Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anti-Objectivism | Field Vs Anti-Objectivism | II 318 Undecidability/VsAnti-Objectivism/AO/Field: other examples are less favorable for the anti-objectivism: E.g. Gödel. Even very simple sentences may be undecidable. E.g. (*) for all natural numbers x, B(x) where B(x) is a decidable predicate, i.e. a predicate, so that for each numeral n we can either prove B(n) or ~B(n). (Through an uncontroversial proof). Problem: you may say now that every undecidable sentence must be objectively correct (see above, must follow from the axioms). Then proof of ~B(n) would be proof of the negation of (*), as opposed to its undecidability. So, because of the assumption about B(x) B(n) must be provable for each number n, thus presumably objectively correct. This seems to show, however, that the generalization (*) is also objectively correct. (This is not undisputed, because it requires as a final step that it is objectively the case that there are no other natural numbers than those for which there are names. ((s)> "not enough names"). FieldVs extreme Anti-Objectivism: if that can be believed, however, he must adopt a more moderate position. Elementary Number Theory/ENT/Undecidability/Field: in fact, almost everyone believes that the choice between an undecidable proposition and its negation is objective, also for the generalized ENT. That would be hard to give up, because many assertions about provability and consistency are actually undecidable number-theoretic assertions, so that the anti-objectivist would have to say that they lack objectivity. Only few of them want that. Nevertheless, it is not obvious that if the ENT is granted objectivity, it would also have to be conceded to the higher regions. I 347 Anti-Objectivism/Gödel/Field/Conclusion/(s): Gödel gives no reason to assume that some undecidable propositions have certain truth values. (pro extreme anti-objectivism, by Field). VsAnti-Objectivism/Gödel/Field: It may be objected that the Gödel sentences of the candidates for our most mathematical theory should not only have a certain truth value, but that they are true! The argument goes by. Induction: all Logical and non-Logical premises of M are true. The rules of inference receive truth, therefore, all Theorems must be true. So the theory must be consistent, therefore the Gödel sentence must be unprovable and therefore true. Gödel sentence: is true only if unprovable; if provable, it is not true. Problem: this induction can of course not be formalized in M. But one often feels that it is somehow "informally valid". If that is true, only the truth of the Gödel theorem is proved, not its particular truth. Solution: we might be able to fill the gap by establishing a principle that if we can prove something informally, it must certainly be true. (Vs: That’s plausible, but not undisputed!). In any case, the arguments for the particular truth of the Gödel theorem are weaker than those for its simple truth. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Boyd, R. | Putnam Vs Boyd, R. | Williams II 492 Scientific Realism/Richard Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd's defense of scientific realism is much more complex than what we have considered so far: Williams II 493 Is a substantial (explanatory) truth concept necessary? Boyd: more indirect approach than Putnam: the (approximate) truth of our theories explains the instrumental reliability of our methods. Method/Boyd: is not theory neutral! On the contrary, because they are formed by our theories, it is their truth that explains the success of the methods. Boyd/M. Williams: thus it turns a well-known argument on its head: BoydVsPositivism. Positivism/Theory: Thesis: the observing language must be theory neutral. The methodoLogical principles likewise. IdealismVsPositivism: VsTheory Neutrality. E.g. Kuhn: the scientific community determines the "facts". Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd turns the >theory ladenness of our methodological judgments very cleverly into the base of his realism. Thesis: Methods that are as theory-laden as ours would not work if the corresponding theories were not "approximately true in a relevant way". Point: thus he cannot be blamed of making an unacceptably rigid separation between theory and observation. Ad. 1) Vs: this invalidates the first objection Ad. 2) Vs: Boyd: it would be a miracle if our theory-laden methods functioned even though the theories proved to be false. For scientific realism, there is nothing to explain here. Ad. 3) Vs: Williams II 494 M. Williams: this is not VsScientific Realism, but VsPutnam: PutnamVsBoyd: arguments like that of Boyd do not establish a causal explanatory role for the truth concept. BoydVsPutnam: they don't do that: "true" is only a conventional expression which adds no explanatory power to the scientific realism. Truth/Explanation/Realism/Boyd/M. Williams: explaining the success of our methods with the truth of our theories boils down to saying that the methods by which we examine particles work, because the world is composed of such particles that are more or less the way we think. Conclusion: but it makes no difference whether we explain this success (of our methods) by the truth of the theories or by the theories themselves! M. Williams pro Deflationism: so we do not need a substantial truth concept. Putnam I (c) 80 Convergence/Putnam: there is something to the convergence of scientific knowledge! Science/Theory/Richard Boyd: Thesis: from the usual positivist philosophy of science merely follows that later theories imply many observation sentences of earlier ones, but not that later theories must imply the approximate truth of the earlier ones! (1976). Science/Boyd: (1) terms of a mature science typically refer (2) The laws of a theory that belongs to a mature science are typically approximately true. (Boyd needs more premises). I (c) 81 Boyd/Putnam: the most important thing about these findings is that the concepts of "truth" and "reference" play a causally explanatory role in epistemology. When replacing them in Boyd with operationalist concept, for example, "is simple and leads to true predictions", the explanation is not maintained. Truth/Theory/Putnam: I do not only want to have theories that are "approximately true", but those that have the chance to be true. Then the later theories must contain the laws of the earlier ones as a borderline case. PutnamVsBoyd: according to him, I only know that T2 should imply most of my observation sentences that T1 implies. It does not follow that it must imply the truth of the laws of T1! I (c) 82 Then there is also no reason why T2 should have the property that we can assign reference objects to the terms of T1 from the position of T2. E.g. Yet it is a fact that from the standpoint of the RT we can assign a reference object to the concept "gravity" in the Newtonian theory, but not to others: for example, phlogiston or ether. With concepts such as "is easy" or "leads to true predictions" no analogue is given to the demand of reference. I (c) 85/86 Truth/Boyd: what about truth if none of the expressions or predicates refers? Then the concept "truth value" becomes uninteresting for sentences containing theoretical concepts. So truth will also collapse. PutnamVsBoyd: this is perhaps not quite what would happen, but for that we need a detour via the following considerations: I (c) 86 Intuitionism/Logic/Connectives/Putnam: the meaning of the classical connectives is reinterpreted in intuitionism: statements: p p is asserted p is asserted to be provable "~p" it is provable that a proof of p would imply the provability of 1 = 0. "~p" states the absurdity of the provability of p (and not the typical "falsity" of p). "p u q" there is proof for p and there is proof for q "p > q" there is a method that applied to any proof of p produces proof of q (and proof that this method does this). I (c) 87 Special contrast to classical logic: "p v ~p" classical: means decidability of every statement. Intuitionistically: there is no theorem here at all. We now want to reinterpret the classical connectives intuitionistically: ~(classical) is identical with ~(intuitionist) u (classical) is identified with u (intuitionist) p v q (classical) is identified with ~(~p u ~q)(intuitionist) p > q (classical) is identified with ~(p u ~q) (intuitionist) So this is a translation of one calculus into the other, but not in the sense that the classical meanings of the connectives were presented using the intuitionistic concepts, but in the sense that the classical Theorems are generated. ((s) Not translation, but generation.) The meanings of the connectives are still not classical, because these meanings are explained by means of provability and not of truth or falsity (according to the reinterpretation)). E.g. Classical means p v ~p: every statement is true or false. Intuitionistically formulated: ~(~p u ~~p) means: it is absurd that a statement and its negation are both absurd. (Nothing of true or false!). |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Cantor, G. | Frege Vs Cantor, G. | I 117 Infinity/Cantor: only the finite numbers should be considered as real. They are as little perceptible as negative numbers, fractions, irrational and complex numbers. FregeVsCantor: we do not need any sense perceptions as proofs for our Theorems. It suffices if they are Logically consistent. I 118 The infinite is no extension of the natural numbers, they were infinite from the beginning! In Cantor, unlike Frege, the order is still to be established; for him, E.g. 0 can follow 13. