Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 16 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Artificial Intelligence | Deutsch | Brockman I 116 Artificial Intelligence/Deutsch: Misconceptions about human thinking and human origins are causing corresponding misconceptions about AGI (artificial general intelligence) and how it might be created. For example, it is generally assumed that the evolutionary pressure that produced modern humans was provided by the benefits of having an ever-greater ability to innovate. But if that were so, there would have been rapid progress as soon as thinkers existed, just as we hope will happen when we create artificial ones. >Imitation/Deutsch, >Knowledge/Popper. But instead, there were hundreds of thousands of years of near stasis. Progress happened only on timescales much longer than people’s lifetimes, so in a typical generation no one benefited from any progress. Brockman I 119 A present-day AI is not a mentally disabled AGI (artificial general intelligence), so it would not be harmed by having its mental processes directed still more narrowly to meeting some predetermined criterion. (…) all the effort that has ever increased the capabilities of AIs has gone into narrowing their range of potential “thoughts.” (E.g., Chess engines); their basic task has not changed from the outset (…). >Artificial General Intelligence/Deutsch. For general problems with programming AI: >Thinking/Deutsch, >Obedience/Deutsch. Brockman I 123 Test for Artificial General Intelligence: (…) I expect that any testing in the process of creating an AGI risks being counterproductive, even immoral, just as in the education of humans. I share Turing’s supposition that we’ll know an AGI when we see one, but this partial ability to recognize success won’t help in creating the successful program. >Artificial General Intelligence/Deutsch. Deutsch, D. “Beyond Reward and Punishment” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Deutsch I D. Deutsch Fabric of Reality, Harmondsworth 1997 German Edition: Die Physik der Welterkenntnis München 2000 Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Creationism | Gould | II 12 Creationism/Gould: since the beginning of the 1980s, there has been a revival of the pseudo-science of "creationism" in the USA, which is actually allowed to claim a precisely measured amount of time in schools. II 251 ff Creationism/Gould: the fact that creationism has recently resurrected in the discussion would suggest to outsiders that something new has been discovered. But this is not the case. Definition Creationism/Gould: creationism is the doctrine according to which the world as a whole was created. After discovering the fossils, it was said that the fossils were created together with the world, which was thought to be only a few millennia old. Creationism has the guaranteed privilege of being allowed to take up a certain quota of school lessons in the USA. The recent rise of creationism is quite simply politics as a result of the revived activities of the evangelical group. Reagan supported this. In American vernacular, "theory" means something like "imperfect fact". Thus, the creationists can argue that evolution is "only" a theory among others. This leads to a seemingly democratic gesture of "allowing" different theories to coexist. II 252 Theory/Gould: evolution is indeed a theory but it is also a fact. Facts and theories are different things, they are not levels within a hierarchy of increasing security. >Theories, >Evolution. II 253 The definitive proofs of mathematics and logic gain their ultimate certainty precisely because they do not deal with the empirical world. The evolutionists make no claim to ultimate truth, though creationists generally do that. "Fact" can only mean in the scientific field that "something is confirmed to such an extent that it would be unnatural to withhold complete consent." For example, I suppose that apples could begin to float tomorrow, but this possibility does not justify that in physics lessons this possibility is given the same amount of time. II 254 The representatives of creationism claim that their theory is "scientific" in the sense of Popper, because he tries to destroy evolution. Gould: it is precisely for this reason that "scientific creationism" is a self-contradictory teaching, precisely because it cannot be refuted. II 255 Unbeatable systems are dogmas, not sciences. The creationists have recently streamlined their argumentation: they now say: thesis: that God has created only "basic types" and that he limited deviations within the framework of evolution among these types. Thus, dwarf poodles and Great Danes come from the dog type, but humans will never come from monkeys, just as a dog cannot turn into a cat. Verifiability/verification/Gould: through scientific research, we could not bring out anything about the creative process used by the Creator. IV 81 Creationism/Gould: if Adam was endowed with a navel by God, it was because God endowed us with an orderly past: even if the earth is only a few thousand years old, the fossils give us the image of a much older earth, but only because God wants to give us this image.