Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Habermas, J. | Luhmann Vs Habermas, J. | Reese-Schäfer II 109 Ethics/Habermas: Cognitive ethics, with the dimension right/wrong. LuhmannVs. Reese-Schäfer II 112 LuhmannVsHabermas: "political moralist" (in Luhmann's eyes sharp criticism.) Ethics should rather ask whether morality can be regarded as good without circumstance. It should not pursue morality itself, but perform translation in both directions. Reese-Schäfer II 140 LuhmannVsHabermas: studies on marital conflicts show that these conflicts cannot be solved colloquially, because the colloquial language provides positive and negative expressions. There is no law that communication leads to consensus. One should therefore understand and analyse discussions themselves as systems. Discussions in particular offer little chance of bringing in one's own subjectivity. The language symbols like God, reform, justice, love, truth, democracy etc. are moralized in the discussions. This limits the possibility of connecting. This means that those who use counterarguments must defend themselves. Reese-Schäfer II 141 LuhmannVsHabermas: there is no logical hierarchy of reasons. Therefore there is no hope for an end to the discussion. At some point it just stops. There must be social, not logical or semantic rules for its termination. Cass 8 VsHabermas: Problem: the term should actually be the same on both sides, because why do we speak of rationality when both are rationality? What is the common component? HabermasVsLuhmann: in Luhmann only the system has rationality but the system is not everything! LuhmannVsHabermas: but that applies also to Habermas' "communication rationality", because if one communicated, there are also still things, over which one did not communicate yet and humans, with whom one did not communicate yet and the conditions change faster than the readiness to communicate again. So the realm of the afterlife plays a role in every model. But the system rationality is better equipped to deal with it. For Habermas, by the way, this afterlife is not the lifeworld. Cass 11 System/Society/Individual/Luhmann: the system is not an object, but a difference (S/U). For example, for the body the consciousness operations belong to the environment! ((s) No border crossing). Luhmann: that is not so frightening at all: for example, I myself feel more comfortable in the "environment" of my society than I would feel "in the society", where others think my thoughts or cause my chemical reactions. LuhmannVsHabermas: systems theory therefore allows us to think of a radical individualism that would not be possible if we were to adopt the humanist standpoint of the human as part of society. HabermasVsLuhmann: radical individualism is not aspired to at all. Society/LuhmannVsHabermas: it would be a mistake to claim that society must run towards a "human goal"! LuhmannVsHabermas: Understanding is already contained in communication - otherwise one needs the receiver, a disciplining instance. If one leaves understanding in communication, one gets a theory relieved of norms and rationality demands. Cass 13 Communication: Tradition like Habermas: Searching for consensus. Luhmann: what do you do when the consensus is reached, then there is no more communication? Habermas: there are enough conflicts. Luhmann: what is then the demand for consensus supposed to do? Then we turn an impossibility into a norm! The result of communication must already be open! Why do we have the "No" in the language? |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 |
| Luhmann, N. | Verschiedene Vs Luhmann, N. | II 48 System/closed/open: in system theory the comparison of closed and open systems is generally valid - with a certain preference for openness. Self-organisation/autopoiesis/openness: "Closedness of the self-referential mode of operation is rather a form of extension of possible environmental contact. VsLuhmann: here one could speak of two levels of description. Critics accuse Luhmann of blurriness here. II 119 SchäferVsLuhmann: morality has more to do with observance of norms than with respect, regardless of religious or other values. HabermasVsLuhmann: Vs Functionalization of the Concept of Truth. Even system theory itself cannot claim any particular validity for its statements. It is only one kind of action among others. Theory is action. But this can only be said again if one ultimately adopts a theoretical point of view outside of practice. II 142 SchäferVsLuhmann: this problem will be solved later by the not quite clean logically "re-entry". Kass.8 VsLuhmann: one always hears that this is terribly abstract. I did not want to deny abstractness either. VsLuhmann: his whole theory could never be proved empirically! VsLuhmann: it is logically inadmissible to handle paradoxes in this way. LuhmannVsVs: brings in the concept of "supervacuus": "superfluous" (actually "over-empty"). Question: if you