Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Behaviorism | Fodor Vs Behaviorism | Danto I 268 Rotary FiguresVsBehaviorism > Mental Representation (inner r) VsIntrospection (ChomskyVsBehaviorism), FodorVsBehaviorism. Fodor/Lepore IV 56 VsBehaviorism/Fodor/Lepore: E.g. assuming "dog" and "shmog" are two words with which speakers react to exactly the same stimuli, namely dogs. Then for e.g. Skinner would follow that "dog" and "shmog" are synonymous. Then, the following sentence would be analytical in the language of the speaker: "Whatever is a dog, is a shmog." QuineVs: there are neither synonyms nor analytic sentences! IV 57 So Skinner’s semantics must be wrong. VsVs: it is namely a priori! Even worse: all the semantics must be wrong, a priori, because this nihilistic theory will say that there are no semantic properties at all. fodor/Lepore: what went wrong this time? We have taken literally, that Quine has not shown in Two Dogmas (TD) (and also has not argued) that there are no semantic facts and no analytic truths. Meaning/fodor/Lepore: what we rather concede is that if meaning is to have any sense at all, then it cannot be reconstructed by reference to the sentences to which the speaker agrees. Meaning/Two Dogmas/TD/Quine: meaning cannot be reduced to the inferences to which one is willing to agree. Reason: what inferences you agree to only depends on how you see the world, i.e. what you intend your words to mean. ((s)> interest, intention, meaning). Important argument: it is impossible to detect which of his/her views the speaker accepts a priori! So there are no analytic sentences. IV 195 Qualia/quality/sensation/exchanged spectra/Fodor/Lepore: it is conceptually possible that while you see something red, I see something green. If the exchange is systematic, there is nothing in the behavior that could uncover it. VsBehaviorism/VsFunctionalism: the reversed spectra thus seem to indicate that behaviorism is wrong (and also functionalism: Block/Fodor, Shoemaker). You might think that a theory of qualitative content could solve the problem. But it is precisely the qualitative content that has been exchanged. And it is precisely the concept of the perceptual identity that becomes ambiguous because of that. VsChurchland: his approach does not help at all. The labels of the dots on the dice could be exactly reversed. ((s) You could always describe them without knowing what feelings are present in the other.) |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Blanshard, B. | Harman Vs Blanshard, B. | Fodor/Lepore IV 167 Twin Earth/Block: (Fodor/Lepore: extremely controversial) assumes that for twins the same intentional psychological explanations apply, not only the same neurological ones. (>Position). Conceptual Role Theory/Block: its advantage is that it allows such an explanation. IV 168 By pleading in favor of the narrow content, Block is moving in the direction of "individualism". Lit.: (>fodor: "A modal argument for narrow content"). HarmanVsBlock: Harman: "Wide functionalism": here, the wide content is analyzed in terms of conceptual role. |
Harman I G. Harman Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995 Harman II Gilbert Harman "Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Block, Ned | Schiffer Vs Block, Ned | I 40 Psychofunctionalism/Block: (naming by Block 1980a): is supposed to be a scientific cognitive psychological theory (BlockVsFolk psychology. SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism/SchifferVsBlock: 1. If there is such a scientific theory that identifies each belief characteristic of a functional property, then this theory is neither known nor formulated yet devised. So Block has to say that there must be a theory Ts that nobody ever thought of so that Bel = BelTs. This theory could not define belief, but discover its reference. The idea would be: Def belief that p/Ts: be a token of the Z-type, having the Ts correlated functional role of BelTs.(p). I.e. the role that will be indexed by (the proposition) p in Ts. Schiffer: this would be a necessary truth, but one that would be only a postieriori knowable after the theory Ts would be brought up. SchifferVsBlock: why on earth must the reference or extension of a belief E.g. that bugs are mortal, be revealed by a theory that no one knows? VsSchiffer: one could argue, in the same way, E.g. as it was eventually discovered that dogs have this and that genotype (set of genes). ((s) meaning empirically) SchifferVsVs: 1. scientists cannot discover this! Science/Philosophy/Schiffer: thesis: Scientists cannot discover that to be a dog = to be from a particular genotype (set of genes). Science: might only determine all phenotypic (appearancewise) and behavioral features of the past, present and future, with which we identify dogs, but to derive a property-identity with the genotype from this, we need a philosophical theory that a) contains a completion from to be a dog = to be from this and that genotype, if... and b) contains in connection with the scientific discovery that I 41 to be a dog = to be from this and that genotype. ((s) no additional condition). SchifferVsBlock/SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: if there were a philosophical theory of this strength, it is unknown to me. It could take the form of a meaning theory for "dog". Problem: the theories that have been developed by Kripke/Putnam for natural-.species terms, are unsuitable for belief predicates. SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: has no more credibility than the credibility that there is a correct semantic theory of belief predicates that contains, along with a scientific psychological theory Ts Bel = BelTs. Problem: There is not the slightest reason to assume that such a semantic theory for belief predicates exists. 2. VsBlock: that a psychological theory can determine the extension for "believes", it has to be able to use the word! Problem: it is unlikely that the ultimately correct cognitive theory will work with folk psychological concepts! ((s) But it must be translatable into everyday language (> universalism of everyday language). The functional architecture may simply be too rich and fine. (Churchland 1981, Stich 1983, Dennett 1986). SchifferVsUniversalism of everyday language: the everyday language concepts may be too blunt. Some authors/Schiffer: might be inclined to say: "then there is just nothing, which corresponds to belief." SchifferVs: it misses the ultimate in our everyday language psychological terms. (see below 6.4). I 42 3. SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: even if a scientific theory on functional states of belief has to quantify, we have to probably not construct it as a relation to propositions. Psychology / Schiffer: a scientific psychological theory (cognitive) is quantifying over functions of external indices for functional roles on internal physical states, external indices: do not have to be propositions but can also be phrases or formulas. Even uninterpreted formulas! (see below) 1. Thesis: if propositions are good indices for a functional theory, then phrases or interpreted formulas of a formal language could be it just as well. (Field, 1978, Loar 1981). 2. content/cognitive psychology/attribution/belief/Schiffer: the psychological theory probably needs nothing more than uninterpreted formulas, not even sentences (not propositions anyway). ((s) belief or belief attribution could be explained scientifically without the use of content). Psychology/belief/Field: (1978, 102): if psychology describes the laws that lead from input to belief and from belief to action, then semantic characterizations of belief are superfluous. (see also Field 1986b, fodor 1980, Loar 1981, Schiffer 1981a, Stich 1983). I 44 4. SchifferVsBlock/SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: it is absurd to assume that there is a single theory about beliefs and desires that is weak enough that is applicable to all kinds of believers, and at the same time strong enough to establish a functional property for each belief. Such a theory would have to uniformly explain the belief settings of such diverse people as normal adults, children, natives and disabled. Problem: for this a necessary condition to believe something would be needed ((s) stronger/weaker/(s): strong theory: defines details. Weak: is applicable to many). 5. SchifferVsBlock/SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: E.g. Twin earth, E.g. Arthritis: to explain these cases we need a sufficient condition to believe something. Twin Earth/TE/Arthritis/Schiffer: we need sufficient conditions for belief, so that the Ts-correlated functional roles are held by Ralph but not by Twin Earth Ralph and by Alfred in w but not in w’ where the use of "arthritis" is correct. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Burge, T. | Stalnaker Vs Burge, T. | II 171 Positive assertion/VsExternalism/VsBurge/VsAnti-Individualism/Stalnaker: how can you define an individualistic analogous to a relational term? II 187 Negative approach/Revisionism/VsExternalism/VsAnti-Individualism/VsBurge/Individualism/Stalnaker: the negative approach has different descriptions: (>terminology): methodological solipsism: Putnam 1975, fodor 1981a Individualism: Burge, also fodor 1987 Principle of autonomy: Stich 1983. Thesis: all states and properties that are attributed and described in psychology should be intrinsic states. Behavior explanation: should only deal with properties that are relevant to the causal powers of the subjects. Indistinguishability/theory: things that are indistinguishable in terms of causal powers should not be included in the explanation. II 188 Def Individualism/Fodor: is the thesis that psychological states in terms of their causal powers are individuated. Science/fodor: it is a scientific principle that in a taxonomy individuals are individuated because of their causal powers. This can be justified a priori metaphysically. Important argument: thus it is then not excluded that mental states are individuated because of relational properties. Relational properties/fodor: are taxonomical when they consider causal powers. E.g. "to be a planet" is relational par excellence StalnakerVsFodor: a) stronger: to individuate a thing by causal powers b) weaker: to individuate the thing by something that considers the causal powers. But the facts of the environment do not constitute the causal forces. Therefore fodor represents only the weaker thesis. Burge/Stalnaker: represents the stronger thesis. StalnakerVsfodor: his defense of the negative approach of revisionism (fodorVsExternalism) builds on a mixture of strong with the weak thesis. Stalnaker: to eliminate that psychological states are individuated by normal wide content, you need a stronger thesis. But the defense of individualism often only goes against the weaker thesis. Example fodor: Individualism/fodor/Stalnaker: fodor defends his version of individualism with the example of a causally irrelevant relational property: E.g. h-particle: we call a particle when a coin lands with the head up, II 189 t-particle: we call this the same particle if the coin shows the tail. fodor: no reasonable theory will use this differentiation to explain the particle's behavior. StalnakerVsfodor: But from this it does not follow that psychological states have to be purely internal (intrinsic). II 193 Mental state/psychological/internal/head/StalnakerVsBurge: e.g. O’Leary believes that there is water in the basement. Is this state in his head? Of course! ((s) Against: Putnam: refers to the meaning of words such as basements and water). Stalnaker: and in the sense like a mosquito bite on his nose is on his nose. II 194 Narrow content/Stalnaker: is accepted as what is completely internal. Psychology: various authors: say that narrow content is necessary for every psychological explanation. They agree with Burge that normal content is often not narrow. Anti-Individualism/Burge/StalnakerVsBurge: seems to conflict with the everyday understanding that I, when I instead of talking about the world talk about how me things appear that I am then talking about myself. Narrow content/StalnakerVsBurge: it is less clear than it seems what narrow content is at all and II 195 I believed that there is such a great conflict between the individualist and anti-individualist. Narrow content/Stalnaker: 1. in which sense is narrow content at all narrow and in which sense is it in the mind purely internal? 2. Which role shall narrow content play at the explanation of mental phenomena? How is the ascription of narrow content referred to the one of wide content? 3. Do we need narrow content at all for the behavior explanation? Or rather the access that we have to the content of our own thoughts? |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Charity Principle | Fodor Vs Charity Principle | IV 93 Principle of Charity/PoC/Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: the principle of charity does not play a significant role! It might be useful for the attribution of intentional contents, but in any case not for physicalistic attributions. Therefore, Davidson also denies that there are laws of action, or of psychophysical attribution. fodor/Lepore: we believe the following is true: if one is willing to infer from "L speakers hold S to be true in circumstances C" to "S is true in L if C", then you cannot coherently deny that if an L speaker utters S in C, then what he/she says is true. |
Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor IV Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Oxford GB/Cambridge USA 1992 |