(1) IV 83 GouldVsGosse: problem: God lied in the creation of the fossils by simulating the impression of a much older earth. Philip Henry Gosse: thesis: all natural processes take place in an endless circle. God, as the Creator, had to break into this circle somewhere. Wherever this happened, his work had to bear the traces of previous stages of the circle. Chicken and egg are present at the same time for God's pleasure, and each with the previous traces of the other. IV 86 Gould: problem: the fossils were created only recently, including the abrasion of the teeth! The hippopotamus could not have closed its mouth without its teeth having been sharpened. IV 90 Creationism: today: creationists reject Gosse because of this. But today's theory is even more ridiculous: all fossils as remains of the flood. IV 91/92 Gosse: surprisingly, we cannot prove that Gosse was wrong, but we cannot prove that he was right either: theories that are not verifiable in principle are rejected in science. Gosse catapulted himself out of science: "There is no visible difference between prochronic and diachronic development".(2) IV 92 J. L. BorgesVsGosse: there is an "involuntary proof that a creation from nothing is absurd: Gosse indirectly proves that the universe is finite and eternal, as imagined by the Vedanta, Heraclitus, Spinoza and the atomists." (3) IV 281 Creationism/art/Gould: creationism believes that each species is endowed with a number of irreducible characteristics. Darwinism, on the other hand: has no fixed characteristics. 1. Philip Henry Gosse. Omphalos: an Attempt to Untie the Geological Knot. 1857. 2. Ibid. 3. J. L. Borges. "The Creation and P.H.Gosse". in: Other Inquisitions, 1937-1952. 1964 University of Texas Press. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Darwinism | Popper | Mayr I 87 Darwinism/PopperVsDarwinism: (Popper 1974): "no verifiable theory, but a metaphysical research program ...." this criticism was later revoked by Popper. >Darwinism, >Evolution. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Epiphenomenalism | Pauen | Pauen I 65 Epiphenomenalism/Th.h.Huxley: no gap argument (Continuity argument): since there is no gap in the sequence of physical processes consciousness can not be effective. >Consciousness, >Effect, >Causality, >Continuity, >Th. H. Huxley. I 69 Epiphenomenalism/PopperVsepiphenomenalism: theory of evolution: without effect would have the consciousness no selective advantage. >Selection, >Evolution, >Benefit. PauenVsEpiphenomenalism: E.g. If pain and experience of happiness were causally undistinguished, we could not distinguish them in memory and behavior. >Pain, >Memory, >Behavior. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Epistemology | Vollmer | I XX EE/evolutionary epistemology/Vollmer: Lorenz is the father of the evolutionary epistemology. Precursor: Donald Campbell, Popper, Lorenz - two meanings: Popper: scientific theoretical: evolution of knowledge (interactionist, VsIdentity theory) - Lorenz: Evolution of cognition. (Identity theory) I 16 Knowledge/history/quality/primary/secondary/Vollmer: with increasing progress more and more properties were recognized as subjective - with Locke impenetrability was still a primary quality - today even expansion is not regarded anymore as a primary quality. I 59 Epistemology: is not "reflection" of the outside world - but also not purely algorithmically - in contrast Information/Lorenz embodied : E.g. hoof: "image" of the steppe soil - E.g. fin - "image" of the water - VollmerVsLorenz: misleading terminology - solution : texture of the hoof indicates texture of the soil. I 73 Knowledge/Vollmer: its third level, scientific knowledge is not genetically determined - there are no "biological roots" of the space-time - we are only obliged to consistency - otherwise we are free in forming hypotheses. I 173 Epistemology/tradition/VollmerVsKant: why do we have just these forms of intuition and categories? - How are they formed? - Why are we bound to these a priori judgments and not to others? I 294 Definition recognition: (1983(1),30): an adequate reconstruction and identification of external structures in the subject - a) construct an internal image, b) compare the model with the stored engrams c) determine in how far object corresponds to already known - for that memory is required - reconstruction is therefore not a reflection - our concept of knowledge is narrower than any concept of information - Stegmüller: three-digit relation: subject recognizes object as image. I 296 Recognize/Kutschera: the step from ignorance to knowledge - knowledge/Kutschera: only to explicate as true belief - neither truth nor subjectivity is gradable. I 310 Epistemology/Vollmer: Tasks: - explication of terms - investigation of our cognitive abilities, comparing different cognitive systems - distinction of subjective and objective structures, descriptive and normative statements, factual and conventional elements - clarification of the conditions for recognition - demonstration of limits of knowledge. 1.Gerhard Vollmer: Mesokosmos und objektive Erkenntnis. In: Konrad Lorenz, Franz M. Wuketis (Hrsg.): Die evolution des Denkens. München 1983, S. 29–91. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Evolution | Deutsch | Brockman I 116 Evolution/Knowledge/Deutsch: the evolution was driven by the benefits of preserving cultural knowledge. (…) there were hundreds of thousands of years of near stasis. Progress happened only on timescales much longer than people’s lifetimes, so in a typical generation no one benefited from any progress. >Knowledge/Popper, >Artificial intelligence/Deutsch, >Culture/Deutsch, >Artificial General Intelligence/Deutsch. Deutsch, D. “Beyond Reward and Punishment” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Deutsch I D. Deutsch Fabric of Reality, Harmondsworth 1997 German Edition: Die Physik der Welterkenntnis München 2000 Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Evolution | Popper | Dennett I 522 Evolution/man/survival/experience/Popper: "Our hypotheses die in our place." - More entries for >Evolution/Popoper. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Falsification | Feyerabend | I 74 Einstein/Popper/Feigl: FeyerabendVsPopper: Popper and Feigl have tried to turn Einstein into a naïve falsificationist. In reality, Einstein puts "the reason of the matter" above the "verification by small effects". "... if no light deflection or perihelion movement were known at all, the theory would be convincing because it avoids the inertial system." I 236 Falsification/FeyerabendVsPopper: that new observations refuted old ones and thus forced the construction of a new astronomy is certainly not right for Copernicus. A process as complex as the "Copernican Revolution" is not based on a single principle. >Progress. --- II 15 Theory/Feyerabend: confirmed theories are not so much refuted by experiments as by contradictory other theories. >Confirmation, >Contradictions. II, 77ff Falsifiability/FeyerabendVsPopper: the criterion loses its meaning in a world in which ideas are firmly connected with the corresponding facts. Here, the stability of the so designated results (in a fixed framework) takes the place of their falsifiability. Cf. >Justification. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Induction | Mayr | I 78 Induction/Francis Bacon/Mayr: large rehabilitation (and actually the first introduction) of induction. For two centuries decisive. >F. Bacon. Justus von LiebigVsBacon: Liebig 1863(1) first rejection of Bacon. "Induction alone cannot produce new theories". Biology: for them, practically none of the universal laws of physics apply. This is why it was largely excluded from science philosophy. >Laws of nature, >Physics. I 80 MayrVsPopper: it is often very difficult, if not impossible, to falsify a useless theory convincingly. The categorical statement that in a single falsification the whole theory falls does not apply to evolutionary biology. >Falsification, >K. Popper, >Theories. I 219 Def Induction/Biology/Mayr: Influence of already existing tissues on the development of other tissues. By proteins. It is important for almost all organisms. 1. J. v. Liebig (1863). The natural laws of husbandry. Boston: D. Appleton and company. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Knowledge | Popper | Brockman I 115 Knowledge/Popper/Deutsch: creative criticism, interleaved with creative conjecture, is how humans learn one another’s behaviors, including language, and extract meaning from one another’s utterances.(1) Deutsch: Those are also the processes by which all new knowledge is created: They are how we innovate, make progress, and create abstract understanding for its own sake. This is human-level intelligence: thinking. Popper’s argument implies that all thinking entities - Brockman I 116 - human or not, biological or artificial - must create such knowledge in fundamentally the same way. Deutsch: (…) understanding any of those entities requires traditionally human concepts such as culture, creativity, disobedience, and morality (…). Evolution of Knowledge/Deutsch: there were hundreds of thousands of years of near stasis. Progress happened only on timescales much longer than people’s lifetimes, so in a typical generation no one benefited from any progress. >Imitation/Deutsch, >Learning/Deutsch. 1. Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 1963). Deutsch, D. “Beyond Reward and Punishment” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Method | Putnam | V 258 Method/science/method fetishism: when there is no way, how can one explain the success of science? Putnam: there are probably methods, but they must presuppose a concept of rationality. V 261f Science/method/Popper: we should allow only the hypotheses that are most easily falsified ((s) due to low probability to refute the others). PutnamVsPopper: this leads to a selection due to arbitrarily assumed predicates (excluding grue etc.)>Grue. There is still narrow rationality. It also excludes a theory of evolution. PopperVsPeirce: VsAbduction, VsBest Explanation >Best Explanation, >Abduction. ((s) A vague method leads to results that are difficult to interpret). |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Negation | Adorno | Grenz I 50 Negation/AdornoVsHegel/Grenz: Adorno separates, against Hegel, the subjective from the objective positivity of negated negation.