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Carnap, R. | Lewis Vs Carnap, R. | Field II 196 Theoretical Terms/TT/Ramsey sentence/Carnap/Lewis/Field: (Carnap 1956, Kap.26, Lewis 1979b,1972). Theoretical Term/Introduction/Content/Ramsey sentence/Carnap: if a new TT was introduced by a theory Θ(T), then the content of the theory is equal to the content of the Ramsey sentence (Ex)Θ(x). Only realization: In a special case in which (E!x)Θ(x) is, we can say that T denotes the only object that fulfills Θ(x). multiple realization: Problem: what does the theoretical term denote here? (>Functionalism/Lewis, >Turing machine). It seems to need to denote something, if this were not possible we cannot explain why Θ(T) is true (and this must be according Carnap's thesis that it "has the content" of(Ex)Θ(x).) Solution/Carnap: if Θ (x) is realized multiple times, then T denotes one random object which fulfills Θ(x). LewisVsCarnap: This is not plausible because it is not explained how it is possible for a user of T to take a particular object instead of another one. Field II 197 Content/TT/Ramsey sentence/Lewis/Field: Lewis felt obliged (probably reluctantly) to not take the content of the Ramsey sentence Ex Θ (x), but the modified sentence of Ramsey: (E! x) Θ (x) ((s) which only presumes one object). I.e. the theory is wrong if Θ(x) is realized multiple times, so that T can be seen as without denotations. Then there is no ambiguity. LewisVs: (1970b): This is costly: Then if somebody states Θ (T), then it is absolutely implausible that he thereby has asserted that nothing than T Θ (x) can be fulfilled. LewisVs: (1972): even worse: it has been applied here on functionalism, which is after all based on multiple realization. Multiple Realization/Functionalism/Field: Many authors actually want to accept mR in one and the same organism at the same time. Partial Denotation/Lösung/Field: Lewis could simply say that (as Carnap says) the content of Θ (T) is simply the Ramsey sentence (Ex) Θ (x), and if Θ (x) is realized multiple ways, then T partially denotes each of the "Realisierer". Lewis IV 88 Theoretical Terms/TT/Definition/Description/Lewis: After having defined the TT through descriptions, we can eliminated the latter with their help. This is how we obtain O sentences. Def Extended Postulation/Lewis: the postulate of T that we get by replacing the TT by descriptions (O sentence). It says that the theory T is realized by the n tuple of the first, second...component of the only realization of T. The extended postulate is equivalent in definition to the postulate. It says that the theory is uniquely realized. It is Logically equivalent to a shorter O phrase, which says the same in a shorter form. This is what we call the "sentence of the only realization of T": IV 89 Ey1...yn (x) x1...xn (T[x1,,,xn] ↔ . y1 = x1 & ..& yn = xn LewisVsCarnap: then the postulate is true if and only if the theory is realized once. Problem: the expanded postulate is an O phrase that is stronger than the Ramsey phrase that merely says that there is at least one realization. Nevertheless, if the definition sentences are part of T, then the extended postulate is a theorem of T. Then the definitions give us Theorems that could not have been derived without them. This means that the definitions themselves, unlike the Carnap theorem, are not Logically implied by the postulate. Therefore, if we want to say that the definition sets of T are correct definitions, we must abandon the idea that the Theorems are all and only the Logical consequences of T's postulate. And we like to give that up. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Conceptualism | Quine Vs Conceptualism | VII (f) 126 Classes/Conceptualism/Quine: does not require classes to exist beyond expressible conditions of membership of elements. ((s) VsPlatonism: Quasi requires that there should also be classes without such conditions, as classes should be independent of speakers.) Cantor's proof: would lead to something else: He namely appeals to a class h of those members of the class k that are not elements of the subclasses of k to which they refer. VII (f) 127 But thus the class h is specified impredicatively! h is in fact itself part of the subclass of k. Thus a theorem of classical mathematics goes overboard in conceptualism. The same fate also applies to Cantor's proof of the existence of hyper-countable infinities. QuineVsConceptualism: which is indeed a welcome relief, but there are problems with much more fundamental and desirable Theorems of mathematics: Ex proof that every limited sequence of numbers has an upper limit. ConceptualismVsReducibility Axiom: because it reintroduces the entire Platonist class Logic. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Davidson, D. | Strawson Vs Davidson, D. | III 189 Truth theory/tr.th./meaning theory/m.th./Strawson: sentences that ascribe actions are sensitive to adverbial modification, for example, if the expressed proposition includes any other proposition if one omits the modifiers. M.th./tr.th./Davidson/Strawson: a theory like his refers to well-understood Logical structures that lie beneath the surface of action ascribing sentences. "Adverbial theory"/StrawsonVsDavidson: I prefer a theory which examines the explanation closer to the surface of everyday language, and thus recognizes, however, more complex basal syntax than Davidson's theory. ("Adverbial access"). The contrast between the two theories is a question of depth and universality: StrawsonVsDavidson: if we seek our understanding in Logic (surface) structures that differ from the grammar. III 193 VsVs/StrawsonVsDavidson: but it remains mysterious that the actual mastering of the current language would have to be explained by the mastering of a potential language (Davidson's theorems). adverbial access/StrawsonVsDavidson: instead: the adverbial access is much more direct. Here, the success of the claim can also be shown more directly. III 194 This is not to deny that we could take paraphrases as help or equivalent sentences with a different grammatical structure. But by this Davidson's program becomes less attractive, a program that is set from the beginning to explain our grasping by those strongly bounded structures, namely the predicate calculus. III 197 Language forms must of course be taken into account, III 198 when we assess our theory for simplicity, reasonableness and realism. StrawsonVsDavidson: and here his approach has problems. 2. the second reason why it is possible to bring in extra syntactic considerations from outside of linguistic philosophy: Actions and events generally suffer from the identity subordination on substances. Strawson IV 139 StrawsonVsDavidson: one can not expect that an ordinary language speaker masters the predicate calculus. But that is unnecessary. Our conceptual scheme is in space and time. IV 141 Another problem: ontology: nominalization of speech parts e.g. "The Kissing". |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Hume, D. | Bigelow Vs Hume, D. | I 226 Non-modal theory/Laws of Nature/LoN/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: most non-modal theories of the LON descended from Hume. Then we can assume nomic necessity to be a relative necessity without falling into a circle. Important argument: then we can just assume nomic necessity as a relative necessity and rely on it being based on an independent approach to laws! Explanation: So it makes sense to make use of laws to explain nomic necessity, rather than vice versa. And that’s much less obscure than modal arguments. I 227 BigelowVsVs: modal explanations are not so mysterious. BigelowVsHume: Hume’s theories are unable to explain these non-modal properties of the laws, they have less explanatory power. I 233 "Full generality"/"Pure" generality/Hume/BigelowVsHume/Bigelow/Pargetter: may not contain any reference to an individual: This is too weak and too strong: a) too strong: E.g. Kepler’s laws relate to all the planets, but therefore also to an individual, the sun. b) too weak: it is still no law. E.g. that everything moves towards the earth’s center. I 235 LoN/BigelowVsHume/Bigelow/Pargetter: in our opinion, it has nothing to do with them, E.g. whether they are useful, or whether they contradict our intuitions. Counterfactual conditional/Co.co/LoN/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: for the Humean, Counterfactual Conditional are circular, if they are to represent LoN. We ourselves only use a Counterfactual Conditional when we have recognized something as a law! When we ask ourselves whether something is a law, we ask ourselves not whether it fulfils a Counterfactual Conditional. I 236 HumeVsBigelow/Bigelow/Pargetter: our modal approach for LoN is circular. BigelowVsVs: it is not! BigelowVsHume: most of Hume’s theories of the LON are circular themselves, with one exception: the theory that Lewis reads out of Ramsey. Ramsey/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: this theory is based on the logical relations of laws among each other (coherence). (Ramsey 1929, 1931, Lewis 1973a, Mellor 1980). I 237 BigelowVsLewis/BigelowVsHume/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: if theories are sets of propositions, propositions must not be sets of possible worlds! For then the best theory for a possible worlds would have to be an axiom: the one-class of this possible worlds All facts of the world are then theorems of the axiom. There would be only one law for each world. No two possible worlds would have a law in common. I 267 BigelowVsHume: went too far in his rejection of necessity in laws. But not far enough in his rejection of the necessity approach to causality. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Parsons, Ter. | Stalnaker Vs Parsons, Ter. | I 73 Bare particulars/modal logic/ML/semantics/Stalnaker: the problem is now to connect the bare particulars-theory with these three restrictions with the quantified modal logic (ML). I 74 Terence ParsonsVs/Stalnaker: T. Parsons attacked this proof theoretically (1969). Anti-essentialism/T. Parsons: question: what axioms do we need for a full and reasoned anti-essentialist theory? That means a theory that prevents any questionable ascription of essential properties? StalnakerVsParsons: problem: some of his propositions are not Theorems: e.g. Theorem: (Ex)N(Fx) > (x)N(Fx). ((s) if F is a necessary property for an object then this applies to all such objects x) E.g. if a square is necessary angular, then all squares). Stalnaker: but the following substitution instance is not a theorem: (Ex)N(Rxy) > (x)N(Rxy). ((s) If something is necessary the father of y, all is necessary the father of y.) Stalnaker: that means the atomic predicate "F" does not represent any property as it should normally be but just a random property of a certain kind. This is not bad per se but imposes the semantics additional burdens. Because the rules have to pick out suitable properties as values for atomic predicates. ((s) QuineVs - Quine: predicates do not represent properties). properties/anti-essentialism/predicates/Stalnaker: in distinguishing it is naturally about between intrinsic, qualitative characteristics and referential or possible world-indexed properties. Only the former come into question. StalnakerVsParsons: this one requires this but does not explain it. Atomic predicate/Stalnaker: this concept cannot help because it is purely syntactic and cannot make a semantic job by itself. Anti-essentialism/quantified modal Logic/Stalnaker/conclusion: to connect the two, we need real semantic conditions for atomic predicates. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Russell Vs Quine, W.V.O. | Prior I 39 Ramified type theory/rTT/Prior: first edition Principia Mathematica(1): here it does not say yet that quantification on non-nouns (non nominal) is illegitimate, or that they are only apparently not nominal. (Not on names?) But only that you have to treat them carefully. I 40 The ramified type theory was incorporated in the first edition. (The "simple type theory" is, on the other hand, little more than a certain sensitivity to the syntax.) Predicate: makes a sentence out of a noun. E.g. "φ" is a verb that forms the phrase "φx". But it will not form a sentence when a verb is added to another verb. "φφ". Branch: comes into play when expressions form a sentence from a single name. Here we must distinguish whether quantified expressions of the same kind occur. E.g. "__ has all the characteristics of a great commander." Logical form: "For all φ if (for all x, if x is a great commander, then φx) then φ__". ΠφΠxCψxφx" (C: conditional, ψ: commander, Π: for all applies). Easier example: "__ has the one or the other property" Logical form: "For a φ, φ __" "Σφφ". (Σ: there is a) Order/Type: here one can say, although the predicate is of the same type, it is of a different order. Because this "φ" has an internal quantification of "φ's". Ramified type theory: not only different types, but also various "orders" should be represented by different symbols. That is, if we, for example, have introduced "F" for a predicative function on individuals" (i.e. as a one-digit predicate), we must not insert non-predicative functions for "f" in Theorems. E.g. "If there are no facts about a particular individual ..." "If for all φ, not φx, then there is not this fact about x: that there are no facts about x that is, if it is true that there are no facts about x, then it cannot be true. I.e. if it is true that there are no facts about x, then it is wrong, that there is this fact. Symbolically: 1. CΠφNφxNψx. I 41 "If for all φ not φ, then not ψx" (whereby "ψ" can stand for any predicate). Therefore, by inserting "∏φφ" for "ψ": 2. CΠφNφxNΠφNφx Therefore, by inserting and reductio ad absurdum: CCpNpNp (what implies its own falsehood, is wrong) 3. CΠφNφx. The step of 1 to 2 is an impermissible substitution according to the ramified type theory. Sentence/ramified type theory/Prior: the same restriction must be made for phrases (i.e. "zero-digit predicates", propositions). Thus, the well-known old argument is prevented: E.g. if everything is wrong, then one of the wrong things would be this: that everything is wrong. Therefore, it may not be the case that everything is wrong. Logical form: 1. CΠpNpNq by inserting: 2. CΠpNpNPpNp and so by CCpNpNp (reductio ad absurdum?) 3. NΠpNp, Ramified type theory: that is now blocked by the consideration that "ΠpNp" is no proposition of the "same order" as the "p" which exists in itself. And thus not of the same order as the "q" which follows from it by instantiation, so it cannot be used for "q" to go from 1 to 2. RussellVsQuine/Prior: here propositions and predicates of "higher order" are not entirely excluded, as with Quine. They are merely treated as of another "order". VsBranched type theory: there were problems with some basic mathematical forms that could not be formed anymore, and thus Russell and Whitehead introduce the reducibility axiom. By contrast, a simplified type theory was proposed in the 20s again. Type Theory/Ramsey: was one of the early advocates of a simplification. Wittgenstein/Tractatus/Ramsey: Thesis: universal quantification and existential quantification are both long conjunctions or disjunctions of individual sentences (singular statements). E.g. "For some p, p": Either grass is green or the sky is pink, or 2 + 2 = 4, etc.". (> Wessel: CNF, ANF, conjunctive and adjunctive normal form) Propositions/Wittgenstein/Ramsey: no matter of what "order" are always truth functions of indiviual sentences. Ramified Type TheoryVsRamsey/VsWittgenstein: such conjunctions and disjunctions would not only be infinitely long, but the ones of higher order would also need to contain themselves. E.g. "For some p.p" it must be written as a disjunction of which "for some p, p" is a part itself, which in turn would have to contain a part, ... etc. RamseyVsVs: the different levels that occur here, are only differences of character: not only between "for some p,p" and "for some φ, φ" but also between "p and p" and "p, or p", and even the simple "p" are only different characters. Therefore, the expressed proposition must not contain itself. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Verschiedene Vs Quine, W.V.O. | Davidson I 55 CreswellVsQuine: he had a realm of reified experiences or phenomena facing an unexplored reality. Davidson pro - - QuineVsCresswell >Quine III) Kanitscheider II 23 Ontology/language/human/Kanitschneider: the linguistic products of the organism are in no way separated from its producer by an ontological gap. Ideas are certain neuronal patterns in the organism. KanitscheiderVsQuine: Weak point: his empiricism. One must therefore view his epistemology more as a research programme. Quine VI 36 VsQuine: I've been told that the question "What is there?" is always a question of fact and not just a linguistic problem. That is correct. QuineVsVs: but saying or assuming what there is remains a linguistic matter and here the bound variables are in place. VI 51 Meaning/Quine: the search for it should start with the whole sentences. VsQuine: the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation leads directly to behaviorism. Others: it leads to a reductio ad absurdum of Quine's own behaviorism. VI 52 Translation Indeterminacy/Quine: it actually leads to behaviorism, which there is no way around. Behaviorism/Quine: in psychology one still has the choice whether one wants to be a behaviorist, in linguistics one is forced to be one. One acquires language through the behavior of others, which is evaluated in the light