Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Identity Theory | Newen Vs Identity Theory | Newen I 168 Nature/Essential/Kripke/Newen: E.g. original meter shows that objects (or substances) have essential and non-essential properties. E.g. Essential: that water is H2O. Therefore, the proposition is a necessary truth a posteriori. Identity Theory/Philosophy of the Mind/Newen: Thesis: mental states are identical with physical states. KripkeVsIdentity Theory: (modal argument): identity is always necessary identity. But: E.g. zombies could we similar to us, but not feel pain. I 169 If this is possible, identity is no longer a necessary identity, and therefore no identity. Identity TheoryVsVs: could argue that the necessary identity applies only to humans. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Dummett Vs Kripke, S. A. | Wolf II 361 Rigid Designators/DummettVsKripke: (Frege): in modal contexts: Descriptions: to be construed as precluding the modal operator (MO), proper names: include MO E.g. Kripke: St. Anne did not have to be mother of Mary but still St. Anne, DummettVsKripke: "St. Anne" is not a predicate, not a candidate for being an accidental property of someone BurckhardtVsDummett: false justification: "St.Anne" simply as a rigid designator - by Dummett: in essential properties it is different. Stalnaker I 173 DummettVsKripke: (M. Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language, London 1973, 232) there can be no proper name, whose whole purpose is to have an object as a reference, without sense that defines the object somehow. Stalnaker: what kind of argument could indicate that we are not only speaking no such language, but that we are not even able to do it? |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Putnam Vs Kripke, S. A. | I (a) 35 Names/Kripke/Putnam: central point: you can use a proper name to refer to a thing or a person, without having true beliefs regarding X. I (a) 36 The use of the name includes the existence of a causal chain. PutnamVsKripke: right: knowledge of a speaker does not have to set the reference in his idiolect. The use of names is common. Now you might say that terms of physical quantities are also proper names, not of things but of quantities. ---- I (g) 189 Nature/essence/Kripke: E.g. Statue: The statue and the piece of clay are two items. The fact that the piece of clay has a modal property, namely, "to be a thing that might have been spherical", is missing to the statue. VsKripke: that sounds initially odd: E.g. when I put the statue on the scale, do I measure then two items? E.g. Equally strange is it to say, a human being is not identical with the aggregation of its molecules. Intrinsic properties/Putnam: E.g. Suppose there are "intrinsic connections" of my thoughts to external objects: then there is perhaps in my brain a spacetime region with set-theoretical connections with an abstract object which includes certain external objects. Then this spacetime region will have a similar set-theoretical connections with other abstract entities that contain other external objects. Then the materialist can certainly say that my "thoughts" include certain external objects intrinsically, by identifying these thoughts with a certain abstract entity. Problem: but if this identification should be a train of reality itself, then there must be in the world essences in a sense that cannot be explained by the set theory . Nature/essential properties/PutnamVsKripke: Kripke's ontology presupposes essentialism, it cannot serve to justify him. Modal properties are not part of the materialistic establishment of the world.. But Kripke individuates objects by their modal characteristics. essential properties/Possible Worlds/Putnam: I, myself,(1975) spoke of "essential properties" but not in parallel worlds, but in other possible states of our world. Example: We can imagine another "possible world" (not parallel), in which a liquid other than water has the taste of water, but none, in which H2O is not water. This is insofar a kind of essentialism, as we have thus discovered the nature of water. We just say water should not be anything else. I (g) 192 And that was already our intention, when we did not know the composition of H2O. Nature/essence/Putnam: is in this sense, however, the product of our use of the word. It is not "built into the world". Nature/Kripke/Putnam: so it is also justified by Kripke. Putnam: both our conception of "nature" does not help the materialists. This purely semantic interpretation presupposes the reference. It cannot support the reference as an "intrinsic correlation" between thought and thing". --- I (i) 246 Truth/legitimate assertibility/Kripke Wittgenstein: that would only be a matter of general agreement. PutnamVsKripke: then this would be a wrong description of the terms that we actually have. And a self-confuting attempt to take an "absolute perspective". --- Rorty VI 129/130 Causal theory of reference: PutnamVsKripke/Rorty, self-criticism, PutnamVsPutnam: the description of the causal relationships between a something and other things is nothing more than the description of characteristics that are neither in a greater nor lesser extent in a"intrinsic" or in an "extrinsic" relationship with it. So also the feature "to be described by a human being". PutnamVsSearle: Vs distinction "intrinsic"/"relational". |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Natural Kind | Kripke, S.A. | Schiffer I 56 natural way / Kripke / Putnam: it seems reasonable to assume that the element-ness is determined in a natural way by empirically established internal structures. I 277 Not all biologists agree that natural kinds are determined by the genotype. Staln I 79 natural kind/ Kripke (1972) names for natural kinds express essential properties. Names for species are referential terms - unlike regular expressions for properties. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Essential Properties | Kripke, S.A. | Staln I 79 Essential property/Stalnaker: (only for the sake of discussion): E.g. Kripke: names for natural kinds (natural kind terms) do express essential properties. |
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