Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Searle, J.R. | McGinn Vs Searle, J.R. | I 68 Consciousness/McGinnVsSearle: conscious states do not allow for a emergentist explanation using mereological terms. We are unable to attribute the pain to its underlying neural entities. But in contrast, it is quite possible to explain the higher level properties of liquids in this way. ((S) Because all levels are readily available to us. States of consciousness are therefore not to explored according to CALM (combinatoric atomism with lawlike mappings). We can well understand higher-level brain functions from its constituents, but if we start from the consciousness this explanation fails. Therefore, we do not have a model for a possible relation of emergence. We see no obvious causal relation. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Consciousness | Searle, J.R. | I 9 Searle Thesis: Consciousness and intentionality are intrinsic and cannot be eliminated by anything. I 28 Searle Thesis: according to neurophysiological research, the brain causes certain "mental" phenomena, such as conscious states of mind, and these are simply higher-level characteristics of the brain. Consciousness is a higher-level or emergent characteristic of the brain. Thesis: Consciousness is a mental (higher level) property of the brain in the sense that fluid is a higher level property of a system of molecules. It does not follow from the fact that something is mental that it is not physical. I 104 Searle Thesis: I will claim that consciousness is simply an ordinary biological feature of the world, but I will also try to show why we find it almost literally unimaginable that this is the case. I 125 Searle: Thesis: 1. Consciousness is not a "substance", it is a characteristic or property of the brain in the sense that fluidity is a characteristic of water. 2. Consciousness is not recognized by introspection. I 126 The introspection model requires that a distinction be made between the act of inspection and the object. 3. There is just as little a "connection" between consciousness and brain as there is a connection between being liquid of water and molecules. If a consciousness is a higher level characteristic of the brain, then there is no question of connection at all. I 126 Searle Thesis: my approach in the philosophy of mind: the biological naturalism. I 128 Thesis: Consciousness gives us much greater discernment than unconscious mechanisms. |
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