of a common situation. It literally does not matter what other kind psychoLogical life is! Semantics/Quine: therefore no more will be able to enter into the semantic meaning than what can also be inferred from perceptible behaviour in observable situations Quine XI 146 Deputy function/Quine/Lauener: does not have to be unambiguous at all. E.g. characterisation of persons on the basis of their income: here different values are assigned to an argument. For this we need a background theory: We map the universe U in V so that both the objects of U and their substitutes are included in V. If V forms a subset of U, U itself can be represented as background theory within which their own ontoLogical reduction is described. XI 147 VsQuine: this is no reduction at all, because then the objects must exist. QuineVsVs: this is comparable to a reductio ad absurdum: if we want to show that a part of U is superfluous, we can assume U for the duration of the argument. (>Ontology/Reduction). Lauener: this brings us to ontoLogical relativity. Löwenheim/Ontology/Reduction/Quine/Lauener: if a theory of its own requires an overcountable range, we can no longer present a proxy function that would allow a reduction to a countable range. For this one needed a much stronger frame theory, which then could no longer be discussed away as reductio ad absurdum according to Quine's proposal. Quine X 83 Logical Truth/Validity/Quine: our insertion definitions (sentences instead of sets) use a concept of truth and fulfillment that goes beyond the framework of object language. This dependence on the concept of ((s) simple) truth, by the way, would also concern the model definition of validity and Logical truth. Therefore we have reason to look at a 3rd possibility of the definition of validity and Logical truth: it gets by without the concepts of truth and fulfillment: we need the completeness theorem ((s) >provability). Solution: we can simply define the steps that form a complete method of proof and then: Def Valid Schema/Quine: is one that can be proven with such steps. Def Logically True/Quine: as before: a sentence resulting from a valid schema by inserting it instead of its simple sentences. Proof Procedure/Evidence Method/Quine: some complete ones do not necessarily refer to schemata, but can also be applied directly to the propositions, X 84 namely those that emerge from the scheme by insertion. Such methods generate true sentences directly from other true sentences. Then we can leave aside schemata and validity and define Logical truth as the sentence generated by these proofs. 1st VsQuine: this tends to trigger protest: the property "to be provable by a certain method of evidence" is uninteresting in itself. It is interesting only because of the completeness theorem, which allows to equate provability with Logical truth! 2. VsQuine: if one defines Logical truth indirectly by referring to a suitable method of proof, one deprives the completeness theorem of its ground. It becomes empty of content. QuineVsVs: the danger does not exist at all: The sentence of completeness in the formulation (B) does not depend on how we define Logical truth, because it is not mentioned at all! Part of its meaning, however, is that it shows that we can define Logical truth by merely describing the method of proof, without losing anything of what makes Logical truth interesting in the first place. Equivalence/Quine: important are Theorems, which state an equivalence between quite different formulations of a concept - here the Logical truth. Which formulation is then called the official definition is less important. But even mere terms can be better or worse. Validity/Logical truth/definition/Quine: the elementary definition has the advantage that it is relevant for more neighboring problems. 3. VsQuine: with the great arbitrariness of the choice of the evidence procedure it cannot be excluded that the essence of the Logical truth is not grasped. QuineVsVs: how arbitrary is the choice actually? It describes the procedure and talks about strings of characters. In this respect it corresponds to the sentence. Insertion definition: it moves effectively at the level of the elementary number theory. And it stays at the level, while the other definition uses the concept of truth. That is a big difference. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Russell, B. | Strawson Vs Russell, B. | Wolf II 17 StrawsonVsRussell: Vs Russell's resolution of singular sentences like "the F, which is G, is H" are general sentences such as "There is exactly one F, which is G, and this F is H" : this is inappropriate. Thus it is not included, that we refer with the singular term to individual things. --- Newen/Schrenk I 92 Reference/StrawsonVsRussell: ("On Referring") in 1950, 45 years after Russell's "On Denoting" (1905)). Strawson: 5 theses (i) one must distinguish between a) the sentence, b) the use, c) the expression (on one occasion) (ii) there is a difference between (Logical) implying and presupposition (iii) truth value gaps are allowed (iv) The meaning of an expression is not its referent, but the conventions and rules. In various uses the term can therefore refer to different objects. (v) expressions can be used referential and predicative (attributing properties). Sentence/truth value/tr.v./Strawson: Thesis: sentences themselves cannot be true or false, only their use. Presupposition/implication/Strawson: difference: Definition implication/Strawson: A implies B iff it cannot be that A is true but B is false. On the other hand: Definition presupposition/Strawson: A presupposes B iff B must be true so that A can take a truth value. Existence assertion/uniqueness assertion/Strawson: are only presupposed by a sentence with description, but not implied. E.g. King of France/presupposition/Strawson: the sentence presupposes the existence, however, does not imply it. And also does not claim the existence and uniqueness. Newen/Schrenk VsStrawson: Strawson provides no philosophical-Logical arguments for his thesis. Newen/Schrenk I 94 He rather refers to our everyday practice. Truth-value gaps/StrawsonVsRussell: accepted by him. Negative existential statements/existence/existence theorem/Strawson/VsStrawson/Newen/Schrenk: his approach lets the problem of empty existence Theorems look even trickier. Referential/predicative/singular term/designation/name/Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: Thesis: Proper names/demonstratives: are largely used referential. Description: have a maximum predicative, so descriptive meaning (but can also simultaneously refer). Identity/informative identity sentences/referential/predicative/Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: here the description has (or two occurring descriptions) such an extreme predicative use that E.g. "Napoleon is identical to the man who ordered the execution of the Duke" is as good as synonymous with the phrase "Napoleon ordered the ...". In principle, both sentences are used for a predication. Thus, the first sentence is informative when it is read predicative and not purely referential. --- Quine I 447 StrawsonVsRussell: has called Russell's theory of descriptions false because of their treatment of the truth value gaps. --- Schulte III 433 StrawsonVsRussell/Theory of descriptions: Strawson brings a series of basic distinctions between types and levels of use of linguistic expressions into play. Fundamental difference between the logical subject and logical predicate. Pleads for stronger focus on everyday language. "The common language has no exact Logic" Schulte III 434 King-xample: "The present king of France is bald". Russell: here the description must not be considered a logical subject. Russell: Such sentences are simply wrong in the case of non-existence. Then we also not need to make any dubious ontoLogical conditions. We analyze (according to Russell) the sentence as follows: it is in reality a conjunction of three sentences: 1. There is a king of France. 2. There are no more than a king of France. 3. There is nothing that is King of France and is not bald. Since at least one member in the conjunction is false, it is wrong in total. StrawsonVsRussell: 1. he speaks too careless of sentences and their meanings. But one has to consider the use of linguistic expressions, which shows that there must be a much finer distinction. 2. Russell confused what a sentence says with the terms of the meaningful use of this sentence. 