Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Empiricism | Quine Vs Empiricism | IV 397 British Empiricism: based on ideas in the mind. These are of course not intersubjectively observable. That means the foundation is private, not public. QuineVsBritish Empiricism: VsMentalistic approach: in the Quine's eyes not consistent. One should stick to what openly observed is true to anyone. Language is nothing private, but something social. IV 398 The language: a social skill that is acquired through the observation of the social use. The externalization of empiricism leads to behavioral access to meaning. (Behaviorism). IV 402 QuineVsBritish Empiricism: Is based on the assumption of ideas (derived from Locke). Uncritical mentalism. Too simple picture of the experiential reference of languages and theories. VI 11 "Linguistic Turn"/Quine: that was good, but not good enough: the distinction between observation sentences and theoretical propositions was only made derivatively, no theoretical terms should appear. Therefore Reichenbach used "bridge sentences" to connect the two sentence types. (VsBritish Empiricism). Observation/Quine: we do not start with objects (we eliminate them), but with sentences! This allows us to define the observation sentence, without bothering about whether it is theory-free or not! We also no longer need to decide which objects the words should designate! (Without reification). Instead of objects stimulus meaning: the willingness to agree to a sentence. VI 11/12 Singular Term/Singular Terms/Ontology/Existence/Quine: if we had assumed terms instead of sentences, we would have skipped the whole issue of objectification and always conceded object-relation from the hollow gut. Meaning Theory/M.Th./Quine: must be empirical. QuineVsLogical Empiricism: neither the analytical truths nor the observation base resists the skeptical attack. V 189 Theory/Ontology/Quine: how should a scientific theory look like at best? We want as many as possible and good predictions. Guiding principles: simplicity and conservatism. V 190 Both are in a dialectical relation! (To use an expression by my students). An strong oversimplification can justify a relatively large deviation. Between the two, we need a compromise. Conservatism/Quine: among other things, caused by our lack of imagination. But also prudence when it comes to hypotheses. Simplicity/Conservativeness: both are already at work in language learning. Language Learning/Quine: occurs in leaps and bounds. Is always based on similarities and analogies. V 191 Short steps are conservative. They are guided by relative empiricism. Def Relative Empiricism/Quine: do not stray further from sense data than necessary. Quine pro: That keeps theory changes low. QuineVsRadical Empiricism: we gave it up when we gave up hope to reduce talk of objects to talk of sense data. Important argument: that requires us to stick with the substitutional quantification over abstract objects. This speaks to the nominalistic mind. It manifests itself in relative empiricism, for both are the same. Nominalism: must not overestimate the ontological harmlessness of the variables of sQ. In general, we can say the values of variables determine the whole ontology if we only have object variables, truth functions and predicates. Stalnaker I 3 QuineVsEmpiricism/Two Dogmas/Stalnaker: when it comes to accepting or not accepting a whole language, along with a theory that is formulated in this language, then it is not certain that there is a base for a distinction which are the language rules (rules), and what are the judgments about the world. There is no theory-neutral way to separate factual questions from semantic ones. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| abstracta | Reichenbach, H. | Rorty VI 173 Reichenbach: the existence of abstractions can be reduced to the existence of concrete objects. Reason: conclusions about abstractions are no probability deductions, but analogies. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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