cannot show with the terms how other things are connected and how not. If you start like this, then you cannot connect any more. The power of such a theory lies in inserting probes into an established theory to see if areas can be better covered. VsLuhmann: if you take the whole thing seriously, the system should also contain its own negation. Otherwise it is not perfectly autonomous. LuhmannVsVs: here I have to resort to my note box (with tens of thousands of notes): one note says that all other notes are wrong! Kass.11 Renate MeinsVsLuhmann: System Theory without action is like a lady without a lower abdomen. LuhmannVsMeins: in reality it is much worse, she has no body at all, it is not part of the social system. Meins: So what are you actually talking about? Luhmann: one only wants to dismiss the concept of action out of this gluing function between individual and society. AU Kass 5 Def Structures/Luhmann: are therefore expectations with regard to the connectivity of operations, be it of mere experience, be it of action and not in a sense that must be meant subjectively. VsLuhmann: a critique of this concept of expectation amounts to subjectivation. Subject/Object/System/Luhmann: for a theory that defines the structural concept of expectations, the subject/object distinction is insignificant at all. Johannes BergerVsLuhmann: expectation is subjective, and therefore useless for the more objective sociology. Luhmann: you will certainly also have experienced that one can statistically examine structures as objective facts. Without considering the thoughts of individual persons. Luhmann: but I try to get out of this System/Object distinction and replace it with the concept of the operation that a system actually performs when it performs it or the observation of this operation by the system or an external observer. Then expectation is no longer subjective, but it is only the question: how do structures reduce complexity? |
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| Structuralism | Luhmann Vs Structuralism | Kass. 14 Structure/System Theory/Luhmann: the strictly operative system theory changes the concept of structure again: systems consist of operations and only as long as these operations can be repeated. Structures are only real if they are used. They are not "ideas" above the world. Reality/Luhmann: are only the operations themselves! The question is then, how one operation comes to the next, and there lies the function of structures. How does an operation find a suitable next one, or how does it generate itself in a starting position. Whereby one has already passed, the other is only the future. However, the reality of the structure is not a "long-term mode". But the reality of the structure corresponds to being "quoted": being used. If they are used, they exist. Kass.14 Structure/Process/System Theory/Luhmann: this has the consequence that one takes the system theory out of the division of structure/process. |
Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Tradition | Ryle Vs Tradition | Lanz I 275 Ryle: psychological statements are hypothetical statements. They are also verifiable from the perspective of the third person. It is not about causes, but about criteria and standards for skills and achievements. I 276 They denote behavioral dispositions and non-internal events that would be the causes of behavior. Intelligence/Tradition: intelligent action: rule or method knowledge, so to know a set of positions. That is, intelligent action would be action with an intelligent cause. (RyleVs). Intelligence/Ryle: there are many examples of intelligent action without consideration: E.g. quick-witted replies, spontaneously correct deciding (fast chess) practically clever behavior in games, in sports and others. I 277 RyleVsTradition: Regress: if intelligent action was the application of intelligence, then this application would again be an action for which intelligence would be necessary, ad infinitum. Definition Intelligence/Ryle: action with a certain level, with a certain quality. The actor possesses corresponding ability and uses them. Ryle I 373 Memory/Presentation/RyleVs trace theory: their followers should try to imagine the case in which someone has a melody stuck in his head. Is this a reactivated trace of auditory sensation, or a series of reactivated traces of a series of auditory sensations? Ryle I 66 Mental state/mind/RyleVsTradition/Ryle: even if there were the mythical inner states and activities assumed by some, one could not draw any likelihoods of their occurrence among others. --- I 84 VsVolition/VsActs of will/act of will/Ryle: both voluntary and involuntary acts of will are absurd. If my act of will is voluntary in the sense of theory, another act of will must have preceded it, ad infinitum (regress) It has been proposed for the avoidance that the act of will can be neither described as voluntary nor as involuntary. "Act of will" is a term