3. The everyday language and not the formal Logic determines the meaning. --- Schulte III 435 Reference/Strawson: an expression does not refer to anything by itself. King-Example/StrawsonVsRussell: with the sentence "The present king of France is bald" no existence assertion is pronounced. Rather, it is "implied". Therefore, the sentence does not need to be true or false. The term does not refer to anything. Definition truth value gap (Strawson): E.g. King-Example: refers to nothing. Wittgenstein: a failed move in the language game. --- VII 95 Description/Strawson: sure I use in E.g. "Napoleon was the greatest French soldier", the word "Napoleon", to name the person, not the predicate. StrawsonVsRussell: but I can use the description very well to name a person. There can also be more than one description in one sentence. VII 98 StrawsonVsRussell: seems to imply that there are such logical subject predicate sentences. Russell solution: only Logical proper names - for example, "This" - are real subjects in Logical sentences. The meaning is exactly the individual thing. This leads him to the fact that he can no longer regard sentences with descriptions as Logical propositions. Reference/StrawsonVsRussell: Solution: in "clear referring use" also dscriptions can be used. But these are not "descriptions" in Russell's sense. VII 99 King-Example/StrawsonVsRussell: claims three statements, one of which in any case would be wrong. The conjunction of three statements, one of which is wrong and the others are true, is false, but meaningful. VII 100 Reference/description/StrawsonVsRussell: distinction: terminology: "Unique reference": expression. (Clearly referring description). Sentence begins with clear referring description. Sentences that can start with a description: (A1) sentence (A2) use of a sentence (A3) uttering of a sentence accordingly: (B1) expression (B2) use of an expression (B3) utterance of an expression. King-Example/StrawsonVsRussell: the utterance (assertion (>utterance) "The present king of France is wise" can be true or false at different times, but the sentence is the same. VII 101 Various uses: according to whether at the time of Louis XIV. or Louis XV. Sentence/statement/statement/assertion/proposition/Strawson: Assertion (assertion): can be true or false at different times. Statement (proposition): ditto Sentence is always the same. (Difference sentence/Proposition). VII 102 StrawsonVsRussell: he overlooks the distinction between use and meaning. VII 104 Sense/StrawsonVsRussell: the question of whether a sentence makes sense, has nothing to do with whether it is needed at a particular opportunity to say something true or false or to refer to something existent or non-existent. VII 105 Meaning/StrawsonVsRussell: E.g. "The table is covered with books": Everyone understands this sentence, it is absurd to ask "what object" the sentence is about (about many!). It is also absurd to ask whether it is true or false. VII 106 Sense/StrawsonVsRussell: that the sentence makes sense, has to do with the fact that it is used correctly (or can be), not that it can be negated. Sense cannot be determined with respect to a specific (individual) use. It is about conventions, habits and rules. VII 106/107 King-Example/Russell/Strawson: Russell says two true things about it: 1. The sentence E.g. "The present king of France is wise" makes sense. 2. whoever expresses the sentence now, would make a true statement, if there is now one, StrawsonVsRussell: 1. wrong to say who uttered the sentence now, would either make a true or a false claim. 2. false, that a part of this claim states that the king exists. Strawson: the question wrong/false does not arise because of the non-existence. E.g. It is not like grasping after a raincoat suggests that one believes that it is raining. (> Presupposition/Strawson). Implication/Imply/StrawsonVsRussell: the predication does not assert an existence of the object. VII 110 Existence/StrawsonVsRussell: the use of "the" is not synonymous with the assertion that the object exists. Principia Mathematica(1): (p.30) "strict use" of the definite article: "only applies if object exists". StrawsonVsRussell: the sentence "The table is covered with books" does not only apply if there is exactly one table VII 111 This is not claimed with the sentence, but (commonplace) implied that there is exactly one thing that belongs to the type of table and that it is also one to which the speaker refers. Reference/StrawsonVsRussell: referring is not to say that one refers. Saying that there is one or the other table, which is referred to, is not the same as to designate a certain table. Referencing is not the same as claiming. Logical proper names/StrawsonVsRussell: E.g. I could form my empty hand and say "This is a beautiful red!" The other notes that there is nothing. Therefore, "this" no "camouflaged description" in Russell's sense. Also no Logical proper name. You have to know what the sentence means to be able to respond to the statement. VII 112 StrawsonVsRussell: this blurs the distinction between pure existence theorems and sentences that contain an expression to point to an object or to refer to it. Russell's "Inquiry into meaning and truth" contains a Logical catastrophic name theory. (Logical proper names). He takes away the status of Logical subjects from the descriptions, but offers no substitute. VII 113 Reference/Name/referent/StrawsonVsRussell: not even names are enough for this ambitious standard. Strawson: The meaning of the name is not the object. (Confusion of utterance and use). They are the expressions together with the context that one needs to clearly refer to something. When we refer we do not achieve completeness anyway. This also allows the fiction. (Footnote: later: does not seem very durable to me because of the implicit restrictive use of "refer to".) VII 122 StrawsonVsRussell: Summit of circulatory: to treat names as camouflaged descriptions. Names are choosen arbitrary or conventional. Otherwise names would be descriptive. VII 123 Vague reference/"Somebody"/implication/Strawson: E.g. "A man told me ..." Russell: existence assertion: "There is a man who ..." StrawsonVsRussell: ridiculous to say here that "class of men was not empty ..." Here uniqueness is also implicated as in "the table". VII 124 Tautology/StrawsonVsRussell: one does not need to believe in the triviality. That only believe those who believe that the meaning of an expression is the object. (E.g. Scott is Scott). VII 126 Presupposition/StrawsonVsRussell: E.g. "My children sleep" Here, everyone will assume that the speaker has children. Everyday language has no exact Logic. This is misjudged by Aristotle and Russell. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Schulte I J. Schulte Wittgenstein Stuttgart 2001 Schulte II J. Schulte U. J. Wenzel Was ist ein philosophisches Problem? Frankfurt 2001 Schulte III Joachim Schulte "Peter Frederick Strawson" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Tarski, A. | Field Vs Tarski, A. | Brendel I 68 T-Def/FieldVsTarski: does not do justice to physicalistic intuitions. (Field 1972). Semantic concepts and especially the W concept should be traceable to physical or logical-mathematical concepts. Tarski/Brendel: advocates for a metalinguistic definition himself that is based only on Logical terms, no axiomatic characterization of "truth". (Tarski, "The Establishment of Scientific Semantics"). Bre I 69 FieldVsTarski: E.g. designation: Def Designation/Field: Saying that the name N denotes an object a is the same thing as stipulating that either a is France and N is "France" or a is Germany and N is "Germany"... etc. Problem: here only an extensional equivalence is given, no explanation of what designation (or satisfiability) is. Bre I 70 Explanation/FieldVsTarski/Field: should indicate because of which properties a name refers to a subject. Therefore, Tarski’s theory of truth is not physicalistic. T-Def/FieldVsTarski/Field/Brendel: does not do justice to physicalistic intuitions - extensional equivalence is no explanation of what designation or satisfiability is. Field I 33 Implication/Field: is also in simpler contexts sensibly a primitive basic concept: E.g. Someone asserts the two sentences. a) "Snow is white" does not imply Logically "grass is green". b) There are no mathematical entities such as quantities. That does not look as contradictory as Fie I 34 John is a bachelor/John is married FieldVsTarski: according to him, a) and b) together would be a contradiction, because he defines implication with quantities. Tarski does not give the normal meaning of those terms. VsField: you could say, however, that the Tarskian concepts give similar access as the definition of "light is electromagnetic radiation". FieldVsVs: but for implication we do not need such a theoretical approach. This is because it is a Logical concept like negation and conjunction. Field II 141 T-Theory/Tarski: Thesis: we do not get an adequate probability theory if we just take all instances of the schema as axioms. This does not give us the generalizations that we need, for example, so that the modus ponens receives the truth. FieldVsTarski: see above Section 3. 