Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| McDowell, J. | Wright Vs McDowell, J. | I 260 Def "Platonic Scylla" 1. Some justification must be found for something that, completely independent of human abilities, determines the real direction that a rule follows, 2. It must be explained how we are supposed to be in any cognitive connection with this "real direction" at all. This is the corresponding Def "rule-skeptical Charybdis": the view, according to which there are no objective requirements at all, which are produced by rules, but exclusively natural unrestricted human abilities. Thus no "general real objectivity". Solution/McDowell/Wright: the "fully satisfying intermediate position": insight that the only thing that is wrong with the Scylla is that objectivity must be assessed from an external perspective. Rules exist only within a practice that is maintained by the fact that the participants agree. I 261 Moral/Ethics/McDowellVsNon-Cognitivism: assumes an impure construction of ethical facts and objectivity (Scylla). As if the moral facts were "there" independently of the evaluative point of view. Fact/Wright: but also the appreciation of any fact requires a point of view! Realism/Anti-Realism/Wright: in this debate the realist represents the side of the Scylla, the anti-realist the side of the Charybdis. I 262 This debate is now being undermined by the "fully satisfying intermediate position". There has never been a debate, only a misunderstanding of what the interaction of our mind with an objective content requires. (In McDowell only implicitly). WrightVsMcDowell: this is not convincing at all: if the debate is to be undermined, the opponents must remain clearly tied to the horns. Realism must therefore always include supereobjectivation and the anti-realism must always be presented as an escape from it. But there is no solution in this way. For example, the question of whether cognitive coercion applies a priori has no essential connection to a hyperobjective concept of facts, and therefore no obligation to an external point of view. I 263 McDowellVsWright: one could reply that any distinction under the aegis of cognitive coercion would be our decision. Therefore, it would be a mistake to assume that opposites of objectivity could be "there" in a more solid way than, say, the requirements of addition. I 264 McDowell's Wittgenstein: wants to open escape routes from the debate. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
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