that cannot accept predicates such as "virtuous", "vicious", "good" or "wicked," which may embarrass those moralists who use the acts of will as the emergency anchor of their systems. I 85 In short: the theory of acts of will is a causal hypothesis, and the question of voluntariness is a question of the cause. I 86 RyleVsTradition: some well-known and truly occurring events are often confused with acts of will: people are often in doubt what to do. The final choice is sometimes referred to as an act of will. But equality is untenable, for most voluntary actions do not come from a state of indifference! Weakness of will/akrasia/Ryle: it is also known that someone can decide, but the action is not carried out becacuse of weakness of will. Or he does not carry it out because of new circumstances. RyleVsTradition: Problem: According to the theory of acts of will, it would be impossible for them to sometimes not lead to results. Otherwise all new executed operations would have to be postulated which explains that voluntary actions are sometimes actually carried out. If a choice was called voluntary, it must have been preceeded by another choice, ad infinitum. Ryle I 87 If the action is not carried out, according to the theory (tradition) there is also no act of will. Ryle I 182 Introspection/Attention/RyleVsTradition: In the case of an inspection, one would have to ask again whether it is attentive or inattentive. (Regress) Vs: That also pretends that there is a difference in having an irritation of the throat and the statement that one has it. Not only is attention far from being a kind of inspection or listening, but inspecting and listening are themselves specific ways of exercising attention. Whether metaphorically or literally, a viewer can always be attentive or inattentive. To do something with attention is not to link an activity with a bit of theorizing, exploring, inspecting, or knowing. Otherwise, any action done with attention would involve an infinite number of activities. VsIntellectualist tradition: as if the exercise of theory is the essential function of mind and contemplation the essence of this activity. Ryle I 215 Consciousness/Tradition/Ryle: According to the traditional theory, soul processes are not aware in the sense that we can report about them later, but that the opening up of their own incident is a feature of these incidents and cannot come after them. I 216 Tradition/Ryle: these alleged revelations would be expressed in the present and not in the past, if they were dressed in words at all. At the same time as I discover that my watch stands still, I also discover that I discover it. RyleVsTradition: this is a myth! 1. We usually know what we are doing. No "phosphorescence" theory is necessary. 2. That we know it does not imply that we are constantly thinking about it. 3. It does not imply that when we know something about ourselves, we encounter some ghostly phenomena. RyleVsTradition: The basic objection against the traditional theory which claims that the mind must know what it does because mental events are consciously or metaphorically "self-luminous" is that there are no such events. I 217 There are no events that take place in a world of any other kind. Consequently, there is also no need for such methods to make the acquaintance of inhabitants of such a world. RyleVsTradition/RyleVsTradition/Ryle: No one would ever want to say that he had gained some knowledge "out of his consciousness". It is a grammatical and logical abuse of the word "knowing" that the consciousness of my mental states is that I know them. It is nonsense to say that someone knows this thunderstorm, this colored surface or this act of concluding. This is just the wrong accusative for the verb "to know". The metaphor of light does not help here. Ryle I 388 Intellect/mind/use of symbols/Ryle: in practice, we do not regard every expression as an intellectual, but only the one understood as work. Border problems do not pose a problem for us. Some problem solving is intellectual, searching for the thimble is not, bridge is in the middle. Thinking/mind/intellect/RyleVsTradition/Ryle: for us, this is important: it means that both theories are wrong, the old with the special, occult organ, and the newer ones, which speak of particular intellectual processes such as judgments, conceptual perception, assumption, thinking through, etc. They pretend to have identification signs for things they cannot always identify in reality. Ryle I 391 Theory/Theories/Ryle: Nothing would be gained with the assertion that Einstein, Thucydides, Newton, and Columbus were concerned with the same activity. Sherlock Holmes's theories have not been constructed by the same means as those of Karl Marx. Both agreed, however, that they wrote theories in didactic prose. Theory/Tradition: To have a theory means to have learned one and not to forget it. To be at the place of destination. It does not mean doing something yourself. Theory/RyleVsTradition: Having a pen is to be able to write with it. Having a theory or a plan means being ready to communicate or apply it when the opportunity arises. Difference: the intelligent listener then acquires a theory, if he is wise, has understood it, he does not have to accept it at all. But we do not set up a theory primarily to be able to put it into words. Columbus did not go on journeys to increase the material for geographic studies. Definition having a theory/Ryle: is the ability to solve additional tasks. To be a Newton follower would not only mean saying what Newton had said, but also to do the same and say what he had said. --- Flor I 263 Can, to be able to/RyleVsTradition: "Legend": that an action can only be carried out intelligently if it is based on or accompanies a theoretical, intellectual performance. (Dualistic). Division in private, theoretical part of the activity and a practical, public. Can, to be able to: (know-how): cannot be determined by theoretical insight! (Knowing that this or that applies). Theoretical insight is itself a form of practice and cannot itself be intelligent or not intelligent! It is not plausible that any action, in which intelligence or its deficiency can be demonstrated, should include the consideration of theoretical statements, norms, or rules. There are also many actions for which there are no formulated rules or criteria for intelligent executio Flor I 264 Regress/Ryle: according to the dualistic notion, an intelligent action presupposes that there has been a theoretical consideration of statements, norms, or rules by which the activity is then carried out. This consideration, however, is itself an action that can be more or less intelligent. This leads to regress. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Various Authors | Luhmann Vs Various Authors | Habermas I 436 VsParsons: simply reproduces the classical model through systems. (Social system = action system). Luhmann instead: human as part of the environment of society. This changes the premises of all questions. Methodical anti-humanism. Habermas I 440 LuhmannVsHumanism: "Cardinal Error". A fusion of social and material dimensions. Reese-Schäfer II 28 LuhmannVsDualism: of observer and object. Universality/Vs: the total view, the universality had to be given up and was replaced by "critique", with which the subject's point of view on universality is rounded up again". Foundation/Luhmann: there is no last stop. (Like Quine, Sellars, Rorty). Reese-Schäfer II 42 VsMarx: rejects the speech of "social contradictions": it is simply about a conflict of interests. Competition is not a contradiction either: two people can certainly aspire to the same good. Contradiction/Luhmann: arises only from the self-reference of sense. Not as in Marx. Contradictions/Legal System: does not serve for the avoidance, but for the regulation of conflicts. Reese-Schäfer II 78 Freedom of Value: (Max Weber): the renunciation of valuations is, so to speak, the blind spot of a second level observation. Reese-Schäfer II 89 Vs Right Politics: here there is no theory at all that would be able to read other theories. There is only apercus or certain literary guiding ideas. Reese-Schäfer II 90/91 VsGehlen: we do not have to subordinate ourselves to the institutions. Reese-Schäfer II 102 VsAction Theory: a very vague concept of individuals that can only be defined by pointing at people. Thus language habits are presented as language knowledge: because language requires us to employ subjects. LL. Language. Reese-Schäfer II 103 Reason/VsAdorno: one should not resign oneself (dialectic of the Enlightenment) but ask whether it does not get better without reason! Reese-Schäfer II 112 Overstimulation/LuhmannVsTradition: cannot take place at all. For already the neurophysiological apparatus drastically shields the consciousness. The operative medium sense does the rest. Reese-Schäfer II 138 Human/Gehlen: tried to determine the human from its difference to the animal. (LuhmannVs). AU Cass. 3 VsParsons: Terminology limited by structural functionalism: one could not ask about the function of structures, or examine terms such as inventory or inventory prerequisite, variable or the whole methodological area. Limitation by the fact that a certain object was assumed as given. There were no criteria for the existence of the object - instead the theory must be able to contain all deviance and dysfunction. (not possible with Parsons) - Question: in which time period and which bandwidths is a system identifiable? (e.g. Revolution: is society still the same society afterwards?) Inventory criteria Biology: Definition by death. The living reproduces itself by its own means. Self-reference (important in modern system theory) is not possible within the framework of the Parsons' model. Therefore we need interdisciplinary solutions. VsAction Theory: the concept of action is not suitable because an actor is assumed! But it also exists without an observer! In principle, an action can be presented as a solitary thing without social resonance! - Paradox/Luhmann: the procedure of the dissolution of the paradox is logically objectionable, but is constantly applied by the logicians themselves: they use a change of levels. The only question that must not be asked is: what is the unity of the difference of planes? (AU Cass. 4) VsEquilibrium Theories: questionable today; 1. from the point of view of natural science: it is precisely the imbalances which are stable, equilibrium is rather metaphor. (AU Cass. 6) Tradition: "Transmission of patterns from generation to generation". Stored value patterns that are offered again and again and adopted by the offspring. However, these patterns are still the same. VsTradition: Question: Where does identity come from in the first place? How could one talk about selfhood without an external observer? That will not be much different either with the assumptions of a reciprocal relationship with learning. Luhmann: instead: (Autopoiesis): Socialization is always self-socialization. AU Cass 6 Information/Luhmann: the term must now be adapted to it! In the 70s one spoke of "genetic information", treated structures as informative, the genetic code contained information. Luhmann: this is wrong, because genes only contain structures and no events! The semantic side of the term remained unexplained for a long time, i.e. the question of what information can choose from. Reese-Schäfer II 76 LuhmannVsMarx/Reese-Schäfer: rejects the talk of "social contradictions": it is simply about a conflict of interests. Competition is not a contradiction either: two people can certainly strive for the same good. AU Cass 11 Emergence/Reductionism/System Theory/Luhmann: this does not even pose the actual question: what actually distinguishes an emergent system? What is the characteristic for the distinction from the basal state? What is the criterion that enables emergence? Will Martens: (Issue 4, Kölner Zeitschrift f. Sozialforschung): Autopoiesis of social systems. It deals with the question following the concept of autopoiesis and communication. Communication/Luhmann: Tripartite structure: Information, Communication, Understanding (not action sequences). (Comes from linguistics, but also antiquity!). Martens: this tripartite division is the psychological foundation of communication. Communication must first be negotiated in the individual head, I must see what I assume to be unknown and what I want to choose, and my body must also be in good shape. Marten's thesis: sociality only comes about in the synthesis of these three components. Social things arise when information, communication and understanding are created as a unit with repercussions on the participating mental systems, which must behave accordingly. The unity is only the synthesis itself, while the elements still have to be described psychologically or biologically etc. Without this foundation it does not work. LuhmannVsMartens: I hope you fall for it! At first that sounds very plausible. But now comes the question: What is communicated in the text by Martens? Certainly not the blood circulation! There is also no blood in the text! The editors would already fight this off, there is also no state of consciousness in the text! So I cannot imagine what the author was thinking! I can well imagine that he was supplied with blood and sat in front of the computer. And that he wanted to take part in the discussion. Luhmann: these are all constructions which are suggested in communication, but which are not actually present in communication. (>Interpenetration). Communication/LuhmannVsMartens: Question: what is actually claimed in the text, and does it not actually refute it itself? Paradox: the text that tells of blood and thoughts claims to bring blood and thoughts, but it only brings letters and what a skilled reader can make of the text. That is communication. That is all I can actually see! Communication/Luhmann: if you think realistically and operatively, you cannot see more in the text. We have to put the words together from the letters ourselves. When psychic systems respond to communication, they change their internal states accordingly. Communication/Luhmann: if one has received this message (from Martens), one can say: everything is actually correct, one could describe a communication completely on the basis of physical or psychological facts. Nothing would be missing, with the exception of autopoiesis itself. Question: we have to explain how communication maintains itself without incorporating psychological and physical operations! Luhmann: this reproduction of communication through communication goes only through total exclusion from physical, psychological, etc. operations. |
Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 |
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