1. Here I showed a solution, but should have explained more. Feferman/Field: Solution: (Feferman 1991) incorporates schema letters together with a rule for substitution. Then the domain expands automatically as the language expands. Feferman: needs this for number theory and set theory. Problem: expanding it to the T-theory, because here we need scheme letters inside and outside of quotation marks. Field: my solution was to introduce an additional rule that allows to go from a scheme with all the letters in quotation marks to a generalization for all sentences. Problem: we also need that for the syntax,... here, an interlinking functor is introduced in (TF) and (TFG). (see above). II 142 TarskiVsField: his variant, however, is purely axiomatic. FieldVsTarski/FefermanVsTarski: Approach with scheme letters instead of pure axioms: Advantages: 1) We have the same advantage as Feferman for the schematic number theory and the schematic set theory: expansions of the language are automatically considered. 2) the use of ""p" is true iff. p" (now as a scheme formula as part of the language rather than as an axiom) seems to grasp the concept of truth better. 3) (most important) is not dependent on a compositional approach to the functioning of the other parts of language. While this is important, it is also not ignored by my approach. FieldVsTarski: an axiomatic theory is hard to come by for belief sentences. Putnam I 91 Correspondence Theory/FieldVsTarski: Tarski’s theory is not suited for the reconstruction of the correspondence theory, because fulfillment (of simple predicates of language) is explained through a list. This list has the form "Electron" refers to electrons "DNS" refers to DNS "Gene" refers to genes. etc. this is similar to (w) "Snow is white" is true iff.... (s)> meaning postulates) Putnam: this similarity is no coincidence, because: Def "True"/Tarski/Putnam: "true" is the zero digit case of fulfillment (i.e. a formula is true if it has no free variables and the zero sequence fulfills it). Def Zero Sequence: converges to 0: E.g. 1; 1/4; 1/9; 1/16: ... Criterion W/Putnam: can be generalized to the criterion F as follows: (F for fulfillment): Def Criterion F/Putnam: (F) an adequate definition of fulfilled in S must generate all instances of the following scheme as Theorems: "P(x1...xn) is fulfilled by the sequence y1...yn and only if P(y1...yn). Then we reformulate: "Electron (x)" is fulfilled by y1 iff. y1 is an electron. PutnamVsField: it would have been formulated like this in Tarskian from the start. But that shows that the list Field complained about is determined in its structure by criterion F. This as well as the criterion W are now determined by the formal properties we desired of the concepts of truth and reference, so we would even preserve the criterion F if we interpreted the connectives intuitionistically or quasi intuitionistically. Field’s objection fails. It is right for the realist to define "true" à la Tarski. |
Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Tarski, A. | Prior Vs Tarski, A. | I 98 Truth/Falsity/PriorVsTarski: the concepts of truth and falsity discussed in the last chapter are not the concepts of Tarski. Prior: ours could be described as properties not of sentences, but of propositions. I.e. quasi-properties of quasi-objects! Not adjectives "true", "false", but rather adverbs "correctly" (accurate, truthful, rightly) and "falsely". I 99 PriorVsTarski: (A) If someone says that snow is white, he says it truthfully iff. snow is white. Tarski: (B) The sentence "snow is white" is true iff. snow is white. The truth of all true sentences of a language can be derived from Tarski's definition with normal Logic. And that is for him the criterion of satisfiability of the truth definition. Quotation Marks/Truth/Truth Definition/PriorVsTarski: for me there are no quotation marks. But in Tarski, these belong more to informal preparation than to strict theory. Use/Mention/Tarski/Prior: left: the sentence is mentioned (by the name of the sentence) right: used. Prior: in my version () there is no mention, only use. (A) is not about sentences from start to finish, but about snow. (B) is about the sentence "snow is white". Self-Reference/Foreword Paradox/Tarski/Paradox/Prior: it remains the case that it looks as if self-reference were involved when we speak about people and what they say, think, fear, etc., which seems to exclude Tarski's semantics. But we must take a closer look: In Tarski, the predicates "true" and "false" do not belong to the same language as the sentences by which they are stated. I 103 PriorVsTarski: we say instead "x says something true if..." Or: "x says during the interval t t'that __" If we abbreviate this last phrase as "Sx!, "Sxp", then we could insert it in Theorems like: CSx∑pKSxpNp∑pKSxpNp. Problem: (see above) If I says that he says something wrong between t and t', then it cannot be the only thing he says. This is a problem for very short intervals. How about if poor old x had to express Theorems, and only had such a short time available for it? To the above theorem he would also have to express the consequent ∑pKSxpNp, and for that he might not have time! Above all, it may be that I will not do it ex hypothesi! Metalanguage/Point: this means that the language in which these Theorems are expressed cannot be the same language that is used for that at some other occasions! |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Various Authors | Frege Vs Various Authors | Brandom II 83 FregeVsBoole: no material contents, therefore unable to follow scientific concept formation. Boole: "scope equality". Frege I 32 Addition/Hankel: wants to define: "if a and b are arbitrary elements of the basic series, then the sum of a + b is understood to be that one member of the basic series for which the formula a + (b + e) = a + b + e is true." (e is supposed to be the positive unit here). Addition/Sum/FregeVsHankel: 1) thus, the sum is explained by itself. If you do not yet know what a + b is, you will not be able to understand a + (b + e). 2) if you’d like to object that not the sum, but the addition should be explained, then you could still argue that a + b would be a blank sign if there was no member of the basic series or several of them of the required type. Frege I 48 Numbers/FregeVsNewton: he wants to understand numbers as the ratio of each size to another of the same kind. Frege: it can be admitted that this appropriately describes the numbers in a broader sense including fractions and irrational numbers. But this requires the concepts of size and the size ratio!. I 49 It would also not be possible to understand numbers as quantities, because then the concept of quantity and the quantity ratios would be presumed. I 58 Number/Schlömilch: "Notion of the location of an object in a series". FregeVsSchlömilch: then always the same notion of a place in a series would have to appear when the same number occurs, and that is obviously wrong. This could be avoided if he liked to understand an objective idea as imagination, but then what difference would there be between the image and the place itself?. I 60 Frege: then arithmetic would be psychology. If two were an image, then it would initially only be mine. Then we could perhaps have many millions of twos. I 64 Unit/Baumann: Delimitation. FregeVsBaumann: E.g. if you say the earth has a moon, you do not want to declare it a delimited one, but you rather say it as opposed to what belongs to Venus or Jupiter. I 65 With respect to delimitation and indivisibility, the moons of Jupiter can compete with ours and are just as consistent as our moon in this sense. Unit/Number/Köpp: Unit should not only be undivided, but indivisible!. FregeVsKöpp: this is probably supposed to be a feature that is independent from arbitrariness. But then nothing would remain, which could be counted and thought as a unit! VsVs: then perhaps not indivisibility itself, but the be considering to be indivisible could be established as a feature. FregeVs: 1) Nothing is gained if you think the things different from what they are!. I 66 2) If you do not want to conclude anything from indivisibility, what use is it then? 3) Decomposabiltiy is actually needed quite often: E.g. in the problem: a day has 24 hours, how many hours have three days?. I 69 Unit/Diversity/Number/FregeVsJevons: the emphasis on diversity also only leads to difficulties. E.g. If all units were different, you could not simply add: 1 + 1 + 1 + 1..., but you would always have to write: 1" + 1"" + 1 """ + 1 """", etc. or even a + b + c + d... (although units are meant all the time). Then we have no one anymore!. I 78 ff: ++ Number neither description nor representation, abstraction not a definition - It must not be necessary to define equality for each case. Infinite/Cantor: only the finite numbers should be considered real. Just like negative numbers, fractions, irrational and complex numbers, they are not sense perceptible. FregeVsCantor: we do not need any sensory perceptions as proofs for our theorems. It suffices if they are logically consistent. I 117 - 127 ++ VsHankel: sign (2-3) is not empty, but determinate content! Signs are never a solution! - Zero Class/FregeVsSchröder: (> empty set) false definition of the zero class: there can be no class that is contained in all classes as an element, therefore it cannot be created by definition. (The term is contradictory). IV 14 VsSchröder: you cannot speak of "classes" without already having given a concept. - Zero must not be contained as an element in another class (Patzig, Introduction), but only "subordinate as a class". (+ IV 100/101). II 93 Euclid/FregeVsEuclid: makes use of implied conditions several times, which he states neither under his principles nor under the requirements of the special sentence. E.g. The 19th sentence of the first book of the elements (in each triangle the greater angle is located opposite the larger side) presupposes the following sentences: 1) If a distance is not greater than another, then it is equal to or smaller than the first one. 2) If an angle is equal to another, then it is not greater than the first one. 3) If an angle is less than another, it is not greater than the first one. Waismann II 12 FregeVsPostulates: why is it not also required that a straight line is drawn through three arbitrary points? Because this demand contains a contradiction. Well, then they should proof that those other demands do not contain any contradictions!. Russell: postulates offer the advantages of theft over honest work. Existence equals solvability of equations: the fact that √2 exists means that x² 2 = 0 is solvable. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Waismann I F. Waismann Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996 Waismann II F. Waismann Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976 |
