/VollmerVsKant: unnecessarily narrow and petitio principii: because the generality of the categories thereby becomes an analytical consequence of this definition. (Circular). |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Sellars, W. | Fraassen Vs Sellars, W. | I 32 Empirical Laws/Sellars: We don’t have them! E.g. that water boils at 100 ° applies only when the pressure is normal. (> Cartwright). Fraassen: that’s only Methodically so far, because we have no confidence in the generalization of our everyday experiences. Problem: but we expect of a theory that Postulates microstructure (theoretical entities) that it shows actual universal regularities. FraassenVsSellars/FraassenVsRealism: thus an unobservable reality is postulated behind the phenomena. E.g. Suppose at an early stage of chemistry it was discovered that different samples of gold dissolved at different speeds in aqua regia. But the samples were identical in terms of observation. I 33 Solution: (then): for the two samples a different microstructure was postulated. Then, the variation was explained with that the samples were mixtures of these two substances (which are identical in terms of observation). Thus, the laws have no observation-wise counterpart. Without that no explanation seems possible. And that is the goal of science, so we have to believe in an unobservable microstructure. This leads to three questions: 1) Does the postulation of the microstructure really have new consequences for the observable phenomena?. 2) Does science really always have to provide explanations?. 3) Could there be another rationale for the use of the image of the microstructure in the development of theories?. FraassenVsSellars: Ad 1): it seems that these hypothetical chemists very well postulated new observable regularities: Suppose two substances A and B with dissolution rates x and x+y. Every gold sample is a mixture of the two substances. Then it follows that every sample dissolves at a rate between x and x+y. And that is not implied by the fact that different samples have dissolved in this scope in the past. Thus Sellars is refuted in the first point. Suppose (for the sake of Sellars’ argument), there is still no way to predict the dissolution rates more accurately. Do we then need a categorical statement that is not based on the observable? (That was Reichenbach’s principle of the common cause, or the demand for the existence of hidden parameters). Sellars/Hidden Parameters: clearly recognizes that this would counter the current quantum mechanics, accordingly, he says that their mathematical models are incompatible with it. I 34 So he is limits himself to those cases where it is consistent to assume hidden variables. Consistency/Fraassen: is, of course, a logical hold point. FraassenVsHidden Variables/FraassenVsSellars: this does not prevent the disaster: although there is some evidence that hidden variables cannot be introduced in a classical deterministic theory, this evidence demands something much more stronger than consistency: E.g. the assumption that two different physical variables cannot have the same probability distribution in the measurement across all possible states. So if we are unable to specify differences in the forecast for the observable, there is no real difference. (No distinction without difference. Stronger demand than consistency stronger/weaker). Ad. 3) How can anti-realism make sense of that? Apart from the actually new empirical consequences (see above) he will cite Methodological reasons. With the assumption of a particular microstructure we could come to new implications of empirical regularities. This is, of course, only a hope. But: Science/Fraassen: Thesis: it is not about explanation as such, but about new statements about observable regularities. I 30 FraassenVsHidden Parameters: if this is empirically equivalent to the orthodox quantum mechanics, it leads to non-logical correlation of non-classical nature, which would still violate the principle of the common cause. But this question is also academic, because modern physics does not need hidden parameters. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
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