| Churchland, P. | Fodor Vs Churchland, P. | IV 189 Mind/brain/Churchland: thesis: the brain represents different aspects of reality through a position in an appropriate state space. IV 191 FodorVsChurchland/LeporeVsChuchland: Churchland also seems to be guilty of the illusion, that there could ultimately be something empirical, so that conceptual relations could in the end be reduced to relations between observation concepts. Churchland: semantic identity goes back to the special place in the network of semantically relevant sentences (and that is of the whole language). Translation: therefore, we can speak of the equality of sentences across languages! IV 192 Equivalent expressions occupy the same (corresponding) places in the corresponding network of the other language. Nevertheless, translation should always take observability into account. IV 193 Churchland/Fodor/Lepore: Churchland surprisingly begins with feelings, not with intentionality (e.g. with propositional attitudes or concepts). Thesis: if we had adequate access to feelings, it could be generalized to a general mental representation. Churchland: the qualitative nature of our sensations is generally considered as inaccessible for the neurobiological reduction. But even so, we find that a determined attempt to find an order here revealed a sizable chunk of expressible information, e.g. color cubes with frequencies. IV 194 Fodor/Lepore: Churchland actually assumes that this is an access to the sensations (through frequencies!), not only to the discrimination ability of the nervous system. Churchland: thus, the inexpressible can be expressed! The "unspeakable rose" can be grasped by indication of the frequency. This is perhaps a way to replace everyday language. IV 195 Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: how plausible is this story in terms of sensations? Does it provide a robust notion of equality in general? Qualia/quality/sensation/exchanged spectra/fodor/Lepore: it is conceptually possible that while you see something red, I see something green. If the exchange is systematic, there is nothing in the behavior that could uncover it. VsBehaviorism/VsFunctionalism: the exchanged spectra thus seem to indicate that behaviorism is wrong and functionalism, too (Block/fodor, Shoemaker). One might think that a theory of qualitative content could solve the problem. But it is precisely the qualitative content that has been exchanged. And it is precisely the concept of the perceptual identity that becomes ambiguous because of that. VsChurchland: Churchland's approach does not help at all. The labels of the dots on the dice could be exactly reversed. IV 196 Why should a semantic space not be put beside it and the condition added that the dimensions of the semantic space must be semantic? They must designate content states through their contents. E.g. Perhaps we could then identify uncle, aunt, President, Cleopatra, etc. along these dimensions? IV 197 E.g. Cleopatra as a politician is closer to the president in terms of marriageability. fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: that is what we are really interested in: a robust theory of the equality of content rather than identity of content that has been lost with the analytic/synthetic distinction. Problem: equality presupposes identity and a corresponding theory. >State semantics: deals with the question of how the identity of the state spaces is fixed. IV 200 Representation/neurophysiological/mind/brain/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: colors are not represented as frequencies. IV 201 Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: two different interpretations of his diagrams would also interpret neighborhoods very differently. --- Metzinger II 466 "Eliminative Materialism"/Churchland: eliminative materialism means two things: 1) Materialism is most probably true. 2) Many traditional explanations of human behavior are not suitable for understanding the real causes. II 467 "Request"/"conviction"/Churchland: Paul and Patricia Churchland: we will probably have to drop these "categories" (FodorVsChurchland, SearleVsChurchland). |
Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 |
| Collins, A.W. | Fodor Vs Collins, A.W. | Cresswell II 157 Sentence/reason/mental object/Collins/Cresswell: (Collins 1979, 225f) thesis: sentences are mental particulars ((s) VsCompositionality). Problem: but everything that can have a truth value (true value) must be a universal. Mental Events/Collins: here we need temporality. Truth/Collins: the carriers of truth and falsehood need propositionality instead of temporality (CollinsVsfodor). Cresswell: this corresponds to Frege’s distinction between idea and thought. fodorVsCollins: Collins is right, but if we believe something, then there is a representation in us that has semantic properties. CresswellVsfodor: fodor makes use of a confusion of object and content. Belief/relation theory/fodor/Cresswell: his proof that belief is relational (1981, 178-181) is in fact a proof that "believes" relates a person with a content (not an object). Belief Object/fodor/Cresswell: fodor also has other arguments for belief objects. Object/content/Cresswell: I just want to say that once this distinction has been made, it does not answer the question what the "content" is that objects are described (order/distinction: if A and B are different, a description of A does not help to understand B). II 159 Belief/Collins: (1979, 420): thesis: a belief can be no internal state, because if I want to find out if I believe p, this is indistinguishable from the procedure that I would use to determine p and different from the procedure I would use if I’m in a particular internal state or not. Semantics/stages/McGinn/Cresswell: McGinn (1982) thesis: semantics has several stages. Lately, this thesis has found several followers. Cresswell: this certainly involves a distinction between the object and content. Because then it is about two things: the explanation of truth conditions and the explanation of the role of linguistic thinking in our mental life. |
Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor IV Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Oxford GB/Cambridge USA 1992 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Compositionality | Fodor Vs Compositionality | IV 64/65 Truth Conditions/tr.cond./holism/Fodor/Lepore: (Fodor/LeporeVsCompositionality as a solution:) "Snow is white", has the truth condition it has, because it belongs to a language that contains "This is snow" and "This is snow", and an indefinite number of other sentences with "is white" and "snow". Semantic Holism/SH: Now, of course, it would be a good argument for semantic holism if only compositionality were really necessary to exclude sentences such as W. Problem: if it is really only because of the structural similarity between "snow is white" and "This is snow" that the former means that snow is white (and not that grass is green), then it would look like an a priori argument against the possibility of non-compositional language, i.e. the expressions of such a language could not have truth conditions! But: Non-Compositional Language/non-recursive/recursive/fodor/Lepore: e.g. suppose a child has mastered the entire non-recursive apparatus of German. It can say things like: "It’s raining, snow is white, grass is green, that’s snow, that is frozen, everybody hates me, I hate spinach etc.", but not: "Snow is white and grass is green" or "Everyone hates frozen spinach", etc. We assume that the dispositions of the child towards the sentences that it has mastered are exactly the same as those of a normal adult who uses these sentences. It is very plausible that this child, when it says "snow is white", it actually says that snow is white. So far, the compositionality principle of holism is not in danger if we assume that the child has "snow is white" and "this is snow" in its repertoire (idiolect). IV 66 E.g. suppose a second child who uses the unstructured expression "Alfred" instead of "Snow is white". For "This is snow": "Sam", and for "This is cold": "Mary". 1st child: infers from "this is snow" to "this is cold" 2nd child: infers from "Sam" to "Mary". We assume that the translated verbalizations of child two do not differ from the verbalizations of child 1. Nevertheless, if compositionality were a necessary condition for content, then there would be an a priori argument that child 2 could not mean anything specific with his/her statements. Meaning/Vs: what someone means with their statements depends on their intentions! ((s) and not on the sound clusters.) Which a priori argument could show that the child could not make its statement "Sam" with the intention to express that snow is cold? T-sentence: perhaps the T-sentence: "Alfred" is true iff. snow is white is to be preferred over the T-sentence "Alfred" is true iff. grass is green. Important argument: but this cannot be a consequence of the compositional structure of "Alfred", because it has none. It can also be doubted that compositionality is sufficient for the solution of the extensionality problem: IV 178 QuineVsKant/QuineVsAnalyticity/QuineVsCompositionality of Inference: (external): it must be possible for inferences to turn out to be wrong. IV 178/179 VsFodor/Lepore: then one might do with a reformulated CRT (conceptual role theory): the compositional meaning, but not the inferential role is compositional, only within analytical conclusions? fodor/LeporeVsVs: there is a risk of circularity: if you assume analyticity at all, compositionality, analyticity and meaning spend their lives doing the work of the others. Quine would say: "I told you!" Inferential Role/fodor/Lepore: the present proposal also threatens their naturalisability ((s) that they are ultimately explained in physiological categories): originally, their attractiveness was to provide a causal role as a basis for the solution of Brentano’s problem of irreducibility to the neurophysiological (>Computation). |
Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor IV Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Oxford GB/Cambridge USA 1992 |
| Conceptual Role | Fodor Vs Conceptual Role | IV 163 Conceptual Role/CRT/Block/Fodor/Lepore: "conceptual role theory" or theory of the conceptual role, semantics of conceptual role. Thesis: the meaning of an expression is its semantic role (or inferential role). Block: believes that one version of this theory is true, but does not want to decide which one. Anyway, it is, according to Block, the only one that fulfills the conditions of the cognitive sciences. fodor/LeporeVsBlock: Block's arguments for the conceptual role theory are not the decisive ones. But this does not lead to semantic holism anyway. It would have to be asserted together with the distinction analytic/synthetic. fodor/LeporeVsBlock: perhaps the psychology, which Block has in mind, needs these conditions, but we do not believe that a version of the conceptual role theory fulfills them. IV 166 Fodor/Lepore/GriceVsBlock: ad 6.: (autonomous/inherited meaning) each Gricean semantics can tell the same story as Block: namely, that the meanings of sentences in a natural language depend on contents of propositional attitudes expressed by these sentences (propositional attitudes may be, for example, the communicative intentions). Grice: thesis: meanings are derived from the content of propositional attitudes (e.g. communicative intentions, >Position). IV 169 Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: 1) Now it becomes obvious: distinctions between inferential roles only solve Frege’s problem if there is an adequate principle of individuation for them. But there is no criterion for that! Block also names this as the main problem. So it is not easier to distinguish between the inferiential roles than between meanings. Twin Earth/TE/CRT/Block/fodor/Lepore: problems with the Twin Earth are going in the a different direction than Frege’s problems (intention/extension). Frege: needs more finely grained concepts than extensions. Putnam: needs less finely grained concepts than extensional equivalence. (Eng) Synonymous expressions must be treated as extensionally different (water/twin earth water). Therefore, a common theoretical approach (CRT - conceptual role theory) is unlikely to work. Solution/Block: "two factors" version of the CRT. The two are orthogonal to each other: a) actual CRT: covers the meaning aspect of Frege IV 170 b) independent, perhaps causal theory of reference: (twin earth/water/twin earth water). fodor/LeporeVsBlock: that has almost nothing to do with conceptual role theory. But also neither a) (meaning) nor b) (causality) are available. But let’s assume it anyway: E.g. suppose distinction meaning/reference: with "two factor" theory: we do have enough discrimination capability, but we pay a high price for it: Question: what actually holds the two factors together? IV 171 Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: precisely in the case of the twin earth, the conceptual role cannot determine the reference! Conceptual Role/Block: seems to be saying that it is indeed not the conceptual role of water that determines what it refers to, but the conceptual role of names! Their reference is causally determined, after all, according to Kripke. Conceptual Role/(s): difference: a) conceptual role of a particular concept, e.g. water. b) a word class, e.g. names. fodor/LeporeVsBlock: but that does not solve the problem! We need something that prevents the confusion of extension and intension. What is it that excludes an expression like (see above) "prime/moisture"? Block: T is not a species concept if the causal theory of species concepts is not true of it. fodor/LeporeVsBlock: that does precisely not prevent "water" from having the extension of a species concept, while having the logic of a numerical concept. Mention/use/fodor/LeporeVsBlock: Block seems to be guilty of this confusion here: the problem here is how the meaning of an expression is related to the denotation if the intension does not determine the extension. Block only tells us that the concpet T, etc. falls under the extension of expressions such as "name", "species concept" if a certain semantic theory is true. This tells us how the inferential roles of "name", "species concept", etc. are related to their extensions. For those it proposes a kind of description theory: E.g. "name" is applied to "Moses", iff "Moses" has the semantic properties which the causal theory defines for names. IV 172 Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: but it does not tell us how the meaning of "Moses" defines its extension! And that is exactly the problem that the "two-factor" theory raises. Narrow content/fodor/LeporeVsBlock: the idea that narrow meanings are conceptual roles sheds no light on the distinction meaning/reference. A semantic theory should not only be able to ascertain the identity of meaning, but also provide a canonical form that can answer the questions about the meaning of expressions. If the latter succeeds, it is not entirely clear whether the first must succeed as well. Narrow content/categories/twin earth/fodor/LeporeVsBlock: problem: how to express narrow contents. |
Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Davidson, D. | Fodor Vs Davidson, D. | IV 68 Problem: the logical apparatus which the meta-language needs to produce correct T-sentences automatically also produces an indefinite number of incorrect T-sentences. fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: currently, there are no suggestions as to what a theory-neutral concept of canonical derivation should look like! IV 69 Therefore, no one knows what to consider a canonical derivation if the syntax varies from truth theory to truth theory. "Canonical Axiom"/fodor/Lepore: such a thing would certainly not make sense: also the issue of the attached logical truth would immediately identify this axiom as well. Q: does not depend on the logical truth being attached behind, i.e. to the right side. QuineVsDavidson: Davidson shows that it can also be smuggled in earlier: e.g. (x)(x satisfies "is white" iff. x is white and LT). This could be taken as an axiom, then the derivative of Q would be a "canonical proof". This shows once again that compositionality is not a sufficient condition to exclude the extensionality problem. E.g. assuming the difficulties had been solved so far, then we would have an argument that a truth theory (WT), which includes W and WT, which includes T can be distinguished then (and perhaps only then) if the language L includes sentences with "snow", "white", "grass", and "green" in structures with demonstratives. That seems to be a holistic consequence. Vs: but that is premature. Language/radical interpretation/RI/Davidson/Quine: thesis: nothing can ever be a language if it is not accessible to radical interpretation! I.e. it must be possible to find out a correct truth theory (WT) by that evidence which observation allows. fodor/LeporeVsQuine/fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: it is not reasonable to establish this principle: on the contrary, if radical interpretation is understood like this, it is conceivable that a perfectly kosher language like English is not a language at all! Then there are two possible ways to justify equating the evidence for the selection of a truth theory with proof about the speaker behavior: 1) that the child and the field linguist are successful with it. A fortiori it must be possible. IV 74 Vs: but this is deceptive. There is no reason to assume that the choice of a truth theory is determined only by the available behavioral observation, along with something like a canon. Linguistics/fodor/Lepore: the real linguistics always tries to exploit something like the intuitions of its informants, it is therefore not in the epistemic situation of the radical interpretation. It has a background of very powerful theoretical assumptions. From the perspective of the radical interpretation, this background is circular: the evidence of the acceptance of these assumptions (background) is the current success of the linguist (> hermeneutic circle). These include assumptions about cognitive psychology, universals, etc. IV 84 Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: Davidson's idea that T-sentences themselves could be laws is not plausible. Even if they were, there would be no guaranteed inference from the lawlikeness of the T-sentences to the content holism. W-sentences are not laws. How could they be, given the conventionality of language! IV 98 "Sam believes that snow is white" is true iff. Sam believes that snow is F. Principle of Charity/fodor/LeporeVsPoC/fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: the principle of charity does not help here at all! If we interpret Sam as believing that snow is white, and believing that snow is F, both makes Sams belief true! IV 100 Principle of Charity/radical interpretation/RI/Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: we have only seen one case where the principle of charity could be applied to the radical interpretation: if there are expressions that: 1) do not occur in token reflexive expressions, 2) are syntactically atomistic. The interpretation of such expressions cannot be fixed by their behavior in token reflexive expressions, it cannot be recovered by the compositionality of the interpretations of its parts. IV 101 We do not know whether such forms exist, e.g. maybe "proton". In such cases, the principle of charity would be un-eliminable. > Behavior/wish IV 120ff. |
Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor IV Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Oxford GB/Cambridge USA 1992 |
| Davidson, D. | Verschiedene Vs Davidson, D. | Davidson I 114 SchulteVsDavidson: the downside of the "literal" concept of meaning, which he considered to be solely accessible to theory, is that many interesting phenomena are thrown to rubbish, at least as theoretically not comprehensible. II 70 VsDavidson: (Rüdiger Bittner): From the fact that beliefs can be determined only in patterns does not follow a reasonableness of meaners (to mean). It follows only that pollsters must proceed in this way. GlüerVsBittner: to accuse Davidson of "unfathomable verificationism" seems unthinkable: the most fundamental assumption is the publicity of the meaning and the content of belief. VsEvent Ontology: various authors: events are actually superfluous, because adverbial modifications can also be realized with more economical ontology. Montague, Clark, Parsons: "Modifier Theory": no events, not limited to "restrictive" adverbs, but more complex logical apparatus. Davidson II 97 Jaegwon Kim: Identifying events not as individual individuals, but with the help of properties. Davidson bases his entire philosophy on the ontology of particular events. Differentiation between event tokens and description. II 141/142 HaugelandVsDavidson:It is not immediately clear that the term "event" in (NK) and (AI) is used in the same way. (macro/micro). The identity relations between macro- and micro-level are not trivial. Davidson's argument is not conclusive without additions that allow an unambiguous assignment. Another question: Scope of the argument: Davidson leaves open whether there can be mental events that are outside of any causal interaction with physical events. An event that does not interact with physical events would therefore be causally impotent and difficult to identify as such. (Other AuthorsVs: Assumption is pointless!). 1.Vs: Jaegwon Kim: the supervenience principle contradicts the anomalism thesis. If every mental token could be described physically unambiguous, would it not then be possible to form an extension-equivalent physical predicate P? ..+.. II 145 f II 147 II 150 2.Vs Isn't the mental causally irrelevant? (Fodor: "epiphobia": fear of epiphenomenalism). 3. HaugelandVsDavidson: Criticism against the ontological prerequisites of the token identity thesis. The concept of the event contains, as we have seen, ambiguities (micro/macro). Lanz I 281 Are micro-events identical to everyday events? Haugeland: For example, wave movements can hardly be described physically. + Doesn't that mean: what is considered a single token depends on the description? Wouldn't it be more plausible to assume that different discourses not only sorted differently, but also constituted different individuals? Haugeland: The world is given to us just as little in the form of prefabricated individuals as they are already categorized independently of our means of description. This would have had fatal consequences for the token identity thesis if it had been transferred to mental entities, because Davidson has no independent argument for their identification with events. LanzVsDavidson: if representation is only determined by causality, no error is possible. EMD II 220 James CargileVsDavidson: 1. You might think "Shem beat Shaun" would consist of two names and a two-digit relation but that is wrong. 2. The sentence is actually a three-digit relational form with two names and an existence quantifier. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Dennett, D. | Stalnaker Vs Dennett, D. | II 180 DennettVsSententialism/Dennett/Stalnaker: Vs propositions as belief objects. (relation theory). Solution/Dennett: "Organismic contribution" of the believer. Neutral with respect to the manner in which it is represented. Def notional attitude-Psychology/not. att./Dennett: (instead of propositional attitude) neutral in terms of the manner of representation. Defined in concepts of possible worlds (poss.w.), "notional worlds". Def prop att-psychology/Dennett: describes attitudes in concepts of wide content. Def sentential attitudes/sent. att./Dennett: syntactic, assumes Mentalese. Def notional world/Dennett: a fictional world that is constructed from a theorist as an external observer, II 181 to characterize the narrow attitudes of a subject. That means my twin on Twin Earth and I have the same notional world. Def narrow content/Dennett: is defined by a set of notional worlds that is the way in which a person who had actual world. notional world/Stalnaker: seem to be exactly the poss.w. that characterize the wide content in the psychology of propositional attitudes. StalnakerVsDennett: all poss.w. except one are fictitious – how can notional attitudes be different propositional attitudes. Why should not. att. be narrow and prop. att. wide? Narrow content/StalnakerVsDennett: are then according to Dennett simply propositions. The difference is neither to be found in the worlds themselves nor the nature of the content if both are just sets of poss.w.. The difference lies in the different responses of the two theories to the question by virtue of which fact someone has a conviction with this content. Propositional atitude-psychology/Dennett/Stalnaker: according to it contents are a function of relation to the actual world although the Twin-Earth-Example shows that they cannot be purely internal. Notional attitudes/not. att.-psychology/Dennett/Stalnaker: shall explain how purely internal (intrinsic) properties can pick a set of poss.w. that is different than the set that is picked by propositional attitudes. Wide content: e.g. O'Leary (correctly) thinks that there is water on the ground floor. This is wrong in the twin earth (tw.e.) because it is not water but XYZ. narrow content/solution: "water-like stuff". Dennett/fodor/Stalnaker: we can compare both approaches: II 182 Narrow content/Fodor/Stalnaker: he changes the nature of the belief object, narrow contents are no longer propositions but functions of context on propositions. Narrow content/Dennett/Stalnaker: is for Dennett of the same kind as further content: both are propositions - function of poss.w. (=notional worlds) to truth values (tr.v.). What changed compared to the wide content is the relation between a believer in a proposition by virtue of which the proposition correctly describes the conviction. StalnakerVsDennett: but in addition he still has to explain how the purely internal (intrinsic) properties of the subject determine the narrow content. Solution/Dennett: e.g. Suppose we know all about the dispositions and skills of a subject but nothing about its causal history. Then that is similar as if we find an ancient object and ask what it was good for ((s)Cf. > Paul Valéry, find on the beach, objet ambigu). Dennett: then we imagine what it was ideally created for. In the notional world of an organism we imagine how the environment looks like to which it is best suited. Solution: propositions that are true in such possible worlds (poss.w.) will be the narrow content of the convictions of these subjects. StalnakerVsDennett: which is now not what we want: those poss.w. look more so that the desires and needs of the organisms in them are fulfilled and not that their propositions are true in them. E.g. it is not clear that the antelope with its properties to respond to lions is better off in a world of lions or in one without. It could then do a better job in terms of survival and to reproduce. Ideal/ideal environment/Dennett: could also be a very ugly poss.w. in which the organisms are, however, prepared to survive in it. II 183 StalnakerVsDennett: that is better, surely we try to cope with the world in which we think we live. But something is missing: a) many properties that enable organisms to survive, have nothing to do with their convictions, b) the fact that some counterfactual skills would help us to survive in a counterfactual poss.w. is not sufficient for saying that such a counterfactual possibility is compatible with the poss.w. which we believe to be the actual world. E.g. Suppose there are no real predators of porcupines in the actual world, they carry their spines simply like that. Then it would be unrealistic to artificially populate their notional world with predators. E.g. Suppose a poss.w. with beings who would like to eat us humans because of our special odor. Then we should not use such a poss.w. to characterize our convictions. Solution/Stalnaker: a belief state must serve in any way to be receptive to information from the environment and the information must have a role in determining behavior. StalnakerVsDennett: if we understand him like that we are still dealing with wide content. II 184 Representation system/Stalnaker: is then able to be used in a set of alternative internal states that are systematically depending on the environment. S1, S2,.. are internal states Ei: a state of the environment. Then an individual is normally in a state Si if the environment is in state Si. Representation: then we could say that the organism represents the environment as being in state Ei. content: we could also say that the states contain information about the environment. Assuming that the states determine a specific behavior to adequately behave in the environment Ei. Belief state/BS: then we can say that these representations are likely to be regarded as a general type of BS. That is like Dennett understands narrow content. Problem/StalnakerVsDennett: 1. the description of the environment is not ascribed to the organism. 