| Various Authors | Wessel Vs Various Authors | I 17 Tolerance Principle/Carnap: ("Die logische Syntax der Sprache", 1934): "We do not want to establish prohibitions, we want to make determinations. Prohibitions can be replaced by a definitory distinction. There is no morality in logic. Everyone may construct his logic, i.e. his linguistic form, as he wants, but if he wants to discuss with us, he must indicate syntactic determinations instead of philosophical discussions." (The principle of tolerance was first formulated by Karl Menger). I 20 WesselVsTolerance Principle: overall we reject it, but we agree with Menger that the concept of constructiveness is unclear. VsMenger: the broadest concept of constructiveness is not the demand for mere consistency! (Wessel like Chr. Thiel). Justification/Logics/Wessel: all attempts at justification here are ultimately circular! Pro Carnap: of course, every Logician and every mathematician has the right to build up arbitrary calculi first, whereby he has to specify the rules correctly. VsCarnap: this does not mean, however, that the possible or existing calculi are equal! That would be a "principle of indifference" . I 136 Def Analytical Implication/Parry/Wessel: (1933): If a formula A analytically implies a formula B, then only those statement variables occur in B that also occur in A. I 137 Axioms: (selection) + A 12. (A ‹-› B) u F(A) -> F[A/B] A 13. F(A) -> (A -> A) Analytical Implication/WesselVsParry: no solution to the problem since > is again an operator and can occur more than once in axioms and Theorems. Pro: here for the first time the idea is expressed that only those variables may occur in the conclusion, which are also contained in the prerequisite. Paradoxes/Implication/Non-Classical Direction/Wessel: Questions: 1. Are there any guarantees that paradoxical formulas are not provable? 2. Are there guarantees that non-paradoxical formulas are not erroneously excluded? 3. Are there criteria to decide whether an arbitrary formula is paradox or not? 4. Is it possible to build a system in which all paradox formulas are not provable, but all non-paradox formulas are provable? I 219 Identity/M.Stirner: "to see the human being in each other and to act against each other as human beings...I see in you the human being as I see in myself the human being and nothing but the human being, so I care for you as I would care for myself...both of us are nothing but mathematical propositions: A = C and B = C therefore A = B, i.e. I nothing but human and you nothing but human: I and you the same". WesselVsStirner, Max: this is the same Logic as in "J.Kaspar (pseudonym of Stirner) is a living being, a donkey is a living being, so J. Kaspar is a donkey". This is the confusion of different Logical forms. ((s) Predication is not a statement of identity: "I am a human being" does not mean "I = human being".) I 314 Euler Diagrams/Borkowski/Lejewski/"ontological table"/Wessel: Extension of Euler diagrams: Inclusion and exclusion of meaning, existence, etc. WesselVsLejewski: his theory is burdened with serious deficiencies. I 315 Term Theory/Wessel: there are unlimited singular terms possible, but each theory gets by with a limited number. WesselVsLejewski: For example, the term "cosmonaut" undergoes a mysterious transformation. first empty term, then singular term, then general term! WesselVs: it is a general term right from the start: the reference has absolutely nothing to do with it. The distinction between empty and non-empty is a completely different classification of terms. This is not a purely Logical task. I 352 Intension/WesselVsStegmüller: the term "content-related" problem only shows that it has not yet been solved on the logical level. StegmüllerVsModal Logic: because modal contexts would have intensional character. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Whitehead, A.N. | Simons Vs Whitehead, A.N. | I 94 Bowman L. Clarke/topology/mereology/Simons: formal objections against his system cannot be put forward. It is based on Whitehead's basic concept of compound, the relata are informally understood space-time regions. I 95 Def connected/connection/Clarke/Whitehead: connected means sharing a point ((s) common point). But the points and all the other borders are no individuals. Limit/Whitehead/Clarke: the limit is no individual. Individuals/Whitehead/Clarke: individuals have no interiors. This leads to a non-classical mereology. Connection/spelling/Clarke: it is written as a small diamond with double tails up and down. Separated/disconnected/external connection/spelling/Clarke: >< y”: x is externally connected with y, = "x touches y". Non-classical mereology/Simons: here o (overlap) and < (part-relation) do not interact in the way as in the classic. Only when an object touches nothing (that means intuitive, if it is open, see above) we can treat its parts as in classical mereology. I 96 "Quasi-topologically"/Clarke: (Because there is no zero element and no boundary elements): e.g. concepts: "interior of x", "closure (completion, final, closure) of x", "outside of x", "x is open", "x is closed". Product: a product of any two open individuals is again open. Axioms: (...) I 97 Bowman L. Clarke: "Just as the linguistic domain of the classical individuals calculus is a complete Boolean algebra without zero-elements, our theorems are a closing-algebra without zero elements and without boundary elements. It is interesting that this much topology can be operated with as minimal assumptions. SimonsVsClarke: the idea of "removing" the boundary elements can be understood in two ways: a) that they "really exist" and we have an artificial limit by that I 98 (This would explain why the mereology is non-classical.) b) that these elements do not exist at all, then we miss the remainder principle (Principle Remainder, RP, see above). If we remove the interior (of a non-open individual), nothing will change! In fact, nothing is left. Closure/SimonsVsClarke: if we take any individual, its interior is a real part of its closure but there is no real part of its closure that is separate from the inside. So we have not even the weak supplement principle. We should therefore think that there are two types of individuals: a) "weak" (open) that do not touch anything and b) "strong" that are in contact with something. Nevertheless, we must not believe that there are any individuals who reconcile the difference again. We can distinguish individuals who differ only in one point but cannot determine the point. SimonsVs: this is not satisfactory. Nevertheless, if we want to perform topology without points and other limits, it is difficult to see how we can solve the problem. Solution/Simons: a philosophical approach must be more complex and allow vague approximations of sharp boundaries (> Menger, 1940, 107). |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Wittgenstein | Millikan Vs Wittgenstein | I 221 not/"not"/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: thesis: "not" is an operator which operates on the rest of the sentence by changing the meaning of the entire sentence. (s)VsWittgenstein/(s)VsMIllikan: Problem: a) "no" does not belong to the sentence, then it can be applied on the whole sentence "The sun is shining". Wittgenstein: "no" changes the meaning of the sentence, to which it belongs. b) it is part of the sentence, then it would have to be applied twice, the second time on itself. It only changes the meaning, if it is not part of the sentence. Projection theory/image theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: then the sentence stands for something that does not exist. Problem/Millikan: this leads to a reification of possibilities. negative sentence/negation/existence/Millikan: negative sentences can not have