(1) >Subjectivity/Adorno, >G.W.F. Hegel. I 50 Dialectic/double negation/PopperVsDialectic/Adorno/Grenz: Adorno agrees with Popper's dialectic criticism: the equation of the negation of the negation with the positivity is the quintessence of the identification and thus of the reification. I 50 Negation/Adorno/Grenz: The consciousness of the absence of something or of falsehood; this moment of the particular negation as the subjective for its part, cannot and must not be credited to objective logic and even to metaphysics.(2) >Objectivity. Grenz I 51 The definite negation does not alter the circumstances. It is only their consciousness. I Grenz 80 Certain negation/MarxVsHegel/Grenz: e.g. the bourgeois revolution against the feudal society: N.B.: here, certain negation as a method was lost. Feudalism is abolished in the double sense: the rule of less over many is liquidated, the social character of the society is preserved. Grenz I 83 Certain negation/AdornoVsHegel/AdornoVsMarx/Grenz: Adorno resolves the antinomy of the ambiguity of cancelling and incorporating of the practical element of history into the particular negation. >History/Adorno. Grenz I 91 Certain negation/Adorno/Grenz: New conception as immanent criticism: a) As a cancellation conceptualized inner-worldly - so it escapes the immanence critique of Hegel. I 92 b) Reveals the concept of purposive rationality as irrational.(3) Thus the necessity arises to eradicate the something-characteristic of the particular nothing history-philosophical.(4) c) This necessity is supported by the pushing trough of nature-history antagonism. Accordingly, the certain negation consists in the fact that the factual is opposed to its potentiality "which cannot suffice".(5) Grenz I 106 Certain negation/art/Adorno/Grenz: Revealing the image content of a cultural phenomenon is only possible as a certain negation of its social content, or, what is the same, as gaining the truth of its untruth. >Art/Adorno, >Works of art/Adorno, >Truth/Adorno, >Truth content/Adorno. Grenz I 113 Double Negation/Adorno/Grenz: Adorno understands the negation of negation as negative: full of content, but without something-character.(6) Grenz I 116 Negation/Adorno/Grenz: certain negation and something-character of the particular nothing are separated by the transformation of the certain negation into the physiognomical analysis and of the determined nothing into a category of experience which is based on being and is only polemically related. This is the performance of Adorno's negative dialectic, with which it brings historical and dialectical materialism to itself. >Materialism/Adorno. Grenz I 180 Negation/Adorno/Grenz: Results of physiognomic negations are artworks or hermetic texts. They thus fail as negations, inasmuch as they negatively negate the negativity of their neganda in practice, but do so without meaning, and thus undefined and diffusely. Theory: on the other hand, the theory-performed determination of beings as negative is merely theoretical, but determined. 1. Th. W. Adorno. Negative Dialektik, In: Gesammelte Schriften, Band 6: Negative Dialektik. Jargon der Eigentlichkeit. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1970.p. 159, FN 2. Ebenda. 3. Negative Dialektik, p. 8 4. Th. W. Adorno. Dialektik der Aufklärung. Philosophische Fragmente. Amsterdam 1947. p 126. 5. Th. W. Adorno. Ästhetische Theorie, In: Gesammelte Schriften 7, Rolf Tiedemann (Hg.), Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. 1970. p. 205. 6. Negative Dialektik, p. 159f |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 A X Friedemann Grenz Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen. Auflösung einiger Deutungsprobleme Frankfurt/M. 1984 |
| Philosopher King | Popper | Gaus I 311 Philosopher King/Popper/Keyt/Miller: Plato's advocacy of intellectual aristocracy and caustic criticism of democracy were vigorously attacked in Popper (1971)(1), the most provocative book published on Plato in the twentieth century. Though the intense controversy that erupted when the book was originally published in 1945 has abated, the issue is by no means dead. Monoson (2000)(2), for example, disputes the canonical view of Plato as virulent antidemocrat. The controversy turns to some extent on one's interpretation of Plato's utopianism. Is the ideally just polis in Plato's view a revolutionary goal, a guide for reform, a standard for evaluating existing constitutions, or something else entirely? A case can be made for each of these alternatives. The fact that the standard for being a true philosopher is set so high that even Socrates, by his own admission (Rep. VI.506b2-e5), fails to qualify strongly suggests that the ideal polis is not intended as an attainable ideal. Cf. >Polis, >Politics, >Plato, >Commentaries on Plato. Literature: (New books on the Republic appear regularly. Among the most notable are Cross and Woozley, 1964(3); Annas, 1981(4); White, 1979(5); and Reeve, 1988(6). Three recent collections of essays are particularly helpful: Fine, 1999(7): vol. Il; Kraut, 1997b(8); and Höffe, 1997(9).) 1. Popper, Karl Raimund (1971) The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945), 5th rev. edn. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2. Monoson, S. Sara (2000) Plato's Democratic Entanglements: Athenian Politics and the Practice of Philosophy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 3. Cross, R. C. and A. D. Wooziey (1964) Plato's Republic: A Philosophical Commentary. New York: St Martin's. 4. Annas, Julia (1981) An Intmduction to Plato's Republic. Oxford: Clarendon. 5. White, Nicholas P. (1979) A Companion to Plato's Republic. Indianapolis: Hackett. 6. Reeve, C. D. C. (1988) Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato 's Republic. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 7. Fine, Gail (1999) Plato 2: Ethics, Politics, Religion, and the Soul. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 8. Kraut, Richard, ed. (1997b) Plato's Republic: Critical Essays. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 9. Höffe, Otfried, ed. (1997) Platon Politeia. Berlin: Akademie. Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Science | Popper | Dawkins I 306 Science/Evolution/Popper/Dawkins: Popper establishes a similarity between scientific progress and genetic evolution. More entries for >Science/Popper. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Da I R. Dawkins The Selfish Gene, Oxford 1976 German Edition: Das egoistische Gen, Hamburg 1996 Da II M. St. Dawkins Through Our Eyes Only? The Search for Animal Consciousness, Oxford/New York/Heidelberg 1993 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des tierischen Bewusstseins Hamburg 1993 |
| Terminology | Dennett | Fodor IV 139 Def Interpretation Theory/Dennett: thesis: beliefs, desires, etc. are not real (ontologically), but only epistemically useful concepts. Dennett I 520 "Tower of Generation and Testing"/Evolution/Consciousness/Dennett: for a summarizing realization the price of idealization has to be paid. On higher floors we become more efficient in finding new tracks. The ground floor contains the Def Darwinian creatures: (hard wired) that fly out of the test. On the first floor: Baldwin effect: "Plasticity of the phenotype": at birth not completely like the ancestors. Second floor: Def Skinnerian creatures: try blind, reinforcement, next time the creature chooses the right one. Third floor: Def Popperian creatures: have an inner, selected environment, they act foresighted the first time, not coincidentally. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Theories | Mayr | I 359 Theory/Biology/Mayr: there are phenomena for which there are simply no theories yet. For example the orientation of the carrier pigeons. I 81 Hempel/Oppenheim: (1948)(1) deductive nomological model (D N model). Modification (John Beatty 1981)(2):"Semantic conception of the theoretical structure": a... I 81 ... theory is the definition of a system. Theories are neither permanent nor general in nature. They are compatible with a variety of solutions and evolutionary character. I 84 External factors: For example, the fact that Wallace and Darwin came to practically the same results in such different ways makes it clear that external factors are irrelevant for the formation of theory. I 93 Theory/Hypothesis/Mayr: Philosophers attach importance to this distinction. Fact/Theory/Law/Mayr: after the discovery of Pluto, a theory became a fact. The laws of thermodynamics could also be described as facts. For example, that birds have feathers is a fact and not a law. I 96 Biology/Mayr: concepts play a greater role than laws here. I 107 Theory/Mayr: often a completely new cause is postulated, although much of the old theory remains intact. I 138 Theory: one and the same theory can be far more revolutionary in some sciences than in others. For example plate tectonics. I 140 Changes in concepts can have a much greater impact than discoveries: Mendel's inheritance, Darwin's evolution, (This argument comes from Popper). I 141 Paradigm (Kuhn)/Mayr: Comparison with platonic eidos: only to replace, not to delete. Variations are just coincidences. I 146 Theory: some theories are only accepted long after they have been established. Reasons: 1. Different series of indications lead to different conclusions 2. Different ideologies: For example, many French were easy for Lamarck... 3. At one point in time, several explanations can interpret a phenomenon equally well. Long distance orientation of birds: sun, magnetic field of the earth, sense of smell, other factors. Sometimes there are several possible answers. I 149 Science: most of the questions about "what " or "how" are accessible to science. Not so the question of why. Vannevar Bush: "Science is an endless borderland". 1. C.G. Hempel, P. Oppenheim, (1948). Studies in the Logic of Explanation. In. Phil. Scie. 1, pp. 135-175. 2. J. Beatty (1995). The evolutionary contingency Thesis. In: Wolters,G. Lennox, J. (Eds.) Concepts, theories, and Rationality in the Biological Sciences. Pittsburgh,. University of Pittburgh Press. pp. 45-81. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Darwin, Ch. | Popper Vs Darwin, Ch. | Mayr I 87 PopperVsDarwinism: (Popper 1974): "no verifiable theory, but a metaphysical research program ...." this criticism was later revoked by Popper. >Darwinism, >Evolution. