Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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Quine, W.V.O. | Fodor Vs Quine, W.V.O. | Esfeld I 62 FodorVsQuine: (and Lepore): the confirmation holism and verificationism refer to different things: Verificationism: refers to linguistic things. Confirmation holism: refers to cross-language entities like propositions. EsfeldVsFodor: However, if we assume beliefs, we can summarize both. Fodor II 114 Language/Behavior/Meaning/Quine/Fodor: but even if there were an identifiable property, how could we justify the assertion, assuming we had found it? Quine: (The Problem of Meaning in Linguistics): Test for the question of whether S is a grammatical phoneme sequence: whether the expression triggers puzzlement. FodorVsQuine: that will fail in both directions: 1) almost all expressions in everyday language are ungrammatical! 2) Almost every grammatical sentence may cause puzzlement in certain situations! Our intuitions about grammar are often not consistent with grammar as such. On the other hand, intuition in semantics is far less reliable than in grammar. Fodor/Lepore IV 54 Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: his argument is a fallacy of equivocation! ((s) Between statement and formula). (Namely: IV 52 Quine/Fodor/Lepore: Def immanence of confirmation: the thesis that, because confirmation is defined through types of entities whose connection IV 53 to a particular theory is essential, it does not have to be possible to construct such questions as if it were about whether two theories match regarding their confirmation conditions.). IV 76/77 Child/Language Acquisition/Language Learning/Quine: perhaps the child has a background (perhaps innate), E.g. about the character of his dialect? Anyway, in that case it differs from that of the linguist in that it is not a bootstrapping. Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: this is totally unjustified. His choice of a WT does not justify true belief and provides no knowledge. But then you cannot attribute any knowledge of the language to the child! Solution: Children know the language in the sense that they can speak it, therefore they have any possible true belief that the speaking may require ((s) and that is compatible with it, i.e. goes beyond that). Not even Quine believes that the epistemic situation of the child is fully characterized by the fact that the observational data are determined. Somehow, even the child generalizes. Problem: the principles of generalization, in turn, cannot have been learned. (Otherwise regress). They must be innate. Solution/Quine: similarity space. Likewise: Skinner: "intact organism" with innate dispositions to generalize in one, but not in the other direction. Hume: Association mechanisms, "intrinsic" in human nature, etc. - - - Note IV 237 13> IV 157 o Causal Theory: many philosophers consider causal relationships constitutive of semantic properties, but their examples always refer to specific intuitions about specific cases, E.g. that we need to distinguish the mental states of twins (Twin Earth?). Quine: he has, in contrast, no problem in explaining why that which causally causes consent must be the same that specifies the truth conditions. For Davidson rightly writes that, for Quine, these are the "sensory criteria" which Quine treats as evidence. And as a verificationist, Quine takes the evidence relation (evidence) as ipso facto constitutive of semantic relations. ((s): relation/relation). VsQuine: the price he has to pay for it is that he has no argument against skepticism!. IV 218 Intuitionism/Logic/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: Quine favors an ecumenical story, according to which the logical connections (connectives) signify different things, depending on whether they are used in classical or intuitionistic logic. Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: as long as there is no trans-theoretical concept of sentence identity, it is unclear how it is ever to be detected. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
Skepticism | Carnap Vs Skepticism | Stroud I 170 CarnapVsSkepticism/Sense/Meaningful/Language/Empiricism/Verification/Verificationism/Stroud: Thesis: the significance of our expressions is limited to their empirical use. This means that the use of the expressions themselves is limited by whether there is a possible sensation which is relevant for determining the truth or falsity of the sentence in which these expressions occur. Def Principle of Verification/Understanding/Meaning/Carnap/Stroud: Thesis: then we can only ever understand something or mean something with our expressions if appropriate sensations are possible for us. Skepticism/Carnap/Stroud: but that does not mean that skepticism is wrong. But: sentence: "Nobody will ever know if__." Here, the "__" would have to be filled