non-existent facts as real value. Justification: negative facts have no causal powers that could play a role in a normal explanation. negative sentence/Millikan: we could assume that negative sentences are not representations. Ex "not-p" is to say "the fact that p does not exist". Wittgenstein has understood it roughly in that way. Pointe: above we said that existence Theorems are not representations. projection theory/image theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: but he does not think that sentences of the form "x does not exist" represent a non-existent fact. Then the variable "X" in "x does not exist" is not about names of individual things (objects, elementary objects) but about representations of possible states (possible facts). Sense/non-existence/negation/Wittgenstein/Millikan: so it was possible for him to maintain that sentences of the form "x does not exist" have a meaning. ((s) > Meinong). Millikan: in our terminology that is, they are representations (MillikanVs). I 222 And at the same time he could argue that the most basic elements of all propositions correspond to real objects. Pointe: this made it possible that he could say "x does not exist" is always equivalent to a sentence of the form "not-p". Millikan: couldn't we keep up at least one half of this equivalence? From "non-p" to "that p does not exist"? MillikanVsWittgenstein: no, not even that we can. When Wittgenstein was right and "not-p" says "that p does not exist", then that would mean for my position that negative sentences dont project world states and aren't representations. Millikan: instead they would project linguistic facts, "not-p" would be an icon, but it does not represent, even though a world state would have the sentence type "p" as a variant. Proto reference/Millikan. "P" would not be an underrepresented reference of "not-p" but a proto reference .Question: would "not-p" be an icon of "p is false"? Vs: then "not" would no longer be an operator! Not/negation/operator/Wittgenstein/Millikan: that is, the projection rule for "not-p" is a function of the projection rule for "p". 1. If "no" would not be an operator, it could happen that someone does not understand the meaning of "p", but still the meaning of "not-p". Absurd. 2. if "not-p" says "that p does not exist", "not-p" would also have to be true if any version of "p" is not completely determined, has no custom meaning. Ex "Pegasus was not a winged horse" Ex "The present king of France is not bald" were true statements! 3. sure, ""p" is wrong" at least reflects (icons) that "p" has no real value. Accordingly: "x does not exist" then reflects the fact that "x" has no reference. Pointe: if "not-p" says "that p" does not exist, it still projects a negative fact. negative fact/Millikan: we should be able to show that a negative fact is still something else than the non-existence of a positive fact. But we can not. We have just moved in circles. non-existent fact/Millikan: can not be a matter of an icon and not the object of a representation. negative fact/Millikan: would have to be something other than a non-existent fact. Pointe: but if we can show that, we don't need to assume any longer that "not-p" says "that p does not exist". negative sentence/projection/fact/negation/Millikan: what I have to claim is that negative sentences depict real or existing world states (facts). It is well known how such a thing is done: Negation/solution: one simply says that the negation is applied only to the Logical predicate of the sentence ((S) internal negation). Here, the meaning of the predicate is changed so that the predicate applies to the opposite (depicts) as of what it normally does. I 223 This can then be extended to more complex sentences with external negation: Ex "No A is " becomes "Every A is non-". MilllikanVs: the difficulties with this approach are also well known: 1. Problem: how can the function of "not" be interpreted in very simple sentences of the form "X is not" Ex "Pegasus is not (pause)". Here, "not" can be interpreted as operating through predicates! Sentences of the form "X is not" are of course equivalent to sentences of the form "x does not exist." Problem: we have said that "existing" is no representation. So "not" can not be interpreted as always operating on a predicate of a representative sentence. Ex "Cicero is not Brutus" can not operate on a Logical predicate of the sentence, because simple identity sentences have no Logical predicate. So "not" must have still other functions. Problem: how do these different functions relate to each other? Because we should assume that "not" does not have different meanings in different contexts. meaningless/meaningless sentences/negation/projection/Millikan: here there is the same problem: Ex "Gold is not square". The sentence does not become true just because gold would have another form than to be a square. Problem: the corresponding affirmative sentences have no sense! Yet Ex "Gold is not square" seems to say something real. Problem: in turn: if "not" has a different function here than in representing sentences, we still need to explain this function. 2. Problem: (Important): the projective rules between simple sentences of the form "X is not " and its real value. real value/negation/Millikan: is the real value of a negative sentence the world state? Ex The fact of John's not-being-tall? Or a precise fact as Johns being-exactly-180cm? I 224 Millikan: the latter is correct. Representation/negation/Millikan: thesis: negative representations have an undefined sense. ((S) But Millikan admits that negations are representations, unlike identity sentences and existence sentences). Millikan: as in vague denotations, real values are determined if they occur in true sentences, but they must not be identified by the hearer to meet their intrinsic function. Opposite/negative sentence/representation/Millikan: thesis: negative sentences whose opposites are normal representative sentences must project positive facts themselves. I 229 "not"/negation/negative sentence/representation/SaD/Millikan: thesis: the law of the excluded third is inapplicable for simple representative negative sentences. Ex additionsally to the possibility that a predicate and its opposite are true, there is the possibility that the subject of the sentence does not exist. And that's just the way that the sentence has no particular Fregean sense. "P or not-p": only makes sense if "p" has a sense. Negation: their function is never (in the context of representative sentences) to show that the sentence would not make sense. sense/Millikan: one can not know a priori if a sentence makes sense. Negation/representation/Wittgenstein/MillikanVsWittgenstein: his mistake (in the Tractatus) was to believe that if everyone sees that "x" in "x does not exist" has a meaning that the negative sentence is then a negative representation. Rationalism/Millikan: the rationalist belief that one could know a priori the difference between sense and non-sense. I 303 Sensation Language/sensation/private language/Wittgenstein/MillikanVsWittgenstein/Millikan: the problem is not quite what Wittgenstein meant. It is not impossible to develop a private language, but one can not develop languages that speak only of what can be seen only once and from a single point of view. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Carnap-Sentence | Carnap, R. | Schurz I 214 Carnap - sentence / CS / Carnap / Schurz: C (T): R (T)> T - ((s) if the Ramsey sentence is true, the theory follows from it.) - Hence, the thesis that the meaning the theoretical terms is determined by the theory itself, is brought to their logical concept - RS / CS: the conjunction of the two is L-equivalent to the theory itself - the CS-L does not imply a non-tautological empirical claim - therefore it is analytical - CS: only provides a characterization of meaning for all th.t. together - not individual - but the division analytic / synthetic is still not working for individual axioms or theorems - I 216 Carnap-sentence says that the meaning of the theoretical terms is to denote the entities that meet the claims of the theory. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Ramsey-Sentence | Ramsey, F. | Schurz I 214 Carnap - sentence / CS / Carnap / Schurz: C (T): R (T)> T - ((s) if the Ramsey sentence is true, the theory follows from it - hence, the thesis, as the meaning of the theoretical terms is determined by the theory itself, brought to its logical concept - Ramsey-Sentence / CS: the conjunction of the two is L-equivalent to the theory itself - the CS-L does not imply a non-tautological empirical claim - therefore it is analytical - CS: provides only one meaning-characterization for all th.t. together - not individual - the division analytic / synthetic still does not work for individual axioms or theorems - I 216 Carnap-sentence says that the meaning of the th. t. is to describe the entities, which satisfy the claims of the theory. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
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