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Epiphenomenalism | Pauen Vs Epiphenomenalism | Pauen I 67 Property Dualistic Variants/Epiphenomenalism: recently: advantage: the renunciation of interactions is obvious from the perspective of property dualism, because this position then also becomes acceptable for physicalism and complies with multiple realizability. Multiple Realizability/Pauen: a variety of neural activity can cause one and the same mental state. (E.g. split brain: takeover by other areas). This is a problem for the identity theory and materialism. I 68 Property-Dualistic Variants/Epiphenomenalism/Pauen: E.g. we are repeatedly dealing with events in everyday life that are by far not causally effective with all their properties. It is not the sound of the ball that destroys the window pane. Explanation/Epiphenomenalism: then come only neuronal, not mental properties can be considered here. Epiphenomenalism Pauen: is, unlike the identity theory, not forced to assume that consciousness is "nothing but" electrochemical processes. I 69 VsEpiphenomenalism/Pauen: 1) The experiments by Libet are not without controversy. 2) Libet himself admits that there might still be a conscious veto even after the build-up of the potential. 3) Nothing else speaks against the act of will being identical with the neural process. It might not have an effect, but it might leave traces in the memory. 4) PopperVsEpiphenomenalism: theory of evolution: without effect the consciousness would have no selective advantage. I 70 EpiphenomenalismVsVs: certain intelligent processes can possibly only occur together with consciousness. But there is no independent evidence for this. There are also no theoretical arguments for the necessity to combine mental and neural properties. Empirically recognized relations would not indicate the necessity. However, it would be possible that certain neural activities that are de facto linked to consciousness, could also occur without consciousness. Insofar, epiphenomenalism has no argument against the evolutionary objection. VsEpiphenomenalism Pauen: 5) violates the deeply rooted intuition that mental states are causally effective. E.g. We believe that our feelings are the cause for us to speak of sensations. E.g. That beliefs are responsible for ensuring that we act according to our beliefs. VsEpiphenomenalism Pauen: the absence of consciousness remains completely inconsequential. I 71 Test/Evidence/Proof/Experiment/VsEpiphenomenalism/Pauen: it is questionable whether empirical evidence of a stable psychophysical correlation under the premises of epiphenomenalism could actually preclude the possibility of a disintegration of mental and neural processes. Test: trivially, a test can only confirm a hypothesis if it was negative as long as the hypothesis was wrong. An experiment that always yields a positive result, regardless of the accuracy of the hypothesis, cannot be a real test. E.g. normally, we would take the statement of a subject that they feel severe pain as evidence of the mental state. Under the premise of epiphenomenalism we cannot do this, though: here, the statement solely depends on neuronal processes. Now that we want to verify whether mental states are involved, it can precisely not be assumed that they (according to epiphenomenalism) usually are involved as a side effect. What would happen now if the hypothetical case occurred and the mental processes failed to take place? I 72 Since they are causally irrelevant, their absence cannot have an effect. I.e. the subject would also speak of their pain if they lacked the experience! Therefore, empirical tests are not suitable to preclude a dissociation of neural and mental states. This does not only affect the perspective of the third, but even that of the first person: the installation of memory traces is causally caused by the event; therefore, the process cannot be affected by the absence of causally irrelevant mental properties. Then I would have to believe to remember an experience that I never had. E.g. The epiphenomenalist should not even be irritated if a device indicates a state of pain that he does not feel. I 73 The reason is always the same: since mental states are causally irrelevant, their absence is, too. VsEpiphenomenalism/Pauen: with this, he jeopardizes our beliefs about the existence of mental states (which he actually does not deny). E.g. If there is no causal difference between pain and happiness, we could not distinguish them in memory and behavior either! I 109 Identity TheoryVsEpiphenomenalism/Pauen: makes the causal efficacy of mental processes without effort, because they simply are always physical processes as well. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Evolution Theory | Verschiedene Vs Evolution Theory | Vollmer I 258 VsEvolution: the theory of evolution is circular: you can only "unroll" things that are already there. VollmerVsVs: the meaning of a term is never determined by etymology, but by definition, use, context. The term does not have the meaning that the Romans gave it when they coined it. >Change of concept. I 276 VsEvolution Theory: "Every adaptation requires a recognition of that to which it is to be adapted. Then the recognition of fitting is a circle." VollmerVsVs: it is not true at all that every adjustment requires recognition. Vsevolution Theory: not predictable VollmerVsVsVs: there is no compelling reason at all to use forecasting capability as a benchmark for the science of a theory. Vollmer: The goal of science is not prognoses, but explanations! I 277 VsEvolution Theory: "It is not falsifiable". For example, if one finds life on Mars, it is explained in evolutionary theory, if none is found, its absence or disappearance is also explained in evolutionary theory. (PopperVsEvolution Theory!) (s)Vs: For example, the not-being-damaged of a fallen cup can also be explained with the help of physics.) I 278 VsEvolution Theory: from the existence of characteristics one can only conclude that they allow and possibly enable life, but not that they promote it! Therefore, one cannot necessarily accept adaptation! (Roth, 1984). Especially one cannot claim that our previous survival proves the correctness of our view of the world! I 279 VollmerVsVsVs: that there are selection-neutral and even survival-damaging characteristics makes it probably an empirical question whether functionality is present in individual cases, but does not impair the fertility of that panselection maxim. The question "What for?" is always allowed in biology, even if it does not always find an answer. I 279 VsEvolution Theory: 1. The transfer of selection theory to the development of cognitive abilities can only succeed if there is objective truth and if knowledge is more useful than error. (Simmel, 1895). 2. Moreover, cognitive fits could also come about other than through self-adaptation, for example by the environment changing and itself adapting (by chance). 3. Correct mapping of the outside world obviously does not play a role in selection! Because there are so many species with "worse knowledge": plants are not "falsified" by the eye, the primordial eye not by the eagle eye, etc. I 282 VsEvolution Theory: can success guarantee truth? Truth/Simmel: actually goes the way of equating success with probation and probation with truth. >Pragmatism. evolutionary EpistemologyVsSimmel: it does not adopt this pragmatic approach. It makes a strict distinction between truth definition and truth criterion. Truth/Vollmer: Success is neither necessary nor sufficient, but is always indicative. Fitting can be determined without any recourse to selection or evolution. I 284 But one can also proceed the other way round: one finds that the contribution of the subject to knowledge is at least partly genetically determined. (Interaction). I 285 Reference/VsEvolution Theory: (e.g. Putnam): it is not clear which reference physical terms have at all! |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Identity Theory | Popper Vs Identity Theory | Vollmer II 96 Eccles/PopperVsIdentity Theory: it is incompatible with the theory of evolution. If evolutionary advantages are realized already in the physical givenness, the "internal aspect" of consciousness, of the psychical world is no longer needed. Because if the physical structures already have this benefit, then the advantage would also exist if the structures did not have this inner aspect. (>Epiphenomenalism); more entries for >Eccles/Popper. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Popper, K. | Feyerabend Vs Popper, K. | I 74 Einstein/Popper/Feigl: FeyerabendVsPopper: Popper and Feigl have tried to make Einstein a naive falsificationist. In reality, Einstein puts "the reason of the thing" above the "verification by small effects". "... If no light deflection or perihelion were known, the theory would be convincing, because it avoids the inertial system. I 236 Falsification/FeyerabendVsPopper: that new observations disproved old ones and thus forced the establishment of a new astronomy is certainly not right for Copernicus. A process as complex as the "Copernican Revolution" cannot be traced back to a single principle. I 356 FeyerabendVsPopper: Popper considers science as a problem solution. This overlooks the fact that problems can be formulated incorrectly. II 82 PopperVsHegel: shows very laboriously that nonsensical consequences are obtained if the propositional logic is combined with Hegel. He concludes that Hegel must be eliminated. FeyerabendVsPopper: E.g. This is about as smart as calling for the theory of relativity to be eliminated, just because simple computers are no match for it. Hegel + propositional logic are nonsense. Why should precisely Hegel be blamed for this nonsense? Logic: incompatible also with the earlier quantum theory and with the differential calculus at the times of Newton... Explanation/Popper: explains "that the world of each of our theories can be explained by other worlds which are described by other theories." The doctrine of an ultimate reality collapses. II 119 FeyerabendVsPopper: but only because it does not correspond to his favorite methodology. But if it turns out that the world is finite, then we have an "ultimate reality." FeyerabendVsPopper: Vs "third world": it is populated with just as many different (and often incommensurate) entities as there are beliefs in the "Second World". Does not solve the problem of relativism, but conceals it. II 201 FeyerabendVsPopper: "mere propagandist." (His former teacher). |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Popper, K. | Mayr Vs Popper, K. | V 80 MayrVsPopper: it is often very difficult, if not impossible, to convincingly falsify an unusable theory. The categorical statement that in a single falsification the entire theory is falsified does not apply to evolutionary biology. V 363 MayrVsPopper: Confusion of terms: early: "Do not let yourself be tempted to take problems seriously that are about words and their meaning. Later he contrasts meaning and truth. He claims that research on meaning leads to nothing and that science is only about approaching the truth. (>NaessVs: Knowledge/Naess). |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Popper, K. | Putnam Vs Popper, K. | V 146 Popper/Putnam: predictions are confronted with "basis sentences" that are publicly accepted. VsPopper: one has criticized, he used a "conventionalist" language, as if the acceptance of a basic sentence would be a convention. >Protocol sentence. Putnam: in reality it is simply recognizing the fact of institutionalization. V 257/258 Method/Popper has suggested that one should accept the most falsifiable hypotheses of the alternative ones. PutnamVsPopper: but it turns out that the falsification varies, depending on which undefined predicates the language choses as a basis. Method/Science: it follows that there is still a necessity, (or the acceptance of a Bayesian "prior"), for a non-formal element that equals a Goodman-decision on the projectability. Here one may ask, how should we explain the success of science, if there is no method? It cannot be denied that science has been remarkably successful. Answer: there is probably a scientific method, but it assumes that you already have a concept of rationality. --- V 258/259 Rationality/Science/Putnam: It cannot be that a newly created method serves only to define what rationality actually is. --- V 260 Popper/Putnam: Claims, that there are rationality terms that are broader than the scientific rationality, and also valid for ethical decisions. PutnamVsPopper: it is not possible to test all theories with high falsifiability. --- V 261 Even his method involves such a thing as a previous selection. Also his calculations of falsfiability levels is not independet from what predicates that are chosen as a basis. >Method/Putnam. Popper/Putnam: could it not be that the Popperian method (as vague and non-formal as it may be) covers not only the concept of scientific rationality exhaustively but the entire concept of knowledge-based rationality? PutnamVsPopper: such a rationality view is even too narrow for science. E.g. it would exclude a theory that belongs to the most successful: the evolution. (Popper would accept this). evolution: is not high-falsifiable, and it does not imply any predictions. --- V 263 PutnamVsPopper: he even exaggerates the degree of falsifiability of theories of classical physics. >Falsification. Method/Science/Putnam: danger, to dilute the method more and more: if it says in the end: "perform experiments as carefully as possible, then conclude the best explanation, eliminate theories that can be falsified by experimenta crucis" then it can no longer be seen, what cannot be verified through such a vaguely described method. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Popper, K. | Vollmer Vs Popper, K. | II 84 VsInteractionism/VsEccles: where does the interaction take place? Eccles: in the "liaison areas" VollmerVsEccles: this is of course only a shift: where are the "liaison areas" located? How does the interaction come about? Eccles/Popper: (monism) Thesis: the self-confident mind is active in reading from the multitude of active centers at the highest level of brain activity...directing its attention to these centers and integrating its selection so that even the most fleeting experiences are brought together into one unit. The self-confident mind also works by changing the spatiotemporal pattern of neuronal processes ...the searchlight offers an analogy. A scanning device, a probe... II 85 VollmerVsEccles/VollmerVsPopper: nothing is gained by vague analogies. Nor does he make any suggestion as to how his hypotheses should be tested. What he thinks is new is the independent activity of the mind, the search for uniform interpretation. But that is exactly what we want to explain! This is reminiscent of the e.g. explanation of the telegraph principle: "It's like a dachshund: if you pinch at the back, it barks at the front". "And what about wireless telegraphy?" "Just like that, but without the dachshund." I 74 Evolutionary Epistemology/EE/Vollmer: does not describe the evolution of knowledge (like Popper) but our abilities. I 75 VollmerVsPopper: his theory of world 3 and his body soul dualism are not compatible with the evolutionary epistemology. I 278 LewontinVsPopper: a theory that does not make forecasts can be testable, and thus empirical! VollmerVsPopper: it could be shown that selection theory makes verifiable predictions! Popper has long since withdrawn his criticism of the theory of evolution! |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
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