2. Information is not distinguished from misinformation (error, deception). That means if it is in state Si it represents the environment as in Ei being no matter if it is. Problem: the concept which originates from a causal relation is again wide content. Important argument: if the environment would be radically different the subject might otherwise be sensitive to it or sensitive to other features ((s) would reverse everything) or it would not be sensitive to the environment at all! narrow content/StalnakerVsDennett: problem: if the skills and dispositions of the organism are included in the descriptions of the content the actual world is initially essential. ((s) problem/Stalnaker/(s): how should we characterize their skills in a counterfactual poss.w.?) II 185 Dennett: if organisms are sneaky enough we might also here ascribe a narrow ((s) counterfactual) content. StalnakerVsDennett: I see no reason for such optimism. You cannot expect any information about virtual poss.w. expect when you do not make any assumptions about the actual world (act.wrld.) (actual environment). Ascription/content/conviction/belief/Stalnaker: in normal belief attributions we ignore not only fairytale worlds but in general all possibilities except the completely everyday! E.g. O’Leary: distinguishes only poss.w. in which the ground floor is dry or wet, II 186 not also such in which XYZ is floating around. Question: Would he then behave differently? Surely for olive oil but not for XYZ. Twin earth/tw.e./ascription: even if the behavior would not change in twin earth-cases, it is still reasonable not to ascribe tw.e.-cases. Context dependence/revisionism/Stalnaker: could argued that it is not twin earth but normal world which makes it unsuitable for scientific ascriptions. Dennett: stands up for his neutral approach (notional world). StalnakerVsDennett: nevertheless causal-informational representation is substantially relative to a set of alternative options (poss.w.). internal/intrinsic/causality/problem: the system of causal relations cannot itself be intrinsical to the representing. Theory: has admittedly a scope to choose between different possibilities of defining content II 187 StalnakerVsDennett: but there is no absolute neutral context without presuppositions about the environment. Narrow content/Dennett/Stalnaker: binds himself a hand on the back by forbidding himself the information that is accessible to wide content. StalnakerVsDennett: I believe that no sensible concept of content results from this restriction. II 238 Language dependency/ascription/belief/Stalnaker: this third type of language dependence is different from the other three. II 239 People must not be predisposed to express belief that type of language dependency at all. It may be unconscious or tacit assumptions. The content must also not involve any language. Dennett: e.g. Berdichev: we should distinguish simple language-specific cases - whose objects are informational states - from those, so propositions are saved - E.g. approval or opinions. StalnakerVsDennett: we should rather understand such cases as special cases of a more general belief that also non-linguistic beings like animals might have. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Dretske, F. | Pauen Vs Dretske, F. | V 230 Meaning/Naturalization/Mental Representation/Dretske/Pauen: (1994.1995): tries, like Fodor, to explain the origin of meaning purely naturalistically. But extends this also to non-human beings. Four aspects: 1) Causal relationship between object and representation 2) Representational function for the organism 3) Evolution of earning 4) Possibility of change. Sign/Meaning/Causality/Dretske/Pauen: (ad 1) a purely causal relationship can only cause a natural sign ("signs"). The normative aspect has no place here. ad 2) The normative distinction between right and wrong of the mental representation comes into play when a device or an organ is assigned the function of displaying a different state of affairs. ad 3) e.g. magnetotactic bacteria pursue deeper, low-oxygen water layers. Suppose these bacteria were brought to the northern hemisphere, they would head for shallower water layers with higher oxygen content! Here it would be unclear what exactly is the object of representation: the magnetic fields or the oxygen concentration? V 232 Dretske: acknowledges that this is difficult to decide. Solution: most organisms have multiple approaches to a situation. If a representation normally occurs in the presence of an enemy, one can speak of a representation of the enemy. ad 4) Only the objection that not the enemy, but the disjunction of all stimuli is the subject of the representation seems possible. E.g. odor or silhouette, or sound. Here, the ability to learn is important. Higher organisms can learn new stimuli, which means that a complete old disjunction could even be absent. Thus, the disjunction cannot be considered as a representation. VsDretske/Pauen: a causally determined sunburn is still not a representation of the sun. V 233 Indigestion are no representation of spoiled food. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Fodor, J. | Brandom Vs Fodor, J. | I 731 BrandomVsNarrow Content: it is not easy at all to tell a coherent story here. Narrow states should be the same for similar individuals. However, because of different contexts there are also some that are distinct for different individuals. These can be identified as copies of each other only by restricting the permissible distinction in their language. This restriction can not be justified without a circle. II 12 Criteria / BrandomVsDretske, VsFodor, VsMillikan: not semantic continuity to the non- or pre-conceptual, but strict discontinuity. II 144 Semantic Theory: Dretske, Millikan, Fodor. BrandomVs: the theory is weakest where they ask of what distinbguishes representations that deserve to be called beliefs, from other index states. Esfeld I 71 FodorVsSemantic holism: compositionality principle (words contribute to the meaning of the sentence): a semantics of the inferential role cannot account for the KP. BrandomVsFodor: compositionality is neutral with respect to an explanation that starts from below. NS I 161 Brandom/Newen/Schrenk: reverses conventional semantics. Instead of assuming, as semantics does, that the correctness of the conclusion "If Princeton lies east of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh lies west of Princeton" is justified by the meaning of "east" and "west", NS I 162 he carries out a Copernican turn: Brandom: Thesis: "west" and "east" get their meaning precisely because they occur in such subsequent relationships. The whole network of sentence utterances in which the words occur and also the corresponding actions constitute the conceptual content of the words. Inferentialism/Brandom/Newen/Schrenk: does not see truth and reference as fundamental units constituting meaning. Correctness/Chance: which conclusions from which utterances are correct is determined pragmatically by social practice guided by implicit rules. Meaning/Holism/Brandom: the meaning of terms and expressions arises from their inferential roles to other terms and expressions, therefore they are not atomistic but holistic. (BrandomVsfodor). |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Fodor, J. | Davidson Vs Fodor, J. | I (b) 36 DavidsonVsFodor/Dennett/Kaplan/Stich: I for my part believe that the concepts of the belief, desire, intent, etc. are not suitable for a science of the type of physics. One of the reason for this is that mental states are identified in part on the basis of their causes and effects. The same is true, however, for human behavior. Therefore, I see no chance to offer scientific explanations in terms of it. Not to describe behavior as a law in analogy to physics. Even Jerry fodor thinks (like Searle) that holism or the indeterminacy of translation constitutes a threat for the realism with respect to the prop. att.s DavidsonVsfodor: The same error: indeterminacy of translation does not mean that the thoughts themselves are somehow vague or unreal. Glüer II 139 A suitable law would be the so-called "bridge law" required for a reduction. Whether there can be such a bridge laws, according to Davidson is not an empirical question, but can be decided a priori. Glüer II 135 The individuation procedures of the intentionalist and physicalistic discourse show a general incommensurability. The intentionalist predicates essentially include normativity. Therefore, no bridge laws possible. (> anomalous monism, > have incidents of reasons, not caused). Anomalous monism/AM: mental incident tokens are as individual each identical with physical incident tokens, but without mental incident types being nomologically identical with the types of physical incidents. Glüer II 147 Fodor: Mental or physical incidents are covered by different laws, i.e. they have different effects. That means, intentionalist descriptions mark a causally important difference. DavidsonVsfodor: To say that this difference is ultimately owing to the physical nature is absurd, because the causal relations are description-independent. Rorty VI 162 Mind/Davidson/Rorty: false concept of the mind: with private states and objects. Source of the harmful dualisms scheme/content, objective/subjective VI 163 DavidsonVsFodor/Rorty: the scientific nature of psychology turns into a search for internal propositional states that should be independent of the rest of the world. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Fodor, J. | Lewis Vs Fodor, J. | Block I 215 Pain/Lewis (VsFodor) can be analytically understood as a condition with a certain >causal role. (>Functionalism). Functionally uncharacterized condition, not a functional state. For example, a functionally uncharacterized brain state. "Pain" can then pick out a neurophysiological state. So he is committed to the assertion that to have pain = the state of this certain causal role. Schwarz I 171 "Naturalization of the content"//Representation/Schwarz: Thesis: Mental representations are insofar alike sentences that their content can be explained by compositionality. (cf. Fodor 1990(1)). LewisVsfodor: principally misguided: only causal role in everyday life (behavior) is relevant. Even if, e.g. the wish to eat mushroom soup, is the beautiful addition of the wish for soup and the wish for mushroom. Because if it is reversely a wish for mushroom soup if the wish plays the exact causal role, regardless of how the wish is constituted. (1994b(2),320f) We can imagine creatures which do not represent like sentences. (vcf. Armstrong 1973(3), chap 1, Braddon-Mitchell/Jackson 1996(4), chap. 10f). Lewis' theory shall also be valid for this possible word, and shall also explain what determines the content. 1. Jerry A.fodor [1990]: “A Theory of content I & II”. In A Theory of content and Other Essays, Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press, 51–136 2. D. Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431 3. D. M. Armstrong [1973]: Belief, Truth, and Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 4. David Braddon-Mitchell und Frank Jackson [1996]: Philosophy of Mind and Cognition. Oxford: Blackwell |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Fodor, J. | Rorty Vs Fodor, J. | I 245 Representation/RortyVsFodor: he confuses a meaning of "representation", which may be accurate or inaccurate, with a different meaning for which this would not apply. I 256 Compliance/Seeing/Correspondence/Behavior/Ryle: here, you have to be satisfied with the phrase "he sees it". Nothing "para-mechanical" can improve our understanding of perceptual recognition. fodorVsRyle/Rorty: a simple story about learned associations will not be enough: the expectation system would have to be abstract and complicated in the same sense. Because the recognized identities are surprisingly independent from the physical uniformities of stimuli among themselves! RyleVsVs/Rorty: might answer that it is this complexity that makes it look as if there is a problem here. Maybe it's just the idea of the little man in the head, which makes us ask the question: "how is it done?". I 257 RortyVsFodor: suppose we needed an abstract recipe for recognizing similarities among potentially infinite differences. Why must the recipe ever be abstract? Presumably, that we need to be able to find out similarities. But then we do not need the notion of a "not abstract" recipe, because every recipe must be able to do this! Infinite: E.g. Rorty: the potential qualitative variations of the contents of a pack of chocolate chip cookies are also potentially infinite. Rorty: So if we talk about "complicated expectation systems" or programs or control systems at all, we are always talking about something abstract. Dilemma: either the explanation of the acquisition of such control systems requires postulating additional control systems, or they are not learned! Either 1) infinite recourse, because what applies to recognition would also need to apply for learning. Or 2) we end up back with Ryle: people have an innate ability. I 267 Abstract/Rorty: it will not surprise us that something "abstract" like the ability to detect similarities, was not obtained, nor was the so 'concrete' ability to respond to the note C sharp. Abstract/Concrete/RortyVsfodor: the entire distinction of abstract/concrete (also Kant) is questionable. No one can say where the line is to be drawn. (Similar to the idea of the "irreducibly psychical" in contrast to the "irreducibly physical".) I 277 Mentalese/A Priori/Fodor/RortyVsFodor: Fodor's thesis that the discovery of the language of thought will be a lengthy empirical process, implies that we can at any time be wrong about it, i.e. we may be wrong about something a priori. (>contingent a priori/Kripke). |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Fodor, J. | Schiffer Vs Fodor, J. | I 80 SchifferVsFodor: his theory implies that everyone is omniscient and infallible under optimal conditions. omniscient: because if any situation exists (and yourself are working perfectly) you believe it and probably know it. infallible: because under ideal conditions nobody believes anything wrong. Optimality condition/Optimum/Schiffer: whatever fodor's optimality condition is, it is clear 1. that they will never be fulfilled 2. that we have no idea what they should be 3. if they are to serve the strong thesis of the language of thought, it must be shown without reference to semantic or intentional vocabulary 4. it is compliable, even though it will never be fulfilled. Otherwise (a) would incoherent. (…+…) I 81 SchifferVsFodor: 1. his performance is not the best solution for finding naturalistic truth conditions for Mentalese. 2. Problem: reliability theory: each reliability theory for mental content must take into account that we ourselves are only reliable indicators in terms of some of our beliefs. E.g. Ralph sees a dog: Then the chances are good that he believes it is a dog. But: E.g. when Ralph Jesus sees how high are the chances that he thinks he's divine! E.g. I have exactly 11 dollars in my pocket: what are the chances that Ralph believes that?. Truth conditions/Mentalese/SchifferVsfodor: So we must not individually proceed belief for belief!. I 82 Reliability/truth conditions/Mentalese/SchifferVsFodor: the reliability considerations extend transversely through the systematic links that exist between the expressions in Mentalese. And again we should better look from the standpoint of thought language as a whole and not, as Fodor, for each mental representation individually. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Fodor, J. | Peacocke Vs Fodor, J. | I 208 Perception/Mentalese/MT/Fodor: what happens in perception, is a description of the environment in a vocabulary is not expressible, that refers to the values of physical variables. E.g. "A butterfly is on the lawn" Instead, in Mentalese we shall speak of "light being the magnitude of the retina and region L". PeacockeVsfodor/PeacockeVsMentalese: what is actually the token of Mentalese, that refers to this localization L? There seems to be nothing there. E.g. a different retina area could supply information about a different localization, as well as the original cell. I 209 But that leads to no difference within Mentalese! There is only a difference of the relata: one refers causally to one area of the retina, the other to another one. VsPeacocke: it could be argued that something like "foggy" ("it's foggy here") corresponds to the individual spots. "Foggy" then has no relevant syntactic structure, but when it occurs in a statement, it will refer to a specific place and time. In fact, several central units of the nervous system must somehow receive non-indexical information from the periphery: E.g. someone who receives one hundred telegrams: "it is bright here", "it is raining here", etc. is not in a position to draw a map if he does not know where the telegrams come from. Peacocke: but an indexical strategy cannot work for more complex contents. A given nerve cell may be neurophysiologically indistinguishable from another one, with completely different content conditions for firing. Trivialization/Mentalese: but if these relations should count as part of the syntactic structure of a (mental) state, then the language of the mind is trivialized. There would be no true sentence analogs. Mentalese/Perception/fodor/Peacocke: a similar argument is about e.g. approved detectors for lines, deep within the perceptual system: these suggest causal relations for perceptions. But possession of a structured content does not require a corresponding physical structure in the state, but there may be in the pattern of relations in which the state stands. Peacocke: a model that satisfies this relational paradigm, but does not require Mentalese must meet several conditions: 1) How can propositional content be ascribed without referring to syntactic structures? I.e. relatively complex contents must be attributed to syntactically unstructured (mental) states. 2) It must be shown how these states interact with perception and behavior. I 215 Computation/Language/Mentalese/PeacockeVsFodor: not even computation (calculation of behavior and perception) seems to require language: E.g. question whether the acting person should do φ. fodor: E.g. the actor is described as computing the anticipated benefit of φ-s under the condition C. Peacocke: the extent to which the subject has the corresponding belief "C given that I φ" may consist in the presence of a corresponding physical state to a certain extent. That would in turn only be a matter of pure relations! The same applies to reaching the state "C and I φ". The states can interact without requiring syntactic structures. Def Computation/Peacocke: (calculation) is a question of states with content that emerge systematically from each other. This requires certain patterns of order and of causal relations, but no syntactic structure. PeacockeVsfodor: it does not necessary apply: "No representation, no computation". I 215/216 Mentalese/Fodor: (Language of Thought, p. 199) Thesis: there can be no construction of psychology without assuming that organisms possess a proper description as instantiation (incarnation) of another formal system: "proper" requires: a) there must be a general procedure for the attribution of character formulas (assigning formulae) to states of the organism b) for each propositional attitude there must be a causal state of the organism so that c1) the state is interpretable as relation to a formula and c2) it is nomologically necessary and sufficient (or contingently identical) to have these propositional attitudes. d) Mental representations have their causal roles by virtue of their formal properties. VsMentalese/PeacockeVsfodor: we can have all of this without Mentalese! Either: 1) There are really sentence analogues in the brain or: 2) fodor's condition could be met otherwise: there could be a semantics that is correlated with Frege's thoughts. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Fodor, J. | Cresswell Vs Fodor, J. | II 53 Meaning/CresswellVsFodor: Cannot be a representation of any kind. Although this is a strong tradition in linguistics, cognitive psychology, and AI (artificial intelligence research). propositional attitude/fodor (fodor, 1981, 177-203, 177): These propositional attitudes must be understood as relations between organisms and internal representations. Cresswell: This can be construed in two ways. For this I use the attitude verb "to say". --- II 54 CresswellVsFodor: his focus on belief may have obscured his view to the fact that there are two different problems with propositional attitudes Object/Fodor/Cresswell: when Fodor speaks about objects of propositional attitudes he does not say that in the semantic sense (meaning as an object) but rather in the sense that the objects of indirect speech are the sentences that have been expressed if the whole sentence is true. CresswellVsFodor: interpreted semantically, his thesis is wrong. Fodor/Cresswell: but he is right in that if (1) Is true, there is a relation that exists between an organism and a representation. But that’s then an external one, not an internal one. Fodor: for him it is about psychology, not to semantics. I.e. it is about what goes on in the activity of discourse (parallel to the speech act theory). In particular, he is concerned with beliefs and desires. --- II 55 Paul ChurchlandVsFodor: (1981) Fodor/Cresswell: so for him it is so about how the expression is related to the rest of the behavior. That’s a very different approach than that of semantics. Semantics/Meaning/that sentence/propositional attitudes/Cresswell: (semantic approach) to learn the meaning of an attribution of propositional attitudes it’s not about the behavior nor about what is going on in Ambrose’s head. If this were the question, it would have to be about the spirit of the speaker of the whole sentence (1). Vs: but even that is not plausible, because we want the meaning of (1), Regardless of who uses it! CresswellVsFodor: because it is so much about the subject for him, he obscures the distinction between the semantic question of the meaning and the psychological one of the organism that has an attitude. Contents/Object/propositional attitudes/Cresswell: the distinction between content and object of an attitude is important, because there may be many different objects (sentences) whose content is the same. ((s) a belief may be expressed differently than in indirect speech). Mentalese/propositional attitudes/Fodor: Thesis: a belief is a sentence in the thought language of the speaker. CresswellVsFodor: Problem: then the original speaker and the speaker of the the attribution would have to have the same sentence in Mentalese in their internal system; E.g. (2) Beatrice believed what Callum said Causal role/fodor/CresswellVsfodor: fodor is interested in the causal role that faith and desires play in behavior. This understands in terms of the manipulation of formulas in a mental code. Patricia ChurchlandVsfodor: (1980) this does not account for semi-conscious and unconscious attitudes. --- II 56 Causal role/CresswellVsFodor: What entities would that be that would have to occur in a causal explanation? Mentalese/CresswellVsFodor: Suppose meanings were internal representations. Problem: (3) Can be said by different people on different occasions, but must then have the same meaning! If we do not assume this, there is no problem at all with propositional attitudes/Cresswell: Problem: how the meaning of an attribution sentence of propositional attitudes is based on the embedded sentence. ((s) That means how the original meaning is preserved with non-verbal substitutions and different contexts). CresswellVsFodor: If meanings were really in your head (as representations), then e.g. the same representation that Fodor has when he says (4) Meanings are in the head and must also be in my head when I utter (3) ((s) the total set). Then fodor’s object of belief is in my head! That would not have to be a problem, but: Causal role/CresswellVsfodor: Problem: How can the representation in my head play a causal role in fodor’s head? VsVs: you could say that’s unfair. Because his object is still in his head. CresswellVsfodor: But that does not help, because if (3) Is really true, then the belief that I attribute to him must be exactly the same as the one he has. --- II 159 Content/Representation/CresswellVsFodor: I’m not at all convinced that representations are involved in content of propositional attitudes. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Fodor, J. | Stalnaker Vs Fodor, J. | II 176 Def narrow content/Fodor/Stalnaker: is a generalization of Kaplan's character in the sense that the context considers any for the speaker external fact that is relevant to the determination of the wide content. Extensional identity criterion/narrow content/fodor: (1987, 30 – 48)(1): C: be the condition that is fulfilled by the twin-me on twin-earth, C’: by myself in the actual world. Since there is no miracle it must be true that when an organism shares the neurophysiological constitution of my twin and fulfills C it follows that his thoughts and my twin also share the truth conditions (tr.c.). So the extensional identity criterion is that two thought contents (mental content) are the same iff they cause the same mapping of thoughts and context on truth conditions. StalnakerVsfodor: problem: that tells us less than it appears about the mapping that is used here. Nor how the relevant function is determined by what is going on in the mind of the believer. II 177 StalnakerVsFodor: we consider the following parody of his argument: e.g. I have the property of being exactly three miles from a burning stable - my twin is located on twin earth at exactly the same place, but, however, has the property of being exactly three miles from a snowy henhouse. C: then there surely is a property for my twin due to which he is three miles from the henhouse while this property does not exist for me. We call this condition C. C’: is then the property that makes up for me that I am three miles from the burning stable which does not exist for my twin. Since there is no miracle, we know at least this much: both, my twin and I, would in our respective world be three miles from a snowy henhouse when condition C ruled and both three miles from a burning stable if C' ruled. StalnakerVsfodor: problem: which determines no function at all that makes the condition C' to the property to be three miles from a snowy henhouse and at the same time condition C to the property to be three miles from a burning stable - a function that allegedly makes the contribution of the location of the subject to a specific relational property. StalnakerVsfodor: there are such functions and there is no need to identify one of them with the contribution of my intrinsic localization with the special relational property. My twin cannot sensibly say: "I did my part, as I - if condition C had ruled, .... Each localization is in the way that for any external conditions if those conditions rule something in this localizations is three miles away from a burning stable. narrow content/Stalnaker: question: does my cousin have the same narrow content as my conviction that salt is soluble in water but not in something else? StalnakerVsfodor: his theory gives no indication as to how an answer to this question was to be found! Note: however for me it is not about an uncertainty at all, this is also true for wide content but that we do not know at all how to identify narrow content. II 180 Belief/Mentalese/Fodor/Stalnaker: his image of faith is decisively motivated by his approach that there is an internal language (Mentalese) which is saved in the internal Belief/fodor: are saved inner propositions. ((s) not propositions). They are convictions by virtue of their internal functional role. They are also identifiable independent of the environment of the subject. Semantic properties/fodor: however partly depend on what happens in the environment around it but the way how they depend on it is determined by purely internal states of the subject! StalnakerVsfodor: here strong empirical presuppositions are in play. Def narrow content/Mentalese/fodor/Stalnaker: function of context (in a very wide sense) on truth conditional content. StalnakerVsfodor: this is attractive for his intentions but it does not explain how it ever comes to that. And how to identify any narrow content. Narrow content/Stalnaker: is there any way at all to identify narrow content that is not based on Mentalese? Yes, by Dennett (…+…) II 188 Def individualism/Fodor: is the thesis that psychological states in terms of their causal powers are individuated. Science/fodor: it is a scientific principle that in a taxonomy individuals are individuated because of their causal powers. This can be justified a priori metaphysically. Important argument: thus it is not excluded that mental states are individuated due to relational properties. Relational properties/fodor: are taxonomically when they consider causal powers. E.g. "to be a planet" is relational par excellence StalnakerVsFodor: a) stronger: to individuate a thing by causal powers b) weaker: to individuate the thing by something that considers the causal powers. But the facts of the environment do not constitute the causal powers. Therefore fodor represents only the weaker thesis. Burge/Stalnaker: represents the stronger. StalnakerVsfodor: his defense of the negative approach of revisionism (fodorVsExternalism) builds on a mixture of the strong with the weak thesis. Stalnaker: to exclude that psychological states are individuated by normal wide content you need a stronger thesis. But the defense of individualism often only goes against the weaker thesis. E.g. fodor: Individualism/fodor/Stalnaker: fodor defends his version of individualism with an example of a causal irrelevant relational property: e.g. h-particle: we call a particle when a coin lands with heads up, II 189 t-particle: we call that way the same particle if the coin shows tails. fodor: no reasonable theory will use this distinction to explain the behavior of the particle. StalnakerVsfodor: but from this it does not follow that psychological states must be purely internal (intrinsic). (1) fodor, J. A. (1987): Explorations in cognitive science, No. 2.Psychosemantics: The problem of meaning in the philosophy of mind. British Psychological Society; The MIT Press. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Fodor, J. | Ramsey Vs Fodor, J. | Schurz I 215 Carnap-Sentence/Carnap-Conditional/CS/CK/strengthening/strengthened/Lewis/Schurz: (Lewis 1970, 83 85): Suggestion to strengthen the Carnap-Sentence: by assuming that the theory implicitly postulates that the reference of its theoretical terms (TT) in the actual world is unambiguously determined. N.B.: the analytical content of a theory is thus represented by the following local "definitions" with the help of certain descriptions of theoretical terms: Identification as Definition/Lewis: Example τi designates the i-th term of the unambiguous n-tuple of entities, which fulfils the claim T(X1,...Xn) in the actual world. (1970.87f) PapineauVsLewis: his thesis that scientific theories go hand in hand with existence and claims of uniqueness for the reference of the theoretical terms is doubtful even if it is interpreted realistically. Instrumentalistic: it is untenable. (Papineau, 1996, 6,Fn 5). Definition/SchurzVsLewis: Definition by description (description, designation) are not full-fledged, but only partial, because they determine the extension of theoretical terms only in those possible worlds in which the underlying existence or uniqueness assumption is fulfilled. I 216 Theoretical Terms/FodorVsHolism: Vs semantic theory holism: the determination of the meaning of theoretical terms is circular. Def semantic theories holism/abstract: Thesis: the meaning of theoretical terms is determined by the meaning of the theory. Solution/Ramsey-Sentence/RS/Carnap-Sentence/CS/Schurz: Ramsey-Sentence/Carnap-Sentence/Holism/Meaning/Circle/Schurz: the method of conjunction of Ramsey-Sentences and Carnap-Sentences is the solution for the accusation of circularity of fodorVsHolism. a) On the one hand: because of compositionality, the meaning of T(t1,...tn) is determined by the meaning of theoretical terms (in addition to the meaning of the other concepts of T), b) On the other hand: it follows from semantic theories holism that the meaning of theoretical terms is determined by the meaning of the theory. fodorVs: that is a circle RamseyVsfodor/CarnapVsfodor: Solution: the Ramsey-Sentence R(T) can be understood without assuming an independent knowledge of the meaning of theoretical terms, and the Carnap-Sentence or Lewis definitions add that the meaning of theoretical terms lies in designating those entities which fulfil the assertion of the theory. ((s) Carnap-Sentence/Schurz/(s): states that the meaning of theoretical terms lies in the designation of the entities which satisfy the theory. |
Ramsey I F. P. Ramsey The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013 Ramsey II Frank P. Ramsey A contribution to the theory of taxation 1927 Ramsey III Frank P. Ramsey "The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Holism | Dummett Vs Holism | Fodor/Lepore IV 8 Analytic/Synthetic/(a/s)/Holism/Fodor/Lepore: there is an argument that anatomical features are also holistic, which presupposes that the distinction anal/synth (a/s) is suspended. E.g. DummettVsHolism: shows neither how communication should function nor language acquisition or language proficiency. (If you have to know all propositions at the same time, which is impossible). ((s) This therefore expects that even anatomical properties are holistic. (or that there are no analytical propositions). Due to this extreme position learning only becomes impossible). Dummett/(s)VsDummett: Departs from the extreme assumption that anatomical properties (which only a second similar thing can have) are also holistic, i.e. are shared by many similar things. So almost a bugbear. Dummett: nor does holism show how a whole theory can be significant at all: if in turn its internal structure cannot be broken down into significant parts, then it has no internal structure. fodor/Lepore: Dummett argues from the following analogy: Sentences are interpersonally understandable, because their meanings are formed from the meanings of their components and the speaker and hearer are privy to these meanings. Dummett/fodor/Lepore: this explanation assumes that the speaker and hearer mean the same thing. Fodor/Lepore IV 9 And it assumes that the constituents have meaning at all. If holism were true, this would be false. Fodor/Lepore IV 10 Holism/Fodor/Lepore: is also a revisionism: he could reply HolismVsDummett: "so much the worse for our conventional understanding of how languages and theories learned and taught". Quine, Dennett, Stich, the Churchlands and many others are strongly tempted by this revisionist direction. Horwich I 459 Meaning Theory/M.Th./DummettVsDavidson: we need more than he gives us: it could be that someone knows all truth conditions without knowing the content of the (metalinguistic) right side of the T sentence. T sentence/Dummett: explains nothing if the metalanguage contains the object language. And because this is so, the same applies if meta language and object language are separated (terminology/Dummett: "M sentence". T-sentence/Davidson: "neutral, snow-bound triviality" No single T-sentence says what it means to understand the words on the left side, but the whole corpus of sentences says that this is everything you can know about it ((s) no theory "beyond", "about"). DummettVsDavidson: thus Davidson admits defeat: then it cannot be answered how the speaker came to his own understanding of the words he used. ((s)> DummettVsHolism) DummettVsDavidson: The ability for language use cannot be split into separate skills Language/Use/Wittgenstein/Davidson/SellarsVsDummett/Rorty: such partial skills do not exist. If "tertia" such as "special meaning ", "response to stimuli", etc. are abolished, there are no components anymore, in which the capacity for language use could be divided (>competence?). E.g. "How do you know that this is red?" Wittgenstein: "I speak German." T-sentence/Davidson: does not double any internal structures. They do not even exist, otherwise the "Tertia" would be introduced again. Meaning theory/DummettVsDavidson/Rorty: he makes a virtue of necessity. But we can expect more from a MT. And that is that it retains the traditional concepts of the empiricist epistemology. Such a theory must explain the ability to use language through knowledge of the truth conditions. Dummett: Contrast: E.g. "this is red" and E.g. "there are transfinite cardinal numbers". Holism/Wittgenstein/VsDummett/DavidsonVsDummett: There is no contrast!. Understanding/Grasping/Wittgenstein/Davidson/Rorty: for Davidson and Wittgenstein grasping in all these cases is acquiring the inferential relations between the sentences and other sentences of the language. Meaning/Wittgenstein: accepting some inferential principle helps to determine the meaning of words. (Davidson ditto). DummettVsWittgenstein/DummettVsHolism: This leads us to the attitude that no systematic MT is at all possible. RortyVsDummett: does not show, however, how it is possible.(1) 1. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 Rorty I 289 Philosophy/Dummett/Rorty: (VsDavidson) (like Putnam): only task of philosophy is the analysis of meaning. (It is the foundation, and not Descartes’ epistemology). DummettVsDavidson/DummettVsHolismus/Rorty: you cannot provide adequate philosophy of language without the two Kantian distinctions (Givenness/Interpretation and Necessity/Contingency). |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Holism | Fodor Vs Holism | Esfeld I 60 Holism/Esfeld: although there are close relationships between all forms of belief holism, the meaning holism (MH) and justification holism (JH) do not imply the semantic holism (SH). One can accept the meaning holism or the justification holism and reject the semantic holism (conceptual content as constituent). (fodorVsSemantic Holism (fodor/Lepore 1992, also Horwich 1998 p.150)). Semantic holism: does not imply meaning holism or justification holism in turn. One can represent logically correctly: while beliefs ontologically depend on other beliefs in terms of having conceptual content, the justification and the confirmation is not relative to the fact that there are other beliefs. ((s) DavidsonVs: only other beliefs can justify or confirm beliefs). --- Fodor/Lepore IV 5 VsMeaning Holism/VsMH/Fodor/Lepore: first objection: you may wonder whether semantic properties are anatomical, but that is not possible with at all semantic properties. E.g. if you wanted to say that the property to express the proposition that the cat is on the mat is anatomically L (relative to the language L), then that would mean to require that this language must have at least one other expression for the cat being on the mat. |
Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor IV Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Oxford GB/Cambridge USA 1992 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Holism | Verschiedene Vs Holism | Davidson II 60 Glüer: if one restricts the meaning holism, one can develop a dynamic model of understanding. We assume that malapropisms, idiolects and T-theories develop. A significant portion remains invariant from theory to theory. A holistic T-theory for one speaker does not exist. Fodor/Lepore IV 10 Language/language acquisition/communication/Fodor/Lepore: the standard view VsHolism is that linguistic and theoretical determinations of speaker and listener can overlap partially at will. You can understand a part of my language without having learned the rest. Dummett/fodor/Lepore: if we understand him correctly, then he says that this image of language only makes sense to the extent that partial conformity in use does not require perfect conformity in use. I.e. only to the extent that Semantic Holism is rejected. Quine VI 20/21 Necessity/Laws/Mathematics/Science/Quine: why is mathematics spared? Many scientists may answer that their laws are necessarily true. However, I take the opposite view: it is precisely an explanation of mathematical necessity itself: it is inherent in our unspoken practice to shield mathematics and make use of our freedom instead of abandoning other suitable beliefs. Holism/Quine: we do well not to make the boat swing too much. Simplicity of theory is an important criterion. Adolf GrünbaumVsHolismus/Quine: He had a stronger holism in mind than ours. Quine VI 22 Theory/GrünbaumVsHolism: one can always save a hypothesis by revising one's theoretical reserves of accepted sentences in such a way that these, together with the threatened hypothesis, imply the absence of the prognosis. Holism/QuineVsGrünbaum: Such an assumption does not occur to me in the first place. It is all about defusing the false implication Holism only combats the naive notion that each sentence has its own separate empirical content. Empirical content/Quine: is rather something that is common to sentences, and in which even mathematical sentences indirectly participate. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Inferentialism | Fodor Vs Inferentialism | Esfeld I 71 Semantics of the Inferential Role/communication/proposition/Esfeld: the semantics of the inferential role implies the thesis of the primacy of beliefs: primarily beliefs have conceptual content. I 72 Important argument: hence, conceptual content is identical with propositional content, since the content is of beliefs of propositional nature. Problem: how can beliefs of different people have the same content if they never share all beliefs and the content in turn is determined by the entire system? This is the interpersonal problem of communication. I 73 Intrapersonal Problem of Communication: it is a problem of the change of beliefs over time: every slightest change would have to change the whole system and each other belief. Solution: Block: (1986 and 1995): strategy: distinguishing two factors in semantics: I 74 1) Narrow Content: depends only on the physical and psychological condition of the person. 2) Reference to something in the world that is not affected by holism. Narrow, inferential content along with reference leads to wide content. Because of the reference the wide content is not subject to the problem of interpersonal communication. Another prominent strategy (Bilgrami) replaces equality of conceptual content by similarity, i.e. "local contents", although concepts are never shared altogether. I 75 FodorVs: similarity cannot be understood without recourse to equality. fodorVsInferential Semantics: it cannot make such a concept of equality available. |
Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor IV Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Oxford GB/Cambridge USA 1992 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Interpretation Theory | Fodor Vs Interpretation Theory | IV 128 Interpretation: the actual objects of interpretation are propositional attitudes, speech acts, etc., not representations. Representations: their content seems to depend on causal or nomic relations of objects in the world and neurological states,... IV 129 ...to which the interpreter usually has no access. Anyway, they are by definition inaccessible for radical interpretation. fodor/LeporeVsVs: the representation theorists should bite this bullett. It is plausible that there are no interesting relations between the epistemic situation of the interpreter and the facts on which the content metaphysically depends. This is, of course, not to deny the the supervenience of the intentional on the physical. Only the interpreter does not have access (fodor/LeporeVsInterpretation Theory). God knows what representations mean. And he is physicalist without doubt! Radical Interpretation/RI/Lewis: even the radical interpreter does not have access to all the physical facts. They are limited to the "behavioral" behaviorist facts. Interpretation/representation/fodor/Lepore: the notion that only representations have original intentional content does not deny that there is indeed interpretation. The idea is rather that the semantic properties of the propositional attitudes and speech acts depend on hidden things which only God knows. Therefore, the inferences on which the interpretation depends are contingent! (?). fodor/LeporeVsInterpretation Theory: it is not obvious that we have original intentionality (which the interpreter needs) in the first instance (i.e. representation, uninterpretable). |
Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor IV Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Oxford GB/Cambridge USA 1992 |
| Lewis, D. | Fodor Vs Lewis, D. | Block I 163 Pain/FodorVsLewis: if you say that pain in humans and Martians is different, you are not stating on the basis of which properties both of them perceive pain. Any disjunction of physical conditions which used to mean pain in the history of the universe, is not a solution. Because that does not cover what the individuals have in common. I 215 Pain/FodorVsLewis: since the property of having the state is a functional one - and not only a functionally characterized property, Lewis is still bound by the functionalism discussed here. Pain/VsLewis: the functionalism presented here asserts a state Z that is defined as a state with such and such a causal role, and the functionalist assertion becomes: "Pain = Z". Here, Z itself is not a functional state (> Ramsey-functional Correlate). I 217 FodorVsLewis: the contrast to Lewis (functional characterization of a state rather than a functional state) can be made clearer: e.g. assuming, a condition type is a specific type of property. Namely, the property which each token of this condition has because it is a token of this type. Then, the pain condition would be identified with the property of being a pain (not of being in pain). I.e. in terms of the pain and not of the organism. Lewis: defines pain as the state that has a certain causal role ("ix"). Functionalism/Block: pain as the property of playing a certain causal role ("lx"). --- Fodor/Lepore IV 107 Radical Interpretation/RI/Lewis: the radical interpretation is governed by fundamental principles that tell us how belief and meanings are usually related to each other, as well as to behavior and sensory input. IV 108 These fundamental principles are nothing but a lot of platitudes of common sense. E.g. that most of the beliefs of the speaker are true. But that can only be true if the speaker has several propositional attitudes. Holism/Fodor/Lepore: then holism can be derived from the conditions for the intentional attribution! Fodor/LeporeVsLewis: (he might perhaps agree): it is not clear that anything metaphysically interesting follows from the fulfillment of conditions for the intentional attribution. IV 114 Meaning Holism/MH/belief/Fodor/Lepore: if according to Lewis’ thesis belief has primacy over the attribution of the intentional, then it must itself be holistic. If meaning holism is to follow, for example, the following would have to be assumed: Def Thesis of the "Primacy of Belief"/PT/Lewis: thesis: "the conditions of intentional attribution include the conditions of belief attribution. Therefore: if the former is holistic, so must be the latter." Semantic Holism/SH/fodor/Lepore: we concede that semantic holism might follow from this thesis (belief holism seems plausible). Primacy of Belief/fodor/LeporeVsLewis: the thesis is so strong that semantic holism emerges even without the principle of charity. Even without any theory of interpretation! But we do not believe that the thesis is true. RI/Lewis/fodor/Lepore: his version of radical interpretation does not endorse the thesis of the primacy of belief (PT) and we do not say that he accepts it at all. We believe that the PT is not true. Holism/Lewis/fodor/Lepore: but if Lewis does not represent the primacy thesis, his arguments in favor of holism are limited. They can show that belief qua belief is holistic, but not that they are holistic qua intentional. IV 121 VsLewis: the primacy thesis is implausible. IV 131 Fodor/LeporeVsDavison/VsLewis: it could be said: because the semantics of representations is atomistic, it follows that intentional attribution as such is not determined by constitutive principles like the principle of rationality! Allowing the attribution of irrational propositional attitudes would simply be a "change of subject". That would be no intentional states! I.e if we attribute irrational things to the speaker, we change our opinion on the content of his mental states. Vs: 1) It could be made stronger, not only epistemically, by saying that even God would change the content of his attribution, before violating rationality. IV 132 2) Assuming the point was metaphysical and not only epistemic: nevertheless it does not follow from the atomistic approach to mental semantics that the principle of rationality could be ignored in the attribution. You cannot believe simultaneously that p and that not p. These principles are constitutive of belief, and also for wishes, etc. |
Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Mentalesese | Peacocke Vs Mentalesese | I 212 PeacockeVsMentalese: E.g. Suppose a creature whose brain is composed of layers of spatially organized "maps": here you do not need Mentalese, either. Disjunction/Belief/Peacocke: could be realized as something that can be explained with the theory of circuits. Then there could be a third state, that would be equivalent to the acceptance of both alternatives. [Fa or Gb]. (>circuit algebra). There might be reasons to believe the whole disjunction without reasons for one side alone! Our model also allows to explain why a person does not always draw the disjunctive consequences of their beliefs! It is possible that a component of S Fa is not always present. "Not always present" means that the component can be implemented quite differently. It could be a concentration of substance in an set of neurons or a question of the distribution in them. Deduction/Mentalese/Peacocke: because of the single requirement that it must take care of analog syntactic structures of the lines, the thesis of Mentalese is obvious. I 213 Vs: but it is not true that it is indispensable. A physical unit could register that the state S Fa v Gb is a disjunction, because it is suitably connected to two belief states. One side could be negated. (e.g., S ~Gb), then the unit could cause the system to go into the state S Fa. In this case, no information about the contents of either of the two sides is required! There is only the modus tollendo ponens. PeacockeVsMentalese: therefore, we can ask in any situation where the language of the brain seems indispensable at first glance: can supposed syntactic operations be replaced by relational operations? If so, we do not need the thesis of Mentalese. Mentalese/Peacocke: as far as I know none of the proponents asserts that except for an assumed Mentalese sentence S that is supposed to be stored if a subject believes that p, also another Mentalese sentence S' is to stored, which means: "I believe that p." ((s) recourse). It is generally believed that it is sufficient for belief that a stored sentence is based on perception, other states and behavior appropriately. Peacocke: but that is exactly my replacement tactics. (Relations instead of syntax). I 213/214 Replacement Tactics/Peacocke: can also be used to show how actions can easily be explained by states with content. Mentalese would have to adopt an additional translation module. Peacocke: an intention that Gb may partly have its propositional content by the fact that the corresponding action is determined by the fact that the subject is in the unstructured state S Gb which has its contents by its relations to other states. This also applies to the practical inferring: ((s) "content from relations rather than language.") The relational model seems to conceive Mentalese as a special case among itself. I 215 Computation/PeacockeVsMentalese: if we can be in mental states with content (by relations), without having to store sentences, then there can also be computation without internal brain language. Because Def Computation/Peacocke: (calculation) is a question of states with content that emerge systematically from each other. This requires certain patterns of order and causal relations, but no syntactic structure. PeacockeVsfodor: it does not necessarily apply: "No representation, no computation". |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Positivism | Fodor Vs Positivism | II 107 Ordinary LanguageVsPositivism: this formalization is only useful where its structure mirrors the natural language. Otherwise, languages can be constructed so that they have any desired property. II 108 When a system is selected at random, no solutions can be expected. Formal Language/Fodor: there can be as many artificial languages as there are solutions to a problem. II 109 Most have been formed on the model of Principia Mathematica(1). This is not the best idea, because everyday language is much more complex. The positivist argues here that many aspects are disregarded, because they are unsystematic. II 110 FodorVsPositivism: he then asserts that his theory applies except in those cases in which it does not apply. II 112 Positivism/Language: distinguishes two branches of semantics: 1) The theory of meaning: relations between linguistic units: analyticity, synonymy, meaning. 2) The theory of designation: relations between linguistic units and reality: denoting, designating, truth, scope of concept. With regard to natural languages, semantic theories in which such concepts are unanalyzed basic concepts are empirically empty. Attempt at a solution: determining those basic concepts operationally. II 113 Vs: that ignores the possibility to construct a systematic theory of the semantic structure of a natural language. In addition, it cannot be expected that the search for operational rules clarifies the elementary semantic concepts if the second path is not taken simultaneously. II 117 Designation/FodorVsTarski: it is obvious that such systems cannot capture the designation problems in natural languages. E.g. "I want to be the Pope" does not designate the Pope. E.g. "I want to meet the Pope" designates the Pope. E.g. "I shot the man with the gun" may refer to "the man" or "the man with the gun". E.g. "The black blue dress" can refer to a checkered dress or the darker one. FodorVsPositivism: after questioning the positivist theories of designation we do not know more about the relationship between the natural language and the environment than before. Fodor/Lepore IV 49 Propositions/Fodor/Lepore: if statements are propositions, then they have their contents essentially (because they are individuated through them): IV 49/50 Now, if contents is determined through their its verification method (Peirce’s thesis), then statements have their confirmation methods essentially QuineVsPeirce: the Quine-Duhem thesis says that confirmation conditions are contingent! (It may always turn out to be wrong, nothing follows from the meaning about the confirmation). 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor IV Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Oxford GB/Cambridge USA 1992 |
| Projectivism | Fodor Vs Projectivism | IV 139 Fodor/LeporeVsProjectivism/Fodor/LeporeVsDennett: 1) Projectivism is not able to construct existence quantifications that go beyond the contents of propositional attitudes. (In contrast to sentences that quote the content). E.g. Smith’s three-year-old hears his father talk about the distinction between analytic/Synthetic. He repeats later: "blahblahblah, analytical synthetical, blahblahblah". For the projection theory this is self-contradictory, because the state that is attributed by the (three-year-old) speaker is not a mental state after all!. IV 140 E.g. Twin Earth/TE: Suppose the people on the Twin Earth have already found out that what they call "water" is not H2O. Therefore, the belief they express with "water is wet" is not of the belief that water is wet! Because they are not in the correct causal relationship with water (but to XYZ). Perhaps you would like to say that there are at least one or two other beliefs which are expressed by the use of this expression (formula) by its twin. Fodor/Lepore: But how can they say that if you know (and you do) that the belief which it expresses is none that you could express at all? ((s) in order to make the projectivist speaker attribution). 1) VsProjectivism: must assert that there are no beliefs on the Twin Earth! Conversely, your twin would have to deny them any belief. These are not just technical difficulties. If projectivism is right, what you believe depends on the interpreter. Vs: but if anything is metaphysically independent from something else, then it is the fact that the repertoire of potential beliefs of a person is independent from the potential speech acts of someone else is. 2) VsProjectivism: cannot explain the "element of interpretation" of the intentional attribution. On the other hand, it does count as a variety of the interpretation theory. Why should the projectivist not assume the reality of the intentional after all. IV 141 Albeit one who rejects the usual assumptions about several-digit predicates of propositional attitudes? I.e. Projectivism: four-digit relation: 1) creature, 2) mental state, 3) propositional object 4) interpreter. |
Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Davidson Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I (c) 41 Quine connects meaning and content with the firing of sensory nerves (compromise proposal) This makes his epistemology naturalistic. - DavidsonVsQuine: Quine should drop this (keep naturalism) but what remains of empiricism after deducting the first two dogmas. - DavidsonVsQuine: names: "Third Dogma" (> Quine, Theories and Things, Answer) dualism of scheme and content. Davidson: Scheme: Language including the ontology and world theory contained in it; I 42 - Content: the morphological firing of the neurons. Argument: something like the concept of uninterpreted content is necessary to make the concept relativism comprehensible. In Quine neurological replacement for sensory data as the basis for concept relativism. Davidson: Quine separation of scheme and content, however, becomes clear at one point: (Word and Object). Quine: "... by subtracting these indications from the worldview of people, we get the difference of what he contributes to this worldview. This difference highlights the extent of the conceptual sovereignty of the human, the area where he can revise his theories without changing anything in the data." (Word and Object, beginning) I 43 - Referring to QuineVsStroud: "everything could be different": we would not notice... -DavidsonVsQuine: Is that even right? According to the proximal theory, it could be assumed: one sees a rabbit, someone else sees a warthog and both say: Gavagai! (Something similar could occur with blind, deaf, bats or even with low-level astigmatism. The brains in the tank may be wrong even to the extent that Stroud feared. But everyone has a theory that preserves the structure of their sensations. I (c) 55 So it is easy to understand Cresswell when he says CreswellVsQuine: he has an empire of reified experiences or phenomena which confronts an inscrutable reality. QuineVsCresswell> Quine III) - I (c) 64 DavidsonVsQuine: he should openly advocate the distal theory and recognize the active role of the interpreter. The speaker must then refer to the causes in the world that both speak and which are obvious for both sides. I (d) 66 DavidsonVsQuine: His attempt is based on the first person, and thus Cartesian. Nor do I think we could do without some at least tacitly agreed standards. ProQuine: his courageous access to epistemology presented in the third person. I (e) 93 Quine: ontology only physical objects and classes - action not an object - DavidsonVsQuine: action: event and reference object. Explicating this ontology is a matter of semantics. Which entities must we assume in order to understand a natural language? McDowell I 165 McDowell: World/Thinking/Davidson: (according to McDowell): general enemy to the question of how we come into contact with the empirical world. There is no mystery at all. No interaction of spontaneity and receptivity. (DavidsonVsQuine) Scheme/Content/Davidson: (Third Dogma): Scheme: Language in Quine - Content: "empirical meaning" in Quine. (I 165) Conceptual sovereignty/Quine: can go as far as giving rise to incommensurable worldviews. DavidsonVsQuine: experience cannot form a basis of knowledge beyond our opinions. It would otherwise have to be simultaneously inside and outside the space of reason. Fodor/Lepore IV 225 Note 13.> IV 72 Radical Inerpretation/RI/Quine: his version is a first step to show that the concept of linguistic meaning is not scientifically useful and that there is a "large range" in which the application can be varied without empirical limitation. (W + O, p. 26> conceptual sovereignty). DavidsonVsQuine: in contrast to this: RI is a basis for denying that it would make sense to claim that individuals or cultures had different conceptual schemes. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Dummett Vs Quine, W.V.O. | Dummett I 142 Since the vocabulary changes and can be used differently, Davidson no longer considers the language of a particular individual as a starting unit, but the disposition to language usage. DummettVsQuine, VsDavidson: not idiolect, but common language prevalent DummettVsDavidson, DummettVsQuine: It is not permissible to assume that meaning and understanding of the private and non-communicable knowledge depend on a theory. It is not natural to understand precisely the idiolect primarily as a tool of communication. It is rather tempting to consider an internal state of the person concerned as that which gives the expressions of idiolect their respective meanings. I 149 E.g. What a move means is not derived not from the players’ knowledge of the rules, but from the rules themselves. Fodor/Lepore IV 34 Language Philosophy/Fodor/Lepore: current status (1992): 1. It may turn out that the semantic anatomism is correct (and atomism is false), and yet holism does not follow, because the distinction analytic/synthetic must be maintained nevertheless. (VsQuine). Representatives: DummettVsQuine: the smallest language in which the proposition that P can be expressed is the one that can express those propositions with which P is analytically connected. 2. It may turn out that the semantic anatomism is correct (and atomism is false), and yet holism does not follow, because even though the distinction analytic/synthetic cannot be maintained because there is a different way of distinction for those propositions, which are constitutive of content, and those that are not. 3. It may turn out that holism follows the assumption that semantic properties are anatomical, but that semantic properties are not anatomical at all! This would mean that the semantic atomism was true. If 3 should be true, someone needs to invent a new story about the relation symbol/world that is not based on similarity or behaviorist stimulus-response scheme,. fodor/Lepore: Thesis: what we doubt is that the previous arguments show that atomism could not be true. But we want to be moderate. ("Modesty is our middle name"). |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Ryle, G. | Fodor Vs Ryle, G. | II 118 Use Theory/Ryle: sentences have no ways of use! Therefore sentences are excluded a priori propositions from the study of philosophical language analysis. Further: sentences do not belong to language, but only to speaking. Language/fodorVsRyle: this ignores the fact that forming an infinite number of new sentences is the most important part of language! But this can only be based on recursive (formal) procedures.# --- Rorty I 256 Compliance/seeing/correspondence/behavior/Ryle: here you have to do with the sentence "he sees it". Nothing "para-mechanical" can improve our understanding of perceptual recognition. fodorVsRyle/Rorty: a simple story about learned associations will not be enough: the expectation system would have to be abstract and complicated in the same sense because the recognized identities are surprisingly independent from the physical uniformities of stimuli among each other! RyleVsVs/Rorty: Ryle might answer that it is this complexity that makes it look as if there was a problem here. Maybe it is just the notion of the little man in our head who lets us ask the question: "how is it done?". I 257 RortyVsFodor: assuming we needed an abstract formula for the recognition of similarities among potentially infinite differences. Why does the formula have to be abstract? Presumably, because we need to be able to figure out similarities. But then we do not need the idea of a "non-abstract" formula, because each formula must be able to do this. Infinite: e.g. Rorty: the possible qualitative differences of the content of a package of chocolate chip cookies are also potentially infinite. Rorty: So if we speak of "complex expectation systems" or programs or control systems, we will always speak about something abstract. Dilemma: either the explanation for the acquisition of these control systems requires postulating additional control systems or they are not learned! Either: 1) There is infinite regress, because what applies to recognition, would also need to apply for learning. Or 2) we end up back with Ryle: people have an unlearned ability. |
Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor IV Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Oxford GB/Cambridge USA 1992 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Stalnaker, R. | Schiffer Vs Stalnaker, R. | I 46 The second position in the logical space for the "propositionalist": (Stalnaker) represents a major divergence from functionalism: he concedes that no psychological theory will provide a definition of belief itself as E.g. x believes that some dogs have fleas. ((s) with content). but probably of x is a belief. ((s) without content). 1. you have to find a psychological theory, with which you can define the monadic predicate "x is a conviction". 2. define a functional property, for each composite belief property via non-functional, explicit definition of the form (R) x believes p iff (Es)(s is a belief; x is in s; & R(s,p)) for a given specified relation R. Stalnaker: takes up an idea of Dennis Stampe. Stampe: (1977, unpublished) as the completion of (R ) (FG) x believes p iff x is in a belief system, that x would not have under optimal conditions, if it were not the case that p. FG/Fuel gauge/Fuel gauge/Representation/Dretske/Terminology/Schiffer: (Dretske 1986): "Fuel gauge"-model of representation: it represents the fuel level, because it is a reliable indicator. ((s) By regularity to representation. Additional assumption: Counterfactual conditional). I 47 Representation/Schiffer: is not only a feature of mental states! >fuel gauge example. SchifferVsStalnaker/Belief/theory: the fuel gauge model is only a first step. It implies that one has no wrong beliefs under optimal conditions. That may be. Problem: 1. What shall these optimum conditions be then that will never be fulfilled? 2. how should they be fulfilled without the fuel gauge model becoming circular?. "Optimal"/Condition/(s): as a condition in itself is suspicious circular: they are fulfilled when everything is ok. (R)/belief/Schiffer: FG is only a proposal for the completion of (R). This should best determine the truth conditions in a system of mental representations. Conclusion: if belief is a relation to propositions, and there is a non-mentalist specification of this relation, then it cannot be functionalist. I 282 Belief content/Stalnaker: (1984): his approach refers to public language, but would be, based on Mentalese, the approach by Fodors, b) there is a ("optimum" -) Condition D - unfulfilled but fulfilled - and be specified in naturalistic vocabulary so An M function f the truth-conditions for function x * lingua mentis M is if for every sentence s of M: D would consist, then x would believe if and only if f(s) consists). Comparable, with "only if" rather than "if and only if". Then one is merely infallible under optimal conditions. SchifferVsStalnaker: that is not much better. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Narrow Content (TE) | Pro | Fodor / Lepore IV 221 Twin Earth/ Fodor / Lepore: Solution: "two-factor view" of content: close Content (conceptual role): this is verificationist - per: Block, Field, Loar, Lycan, McGinn, Putnam. |
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| Representation | Pro | Esfeld I 137 Content of belief states / Fodor: thesis: is derived from the original representational content. (Mental Representation originally). (Fodor and Lepore, 1992). |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Thinking w/o Language | Versus | Fodor / Lepore IV 126 Thinking / language / Sellars: mental content is parasitic on linguistic content. |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conceptual Role | Block, Ned | Fod/Lep IV 163 Meaning/conceptual role/conceptual role semantics/CRT/Block: Thesis: The meaning of an expression is its role in a language - Fodor/Lepore: this invites to the conclusion that expressions belonging to different languages have different meanings - this leads to "translation holism" rather than to content holism. Block's argument is not transcendental but the proposal of a theory. ((s) Conceptual role is here equated with semantic or inferential role.) Fodor/Lepore: this does not lead to semantic holism, at most in connection with the analytical/synthetic distinction. Thesis: Belief must be explained causally. IV 168 Coextension/Inference/Block: Thesis: the inferential role of coextensive expressions may differ. Thus the CRT can distinguish between morning star/evening star or between "Cicero" and "Tullius". |
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| Representation | Churchland, P. | Fod/Lep IV 189 Paul Churchland: it also has in mind - thesis: that a kind of representations reflect "contents" of neurological states. However, he is up to his neck in intentionality. IV 189 Churchland: thesis: the brain represents different aspects of reality through a position in an appropriate state space. IV 193 Thesis: what we then retain are random dimensions, depending on the taxonomy inclination of semantics. Churchland/fodor/Lepore: starts surprisingly with feelings, not with intentionality (like propositional attitudes or terms). Thesis: If we had adequate access to sensations, this could be generalized to a general mental representation. |
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| Representation | Fodor, J. | Esfeld I 137 Content of belief states / Fodor: is derived from the original representational content. (Mental representation is the origin). (Fodor and Lepore, 1992). F / L IV 127 Representation / Fodor / Lepore: their semantics is atomistic. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Content | Lewis, D. | Schw I 161 Mental Content/Lewis: Thesis: is determined by the causal role, by the typical causes and effects. content/DavidsonVsLewis: the content depends on the language we speak. (Davidson 1975) Meaning/LewisVsDavidson: what the sentences of the public language mean depends on the content of our expectations, wishes and beliefs. Schw I 171 Naturalization of Content/Representation/Schwarz: Thesis that mental representations are sentence-like to such an extent that their content can be explained compositionally. (cf. Fodor 1990). |
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| Mentalese | McGinn, C. | Schiffer I 73 McGinn (1982a, 70): the inner sentences are the basic objects of interpretation. Their content gives the idea of its content and thoughts transfer their contents to public language. fodor: ((1987), "Guru of Mentalese"): (unpublished): the strategy is to take the property of the intentional mental states as inherited from the semantic properties of mental representations that are implied in their Tokening. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Semantics | McGinn, C. | Cresswell II 159 Semantics/Levels/McGinn/Cresswell: McGinn (1982) Thesis: Semantics has several levels. Recently, this thesis has found several advocates. Cresswell: This certainly includes a distinction between object and content. Because then it is about two things: the explanation of truth conditions and the explanation of the role linguistic thinking plays in our mental life. Cresswell: thesis: the truth conditions of sentences with propositional attitude will be determined by the contents of that sentences. That's the only thing I'm interested in. content/Representation/CresswellVsfodor: I am not at all convinced that representations are involved in contents of propositional attitudes. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
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