by an expression which can only be meaningless, because it is unverifiable. Def Meaningless: neither true nor false. I 174 CarnapVsSkepticism: the question "Are there external things?" would thus be pointless. It would not be a question that you could not answer (sic), because there is no meaningful question and no meaningful response here. Important argument: but that does not mean that there are no entirely meaningful questions about the existence of external things: these are the internal questions ((s) within an area of knowledge). I 176 Truth/Sense/Meaningless/Carnap/Stroud: something that is true, cannot contradict something that is meaningless. Moore/Carnap/Stroud: verificationism shows that everything Moore says can be true, without however refuting skepticism. But there is nothing meaningful that he does not consider. VerificationismVsSkepticism/CarnapVsStroud: the skepticism is not, as Kant says, to be understood transcendentally, but it is meaningless as a whole, because unverifiable. Def External/External Questions/Existence/Carnap/Stroud: are "philosophical" questions that relate to the whole (the outer frame, i.e. that is initially not possible). Def Internal/Internal Questions/Science/Existence/Carnap/Stroud: these are questions about the existence of things that are asked within a science. E.g. the question of the existence of numbers is useful in mathematics, but not outside of it. I 177 External/Existence/Verificationism/CarnapVsSkepticism/Stroud: if skepticism allows the things outside of us to be useful at all ((s) The sentences about the things that cannot be things may be useful or useless), then he cannot describe them as unknowable. I 178 Objectivity/Verification Principle/Carnap/Stroud: this principle prevents any concept of objectivity that does not contain the possibility of empirical verification. VsSkepticism: every concept of objectivity which includes the possibility of knowledge then makes skepticism impossible. Practical/Theoretical/Verification Principle/Carnap/Stroud: the distinction theoretical/practical goes far beyond the verification principle. Stroud I 187 CarnapVsSekpticism: the traditional philosophical skepticism (external) is actually a "practical" question about the choice of linguistic framework (reference system). This does not follow from the verification principle alone. It is part of a theory of knowledge (epistemology) according to which the insignificance of the skeptical question is indicated by a non-skeptical answer to the question how it is possible that we know something. Knowledge/Carnap/Stroud: two essential components: 1. Experience, 2. linguistic frame (reference system) within which we understand the experience. Language/Carnap/Stroud: is a rule system for the formation of sentences and for their verification or rejection (ESO 208). Thus we are equipped to determine that some statements coincide with our experience and others do not. Without those statements, which are made possible for us by the acceptance of the language, we would have nothing either to confirm or to refute the experience. Skepticism: would agree so far. It also needs expressions of language for the things of the outside world. CarnapVsSkepticism: he misunderstands the relation between the linguistic context and the truths that can be expressed within it. He thinks the frame was only needed I 188 To express something that was "objectively" true or false. ((s)> Quine:> immanence theory of truth, immanent truth > Ontological relativity: truth only within a theory/system). Objectivity/CarnapVsSkepticism/Stroud: every speech on objective facts or external things is within a reference system (frame) and cannot justify our possession of this frame. ((s) which is a practical choice (convention). Theoretical Question/Philosophy/Carnap: the only theoretical question that can we ask here is that about the rules of language. I 192 CarnapVsSkepticism: misunderstands the relation between linguistic context of the expression about external objects and the truths that are expressed within this reference system. StroudVsCarnap: but what exactly is his own non-skeptical approach to this relation?. 1) to what system belongs Carnap's thesis that existence claims are neither true nor false in the thing language?. 2) what does the thesis then express at all?. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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Immanence | Quine, W.V.O. | Field II 192 Referential indeterminacy / theory / Quine / Field: Quine thesis: the vagueness shows that scientific terms are "meaningless (and denotationslos) outside their own theory" (inter-theoretically meaningless). This thesis is based on the II 193 Immanence of truth / Quine (Quine 1984 b, 304, 1960 § 6) truth is always only relative to a conceptual scheme. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |